Revolts and Social Movements* Nikos Serdedakis I.

Introduction Admittedly or not, the riots that broke out in Athens and in many urban centres of the country on December 6, 2008, as a reaction to the shooting of 15-year-old Alexandros Grigoropoulos by a special guard of the Hellenic Police, put many groups of people in an awkward position. The journalists and political leaderships bewilderment received much ink, and much still remains to be said. Journalists and political cadres found themselves in a quandary, expressing on the one hand their revulsion at the outbreak of one more case of unprovoked state violence and condemning on the other the outbreak of violence on the fringes of the mass protest demonstrations, while acknowledging the righteousness of the anger firing up the youths in rebellion. Society itself had its moments of puzzlement while watching teenagers and especially younger pupils yearn, even if only symbolically, for a conflict with the police forcesthe children of the very same generation thought to be apolitical and addicted to individual games in front of all types of electronic monitors. I think it is the same puzzlement that we ourselvesresearchers, social scientists or/and activistsall experienced too while studying collective action and social movements. Used in organizing the categories of our analysis around wellarticulated social movements, their relevance to social groups and to ideological trends, we realized that even the most up to date approaches in the field of the sociology of collective action and social movements were not in a position to deal with the phenomenon of revolt in satisfactory manner. Revolts that still flare up in contemporary capitalist societies, in both urban and rural areas, despite the various theoretical conjectures about the gradual taming and integration of collective action in societies where genuine representative political systems are functioning. II. Needful conceptual clarifications One of the risks incurred is to consider revolts as a pre-political phenomenon, as the manifestation of the irrationality of the masses and of the social pathology that breeds anomic subjects and behaviours. The opposite danger lies in trying to interpret the collective actions endowed with a violent content in the same terms as those used in the analysis of recognized social movements. What is distinctive in such movements is their well-established organizational basis and the clear strategies and practices they adopt in order to gain as much political power as possible from the dominant social groups. Achieving this goal (i.e. acquiring more political power) is supposed to form the most favourable preconditions for a positive outcome of collective action during the confrontation between the social basis of the social movements and the elites. What are at stake in such a confrontation is not only the redistribution of available social resources, but also the prevalence at the level of the social meanings predicating it. It is worth noting that there are only few researches and related publications that tackle the topic of post-war rebellious phenomena, even though their emergence is not rare. The same holds true with respect to the discussion of the topic of revolts in
*

Paper presented at Conference Rioting and Violent Protest in Comparative Perspective, Panteion University, Athens, 9-11/12/2009.

works that have a broader scope, treating issues such as the phenomenon of political violence or social movements and action repertoires thriving in them. This theoretical and research deficit is not difficult to explain. First, it can be interpreted as a result of the theoretical rupture in the field of the sociology of social movements in the mid-1970s, when the predominant until then approaches of collective behavior start being strongly criticized and gradually marginalized by theories based on the paradigm of rational choice theories that emphasize both the organizational prerequisites for protest and the political environment within which the action of social movements takes place. On the other hand, the gap in the contemporary literature on revolts can be attributed to the peculiar division of labour that followed the aforementioned theoretical turn. The tendency in the new approaches was to focus on the investigation of the new social movements that took shape after the conclusion of the cycle of protest that reached its peak at the beginning of the 1970s. This tendency resulted in cutting off the social movements researchers working on social movements from those working on revolts. The latter despite their internal theoretical and methodological differences, insisted on basing their analyses of social and political revolts rooted on the concepts of crisis and social disorganization. The concepts of crisis or of the rapid social transformations that shape the conditions for the intensification of the phenomenon of social disorganization draw on Durkheims analysis of anomic behaviours in contemporary capitalist societies and of declining social cohesion. The traditional approaches of collective behavior exploit Durkheims analysis in order to interpret the different expressions of social action as the result of the processes of the peoples unsatisfactory social integration into the social systems.1 According to this view, the processes of social change, when they occur rapidly, disrupt the taken-for-granted social world to such an extent that they make the people afflicted by the new reality available for mass mobilization. In this sense, riots and contemporary mass ideological-political movements alike are interpreted as the work of the underdogs and the rootless often prompted by fanatical albeit charismatic leaders: [] social movements are portrayed as mindless eruptions lacking either coherence or continuity with organized social life (Piven & Cloward 1992: 301). Some of the approaches of this kind seemed suitable for the interpretation of the rise of mid-war fascist movements. They were however considered totally inadequate to analyse both the traditional labour movement and the new social movements that emerged during the post-war period. Theories of collective behavior despite their partial contribution to the analysis of collective action did not manage to purge themselves of the criticism heaped on them for reproducing implicitly a psychologism bearing approaches marked by reactionism. The theoretical schemes, on the other hand, that were developed for the interpretation of the new social movements by initially exploiting the premises of the rational choice theories tended to centre on highlighting the characteristics of organized action and the preconditions for its successful outcome (collection of crucial resources by the protest organizers, exploitation of favourable political opportunities, strategic framing of collective action pervasive in the broader social environment).
1

