LAND TITLES AND DEEDS Garcia v. CA 312 S 180 Sapto v.

Fabiano 103 Phil 683, May 16, 1958 Titong v. CA 287 S 102 Li Seng Giap v. Director 59 Phil 687 Binalay Grande et al vs. CA 115 Phil 521, March 15, 1934 Grande v. Manalo, GR 92161 March 18, 1991 Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila FIRST DIVISION G.R. No. 133140 August 10, 1999

The redemption period of the foreclosed mortgage expired without the Magpayos redeeming the same, hence, title over the land was consolidated in favor of PBCom which cancelled the Magpayo's title and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 138233 was issued in its name. On October 4, 1985, the Magpayos filed at the RTC of Makati a complaint seeking the nullification of the extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage, public auction sale, and PBCom's title docketed as Civil Case No. 11891. This complaint was dismissed for failure to prosecute. On October 15, 1985, PBCom filed at the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati a petition for the issuance of a writ of possession over the land, docketed as LRC Case No. M-731, which Branch 148 thereof granted. Upon service of the writ of possession, Mrs. Magpayo's brother, Jose Ma. T. Garcia (Garcia), who was in possession of the land, refused to honor it and filed a motion for Intervention in the above-said PBCom petition, which motion was denied. Garcia thereupon filed against PBCom, the Magpayos, and the RTC Sheriff the instant suit for recovery of realty and damages wherein he alleged, inter alia, that he inherited the land as one of the heirs of his mother Remedios T. Garcia, and that PBCom acquired no right thereover. In its answer, PBCom averred, inter alia, that Garcia's claim over the land is belied by the fact that it is not among the properties owned by his mother listed in the Inventory of Real Estate filed at the then CFI of Pasay City, Branch 27, in SP Proc. No. 2917-P, "In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of Remedios T. Garcia Petition for Letters of Administration, Pedro V. Garcia Petitioner-Administrator. The Magpayos, on the other hand, asserted that title over the land was transferred to them by Mrs. Magpayo's parents to enable them (Magpayos) to borrow from PBCom. Garcia filed a Motion for Summary Judgment praying that judgment be rendered in his favor to which PBCom counter-motioned that judgment should be rendered in its favor. The court a quo denied the motion for summary judgment on the ground that PBCom raised in its answer both factual and legal issues which could only be ventilated in a full-blown trial. The court a quo, however, later issued a summary judgment.2 In its summary judgment, the lower court held that the mortgage executed by the Magpayo spouses in favor of PBCom was void. It found that: . . . [A]t the time that the defendants Magpayo spouses executed the mortgage in favor of the defendant PBCom on March 5, 1981, the said spouses were not yet the owners of the property. This finding is evident from the other undisputed fact that a new Torrens title was issued to the defendants Magpayo spouses only on March 9, 1981 . . . . The Magpayo spouses could not have acquired the said property merely by the execution of the Deed of Sale because the property was in the possession of the plaintiff. The vendor, Pedro V. Garcia, was not in possession and hence could not deliver the property merely by the execution of the document (MANALILI V. CESAR, 39 PHIL. 134). The conclusion is therefore

JOSE MA. T. GARCIA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, SPS. LUISITO & MA. LUISA MAGPAYO AND PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMUNICATIONS, respondents. PUNO, J.: This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to set aside the decision rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 44707 entitled "Jose Ma. T. Garcia, Plaintiff-Appellee versus Spouses Luisito and Ma. Luisa Magpayo and Sheriff of Makati, Defendants, Philippine Bank of Communications, Defendant-Appellant".1 The facts are as succinctly summarized by the appellate court, viz.: Atty. Pedro V. Garcia, in whose name TCT No. S-31269 covering a parcel of land identified as Lot 17 situated at Bel Air II Village, Makati, was registered, sold with the consent of his wife Remedios T. Garcia, the same to their daughter Ma. Luisa Magpayo and her husband Luisito Magpayo (the Magpayos). On March 5, 1981, the Magpayos mortgaged the land to the Philippine Bank of Communications (PBCom) to secure a loan, Five Hundred Sixty Four Thousand (P564,000.00) Pesos according to them, One Million Two Hundred Thousand (P1,200,000.00) Pesos according to PBCom.1wphi1.nt On March 9, 1981, Atty. Garcia's Title was cancelled and in its stead Transfer Certificate of Title No. S108412/545 was issued in the name of the Magpayos. The Deed of Real Estate Mortgage was registered at the Makati Register of Deeds and annotated on the Magpayos title. The Magpayos failed to pay their loan upon its maturity, hence, the mortgage was extrajudicially foreclosed and at the public auction sale, PBCom which was the highest bidder bought the land.

inescapable that the said mortgage is null and void for lack of one of the essential elements of a mortgage as required by Art. 2085 of our Civil Code . . . .3 Thus, it invalidated the foreclosure sale and nullified TCT No. 138233 issued to PBCom. Dissatisfied, PBCom appealed. In reversing the trial court, the Court of Appeals held: (P)laintiff-appellee's assertion that ownership over the disputed property was not transmitted to his sister and her husband-Magpayo spouses at the time of the execution of the Deed of Sale as he was still in actual and adverse possession thereof does not lie. For in his complaint, plaintiff-appellee alleged that he entered into possession of the disputed property only upon the demise of his mother, from whom he alleges to have inherited it but who was not the registered owner of the property, that is, on October 31, 1980 (Certificate of Death, p. 17, Records), by which admission he is bound. Since the execution of the deed of sale by Atty. Pedro V. Garcia in favor of the Magpayos took place earlier or on August 1, 1980, then contrary to his claim, plaintiff-appellee was not in possession of the property at the time of the execution of said public instrument. Furthermore, it appearing that the vendor Atty. Garcia had control of the property which was registered in his name and that the deed of sale was likewise registered, then the sale was consummated and the Magpayos were free to exercise the attributes of ownership including the right to mortgage the land. When the land is registered in the vendor's name, and the public instrument of sale is also registered, the sale may be considered consummated and the buyer may exercise the actions of an owner (Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines, 1992 Ed., p. 55). That the Magpayos' title, TCT No. S-108412, was issued four (4) days following the execution of the deed of real estate mortgage is of no moment, for registration under the Torrens system does not vest ownership but is intended merely to confirm and register the title which one may already have on the land (Municipality of Victorias v. Court of Appeals, 149 SCRA 32, 44-45 [1987]). Petitioner Garcia moved for a reconsideration of above decision which was denied. He now comes before us raising the following errors committed by the Court Appeals: I The respondent Court of Appeals has departed from the accepted and usual course of proceedings when it decided the appeal subject of this case based on issues which were raised neither in the trial court nor in the appellant's brief. II The Court of Appeals decided the appeal in a manner not in accord with applicable jurisprudence when it disregarded the admissions of the private respondents and, despite ruling that Summary Judgment was proper, made its own findings of facts which were contrary to the said admissions. III

The Decision of the respondent Court of Appeals was not in accord with established jurisprudence and even contradicts itself, as far as the issue of the propriety of the Summary Judgment is concerned. The petition has no merit. Anent the first assignment of error, petitioner alleged that the Court of Appeals resolved the issues "ownership" and "possession" though they were not raised by PBCom in its appellant's brief. The allegation is belied by page 17 of PBCom's appellate brief, viz.: Due to the wrong cited case, the trial court opined erroneously that "Magpayo Spouses could not have acquired the property merely by the execution of the deed of sale because the property was in the possession of the plaintiff" (Order, p. 10). Again, the trial court could not distinguish ownership from possession. Ownership and possession are two entirely different legal concepts. Plaintiff-appellee's possession as found by the trial court, started only "at the time of the filing of the complaint in this present case up to the present." (page 2, Summary Judgment). Assuming that to be true, plaintiff-appellee's possession which started only in 1986 could not ripen into ownership. He has no valid title thereto. His possession in fact was that of an intruder, one done in bad faith (to defeat PBCom's Writ of Possession). His possession is certainly not in the concept of an owner. This is so because as early as 1981, title thereto was registered in the name of the Magpayo Spouses which title was subsequently cancelled when the property was purchased by PBCom in a public auction sale resulting in the issuance of title in favor of the latter in 1985. Anent the second-assignment of error, petitioner contends that the following facts were admitted by the parties in the trial court: 1. The petitioner is a compulsory heir of the late spouses Atty. Pedro V. Garcia and Remedios Tablan Garcia; 2. The property subject of this dispute was previously the conjugal property of the said spouses; 3. The petitioner and his family have been and are continuously to the present in actual physical possession of the property. At the time of the alleged sale to the Magpayo spouses, petitioner was in possession of the property; 4. When his mother Remedios Tablan (sic) Garcia died, sometime in October, 1980, he became, by operation of law, a co-owner of the property; 5. Atty. Pedro V. Garcia, at the time of the execution of the instrument in favor of the Magpayo spouses was not in possession of the subject property.4 We reject the contention of petitioner for a perusal of the records shows that these alleged admitted facts are his own paraphrased portions of the findings of fact listed by the trial court in the summary judgment.5 Indeed

