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Subjected Emotion Geueral Subjects SectionAGeneral Subjeota SeotionASubJeote Seotion eneral Subject Section
ACADEMIA DEPARTMENTACADEMIO DBPARl1IEN ACADEMIC DBPAR.l1IEN CADEMIO DBPA.R'.l'1IEN CADEMIC DEPARTMENT . '. ' DEPARTME! THE INFANTRY SCHOOSCHONT INFAUTRY SCHOOL ' * *' ' ' ' . OL'bf'3et ingo OLF6rt3etsningf G&orgia. L"F6rt3e'tsningf Georgia. OLbf3et bingo bt1rBflt2n1rJ.g GorgiaAbt1r'Bflt2n1rJ.g G&orgia.A"F6rt3e'tsningf GeorgiaAbt1rBflt2n1rJg &

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F6rt3etsningf, Gorgia ?'bf'3et bf3et Geo-

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rgia amatory1947

ADVANCED mFANTRY DVANCED INFANTRY OFFICERS

COURSE

19481948

' THE OPERATIONS OF THE 3RD BATTALION , 394TH INFANTRY INFANTRYINFANTRYFAN'TRINFANTRFANTRGANTRY FAN'TRY FANTRY HE Y(99TH INFANTRY DIVISION ) IN THE GERMAN ARDENNES ( (99TH Y99TH ARDENNEm 99TH '' DECE1,3ER SCOUNTEROFFENSIVE SCOUN'l'EROFFEl SKIVE COUNTER-OFFENSIVE SCOUNlEROFFEl SIVE DECE13ER DECEMBm 1 JANUARY 1945 194COUN'l'ER-OFFEl 16 DECEMBER

( 5Personal Experience Personal

he OFFENSIVE COUNTER , COUN'l'ER COUNlER

Coulter OFFEl Offal

Of of a Battalion Executive Officer

ricer )

or opera.tion Type of operation

.

desoribed. desoribed described.:

BATTALION

m IN

DEFENSE DEFENSDefe-

nse ntry

. EMajor George A Clayton. InfantryADA. Major ADVANCED INFANTRY OFFICERS ClASS NO VANCED

, , Infa. . A Clayton Infantry

I..

f , 4
4f If

s I

sTITT-

TABLE C0NTENTS C0N'TENTS CONTENTS ABLE ) OF CONTENTS'

--4.. --4 4.
4.

EIndeX.. , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .- . 1nd x. . IndeX. IndeX nd enda .

.

. x

PAGE PAGAg-

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1
11.

Bibliogra.phy. Bibliogra.phy. . Bibliography * Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. .. . . . $ $.,. ? .,. . A, . .*..ft 1t-.1'C-'C. ..It..-... 4j. R * < *' * a * e v* * . . * *' v * . " & " * * , * ft 1t.1CC :It *
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.... . ............. .. ...... . . h.Introduction. * * * * . . . . . . t . . . . * * * * . . * . . * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * . * * * * * * . * Introduction. Introduction. . . .

o *

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The General

,, , , , , ,, , , Situation.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Situation ,
. Situation.. . . . . . . . Situation* * * * * * * * . . . . . . . . . . * . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
v

7
77-

The Regimental
roman The r rman German

1111 1313 2525 292329 23

, ,, , , Attaok.* * , , * Attack. *,* Attaok * * Attack. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ., . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Analysis and Criticism. * * * * . * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * . . * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * Critioism.. Critioism Oritioism* . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Criticism Briticism

I ssons.* * * Lessons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1esons ssons *

sons
-

Ma.p . Map A

The General

SituationSituation Situati-

on

1 p Map B

Info ntry The 394th Infantry Situation at the Bullingen-Losheinergraben BullingenLosheimergrabenBullingenLoshetmergrabenBullingen-Losheimergraben Bullingen-Loshetmergraben BullingenLosheinergrabenInf entry 16 Deoember 1944 and Elsenborn 20 Deoember - 1 Januarynd December January December Area Janua-

Eleanor

Bullingen Bulling
Buckshot Buckholz

Losheimergraben Loshetmergraben Losheinergraben

ry

Ma.p . Map C

The 3rd Battalion , 394th DeCeIl1ber 19416 December 1944

F. Infantry Situation at P , F

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.- tens1T8Dark December - Account or the' Germane'* Ardennes Counter-Offensive eDeoember Germans' Aooount of the' Germans' Ardennee Counter.-Offens e Counter - tens1T8 CounterOffensive- FGermane iv Counteroffensi- -- - - " 1y44 Deoemoer-1-gQ---------------ve Deoemoer1gQ-- - - - - - - --- - Deoemoer1gDecember"1944 December1944ueoemoer ein December"1944in December1944 Eocene : Robert B. Merriam, - Chief of " Ardennes Section ot Hist'orioal Divi ' ' ' t1oal Div H1 t" By ob'ert E . Merrianf -C1i1er or"Ardetm s Seotion of Historioal DiviQu Merrie.in Divi. Merrie.inC1i1er of Meridian MerrieinC1i1er u. obert E, Merriein C1i1er orArdetm Emotion Divi Hiatorioal n1' Historical n1 B Merriaia E Meriden Asian s scion , European Theater of Operations Operationsot Oparaticn sion sian Operatic ion .

! Hobart Hobert
'

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2 . S US A 3 XI rA4 Aotion A Action Aftor After 4 Abortion ntry tor A 5 A 6 esInfantry "A sA A Infantry A 7 eS A S 8 A 9 Paragraph 44A-. 4A 4f4ft

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A-2 First U.S. Army . . U. S. A2 US US 4ft. A 4A.

- 7 A3 V 4

AA3 t.A3 tA3 A-3 A.3

ETON ( . Corps , U. S. Army , Operations in the ETO (9 Jan 1942 U.S. U . veXEC "The German Counter-Offensive" " ve"EEC The Gunman CounterOffensive"XIX " ve Chapter Gennan CounterOffensiveCounter-ortens i ve"
:

A-4

' , Infa.ntryAf't - otion Report , 394th Infantry Regiment , 99th US. Infantry . lotion Aft Aftor-Action Aftor-Aotion U.S. Infa.ntry US. Infantry, tore December 1944 and January 1945 Deoember Janua.ry 194Division for
.

' 1
, BIBJJ gI3I BIB
.

PBY RIBIjtQGRAjPHRIBIjtQGRAjPHg IBIjtQGRAjPHg . PBBIBJ.J BY

:

. . ..

Decomposer -- Deoemoer
. .
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fief iief rarest

.

Offensive Counter. Counter . Offends Offens Div t '

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Report of Operations

1
"

( Au 1944 (1 Aug

22 Feb 1945) , 1945)

portends Offensive" Offensive Counter ortens Counter

< (

1945)-) 9 May 1945) 19451945

Infa.

5A5 A-5

. Knowledge or f/c , Lombard Executive orrioer Co 394th Personal Kncywledge of I/fc . Lombardo , Exeoutive Officer , Co. I , 394thIk sorrier Lt. Lt , 1 Infa.ntry j Infantry Regiment
.

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A-6 A6

Foroes Forces Fighting Forgoes , April

" 1945 , "German Offensive German

Ardennes"ArdennesArdenneArdennes" Ardennin the Ardennes"

A- ? A-7 A7
A-S A-8 AS A8

Infantry Journal ,
&

May 1945

Bulge"BulgeBulge Bulg, " "Battle in the Bulge"" Battle 1945

Army

Nave { Na.v . Nav Navy

. Navajo Navy Na.V"J NaVJ
"

Journal ,

24

February

. , U.S. First U. S. US US.

1944 194-

Army Arm-

yA9 A-9

Manfully Army * AnflY &

A ' Army Jourl'ltl1 Jourlltl1 Journal , 3 May 1945 , U.S. Third AArm1945.. US 1945 . .

10 A

yA10 Captured Enemy Document Dooument A-10 A10

16 December Deoember

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' il COUNTER-oFFENSIVE COUNTER-OFFEWSIV3t, 4.DECEMBER OFFEWSIV3t 16 DECE oFFENSIVE COUNTER 18 DEE ( 5Personal Per8oD&1lxper1euae
.

THE OPERATIONS OF THE 3RD BATTALION INFANTRYINFANTRY 394TH INFAHTRY INFANTR,. IIJI um.'I'U. umI ' III GERWARPRI umIU '" '\ a ! 9lYltB ' I' (99T.H. "I\\ ''I! A'DY\'ft" (99T.H. JI ANT'U. J.' rTn T (99TH. IN ':A..1I..n. -BmBKsr mI \'- !' ( 9lYl'tB . ' um.'I' ' U J Tn . "I'I ANDY Y99TH INFAMY . ,"D r' ' rT.n T..\ ." ) .:JI.' .- .T3B. G'ERW..ARPRI "I I A'DY ! : ... .. ., 99TH. INFAMYBmBKsr a ''IIJI' cB6nM ElIU.J1U1 1I ' . RrariDB8 99TH J.I. JiANTx-'U. BmBKsr JI .T3B cB6nM.. . .E'l.IU'-.J1U1 ilJ. GRAPERIES ilJ ' I 1JJ
. '
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Infamy
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& Per8oD1lxper1euae 5Per8oD1lxper1euae of a Battalion Executive dottier ) Personal Experience ot Exeoutive Officer ottioer
_

ADY " II .E'l.IU' 'ft" I ] .J1U1 J1U1 ElIU ElI January 194JDT RY 19451 JAlUARY 1945 DT
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IntroduI
I-

INTRODUCTION ION INTRODUCTIINTRODUCE INTRODUCT IOINTRMUCT INTERMIT In.

siders ctions

n " ON"Soldiers of the West ONSoldiers N"Soldiers NSoldiers "Soldiers Soldiers

. Front. * Front

mata

attacking armies are advancing

dentity need ' dontt don't dont
*

. you. stake.to say more to you You all feel it , everything is at stake.. 1s tee1 staon't stake You bear in yourselves a holy duty to give everything and to achieve thethe Hke (l "Our Fatherland and our Fuhrer11" - von Rundstedtt esperus superhuman for " 1TFuehrer Fuhrer" Our Fatherla.nd a11d Fuhrer Rundstedt. Rundstedt. (1) Undusted (1)-) Dec 1944 This order taken from a German soldier about 1000 hours 16 Deo 1944his
*
.

stoAnglo-w\merioans. . AngloA.merioans. Anglo- \ .merioans. today against the Anglo-Americana , I Anglo-American Anglo- A Amerioans Americans Americana merioans. Merion
Your

great hour has struok* Strong struck.. strongstruok. Strongstruck Sto-

w
.

Anglo

DII-

Deco

in the vicinity of Losheimergraben , vioinity Infantry ,

gave the

394th. Belgium by a member of Co * L , 394th ot Co. Co

first

'the indioation of 'the vastness indication

and

stethe intent of the-

ersman counter-offensive German oounter-offensive

offensive in the oounter counter

dio- dic- Deoember ditArdennes area in December 1944 and diodido dice dicdio dic

tatted stated tatod tated the role toed

' In1antry Infantry that the 3rd Battalion , 394th In1'antry

would

play in att- at at-

at

MeAnglo Anglo-Ameri- AngloAmeri- Angl eriKeri Anglo-Ameritempting seotor empting to aid in the defense of the central sector of the Anglo-Ameri eriAmerica

opera- operafront.. In order to thoroughly understand the sequence of the opera front theneoessary tetions of this Battalion , it is necessary to review the situation on the ions 1944- * Western Front in the tall and early winter of 1944.. 1944 fall
can oan
Doan rion

eri Anglo Ameri

eter

.Contrary to the opinion of the masses , the Contrary

German

heathe attack in the-

abortion apparentlyArdennes sector was not a spur of the moment action but was apparently aotion dedness

ently
evaded vaded

oonceived conceived subsequent

to July

1944

after the Allies had

apparsuccessfully in sucoessfully in-inin

acr-

Normandyand expanded the toehold on the European continent on the Normandy oontinent Norm-

beaohes. beaches. . beaohes. beaches. andy beaohes beaches

Most

or plaimingplanningpaining aotual plaiming paintiplannauthorities are of the opinion that the actual planning
Rundetedt Whether von Rundstcdt , Undusted Undated
oountercounter- oounterand launched the counteroounter counter

aorossacrossaoross Amerioan stage of the attack began when the American Armies were racing across ngs

ing
.

oss
, .

and approa.ching France a.nd approaching the German

.

frontier.. frontier

.Model Mode1 Model or

Keitel oonoeived the taotioal plan tactical Kite conceived

majormajooffensive is open for discussion , but apparently Hitler played a major far disoussion

l 1 1

( r) 1 (1)

document Captured enemy dooUJD8nt , A-10

10 A
3
33-

I
-1. 1. 1. 1
R-Ir"

, i

rrole plau role in the entire plan ole lau

and maintained an 8.ctive 8ctive active

.

partioipation during participation duringduri-

ng phases.* all phases.

Metz city ity of Met

To

'" halting'of haltingof immiIn" Patton"s raping inPattonts halting Pattons raoing in' aid in the halting of General Patton's racing armies in ' tl e halting' Patton
'

August 1944 , a plan was attempted ugust agist

, .

ni " i

i
iA-

to strike from the south in the 'pricing vioinvicin- vicinal 'ricin- ricinfran vioinviolin 'ricinvioin vicin 'ricin ricin
and drive north northNorthrthe in preparing for thecan-oancancaDoan oan can this to be oan- new and endandba-

'

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to out the American lines of oommunioation communication Junerioau..lines Amerioau.lines Amerioaulines Junerioaulines Mercifulness
..

to th the

. a.nd Belgium border and thus gain valuable time ga.in

.

defense of the Fatherland, but available troops caused eadfin Fatherland..

coaled oalled celled nalled

.

and gathered was

for the later

and

larger offensive.* This offensive.

and

anger offensive la.rger ndage larger

\7here Where \7here 7here here

to be planned , supervised well-planned

. deoeption to the greatest degree* deception degree. oderation

well
2
manpower

to

mmake use ofof

(2)( ) 2W(2) 27-

te

erman C-erman Berman the German

-

would merely dent ward s ive. sive. . dive sive * skive sive. sive ive Looking; Lookine
.

C
"

attack here to attaok ?

cox antlers commanders

With

the limited

munber number of

to divisions available todevoir- deoi- deciand would not be devoid deoideoi deci

Yme ? me ac it wac

frontevident that action on the Eastern front

the Russian

reservoir

dec

atta.ok to the west, conditions for an attack attaok

.

vrere more favorable were favorablereared favorab-

- .. the le
ority. . ority. ority forty ority

America.n American and

British

Armies had invaded and due

with liberated France with-

al minimumn a minimum number of min

divisions

memo sized mechanized to air , meoh ized

supersuperiand motorized superisuperi

were forcedIn addition, the Allied Armies in the Western Front ware forced forceaddition..
. few ba.ttered and battered

d pluck pluc plus rts

'

to bl"illg to bring in all supplies through a blillg Lilly

the
lTormanc1y Normandy

seapoineffioient seaports inefficient seaports-

routebeaohheads ooupled with a long overland supply route beachheads coupled

Salem truok trl\nsport. transport.. maintained by costly and slow truck transport mnintained slem * \

mand

ldbelieved dbelieved the main believed

Allied effort

would be made
.

trl

nsport. sport ctrl

CommanCommand COmnmThe German High COmnmld Comm

Com-

vioin- vicin- vicinal vioinviolin vicinin the north in the vicin vioin

Apache city ity of Aachen

and the with the Cologne plains a.nd Ruhr Industrial Area as theknown With the loiown limited number of lotion nunber

objectives. . objectives. objectives

Allied divisions available ,

it was
on on

Vlould be necessarilyneo scarily ssarilyevident that portions of the Allied front would bo necessarily ssarily Loud

necess-

eoon lightly eon orrensiw actionforensic actioarily held in line with economy of forces to support offensive action

n other
nnes sforest forest

' ) parts of'' the front of f'rCnt.* frCnt. front.