I have particularly in mind the analyses by Gustave Le Bon, Eric Hoffer, William Kornhauser and Hanna Arendt.

However, this theoretical orientation which is empirically focused on the new movements that grew in the context of the welfare states after 1968 runs the risk of being led to deterministic-like positions. It is telling that Charles Tillys in his most recent writings holds the view that the social movements (as a form) arise simultaneously with the current representative political systems, tending towards full integration (or institutionalization) to the extent that political participation broadens and the processes of democratization deepens. Thus it comes as no surprise that the adherents of this approach meet difficulties in efficiently analyzing the expressions of collective action, that recover a strong radical content and form within the framework of the neo-liberal hegemony.2 These stances result from a fundamental and axiomatic in its nature concession, according to which the forms of collective action can be analyzed within the framework of a continuum, with the conventional-institutional forms of political action placed on one end, and the most violent forms of protest, riots and revolts, on the other end. In this context, violent forms of action are defined as simply a phase in other forms of collective action, caused by the same forces that move people to other, normal assertions of collective interest (Rule 1988: 170-171, in Piven and Cloward 1992: 302). Although, on the one hand, institutional and extra-institutional collective actions are rightly viewed as proceeding from existing conflicts of interests, on the other hand they end up being considered as phenomena of the same type that can be analyzed in a theoretically and methodologically unified framework. This haziness over the differences existing between institutional and extrainstitutional collective action inevitably leads to the disparagement of the radical protest potential within societies in which wealth and power are unevenly distributed. As Piven and Cloward (1992: 303) have it, [n]evertheless, protest is indeed outside of normal politics and against normal politics in the sense that people break the rules defining permissible modes of political action. Of course, the distinction between normative and non-normative is not always easy to draw [] Still, a riot is clearly not an electoral rally, and both the participants and the authorities know the difference. At the heart of these observations lies the follwing question: Should we consider that social movements on the one hand, and uprisings or even revolts on the other hand constitute phenomena that can be jointly analyzed, or should we consider them as absolutely distinct from each other? Before answering this question, it seems necessary to proceed with a conceptual clarification, by formulating clear definitions. According to Sidney Tarrow and David Meyer (1998: 4), movements [] are best defined as collective challenges to existing arrangements of power and distribution with common purposes and solidarity, in sustained interaction with elites, opponents, and authorities. Jeff Goodwin (2001: 10) following the above definition, will later add, that a revolutionary movement is a social movement that puts forward antagonistic demands with the aim of gaining control over the state or of a part of its territory. Consequently, a revolt can be analyzed as a violent social upheaval bringing about the substitution of a leading group for another that enjoys broader popular legitimacy (Davies 1962: 6). Skocpol (1994: 5) will claim that [] social revolutions [can be] defined as rapid, basic transformations of a societys state and class structure, accompanied and in part accomplished through popular revolts from
2

