ISSUE Article VI, Section 18 Case Digest - Madrigal v. Villar, G.R. 183055, July 31, 2009 Madrigal v.

Villar G.R. 183055 July 31, 2009 FACTS On August 2007, the Senate and the House of Representatives elected their respective contingents int he Commission on Appointments (CA), with Sen. Maria Ana Consuelo A.S. Madrigal as one of the contingents in the Senate under the PDP-Laban party. Sen. Madrigal of PDP-Laban, by separate letters to Senator Manuel Villar and Speaker Prospero Nograles, claimed that the composition of the Senate contingent in the CA violated the constitutional requirement of proportional representation. With this claim, she requested for the reorganization of the CA and that, in the meantime, "all actions of the CA be held in abeyance as the same may be construed as illegal and unconstitutional." Sen. Villar answered her letter noting that he intended to have the CA Committee study and deliberate on the matter. However, he also stated that copies of the letters of Madrigal would be transmitted to the Senate Secretary for it had better jurisdiction on the issue, as per Sen. Arroyo's comment which stated that, "if there is a complaint in the election of a member, or members, it shall be addressed to the body that elected them, namely the Senate and/or the House. Thus, it was just appropriate for the case presented by Madrigal to be included in the Order of Business of the Session of the Senate to be properly addressed. However, Sen. Madrigal, by letter, reiterated her request for the actions of the CA to be held in abeyance pending the reorganization of both the Senate and House of Representatives contingents. Thereafter, she filed for a petition (2nd to that of Drilon, G.R. 180055) for prohibition and mandamus with prayer for issuance of temporary restraining order/writ of preliminary injunction against Sen. Villar in his capacity as Senate President and ExOfficio Chairman of the CA, Speaker Nograles, and the CA, alleging that respondents committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction:
y in failing to comply with the constitutionally required proportional party representation of the members of the CA y in continuously conducting hearings and proceedings on the the appointments despite the above y in failing, despite repeated demands from petitioner, to reorganize the CA members.

Can a Senator challenge before the Supreme Court that she was denied proportional representation with the Commission on Appointments? HELD No. The doctrine of "primary jurisdiction" dictates that prior recourse to the House is necessary before Sen. Madrigal may bring her petition to Court. Sen. Villar's invocation of the said doctrine is thus well-taken. Furnishing a copy of the petitioner's letter to the Senate President and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives does not constitute the primary recourse required prior to the invocation of the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. More to that, the Members of the House who claim that they have been deprived of a seat in the Commission on Appointments must first show to the House that they possess the required numerical strength to be entitled to seats in the CA. Hence, the petition was dismissed. Article VI, Sections 21, 22 and 1 Case Digest - Senate v. Ermita, G.R. 169777, April 20, 2006 Senate v. Ermita G.R. 169777 April 20, 2006 FACTS Senate of the Philippines petitioned for certiorari and prohibition for E.O. 464, alleging that the Senate has a vital interest in the resolution of the issue of its validity, pointing out that the Executive Order directly interferes with and impedes the valid exercise of the Senate's powers and functions and conceals information of great public interest and concern. Hence, Senate prayed for E.O. 464 to be declared unconstitutional. Petitioners alleged that the E.O. violated various provisions in the Constitution, specifically, Art. VI, Sections 21, 22, and 1, which mandate the publication of the Rules of Procedure, the appropriate steps that must be taken by the heads of department, and the state the legislative power which is vested in the Congress of the Philippines. ISSUE Is Section 3 of E.O. 464, which requires all the public officials enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either House of Congress, valid and constitutional? HELD Section 3 of E.O. 464 requires all the public officials enumerated in Section

2(b) to secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either house of Congress. The enumeration is broad. It covers all senior officials of executive departments, all officers of the AFP and the PNP, and all senior national security officials who, in the judgment of the heads of offices designated in the same section (i.e. department heads, Chief of Staff of the AFP, Chief of the PNP, and the National Security Adviser), are "covered by the executive privilege." The doctrine of executive privilege is premised on the fact that certain information must, as a matter of necessity, be kept confidential in pursuit of the public interest. The privilege being, by definition, an exemption from the obligation to disclose information, in this case to Congress, the necessity must be of such high degree as to outweigh the public interest in enforcing that obligation in a particular case. Congress has the right to information from the Executive Branch. E.O. 464 somewhat allowed the executive branch to evade congressional requests for information without need of clearly asserting a right to do so and/or proffering its reasons therefor. By the mere expedient of invoking said provisions, the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is frustrated. Sections 2(b) and 3 of Executive Order No. 464 (series of 2005), "Ensuring Observance of the Principle of Separation of Powers, Adherence to the Rule on Executive. Privilege and Respect for the Rights of Public Officials Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation Under the Constitution, and For Other Purposes," are declared VOID. Sections 1 and 2(a) are, however, VALID. Thus, the petition is partially granted. true or false. a proclamation of a state of emergency is sufficient to allow the President to take over any public utility.