German Gernan

intelligence

knaw knew
a.nd and
.

ArdennoArdennes Ardennethe Ardennos Ardethrougha drive through throua..

Belgiwn Belgian in Belgium and

.

Luxemburg were Luxumberg

lightly held

gh 'the the German ot

( ) (2)

area. oonoentrated such an area with a concentrated

, , , , .- A A-I p 3,4,5,6,7.3,4,5,6,7. 34567A7A 3,4,5,6,7.A7 34567.A7 34567A7 2 A-l , p.. 3,4,5,6,7.-A-7 34567. 7 1 3,4,5,6,7.A734567
A-1 A-7 4
44r

I l

' div'isions divisions to break through and head towards Antwerp , thus

A 7

effort

on a narrow

front

allOWallOW' allowwould allow

'

all-

Z *

,
20
'.

J' J

Jc- ' C-

outting cutting oft outing utting off

-.

and

tram frcaa from isolating Africa

. -

T.

. .. .T. .. .

& . ., ., ..... 9&i

glaring thc
, ",,

ly othc cutC <m13 &i .glaionge"'the cutocms .cof . fthe mr ca the We a torn Fronts cutch . e.war Wee-tern Wea.torn Front, Wheaton Weatorn glaiongethe cutoc. coffertory cz ewar .T ' 9i go ' the customs >r. the -'trar cz. trar 'trar cutoc cutch
.

laughed laUDOhed season to be launched during a seasonsea' , . "a--the battle. unPavorable unPavora'ble infltTende-the ba.ttl untaV ta' le" Punta unfavorable for Allied air superiority to greatly influence - the battle son le int'laen infltTende battl intlaen inland
and

deoeption direct plan with great deception direot

"

e
of
.

to

30

divi Allied div ions divisions

. .

r * ear ofe'trar of-e ofetrar

. -

Wee tern
and
.. ..
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ow dto do rd

. .

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.

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( See Map A )

. . . . ..0. 0. 0
.
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It
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probably9and probably probablyprobab-

to' & bold to boldBorlto a .bold.

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After further research ,

oarry to carry out the attaok with attack hoary

was it 'was
'

Higgins Command Cohen end endCoen -end CommanCanmaDHigh Coenend Contend deoided by the German Higi CanmaDd decided Canada Cana-

two Panzer armies with and

ns ooordination in coordination with strong anti-tank antitank

'bhe spearheads.- * spearheads blooking forces north and south of 'bhe main penetrations spearheads.. blocking torches spearhethe looking locking torces spearhhe
.

foreairoraft aircraft tank anti-aircraft anti anti-airoraft units to form

form.

anti
and

divisionsinfantry divisions divisio-

and oonserwd Cterman airframe Ceriman airfare moonseed German airforce Gert .n airforoe units , which had been closely supervised a.nd conserved , olosely loosely Get ads n airforoa eads were

to venture forth in an all-out support

to

ntain

superiority. * localized air superiority. Following powerful artillery preparations , looalized

astron strong armored spearheads were stron smash through the

out all

to gain

and maintain maintain-

mai-

Allied lines

manandand

Muse race for the Meuse river and gain bridgeheads there the drake

first

chemthenday , then

tor istries for Liege strike tore

a.nd and
.

, . Antwerp. Antwerp

This was

all to

aooonplished accomplished againsbe acoor lished against actor lashed

aga-

tstrict strict inst

designed effeot time schedules and was designod to effect

Antibes Armies had been broken and Anrties

thrustsfast penetration thrusts thru-

sts
so o of

after the Allied

. unitsunitdemoralized. demoralized* Armored units uni-

ts the first f

wave were

to to

move forward

miss ion of gainingwith the single mission of'' gaining gain,

mopupas monoptrom mopOtp mop from mopOtMeuse River bridgeheads and were not to waver tromp this mission an mop-up mopniMuse al mop-nip moot

ing
onte the

up nip

on aooomplished unite Mpoperations operations of isolated units were to be accomplished by infantry units onolizations

heals or the armored elements. heels of elements.

Thirty-two Thirtytwo hirtytwo Thirty

scions nation alone sions , twelve

Volksgrenad1er divi diviorder of battle of twelve Panzer divisions , twenty Volksgrenadier divi- node

two

4
(4)( ) (4) 4Tanato be used in the battle with an

German

divisions

were

div

artillery
and

corps , fourteen army

sevenseveartillery battalions , seven To

sough sa suoh agather such a-

rance brigades rocket

battalions.* thirteen anti-tank battalions.

striking force together after five hard years of warfare triking

tank anti
( )

was a

great drainidraindrain the

or economy eoon ng the German Army' and presented great problems of troop eooncmy with groat Army' goat eon on

A-I p 910111213 A A , , , , 4 A-l. p 6 Z 3 A-l , p.. 9,10,11,12,13 (4) A-l.,. p. 11. A A l

( ) (3) A-Z

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55-

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. . . . ...
.

much of ucah or
. 111. .

,i e a n- 1 " !
_ ': EBsw-n "a-cat Italian front : cant 1t1ittn -front EBswn frat . 1t1ittnfront Eastern i''cnt. il-i tromp astern frcat , 1t&.1ittnfront EBsw icnt 1t&.1ittn 'trom Debs cat 1t.1ittn trom
-

J t
.JE.tEJ
.

dly
C

q. q needed troops !
.

"a il
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and Norwegian Norng1an

.

garrison saorificing badlysaorifioing sacrificing badly

?
'

. support t.hia. to sipp.or- thai ! sipp.or this. sippor this sipper thia
.

..

", out.,1.1-1-e dnwrl <n % newer *13rwou * ,, 2CI.l'"rd

.

; venture (6) out.,1.1 2CI.lrdrventure , (6)-) out1.11e . " wt1tde ( 0) iil 0 out11 2CIlrd'wt1tde' ; 6S-

il
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Surpr Nile Slurp ile Surprise urprise

. . . .. . . 1MhSr 1. 1MhSr.

was wail mils wal mis

.

Vi tal 1mportaJ importance to be of 'Vi tail iaportanoe in the ! e vital inportanoe

'

German
r . ilw... ilw

Padand plan and-

. ..

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. 1.. . . . .. 1
. .

.' ._ . .
. 1IA

precautions coupled with deceptive devices and plans were to be taken devious takendevioes take-

aking
. . r1.r
.

. sauces the success depended sUGces. sUGces

"
.

upon
..
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, c..IAL . . . . . .. . D " .11,4A .114A 114A

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.

, .

I Lr
.. . 'I.. 1r . .
. ' . . .

.. A + .L..r. . . .A.. . . . ...\ . . . .

.. . .
.. .

element. this . element. Great * .. ._ .

,.
1

. . URL . .A .rL.w" . A rLw

www

..

. . r..n. . . . . .
. . ..

il

. and painstaking painstakingpainsta1d.ng painsta1dng

.

painstneces-

to to maintain secrecy to the last hour with commanders seoreoy corianders cooainders stereo
being sting kept uninformed

on

sary

planning , re-equipping and movement requirements.. mowmetrl mower; requirements* re-equipp1ng equipp1ng equipping

held Toaoknowledged the generally well acknowledged fact that the Allies would attempt toto

re
soheme scheme

everlalevels all levels-

until the latest

e oonsistent neoessarynecessaryneoessary time consistent with necessary

'Forman ormanoe cox 'ormanoe with conformance In conformanoe with-

ngan Apache areagain and maintain a penetration and exploitation in the Aaohen area remand oontinue continue

to the Rhine River , the

"Watoh on the "Watch German oode word "" Watoh thecode Swath Watch utode
Arrrry Army

Rhine" Rhine erine"

was invented and behind

this veil the Sixth Panzer this appeared to

and thethe

November.mselves Seventh Army was spotted on the Cologne plains by the Allies in November.. NovembNovember

To er

the Allies , as the

Germans wanted , wanted.. wanted

be a defensive-defensivedefensive

counterattack

. ( (6) to prevent us from reaching the Rhine (6)-) Rhine., 6Swere re

Strict trict secrecy regulations

attaoking divisidivisions effeot in effect with attacking divisionsone day

ons
moving
,

into their last assembly position

.all ble all

movement during was

light day
day-light

attack- * the attacka- . prior to tJ1e attack. attack , attack

18Bance was forbidden ,' no reo Oreo reoornaissance overeconnaissance over

, ;

rattack areas attack rtrick

Cologne , ology cooned
r '

to
was

; be made , a fake army group was rake

travel

otofot of established north coun- ; limited ; fake radio messages were sent ,' all unun

dele nts ele ants reliable elements

were weeded out of

Germany

were wered held deep

in

to be

moved up

heacoleus . olues were to be planted to mislead us * All these measures plus theclues outs the us. eless us

Allied dlined

frame of mind

that the
German

Germane Germans were unable

offensive and that the

rate of attrition
a..
.

paused "safe-from-attack" "se.1'e-tran-attaok" furthercapo capaoi ty far replaoement caused "safeHfrcm-attack"" thought and further capacity for replacement oaused a " ' se.1etranattaok capaoi frate"safeHfrcm eca furtsafeHfrcm heca attaok" attack" supplies , troops , lld to gain the necessary enab led enabled the German High necessary' ld nab her rnal
.lld Command
Commie COJJmI
.

8.11d 811d . and

tore opp ortune opportune area for tor op

A- p A 5 A-l.,. p.. A 1 l-l.

( ) (5)

l
A-1

12

, , A-I p 16,17,18. . 161718. A 16,17,18 6 A-l , p.. 16,17.18.. 1 161718

( ) (6)

I l
A-1

an

out all

- attack. . all-out attack*

*

6
66-

"
tran safe
was

attacking divisions ,' airfare unansattaoking airforce units airforoe units-

, . at the last moment. moment

to

faketakeand fake take fac-

mount a.. large scale scalea

"se.1'e attaok attack "safe from train se1e

greater than thethe th-

t-

'

ot Thus , one of the

greatest

-.

'-

-.
.

- --

--- It
,

-..

, , _. .

,
I II I

t. *

'

"

.4 4
.

. *

.
(

\1 : 1 , \

.
,

tore elemeJXts tor elements for a

1
"

' action was suooessful of'fensive action1 successful offensive action"1 gained
.

"

1dand&1d ind-- surprise and ad_

ily
.
.

p adsorption dsoeption , 1ri a powerfull deoeption with prerful deception .r sorption r refuel exation

Qerman Arsty poised ArstyGerm n Arstypoised Berman Artsy poi8 Arturo Paratyphoid Arur
,

, .

y &v1l"Jwothehavilywv1lJwoand hidden la the-ha&vily-. . , .. th - avi :) hid&n in theha&vilyw-.-',hid& n the-h avid y

wooded ooded areas of oded

_

Loretta Ardem81 toreeta the Ardennes forests with

.
.

3000 5000

. sup- supsup airplanes ready to sup.

.
" "

hind hidn

the h
,

ha&vily heavily havily the v1l"J heav.

.- . ""
w-

: .port port the attack* ( '1) ettaok.. (7) attack. ettaok 1

.
.
.

. .

Etta
. ..

. .. . .
. .

..

"-

7
.

,-

. . . . .. . . . .. . .
. .

SITUATION THE GENERAL SITUATIOStationm4

44-1

- . -"
.
.

..

"

. . . .. .
.

..

..

. .. .

.. . .

. . . ..

aoross NAfter aster After the race across France ,

Belgium and the Lowlands

. a.nd and

, the Allied AlliedAll-

ied

troops approaohed the approached

German

frontier

were

of halted by the lack of-

prepareprepagasoline and other supplies and required time to regroup and prepare

meetingdmeetingGermany. meeGeray. Geray. for an all-out offensive against Germany With supplies again meeting re out Gray oonsistenthconsistentoonsistent consistdemand , the Allies took the offensive in November and by consistent emand ting
*

all

ent
up

. chord ho.rd hord hard o.rd

fighting against

stiff resistance

pulledpulleand inclement weather had pulled

o d to the

German West Wall on many

or earlyportions of the front and in early

dams
heathe just north of the-

December were

Roer righting for the Roger river fighting

(8)(8) Ardennes forest (8)* dedness forest.. 8L-)

hed the Swiss border to the North Sea holding

shiny sirby div sibyl sirly silly Thesthree. nurtgen attack. TUurtgen Urgent to the Hurtgen Forest attack Thbadly depleted sions with odd-mile front frotstretched along a sixty-three esixtythree divisions esixtythr sixty-thre esixtythre sixty-thr mile f'ront from odd eses sixty heses three thru thre
sirby-three divisiy-three divi Late in November the entire Allied strength was sirly-three divi- ate
same some scions wi

due

siy
*

These

thr
a

*e

were

600

'

from-

some

'rontconti!'rontfortnfrontront 'ront portions of the front

EoOD Economy Rood

ngently lightly while attacks ightly

had to be serious and
I ! i.
--

were launched on other

.

parts. parts. pe.rt* pert

.

or foroe foroeforehforceof force fore

OpposingOpposing Opposi-

i.enacted enacted i ideate

,
.

. a oondi tion existing. * with such a. condition existing Joni ion

ng Allied forces the

ns th ons wi with
number

was an

divisionsdivisioesttmated estimated and identified seventy divisions divisiAllieslightly held by the Allies Alli. a,

selectedselectearea.. of others in the area* The Ardennes area was selected

as as one of the portions of the front to be

d
es as
.

be assu d ass roads a.nd terrain with poor roods and thus , not assumed to benewneseotor a.tta.ck.* a.n area. of' attack. an area of a likely German attack. In this sector , many of the new indoctriindootriindoctri'battle indootri- indootri indoctriw limo indoor U . 3. vus * line U.S. U.S . divisions first went into lino to receive their battle indoctrinate U.S. U.S US 3.

it

was rugged
.

'

'

) nation. . 9Tnation , (9)nation. (9) nation (9)-

A p 48 (8)(9) A 89 1 7 A-ls, p. 30 (8) (9) A-l , A - 89 1

( ) (7)

he US First
. . The U.S.

oops tl1Toe oorps coif food Army was composed of three corps coi osod
( )( )

A-1s p * 30-48

l
A-1

containing a

total

22 Chap 2-

7
7-

.. .

.
.

' ,

!'
:
, .

, ....

' overcave. y cave g.) Soave oaveloavelyyof three armored divisions , eleven infantry divisions , and three oavelyyinf'antry oavel y lovely
groups. * groups. groups . grows groups roups
.

In the southern portion of the let 1st

'

Army

area

Ardennes-s was the Ardennes.s Ardenn Arden

.

"

'

'

Arde-

ntry
was
moored mored
Roger ower Roer

sow 10m3 Geo.tor with 1'0m3 ot "quiet"" nnes nth some eighty miles of " Geotor Ghetto seobor sober
and one cavalry group oavalry
* *
'
. ...

divisions

oovered quiet front covered ot the ofthe 8th U.S. Corpsj U. S. CorpsI; U. S US. Corps
,

tour infantryby four infantry

ot thnorth of thisthis

infaar

. U.3. U3. U3 is the 5th U3 .h Corps

.
. .

'h" " h"

""

..

. .

.. . . .

arcar- tx-y qivisions arinfantry divisions and part of two ar'- ar of four i .
:

. ..