For a more analytical critical assessment of the various theoretical paradigms, see Nikos Serntedakis (2007).

below. Drawing on the above definitions, I hold the view that a revolt constitutes a temporally short, violent, mass upheaval against the authorities, bringing about, however, only a temporary collapse of the institutionally established order. In this sense, uprisings can be analyzed as micro-revolutions (Goldstone and Useem, 1999). III. Revolts and revolutions: similarities and differences As for the question previously put, that is, whether social movements, uprisings and revolts can be analyzed with the same analytical tools within a common scientific field, the answers diverge. On the one hand, Theda Skocpol argues that revolts and social movements constitute distinct empirical phenomena, suggesting that the former should be analyzed separately, in the context of approaches centred on the state. Contrary to the sociologists of revolutions, who lay emphasis on dissatisfaction and frustrated expectations as the most important prerequisites for revolt, Skocpol (1994: 104) writes: [r]evolutions above all are not mere extreme manifestations of some homogeneous type of individual behavior. Rather they are complex conjunctures of unfolding conflicts involving differently situated and motivated (and at last minimally organized) groups, and resulting not just in violent destruction of a polity, but also in the emergence of new sociopolitical arrangements. According to Skocpol (1994: 5), there are three fundamental prerequisites for the outbreak of a social revolt: 1) significant foreign geopolitical pressures exerted on a regime by competitive states, 2) elites with special institutional influence obstructing the attempts of a regime to respond to foreign pressures, thus paralyzing the national state apparatus (which results in administrative and/or military collapse), and 3) the rural populations high level of solidarity and autonomy that enables them to rebel against the landowners simultaneously with the collapse of the state apparatus. Once these factors are pulled together, wider conflicts between the elites and the popular classes are expected to be fuelled, which may lead to revolutionary changes on both state and social structures. Contrary to Skocpol, sociologists of collective action claim that social movement and revolts can be analyzed in the same framework, since their emergence and outbreak are provoked by similar causes. Expanding Neil Smelser and Charles Tillys view, Jack Goldstone will uphold that social movements and revolts constitute divergent phenomena even though their emergence is due on similar causes. Goldstone (1998: 128-129) advocates that the stance adopted by a state towards protest constitutes the crucial variable for the transition from the collective actions that are organized by a social movement to a revolutionary situation. A social movement usually makes claims either by demanding a change in specific policies or by aiming at a broader change on the level of values and social practices. Facing up to such demands, the state has three options: maintain a mild attitude, collaborate, or remain neutral. If the state chooses the path of repression, broader coalitions of protesters might be formed and a movement seeking to overthrow state authorities might arise. Excessively strong repression is likely to marginalize the revolutionary movement, yet rendering the dominant regime extremely unstable, whereas weak repression of the movement might lead to the outbreak of a revolt, provided, of course, that the revolutionaries have secured the broader popular recognition and legitimacy of their action. My impression is that both Skocpols and Goldstones approaches are of no special help to our comprehension of the outbreak of revolts in the modern world and that they do not enlighten us on the possible relations between uprisings and social