petitioner did not cite any page number of the records or refer to any documentary Exhibit to prove how and who admitted the said facts. Petitioner's third assignment of error that he alone as plaintiff in the trial court is entitled to a summary judgment merits scant attention. A summary judgment is one granted by the court, upon motion by either party, for an expeditious settlement of the case, there appearing from the pleadings, depositions, admissions, and affidavits that no important questions or issues of fact are involved (except the determination of the amount of damages) and that therefore the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.6 Under Rule 34, either party may move for a summary judgment the claimant by virtue of Section 1 and the defending party by virtue of Section 2, viz.: Sec. 1. Summary judgment for claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counter-claim, or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory relief may, at any time after the pleading in answer thereto has been served, move with supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any part thereof. Sec. 2. Summary judgment for defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory relief is sought may, at any time, move with supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor as to all or any part thereof. It is true that petitioner made the initial move for summary judgment. Nonetheless, PBCom likewise moved for a summary judgment with supporting affidavit and documentary exhibits, to wit: COUNTER-MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT PBCom Is Entitled To A Summary Judgment The procedure for summary judgment may be availed of also by the defending parties who may be the object of unfounded claims as clearly shown in Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 34. xxx xxx xxx

he believes to be ownership, whether his belief be right or wrong."13 The records show that petitioner occupied the property not in the concept of an owner for his stay was merely tolerated by his parents. We held in Caniza v. Court of Appeals 14 that an owner's act of allowing another to occupy his house, rent-free does not create a permanent and indefeasible right of possession in the latter's favor. Consequently, it is of no moment that petitioner was in possession of the property at the time of the sale to the Magpayo spouses. It was not a hindrance to a valid transfer of ownership. On the other hand, petitioner's subsequent claim of ownership as successor to his mother's share in the conjugal asset is belied by the fact that the property was not included in the inventory of the estate submitted by his father to the intestate court. This buttresses the ruling that indeed the property was no longer considered owned by petitioner's parents. We also uphold the Court of Appeals in holding that the mortgage to PBCom by the Magpayo spouses is valid notwithstanding that the transfer certificate of title over the property was issued to them after the mortgage contract was entered into. Registration does not confer ownership, it is merely evidence of such ownership over a particular property.15 The deed of sale operates as a formal or symbolic delivery of the property sold and authorizes the buyer to use the document as proof of ownership.16 All said, the Magpayo spouses were already the owners when they mortgaged the property to PBCom.17 IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 44707 is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.1wphi1.nt SO ORDERED. Davide, Jr., C.J., Kapunan, Pardo and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
17

The New Civil Code provides: Art. 2085. The following requisites are essential to the contracts of pledge and mortgage: (1) That they be constituted to secure the fulfillment of a principal obligation; (2) THAT THE PLEDGOR OR MORTGAGOR BE THE ABSOLUTE OWNER OF THE THING PLEDGED OR MORTGAGED; (3) That the person constituting the pledge or mortgage have the free disposal of their property, and in the absence thereof, that they be legally authorized for the purpose.

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court to render summary judgment in PBCom's favor by DISMISSING plaintiff's Complaint as well as Sps. Magpayo's Cross-Claim for being sham and frivolous.7 Needless to state, there was no error on the part of the appellate court in resorting to summary judgment as prayed for by both parties. We stress again that possession and ownership are distinct legal concepts. Ownership exists when a thing pertaining to one person is completely subjected to his will in a manner not prohibited by law and consistent with the rights of others.8 Ownership confers certain rights to the owner, one of which is the right to dispose of the thing by way of sale.9 Atty. Pedro Garcia and his wife Remedios exercised their right to dispose of what they owned when they sold the subject property to the Magpayo spouses. On the other hand, possession is defined as the holding of a thing or the enjoyment of a right.10 Literally, to possess means to actually and physically occupy a thing with or without right. Possession may be had in one of two ways: possession in the concept of an owner and possession of a holder.11 "A possessor in the concept of an owner may be the owner himself or one who claims to be so."12 On the other hand, "one who possesses as a mere holder acknowledges in another a superior right which

Third persons who are not parties to the principal obligation may secure the latter by pledging or mortgaging their own property. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-11285 May 16, 1958

VICENTE SAPTO, LAUREANA SAPTO and DORA (BAGONA), plaintiffs-appellants, vs. APOLONIO FABIANA, defendant-appellee. Rodolfo A. Ta-Asan for appellants. Napoleon B. Nidea for appellee. REYES, J.B.L., J.: Sapto (Moro), now deceased was the registered owner of a parcel of land located in Alambre, Toril, Davao City, under Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-5701 (0-28) of the Register of Deeds of Davao City. When Sapto died, he left his children Samuel, Constancio, and Ramon as heirs of the property in question. Ramon pre-deceased his two brothers, leaving no, other heirs. On June 6, 1931, Samuel and Constancio Sapto executed a deed of sale of a portion of four hectares of the land aforementioned if favor of defendant Apolonio Fabiana, in consideration of the amount of P245.00. The sale was duly approved by the Provincial Governor of Davao, but was never registered. Possession of the land conveyed was, however, transferred to Fabiana and the latter has been in the possession thereof 1931 up to the present. Thereafter, Constancio Sapto died without any issue, Samuel Sapto married one Dora (Bagoba) and upon his death was survived by his widow and two children, Laureana and Vicente Sapto. On October 19, 1954, the widow and children of Samuel Sapto filed this action in the Court of First Instance of Davao for the recovery of the parcel of land sold by their predecessors to defendant Apolonio Fabiana in 1931. After trial, the lower court held that although the sale between Samuel and Constancio Sapto and defendant in 1931 was never registered, it was valid and binding upon the parties and the vendors heirs, and ordered the plaintiffs to execute the necessary deed of conveyance in defendant's favor and its annotation in the certificate of title. From this judgment, plaintiffs appealed to this Court. The issue is whether the deed of sale executed by appellants' predecessors in favor of the appellee over the land in question, although never registered, is valid and binding on appellants and operated to convey title and ownership to the appellee. The question is not new. In a long line of cases already decided by this Court, we have consistently interpreted sec. 50 of the Land Registration Act providing that "no deed . . . shall take effect as a conveyance or bind the land, but shall operate only as a contract between the parties and as evidence of authority to the clerk or register of deeds to make registration" in the sense that as between the parties to a sale registration is not necessary to make it valid and effective, for actual notice is equivalent to registration (Obras Pias vs. Devera Ignacio, 17 Phil., 45; Gustilo vs. Maravilla, 48 Phil., 442; Quimson vs. Suarez, 45 Phil., 901; Winkleman vs. Veluz, 43 Phil., 609; Galasinao vs. Austria, 51 Off. Gaz. No. 6, 2874; Carillo vs. Salak, 91 Phil., 265). "The peculiar force of a title under Act No. 492", we said in Medina vs. Imaz and Warner Barnes and Co., 27 Phil., 314 (syllabus), "is exhibited only when the purchaser has sold to innocent third parties the land described in the conveyance. Generally speaking, as between vendor and vendee, the same rights and remedies exist in relation to land not so registered". In Galanza vs. Nuesa, 95 Phil., 713, we held that "registration is intended to protect the buyer against claims of third persons arising from subsequent alienations by the vendor, and is certainly not necessary to give effect as between the parties to their deed of sale". And in the recent case of Casica vs. Villaseca, G.R. No. L-9590, April 30, 1957, we reiterated that "the purpose of registration is merely to notify and protect the interests of strangers to a given transaction, who may be ignorant thereof, and the non-registration of the deed evidencing said transaction does not relieve the parties thereto of their obligations thereunder".