'

y tx
-

divisions

' e ca'valry e and a. cavalry group with the mission of'' capturing the oapturing throf oa.pturing the'nth ' nth
. . .

rlBnk flank ; and River dams J a.nd on the extreme northern rollback of the 1st US * Au..S.. A . ArmyAryU* s. AUS Army
Roger River unRoar the 7th Corps along the Roer Rivor with four infantry divisions , anan

us

was wash ans

armored

of second division , part or seoond

vra.s A.rmy vras eras Army v/as vas / .
.

armored

division ,
Army ArrrIY

group- . and a cavalry group oavalry group.* grovalor oorps andanbantwo oops andswith tvlO corps and

up
i."t si."t dit sit six sit ds
.,
"

.North of the 1st US , last U. S. . North lst U, S.

v
as
was

. US , the U. S. Ninth U.S. * US US.

divisions sitting

teaon the Roger River waiting for the capture of the Roer the.

ms
dams
cost ! ! ost Most
'

, tcwra.rds tcwrards launch south , to launoh an attaok across the rivor cowards the Rhine Rhine.. attack aoross river towards *
Rotor Roar of the Roor

river line

lightly held by infantry

a.nd and
.

of north of-

\
"

were ten 5th Corps , four armored divisions and two infa.ntry divisions werewherthe infantry
.

resting out of contact with the enemyr and resting , equipping and preparing Rene oontaot prepa.ringene eat preparingprepa.ring preparirestin re-equipping
.

onto

ng further offensive actions in this area,. (10)) ( 10Aarea. (10)corrosive act orfonsive acti ns 10 markedArray marAlong most of the First and Ninth Army fronts , the divisions marked markelong
tore tor for

re
2nd

ting and held , but 13 December 1944 , the 5th Corps launched an offensive tune Deoember offensivetime ked held. held.
, .

offen-

sive
era
a.ms da.ms . dams

through the

hills

Ardennes and dense woods of the northern Ardennas

vioin- vicin- vicinal vioinviolin vicinin the vicin vioin

city of Monschau heading ity Manchu

for the
..

Riverdtown of Schmidt and the vita l Roer River Sohmidt vital Roger Rivervit Riv-

area.. in that area*

Slow steady progress was made through the bad terrain ; Slaw terrainaHess pro ess terrainthroueh vnti. vnti w'kdetormined wkdetormined w 'determined kdetormined wsls determined sells kdetormined dams* Shiftingthat vent' detormined to hold the dams.. Shifting Shif..

terraDirt Div

in
.

a.nd and a persistant .nd parsistal1t persistent

enemy

ting
scions ssions sions

slighti1y slightly to the south ,

we

oonditions find the following conditions

DiviThe 99th Digre- DirtDiviDiviDirtDivi-

tvrenty holding a twenty mile front through dense Trent

maintear ainwoods and rough terrain terrainfter ain

terr-

ain

frame rom Honshu south from Monsohau

to Losheimergraben with the

attackingDivision attacking attack-

ing ing
;

of' Division.- . along a corridor through the northern sector of' the 99th Division Division.* oorridor

Divi-

sion

Elements of the

latter division
was

were 'were
'

engaged eneaged while whialso enraged in this attack while;

le ( (10)) A-l , p . 10 A-1 p A p 1

balance or the balanoe of the division

proteoting tIle in a defensive position protecting the

, , , 74,75,76,77 74757677

A 8
A-8
8
88-

- .

- --

--- - ,

'
,

'-

..

. . . . . .. . .
.

. .

'

"

'

'

'

. 4
44,

iii
'

41IJ' 41IJ

, ..

..

'

divi.div1divi- . ot div1div1 road divi olla dirob vita.t El.senborn vicinity and roab network To the south of this dividiv Eleanor vitat Elsenb rn viscidity a.n.d rOl.a network.* vital El vita. Elsenborn vita Dearborn Else vita seaborn vioirdty rOla y - , > s ion with an 8-10,000 yard gap was the 14th Cavalry Group holding a 10,000 10000 \ yv s the .1 itr .106th Infe itr106th Infer int8 105th Infantry sector turJ1er out 1 it diffioult ifficult ! \\ difficult nine mile seotor and further south was the-105th Infantry", --"Divisionn , newly arrived trom'the U.S.. , and in line since 12 December DeoembeDecembesinoe dived ar -ived from the U.S. 'Divlsi DeceDivlsi sine Deoember ived troth . roversion -Division "Division ewly arived tromthe US Division -Divlsi Divlsi ills Dills Spondee Eifte1 southsouth Scheme Eiffel.. rholding the vital and difficult Sohnee Eiffel Going further southwholding diffioult Schnee Eifte1., mber
.
.. .

.y }, '.

. "

8
_

divviead-

.-

'

.. .

. . . . M'' MMM

'

the
. ,

"

. .. .

..

..

..

.. .

" ..

._

'ft ft

'

we est
\
..

Division. , C. CA DivisioC.O. ! DivisiC . CCA CO bind iind find the 28th Infantry Division , C.C.A.. of the 9th Armored Division of Infantry Division holding an extended front or about
( See Map Sea tap
B

CA

: i;

'
'

and on n'ft oni the 4th nft miles. . miles miles. miles
The

4040

11
( II (11))

entire allied front in this sector to

move

was

roof quiet but patrols of-

both bot

. able Germans and Americans were a.ble

tenthe readily between the-

timetime necessary and numerous gaps in the opposing lines and during this trimedencies

ster the

8ns thoroughly reconnoitered

Gern\8.ns Gern8.ns Germans \ Germ Gern 8.ns
.

' paused Field F'ieldF'ield oaused Fiethe entire area and caused Field-

frcontinuous "The enemy does not have a oontinuous line of fThe enenw renew to say, " lders aboutaborosista.ooecresistance. rosista.ooec rosista.ooecHe carries on defensive battle from strong points about resistance . resistance. resistance reesias rostiest rosiest eesias

Marshall Model
.

of-

He

relativelysrelativelyIn the most forward line , relatively relativut well-developed positions Thesplaoed developed strong seourity elements are placed in we11-developed positions.. These Thstrone trone security stone ely we11 prong attacks anrong rong barong e\rong attaoks systematioally eseourity esecurity elements yield systematically in the case of rbrong a.ttaoks Aseourity security eses

depth four to five kilometers in depth..

:;

well
The
:

them. retreat dretreat to the strong points behind them. ndre

.

organ- organstrong points are organ

e
\; FLprong

and

'' ' terrainfla.nking et'f'ect etfect sized tzed chessboard fashion , with flanking effect , well adapted to terrain ized ohessboard f'ashion zed
, wood patches , and crossroads. . At the crossroads sect oamouflaged in which are defendedeven when surrounded , well camouflaged and dug indefended nts defended even

sectors , localities

transtrong points pointspoi-

, J

Paespecially anti-tank and speoially specially antitank andtanks and tank destroyers and heavy weapons , takes
mortars form the backbone.. backbone ndora
severalStronger reserves are in positions several
"

tank anti
.

lone kilometers behind the zone of strong points ,

sough suoh such

as villages or

centr"'lly at centrally located points , centrlly ' tullyare fully tully main highways doin forest patches near doing highways.. They a.re fully.

infantrycintantrycintantry in motorized , and are committed in. combat groups of two to three infantry

ntry
( ) (11)

infa-

companies ompanies with

eight to ten tanks.. tanks

Prom From

They go
we
Doan

abortion hours 8ix houseinto action about six houraotion

starts"" starts father safter the attaok sarts11 . attack t after

this

oan can see

that the

German High

11 A-2 , A-9 A A

29
9
9-

0t 0I

I t t
t'
'

1
1C,

.
'
-

'

i1dformed abo tour pos1tioDS and 'ourtaotios ha'our aDd"'our 'taotios andCommand aDdour -taotios hanContend was trail informed about'our positions aivd ourtaotios and " ommand well i ormed ambo t our p'os1tioDS aid our taotios andadder stations i1d" oratorios i1d
' ' "'

. a.n "oould consequently develop an Gould oonsequently dhold ndout oould could

atta.o1c acoordingly.. attao1c acoordingly accordingly.acoordingly.accordingly. intelligent attack accordingly, according.

To ly

turn the tide

'
*

on

th.- . theGerDan German the Western Front , the Germans scraped the thth.

bottom or the manpower 'd.tJPdwer ereto of dtJPdwer madwer madder

.

barrel

and

botheother recalled divisions from other-

rations . fronts. fronts * fronts. fronts

The

final

German order of

battle

' tollCM'81 t was as follows tollCM81

nor
ste the
ad of

or 11onsohau to Nervier twnorth on an East-West line running north of Monsohau and Vervier toHonshu
form a blocking fore force foroe ofer
61 67

West East
all
to
a

to

keep open the

penetration

comp o omp os ed oomposed Corps composed mainly of' of'

infantry divisions

:
.

th

To To

thethe te-

waswaon the south was

and strong antianti-

anti
-

tank elements, elements..

part of'' the Sixth Panzer of

be led by the

Army.. Army

The spearhead spearheadspearhe-

this

army was array

1st let

whichwhichCorpswhich and 2nd S . S . Panzer Corps -which which S.S. hitc-

SS

Corps

were her

, Huy. Muse to cross the Meuse River between Liege and Huy . Guy
The

Belgium and then thenhen-

Antwerp. drive ries northwest to Antwerp,.

be Muse crossing of the Meuse was to be-

paratroup brigadehand-pinked aided aded by a special hand-picked English-speaking paratroop brigade brig-

ade
.
'

\ whioh \Vas under Skorzney whiplash whiohVas Vas Sorbonne which was
'

pinked speaking picked English hand

to seizl3 bridgeheads seize bridgehea.ds
.

and

Allieddisrupt the AlliedcAllied Fifththe Fifth

! cOJU1'n.1.nication . cOJU1n1nication cOJU1n1.nication OJU1'n.1.nication lines OJU1n1nication communication cor.mnication ommunication lines. South of the Sixth Panzer cormnication fornication
.
.

' Array we find Army f'ind

.

fth
fined find

, ' redeastWresteast-Wrest Panzer amides rlltn TC fawner boundry fanzer Army with the boundary between armies running ; a.long an east--- rest east4'8steast48steast restcastrateastrest amies rllt.n ; T'C along east4'8st east48st Easters

lilt

Wrest east
'

Fi-

. of 8t. Viet Belgium line just north of'' St. Vith , Belgium. ion St. 8t
.

. To spearhead spearhea.d

this drive ,

wewe de-

crossPa.nzer whioh the 58th Panzer Corps and 47th Panzer Corps which were to cross
.

Amour Namur le.mur _ Nauru head lemur the Meuse in the vicinity of Dinant and Wamur , Belgium , then headInfant tie Muse

proteot Drussela northwest to Brussels and protect the Russell

ten the Sixth Panzer
Army

left flank

of of the spearheads of-

flankthe to the north.. Protection for ''the southern flank flannorth

of of the penetration was

orth Army. Army Array ten the Seventh Array..

to
(

acoomplished be accomplished with two

See Map
.

Noorps oroops or infantry corps ofof

12

( (12))

A)

The
d Hl Ting ddening denying

plan had the

venomous enonn.ous enonnous enormous

reaohing task of not only reaching

that port to the Allies , but also of destroying all AlliedAll,

An Allied
-

An-twerp andAntwerp matwerp and ad-

ied
ng -to to
.

Apache troops north of the Aachen area which were attacking and threatening; attaoking threateningthreateninethreatenine threatenia.nd CC'logne Area. . theCologne reaoh ' reach the CClogne plains and then the Ruhr Industrial Area , the th.

ereat
( (12))

grea.test greatest such a.rea. in Western Europe and the area

.

German war

strial

) wi'thtut potential without withtut

'

A-1 p A--l. 12 A-l ,. p.. A A

whioh which they could not carry on a oarl-Y

1. l

, , , . 14.30,31,32 14,30,31,32 14.303132 14303132

1010 1-

indu-

industrialindustrial

oar oarl

. large scale war * war. war

1 I
1I

. <
:

; #
.

..

7: *

REGIMENTAL THE REGBCSNTAL

SituatioSITUATIONSITUATION
.
.

n
any m- l many any

On On 14 November

1944

e 394th from Engla after a hasty trip from. England , the 394th_

Infantry relieved the 60th Infantry

dbook took over a defensive position
.

Regiment of
"

the 9th Division

hanandand

thou on the tho

Germ- GerGear Gel.Belg1w1 ElGerbetween Belg1w'1 Gel. border "between Belgium' and Gel.- . Ger Gel

vicinity vioin b1 in the violin b.1 of Bullingen , Bulling

The 2nd
.

Belgium and facing the Seigfreid SeigfreidSeigtreidSeigtreid

Sigrid Sigr-

id

Line. . Line. Line

ethBa.ttalion the Battalion , 394th Infantry went into position on theon

nographer seotor northern sector

Weisentein the international border at Weiaentein Weinstein Wisent

coveroverdraooveredcoveredand covered oovered

hanandand

wn extended front through very heavily wooded , rough , an ed

hilly ,

broken dbrake

terrain.. terrain
2nd

soobooktookSouth of the 2nd Battalion , the 3rd Battalion took

Verv1er-Leige high- VervierLeige highVervier- - Liege Vervier- Leige Nervier vital Vervier-Leige high Verv1er Nervier Vervier -

veer nver over lover position protecting a crossroad on the ner

. ws.y we.y wey way from the wsy wy whey

Liege Leige Eerier

.

Infantry Battalion , 60th Infa.ntry

.

and

like the

. 2nd Batta.lion BattalioneBatta.lionBattalionBattalion

Battali. '

on

vms was eras ras spread

thinly through

heavy hoavy woods and rough

terrain.. terrain

testOn the the-

) of osterone flank of the 394th Infantry and also the southern fla.nk ofsrUthern southern flank offer e last ten so-oalled the 99th Division in a so-called reserve area entered the 1st Battalion , lst coaled oalled called

tormingstorming formingforming 394th Infantry with the mission of protecting the open flank and torming Infa.ntry miss ion proteoting storminformin.

so

g a limited

reserve.. reserve

To

the south

some 8-10,000 , a-10,000 10,000

alry
Group

day.- * daysdays contact day with the only oontaot being; by motorized patrols two times per day.. dada-

onto

ys other forces were in forgoes No foroes out hindorance.. hinderance. hinderance hindorance hindrance
The

this area

. and enemy patrols could operate with with- pa.trols with:

a 8

yds yd 10000 yds..

was

Cavalrythe 14th Cavalry Cav-

performregiment mission of the regl1 nt was to defend and perform Perf-

orma , . 8-2 S-2 and C,0. S C0 8 CO 2 C0..

inst
The

abortion aggressive patrolling and in the First patrol action , the 3rd Battalion , notion aotion C.O. Co L were

vhile action agaaotion against killed ,while performing patrol abortion againstGvile

erman units in the So igfre id Line.. German digress Soigfreid Line Seigfreid Sigrid

13

( (13)(13)) 13T-

torrain he terrain

area in this a.rea.

.

was , as

and pointed out above , very rugged andla-

SW-NE deep BITE followed a dominating heavily wooded ridge line running SW-ITE with deepITE SW

ndfall

NE

approaches running into our positions and areas

that could

ooveredcoveredbe covered coveoovered

.

over-

do

; rroups only by combat groups and red King ing and

.

flank- flankoontained fla.nkflankfla.nk self contained small units. Supporting fla.nk- flank units.*

va iron protective firos tram final protect fires from protecti ff firs

pportion portion of the front

and out-costing was out-posting

13
( (13))

Personal

out
posting costing

aa oover Machine Guns could cover only aover

due ius diffioult difficult even in daylight Pius

<

Knowledge

1-

1111

. v
.

. *
. A

J
Jf
FaJf-

"

. "

'.

. .,

, .

..

...
.

to the
tso

denseness of'' of

'

"1 ,
" 1

r
"

the forests and

-I I extended
. n "
. .

,.

"

'

...
.

, .

. ..

. ," . - . . . .v . . . .". " . . "

"

_ v

distanoes distances between

. _ 'r. 'r
M

. . ..N.. .A.N A ,.

-' pla- platplan plaplan plapla pla

.

.. . .

r " . . .r. ' .'

. "
.
. -

. ,.
%

. IP
,I

I _ ..
_ ..

. ..

..

.. .

. .

oons toons tons

compancompanies.oompanies.- . and companies companies., oompanies. oompanies

The ies

orossroads vital crossroads of

3rdLosheimergraben defended by the 3rd

.

-- .

-.