movements, at least to the extent that uprisings are understood as phenomena that can be analyzed as micro-revolutions. These approaches raise two issues. On the one hand, Skocpols approach concentrates on the great social revolutions and revolutionary movements of the Third World (Goodwin-Skocpol, 1989), where the rural classes and the geopolitical environment both play an important role. Her macro-structural comparative approach is obviously not in a position to explain the short-lived insurgencies that are phenomena of low effectiveness as for their consequences. On the other hand, Goldstones approach probably overestimates the potential of contemporary social movements, while attaching great importance to the variable of state repression. There is, however a significant gap in both approaches. It lies in the absence of any thorough discussion of the reasons behind the emergence of social movements, riots or social revolts. My point here is that the reasons that give rise to social movements and uprisings may be common, but this does not imply that uprisings necessarily result from the action of the current movement organizations. My claim is that the sphere of social movements is independent of the revolutionary outbreaks, despite the fact that the organized social movements are occasionally ahead of the revolts that break out from the social basis to which they allegedly give voice and on behalf of which they engage in struggles and demands. What is happening in these cases then? Do movement, their organizations and their cadres express the mood and the determination of the rebels, or do they try to manipulate them into putting an end to the upheavals that they have fuelled? Frances Fox Piven and Richard Clowards research on the poor peoples movement in the USA provide enlightening answers to this question. IV. Poor peoples insurgencies and social movements organizations Piven and Cloward reflect upon the mass protest movements in twentieth-century America, the unemployed and industrial workers movements during the Great Depression, the African American Civil Rights Movement and National Welfare Rights Movement, raising queries in order to examine the moment of their birth, the shape they took and the way the ruling elites responded to their action. Without overlooking the role played by the organizations in the context of the protests, they see the need for drawing a distinction between the protest movements on the one hand and the organizations trying to speak for them on the other. Diametrically opposed to the prevailing approaches to the field, they underline that social movement organizations should be studied neither as the organizers of dissatisfaction, not as the leading protagonists who collect and administer the resources required for mass mobilization, but rather as self-appointed mediators who blunt the protesters political potential. Reconstituting the history of social movements in mid-war and post-war America, they identify a crucial difference between the ideological nature of the corresponding movements and their leaderships designs, and also a convergence of views with regard to the role of the organizations within the movements. The labour movement leaders subsumed their struggles within the prospects of radical social transformation and of transcendence of the capitalist society, towards socialism. On the contrary, the African American leaders campaigning for equal rights between black and white people were fostered by the spirit of Americanism, aiming at reforms that would legitimise this spirit without undermining its fundaments.

In spite of this essential differentiation, a common stance on the issue of organization is revealed. The efforts of the leaders of social movements, despite their ideological differences, were directed at the constitution of formal organizations because they shared the conviction that these organizations constituted an important means of acquiring political influence. This conviction is based on three admissions. It is assumed that organizations are capable of collecting and coordinating economic, symbolic, ethical, cultural and political resources crucial for mobilization that the non-organized actors do not posses. It is also believed that organizations will use these collected resources for achieving their ends in a strategically intelligent way. Finally, organizations are regarded as the basic prerequisite for securing a prolonged mobilization of the dissatisfied. All three assertions and preconceptions tacitly activate an understanding of collective action such that action is likely to lead to the change strived for, that is, when the power of the mobilized groups reaches the point where it can force the ruling elites to concessions, enhancing in turn the massive participation in the movements. The empirical examination of the movements investigated by our authors seems to contradict this seemingly logical conclusion. As initially stated, the ruling elites do not make concessions likely to protract massive upheaval and fuel protest against them. Piven and Clowards basic position might look provocative. Radical mass movements do not result from the organizational efforts of the organizations leaders and cadres who allegedly speak for them. In other words, the organization of social movements thrive parallel to the mobilization of the masses, they shape or enhance their role after the outbreak of mass unruliness, thereby creating an illusion about the significance of the organizations and the leadership constituted within them. In turn the ruling elites in such periods of crisis look for a way of volatising dissatisfaction through the recognition of organizations that are more ready to negotiate. The elites appear to attribute certain authority and recognition to the organizations in an effort to relocate the conflict at the institutional level, with the aim of limiting the unanticipated consequences of mass action.
[] by endeavoring to do what they cannot do, organizers fail to do what they can do [] those who call themselves leaders do not usually escalate the momentum of the peoples protests [] Thus the studies that follow show that, all too often, when workers erupted in strikes, organizers collected dues cards; when tenants refused to pay rent and stood off marshals, organizers formed building committees; when people were burning and looting, organizers used that moment of madness to draft constitutions. The study of past movements reveals another point of equal importance. Organizers not only failed to seize the opportunity presented by the rise of unrest, they typically acted in ways that blunted or curbed the disruptive force which lower class people were sometimes able to mobilize. (Piven & Cloward 1979: xxi-xxii)