No right of innocent third persons or subsequent transferees of the property in question is involved herein. The property has remained and still is in the possession of the vendee of appellants' predecessors, herein appellee. It is, therefore, clear that the conveyance between appellee and his vendors and valid and binding upon the latter, and is equally binding and effective against the heirs of the vendors, herein appellants. To hold otherwise would make of the Torrens system a shield for the commission of fraud by the vendors or his heirs (Gustilo vs. Maravilla, 48 Phil., 442), who would then be able to reconvey the same property to other persons. Appellants cite several cases wherein we have held that under the Torrens system, registration is the operative act that gives validity to the transfer or creates a lien upon the land. The authorities cited refer, however, to cases involving conflicting rights over registered property and those of innocent transferees who relied on the clean titles of the properties in question. These cases have, therefore, no bearing on the instant case, where the appellee has always, remained in the possession of the land in question and no subsequent transfer thereof to other persons has been made either by appellants or their prodecessors-in-interest. The appellants aver that it was error to require them to execute a deed of conveyance in favor of the plaintiff, appellee, and argue that the latter's action to obtain it had long prescribed, twenty years having elapsed since the original sale. This contention must be overruled, being predicated on the assumption that the reconveyance is sought by way of performance of the contract of sale entered into in 1931. No enforcement of the contract is in fact needed, since the delivery of possession of the land sold had consummated the sale and transferred title to the purchaser, registration of the contract not being indispensable as between the parties. Actually the action for conveyance was one to quiet title, i.e., to remove the cloud cast upon appellee's ownership by the refusal of the appellants to recognize the sale made by their predecessors. This action accrued only when appellant, initiated their suit to recover the land in 1954. Furthermore, it is an established rule of American jurisprudence (made applicable in this jurisdiction by Art. 480 of the New Civil Code) that actions to quiet title to property in the possession of the plaintiff are imprescriptible (44 Am. Jur. p. 47; Cooper vs. Rhea, 39 L. R. A. 930; Inland Empire Land Co. vs. Grant County, 138 Wash. 439, 245 Pac. 14). The prevailing rule is that the right of a plaintiff to have his title to land quieted, as against one who is asserting some adverse claim or lien thereon, is not barred while the plaintiff or his grantors remain in actual possession of the land, claiming to be owners thereof, the reason for this rule being that while the owner in fee continues liable to an action, proceeding, or suit upon the adverse claim, he has a continuing right to the aid of a court of equity to ascertain and determine the nature of such claim and its effect on his title, or to assert any superior equity in his favor. He may wait until his possession is disturbed or his title is attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right. But the rule that the statute of limitations is not available as a defense to an action to remove a cloud from title can only be invoked by a complaint when he is in possession. One who claims property which is in the possession of another must, it seems, invoke his remedy within the statutory period. (44 Am. Jur., p. 47) Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is affirmed. Costs against appellants. So ordered. Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Endencia, and Felix, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 111141 March 6, 1998 MARIO Z. TITONG, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (4th Division), VICTORICO LAURIO and ANGELES LAURIO, respondents. ROMERO, J.: Like a priceless treasure coveted by many, but capable of ownership by only one, this 20,592 square-meter parcel of land located at Barrio Titong, Masbate, Masbate is claimed by two contestants in this petition for review on certiorari. Unfortunately, legal title over the property can be vested in only one of them. The case originated from an action for quieting of title filed by petitioner Mario Titong. The Regional Trial Court of Masbate, Masbate, Branch 44 1 ruled in of private respondents, Victorico Laurio and Angeles Laurio, adjudging them the true and lawful owners of the disputed land. Affirmed on appeal to the Court, of Appeals, petitioner comes to us for a favorable reversal. Petitioner alleges that he is the owner of an unregistered parcel of land with an area of 3.2800 hectares, more or less, surveyed as Lot No. 3918, and declared for taxation purposes in his name. He claims that on three separate occasions in September 1983, private respondents, with their hired laborers, forcibly entered a portion of the land containing an area of approximately two (2) hectares; and began plowing the same under pretext of ownership. Private respondents denied this allegation, and averred that the disputed property formed part of the 5.5-hectare agricultural land which they had purchased from their predecessor-in-interest, 2 Pablo Espinosa on August 10, 1981. In his testimony, petitioner identified Espinosa as his adjoining owner 3, asserting that no controversy had sprouted between them for twenty years until the latter sold Lot No. 3479 to private respondent Victorico Laurio. 4 This was corroborated by Ignacio Villamor, who had worked on the land even before its sale to Espinosa in 1962. The boundary between the land sold to Espinosa and what of petitioner's property was the old Bugsayon river. When petitioner employed Bienvenido Lerit as his tenant in 1962, he instructed Lerit to change the course of the old river and direct the flow of water to the lowland at the southern of petitioner' s property, thus converting the old river into a riceland. 5 For his part, private respondent anchors his defense on the following facts: He denied petitioner's claim of ownership, recounting that the area and boundaries of the disputed land remained unaltered during the series of conveyances prior to its coming into his hands. According to him, petitioner first declared the land for taxation purposes under Tax Declaration No. 2916, 6 which showed that the land had an area of 5.5 hectares and was bounded on the North by the Bugsayon River; on the East by property under the ownership of Lucio Lerit; on the South by property owner by Potenciano Zaragoza; and on the West by property owned by Agapito de la Cruz. 7 Private Respondent then alleges that, on December 21, 1960, petitioner sold this property to Concepcion Verano vda. de Cabug, after which Tax Declaration No. 5339 8 was issued in her favor. In compliance with their mutual agreement to repurchase the same, petitioner reacquired the property by way of sale 9 on August 24, 1962 and

then declared it for taxation purposes in his name under Tax Declaration No. 5720. 10 However, the property remained in petitioner's hands for only four (4) days because, on August 28, 1962, he sold it to Espinosa 11 who then declared it in his name under Tax Declaration No. 12311. 12 Consequently, the property became a part of the estate of Pablo Espinosa's wife, the late Segundina Liao Espinosa. On August 10, 1981, her heirs executed an instrument denominated as "Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with Simultaneous Sale" whereby the 5.5-hectare property under Tax Declaration No. 12311 was sold to private respondent 13 in consideration of the amount of P5,000.00. Thereafter, Tax Declaration No. 12738 was issued in the name of private respondent. In all these conveyances, the area and boundaries of the property remained exactly the same as those appearing in Tax Declaration No. 2916 under petitioner's name. It was proved at the proceedings in the court a quo that two (2) surveys were made of the disputed property. The first survey 14 was made for petitioner, while the second was the relocation survey ordered by the lower court. As anticipated, certain discrepancies between the two surveys surfaced. Thus, contrary to petitioner's allegation in his complaint that he is the owner of only 3.2800 hectares, he was actually claiming 5.9789 hectares, the total areas of Lot Nos. 3918, 3918-A and 3606. On the other hand, Lot No. 3479 pertaining to Espinosa, was left with only an area of 4.1841 hectares instead of the 5.5 hectares sold by petitioner to him. Apprised of the discrepancy, private respondent filed a protest 15 before the Bureau of Lands against the first survey, likewise filing a case for alteration of boundaries before the municipal trial court, the proceedings of which, however, were suspended of the instant case. 16 Private respondent testified that petitioner is one of the four heirs of his mother, Leonida Zaragoza. In the Extrajudicial Settlement with Sale of Estate of the deceased Leonida Zaragoza, 17 the heirs adjudicated unto themselves the 3.6-hectare property of the deceased. The property involved is described in the instrument as having been declared under Tax Declaration No. 3301 18 and as bounded on the North by Victor Verano, on the East by Benigno Titong, on the South by the Bugsayon River and on the West by Benigno Titong. On September 9, 1969, Tax Declaration No. 8723 was issued to petitioner for his corresponding share in the estate. However, instead of reflecting only .9000 hectare as his rightful share in the extrajudicial settlement 19 petitioner's share was bloated to 2.4 hectares. It therefore appeared to private respondent that petitioner encroached upon his (Laurio's) property and declared it a part of his inheritance. 20 The boundaries were likewise altered so that it was bounded on the North by Victor Verano, on the East by Benigno Titong, on the South by property owner Espinosa, and on the West by property owner Adolfo Titong. 21 Private respondent accordingly denied that petitioner had diverted the course of the Bugsayon River after he had repurchased the land from Concepcion Verano vda. de Cabug 22 because the land was immediately sold to Espinosa shortly thereafter. 23 The lower court rendered a decision in favor of private respondents, declaring him as the true and absolute owner of the litigated property and ordering petitioner to respect private respondents' title and ownership over the property and to pay attorney's fees, litigation expenses, costs and moral damages. Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the decision. On motion for reconsideration, the same was denied for lack of merit. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari. At the outset, we hold that the instant petition must be denied for the reason that the lower court should have outrightly dismissed the complaint for quieting of title. The remedy of quieting of title may be availed of under the circumstances enumerated in the Civil Code: Art. 476. Whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or any interest therein, by reason of any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which is apparently valid or