Pimentel vs. vs. Joint Committee of Congress to Canvass the Votes Cast for President and Vice-President in the 10 May 2004 Elections [GR 163783, 22 June 2004] En Banc Resolution Facts: By a Petition for Prohibition, Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. seeks a judgment declaring null and void the continued existence of the Joint Committee of Congress (Joint Committee) to determine the authenticity and due execution of the certificates of canvass and preliminarily canvass the votes cast for Presidential and Vice-Presidential candidates in the 10 May 2004 elections following the adjournment of Congress sine die on 11 June 2004. The petition corollarily prays for the issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Joint Committee to cease and desist from conducting any further proceedings pursuant to the Rules of the Joint Public Session of Congress on Canvassing. Issue [1]: Whether legislative procedure, precedent or practice as borne out by the rules of both Houses of Congress supports Pimentels arguments against to the existence and proceedings of the Joint Committee of Congress after the sine die adjurnment of Congress. Held [1]: NO. Pimentels claim that his arguments are buttressed by legislative procedure, precedent or practice as borne out by the rules of both Houses of Congress is directly contradicted by Section 42 of Rule XIV of the Rules adopted by the Senate, of which he is an incumbent member. This section clearly provides that the Senate shall convene in joint session during any voluntary or compulsory recess to canvass the votes for President and Vice-President not later than thirty days after the day of the elections in accordance with Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution. Moreover, the precedents set by the 1992 and 1998 Presidential Elections do not support the move to stop the ongoing canvassing by the Joint Committee. Thus, during the 1992 Presidential elections, both Houses of Congress adjourned sine die on 25 May 1992. On 16 June 1992, the Joint Committee finished tallying the votes for President and Vice-President. Thereafter, on 22 June 1992, the Eighth Congress convened in joint public session as the National Board of Canvassers, and on even date proclaimed Fidel V. Ramos and Joseph Ejercito Estrada as President and VicePresident, respectively. Upon the other hand, during the 1998 Presidential elections, both Houses of Congress adjourned sine die on 25 May 1998. The Joint Committee completed the counting of the votes for President and Vice-President on 27 May 1998. The Tenth Congress then convened in joint public session on 29 May 1998 as the National Board of Canvassers and proclaimed Joseph Ejercito Estrada as President and Gloria MacapagalArroyo as President and Vice-President, respectively.

False. it may be true that the president can declare state of emergency but only with a limited power, that is to cal...l-out to the military to prevent lawless violence. but with regards to taking over the public utility is beyond its control. for the latter to be possible, it needs to have the intervention of the congress, which is clearly stated in Article VII, section 18 "the State may, during the emergency and under reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest", this refers to the congress and not the president. whether or not the president can acquire such power still depends on congress. Because such power needs delegation from congress and its up to the congress to delegate it to the president or not.

Issue [2]: Whether the existence and proceedings of the Joint Committee of Congress are invalid, illegal and unconstitutional following the adjournment sine die of both Houses of Congress of their regular sessions on 11 June 2004. Held [2]: NO. The term of the present Twelfth Congress did not terminate and expire upon the adjournment sine die of the regular session of both Houses on 11 June 2004. Section 15, Article VI of the Constitution (which provides that "The Congress shall convene once every year on the fourth Monday of July for its regular session, unless a different date is fixed by law, and shall continue to be in session for such number of days as it may determine until thirty days before the opening of its next regular session, exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays. The President may call a special session at any time.") does not pertain to the term of Congress, but to its regular annual legislative sessions and the mandatory 30-day recess before the opening of its next regular session (subject to the power of the President to call a special session at any time). Section 4 of Article VIII also of the Constitution clearly provides that "the term of office of the Senators shall be six years and shall commence, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election." Similarly, Section 7 of the same Article provides that "the Members of the House of Representatives shall be elected for a term of three years which shall begin, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election." Consequently, there being no law to the contrary, until June 30, 2004, the present Twelfth Congress to which the present legislators belong cannot be said to have "passed out of legal existence." The legislative functions of the Twelfth Congress may have come to a close upon the final adjournment of its regular sessions on 11 June 2004, but this does not affect its non-legislative functions, such as that of being the National Board of Canvassers. In fact, the joint public session of both Houses of Congress convened by express directive of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution to canvass the votes for and to proclaim the newly elected President and Vice-President has not, and cannot, adjourn sine die until it has accomplished its constitutionally mandated tasks. For only when a board of canvassers has completed its functions is it rendered functus officio. Its membership may change, but it retains its authority as a board until it has accomplished its purposes. Since the Twelfth Congress has not yet completed its non-legislative duty to canvass the votes and proclaim the duly elected President and Vice-President, its existence as the National Board of Canvassers, as well as that of the Joint Committee to which it referred the preliminary tasks of authenticating and canvassing the certificates of canvass, has not become functus officio. In sum, despite the adjournment sine die of Congress, there is no legal impediment to the Joint Committee completing the tasks assigned to it and transmitting its report for the approval of the joint public session of both Houses of Congress, which may reconvene without need of call by the President to a special session.