Piven and Clowards conclusion suggests that whatever is gained by the dominated is due to the upheaval that they brought about, and not to the demonstration of their systematically organized power. At this point the authors seem to re-evaluate the findings of the collective behavior theories, by ostracizing, however, every hint of irrationality on the part of all those who take part in protest movements. The protest and the unruliness of the masses and the collective action are not the result of the organizers and leaders collection of resources, but constitute an answer to the changes in the institutional order of things, that is, they emerge in periods of crisis, either because of the deterioration of living conditions, or because of increased expectations raised in times of rapid social transformation. At the same time, the masses relative weakness in the representative political systems and their failure in 6

exploiting the expansion of electoral rights indicate that the embraced protest tactics that disrupt or ignore the existing rules of the game do not reflect the irrationality of some agitators, but the only resource available to the poor. The conclusion to be drawn is that the institutional preconditions for collective action on behalf of the popular masses are as limited as the boundaries of the action that they can engage in: [i]ndeed some of the poor are sometimes so isolated from significant institutional participation that the only contribution they can withhold is that of quiescence in civil life: they can riot (Piven & Cloward 1979: 25) However, as Piven and Cloward point out, in the end the outcome of collective action is not to be measured at the level of the institutional upheaval that the mobilized are in a position to fuel, but at the level of the magnitude of the disruption that they bring about within the political system. In other words, the crucial issue is the political impact of collective action, the social movements capability to take advantage of appropriate political opportunities. At this point, the political elites antagonisms in the political system play an important role, especially during election periods. In times of relative stability, three options are open to those in power: they can ignore the protest, they can adopt repressive measures, or they can try and play the role of mediators. On the contrary, in times of rapid social transformation or/and political upheaval, it is more difficult to ignore the collective actors demands and confront them through state repression mechanisms. Here it emerges the perspective of a positive structure of political opportunities for collective action, primarily as it relates to the uncertainty surrounding the electoral assertion of the political elites. Under such conditions, the authors empirical research reports that a double strategy is adopted: the carrot and stick policy. On the one hand, the leadership will try to win over the mobilized groups through processes for their recognition and through various proposals for their integration, while on the other hand they will try to reduce the influence that the protesters have gained over the population. This can be achieved through measures or decisions that appear to meet the protesters demands. If such a strategy is unsuccessful, then the activation of the repressive mechanisms for the neutralization of the protest becomes easier. To sum up, we can say that Piven and Clowards empirical research and the theory that they develop concerning the phenomena of collective action bring out the interaction between the protesters and the economic and political elites, an interaction that is often thrust aside. Social movements emerge in periods of radical social transformation and organize the collective action of specific social groups, not on the basis of the resources collected by the leaderships and the various organizations, but within the framework of a series of concrete political opportunities that occur in those circumstances. In what way then can we reconsider in the current circumstances not only the social movements but also the other forms of radical collective action that seem to bounce back? The answers to this question are extremely complex and will certainly constitute the beginning of new processes in the field of the sociology of social movements. To start with, we can work on the contributions of the research conducted to date to reassess the view holding that the radical protest and unruliness of the dominated do not result from the organizers and leaders collection of resources, nor do they express the pathology of contemporary societies, but they constitute a response to the changes in the institutional order of things, a product of the times of crisis, either due to the deterioration of living conditions, or to increased expectations raised in periods of rapid social transformation. According to this analysis, the collective (mass) forms of protest that disrupt or disregard the existing