effective but is in truth and in fact invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title, an action may be brought to remove such cloud or to quiet the title. An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from being cast upon title to real property or any interest therein. Under this provision, a claimant must show that there is an instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which constitutes or casts a cloud, doubt, question or shadow upon the owner's title to or interest in real property. 24 The ground or reason for filing a complaint for quieting of title must therefore be "an instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding." Under the maxim expresio mius est exclusio alterius, these grounds are exclusive so that other reasons outside of the purview of these reasons may not be considered valid for the same action. 25 Had the lower court thoroughly considered the complaint filed, it would have had no other course of action under the law but to dismiss it. The complaint failed to allege that an "instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding" beclouded the plaintiff's title over the property involved. Petitioner merely alleged that the defendants (respondents herein), together with their hired laborers and without legal justification, forcibly entered the southern portion of the land of the plaintiff and plowed the same. He then proceeded to claim damages and attorney's fees. He prayed that, aside from issuing a writ or preliminary injunction enjoining private respondents and their hired laborers from intruding into the land, the court should declare him "the true and absolute owner" thereof. Hence, through his allegations, what petitioner imagined as clouds cast on his title to the property were private respondents' alleged acts of physical intrusion into his purported property. Clearly, the acts alleged may be considered grounds for an action for forcible entry but definitely not one for quieting of title. When the issues were joined by the filing of the answer to the complaint, it would have become apparent to the court that the case was a boundary dispute. The answer alleged, among other matters, that petitioner, "in bad faith, surreptitiously, maliciously and fraudulently had the land in question included in the survey of his land which extends to the south only as far as the Bugsayon River which is the visible and natural and common boundary between the properties." 26 Moreover, during the hearing of the case, petitioner proved that it was actually a boundary dispute by evidence showing what he considered as the boundary of his property which private respondents perceived as actually encroaching on their property. In this regard, the following pronouncements of the Court are apropos: . . . (T)he trial court (and likewise the respondent Court) cannot, in an action for quieting of title, order the determination of the boundaries of the claimed property, as that would be tantamount to awarding to one or some of the parties the disputed property in an action where the sole issue is limited to whether the instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding involved constitutes a cloud upon the petitioners' interest or title in and to said property. Such determination of boundaries is appropriate in adversarial proceedings where possession or ownership may properly be considered and where evidence aliunde, other than the "instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding" itself, may be introduced. An action for forcible entry, whenever warranted by the period prescribed in Rule 70, or for recovery of possession de facto, also within the prescribed period, may be availed of by the petitioners, in which proceeding the boundary dispute may be fully threshed out. 27 Nonetheless, even if the complaint below were to be considered as a valid one for quieting of title, still, the instant petition for review on certiorari must fail.

As a general rule, findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are binding and conclusive upon this Court. Such factual findings shall not be disturbed normally unless the same are palpably unsupported by the evidence on record or the judgment itself is based on a misapprehension of facts. 28 Upon an examination of the records, the Court finds no evident reason to depart from the general rule. The courts below correctly held that when petitioner "sold, ceded, transferred and conveyed" the 5.5-hectare land in favor of Pablo Espinosa, his rights of ownership and possession pertaining thereto ceased and these were transferred to the latter. In the same manner, Espinosa's rights of ownership over the land ceased and were transferred to private respondent upon its sale to the latter. This finds justification in the Civil Code, as follows: Art. 1458. By the contract of sale one of the contracting parties obligates himself to transfer the ownership of and to deliver a determinate thing, and the other to pay therefor a price certain in money or its equivalent. A contract of sale may be absolute or conditional. In other words, a sale is a contract transferring dominion and other real rights in the thing sold. 29 In the case at bar, petitioner's claim of ownership must of necessary fail because he has long abdicated his rights over the land when he sold it to private respondent's predecessor-in-interest. Petitioner's claim that he acquired ownership over the disputed land through possession for more than twenty (20) years is likewise unmeritorious. While Art. 1134 of the Civil Code provides that "(o)wnership and other real rights over immovable property are acquired by ordinary prescription through possession of ten years," this provision of law must be read in conjunction with Art. 1117 of the same Code. This article states that ". . . (o)rdinary acquisitive prescription of things requires possession in good faith and with just title for the time fixed by law." Hence, a prescriptive title to real estate is not acquired by mere possession thereof under claim of ownership for a period of tea years unless such possession was acquired con justo tilulo y buena fe (with color of title and good faith). 30 The good faith of the possessor consists in the reasonable belief that the person from whom he received the thing was the owner thereof, and could transmit his ownership. 31 For purposes of prescription, there is just title when the adverse claimant came into possession of the property through one of the modes recognized by law for the acquisition of ownership or other real rights but the grantor was not the owner or could not transmit any right. 32 Petitioners have not satisfactorily met the requirements of good faith and just title. As aptly observed by the trial court, the plaintiff's admitted acts of converting boundary line (Bugsayon River) into a ricefield and thereafter claiming ownership thereof were acts constituting deprivation of the rights of others and therefore "tantamount to bad faith." 33 To allow petitioner to benefit from his own wrong would run counter to the maxim ex dolo malo non oritur actio (no man can allowed to found a claim upon his own wrongdoing). Extraordinary acquisitive prescription cannot similarly vest ownership over the property upon petitioner. Art. 1137 of the Civil Code states that "(o)wnership and other real rights over immovables prescribe through uninterrupted adverse possession thereof for thirty years, without need of title or of good faith." Petitioner's alleged possession in 1962 up to September 1983 when private respondents entered the property in question spanned twenty-one (21) years. This period of time is short of the thirty-year requirement mandated by Art. 1137. Petitioner basically anchors his claim over the property on the survey plan prepared upon his request, 34 the tax declaration in his name, 35 the commissioner's report on the relocation survey, 36 and the survey plan. 37 Respondent court correctly held that these documents do not conclusively demonstrate petitioner's title over Lot Nos. 3918-A and 3606.

