Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila THIRD DIVISION G.R. No.

178741 January 17, 2011 ROSALINO L. MARABLE, Petitioner, vs. MYRNA F. MARABLE, Respondent. DECISION VILLARAMA, JR., J.: 1 2 On appeal is the Decision dated February 12, 2007 and Resolution dated July 4, 2007 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 86111 which reversed and 3 set aside the Decision dated January 4, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 72, Antipolo City, in Civil Case No. 01-6302. The RTC had granted petitioner s prayer that his marriage to respondent be declared null and void on the ground that he is psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential obligations of marriage. The facts, as culled from the records, are as follows: Petitioner and respondent met in 1967 while studying at Arellano University. They were classmates but initially, petitioner was not interested in respondent. He only became attracted to her after they happened to sit beside each other in a passenger bus. Petitioner courted respondent and they eventually became sweethearts even though petitioner already had a girl friend. Later, respondent discovered petitioner s other relationship and demanded more time and attention from petitioner. Petitioner alleged that he appreciated this gesture like a child longing for love, time and attention. On December 19, 1970, petitioner and respondent eloped and were married in civil rites at Tanay, Rizal before Mayor Antonio C. Esguerra. A church wedding followed on December 30, 1970 at the Chapel of the Muntinlupa Bilibid Prison and their marriage was blessed with five children. As the years went by, however, their marriage turned sour. Verbal and physical quarrels became common occurrences. They fought incessantly and petitioner became unhappy because of it. The frequency of their quarrels increased when their eldest daughter transferred from one school to another due to juvenile misconduct. It became worse still when their daughter had an unwanted teenage pregnancy. The exceedingly serious attention petitioner gave to his children also made things worse for them as it not only spoiled some of them, but it also became another cause for the incessant quarrelling between him and respondent. Longing for peace, love and affection, petitioner developed a relationship with another woman. Respondent learned about the affair, and petitioner promptly terminated it. But despite the end of the short-lived affair, their quarrels aggravated. Also, their business ventures failed. Any amount of respect remaining between them was further eroded by their frequent arguments and verbal abuses infront of their friends. Petitioner felt that he was unloved, unwanted and unappreciated and this made him indifferent towards respondent. When he could not bear his lot any longer, petitioner left the family home and stayed with his sister in Antipolo City. He gave up all the properties which he and respondent had accumulated during their marriage in favor of respondent and their children. Later, he converted to Islam after dating several women. On October 8, 2001, petitioner decided to sever his marital bonds. On said date, 4 he filed a petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage to respondent on the ground of his psychological incapacity to perform the essential responsibilities of marital life. In his petition, petitioner averred that he came from a poor family and was already exposed to the hardships of farm life at an early age. His father, although responsible and supportive, was a compulsive gambler and womanizer. His father left their family to live with another woman with whom he had seven other children. This caused petitioner s mother and siblings to suffer immensely. Thus, petitioner became obsessed with attention and worked hard to excel so he would be noticed. Petitioner further alleged that he supported himself through college and worked hard for the company he joined. He rose from the ranks at Advertising and Marketing Associates, Inc., and became Senior Executive Vice President and Chief Finance Officer therein. But despite his success at work, he alleged that his misery and loneliness as a child lingered as he experienced a void in his relationship with his own family. 5 In support of his petition, petitioner presented the Psychological Report of Dr. Nedy L. Tayag, a clinical psychologist from the National Center for Mental Health. Dr. Tayag s report stated that petitioner is suffering from "Antisocial Personality Disorder," characterized by a pervasive pattern of social deviancy, rebelliousness, impulsivity, self-centeredness, deceitfulness and lack of remorse. The report also revealed that petitioner s personality disorder is rooted in deep feelings of