Battalion afforded a
baoh. . Verveir baoh Verve bach , Verve it baoh. bah baoh bah

Gear Ger good main highway leading from Germany Gernay

Butgen- Burgeon to ButgenButgen

Le ige. and Liege Leige. Leige. ige

ge
and

sup- supThis crossroad was the hub of the only sup orossroad all
' ; supplies f'or the regiment had to for reliment
[

ply route il1 the area in

ethrough wrought through

overmovmove

point this point.. This high hi h

was

ground dominated
'

all

other terrain toto

te

the front and

the key

sector.the sector sectterrain feature of 'the regiment sector..

or Deoember On 9 December

1944 , the 1st

.

3rd Battalion , 394th relieved the 3rda a..

Battalion , 394th
and by ed
aments ments
King

and thus the

la.tter latter went into

flanking position position-

baaing baing virtue of being in a reserve position

hut- hut- and having small hut hut-

oover Gould oloth- oould cloth- over in the area , the troops could sleep under cover , repair booth olothclotholoth cloth
.

of

ing , and thoroughly clean and profit clea.n rofit refit

The

all

. weapons. weapons *

14
( ) (14)

( See Map

B)

battalion

was

divisionto protect the right flank of the division divisi-

on the regiment and iment ra pimento

an and

abortion to prepare for further action. action. aotion.* aotion

ish
.

. hthis , Co. L with one this Co

of . seotion of-heavy section .hea.vy heavy

.

ions
oon

a.stride nain astride a main railroad entering

Bookshop .Buokholz .Buckholz Buckshot Buckholz Buokholz

of
&

To aooomplish aooomplisaccomplish accomplisaccompl-

positionsmaohine guns had positions machine

yd8 about 300 yds yd
.

positSB SE

s i

tromp Germany trom from Germ

. F
P F.
FP-

Station

and had contact with oontact

L. L& platoonthe Regimental I&R platoon IR

,

platK

which extended the

last Battalions Co. of right flank of'' the 1st Battalion Co . Co lst
.

cononwith one

ha.d densation maohine esection heavy machine guns had eseotion seotion section

defensivethe equivalent of a platoon in defensive defenmv SW

ith
, . CP. . on C.P. .P. CP. CP

sive
position
ngated ncated canted boated oated cated

on high ground 500 yds S yd

. L and maintained a.nd ma1ntained. ma.1nta.-ined.
.
: .

Co. with Co.

ma.1nta. ma1nta dined ined.

-

. ba.lanoe balanoe the balance of the Co. Co

.

. area.* Co battalion reserve area Co.. I

NB NE

ab out yds about 400 yd abou

.

. be.lanoe or Co belanoe with the balance of Co.. beanie

connectedro1Z y 1l-hn' wand connectedconnecteF.B\jpJdiQla .and connected y hn' ot F ._.Bg..1lhn'' and oonneoted y1lhn of jpJdiQla . bonneted \ hn
,

1l.\ F.B
., ,

, r.

> .

10loon eloloo10oentrally lo- in a centrally lo 10

I n 14' ", 14 d .>

'

.. i ) k
, .

# ( ( Jt I rX

* 1 n f4-/ i f i/1' * 4

i
> !

w-

was

areamarin the battalion reserve area

M

reserve in reserve..
The

The Battalion BattalionCBattalionL

&

BattaliK
aa in a-

was located loca.ted

conter are center of in the counter of'' the arc

' Coifs Coos Cots formed by Cofs Co's Cos

nlagen large building near F. Buokholz railroad station. station. F. Bookshop

battalionentire battalion

lion
position
( (14))

was

lightly held

and

fensive positions assigned festive

all to all

de- troops were not dug-in , nor were de dede

oOJ11)a.nies oaanpanies companies as oOJ11anies oOJ11a.nies adamantine )
.

the battalion was to be

in
dug

batta-

14 A-4 , p.. A p

4
. _
.

.12 12

\.
A

. JJAW

\
11

.. .. .
.

AWprepared prepared

G
a
,

to

move

on

area.- . arenotioe area.* short notice to any portion of the division area

On 12

December 1944 , Deoember 1944 1944..

.
.

. * C. O. theC.O. tethe C.O 394th Infantry relayed an order of the CO CO.

one

, toed _ . Pjvis1.onC.G * --to- send Pjvis1onCG to aend Pjvis1.onC.Gto Pjvis1.onC.-G snd Pjvis1onCGto Divieion0Q.to amend Pjvis1onC.G * Divieion0Qto Pjvis1.onC. DlvisionJVG . -to sand DlvisionJVGto Pjvis1onC DlvisionJVG levision toaend

Division
-_
_

_ -

rifle

In- oamp oompany reinforoed company reinforced to the 395th In amp InIn

gantry which was north of the 394th Infantry to reinforce them as they n Roth theyfantry whioh reinforoe rth heSe1gfTeid1ine Se1gfTeid -1ine Seigfreid-line posit tionB attacking strongly held positions in the Seigfreid line posi tomb Seigfreid Sigrid -1ine
-

were wer

ngs progress. slow progress. *

'

cotnplianoe with In compliance writhe oanplianoe vrith

online

this directive., direotive directive.

line
. Oompa.ny Oompany Company

Sigrid
this pr L p'r _ P f f
'
" .

ia1d.ngarid makiia1dngia1d.ng making ia1dng and making.

theI with the th-

Comp M wus Was us first machine gun platoon of Company M was eirs maohine bey 'bhe bhe 395th Infantry as regimental reserve. regimenta.l reserve. the he te
.

to'odetached and attached to attaohed to-

Abortions of Aotions Actions

oompany werecompany were Ger-

many and
.

varied during; the following two weeks.. Thus weeks* durine urine
one

we

3rdf3rd find the 3rd-

Batta.lion.. Battalion, 394th Infantry minus toon holding an open division ton - ion reserve. ( ) (16)) onion reserve. (15) ( scion oion sion -ion ion 15 16
*

rifle
and

oompany company and machine gun Apia pIa- pla- plan pIapla\

/f" 0'' .1L , P" f""' 0 1 /" I

flank

also assuming the role of

pIa pla divis- divi- dividivi div

ETHOS THE GERM ATTACK THS GERMA.N ATTAC. TIC GERMAN

Attaand artillery antheon the

KAt 0530 hours 16 December 1944 , the Germans ca3rnnenced commenced a two hour hourAt houck houro Deoemb hour Deemr

b rrage r rage barrage along

the entire regimental front with mortars ,

multi
south to ved

barrelled barrel
fall

nimbly projectors which ooncentrated nninly multi-barrelled dmultibarrelled rocket projeotors whioh concentrated mainly
ea last area Losheimergraban oroa Losheimergraben corona in th 1st Battalion area the lst
'bhe elemi NT 'bhe on elements of the 3rd Battalion.- * elem nta Battalion. Battalion. he

moved moinitially , then moved-

Battal-

' died About 0930 hours , imindentified troops appeared ied unindenti1ied unindenti1'ied unidentified unindentif
on the ds tIle

ion

at about

yar1000 yards yardsCompanyCompanCompany

railroad line which

Company L was

astride.. astride

misreEarly morning mistsmists

prevented definite recognition of the approaohing elements but presented reoognition approaching
y L

outposts a short while later definitely established the fact that 1e fagot thatfaot heatenemy and so

hery they were

relayed the information. information.*

.

Frexn From Prom Rex

desoription the description ,

were outposts werewh-

it was
on and

macro a olosed determined the enemy was in a. closed route maroh column formation march formationloosed formatimaximum

to achieve aohieve

oasualty effect the casualty effeot

Comp Company L

withdrawn and the main positions erewith

fully alerted

and

hold instructed to holdinstruoted ho-

all fires. ld fires.

*

Upon

reoeiving receiving this information , the Battalion Headquarters Personal

Knowledge

15 A-5 (16)) A (16

( (15))

1313

. .

'-

'

A&P platoon & AP

was dispatched dispatohed

the railroad and ed

velopments clements elements
-

s recur i ' 1 ecur securi-'by torward. Whenwithin yarde securi'bytorward. Whe withinabout yards securing -torward.-. Whe-n -within -about forwarder Inanition securibytorward Minn security forwardr - . When -within about 200 yarded and torward.When orward.Minn orward.- Minnwithin forward orward. Wherewith toward
-

'by by

appr ohed , they did' not" change 'formation' and did - "have apr heed th ; did not h e formation and' didnot -' 7ieV6did'not" 'formation'and'did.n 7ieV6 didnot formationanddidn tdidn't -not approached and'did. :8.ft bandied t:8.ft did not anddid 8.ft not formation and'did.-n have didn't t8ft
'
'
"

pekoe ot to a high piece of terrain that overlooked pieoe overlookedoverlookenenemyextended the right flank of Company L . As enemy en L, L encir'

scriptoria Inn within securi toward forward

.-

Rtationary stationary railroad box cars ,

formation t 8ft
' '

billable available all a ilable fires

were brought ware

n
' ';

'

"

'

""

. ,

11 in -line with severalinline i h several line ! I

_ -

! _

:.

bearto bear bar-

labored on the enemy and sop laoed as so placed

to confine

him

em-emto the high railroad em em

banlonont. ban1ancnt. balmment ban1ancnt bankment . ban1ancnt. banlonont banlonont. ban1ancnt bankment blanket balloon
*

Short intervals in depth separated the

Andandenemy elements and

ean . tv/o oompanies an estimated two companies were writhing 400 yards of the lea.d elements.- . / vrithin lead elements* within elemenelements.

tv o

ts

As Company L opened
& the A&P platoon also AP

frontal fire firo fire fro

and
.

fire

from the enemy

right flank ,

commenced from oommenced from.

' enemyss lef't enemy enemyt ' formed formerenews enenws the enemy's left flank and formedenenw's

a devastating boxed d

supporting supportine with supportive ;

Compan.y Company
.

81mm mortars firing 81nnn 81 nmi firingdmi

:

ng the
mvn own dmvn down damn

firi-

olumn coluFrom all indications , mn indioations

vras a company was trapped vas

olumn.o coluoolumn.column.oolumn.. column. oolumn column olumn.

andand complete the enemy was taken by oomplete surprise maene11\Y ene11 \
.

on- neuvered an undetermined but heavy number of casualties. About oneone suffered oasua.lties. oasualties casualties. Nehalf half eal

Y
A

in the
gun

. bo.x box

taking thea.rea taking proteotion hecar area takin [ protection in the

.

cars bazooka ars and bozooka and

57mm AT 57nan

severseveral firing at close range scored severalhigh power line rela.y tower about relay
.

direct hits. alties hits.

*

and mAohine gunmen en machine u\nnen g\unnen

300 yards from the main

g
As 30

the

enemy

esoape riflemenattempted to escape from the oars , riflemen riflem-

. them. killed them,

line sheltered position there

were able

Germans

automation weapoautomatio weaponswith automatic weapons by and covered byoovered Babr-

ns

and though the enemies

was

restrained

fire

yonies yfield of fires firec

all types , they

enemy t9nemy

oause cause to pause several casualties among oasualties amongamo-

ng troops.. troops.our troops* troo-

ps the Once
pense of about pens
rno no

ex were troops vrere stopped , they withdrew but at the ex- reared exex
poor Little or'

war and prisonors prisoners of vmr aml numerous casualties. mr amyl casualties. oasualtie
(

activity to the front

This

. . . was observed D.nd BlJoH' intimated reorganisation obeervecl Dandy Bloch intime.ted reorganiza.tion reorganiza.tionobeerved and such reorganizationreorganisationobserve Dnd such' intimeted reorganization reorganizati-

on for further attack.. attack

ng to

find out our

attemptingoorrect attemptilater proved to be correct , and in attempting positions th enenw itions airlrailrenew flank pas pitons , the enemy sent a patrol down the rail

line in a ine
nlagen large

wide sweeping move

to the southwest

and were oaught caught aught

aa in a-

bowl like

platoon.. * bowl-like ravine by the Ammunitions and Pioneer platoon

1414

Here

:;

e e'
'

.
,

III''

""

I
A-

enemy 'again , the renew suffered heavy casualties but in this abortion the the.again enenw gain oasualties action theaotion he-

p lat. Ot1 plat.don leader platdon platoonleader AP platoon -leader lat

&P .A&P A&P ''p A&P
.
.

platoon
:=

wa was waR
_

illeg- . killed.- * killed. killed,

.
_

Early ally arly arly

bby Company by ed

edoaand hasty interrogation of .8e r PjTHs _that _were oaptured capturedoapturedcapturo--L Deseveral Ms at !, e captured Piths !t _ 8e L ed
_ _

a
"

revealed the enemy strength renew enenw

VV The POWs PWs 'fhe PvV'' fhe PvV Me he PW's
'

was one

the battalion of thewhichwhich"whicarea Whioh which in this ar.ea "which

.

12th
"

S S

Panzer Division Palmer Pamer Division..

.

informationalso volunteered the information informat-

that they had been told there ion

.

were no U . S , troops U.S. U.S. US

hprobably 8emarch inarch oolumn probably explained the route inarching column formation and lack of se selaok 8ese lao se- 8e

acuity curity in the

,

mattock attack. initial attaokc. attack attaok

At

this time ,
""

it was

determined also determineddetermin-

P1Vt FlY's FlYs the Flays were part of a larger force and the von Rundstedt all-out Undusted alloutalloutaed P1yt' s

attaok attack ttaok

out
No se

order was taken from one or them. of them.

. What an hour .That That

ap- apbefore ap

all ap

fallout
aa e e to be a-.
e-.

pearled peared

to be

ncnv now a local attack was nO\v determined or believed Incan \ 100a1 a be nO leaved ttaok

taco

lieved

nlarge scale offense., nlagen soa1e offense.- . .large large offenoffense

aotion ocourred further abortion occurred for about action

one hour when suddenly Budden1y

a
aa-

o libre very heavy large caliber mortar barrage Davy h avy calibre lire

fell

on the

C.P.. C.P. Battalion C.P- . CP

.at F. Bookshop and oaused paused A. Buckshot Buckholz at . Buokholz caused

oasua1ties several casualties

theand destroyed the te-

battalion switchboard arstain

; telephone by emergency emel'"eenoy emeleenoy
'"

communing action Kent nd oommuni ation and telephone communication with regiment , butreg ent but Greg eomnunieation

means was

still

compoompaniescompaniesoompanies. companies. companies available to all oompanies.

Co.mpany Company L , Company
.

.Shortly after the hoavy attaok on Shortly h a heavy hoary attack anies

disin itsits
ramrods rardsyards400 yards Radrards

entirety went into position sentient

on the commanding : oomandine

terra.in terrain about

.

ya-

rds
nheld ane held

south of the isson

. battalion C.P.. CP

Germaand blocked the road leading from German Germwhich was

territory to Honsfeld Hosed

K

to the

; IM
NVY NY

of the 3rd Battalion BattalionBattali1100About 1100

-

and on the on

alternate route to
was
.

Butgenbaoh and Vervier.. Vervier.. Nervier

.