A survey is the act by which the quantity of a parcel of land is ascertained and so a paper containing a statement of courses, distances, and quantity of land. 38 A survey under a proprietary title is not a conveyance. It is an instrument sui generis in the nature of a partition; a customary mode in which a proprietor has set off to himself in severalty a part of the common estate. 39 Therefore, a survey, not being a conveyance, is not a mode of acquiring ownership. A fortiori, petitioner cannot found his claim on the survey plan reflecting a subdivision of land because it is not conclusive as to ownership as it may refer only to a delineation of possession. 40 Furthermore, the plan was not verified and approved by the Bureau of Lands in accordance with Sec. 28, paragraph 5 of Act No. 2259, the Cadastral Act, as amended by Sec. 1862 of Act No. 2711. Said law ordains that private surveyors send their original field notes, computations, reports, surveys, maps and plots regarding a piece of property to the Bureau of Lands for verification and approval. 41 A survey plan not verified and approved by said Bureau is nothing more than a private writing, the due execution and authenticity of which must be proven in accordance with Sec. 20 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. The circumstance that the plan was admitted in evidence without any objection as to its due execution and authenticity does not signify that the courts shall give probative value therefor. To admit evidence and not to believe it subsequently are not contradictory to each other. This Court cannot alter the conclusions of the Court of Appeals on the credibility accorded to evidence presented by the parties. 42 Similarly, petitioner's tax declaration issued under his name is not even persuasive evidence of his claimed ownership over the land in dispute. A tax declaration, by itself, is not considered conclusive evidence of ownership. 43 It is merely an indicium of a claim of ownership. 44 Because it does not by itself give title, it is of little value in proving one's ownership. 45 Moreover, the incompatibility in petitioner's tax declaration and the commissioner's report as regards the area of his claimed property is much too glaring to be ignored. Tax Declaration No. 8717 states that petitioner's property has an area of 3.2800 hectares while the totality of his claim according to the commissioned geodetic engineer's survey amounts to 4.1385 hectares. There is therefore a notable discrepancy of 8,585 square meters. On the other hand, private respondent's claimed property, as borne out by Tax Declaration No. 12738, totals 5.5 hectares, a more proximate equivalent of the 5.2433-hectare property as shown by the commissioner's report. There is also nothing in the commissioner's report that substantiates petitioner's claim that the disputed land was inside his property. Petitioner capitalizes on the lower court's statement in its decision 46 that "as reflected in the commissioner's report dated May 23, 1984 (Exhibit 3-3-A), the area claimed is inside lot 3918 of the defendants (Exhibit 2)" 47 or the private respondents. A careful reading of the decision would show that this statement is found in the summary of defendants' (herein private respondents) evidence. Reference to Lot No. 3918 may, therefore, be attributed to mere oversight as the lower court even continues to state the defendants' assertion that the 2-hectare land is part of their 5.5-hectare property. Hence, it is not amiss to conclude that either petitioner misapprehended the lower court's decision or he is trying to contumaciously mislead or worse, deceive this Court. With respect to the awards of moral damages of P10,000.00 and attorney's fees of P2,000.00, the Court finds no cogent reason to delete the same. Jurisprudence is replete with rulings to the effect that where fraud and bad faith have been established, the award of moral damages is in order. 48 This pronouncement finds support in Art. 2219 (10) of the Civil Code allowing the recovery of moral damages for acts enumerated in Art. 21 of the same Code. This article states that "(a)ny person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage." The moral damages are hereby increased to P30,000.00. We agree with the respondent court in holding that the award of attorney's fees is justified because petitioner filed a clearly unfounded civil action. 49

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is hereby DENIED and the questioned Decision of the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED. This Decision is immediately executory. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED. Narvasa, C.J., Kapunan and Purisima, JJ., concur. EN BANC G.R. No. L-33652 February 24, 1931 LI SENG GIAP Y CIA., applicant-appellant, vs. THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, ET AL., oppositors. THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, appellant. Agustin Lukban and Marcos Coo Tauco for applicant-appellant. Attorney-General Jaranilla for oppositor-appellant. STREET, J.: This case involves cross appeals brought respectively by the applicant, Li Seng Giap y Cia., on the one hand, and the Government of the Philippine Islands, represented by the Director of Lands, on the other, with respect to the disposition made of lot No. 4 in expediente No. 129, G. L. R. O. Record No. 31548, of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte, whereby said lot was adjudicated to the applicant with the exception of a part covered by a pier extending into Mercedes River, in the municipal limits of Daet, which portion was declared to be Government property. The case also involves an appeal of the same applicant, Li Seng Giap y Cia., whereby the said applicant seeks to reverse an order of the same court disallowing its application with respect to lot 8 in the same expediente, and declaring said property of the Government. To deal first with lot 8 with respect to which the applicant alone appeals, we note that this lot contains an area of more than 459 hectares. The proof shows that this property is virgin forest covered with trees and forest growth. Some of the trees upon it are from 200 to 300 years old, and it has never been reduced to cultivation, being more valuable for forest than agricultural purposes. In years past the Bureau of Forestry has been issuing permits to various persons to cut wood on this tract of land, and in particular, in 1925, Esteban Abo cut trees under such a permit on this property without being disturbed by any one. The supposed right of the applicant is based upon a possessory information begun December 31, 1895, and approved October 15, 1896, in the name of Rufino Mabesa. It is evident that this document cannot have the effect conceded to a possessory information obtained within the period limited by the royal decree of February 13, 1894. No sufficient proof is made with respect to the possession of this parcel by the applicant or its predecessors in interest. Inasmuch also as the property is forest land, it was not susceptible of private appropriation under existing laws, nor was its inclusion in the old possessory document justified under the prior laws, which prohibited the alienation of forest lands. We note further that the tract in question is vastly larger than the land included in the possessory information relied upon. The trial court committed no error in denying the application for the registration of this lot in the name of petitioner. With respect to lot 4 both parties have appealed, but the appeal interposed in behalf of the applicant relates only to the area covered by the pier ( pantalan) which the trial court excluded from registration, while the appeal of the Attorney-General, interposed in behalf of the Government, covers a respectable part of the lot 4. At the outset we note that the appealed decision states that the Government presented no proof in support of its opposition with respect to lot 4. This is a mistake, since the Government presented three witnesses whose testimony consists of

thirty pages of the transcription, in addition to which the Government presented several exhibits. The oversight of the trial judge in failing to take account of this proof deprives his finding of the weight to which it would ordinarily be entitled. The applicant deraigns its title through several parties, namely, directly from Vicente Madrigal, who acquired the property from Urrutia y Cia., who in turn purchased it from one Francisco Arana. To go no farther back than a deed from Madrigal to the applicant dated February 21, 1924, we note that Madrigal conveyed to the applicant a parcel of land 39.5 yards in length by 19 yards in breadth, that is to say, a total area of less than 600 square meters. The lot actually surveyed as lot 4 and claimed by the applicant contains 2,801 square meters, and although the description given in the deed describes a lot running out to the pier, it nevertheless clearly appears that said description includes land to which the vendor really had no title. In the first place, the property which was originally at the heart of this holding is the land covered by an old bodega, indicated in Exhibit 1, of the Director of Lands. Separating that lot from the lot now covered by plaintiff's new camarin is the heading of a street, formerly making part of the provincial road to Daet, but for a number of years past the road had been diverted from this head, apparently by the erosion of the river, so that the road now passes around the old bodega instead of running between the old bodega and the sea. But the land thus left out of the street has been taken care of by the municipality at public expense. Evidently this parcel was no part of the land belonging to the owner of the old bodega. The particular ground covered by the new camarin in immediate juxta-position to the pier ( pantalan) was years ago the site of a shed built of light materials. Access to the pier was had over this lot by the public over a narrow way, but since the building of the new camarin by the applicant, the path leading to the pier along the side of the new camarin is much restricted. Moreover, in building the new camarin the proof shows satisfactorily that there has been an encroachment of several meters on the waters of the Mercedes River, where the pier is built. This encroachment was effected by filling in with rubble and building the new camarin over the extension. From the proof it is clear that at high tide the waters from the sea came in and inundated part of the space now covered by the new camarin. It results that the applicant has proved title only to the site of the old bodega, conforming to the space covered by lot 2 in Exhibit 1 of the Director of Lands, and with respect to the other land now comprising lot 4 the applicant's title is not made out. The judgment as to lot 4 will therefore be reversed and the order for the registration of lot 4 in the name of the applicant is vacated, with leave, however, to the petitioner to reform his plan, with the result of including therein the lot actually covered by the old bodega, and upon the submission of such plan, the court will allow the lot to be registered in the name of the applicant. As to lot 8 the judgment is affirmed. So ordered, with costs against Li Seng Giap y Cia. Johnson, Villamor, Romualdez and Villa-Real, JJ., concur. Johns, J., concurs. Separate Opinions MALCOLM, J., dissenting: We dissent. The judgment of the lower court should be affirmed. EN BANC G.R. No. L-40177 March 15, 1934 LI SENG GIAP & CO., applicant-appellant, vs. THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, oppositor-appellee. Manly and Reyes for appellant. Office of the Solicitor-General Hilado for appellee. --> DIAZ, J.: chanrobles virtual law library