2003 bar - is people power recognized by 1987 consti? - Is "people power" recognized by the 1987 Constitution? Explain fully. SUGGESTED ANSWER: "People power" is recognized in the Constitution. Article III, Section 4 of the 1987 Constitution guarantees the right of the people peaceable to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances. Article VI, Section 32 of the 1987 Constitution requires Congress to pass a law allowing the people to directly propose and enact laws through initiative and to approve or reject any act or law or part of it passed by Congress or a local legislative body. Article XIII, Section 16 of the 1987 Constitution provides that the right of the people and their organizations to participate at all levels of social, political, and economic decision-making shall not be abridged and that the State shall, by law, facilitate the establishment of adequate consultation mechanisms. Article XVII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution provides that subject to the enactment of an implementing law, the people may directly propose amendments to the Constitution through initiative.

No I - Is "people power" recognized by the 1987 Constitution? Explain fully. SUGGESTED ANSWER: "People power" is recognized in the Constitution. Article III, Section 4 of the 1987 Constitution guarantees the right of the people peaceable to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances. Article VI, Section 32 of the 1987 Constitution requires Congress to pass a law allowing the people to directly propose and enact laws through initiative and to approve or reject any act or law or part of it passed by Congress or a local legislative body. Article XIII, Section 16 of the 1987 Constitution provides that the right of the people and their organizations to participate at all levels of social, political, and economic decision-making shall not be abridged and that the State shall, by law, facilitate the establishment of adequate consultation mechanisms. Article XVII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution provides that subject to the enactment of an implementing law, the people may directly propose amendments to the Constitution through initiative. 2009 Bar: Congressmanm nonoy delivered a privilege speech...... etc answer: The IUB officials filed suit to prohibit the HCGG from proceeding with the injury and to quash the subpoena, raising the ff arguments: a.) the subject of thelegislative iinvestigation is also the subject of criminal

and civil action pending before the court and the prosecutors office; thus the legislative inquiry would preempt judicial action. the legislative inquiry is only aid of legislative. it is not binding on the criminal or civil aspect of the case. thus, the motion to quash in legislative body is unvailing. b.) the BSP governor may refuse attendance provided he can prove that his office is covered by the executive privilege. otherwise, he may be compelled to appear before body. No IV. In an election case, the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal rendered a decision upholding the election protest of protestant A, a member of the Freedom Party, against protestee B, a member of the Federal Party. The deciding vote in favor of A was cast by Representative X, a member of the Federal Party. For having voted against his party mate, Representative X was removed by Resolution of the House of Representatives, at the instance of his party (the Federal Party), from membership in the HRET. Representative X protested his removal on the ground that he voted on the basis of the evidence presented and contended that he had security of tenure as a HRET Member and that he cannot be removed except for a valid cause. With whose contention do you agree, that of the Federal Party or that of Representative X? Why? (5%) SUGGESTED ANSWER: I agree with the contention of Representative X. As held In Bondoc v. Pineda, 201 SCRA 792 (1991), the members of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal are entitled to security of tenure like members of the judiciary. Membership in it may not be terminated except for a just cause. Disloyalty to party is not a valid ground for the expulsion of a member of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal. Its members must discharge their functions with impartiality and independence from the political party to which they belong. No V - During his third term, "A", a Member of the House of Representatives, was suspended from office for a period of 60 days by his colleagues upon a vote of two-thirds of all the Members of the House. In the next succeeding election, he filed his certificate of candidacy for the same position. "B", the opposing candidate, filed an action for disqualification of "A" on the ground that the latter's, candidacy violated Section 7. Article VI of the Constitution which provides that no Member of the House of Representatives shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. "A" answered that he was not barred from running again for that position because his service was interrupted by his 60- day suspension which was involuntary. Can 'A', legally continue with his candidacy or is he already barred? Why? (5%) SUGGESTED ANSWER: "A" cannot legally continue with his candidacy. He was elected as Member

of the House of Representatives for a third term. This term should be included in the computation of the term limits, even if "A" did not serve for a full term. (Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. n, p. 592.) He remained a Member of the House of Representatives even if he was suspended.
y

No XVII. - Suppose that Congress passed a law creating a Department of Human Habitat and authorizing the Department Secretary to promulgate implementing rules and regulations. Suppose further that the law declared that violation of the implementing rules and regulations so issued would be punishable as a crime and authorized the Department Secretary to prescribe the penalty for such violation. If the law defines certain acts as violations of the law and makes them punishable, for example, with imprisonment of three (3) years or a fine in the amount of P10,000.00, or both such imprisonment and fine, in the discretion of the court, can it be provided in the implementing rules and regulations promulgated by the Department Secretary that their violation will also be subject to the same penalties as those provided in the law itself? Explain your answer fully. (5%) SUGGESTED ANSWER: The rules and regulations promulgated by the Secretary of Human Habitat cannot provide that the penalties for their violation will be the same as the penalties for the violation of the law. As held in United States v. Barrias, 11 Phil. 327 (1908), the fixing of the penalty for criminal offenses involves the exercise of legislative power and cannot be delegated. The law itself must prescribe the penalty.