Company hours , C01Ilpany

, an estimated -two companies a.ttaoked alJ egtinlated two oompenies attaoked heavily attacked by alJ. edtimated bwo oompe.nies estimatedtwo oompe.niesetiolated Bo companiesestimated compani.

temes enemy tr oops and though Germans oame within 100 yards of thefoamed came troops of the

pestuous positions they failed to penetrate

hQur withdre\v. \ an hour withdrew.. withdrew withdre

and oa.sualties reoeive oasualties ble though the enemy did not receive heavy casualties
.

v.

and

otofot kabob aboub about tfafter abou'b three-quarters of

'

Casualties to

Company

neg1igblenegligible neg1igble negligble negligiin this fight were negligble-

three
quarters
,
he

failed inrailed Min

inis attack.- . his attaok.attaok. attack. attaok attack

attaThe

ck initial

attack

on the 3rd

Battalion

foamed came oame

from the southeast

1515

s.crong scrong e a and by e. sequence of scrounge probing action wad culminating strong abortion , -aad a optionedd aotion aad aotionaad oulminating
. .

amok e.t'' aok" aok"'on artache on attack"" 'on attack..on attack"on Akron aokon et aok attackon attack attack"
'.

attack
..
.

approve to approe.oh Q th _ te approach southland southwest- of tb 3rd _Battalion . _That _- he would of approeoh approach-south-and O\lthwest L the 3rg. _ f! 1 southwest- Tb 3rg woulsouthwestof \ outh 3rdBattalion. _ That-he-would southwest 3rdBattalion Thathewouldlthwest
. __
_

dlater soloed later suooeed date succeed

- . , , were south of this battalion for 8-10fOOO yards , there W9re no TJ . S , troops US . troo8-10,000 U.S. troops8-10.000 10fOOO 10,000 810.000 heo US 10.000 10000

ps

and any of the many roads and

apprecapproachapproach. . approach. approach

- 8"
'
"

Liam LIa'' LIa

.-

'

'

south O and
approach
_ _
_

Company K had company ompany

attempted to
_

lithest

sough tactios such taotics reoognized beoause in suoh tractions had to be recognized because to thethe tactics T-

rr
vrr off i
,

ad " "bunco "bounco-offw "bounce-off" unco-vrr" "bounco b "bounce j bounco" bounce

unco offw vrr" off"

.

thehein the
'
-

routtlrouand ;find a.. grotfind- routtl find' a routerout finda route

_

find
_

he
_
_ -

would That

trails

could be used as routes ofof

.Action of the 1st Battalion to the north would necessarily play Action neoessarily playiation
a tremendous influence on 3rd influenoe
abortions aotions Battalion actions , thus ,
: .

efly
sun arize summarize ummarize un

' brieflet's brieflyslets briefly

ly arise
y A
& B

bri-

prorress 1at the battle progress on i 1.at part of the sector.. seotor. seotor sector that
,

' CompanysCompany'sCompany's Companys Company Compan.

deafens formed a defensive defens ivo

iv

line running about

= ea.st a.nd south300 yards east and south south-

.

east of Losheimergraben

and protruded with exposed

Betweflanks.. Between flanks Between-

CompanyCompanen Compathe south flank of the 1st Battalion and the north flank of Company ny L6 yL L6

, there

had beeu a largo gap been bee large

.

in our lines

and

a to attempt to form aa--

lpine oovering com- com- com approa.ohes approaohes line covering the easy approaches in this area , the regimental comm ender maunder mander

nder had placed the 394tJl Info ntry 394th Infantry Inf entry
and

platoon IR platoon..
& I&R

Following the heavy heav-

yartillery barrage artillery

y A
&

at about

' CompanysCompany'sCompanys 0700 hours the enemy attacked Company's Companattaoked Company
or seiziof seizing seizing-

Loshe ergraben at Losheimergraben very heavily with the objective Lose serrate
.

ng cora.nding terrnin coranding the commanding terrain and the corning

i

vital

wes- . highway crossroads leading west west.,

outpostsoutpostoutposwere t.Initial assaults with tanks and infantry ware repelled but the outposts taru Initial taus & Co a r's workword' rs out of Company's A & B and the I&R platoon were cut off and further word ts Company IR si Companys
days was not heard from them tram

after the initial

had suoceeded succeeded

enemy

attaoks. attacks. attaoks attacks.

1n takingIn taking

taki-

ng thou ender than the tha enerj this position , tho enemy
Battalion

1stlet$ betvreen be 1en in driving between the 1st let

. and 3rd Battalion , thus , leaving the Ba.ttalion

latter in
The

a precariouspreoariouspreoarious precarious uproari-

preca-

rious
moving moting

andand posit a.ttacks developing posi tion position with enemy attacks developin both north and south anaous ion
.

surround thematizing threatening to completely surround. the battalion.. ba.ttalion. battalion

.

the ability of the-

1st Battalion to hold Losheimergraben

:

fromand prevent enemy armor profrom

SBSESE BSthe SB

rapidly west to join with

energy enemy armor approaohing from approaching

and converging on Butgenbaoh was questionable and appeared conwrging

to be limited

1616

'

un- unaunununa Luna unIn time unless heavy reinforcements were disDatohed i whioh was Unu- dispatched which dispatchedwhich in un dis'Datohed dispatchedJ dispatched

,,! ') )9th Divipion reserve. , e Surd Srd alikely l1kelj.. because even the 99th DivifJion reserve. . the 3rd Battalion , l1kelj boca-e l1kelj likely boca 9th Division
{

394th was engaged

e
.

dispatched
'
m M

J
ii-

fully. (17) fully*. ( ) 17

( See Map

C)

C.O- . COC.d. Cdaooordanoe In accordance with the developing threats , the Battalion C.O. C.d. CO Cd

.3rd Battalion , requested 3rd

nger never nevr new neVT anet neT

to withdraw to the north

NE and HE W

aJa to form a-

shorter line

and

to develop the defense of the 1st Battalionlet BattallIt Battalion

.. ,
_

regimentalright flank , thus ,. insuring better defense for the entire regimental regimethus ion fla.nk thus. sector. . sector sector. sector ntals
*

and

.
.

South aotion Suoh a.otion abortion Such action

.

was taken on the

initiative
.

BattalionCof the 3rd Battalion BattaliSE

. on C.O. .O. . with CO

Compaq Compa Companyr

ohe.nge direotion from trom ohenge swinging around to change direction tromp Cohen

to

SWSW W-

to gain

and maintain contact with oontaot

onto

1st the southern flank of the 1stframframe fromon the road leading from fram Frafro-

Battalion

oompany and anchor the company

m F. . Buokholz n Bookshop F F

. -. highvmy.. TLosheimergraben..Bullingen highvmy LosheimergrabenBullingen highway This to the Losheimergraben-Bullingen arterial highway. ThisLosheimergraben
WE NE

his
.o ft.
;

would plaoe Company L about 500 yards place

ft.\.o King ft..o ing .\ ancing facing

Bullingen Bulling
Company
K

right flank

high

advand of the railroad line and-

. southwest. southwest

mancy Company L and

highway. ighway. highway nhihvy. hihvy. chivy. hihvy

lithowithbook to pull baok to pos ition in line with back position ion thou F Buokholz-Loshefmergraben-Bullingen BuokholzLoshefmergrabenBullingenhBuokholzLosheimergrabenBullingenorthwest of tho F. Buokholz-Losheimergraben-Bullingen the . BuokholzLosheimergrabenBullingenhwas
M

CompallY Company Comply

was

to provide

Bookshop Bullingen Bulling Buokholz

MG
,

Loshefmergraben Losheimergraben

and mortar support though firestiresfires tirefiretires

theand the ch-

latter weapons QQ heavily woodedd area.. QQ.d eekily wood area

of of the
QQ.
.

were wero

HOPIS ' handioapped OPs lank of OP's greatly handicapped by laok of'' Bops lao OPIS

( See Map C ) Irlap

Ira

The withdrawal was withdravra.l withdravral

.

aooording progressing according to plan and

new

troopsall troops troohomone afforded one-

ps
eland and

were digging in

complies
>>

complies anent complishment of complisl nent

one nne half ne

at the

positions by

1500 hours which whioh

one-half nne-half hours of daylight for final preparation.. preparation

the plan
1600 hours was

aoac- . ao. aoSuooessful aoSuccessful ac. ao

. interrupted by an order from C.O. 394thCO. 394th

one

Infantry about

to send

platoon of

Compa.ny C Company IK
.

oocupyoccupyoccupy occupto oocupy

, ant defend Liie area and Lie ihe he

sough sucBookshop. suohsuchSohBuokholz. Buckshot Buckholz in the vicinity of F.. Buokholz Objection to such F Buckholz. Objeotion suoh

o move was made on a h

de toroe Gould dethe grounds that such a small force oould not de- tore could de

of' operationally pe.rtioulalparticularaoooup pe.rtioulalfend the area , to occupyr such a position would be of' no particularpe.rtioulal
.

parti-

cular
17
( (17))

advantage dvantage ,

and would only

platoonloss of platoresult in the 1088 of'' a badly needed platoon

on and weaken the

regtment. regiment right flank positions of the regiment.

A 4
A-4
1717

As

tLO\1' now above \ tLO outlined a.bove , the battalion was LLOIT ' minus LO
.

oon
.toon toon , ston ton

guna maohine gun Company machine guns , COlDpIU1J Company

K

, but thou objection tho ob jeotion emotion

1' 1
ELLIOT

CompAX1f Company

and I a.nd 1st PlatoonPlatoon

.

Plat.,

vres was Rees

amid ami" PIe- Plaami overruled'ami" the 1st PIe.Pla- overruledami Plax overruled 'and overruled' and PiPIe. PlaPIe overruled Pla
'
"

. Lt * under Lt Rose , executive officer of Company exeoutive offioer ot Oompany Lt.

X K

was dis- dais dis-

patohed patched

oarry to carry out the assigned mission.. mission hoary

About 1800 hours , the

a.nd and
.

dis pIa- pla- Apia plan pIaplapIa pla

toon , ton

by runner , reported
-

it

was

in position

withnot in contact with wri-

e lements- . enemy elements. lamentselements* elemelaments. laments

then lamepare for

.All troops continued to oontinued nts All

enemy

improve

positions in the

pre- new area.. and prearea

pre

attacks.. attacks*

AT

anbanmines were requested but never received and llever lever

MRS MSR

it

dit was

later lator learned the Regimental

tanks swinging swineine asinine
; .

greenback gemsbok genbaok genback by German tonhook enback

.
.

up

ohanging.. ohanging. changing. ohanging changing sca.rce hanging forms.ti.on tho.t receiv changformstion formation was scarce and that received was very hazy and rapidly changing.- . thot receiv-cd hanghot receive
-

ing

Pla- last Plax oontact \vith \ Deoember About 3000 hours , 16 December 1944 , radio contact with the 1st Pla 2000 vith oontactvith itch lst Plamovinga.rmor CompatlJ toon , Company K was gained and reported enemy armor could be heard moving Compact moviton CompatlJ" Vl8S ng Jared Lanzcrath- app ared . Theo Lanzcrath observed. The but not as yet observed Tho enemy armor soon appeared on the Lanzcrath* Blanca
"
. Vl8.S

cd
,
.

ButgButButvicinity But in the vioinity of But- in- from the south.. All situation in insouth in

cu.t was cut .

contact

fionsfeld Honsfeld Ronsfeld road finessed Rinsed Hosed

and Lt . Rose informed the Lt. Lt*

. C.O Battalion C.O. that CO stallion 00. 00 ttalion 0.0..

B
*

the
To
we

eneenemyenemy

my vms was

attaching at attacking
.

2030 hours and requested

was

help. additional help.

*

reinforcereinforce reinfobelievedbelieved believe-

rce pla.toon this platoon further

a d

considered inadvisable because what

hold S hOl a few hours

battalion could not long hold

.
, .

earlier could not

Shelnow be held held-

per- . . perC.O. company by a platoon or companythus the Battalion CO again requested per compe.ny.thus compenythus
F mission to withdraw the platoon from F ., F
vms was Bookshop Bubo Buo BuoKholz

oz olz , but this request too ,

manyrefusod.. Continued enemy armor movements were reported and many Marefused. refused refusod foryans ha.d a.round tanks had gone around the platoon and were bumper to bumper heading for
.
.

' Honsf'eld. Honsfeld. . Honsfeld ehanded Honsf'eld. Honsfeld. Honsfeld Hosed

By 2200

ha.d fiftyfivethours , the 1st Platoon had reported about fifty-five

.

n.ru tn.ru tanks tnru anks true

.

heatthatwith infantry aboard had passed through their position and that
2230

fifty five
.

, overrun. hery wore they were being overrun. At *

\ SE\.ying was reoeived saying many dying on received .ying
.

, the

last

messa.ge message from

.

pla.toonpla.toon platoon platothis platoonwere they were-

SE
to

casualties had been suffered

al1d and

surrounded.- * surrounded. . surrounded surrounded. surroundsurrounded

The

ed

enemyenemattaoked enebalance of the night the battalion was not attacked but enemy

ma

yarmr () armor was hoard heard armr

mv MY Lanz erath-Hons fe Id Lanzerath-Honsfeld Lan be moving NW along the Lanzerath-Eonsfeld road and

Hones Lanzerath Hons Honsfeld earth erath Eonsfeld Enfield Blazer Hosed

18

:t
"

1
1"

!'

\.'
' *.

"

140rning found morning

all

remaining oompanies companies

'" .

intact
.
.
.

and

-.

. . ..
.

further digging in turther

andindand

improving positions* isposing positions..

With

daylight , the

enemy

1stagain attacked the 1st lotletattaoked lot let bombing , and straf'straf'i- strafistraf-' strafe strafstraf'

Losheimergraben Battalion at Losheimorgraben after a heavy shelling ,

straf

ng. * King ing . ing.

ing
on ed

otofThe . attaok was again repulsed and the right and southern flank of aga.in ot The.attaok Heatstroke The. attack The
.
_

ten atta.ok her the regiment was intact* About 1500 hours , another attack attaok intact. intaot.. intaot
.

was launched launchedlaunchimim-highly im imim

both the 1st a.nd 3rd battalions and further defense ba.ttalions let and
.

wa waa Wada wad

regimont proba.ble probable and the regiment was notified of such.. such
.

Loshe ergrabenBul1ingentfurringen Lose ergraben-Bul1ingen battalion motors were sent to Murringen via Losheimergraben-Bullingen Losheimergraben furring lberta Urine LosheimergrabenBullingenhighway ray hi vray as a
movement NE from Honsfeld by Honsfe1d

Hosed
,

the
.

Bul1ingen Bullingen ergraben Bulling serrate

( See ISap 1i3.p Map 1i3p Sap
.

About 1600 hours , all allA-

Germans would have trapped trappedB)

trapp-

all vehioles in the 1st ed vehicles

draw

and 3rd

; ar a bal.talion area (18) baltalion a.r a. 18 battalion area.. ( )

.

with- At 1630 hours , a message was received for the 3rd Battalion to with withreoeived
to the high-ground east of Murringen

ground high
nnd and nd
.

Urine and prepare

oompany company went

there- . positions there.- * there. there

K

About 10 minutes

later an order

was received attaching Company reoeived attaohing

to thethe

1st Battalion

ccordanoe in accordance that

elongalong into positions alongalo'

ng uhe uhe ate the the he

Losheimergraben-Butgenbaoh Losheunorgrc.ben-Butcenbaoh Losheimergroben-Butcenbaoh road Losheunorgrc.ben Losheimergroben Losheimergraben Butgenbaoh Butcenbaoh

:

mV' mV Losheimergraben.mV'of Losheimergraben.. mVof Losheimergrabexuabout 400 yards NW of Losheimergrabexu mV Losheimergraben

The 3rd

Battalion
.

now
M

consisted of Battalion Headquarters

( minus

ComCompany , Com- Com

pany L, a.nd Company and panky

As

k6 1st L. ,6 platoon ) . L 6 let k ,6 L6

,

, advanoeadvancethe battalion unite were withdrawing from positions and advanoe advance units yere ere
,

adv-

ance

elements beginning preparation of oppositions ofpositions positions east of Murringen ,

waswaUrine it was

learned that thou steland tho the

Germans had oaptured Hunningen captured Shunning

. * , ''the Regimental C.P- , C.P. the C.P CP.

.

. highwa.y. Hishighway This.location , and appeared to be moving north to the main highway. This location

sing ion Urine south and west which was to be the 1st let heo
.

inform ..tion revealed that Murringen would have to be defended from theinformation the tha.t tion T-

'beak taker taskbeak taskupon with- withBattalion 394th 'takr upon with * task
The 2nd

drawa1 Loaheimergraben drawal from the Losheimergraben drawl

was

.and being heavily assaulted and penetrated and was of necessity going goinassaulted-and neoessity goingassaulted
.
-

g to to withdraw to the west

bE ). Etta 1

and
a.nd and
.

area.* area.

task

Battalion , positions retrograde

on the north ,

and take up defensive

on the north ofof

movement of allballal-

ten completing the 3rd Battalion , thus , oompleting the

regiJnent E tta ions battalions of the regiment iterations reinvent b

first

all

forming a new line on the more open and

18

( ) (18)

A 4
A-4
l9
1919

. I
, .