On August 16, 1932, Li Seng Giap & Co., a partnership composed of individuals who are not citizens of the Philippine Islands nor of the United States, but aliens, instituted these proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, for the registration in its name in the registry of deeds, of the three parcels of land described in the plans Exhibits A and B, and technical descriptions attached to its application, in accordance with the provisions of Act No. 496 and of Chapter VIII or Title II of Act No. 2874.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The Director of Lands filed an opposition to the said application alleging as his grounds that the three parcels of land in question were public lands belonging to the Government of the United States under the administration and control of the Government of the Philippine Islands, and that, being an alien, the applicant partnership cannot invoke the benefits of the provisions of section 45 of the said Act No. 2874. The aforecited section is contained in Chapter VIII of Title II of the said Act invoked by the applicant. The Director of Lands has made no reference to Act No. 496 in his opposition for the reason that the Act in question merely prescribes, in general terms, the manner or procedure to be followed by an applicant in the obtainment of the certificate of title applied for, or in the denial or issuance thereof, as the case may be, by the court or by the Government agencies therein mentioned.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library After the trial, the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur rendered judgment therein denying the application of the applicant partnership on the ground that it is an alien, and holding, at the same time, that the parcels of land it sought to register in its name are a portion of the public domain. The said applicant took exception to and appealed from such judgment, claiming that the trial court committed the following alleged errors, to wit: I. The trial court erred in holding that the applicant, Li Seng Giap & Co. being a partnership made up of individuals who are neither citizens of the Philippine Islands nor of the United States, is not entitled, for this reason, to register the land described in its application under the provisions of the Land Registration Act.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library II. The lower court also erred in declaring the land described in the application a part of the public domain.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library III. The lower court also erred in denying the applicant's motion for reconsideration as well as its motion for new trial. It is unnecessary to discuss the nature of the three parcels of land in question. The record shows that they are agricultural lands which at present contain coconut trees, abaca and cacao with which they have been planted for over forty years. The coconut trees there on range from one to forty years in age. The said three parcels had likewise been cultivated and had actually been occupied for many years during the Spanish regime by several natives of the Province of Camarines Sur, named Inocencio Salon, Lazaro Ceron, Margarita Labordes, Doroteo Quitales and Cornelio Vargas. The occupation or possession thereof by the above-named persons was under claim of ownership but neither the exact date when such possession began nor the circumstances under which they acquired the property in question has been determined. However, it seems certain that such occupation began some fifty-five years ago and continued without interruption from that time until said persons decide to sell them to Sebastian Palanca who is also an alien like the herein applicant. Neither is there anything of record to show when the sale was made but it also seems certain that it took place during the Spanish regime. Sebastian Palanca continued in possession of the aforesaid three parcels of land from the time he acquired them in the manner hereinbefore stated until July 22, 1930, when he sold them to the herein applicant-appellant. However, before selling them and while he was in possession thereof under claim of ownership, as alleged, he failed to obtain a gratuitous title or even a mere possessory information therefor, which would serve to protect his claim of

ownership, by taking advantage of the benefits afforded by the Royal Decree of February 13, 1894, which was promulgated in the Philippines and published in the Gaceta de Manila, No. 106, of April 17th of the same year.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The pertinent parts of said decree, which are also articles 1, 19 and 21 of the Maura Law, and which had been in force in the Philippines during the last years of the Spanish regime and continued to be so until the enactment of the Public Land Act and the amendments thereto, read as follows: ARTICLE 1. All uncultivated lands, soil, earth, and mountains not included in the following exceptions shall be considered alienable public lands: First, those which have become subjected to private ownership and have a legitimate owner. Second, those which belong to the forest zones which the State deems wise to reserve for reasons of public utility. xxx xxx x x x chanrobles virtual law library

Therefore, there can be no doubt but that under the last aforecited article the three parcels of land in question reverted to the State as property of the public domain upon the expiration of the period specified therein, by reason of negligence on the part of the possessors thereof.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The applicant-appellant contends that under the provisions of section 54, paragraph 6, of Act No. 926, it has necessarily acquired the right to have the corresponding certificate of title issued to it upon registration of the said parcels of land in its name in the registry of deeds, inasmuch as it had actually been in the open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession thereof, under claim of ownership, not only by itself but also through Sebastian Palanca from whom it had purchased them, for more than ten years prior to July 26, 1904, the date on which the aforesaid Act went into effect, in accordance with the proclamation of the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands of the same date.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The section invoked by the applicant-appellant reads as follows: SEC. 54. The following-described persons or their legal successors in right, occupying public lands in the Philippine Islands, or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles to such lands have not been perfected, may apply to the Court of Land Registration of the Philippine Islands for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor to wit: chanrobles virtual law library 1. All persons who prior to the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the United States had fulfilled all the conditions required by the Spanish laws and royal decrees of the Kingdom of Spain for the purchase of public lands, including the payment of the purchase price, but who failed to secure formal conveyance of title; chanrobles virtual law library 2. All persons who prior to the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the United States, having applied for the purchase of public lands and having secured a survey, auction, and an award, or a right to an award, of such lands, did not receive title therefor through no default upon their part; chanrobles virtual law library 3. All persons who prior to the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the United States, having applied for the purchase of public lands and having secured a survey and award of same, did not, through negligence upon their part, comply with the conditions of full or any payment therefor, but who after such survey and award shall have occupied the land adversely, except as prevented by war or force majeure until the taking effect of this Act; chanrobles virtual law library 4. All persons who were entitled to apply and did apply for adjustment or composition of title to lands against the Government under the Spanish laws and royal decrees in force prior to the royal decree of February thirteenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-four, but who failed to receive title therefor through no default upon their part; chanrobles virtual law library 5. All persons who were entitled to a gratuitous title to public lands by "possessory proceedings" under the provisions of articles nineteen and twenty of the royal decree of the King of Spain issued February thirteenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-four, and who, having complied with all the conditions therein required, failed to receive the title therefor through no default upon their part; and chanrobles virtual law library 6. All persons who by themselves or their predecessors in interest have been in the open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural public lands, as defined by said Act of Congress of July first, nineteen hundred and two, under a bona fide claim of ownership except as against the Government, for a

ART. 19. Possessors of alienable public lands under cultivation who have not obtained nor applied for composition on the date this decree shall be published in the Gaceta de Manila, may obtain a gratuitous title of property, by means of a possessory information in conformity with the law of civil procedure and the mortgage law whenever they establish any of the following conditions: chanrobles virtual law library First. Having, or having had, them under cultivation without interruption during the preceding six years.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Second. Having had possession of them for twelve consecutive years, and having had them under cultivation until the date of the information, and for three years before that date.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Third. Having had them in possession ostensibly and without interruption, for thirty or more years, although the land is not under cultivation. xxx xxx x x x chanrobles virtual law library

ART. 21. A term of one year, without grace, is granted order to perfect the informations referred to in articles 19 and 20. Article 80 of the regulations for the carrying out of the Royal Decree above-mentioned provided as follows: ART. 80. By virtue of the provision of article 21 of the Royal Decree of February 13, 1894, the inextensible period for carrying out the informations referred to in the two preceding articles, shall be counted as on the 17th day of April, 1895.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Upon the expiration of this period the right of cultivator and possessors to the obtainment of free title shall lapse, and the full property right in the land shall revert to the State or, in a proper case, to the public domain.