rejection starting from the family to peers, and that his experiences have made him so self-absorbed for needed attention. It was Dr. Tayag s conclusion that petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligations. After trial, the RTC rendered a decision annulling petitioner s marriage to respondent on the ground of petitioner s psychological incapacity. Upon appeal by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), the CA reversed the RTC decision as follows: WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the appeal is GRANTED and the assailed Decision hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the marriage between the parties is declared valid and subsisting. No costs. 6 SO ORDERED. The CA held that the circumstances related by petitioner are insufficient to establish the existence of petitioner s psychological incapacity. The CA noted that Dr. Tayag did not fully explain the root cause of the disorder nor did she give a concrete explanation as to how she arrived at a conclusion as to its gravity or permanence. The appellate court emphasized that the root cause of petitioner s psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically identified, sufficiently proven by experts and clearly explained in the decision. In addition, the incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage and shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. It must also be grave enough to bring about the disability of the petitioner to assume the essential obligations of marriage. On July 4, 2007, the CA denied petitioner s motion for reconsideration. Hence, this appeal. Essentially, petitioner raises the sole issue of whether the CA erred in reversing the trial court s decision. Petitioner claims that his psychological incapacity to perform his essential marital obligations was clearly proven and correctly appreciated by the trial court. Petitioner relies heavily on the psychological evaluation conducted by Dr. Tayag and quotes the latter s findings: Petitioner had always been hungry for love and affection starting from his family to the present affairs that he [has]. This need had afforded him to find avenues straight or not, just to fulfill this need. He used charm, deceit, lies, violence, [and] authority just so to accom[m]odate and justify his acts. Finally, he is using religions to support his claim for a much better personal and married life which is really out of context. Rebellious and impulsive as he is, emotional instability is apparent that it would be difficult for him to harmonize with life in general and changes. Changes must come from within, it is not purely external. Clinically, petitioner s self-absorbed ideals represent the grave, severe, and incurable nature of Antisocial Personality Disorder. Such disorder is characterized by a pervasive pattern of social deviancy, rebelliousness, impulsivity, selfcenteredness, deceitfulness, and lack of remorse. The psychological incapacity of the petitioner is attributed by jurisdictional antecedence as it existed even before the said marital union. It is also profoundly rooted, grave and incurable. The root cause of which is deep feelings of rejection starting from family to peers. This insecure feelings had made him so selfabsorbed for needed attention. Carrying it until his marital life. Said psychological incapacity had deeply marred his adjustment and severed the relationship. Thus, said marriage should be declared null and void by reason of the psychological 7 incapacity. According to petitioner, the uncontradicted psychological report of Dr. Tayag declared that his psychological incapacity is profoundly rooted and has the characteristics of juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability. Moreover, petitioner asserts that his psychological incapacity has been medically identified and sufficiently proven. The State, on the other hand, never presented another psychologist to rebut Dr. Tayag s findings. Also, petitioner maintains that the psychological evaluation would show that the marriage failed not solely because of irreconcilable differences between the spouses, but due to petitioner s personality disorder which rendered him unable to comply with his marital obligations. To the mind of petitioner, the assailed decision compelled the parties to continue to live under a "non-existent marriage." 8 The Republic, through the OSG, filed a Comment maintaining that petitioner failed to prove his psychological incapacity. The OSG points out that Dr. Tayag failed to explain specifically how she arrived at the conclusion that petitioner suffers from an anti-social personality disorder and that it is grave and incurable. In fact, contrary to his claim, it even appears that petitioner acted responsibly throughout their marriage. Despite financial difficulties, he and respondent had blissful moments together. He was a good father and provider to his children. Thus, the OSG argues that there was no reason to describe petitioner as a selfcentered, remorseless, rebellious, impulsive and socially deviant person. Additionally, the OSG contends that since the burden of proof is on petitioner to establish his psychological incapacity, the State is not required to present an expert witness where the testimony of petitioner s psychologist was insufficient

and inconclusive. The OSG adds that petitioner was not able to substantiate his claim that his infidelity was due to some psychological disorder, as the real cause of petitioner s alleged incapacity appears to be his general dissatisfaction with his marriage. At most he was able to prove infidelity on his part and the existence of "irreconcilable differences" and "conflicting personalities." These, however, do not constitute psychological incapacity. 9 10 Respondent also filed her Comment and Memorandum stressing that psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage should contemplate downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume the essential marital obligations, not a mere refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will, on the part of the errant spouse. The appeal has no merit. The appellate court did not err when it reversed and set aside the findings of the RTC for lack of legal and factual bases. Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended, provides: Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization. The term "psychological incapacity" to be a ground for the nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, refers to a serious psychological illness 11 afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage. These are the disorders that result in the utter insensitivity or inability of the afflicted party to 12 give meaning and significance to the marriage he or she has contracted. Psychological incapacity must refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to 13 the marriage. 14 In Republic v. Court of Appeals, the Court laid down the guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36. The Court held, (1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. (2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. (3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. (4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. (5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage.1avvphi1 (6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. (7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. (8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. In the instant case, petitioner completely relied on the psychological examination conducted by Dr. Tayag on him to establish his psychological incapacity. The result of the examination and the findings of Dr. Tayag however, are insufficient to establish petitioner's psychological incapacity. In cases of annulment of marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended, the psychological illness and its root cause must be proven to exist from the inception of the marriage. Here, the appellate court correctly ruled that the report of Dr. Tayag failed to explain the root cause of petitioner s alleged psychological incapacity. The evaluation of Dr. Tayag merely made a general conclusion that petitioner is suffering from an Anti-social Personality Disorder but there was no factual basis stated for the finding that petitioner is a socially deviant person, rebellious, impulsive, self-centered and deceitful. 15 As held in the case of Suazo v. Suazo, the presentation of expert proof in cases for declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity presupposes a thorough and an in-depth assessment of the parties by the psychologist or expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable presence of psychological incapacity. Here, the evaluation of Dr. Tayag falls short