I I.

'

;!

u J
ub:

, ,

'

ot Murringen.* better terrain of IMurringen. etter rringen. rringen cringe

.

Urine ( See ) n\Jt Ra.tions days Rations had not been received for two daya and day n Jt ed to obtain them upon arrival in Murringenj, but about Murringen Urine
Map
C
\

it was
town

hopedurgently hoped hop-

1300 hours

Deoem17 Decem Decem- DeoemDeoem Deem

beer ber ,

kitohens the regimental kitchens

had withdrawn from iran

that

sunken w1knoww1known unknunkn unkunknowto an unknown unk-

notting nlocation to the northwest to avoid the nown location

o- Butgenbaoh. ; Butgenbaoh south in the vicinity of Butgeribaoh* vioinity of- Butrenbaoh.. Bulgaria Butrenbaoh heo Burden
. f

Garman forces Gorman forgoes moving up from the German foroes theAn

T-

cates carte cate the kitchens and cats ki tohens tokens

10lo- officer was dispatched to 10offioer lo10 lo / ' I' I and return with rationsand finally caught up with oaught vtith rations , and tithe wriaught with-

rations
J
'

/ '

them tten
,

Kr inke 1 t inked It inks at Krinkelt but Trinket

vvas enemy armor was vas

King enter ing entering the

f"roJn .the northtown iVom .the north northlfrond troika froJn i roia ion
"

and enemy

shelling

was heavy and

mowment moment continuous.* oontinuous.. choontinuous continuous. Further movement of thethe th-

tones vily

servioe service esauri eerio

train

was necessary and neces sary nieces scary

after an a.ll night all

. . Ca.mp Camp

movement on heavily heavily-

hailshea-

oongested congested roads ,

. Dnd and north D.nd west nor Dandy west..

it

finally stopped at

Elaenborn tar Elsenborn , far to thetethe Eleanor

S4646-4 battalion S-4

Complete lack of aggressiveness of the laok lao

.
'

BatJGfllion had thus paused the 3rd Battalion caused oaused

opera.te without Class to operate 'w'ithout Glass I

'

IIIand III

S 6 4
,

supplioB supplied supplies of any type for two days and nights supplios nights..

capacapableOnly through the capable

as brought forward asforwardiasforwardias forward forwa.

ble - ' hen the Battalion S-416 S-4's S-4' 416s rd 4's 4s
on
a.nd and
.
.

work or members of the of

&

thus the

A &

4' S 4
P

platoolw platoons platoon

wae 8 was vms wade ammunition

punition unition

or of the regiment did not in any

.

8J11lm.1nition8J11lm1nition8J11lm1nition 8J11lm.1nition way handle ammunition ammrnitionammunitionammrnition ammuniti-

suppunneoessary pla.toon distanoe supplyplatoon did much unnecessary long distance supply
needed tasks urgently needed..

Gould ha.uls elarus lhauls oould hauls and could not properly perform other

ff 1
.

-rh | ( ly rh 1.
eB< el

&

/ P J"
CP-

J
"

constructed road blocks would have onstructed blook look bookshelves blookhave
,

,;

adval impeded the enemy Advil e advance

as greatly as-

their hier

movement was confined a. oonfined a

great deal to roads easily blocked* blockedblooked- . blocked. blooked. blooked looked
preparing battalion in preparing-

.Desperate work was accomplished by the aocomplished Desperate

prep.

aring
nley ha.d had boon on a.d bean
.

: lu1urringen 1urringen positions at Murringen but at about

enemy had nley

Urine

theDeoember He0200 hours 18 December 1944 , the

.

outflanked
unable
enemy

it

a.nd soul sotJ-- 'because on the north and sou, - ' because the 2nd Ba.ttalionh'. Ba.ttalion BattalionBattalion sotJbecause sotJ southeaster Battaliso'
"'

so sot

oonduot to conduct conduit

an organized and

orderly withdrawal
Two

todue to

te

heavy the hea.vy

.

pressure and difficult terrain. diffioult terrain.

theoompanies of the companies

1st Battalion
. hea.vy heavy

eaoh had only 15 or 20 personnel Leah each

left

as a

theresult of the th-

ee fighting at
a defense
Q e a
Q.. Q.

unab e Loaheimergraben Losheimergraben and were subsequently unable nab

T (J t119 To the

organizeorganizto organize

Murringen at Murringen..

Urine

Rookerath)f north (of the 394th Infantry at Rookerath ProvokBroker

er

. a.nd Kr inks and Krinkelt

It Trinket heavy fighting

was

plaoe place taking pla.oe with the

.

Germans making king

20

. . ,. I-

: Mkb I Mkb , : , , ;;. . Kb Iamb

'

'

"

"

. .

]. : . . . . 11.. . .11. 11
. . . .

. ' r.t' rt
. ,

'

:. . . .. . '

::

'

"

"

.:

.. : _ ' . -- :

.. .

:__

,. .

;.

'; .
.

:;:
.

. j
b-

j-

'

.
T

'

, a

I
i..I.I

progress against stiff' resistance but this drive ooupled with the enemymproves coupled enemy stiff' resistamse enemenemEngel enel\Y enelYene\ enel
,

my

emy ythrust from the Butgenbaoh-Bullingen area in the south threatened thethrust tethe Butgenbaoh

enier
was

h8J1d aooord1Dgly Neenoiroler nt encirclement of the 394th Infantry 8J:1d accordingly a withdrawal NVT and Nw1thdra\Val NW \ .l Anwithdraw VT enoiroler enforcer w1thdra NV: .
hW h"W

Bullingen Bulling
'
+

Y
en-

wsroom "Wfrom Wfrom tifoam Tfrom Murringen by the regiment commencing from cormmenoing oommencing

Urine
'
*

at

0246 hours 18 December 1944Deoember 1944

.

Vall

"

f8WJeff eot darken ees * fewa f8W darkn Rees effeo't , an-1 'WLh eff effeot an WLh in effeot8HMUthse in darkness with visibility limited to a. few effect aM Walsh fevisibilit

et 1

west . feet. feet * feet. feet drawal drawl

Enemy Enema Enemf

looation location

and

penetrations were
enemy and

unknown and

with- with-within the with-

from lrringen Murringen lurringen !

luring Urine
.

l to Krinkelt inkjet Trinket iUkelt

friendly

orossedcolumns crossed crosscrossedorossed

and intermingled with each other and ed

The ble

mot.ora motora motor battalion motors

mentor King upon boring Krinkelt ran antoX'ing on-boring entor' ing Kr ; antoXing Trinket anteing Michel
-

aborting through the vehicle drivers acting on their aoting vehiole ndhog

on iucelt
snow covered
vms was
.

foe friend or toe

was unreoognizab1e. . unreoognizab1eunreoognizab1e.unrecognizable.unreoognizab1e unrecognizable. unrecognizable unrecognizaenemy armor and andsa-

into

esoaped arousoaped around initiative escaped around, . '

-

tom throu the town through nd tovm thou h

difficult

snow-covered fenced
impossible.. impossible

was- accompliwas aceomplished.wu. accomplishedwasaceomplished. wu ace-omplished. acc'omplished. fields wa * acc'omplished.- * accomplished . omplished. comprised

shed
Convoy

oontrol control at this point

Due

to the

ace
.

munerous internumerous inter inter-

mingling of friendly and enemy forces from Jtoringen to Trinket , no 1erurringen o1lurringen nKrinkelt noTouring
wasbond o.nd waond ptioned pitohed battles were fought and with few exceptions the withdrawal was pitched exoeptions oticed

Stloc.essfully Stlocessfully ssuccessfully successfully Stressfully

.

aocomp1ished accomplished on the

cor any company coir hor corflpany horman

leadership. . leadership
and

ugh
Krinkelt Trinket
394tl1 394th 94tl1

throughhen a line running generally east and west through throdisorganized3disorganizedreached Wirtzfeld was Beached , protection for the disorganized Withed wa.s eaohed
/ Thong Vthon I/hen 1en
V .

of exoellent action of'' excellent

a.ndanda.nd squad , platoon ancand

Infantry

393rdwas afforded by elements of the 2nd Division and 393rd toContinued movement to

Infantry

. . enezr.y. enezry enemy Regiment which were holding the enemy. emery

te

easternarmaments Easterthe northwest found the remanents of the 394th Infantry at the eastern Elsenborn side of Elseriborn by 0700 hours Desertion tide Eleanor
19 December Deoember

1944

t al st
modal m Meal moal

to receive their first reoeive firstfirsfir-

in three

days and be out of

range.- . range., light artillery range ran- *

ge The

action of the past three

Dnd and
Dandy . D.nd

man anddays had acoounted for many men and accounted da.

offioers officers ndifies

ariless srifles rifles

upon

a.vailable arrival at Elsenborn the only equipment available Eleanor

was wewa-

and a few

light
.

a8lit1m"m"jrt ( 8lit1mmjrt 81 upply.diBrrztohine gauge -and guns-and supply a "upply dis; machine guae --and two 81mm " mortars.. ' - " upply.diBmaohine guaeand mortars, nappy dais- garland npply dis upply d a runs.-and t"marts : upply.diB.
" . , .

guns runs. runs and

,

s.upply.diB tmarts supply s.marts s. supply

.

hipline cipline irline

B* had been relatively good but ae-- nearly rela.tive1y Benearly Be Beanery relative1y

; nee.r-mountainous terra.in near-mountainous withdrawal was through mountainous terrain and knee-deep snow , r
.
.

boost ene oost supplies. coupled ooupled with fierce enemy attacks had cost dearly in supplies. oupled rouped fieroe Rene w attaoks

cs s-\ \

gunners and anti-tank crews had remained \,{ ore\s

hine

tank ore anti

nee.r near ne'er

2121-21 21 21
-

all

movement

during thethe
gr-.
l

deep knee

;/

'

'f f
'

MachineMachine Mac-

at their

weapons

firing untiluntil

".

'

1 ./
1-

the

poss ib 18 n ..nay ha.ving nay mt.ny atterlmutiny mtny astelast possible moment thus having to abandon many weapons Latter afteratter after 57rmn 57mrn image destruotion snrmy limited destruction.. Movement of the 57mm anti-tank guns over snowy imited destruction sentry riated destruotion. snowsnrm.

yfields by the inadequate 1J.a.t 1Ja.t 1Jat fields i

.

6 6x6 +;,
.

hes oaptured the weapons were captured by

- - - .

tank antiiwp-Wible and thustruqfc pr ruac. prig--mover ma. UJp11 ible ruac Plano .tr race mover w iwp tr .pr thru prig ma Wible Wile thus Iwo thus'
Q
.

q } prlrao . mover WU .UJp11 "ible a.nd thus&* .mover w& itnp7s3: dibble thrusthrusthus'. . -

"

'
-

enemy troops.- . troops. troops

Elements of the 2nd Division , 393rd Infantry , a.nd 395th Infantry and 396th InfantryInfan.

were

try still
Belgium
I. ) I . vent3ng rent 3.ng venting
.
e

or ofNsuooessfully successfully holding near Krinkelt and north /with units orwith of northwith Trinket forthwith with /
moved up from

orth let ten the 1st Division hastily

the

rest area

near Aubel , Abel

.

to counterattack oounterattaok
the
enemy from

and defend

in the

pa- prButgenbaoh area. tkus prearea . prpreIarea, thus pre- -

pre prpr

driving north to trap the

2nd and 99th

. * Divisions. Divisions

19

( ) (19)

. Reorganization of the U.S.. lines tr.3. tr3. US tr3

was

urgently

theohebneeded and under thecTathe

homa
oonnnand oommand command onnnand ommand domad

99thof Major General Robertson of the 2nd Division , the 2nd and 99th
' .

has'tily ga.thered Divisions hastily gathered positions

on

all available units

( ) (20)-

and prepared

orgaorganize to organize-

, tIle Eleanor Heighths Eighths 4000 nize the Elsenborn Heiphths about 4,000 yards tm road junction twin Elsenborn.. (20) oad Elsenborn 20 Eleanor 20al
: tnwn irnvn of Irvin

east of the vitalrvital vit-

Early in the morning of

mpanies I and pansies panies
K

19 December Deoember

ComCo- the 3rd Battalion minus Com

M

, and the 1st Platoon of Company

and began

assembled on thethe th-

eastern side of Eleanor Elsenborn eater

. Mattie mantic wea.pons matio matic weapons

auto to reorganize , distribute the auto- ; =

left , distribute supplies ,

the

'

and replace leaders replaoe da days , the morale of

hadhathat had

dean been

lost., With lost. 1ith

first

meal

in three

person- personperso- * all person

-

. enemy\ 11e1 noel . enemy. enemy nel went up and everybody was again anxious to stop the enemy. About
: !

'

n J

1000 hours

the regimental defense order

was

received and

we

thetefind the

King location fo11 ing looatiol battalions in the following locations.. locations arstains

The 3rd
.
, .

Battalion

was

tethe in the-

prams Dragprespraspras Dras. sector Drabs Drenorth half of the regiment seotor on Hill J5J3S? just east of the Drag nor ho.lf holf Dras Hill. Hill. 59

erver river. . arier river. river

.

The

1st Batta.lion Battalion

.
'
-

was

regimentalin the southern half of the regimental regime-

re- '' .sector and the'2nd .sector re = the2nd -607 sector Elsenborn nd the' sector on Hill 607 due east of Eleanor , a-nd the 2nd Battalion in re- re 991 11111607 ntals 11111 99.1
' .
-

' ;

MIRMIftor Misfit MitMIR. Miventer serve in the oenter of the sector a.nd 1000 yards to the rear of the MIft.. aarva MIR seotor and MIft enter larva
.

vas nor 39th rth 39 1 Infantry was in position north1 of the 3rd Battalion
.The The ten

and thethe
( See Map
C

324th Engineer Combat Battalion south of the 1st Battalion. Ba.ttalion Battalion. Enr.ineer Enrineer .;
.

19 A-3 ((20)) A 20
( (19))

A 3
A-3
22

. ' i ,;
'i.. . . .,. **
'

1
11-

About 1200 hours , Company Accompany Cconpany Compa.ny

.

rejoined

and the

defense battalion defensedeferamrods yarrardsyardsroadabout 500 yards rards yard-

consisted of nseless
.

Company
"

on the
.

left with the left flank

enemy

tromp .trom arm .trom a neck of wOr."ds wOrds trom neok woods from ds from neo ster fr an
.

protru.ding protruding from the

positions

operopenand on an open openha-

nded a.nd and

.

fon7ard s barren forward slope well within small lope

.

range arms ran e of enemy outposts outposts.- , . outposts.

outp-

osts
,

WB was Company L WB. $ on

the

left flank also

yards from the enemy held woods to renew enenw

1500on a forbad open slope but 1500 1600 forward forvrard - 81mm 8lmm our front The 81mra mortars of ComCo- Com * front..

mpany mpony pony M pany II panky

supported the front line

rifle
.

.from companies from one

.

position

undandand

one machine gun ( junk jun

was vlith each platoon vms with ea.ch lithe

company. corapany company rifle corapany.. orphan

*

. .The ba.-tta.lion re rebattalion re- -

andand serve consisted of the few remaining personnel of the Ammunition sanoonDisted remaininc persormel

ba. re
stallion tta.lion
de.vmdawnde.vm devm and dawn dawdvm de.

dpiper platoon Pioneer

and the anti-tank: platoon anti-tankk anti-tam platoon.

ses
man a.nd and .nd
.

592- . slope of Hill 592 , 592. 592

tankk tam tank anti

in position

on

reversethe reverse rever-

- Dece beer Deice ber Durian .During During .Durin the night of 19-20 December , elements of Durin noir nir
.
:

19 20
.