period of ten years next preceding the taking effect of this Act, except when prevented by war or force majeure, shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a government grant and to have received the same, and shall be entitled to a certificate of title to such land under the provisions of this chapter.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library All applicants for lands under paragraphs one, two, three, four and five of this section must establish by proper official records or documents that such proceedings as are therein required were taken and the necessary conditions complied with: Provided, however, That such requirements shall not apply to the fact of adverse possession. It may be noted that the case of the applicant does not come under paragraph 1, 2, 3, 4 or 5 of the aforecited section, which, by the way, conclusively shows that prior to the enactment of Act No. 926, the said Maura Law was the last law which regulated the acquisition of alienable public lands and the issuance of the corresponding title to those who could establish their claim that they were entitled thereto. Being aware of this fact, the applicant has never invoked said paragraphs. He merely confines himself to invoking the provisions of paragraph 6 thereof, in support of which he cites the rulings of this court in the cases of Tan Yungquip vs. Director of Lands (42 Phil., 128) and of Central Capiz vs. Ramirez (40 Phil., 883).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library In the former case, it was held that inasmuch as the applicant Tan Yungquip, who was a Chinaman, had proven: That he had acquired the parcels of land which he sought to register in his name, some by purchase and others by inheritance; that he and his predecessors in interest had been in the open, peaceful, continuous and notorious possession of the same for at least thirty years, and that such parcels of land were agricultural lands, therefore, he was entitled to have them registered in his name under the provisions of the aforecited section 54 of Act No. 926, for the reason that he filed his application to that effect more than one year prior to the enactment and enforcement of Act No. 2874. It was likewise held therein that the matter should be decided in favor of said Tan Yungquip on the ground that no valid law could be found, at least on that occasion, which prohibited the registration in his name in the registry of deeds, of the parcels of land of which he claimed to be the owner.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library In the latter case above cited, that is, the case of Central Capiz vs. Ramirez, it was likewise held that lands held in private ownership constitute no part of the public domain and cannot, therefore, come within the purview of said Act No. 2874 on the ground that said subject (lands held in private ownership) is not embraced in any manner in the title of the Act, and that the intent of the Legislature in enacting the same was to limit the application thereof exclusively to lands of the public domain.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Although nothing has been said in the decision rendered in the aforecited case of Tan Yungquip vs. Director of Lands to the effect that the application of the therein applicant should be granted on the ground that the provisions of section 54 of Act No. 926, which were therein under consideration and interpretation, do not distinguish between citizens of the Philippine Islands or of the United States and aliens, however, the appellant contends that the aforecited section has such scope and that the question raised in this case should be decided under the latter interpretation.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library We do not believe that the rulings it the aforecited two cases and that in the case of Agari vs. Government of the Philippine Islands (42 Phil., 143), are decisive and applicable to the case under consideration, on the ground that although it is true that Agari, who was the applicant in the last case, was an alien, it was likewise true that the persons, from whom he had acquired the land which he sought to register in his name in the registry of deeds during the time Act No. 926 was still in force, were natives of the Philippine Islands, who, in turn, had acquired it through their father, who was likewise a native of the Islands, by composition with the State in accordance with

the laws then in force; nor that, under the provisions of the aforecited section 54 of Act No. 926, the applicantappellant Li Seng Giap & Co. could have succeeded in securing the certificate of title which it now seeks; in the first place, because the three aforecited decisions refer to cases which are different from the one now under consideration; in the second place, because said decisions were based on the supposition that the parcels of land in question therein were of private ownership and at that time no law was known to be in existence, which prohibited the registration of said parcels of land in the registry of deeds, in the name of the aforesaid applicants Tan Yungquip, Central Capiz and Agari, and in the third place because while Act No. 926 was still in force (it is no longer in force, having been expressly repealed by section 128 of Act No. 2874, on December 28, 1919), it should have been interpreted in the light of the provisions of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, commonly known as the Organic Law of the Philippine Islands, inasmuch as the former had been approved under the authority of sections 13, 14, 15 and 62 of the latter Act. The very title of Act No. 926 above referred to shows that one of the purposes for which it was approved was to carry out the provisions of sections, 13, 14, 15 and 62 of the aforecited Act of Congress, which title reads in part: An Act . . . providing for the determination by the Philippines Court of Land Registration of all proceedings for completion of imperfect titles and for the cancellation or confirmation of Spanish concessions and grants in said Islands, as authorized by sections thirteen, fourteen, fifteen, and sixty-two of the Act of Congress of July first, nineteen hundred and two, entitled "An Act temporarily to provide for the administration of the affairs of civil government in the Philippine Islands, and for other purposes". Sections 14 and 15 of the aforesaid Act of Congress, which bear relation to the question under consideration, provide as follows: SEC. 14. That the government of the Philippine Islands is hereby authorized and empowered to enact rules and regulations and to prescribe terms and conditions to enable persons to perfect their title to public lands in said Islands, who, prior to the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the United States, had fulfilled all or some of the conditions required by the Spanish laws and royal decrees of the Kingdom of Spain for the acquisition of legal title thereto, yet failed to secure conveyance of title; and the Philippine Commission is authorized to issue patents, without compensation, to any native of said Islands, conveying the title to any tract of land not more than sixteen hectares in extent, which were public lands and had been actually occupied by such native or his ancestors prior to and on the thirteenth of August, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library s. SEC. 15. That the Government of the Philippine Islands in hereby authorized and empowered, on such terms as it may prescribe, by general legislation, to provide for the granting or sale and conveyance to actual occupants and settlers and other citizens of said Islands such parts and portions of the public domain, other than timber and mineral lands, of the United States in said Islands as it may deem wise, not exceeding sixteen hectares to any one person and for the sale and conveyance of not more than one thousand and twenty-four hectares to any corporation or association of persons: Provided, that the grant or sale of such lands, whether the purchase price be paid at once or in partial payments, shall be conditioned upon actual and continued occupancy, improvement, and cultivation of the premises sold for a period of not less than five years, during which time the purchaser or grantee cannot alienate or encumber said land or the title thereto; but such restriction shall not apply to transfers of rights and title of inheritance under the laws for the distribution of the estates of decedents. It may be noted that both of the above-cited sections provide that gratuitous title to property may be issued only to natives of the Philippine Islands who are in possession of the necessary qualifications specified therein. It may therefore be inferred from the foregoing that Act No. 926 could not have a different scope from that given it by the aforecited Act of Congress and, therefore, the phrase "all persons" employed in paragraph 6 of section 54 of the

10

former Act should be understood to mean only citizens of the Philippine Islands or citizens of the United States or of any insular possession thereof.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The parcels of land involved in this case, which as hereinbefore stated, have reverted to the State after April 17, 1895, by virtue of the Maura Law, not of private ownership. Neither were they so on or after the aforesaid date. The applicant herein did not show any title thereto either by possessory proceedings or otherwise, which may be considered as having been issued by the Government. The only basis on which it now claims the right to have them registered in its name is its alleged possession thereof together with that of Sebastian Palanca and of the former possessors, as if to say, that it is entitled to the registration thereof in its name, inasmuch as the parcels of land in question already belong to it, having acquired them by prescription through the continuous, open, exclusive and notorious possession thereof, under claim of ownership, at least since the Spanish regime in the Philippine Islands. However, the truth is that the law expressly provides that no public land may be acquired by prescription, and that such mode of acquisition does not hold as against the Government. This provision is contained precisely in the very law invoked by the applicant, that is section 54, paragraph 6, of Act No. 926. In the case of Ongsiaco vs. Magsilang (50 Phil., 380, 386), this court said: chanrobles virtual law library ". . . in a controversy between private individuals, where the Government has not intervened, and where it appears that the land has ceased to be of public domain and has come to be of private ownership, a petitioner may obtain registration of land upon a title acquired by adverse possession as against individual opponents. The same rule does not maintain with respect to land claimed by the Government and as to which the Government is opposing." In the case of Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Abad (56 Phil., 75, 80), this court, deciding a question similar to the one raised herein by the appellant, said as follows: "Subsection (b) of section 45 of Act No. 2874 is not obnoxious to the constitutional provision relied upon by the appellant, as depriving the appellant of property without due process of law. That provision has reference to property to which the citizen has acquired a vested right. It does not extend to privileges and inchoate rights which have never been asserted or perfected. The contention of the appellant . . . is therefore without merit." There is no justifiable reason for disturbing the holdings of this court in the aforecited two cases. On the contrary, it is considered timely to reiterate them herein inasmuch as they decide the same question.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The provisions of section 54 of Act No. 926 as well as those of section 45, paragraph (b), of Act No. 2874 should necessarily be so construed as not to permit aliens to obtain title to lands in their favor. It should not be understood, however, that the constitutional guaranty that no person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws, is violated thereby, because, as this court has said in the case of In re Patterson (1 Phil., 93, 95, 96), "Unquestionably every State has a fundamental right to its existence and development, as also to the integrity of its territory and the exclusive and peaceable possession of its dominions which it may guard and defend by all possible means against any attack . . . . Superior to the law which protects personal liberty, and the agreements which exist between nations for their own interest and for the benefit of their respective subjects is the supreme and fundamental right of each State to self-preservation and the integrity of its dominion and its sovereignty." It is upon grounds of public policy that the rights of individuals, particularly of aliens, cannot prevail against the aforesaid right of the Government of the Philippine Islands. and more particularly when, as in the present case, far from violating any constitutional law, it deals precisely with the enforcement of the provisions of the first organic law of the country and those of the Jones Law (section 9), to the effect that lands of the public domain should not be disposed of or alienated to persons who are not inhabitants or citizens of the Philippine Islands.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Wherefore, finding that the judgment appealed from is in accordance with the law, it is hereby affirmed in toto, with the costs against the appellants. So ordered.