of the required proof which the Court can rely on as basis to declare as void petitioner s marriage to respondent. In fact, we are baffled by Dr. Tayag s evaluation which became the trial court s basis for concluding that petitioner was psychologically incapacitated, for the report did not clearly specify the actions of petitioner which are indicative of his alleged psychological incapacity. More importantly, there was no established link between petitioner s acts to his alleged psychological incapacity. It is indispensable that the evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between the acts that manifest psychological 16 incapacity and the psychological disorder itself. 17 For sure, the spouses frequent marital squabbles and differences in handling finances and managing their business affairs, as well as their conflicts on how to raise their children, are not manifestations of psychological incapacity which may be a ground for declaring their marriage void. Petitioner even admitted that despite their financial difficulties, they had happy moments together. Also, the records would show that the petitioner acted responsibly during their marriage and in fact worked hard to provide for the needs of his family, most especially his children. Their personal differences do not reflect a personality disorder tantamount to psychological incapacity. Petitioner tried to make it appear that his family history of having a womanizer for a father, was one of the reasons why he engaged in extra-marital affairs during his marriage. However, it appears more likely that he became unfaithful as a result of a general dissatisfaction with his marriage rather than a psychological disorder rooted in his personal history. His tendency to womanize, assuming he had such tendency, was not shown to be due to causes of a psychological nature that is grave, permanent and incurable. In fact, the records show that when respondent learned of his affair, he immediately terminated it. In short, petitioner s marital infidelity does not appear to be symptomatic of a grave psychological disorder which rendered him incapable of performing his spousal obligations. It has been held in various cases that sexual infidelity, by itself, is not 18 sufficient proof that petitioner is suffering from psychological incapacity. It must be shown that the acts of unfaithfulness are manifestations of a disordered personality which make petitioner completely unable to discharge the essential 19 obligations of marriage. That not being the case with petitioner, his claim of psychological incapacity must fail. It bears stressing that psychological incapacity must be more than just a "difficulty," "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations. Rather, it is essential that the concerned party was incapable of doing so, due to some psychological illness existing at the time of 20 the celebration of the marriage. In Santos v. Court of Appeals, the intention of the law is to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter 21 insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. All told, we find that the CA did not err in declaring the marriage of petitioner and respondent as valid and subsisting. The totality of the evidence presented is insufficient to establish petitioner s psychological incapacity to fulfill his essential marital obligations. WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED for lack of merit. The February 12, 2007 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 86111 and its Resolution dated July 4, 2007 are hereby AFFIRMED. G.R. No. 165321 August 3, 2010 RICARDO P. TORING, Petitioner, vs. TERESITA M. TORING and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents. DECISION BRION, J.: We resolve the appeal filed by petitioner Ricardo P. Toring from the May 31, 2004 decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 71882. The CA reversed the August 10, 2001 judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 106 of Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-99-36662,2 nullifying Ricardo's marriage with respondent Teresita M. Toring on the ground of psychological incapacity. THE FACTS Ricardo was introduced to Teresita in 1978 at his aunt s house in Cebu. Teresita was then his cousin s teacher in Hawaiian dance and was conducting lessons at his aunt s house. Despite their slight difference in age (of five years), the younger Ricardo found the dance teacher attractive and fell in love with her. He pursued Teresita and they became sweethearts after three months of courtship. They eloped soon after, hastened by the bid of another girlfriend, already pregnant, to get Ricardo to marry her.

Ricardo and Teresita were married on September 4, 1978 before Hon. Remigio Zari of the City Court of Quezon City. They begot three children: Richardson, Rachel Anne, and Ric Jayson. On February 1, 1999, more than twenty years after their wedding, Ricardo filed a petition for annulment before the RTC. He claimed that Teresita was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage prior to, at the time of, and subsequent to the celebration of their marriage. He asked the court to declare his marriage to Teresita null and void. At the trial, Ricardo offered in evidence their marriage contract; the psychological evaluation and signature of his expert witness, psychiatrist Dr. Cecilia R. Albaran, and his and Dr. Albaran s respective testimonies. Teresita did not file any answer or opposition to the petition, nor did she testify to refute the allegations against her.3 Ricardo alleged in his petition and in his testimony at the trial that Teresita was an adulteress and a squanderer. He was an overseas seaman, and he regularly sent money to his wife to cover the family s living expenses and their children s tuition. Teresita, however, was not adept in managing the funds he sent and their finances. Many times, Ricardo would come home and be welcomed by debts incurred by his wife; he had to settle these to avoid embarrassment. Aside from neglect in paying debts she incurred from other people, Teresita likewise failed to remit amounts she collected as sales agent of a plasticware and cosmetics company. She left the family s utility bills and their children s tuition fees unpaid. She also missed paying the rent and the amortization for the house that Ricardo acquired for the family, so their children had to live in a small rented room and eventually had to be taken in by Ricardo s parents. When confronted by Ricardo, Teresita would simply offer the excuse that she spent the funds Ricardo sent to buy things for the house and for their children. Ricardo likewise accused Teresita of infidelity and suspected that she was pregnant with another man s child. During one of his visits to the country, he noticed that Teresita s stomach was slightly bigger. He tried to convince her to have a medical examination but she refused. Her miscarriage five months into her pregnancy confirmed his worst suspicions. Ricardo alleged that the child could not have been his, as his three instances of sexual contact with Teresita were characterized by "withdrawals"; other than these, no other sexual contacts with his wife transpired, as he transferred and lived with his relatives after a month of living with Teresita in Cebu. Ricardo reported, too, of rumors that his wife represented herself to others as single, and went out on dates with other men when he was not around. Ricardo opined that his wife was a very extravagant, materialistic, controlling and demanding person, who mostly had her way in everything; had a taste for the nightlife and was very averse to the duties of a housewife; was stubborn and independent, also most unsupportive, critical and uncooperative; was unresponsive to his hard work and sacrifices for their family; and was most painfully unmindful of him.4 He believed that their marriage had broken down beyond repair and that they both have lost their mutual trust and love for one another.5 Dr. Cecilia R. Albaran testified that a major factor that contributed to the demise of the marriage was Teresita s Narcissistic Personality Disorder that rendered her psychologically incapacitated to fulfill her essential marital obligations. To quote Dr. Albaran: Teresita, the respondent[,] has [sic] shown to manifest the following pervasive pattern of behaviors: a sense of entitlement as she expected favorable treatment and automatic compliance to her wishes, being interpersonally exploitative as on several occasions she took advantage of him to achieve her own ends, lack of empathy as she was unwilling to recognize her partners [sic] feelings and needs[,] taking into consideration her own feelings and needs only, her haughty and arrogant behavior and attitude and her proneness to blame others for her failures and shortcomings. These patterns of behavior speaks [sic] of a Narcissistic Personality Disorder, which started to manifest in early adulthood. The disorder is considered to be grave and incurable based on the fact that individuals do not recognize the symptoms as it is ego syntonic and they feel there is nothing wrong in them. Because of that[,] they remain unmotivated for treatment and impervious to recovery.6