InfantryaInfantry the 395th Infantry-

.the : nur Divi.sinn Krinkelt throuEh inure the 2nd Division withdrew from Trinket through our Divisinn
.

lines

December Decelrber Deceirber tickling Declarer ba v Decelr.ber ai .in found. tJc.lion n 20 Deceir.ber again found the battalion in a front in tJclion , ith tams t -ood Pleural dofonsive t.hi t.imo itch utt time tMs timo in a..ood natural defensive position ,with thin this stood Iletural doc t.hi t ood Ile.tura.l dofcn ive tts ths thi od man vritIi thong equote a.nd \'ri th android and with more tho.n adequate artillery support.. Al support All thon equo.te a.nd'ri .nd viii than e quote 'ri andri ri

of
.

(;

butbubaline position but b-

. Timor

a.. \
.

' ::

()

dive

"

long fields of fire fireafirelonfBloomfield lonf lonffields lon

; -

\'

e..

].

ar nition : notion anmunition obtainable ammunition ,

' forautOlnntio 'I'reapolW were anti-to.nk Firepower anti-tank mines , and automatic weapons' rare in position and prepared for weapon's rere foAtlantic IreapolW 'rere Tonka to.nk tank -the nerl cnemy attack.. About 2000 hours , 20 December the enemy launchedla.unchedla.unched rte ref the nearly launched rte next onemy attack the rerfc enemy a launchettaok. ttaok taco
. ',

anti
.

=
.

'

a. a. a d

: obstacle o.btack tremendous tank and infantry attack but tromendous fires from the 99th and obtack fran
.

2nd2nd

co.mpletelyco.mpletely Division Artillery batty lions lasting forty-five minutes completelycompletely battalions batt comple.

tely

routed the attack.. attaok. attaok attack

None off of

the

; ..nks -uanks inks enemy infantry :{ oruanks were able toTuanks infantry drunks wore a.ble to nks infantr or yanks
.

forty five

be roach our positions and the screaming of the wounded Germans could beorah
da1"lmcss.darlrnoss.da1lmcsshoard tho remaining hours of darkness* r arraigning heard the rarnaining da1lmcss. darlrnoss. da1lmcss head thou rnaininG h0urs or da1"lmcss.. darlrnoss raininG
"

The
.

- December round continuouscontinuousrperiod 21-27 Docenfuer found both forces performing continuous
duals taking vioious patrolling with frequent vicious artillery d "ls takingls tak"

27 21
23

reconno.iOGanC econno.iOGanC reconnoiOGanC reconnaissance placket place. place.. placet place

ing ing

Company

' Cflmpany Plethora. .of.Xampany. * f ." Flippancy Platoon oiCampany I and the 1st Ple.toor. oi'"Campany. Pletoor ofXampany
.
. . <

iceman Oxfam
.

r.eturned returned
.

3rd to 3rd-

Battalion oontrol Battalton control

ppositions positions

! ' . L'sa.nd immediately LsSuDecember and inmedia.tely took over Company Ls L's inmediately
.

be'oming be '; om.ine pposition beoming position with the latter becoming; the battalion reserve omine ba.ttalion mine
.

up and taking upsu-

on

the next

terrain feature to the rear at

yardsabout 800 yards

distance. . ( ) distance. (21) distance 21

21 A-5 A
( (21))

25'i2523 25

(,

11 "

'

/ -I

'

The

division
war

commander cmmnander

desired aggressive patrolling and

enemy

comsomsome

eprisoners of prisoners parison

to gain intornat1on about the information

to

our

assfront as

aintlier
ut

intelligence about the

:

Germans Germane Gremlins Geraane was completely laok171gfll,, Gernlins * as ' con lately lacking. 'con 'o6 letely o6 commander
.

. downplayed oomplianceoar.rplianceoowpliauoeoarrpliance oar.rpliance compliance oowpliauoe In oompliance compliaairplane

nce this the regimental with regiJnental

snosendordered the 3rd Battalion to send

enemy

penetra.te out a strong patrol to penetrate the

held woods and continue tooontinue to held

te

the road running north from Roolcerath in Rookerath Frolicker Broker

previ"Us reoonnaissanoe patrols previous reconnaissance patrol , previUs
"

German

territory.* territory.

FromFrom

awns wns it was

oonfirmed confirmed

that the

out- enemy out-

out

writhe ; posts were along the edge of the woods vrith their main line of resistancea.long rosistancewith resistance rosistance edeo resistanedo
.

ce well prepared automatic weapons automation of automatio

proteoted positions protected by riflemen inin

about yards. habit three hundred yards.

to reoonnaissanoe reconnaissance patrol had been allowed toGermans had outcutcuout cut loosed olosed then closed in and mo-

outer the enter oter 1e

woods

previously and thou tho the

tter

uthier escape their

but
.

two mon had suoceeded men succeeded

.

in returning to

our limos and lines land0ur linos and.

grave gave gavo this valuable information.. gao valua.ble information informf.ltion. informfltion

' Which Wi'ch Wich With

pla.nsImo wledge Ivory knowledge vary oareful pla.ns plansplastknmledge very plan" ledge this knm"ledge vory careful plans
. was made available.- . a.vailable.a.vailable. available. available

were made ner mnde ered monde

for the patrol

and

artillery support

availa-

ble

hQurs one About 0700 hours 27 December , ono Deoember Deoomber

.

rifle

legitilightplatoon with a section of light seotion

. Huns . Comoomrnand maohine CUllS atbached machine guns a.ttached from Company I under the command of Lt ComfortCOmpD.l " Moorland Conriany COmpDl doorman oormand Corrigan Comply macies ; uns attached Lt. Comfort

fort yard for. contact with the ocast

.
:

' moved for.-yard and successfully SUOOF.ssi'ully rard forward SUOOFssiully fo ramrod
.!

for
.

penetrated the woods.. vroods. vroods woods roods

300 was

ra.dioradioradio Excellent ra.dio radi.

SR patrol by SCR
}

househourmaintained and at 0930 hours

Hough father safter hard going t ough very through after

sncnrs snmrs deep snows the sinners

.

patrol reported

a sharp sharpshar-

pie fight a.t at fire

and ca.ptured the main enemy position a.nd captured several prisoners.- . prisoners. prisoneprisoners enenv Geneva
.

rs
.

For bout about

pC .trol troll

' ha.d pC\.trol \ pC.trol leodor reJortGd patrol leo.dor reported he had reached the road and was returning butpstool leader [ buretur11il'lb bugretur11illb but eatre .
.

forty five
fire to

forty-five minutes contact

was

lost but at
was

110urS theste1045 hours the th-

report

e
. :wo-e were we.e we.e woe wee wer e're

yout about fifteen bout aboo bout

minutes

later another report

theyreceived saying they therhe-

ey wo
small stall
hed the

thHeavyHeavy Head-

in

a a.

very heavy

fire fight fieht filet

;

a.ppeared and appeared

.

to bo surrounded. . be surrounded

arms

our

front

was Mills 'MlS MlS

' >

fromheard but no further reports from frot-

patrol

were heard and none of the personnel perscrmel perspire

returned.* returned. to the

From allProm alli-

indications ndications , the eviations

. enemy had gained enough time due ha.d ained aimed

deep

all penetrationpenetration penetratiThe TeTh-

. on bring up strong reserves and completely overwhelm the platoon. pla.toon.. oompletely to platoon

\ vas \vas einformation gained from this patrol was negative and the cost was very patrolvas information nderization
'

patrol
2424

!I 'tI tI
iiI '

t
/ t/
.

t- t

'"

y ,1 ,,1.11

shing ono reinforced on high with one reinforoed platoon being completely lost. loot. loot lost.
_ .

The battalionbattalion.cbattalion battalio-

ao ommanders dexs oommanders commanders .commanders des

n alion

. d,3 nsnowex-e nowwere now blading d3 n sending out thi. wex nows lding obj.otians ob,4eations original objections to Be !ld.ing out. this patrol ware snothin objotians t t$ ob4eations thi
,
, .

wballed faots.- * facts.backed with fagots. acked faots. facts. faots facts

cts
' w'ith with ieth

fa-

e
ex
-

batt,

s Deoember About 1700 hour , 28 December , hours

the

enemy

thea again a. heattacked ttaoked but the staked

.

weight of the blow wing

fell

on

gaa the 1st Battalion to our right with a-

eightoompany. company. oompany* fight glancing lancing blow on our right company. After a very sharp two hour fight-

Sforced forced to withdraw orbed

self
self-propelled self- , ropelled selfropelled propelled self- propelled
;>

guns , ns

artillery ,

.W' asw S W .S was and small arms , the enemy wasabs'

and had not penetrated more than 25 yards

at

anyany

plaoe. place. , place.. plaoe. place plaoe place

yeas . was VieS This Vi'e.S the

'

last of the

' ; enemy attempts atteXCJtts atteX'CJtts attracts

394th to penetrate the 394th-

sector.Infantry seotor.- , sector. seotor. seotor sector. sect-

or
The ys was due va \va tars \va

thou asuelties incurred durinc . da.ysdaysdays ma.jority the asue.lties inured durian majority of tho casualties inourred during; the next few da.ys da. .

Rene w ene to the enemy having observed

artillery fire

on our positions positionspositio*

ns The ns

paused nun rouse and by the sub-zero weather which caused numerous whioh oaused ntun rous
"

,; exooeded the tvo rate of attrition ca.used "by these two factors often expended theexceeded caused b :{ by
,
,

zero sub

evacuations. evacuations evacuatiofrost bite evacuations.- .

to

Raythreplacement rate.- . rate. rate eon On Deco mber Deo amber Volksgrenadler 30 December , Volksgrenadier VolksErenmdior

units

were

identified to

our front frontfron-

Hans and the Germans had assumed a defensive role.- , Gen ans defenoive role ted role.. ' ' ANALYSIS AND) CRITICISM CRIIICISMCRI'I'ICISMCRITICISMAM CRI'I'ICISM CRIIICISM CRITICIS-

M A

study of this series of operations indicates that the battalion battalionindioates battali.

vivo two bvo on initially assigned tvvo initia.lly assi/ned 'bvo ! bo

was

beaabdholding be reg ental dental holding an open divi8io and regimental flank , and could not clearly beGreg olearly redivision

ass assi ned

/
,

'

andlanlandiv'isions missions , of being the divisions reserve and

'

con pitted oommitted committed ominated omitted

carry to oarry out either hoary

one on

to the fullest extent.. All initialtextent initial initiextended necessarily over extendedneoessarily
norththe north Nor-

roop dispositions troop dispose pitons ator dispos itions

nded
.

tw-o taint reasons.. two beoa.use of tw.o main reasons beoause because tw utain
. -

in the

aroma ware aroa Ardennes area were

exte-

First - the Allied attack to

beck

required re lired a great th laired

baaing baing being

many
fawn

troops with the

availabletotal Allied divisions available availaU.S.- * U.S-

, SmUS. beC se U.faw U.S. US ble relatively few for the frontage and ; secondly , because of the US . ArdermesArdennesAirdromes army Ardennes .Army's ArdennArmy's belief that the Germans would not attack through the Ardermes Arr 's Armys Airdroattaok Arms S. ''s
Barr. . Arr.

es

mes and thus our troops

area. in that area

were

sprea- * spread.- , spread.. thinly spread

d
26iiasas ba26

.
.

. *
"

,.

J /
TJ-

he

' The 394th Infantry In1'antry In1antry

carry de in attempting to oarry out the aggressive de- hoary dede

.
,
, .

fense in fens
flank. . flank. ern flank

oomcom- Loshoimergraben Loshaimergraben a.rea a.lthough oomthe Loshe liner grab en area although not being in direct com.although Lose oom com noboom
. . :
.

mavd mand mard of the 3rd Ha.ttall.C'n required . ' nard mad HattallCn Battalion .required Chattel jrequired
}

it

proteot to protect the regimental southern southernSouthaooepted defenseof accepted defense roomette defensdefeThe

To

adequately protect this open flank , the battalion should adequataly shouldshoul1at that mission
and by

have d've had only

applioation all application

parried ohanges., ohanges. changes. dootr ines nse Hines doctrines should have oarried out several changes carried door ibilities line position
distance of istance
8

as albattalion as-

F Buckshot frontlocated at P. BucWiolz was , although the division reserve , in a front F Uncial P. Buckholz
' on the flank'Vrith no friendly troops i'riendly flankVrith iriendly flank with
'

flank

aa to the south for ad--

to

10 thousand

! one yards.. None of the yards fone

incompanies were unin

prepared defensive positions and

proteotive final protective

mortar and artilleryartillery

ery fires
one Rene ean ene

artill-

were not planned . planned.

.

This in conjunction with one oonjunction

.

rifle

Andundoompany andcompany and

ma.ohine maohine machine gun platoon leaving the lea.ving

battalion

Deoember on 12 December and being being-

attaohed attached to the 393rd Infantry until

King

23 December paused Deoember caused oaused

weaken- weakenfurther weaken

L. L Compa.ny LCompany B-

ing of an already precarious position* position.preoarious position.. positi-

on

The companies oaripanies airplanes

plaoed of the b . "battalion battalion were poorly placed with stallion .ttalion ttalion
"

being the only eing

one 011e

a in a. semi-ready position to
.

company omancy covered the

Anti-guns .Antiguns were guns ducating Anti

ad
ns

\Vhich vas Vhich \ which was an Vhich \vas \Chitchats Vhichvas

roa.d Lanzerath roa.droad rorailroad route of approach but the Blazer roadovereooverodequally good or better route was not adequately covered overrode, ooverod.* ooverod.
.

ready semi

moet an

attaok. Chirattack.. Thisattaok attack This

not in position to cover this road and mines and motheroover otherother over
. Compa.ny Company

board bloak employed road bleak methods were not employed.. block

tot, although ready toto

positionsBuckholz F Bookshop aled take a position south of F , Buckshot , did not have prepared positions positioF. Buokholz
and thus
; pmrrervas paver vas greatlYIeakened weakened defensive pmrrer \vas grea.tlYIeakened. merrier \ its defenl3ive power was greatly ,weakened.. prefabs
' .

ny good positions about 800 had ood od Franken rivor , j.t could have Frankie ri vor jt or rrain river it
.

greatly
Company
M

Ha.d Had
.

companycanpanycanpany compathis company

theF. yards south of F , Buckholz along the teF. Buckshot

defended

initially but

no doubt would wouldwoul.

have d've had the

right flank turned

and could not

suoh a posit n such in sough a. position

gavegavaveave havehave
.

eling long ling delayed an aggressive force.. force

morta.rsmorta.rs mortarsmaohine guns and mortars machine mort-

ars

were not properly employed as ''both were proporly both

reservein the battalion reserve

res-

defensiveinoreasing defenerve and could not perform their mission of increasing the defensive

position

sives

of strength of'' the

rifle

companies and the oompanies

battalion. battalion,.

With an

all

all-around around

2626

Il. "Il. w Il !

p. w Il
"

.. .
.

'

prepared defense in the P , Bookshop area , the battalion could have repared F Buokholz Gould havoould havF. BuoWiolz
ebetter delayed the better .vailable. . vailable * valuable vailable. vailable
whee wThe The

Boil

enemy Rene ene

but the entire battalion position

done by Company L Oompany
-

' . 'W'8.S W8.S was W8S

'

a- tow tonot A.aA.