rules of the game do not reflect the irrationality of some agitators, but potentially constitute the only resource available to those who experience social exclusion under conditions of strong political oppression.3 As a concluding remark it can be said that this might be the way to meditate in a more coherent manner upon the various forms of social antagonism, ranging from social movements and uprisings to contention, while avoiding the assimilation of any form of protest to a social movement or, on the contrary, of the movements action to an uprising. V. Contemporary social movements and revolts. Tentative conclusions. The conclusions drawn from the study of Piven and Cloward were in a way misinterpreted. This misinterpretation lead to a false polarity in the field of collective action and social movements. For example, resource mobilization followers saw in the conclusions of Poor Peoples Movements an implicit contestation to the new perspective and in particular to its focus on the consideration of Social Movements Organizations (SMOs) as the central locus around which social movements are built. Additionally, the arguments of Piven and Cloward were practically marginalized, especially because they were perceived as a reaction of mal-integration or breakdown theorists to the newly advanced Rational Choice perspectives in the study of collective action (Buechler 2005: 56-58). Independently of this superficial, in my view, dispute, I sustain that this direct or indirect dialogue raised a very crucial question, concerning the nature of social movements and the changes of their content and form, historically and in the long dure. Around this crucial for the literature topic, two theses are still claiming for supremacy in the respective epistemic field. The first is well represented by Charles Tilly, stemming from his early empirical research as well as his later theoretical elaborations. Tillys empirical research on collective action in France and England from the 17th to the 20th century became the starting point for his approach, viewing social movements as a specific form of claim making that was introduced in the public arena in countries that were starting to build representative political structures and institutions. In a way, following Stein Rokkans (1982) theoretical conceptualization Tilly focused on the two major processes that characterize modernity, namely the formation of centralized national states and the advancement of industrial revolution, Tilly concludes that social movements are a product of these modernizing trends, an expression of those social groups (and social categories) that are excluded from political decision-making centers. In this respect, the form and content of social movements are primarily considered in socio-political terms and their future is inextricably connected to the ongoing processes of democratization or conversely to the processes of de-democratization in the different geo-political areas of the contemporary world (Tilly 2004). A different thesis is advanced by those who sustain that social movements are not only well-organized collective efforts mediating between the disadvantaged and the over-represented social and political elites. In their view, social movements are not always as political in their goals as other scholars claim them to be. Discussing the common agreement arising from different theoretical perspectives about the characteristics of social protest in the pre-industrial and the industrial era, James
3

This view draws on Frances Fox Piven and Richard Cloward, (1979), as well as on Jeff Goodwin (2001).

Jasper (1997: 6-9) calls our attention to the post-material turn of the new social movements or in his terms of the post-industrial movements. Having in mind the contemporary protests which focus on environmental, ecological, civil and political rights issues, Jasper underscores their different content and the diversified social position of their constituents vis--vis the rank and file of the more traditional movements growing in the first half of the twentieth century. In his view a great part of social protest is embedded in cultural settings: collective action during the last three decades of the twentieth century is oriented towards the politics of identity and the defense of newly advanced or endangered life styles and moral beliefs. Following this rationale, David Snow and Sarah Soule also maintain that [n]or are the claims and challenges of all social movements directed at a particular national government or state (Snow and Soule 2010: 3). Trying to relax the emphasis on political opportunities and the conceptualization of social movements as an expression of contentious politics, Snow and Soule propose a more inclusive definition of social movements as [] challengers to or defenders of existing structures or systems of authority [] social movements often challenge and seek to challenge and change existing cultural understandings that function in an authoritative manner (Snow and Soule 2010: 6-8). This argumentation aims at constructing social movements as an object of sociological research widening the definition of the political dimension of collective action. Political ends are not confined to the realm of the major political settings, institutions and diverse polity systems. Instead, they are viewed in a wider perspective that includes all those efforts aiming for the redistribution of power, wealth and status in the contemporary capitalist societies. What should be always kept in sight is that this fervent debate is advanced in the grounds of the current trends regarding the trajectory of the new social movements leading to their institutionalization and integration in what Mayer and Tarrow (1998) denominate as social movement societies. Tilly's observation is particularly crucial:
Perhaps social movements are splitting: on one side, older styles of action and organization that sustain contentious political involvement at points of decision-making power; on the other, spectacular but temporary displays of connection across the continents, largely mediated by specialized organizations and entrepreneurs. If so, we must think hard about the effects of such a split on democracy, that faithful companion of social movements throughout their history (Tilly 2004: 122).