She based her diagnosis on the information she gathered from her psychological evaluation on Ricardo and Richardson (Ricardo and Teresita s eldest son). She admitted, though, that she did not personally observe and examine Teresita; she sent Teresita a personally-delivered notice for the conduct of a psychiatric evaluation, but the notice remained unanswered. In opposing the petition for annulment, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) contended that there was no basis to declare Teresita psychologically incapacitated. It asserted that the psychological evaluation conducted on Ricardo (and his son Richardson) only revealed a vague and general conclusion on these parties personality traits but not on Teresita s psychological makeup. The OSG also argued that the evidence adduced did not clinically identify and sufficiently prove the medical cause of the alleged psychological incapacity. Neither did the evidence indicate that the alleged psychological incapacity existed prior to or at the time of marriage, nor that the incapacity was grave and incurable. The RTC agreed with Ricardo, and annulled his marriage to Teresita. In short, the RTC believed Dr. Albaran s psychological evaluation and testimony and, on the totality of Ricardo s evidence, found Teresita to be psychologically incapacitated to assume the essential obligations of marriage. The OSG appealed the decision to the CA. The CA reversed the RTC decision and held that the trial court s findings did not satisfy the rules and guidelines set by this Court in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina.7 The RTC failed to specifically point out the root illness or defect that caused Teresita s psychological incapacity, and likewise failed to show that the incapacity already existed at the time of celebration of marriage. The CA found that the conclusions from Dr. Albaran s psychological evaluation do not appear to have been drawn from well-rounded and fair sources, and dwelt mostly on hearsay statements and rumors. Likewise, the CA found that Ricardo s allegations on Teresita s overspending and infidelity do not constitute adequate grounds for declaring the marriage null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code. These allegations, even if true, could only effectively serve as grounds for legal separation or a criminal charge for adultery. THE PETITION AND THE PARTIES ARGUMENTS Ricardo faults the CA for disregarding the factual findings of the trial court, particularly the expert testimony of Dr. Albaran, and submits that the trial court in declaring the nullity of the marriage fully complied with Molina. In its Comment,8 the OSG argued that the CA correctly reversed the RTC s decision, particularly in its conclusion that Ricardo failed to comply with this Court s guidelines for the proper interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code. Reiterating its earlier arguments below, the OSG asserts that the evidence adduced before the trial court failed to show the gravity, juridical antecedence, or incurability of the psychological incapacity of Teresita, and failed as well to identify and discuss its root cause. The psychiatrist, likewise, failed to show that Teresita was completely unable to discharge her marital obligations due to her alleged Narcissistic Personality Disorder. Ricardo s Reply9 reiterated that the RTC decision thoroughly discussed the root cause of Teresita s psychological incapacity and identified it as Narcissistic Personality Disorder. He claimed that sufficient proof had been adduced by the psychiatrist whose expertise on the subject cannot be doubted. Interestingly, Ricardo further argued that alleging the root cause in a petition for annulment under Article 36 of the Family Code is no longer necessary, citing Barcelona v. Court of Appeals.10 These positions were collated and reiterated in the memoranda the parties filed. THE COURT S RULING We find the petition unmeritorious, as the CA committed no reversible error when it set aside the RTC s decision for lack of legal and factual basis. In the leading case of Santos v. Court of Appeals, et al.,11 we held that psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability, to be sufficient basis to annul a marriage. The psychological incapacity should refer to "no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly

incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage."12 We further expounded on Article 36 of the Family Code in Molina and laid down definitive guidelines in the interpretation and application of this article. These guidelines incorporate the basic requirements of gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability established in the Santos case, as follows: (1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state. The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity. (2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis (Salita v. Magtolis, 233 SCRA 100, 108), nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists. (3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's." The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto. (4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage. (5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage. (6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such noncomplied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision. (7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.13 Subsequent jurisprudence on psychological incapacity applied these basic guidelines to varying factual situations, thus confirming the continuing doctrinal validity of Santos. In so far as the present factual situation is concerned, what should not be lost in reading and applying our established rulings is the intent of