A- . F

excellent work
along the

star-Ping in stopping the

attack aled attaok erman German

dly take
ing
King

up a

hasty make-shift defense

'

it

make shift

line rail

rail-line enabled the battalion

and prevented

Ping star

initito hurriedly hurriedlyhurrie-

initialGinitial

the

enemy tromp separat trom 8eparat separat- separatseparate 8eparat- from 8eparat-

from the other

regiment.the'regiment. the'regiment theregiment the regiment.* regimunits of the' regiment.

therein

The ent

battalion

commander ocTmnander

displayed intelligent

with- withinitiative in with

:
.

drawing and defending

BuBuokholz-Losheimergraben Bookshop inerrable but astride the F. Buokholz-LosheijTiergraben road butLosheijTiergraben Losheimergraben F. Buokholz-Loshe n.ergraben Buokholz nergraben bpaused and caused the 3rd oaused
withdrawwithdraBattalion to withdraw
enemy

uts positions sch

sough suoh such

were weakened by the heavy enemy pressure on the 1st 1stlotlot

Bookshop Loshe Buokholz Lose

Losheimergraben Lcshetmergraben Battalion at Lcsheimergraben

w Murringen in order to esoape being cut off by the escape to to orf of

n f

Urine
. ,

penetrationpenetration penetratio*

Jof formm- battalion of the farmer-' battalion.. formm formmbattalion. farms form
O-

1 ''J 'J-

The withdrawal

LosheimergrabenLosheimergrabeLosheimergraben along the Losheimergraben--

Murringen nItoringen Itoringen Touring Urine

highway was well executed with vrell reel exeouted

all available
.

troops hastily hastilyt-

tily

hasDefenseDefense Defen.

ta1d.ng . a1d.ng ta1dng taking :, tfu.rringen. a1dng Murringen aking up new positions on the high ground east of Murringen.. tfurringen hirh hrh

furring Urine

se this position at
.

w s was
;

dependent upon the 1st and 2nd Battalions success successuoces- success- suocesssuocess
canandandsaanomy and. ground but extreme enomy pressure and
:

swan sfully "vithdra.wine to the same high sane saJne fully "withdrawing vithdrawine

.advances advances prevented didacies ndaracs

a suocessful withdrawal Batta.lionBattaliontwithdrawn Batta.lion this , thus a. successful withdrayml by the 3rd Battalion Batta. .

con- through Trinket conKririlcelt hrough Krinkelt to Elsenborn in oomplete darkness under adverse con Eleanor complete

lion
ma and

necessary. necessary editions ssary ditions was neo ssa.ry..

.

say
.

Here , as

in the previous withdrawal , the

.

ene-

enemyenemy eneJ1WeneJ1W

friendly situa.tions situations

mony any Many

- tant. enearly nonexistsnearly non-ex is tant.- . nearly non-existants ntonly nonexistnoarly nonexiste.nt.antinonexistantsMsterly existe.nt. meneal non-existe.nt. taint tant existents existants
.

ent well

non
non existent ex
.

Hywewawas were canpletely unknown and communication Yme communica.tion wasYmcompletely Me

company offioersoffioers tra.ined hootenanny offioers trained oOlnpany officers and non-commissioned officers commissioned officersoffic-

ers
were

dour ing dur King casualties during the

first fir at

tyro days . two da.ys

a theGen .n ttaoks n Taos of the German attacks but the

.

non
.. . .

vrell well fought reel re'll

or battles of the battalion in faulty situations

Jeff attest to the efficiency ency eff ency. enc
,

and against against-

agalead-

fierce inst

enemy e.. ta ks enenw attacks renew e

leaders.of the remaining leaders.. t. leaders

.

t
.

.,

ers
man and

Time and

again

it was

necessary for these leaders to take abortion on neoessary action onaotion o-

their ther

severely Whitechelons hit initiative as all eohelons of the division were severly hitcaMaCommnd at commemoration oomnnmioation communication was at times non-existant.. Comr .nd ohannels were atexistant. Comer nd channels existent Command
own

t tties

tt es tunes times tines

very ineffeotive because the enemy beoause ineffective beoa.use

.

non
27"2727

artillery

had

early in the

'

t
\t' V \t' t'
8t
'

\,saa.

s /

attaok attack destroyod ttack destroyed

effective. . effective effeotive. effective. effeotive effective
Deoember December The
A

all

telephone lines and radios were not

more

($ 40f40f than 4 0%

oo Lethe complete lete

state of flux existed from about

'

1900 hours 1616

'

reg1men't reg1ment regiment regimen until the regimenb;

.

was assemble d assembled assembl was

. at EleeribOrn . El.eub n Emersion * Eleub n. Eleeeubo Elbe

enemy

Elsenborn batta.lion battalion at Eleanor

in

good defensive

ana positions with a-

near normal frontage and successfully stopped the suooessfully ear

ecember. eoember. Deoember. December.. Deoember December

ot attattacks of lateDlate
on the theth-

endee

Good

proven equally as good a.nd would have prevented the enemy from laying and layingrment
.

rd
mrd fOr' fOr
thou tho the
-

of fields or fire

were available availa.ble

.

in this position

' \ eorem avefOr'\mrd fOr'mrd forward slope but the long gentle reverse slope would probably have havefOrmrd eocrat

ve proteotion of the foxholes.. For the enemy to attack protection attaok foxholes newness tatted oross ing roulade pos i-bion vrould bison pe bion this position in thjs area would have neoess i tated crossing a necessitated cross King ppiest
_

,i observed mortar and

.

ing

lay-

artillery

percentageour troops causing a higih percentage on O high percentaoausin Austin

.

ge shrapnel casualties. of oasua.l ties. casual oasual casualties.

ties
due

anpaused andMany casualties were caused by trench foot and Uany oasual ties oa.used rainy casual oaused Any
men on

other frost bites

to the inability of the

the

1JIIR MIR MlR MR

to leaveleave lea-

a reverse slope slopeslosnowsnow- snow snoclean , snowsnicsni.

So

w c verged , smooth skyline and advance over covered s1CJrline ckered covered

vered kered
,,
>

pro- prfina.l pro terrain ideal for final pro-

tect bier fires oto ive teo dive tect tec bive fires.. tech toe teo tecl tec tel

out-- pots out-poats baenbeenStrong out pocts on the forward slope would have been outposts outpocts rorvmrd bean baen out-Posts roved
.

oven dela.yinG thou Gorrnal'W bond successful in delaying, tho Germans o..nd perhaps prevented him fron ovenCorneal ond from overthe GorrnalW and
' ..

out
poats Posts oats

crest.reaching, the crest.. crest

cr-

- Deoember laoklackSupply from the period 16-20 December was poor , as a complete lack laok alolaclao

ests

8-1 seotion of aggressiveness by the S-4 section required the battalion batta.lion

S 8 1 4
:

20 16

dispatohdispatchdispatoh to dispatch dispaton the theAmm- AmmuAmmu Amuck

an officer to find the service servioe ch offioer

trains

and

bring forward rations

fourth day.. ocrat day

vas It ,was

necessary for the battalion to use valuable neoassary

thou thethobrain tho teammnition unition and Pioneer platoon personnel to bring forward ammunition as the brin notion nition

arstain S an nunition.armnunition.ammunition.ammunition. . rmnunition. armnunition armnunition. ammunition ammunition. ammunitin enunciatimunitions nunition. nunition dlebar
.

re tment Da.tta.lion S-4 ha.d been instructed by regiment tent instruoted Dattalion Battalion 8-4 had
.

8 4

that

lie he was not

handleahandleto handle hadeahan-

on To sum up the

! op0ratio1 entire operation ,

.

it

must JmJst be stated Jams sta.ted

.

that the

Ger-

German Germa-

t
'
.

nattaok nattack man attaok attack

'Vla.S was VlaS LaS

strong , aggressive , a.nd designed to and dosigned

-

hit

bt
-

twotwava.ilab le sucoessfully available for the defense , did successfully stop an estimated two ava.ilab
.

bat availab
or balion Albion
.

a known weak senator seator. beak senat- , seator sector* eak seator.- .
.

The battalion , bat-balion

not -with a.l1 not with olear notwith a lear although nitwit a. clear mission and all companies notal1
.

bt\t-bD.llon bttbD.llon \ obattalion battalion bD.llon

enemy

tvren'ty-four tvrenty-four attaok for twenty-four hours from attack tvrenty tvren'ty
'

4to about the to

same hour 17 December December.* Deoomber. Deoomber.

four
22828

twenty Trent

Deoamber 1940900 16 December 1944 Dreamer

Enemy envelopment

threats from frcn fern

'

, .

.
s I

JtJt'' TJJt ar tr 'r

Ir

IriIr-

paused enor tnorth t'north and south oaused withdrawals under the most adverse conditionsnorth caused oonditionsoonditions conditions conditio' ' but those were successfully parried out causing ns w'ere 8ucoessf'ully carried 8ucoessfully oarried sucoessfully pausing oausing

enemy

ma1d.ng makingma1dng delays and making ma1d.nma1dnmaki.

ng battalion available for gthe tore the tor

unary uary 1945 were

a successful defensive stand suooessful

eriborn.El eriborn. Elsenborn. at Elsenbora, eriborn ribbon Eleanor ribb-

, on no tine during the operation from 16 December 1994,4 = At Deoember 19944 time 1944 operations

to

Jan1 JanJan--

Jan

there tanks

or tank destroyers
.
)

Infantry or the 3rd Battalion Lich co-used e. severe handicap* handicap.. handioap. handioap Hitch Battalionv.Jhich used a ich ; which caused e 'Jhich
.

co

10 394th available to the 394thavailab 57mm The 57mm-

AT

guns were no math match matoh

for the

German tanks as the Gernan

ocnotprojectile did not

tave have the required penetrating

ly. . ly. ly ly The 11
,

ability
,

and mobilityvas lacking complete vas \ mobility was laoking complete- \vas looking complete- -

mobility

lj l

ton 6x6 prime prima

.

mover

vehjcle vehicle of the

57mm AT gun was of 57ma

weaponor no V8lue off roa.ds and the gun crews could not man-handle the weapon er weaproads man-ha.ndle value

man
ha.ndle handle
.

littlelittle littl-

on heavy in
. a.n an .

snows and

forests.* forests.

eitheraeitherTanks or tank destroyers should be either eith.

er in.tegral regiment .n integral part of the infantry reG1.ment or attachments reG1ment

of' pla.toon of' one platoon is
.

on the basis basisbas.

. available.nade available. of tanks per infantry battalion should be made . .va.ilable.- . .va.ilable. available availabavailavaluable vailable

le

The bazooka. ble bazooka.

57mm 57mn 7mm 57m AT

the5opera.tions the ba.ttalion in the operations of this battalion proved better than the.

gun but

oapa.bility oapability its capability is limited

.

due

shortrshorto the relatively short

range. ange. . range tage

he total
rThe The

of

959

casualties of

killed i

ittaMBfeUftij ,;
/"

r
' rT-

''r

inand wounded in

Deoember abortion aotion betv en action between 16 December 1944 and 31 December 1944 by
meant ment

bet

Regi- Regis Regithe 394th Regi

,

wear =e wer whioh We oostly of which the 3rd Battalion had a proportionate share were costly ,
,

'

'

abortion stenaning steaming but the action aided a great deal in stemming the aotion

German

anand attack and-

B prevent King preventing him from turning the southern flank in the drogen ing outhern

Elsenborn area , thus denying him both valuable time Eleanor a.rea
.

ButgenbaokButgenback- ButgenbaokButgenbaok Butgenback Buttonhook vital Butgenbacknet- a.nd and good road netnet
.

works for

further advances, advances. advanoes.. advanoes reLessores LESS oreLESSONS LESSON. opera.tions a.re in this series of operations aresI: are
.

le
.

ons Valor Valur 1 , The infantry 1. 1

,
.

. SValur '.-. le lessons learned SValur..le Valor Valur Valur'-le Valur..le sValur'le sValurle Valurle salable Valur' Allure

battalion should not be given

oonducted. properly conducted.. oonducted conducted

more

one cothan one-

mmission as only one can be mission

2929

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unit ,

whomever whonaver whenever

. oontact promprom prein contact with the enemy , should have pre- pre. pre. enenr $ ender

pared positions with oonplete employment of automatic weapons tooomplete complete automation automatio to automtio moonlet

strengthen the defense defense.. *

3. 3.
An open

flank position should always be

; on eood. defensive good eood defensiverood defens.

defen-

ive sive
.

terra. in terra. in.. terra terrain. terrain. terrain

4 * All likely 4. 4 enemy ' avenues enemy'

Gapproaoh oovered y ATof approach must be covered by AT

weapons and by mines . atepost mines. *

5* 5. 5.

ver

cause extreme weakening or positions. of positions.* 6. 6.

A

Over Over
consider
.

never comfort or Over-consider at ion for the oomfort of troops should neverOver-consideration consideration

ne-

removed remoplatoon should never be given a mission when greatly removed-

. comp .ny n.nd from the company and when the commander on oommander ny nnd ved nd

outlinesolearly outlines the spot clearly outlin-

suoh the fallacy of sough a. maneuver. es falla.oy such a maneuver. fallaoy

. .

7. 7.

The flow of

enlist oontinuousannlst supplies from rea.r to front must be continuousoontinuous rear roar continuous continuo.
.

us a.ll all
a.nd and .nd
.
.

supply personnel must be thoroughly indoctrined. with their peraonnel theirindoctrinate indoctrined ther-

rra
.

te-

great responsibility.. Erea.t responsibility Herat Ereat e're

must be accomplished, accomplished. aooomplished nel aooomplished.. 8. Higher 8. Hirher Hirer
;

personpersonnelInstant replacement of poor supply personnel

hea.dquarters headquarters should keep the lower quits informed ofof uuits units
.

ten the situation at 9. 9.

tunes. tunes t es. es all times.

*

Defense or the reverse slope should be used when of

.

beneficial.* beneficial.

. 10 * 10. 10

oa.nnot oannot Troops cannot operate under sub-aero weather conditions with sub - cero oonditions withsub-zero wi,

palookas j&M pac& packpaoks paoksuoh paloequipment such jM equip normal winter clothing 1aad cold weather equipz nt sough as shoe packs sad

thin

zero aero sub

ks
e

swill prevent okas will

11 . 11. * 11
Men

many

, . oasualties. oasualties casualties*

.

. opportune must be .fed hot meals a.t every opportun ty. opportunity. opportunity. fed at

ty
.
.

use usConstant use-

' . . of of emergency rations weakens men and destroys morale weakans ra.tions w'eakans mon a.nd morale. *
.

12 , . 12. 12

Discipline of

all

troop must oombat troo s mu . be s combat troops .mu .t . .be stressed .s.ed seed sed
. . ,

at all times., times t.ime at. 1 tines. at time

. .

13 * Battalion . 13. 13
.

shouldAmmunitions and Pioneer platoon personnel should shoul.

' frOli1 3l11munition 3upply f'rOli1 regimenta.l not be used for 3.l11munition supply from regimental dn't ammunition

bivouacs. bivouaos.* bivouaos train bivouacs.

. 14 * Artillery in preponderance 14. 14

oan can when properly used Doan normally

30

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on enemy attack short or the defenders main bottle position z an { b ttle positiQdefendet"B ma.n buttle positiQ * of defendetB man butte positiQ1defender ! title pos citric itic
"
, .

-15 . " --15. T hks' 'mult' b"e etTailakle- 4o-aa . 5. hks -14..Tanke. mulct b etTailakle4oaaisifaastry battalion 14..Tanke. & &n".1nf&try batta.lion 14..Tanke. mwt dew14Tanke. wt a ils 15. Tank * mult b", etTailakle t. o-sn..ir a%try "battalion in the d9 14Tanke at Attila dew. deadew 14Tanke =at- aft11a t sn..ir & ks atbe ills * n.1nftry abe n1nftry disinfest .fence fened fence fense for anti-tank protection and for aiding in aggressive counter ant1-tank fens oountercounter- counteroounteroounter
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16 . Retrograde 16. 16

movements are extremely

diffioult difficult

as

awoken w acknow- Mackinaw aokn wl- acknow is acknoww-

ledged by edged
hem the

all military
.

leaders but training in sough suoh such

was lacking andlao1dng antand

anile and. men anil and

' su fared accordingly mission suffered accordingly.. snff'ered aooordingly. snffered aooordingly

3131

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