This split that Tilly observes in his later writings and he explains as due to the proliferation of transnational advocacy networks and the predominance of NGOs in the so-called social movement sector, it can be traced, in my view, not only in the late 90s but much earlier. The professionalization of SMOs, gradually leading to their systemic cooptation, was a very clear trend after the conclusion of the fist post-war cycle of protest, around which, among other things, resource mobilization theory was built (Serdedakis 2007). I argue that this split is not only circumscribed to the organizational aspect of movements structure. The specific organizational features of the new social movements must be considered in a wider horizon, mainly as an outcome of a process that leads to the creation of a growing gap between professionalized SMOs and the social base these movements claim to represent. I think that this is the most crucial point raised by Piven and Cloward in their study. They consider the different aims and function of SMOs in relation to the insurgencies of the dangerous classes that form their grievances under the liberal (capitalist) domination. For example, the labor movement in the 19th and 20th century

developed throughout the workers communities and solidarity networks and in straight relation to them. Labour movements activists were sharing the same everyday life conditions, confronting the same sustenance difficulties and above all the same perceptions about right and wrong connected to the unequal distribution of power, wealth and status in the emergent industrial societies. Only after the institutionalization of trade unions, especially in the postwar period -the welfare state idyllic interlude- we can observe the creation of a path that alienates the social base of the workers movement from their organizations. The same tendency can be traced in all social movements. The question that re-surfaces here concerns the destiny of social movements from their radical origins to their pacification. If their destiny consists in the unavoidable separation of SMOs from the excluded constituencies out of which they grow, then the eruption of revolts maybe considered as the expression of illrepresented social groups that above all are trying to voice their presence, their denied needs and accumulated grievances. Putting aside questions regarding a definitive and exhaustive definition of social movements, I propose to redirect our attention not only to the degree of their action orientation to the various centers of decision-making or, inversely, to their struggles against the various systems of authority, but to the crucial theme concerning their connection, closeness or distance, to concrete social categories, groups and classes that are perceived to be their peculiar expression. I sustain that it is urgent to reflect the historical trajectory of social movements in order to further our comprehension of their changes in content and form over the last two centuries. Doing so we will be forced to reconnect social movements theory to the needful sociological sensitivity that can reinvigorate research and theory building, connecting the movements past, present and future to the big transformation we witness nowadays.
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Jasper J., The Art of Moral Protest. Culture, Biography and Creativity in Social Movements, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London, 1997. Tarrow S., Meyer D., The Social Movement Society, Contentious Politics for a New Century, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Lanham, 1998. Piven F.F., Cloward R., Poor Peoples Movements, Vintage Books, New York, 1979. Piven F.F., Cloward R., Normalizing Collective Protest, Morris A., Mueller C., Frontiers in Social Movement Theory, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1992, . 301-325. Rokkan S., Costruzione della Nazione, Formazione delle Fratture e Consolidamento della Politica di Massa, in Rokkan S., Cittadini, Elezioni, Partiti, Il Mulino, Bologna, 1982. Skocpol T., Social Revolutions in the Modern World, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1994. Serdedakis N., Methodological questions in the study of collective action and social movements in Skevos Papaioannou (ed.), Theory and method in the social sciences, Kritiki, Athens, 2007, . 381-395. Seferiadis S., Contentious politics, collective action, social movements, Greek Review of Political Science, 27:7-42, 2006. Meyer D., Tarrow S., (eds.) The Social Movement Society: Contentious Politics for a New Century, Rowman & Littlefield, Boulder, CO, 1998. Tilly Ch., Social Movements 1768-2004, Paradigm Publishers, Boulder-London, 2004. Psimitis M., Introduction to the contemporary social movements, Atrapos, Athens, 2006.