the law to confine the application of Article 36 of the Family Code to the most serious cases of personality disorders; these are the disorders that result in the utter insensitivity or inability of the afflicted party to give meaning and significance to the marriage he or she contracted. Furthermore, the psychological illness and its root cause must have been there from the inception of the marriage. From these requirements arise the concept that Article 36 of the Family Code does not really dissolve a marriage; it simply recognizes that there never was any marriage in the first place because the affliction already then existing was so grave and permanent as to deprive the afflicted party of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he or she was to assume or had assumed.14 In the present case and guided by these standards, we find the totality of the petitioner s evidence to be insufficient to prove that Teresita was psychologically incapacitated to perform her duties as a wife. As already mentioned, the evidence presented consisted of the testimonies of Ricardo and Dr. Albaran, and the latter s psychological evaluation of Ricardo and Richardson from where she derived a psychological evaluation of Teresita. a. Dr. Albaran s psychological evaluation and testimony Dr. Albaran concluded in her psychological evaluation that Teresita suffers from Narcissistic Personality Disorder that rendered her psychologically incapacitated to assume essential marital obligations. To support her findings and conclusion, she banked on the statements told to her by Ricardo and Richardson, which she narrated in her evaluation. Apparently relying on the same basis, Dr. Albaran added that Teresita s disorder manifested during her early adulthood and is grave and incurable. To say the least, we are greatly disturbed by the kind of testimony and evaluation that, in this case, became the basis for the conclusion that no marriage really took place because of the psychological incapacity of one of the parties at the time of marriage. We are in no way convinced that a mere narration of the statements of Ricardo and Richardson, coupled with the results of the psychological tests administered only on Ricardo, without more, already constitutes sufficient basis for the conclusion that Teresita suffered from Narcissistic Personality Disorder. This Court has long been negatively critical in considering psychological evaluations, presented in evidence, derived solely from one-sided sources, particularly from the spouse seeking the nullity of the marriage. In So v. Valera,15 the Court considered the psychologist s testimony and conclusions to be insufficiently in-depth and comprehensive to warrant the finding of respondent s psychological incapacity because the facts, on which the conclusions were based, were all derived from the petitioner s statements whose bias in favor of his cause cannot be discounted. In another case, Padilla-Rumbaua v. Rumbaua,16 the Court declared that while the various tests administered on the petitioner-wife could have been used as a fair gauge to assess her own psychological condition, this same statement could not be made with respect to the respondent-husband s psychological condition. To our mind, conclusions and generalizations about Teresita s psychological condition, based solely on information fed by Ricardo, are not any different in kind from admitting hearsay evidence as proof of the truthfulness of the content of such evidence.17 To be sure, we have recognized that the law does not require that the allegedly incapacitated spouse be personally examined by a physician or by a psychologist as a condition sine qua non for the declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.18 This recognition, however, does not signify that the evidence, we shall favorably appreciate, should be any less than the evidence that an Article 36 case, by its nature, requires. Our recognition simply means that the requirements for nullity outlined in Santos and Molina need not necessarily come from the allegedly incapacitated spouse. In other words, it is still essential although from sources other than the respondent spouse to show his or her personality profile, or its approximation, at the time of marriage; the root cause of the inability to appreciate the essential obligations of marriage; and the gravity, permanence and incurability of the condition. Other than from the spouses, such evidence can come from persons intimately related to them, such as relatives, close friends or even family doctors or lawyers who could testify on the allegedly incapacitated spouse s condition at or about

the time of marriage, or to subsequent occurring events that trace their roots to the incapacity already present at the time of marriage. In the present case, the only other party outside of the spouses who was ever asked to give statements for purposes of Teresita s psychological evaluation was Richardson, the spouses eldest son who would not have been very reliable as a witness in an Article 36 case because he could not have been there when the spouses were married and could not have been expected to know what was happening between his parents until long after his birth. We confirm the validity of this observation from a reading of the summary of Richardson s interview with the pyschologist: Richardson s statement occupied a mere one paragraph (comprising eleven sentences) in the psychological evaluation and merely recited isolated instances of his parents fighting over the foreclosure of their house, his father s alleged womanizing, and their differences in religion (Ricardo is a Catholic, while Teresita is a Mormon).19 We find nothing unusual in these recited marital incidents to indicate that Teresita suffered from some psychological disorder as far back as the time of her marriage to Ricardo, nor do we find these fights to be indicative of problems traceable to any basic psychological disorder existing at the time of marriage. For one, these points of dispute are not uncommon in a marriage and relate essentially to the usual roots of marital problems finances, fidelity and religion. The psychologist, too, never delved into the relationship between mother and son except to observe their estranged relationship due to a previous argument a money problem involving Ricardo s financial remittances to the family. To state the obvious, the psychologist s evaluation never explained how the recited incidents, made by one who was not even born at the time of the spouses marriage, showed a debilitating psychological incapacity already existing at that time. Of more serious consequence, fatal to Ricardo s cause, is the failure of Dr. Albaran s psychological evaluation to fully explain the details i.e., the what, how, when, where and since when of Teresita s alleged Narcissistic Personality Disorder. It seems to us that, with hardly any supporting evidence to fall back on, Dr. Albaran simply stated out of the blue that Teresita s personality disorder manifested itself in early adulthood, presuming thereby that the incapacity should have been there when the marriage was celebrated. Dr. Albaran never explained, too, the incapacitating nature of Teresita s alleged personality disorder, and how it related to the essential marital obligations that she failed to assume. Neither did the good doctor adequately explain in her psychological evaluation how grave and incurable was Teresita s psychological disorder. Dr. Albaran s testimony at the trial did not improve the evidentiary situation for Ricardo, as it still failed to provide the required insights that would have remedied the evidentiary gaps in her written psychological evaluation. In fact, Dr. Albaran s cross-examination only made the evidentiary situation worse when she admitted that she had difficulty pinpointing the root cause of Teresita s personality disorder, due to the limited information she gathered from Ricardo and Richardson regarding Teresita s personal and family history. To directly quote from the records, Dr. Albaran confessed this limitation when she said that "[t]he only data that I have is that, the respondent seem [sic] to have grown from a tumultuous family and this could be perhaps the [sic] contributory to the development of the personality disorder."20 Dr. Albaran s obvious uncertainty in her assessment only proves our point that a complete personality profile of the spouse, alleged to be psychologically incapacitated, could not be determined from meager information coming only from a biased source. b. Ricardo s testimony Ricardo testified in court that Teresita was a squanderer and an adulteress. We do not, however, find Ricardo s characterizations of his wife sufficient to constitute psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. Article 36 contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume basic marital obligations. Mere "difficulty," "refusal, or "neglect" in the performance of marital obligations or "ill will" on the part of the spouse is different from "incapacity" rooted on some debilitating psychological condition or illness.21 Ricardo s testimony merely established that Teresita was irresponsible in managing the family s finances by not paying their rent, utility bills and other financial obligations. Teresita s spendthrift attitude, according to Ricardo, even resulted in the loss of the house and lot intended to be their family residence.

This kind of irresponsibility, however, does not rise to the level of a psychological incapacity required under Article 36 of the Family Code. At most, Teresita s mismanagement of the family s finances merely constituted difficulty, refusal or neglect, during the marriage, in the handling of funds intended for the family s financial support. Teresita s alleged infidelity, even if true, likewise does not constitute psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. In order for sexual infidelity to constitute as psychological incapacity, the respondent s unfaithfulness must be established as a manifestation of a disordered personality, completely preventing the respondent from discharging the essential obligations of the marital state;22 there must be proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor that effectively incapacitated her from complying with the obligation to be faithful to her spouse.23 In our view, Ricardo utterly failed in his testimony to prove that Teresita suffered from a disordered personality of this kind. Even Ricardo s added testimony, relating to rumors of Teresita s dates with other men and her pregnancy by another man, would not fill in the deficiencies we have observed, given the absence of an adverse integral element and link to Teresita s allegedly disordered personality. Moreover, Ricardo failed to prove that Teresita s alleged character traits already existed at the inception of their marriage. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the psychological incapacity must exist at the time of the celebration of the marriage, even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.24 In the absence of this element, a marriage cannot be annulled under Article 36. Root cause of the psychological incapacity needs to be alleged in a petition for annulment under Article 36 of the Family Code Citing Barcelona,25 Ricardo defended the RTC decision, alleging that the root cause in a petition for annulment under Article 36 of the Family Code is no longer necessary. We find this argument completely at variance with Ricardo s main argument against the assailed CA decision i.e., that the RTC, in its decision, discussed thoroughly the root cause of Teresita s psychological incapacity as Narcissistic Personality Disorder. These conflicting positions, notwithstanding, we see the need to address this issue to further clarify our statement in Barcelona, which Ricardo misquoted and misinterpreted to support his present petition that "since the new Rules do not require the petition to allege expert opinion on the psychological incapacity, it follows that there is also no need to allege in the petition the root cause of the psychological incapacity."26 In Barcelona, the petitioner assailed the bid for annulment for its failure to state the "root cause" of the respondent s alleged psychological incapacity. The Court resolved this issue, ruling that the petition sufficiently stated a cause of action because the petitioner instead of stating a specific root cause clearly described the physical manifestations indicative of the psychological incapacity. This, the Court found to be sufficiently compliant with the first requirement in the Molina case that the "root cause" of the psychological incapacity be alleged in an Article 36 petition. Thus, contrary to Ricardo s position, Barcelona does not do away with the "root cause" requirement. The ruling simply means that the statement of the root cause does not need to be in medical terms or be technical in nature, as the root causes of many psychological disorders are still unknown to science. It is enough to merely allege the physical manifestations constituting the root cause of the psychological incapacity. Section 2, paragraph (d) of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (Rules)27 in fact provides: SEC. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. xxxx (d) What to allege.- A petition under Article 36 of the Family Code shall specially allege the complete facts showing that either or both parties were psychologically incapacitated from complying with the essential marital obligations of marriages at the time of the celebration of marriage even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its celebration.

The complete facts should allege the physical manifestations, if any, as are indicative of psychological incapacity at the time of the celebration of the marriage but expert opinion need not be alleged. As we explained in Barcelona, the requirement alleging the root cause in a petition for annulment under Article 36 of the Family Code was not dispensed with by the adoption of the Rules. What the Rules really eliminated was the need for an expert opinion to prove the root cause of the psychological incapacity. The Court further held that the Rules, being procedural in nature, apply only to actions pending and unresolved at the time of their adoption.1avvphi1 To sum up, Ricardo failed to discharge the burden of proof to show that Teresita suffered from psychological incapacity; thus, his petition for annulment of marriage must fail. Ricardo merely established that Teresita had been remiss in her duties as a wife for being irresponsible in taking care of their family s finances a fault or deficiency that does not amount to the psychological incapacity that Article 36 of the Family Code requires. We reiterate that irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, and the like, do not by themselves warrant a finding of psychological incapacity, as the same may only be due to a person s difficulty, refusal or neglect to undertake the obligations of marriage that is not rooted in some psychological illness that Article 36 of the Family Code addresses.28 WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the petition and AFFIRM the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 71882. Costs against the petitioner. G.R. No. 158298 August 11, 2010 ISIDRO ABLAZA, Petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. DECISION BERSAMIN, J.: Whether a person may bring an action for the declaration of the absolute nullity of the marriage of his deceased brother solemnized under the regime of the old Civil Code is the legal issue to be determined in this appeal brought by the petitioner whose action for that purpose has been dismissed by the lower courts on the ground that he, not being a party in the assailed marriage, had no right to bring the action. Antecedents On October 17, 2000, the petitioner filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Cataingan, Masbate a petition for the declaration of the absolute nullity of the marriage contracted on December 26, 1949 between his late brother Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila Honato.1 The case was docketed as Special Case No. 117 entitled In Re: Petition for Nullification of Marriage Contract between Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila Honato; Isidro Ablaza, petitioner. The petitioner alleged that the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila had been celebrated without a marriage license, due to such license being issued only on January 9, 1950, thereby rendering the marriage void ab initio for having been solemnized without a marriage license. He insisted that his being the surviving brother of Cresenciano who had died without any issue entitled him to one-half of the real properties acquired by Cresenciano before his death, thereby making him a real party in interest; and that any person, himself included, could impugn the validity of the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila at any time, even after the death of Cresenciano, due to the marriage being void ab initio.2 Ruling of the RTC On October 18, 2000, 3 the RTC dismissed the petition, stating: Considering the petition for annulment of marriage filed, the Court hereby resolved to DISMISS the petition for the following reasons: 1) petition is filed out of time (action had long prescribed) and 2) petitioner is not a party to the marriage (contracted between Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila Nonato on December 26, 1949 and solemnized by Rev. Fr. Eusebio B. Calolot). SO ORDERED.

The petitioner seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration, but the RTC denied the motion for reconsideration on November 14, 2000. Ruling of the Court of Appeals The petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), assigning the lone error that: The trial court erred in dismissing the petition for being filed out of time and that the petitioner is not a party to the marriage. In its decision dated January 30, 2003,4 however, the CA affirmed the dismissal order of the RTC, thus: While an action to declare the nullity of a marriage considered void from the beginning does not prescribe, the law nonetheless requires that the same action must be filed by the proper party, which in this case should be filed by any of the parties to the marriage. In the instant case, the petition was filed by Isidro Ablaza, a brother of the deceased-spouse, who is not a party to the marriage contracted by Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila Honato. The contention of petitioner-appellant that he is considered a real party in interest under Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as he stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, is simply misplaced. Actions for annulment of marriage will not prosper if persons other than those specified in the law file the case. Certainly, a surviving brother of the deceased spouse is not the proper party to file the subject petition. More so that the surviving wife, who stands to be prejudiced, was not even impleaded as a party to said case. WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error therefrom, the Orders now on appeal are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner-appellant. SO ORDERED.5 Hence, this appeal. Issues The petitioner raises the following issues: I. WHETHER OR NOT THE DECISION OF THIS HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IN CA-G.R. CV. NO. 69684 AFFIRMING THE ORDER OF DISMISSAL OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 49 AT CATAINGAN, MASBATE IN SPECIAL PROCEEDING NO. 117 IS IN ACCORDANCE WITH APPLICABLE LAWS AND JURISPRUDENCE; II. WHETHER OR NOT THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IN CAG.R. CV NO. 69684 (SHOULD) BE REVERSED BASED ON EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 209 AND EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE. The issues, rephrased, boil down to whether the petitioner is a real party in interest in the action to seek the declaration of nullity of the marriage of his deceased brother. Ruling The petition is meritorious. A valid marriage is essential in order to create the relation of husband and wife and to give rise to the mutual rights, duties, and liabilities arising out of such relation. The law prescribes the requisites of a valid marriage. Hence, the validity of a marriage is tested according to the law in force at the time the marriage is contracted.6 As a general rule, the nature of the marriage already celebrated cannot be changed by a subsequent amendment of the governing law.7 To illustrate, a marriage between a stepbrother and a stepsister was void under the Civil Code, but is not anymore prohibited under the Family Code; yet, the intervening effectivity of the Family Code does not affect the void nature of a marriage between a stepbrother and a stepsister solemnized under the regime of

the Civil Code. The Civil Code marriage remains void, considering that the validity of a marriage is governed by the law in force at the time of the marriage ceremony.8 Before anything more, the Court has to clarify the impact to the issue posed herein of Administrative Matter (A.M.) No. 02-11-10-SC (Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages), which took effect on March 15, 2003. Section 2, paragraph (a), of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC explicitly provides the limitation that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or wife. Such limitation demarcates a line to distinguish between marriages covered by the Family Code and those solemnized under the regime of the Civil Code.9 Specifically, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC extends only to marriages covered by the Family Code, which took effect on August 3, 1988, but, being a procedural rule that is prospective in application, is confined only to proceedings commenced after March 15, 2003.10 Based on Carlos v. Sandoval,11 the following actions for declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage are excepted from the limitation, to wit: 1. Those commenced before March 15, 2003, the effectivity date of A.M. No. 0211-10-SC; and 2. Those filed vis--vis marriages celebrated during the effectivity of the Civil Code and, those celebrated under the regime of the Family Code prior to March 15, 2003. Considering that the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila was contracted on December 26, 1949, the applicable law was the old Civil Code, the law in effect at the time of the celebration of the marriage. Hence, the rule on the exclusivity of the parties to the marriage as having the right to initiate the action for declaration of nullity of the marriage under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC had absolutely no application to the petitioner. The old and new Civil Codes contain no provision on who can file a petition to declare the nullity of a marriage, and when. Accordingly, in Nial v. Bayadog,12 the children were allowed to file after the death of their father a petition for the declaration of the nullity of their father s marriage to their stepmother contracted on December 11, 1986 due to lack of a marriage license. There, the Court distinguished between a void marriage and a voidable one, and explained how and when each might be impugned, thuswise: Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial decree is necessary in order to establish the nullity of a marriage. "A void marriage does not require a judicial decree to restore the parties to their original rights or to make the marriage void but though no sentence of avoidance be absolutely necessary, yet as well for the sake of good order of society as for the peace of mind of all concerned, it is expedient that the nullity of the marriage should be ascertained and declared by the decree of a court of competent jurisdiction." "Under ordinary circumstances, the effect of a void marriage, so far as concerns the conferring of legal rights upon the parties, is as though no marriage had ever taken place. And therefore, being good for no legal purpose, its invalidity can be maintained in any proceeding in which the fact of marriage may be material, either direct or collateral, in any civil court between any parties at any time, whether before or after the death of either or both the husband and the wife, and upon mere proof of the facts rendering such marriage void, it will be disregarded or treated as non-existent by the courts." It is not like a voidable marriage which cannot be collaterally attacked except in direct proceeding instituted during the lifetime of the parties so that on the death of either, the marriage cannot be impeached, and is made good ab initio. But Article 40 of the Family Code expressly provides that there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second marriage and such absolute nullity can be based only on a final judgment to that effect. For the same reason, the law makes either the action or defense for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage imprescriptible. Corollarily, if the death of either party would extinguish the cause of action or the ground for defense, then the same cannot be considered imprescriptible. However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that

matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. This is without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a final judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The clause "on the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void" in Article 40 of the Family Code connotes that such final judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of remarriage.13 It is clarified, however, that the absence of a provision in the old and new Civil Codes cannot be construed as giving a license to just any person to bring an action to declare the absolute nullity of a marriage. According to Carlos v. Sandoval,14 the plaintiff must still be the party who stands to be benefited by the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit, for it is basic in procedural law that every action must be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party in interest.15 Thus, only the party who can demonstrate a "proper interest" can file the action.16 Interest within the meaning of the rule means material interest, or an interest in issue to be affected by the decree or judgment of the case, as distinguished from mere curiosity about the question involved or a mere incidental interest. One having no material interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as plaintiff in an action. When the plaintiff is not the real party in interest, the case is dismissible on the ground of lack of cause of action.17 Here, the petitioner alleged himself to be the late Cresenciano s brother and surviving heir. Assuming that the petitioner was as he claimed himself to be, then he has a material interest in the estate of Cresenciano that will be adversely affected by any judgment in the suit. Indeed, a brother like the petitioner, albeit not a compulsory heir under the laws of succession, has the right to succeed to the estate of a deceased brother under the conditions stated in Article 1001 and Article 1003 of the Civil Code, as follows: Article 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or widower, the latter shall be entitled to one half of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their children to the other half. Article 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased in accordance with the following articles. Pursuant to these provisions, the presence of descendants, ascendants, or illegitimate children of the deceased excludes collateral relatives like the petitioner from succeeding to the deceased s estate.18 Necessarily, therefore, the right of the petitioner to bring the action hinges upon a prior determination of whether Cresenciano had any descendants, ascendants, or children (legitimate or illegitimate), and of whether the petitioner was the late Cresenciano s surviving heir. Such prior determination must be made by the trial court, for the inquiry thereon involves questions of fact. As can be seen, both the RTC and the CA erroneously resolved the issue presented in this case. We reverse their error, in order that the substantial right of the petitioner, if any, may not be prejudiced. Nevertheless, we note that the petitioner did not implead Leonila, who, as the late Cresenciano s surviving wife,19 stood to be benefited or prejudiced by the nullification of her own marriage. It is relevant to observe, moreover, that not all marriages celebrated under the old Civil Code required a marriage license for their validity;20 hence, her participation in this action is made all the more necessary in order to shed light on whether the marriage had been celebrated without a marriage license and whether the marriage might have been a marriage excepted from the requirement of a marriage license. She was truly an indispensable party who must be joined herein: xxx under any and all conditions, [her] presence being a sine qua non for the exercise of judicial power.1avvphi1 It is precisely "when an indispensable party is not before the court [that] the action should be dismissed." The absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present.21 We take note, too, that the petitioner and Leonila were parties in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 91025 entitled Heirs of Cresenciano Ablaza, namely: Leonila G. Ablaza and

Leila Ablaza Jasul v. Spouses Isidro and Casilda Ablaza, an action to determine who between the parties were the legal owners of the property involved therein. Apparently, C.A.-G.R. CV No. 91025 was decided on November 26, 2009, and the petitioner s motion for reconsideration was denied on June 23, 2010. As a defendant in that action, the petitioner is reasonably presumed to have knowledge that the therein plaintiffs, Leonila and Leila, were the wife and daughter, respectively, of the late Cresenciano. As such, Leila was another indispensable party whose substantial right any judgment in this action will definitely affect. The petitioner should likewise implead Leila. The omission to implead Leonila and Leila was not immediately fatal to the present action, however, considering that Section 11,22 Rule 3, Rules of Court, states that neither misjoinder nor non-joinder of parties is a ground for the dismissal of an action. The petitioner can still amend his initiatory pleading in order to implead her, for under the same rule, such amendment to implead an indispensable party may be made "on motion of any party or on (the trial court s) own initiative at any stage of the action and on such terms as are just." WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is granted. We reverse and set aside the decision dated January 30, 2003 rendered by the Court of Appeals. Special Case No. 117 entitled In Re: Petition for Nullification of Marriage Contract between Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila Honato; Isidro Ablaza, petitioner, is reinstated, and its records are returned to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 49, in Cataingan, Masbate, for further proceedings, with instructions to first require the petitioner to amend his initiatory pleading in order to implead Leonila Honato and her daughter Leila Ablaza Jasul as parties-defendants; then to determine whether the late Cresenciano Ablaza had any ascendants, descendants, or children (legitimate or illegitimate) at the time of his death as well as whether the petitioner was the brother and surviving heir of the late Cresenciano Ablaza entitled to succeed to the estate of said deceased; and thereafter to proceed accordingly.