Malcolm, Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Hull, and Butte, JJ., concur. Imperial, J., concur in the result.

Separate Opinion STREET and GODDARD, JJ., dissenting: chanrobles virtual law library It is settled by the decision of Central Capiz vs. Ramirez (40 Phil., 883), that Act No. 2874 is applicable only to land of the public domain; and the undersigned are of the opinion that the land which has been held in private character from a date anterior to July 26, 1894, as occurred in the case of the land which is the subject of this application, should not be considered public domain. The land covered by this application should therefore have been registered in the name of the applicants, exactly as was done in Tan Yungquip vs. Director of Lands (42 Phil., 128). Any other interpretation makes Act No. 2874, as applied to this land, subject to the objection that it deprives the applicants of the equal protection of the law. G.R. No. L-17652 June 30, 1962

IGNACIO GRANDE, ET AL. Petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, DOMINGO CALALUNG, and ESTEBAN CALALUNG, Respondents. BARRERA, J.: chanrobles virtual law library This is an appeal taken by petitioners Ignacio, Eulogia, Alfonso, Eulalia, and Sofia Grande, from the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. 25169-R) reversing that of the Court of First Instance of Isabela (Civil Case No. 1171), and dismissing petitioners' action against respondents Domingo and Esteban Calalung, to quiet title to and recover possession of a parcel of land allegedly occupied by the latter without petitioners' consent.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The facts of the case, which are undisputed, briefly are: Petitioners are the owners of a parcel of land, with an area of 3.5032 hectares, located at barrio Ragan, municipality of Magsaysay (formerly Tumauini), province of Isabela, by inheritance from their deceased mother Patricia Angui (who inherited it from her parents Isidro Angui and Ana Lopez, in whose name said land appears registered, as shown by Original Certificate of Title No. 2982, issued on June 9, 1934). Said property is identified as Lot No. 1, Plan PSU-83342. When it was surveyed for purposes of registration sometime in 1930, its northeastern boundary was the Cagayan River (the same boundary stated in the title). Since then, and for many years thereafter, a gradual accretion on the northeastern side took place, by action of the current of the Cagayan River, so much so, that by 1958, the bank thereof had receded to a distance of about 105 meters from its original site, and an alluvial deposit of 19,964 square meters (1.9964 hectares), more or less, had been added to the registered area (Exh. C-1).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library On January 25, 1958, petitioners instituted the present action in the Court of First Instance of Isabela against respondents, to quiet title to said portion (19,964 square meters) formed by accretion, alleging in their complaint (docketed as Civil Case No. 1171) that they and their predecessors-in-interest, were formerly in peaceful and continuous possession thereof, until September, 1948, when respondents entered upon the land under claim of ownership. Petitioners also asked for damages corresponding to the value of the fruits of the land as well as attorney's fees and costs. In their answer (dated February 18, 1958), respondents claim ownership in themselves,

11

asserting that they have been in continuous, open, and undisturbed possession of said portion, since prior to the year 1933 to the present.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library After trial, the Court of First Instance of Isabela, on May 4, 1959, rendered a decision adjudging the ownership of the portion in question to petitioners, and ordering respondents to vacate the premises and deliver possession thereof to petitioners, and to pay to the latter P250.00 as damages and costs. Said decision, in part, reads: It is admitted by the parties that the land involved in this action was formed by the gradual deposit of alluvium brought about by the action of the Cagayan River, a navigable river. We are inclined to believe that the accretion was formed on the northeastern side of the land covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 2982 after the survey of the registered land in 1931, because the surveyors found out that the northeastern boundary of the land surveyed by them was the Cagayan River, and not the land in question. Which is indicative of the fact that the accretion has not yet started or begun in 1931. And, as declared by Pedro Laman, defendant witness and the boundary owner on the northwest of the registered land of the plaintiffs, the accretion was a little more than one hectare, including the stony portion, in 1940 or 1941. Therefore, the declarations of the defendant Domingo Calalung and his witness, Vicente C. Bacani, to the effect that the land in question was formed by accretion since 1933 do not only contradict the testimony of defendants' witness Pedro Laman, but could not overthrow the incontestable fact that the accretion with an area of 4 hectare more or less, was formed in 1948, reason for which, it was only declared in that same year for taxation purposes by the defendants under Tax Dec. No. 257 (Exh. "2") when they entered upon the land. We could not give credence to defendants' assertion that Tax Dec. No. 257 (Exh. "2") cancelled Tax Dee. No. 28226 (Exh. "1"), because Exh. "2" says that "tax under this declaration begins with the year 1948. But, the fact that defendants declared the land for taxation purposes since 1948, does not mean that they become the owner of the land by mere occupancy, for it is a new provision of the New Civil Code that ownership of a piece of land cannot be acquired by occupation (Art. 714, New Civil Code). The land in question being an accretion to the mother or registered land of the plaintiffs, the accretion belongs to the plaintiffs (Art. 457, New Civil Code; Art. 366, Old Civil Code). Assuming arguendo, that the accretion has been occupied by the defendants since 1948, or earlier, is of no moment, because the law does not require any act of possession on the part of the owner of the riparian owner, from the moment the deposit becomes manifest (Roxas v. Tuason, 9 Phil. 408; Cortez v. City of Manila, 10 Phil. 567). Further, no act of appropriation on the part of the reparian owner is necessary, in order to acquire ownership of the alluvial formation, as the law does not require the same (3 Manresa, C.C., pp. 321326).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library This brings us now to the determination of whether the defendants, granting that they have been in possession of the alluvium since 1948, could have acquired the property by prescription. Assuming that they occupied the land in September, 1948, but considering that the action was commenced on January 25, 1958, they have not been in possession of the land for ten (10) years; hence, they could not have acquired the land by ordinary prescription (Arts. 1134 and 1138, New Civil Code). Moreover, as the alluvium is, by law, part and parcel of the registered property, the same may be considered as registered property, within the meaning of Section 46 of Act No. 496: and, therefore, it could not be acquired by prescription or adverse possession by another person. Unsatisfied, respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals, which rendered, on September 14, 1960, the decision adverted to at the beginning of this opinion, partly stating: That the area in controversy has been formed through a gradual process of alluvium, which started in the early thirties, is a fact conclusively established by the evidence for both parties. By law, therefore, unless some superior title has supervened, it should properly belong to the riparian owners, specifically in accordance with the rule of natural accession in Article 366 of the old Civil Code (now Article 457), which provides that "to the owner of lands adjoining the banks of rivers, belongs the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters." The defendants, however, contend that they have acquired ownership through prescription.

This contention poses the real issue in this case. The Court a quo, has resolved it in favor of the plaintiffs, on two grounds: First, since by accession, the land in question pertains to the original estate, and since in this instance the original estate is registered, the accretion, consequently, falls within the purview of Section 46 of Act No. 496, which states that "no title to registered land in derogation to that of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession"; and, second, the adverse possession of the defendant began only in the month of September, 1948, or less than the 10-year period required for prescription before the present action was instituted.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library As a legal proposition, the first ground relied upon by the trial court, is not quite correct. An accretion to registered land, while declared by specific provision of the Civil Code to belong to the owner of the land as a natural accession thereof, does not ipso jure become entitled to the protection of the rule of imprescriptibility of title established by the Land Registration Act. Such protection does not extend beyond the area given and described in the certificate. To hold otherwise, would be productive of confusion. It would virtually deprive the title, and the technical description of the land given therein, of their character of conclusiveness as to the identity and area of the land that is registered. Just as the Supreme Court, albeit in a negative manner, has stated that registration does not protect the riparian owner against the erosion of the area of his land through gradual changes in the course of the adjoining stream (Payatas Estate Development Co. v. Tuason, 53 Phil. 55), so registration does not entitle him to all the rights conferred by Land Registration Act, in so far as the area added by accretion is concerned. What rights he has, are declared not by said Act, but by the provisions of the Civil Code on accession: and these provisions do not preclude acquisition of the addition area by another person through prescription. This Court has held as much in the case of Galindez, et al. v. Baguisa, et al., CA-G.R. No. 19249-R, July 17, 1959.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library We now proposed to review the second ground relied upon by the trial court, regarding the length of time that the defendants have been in possession. Domingo Calalung testified that he occupied the land in question for the first time in 1934, not in 1948 as claimed by the plaintiffs. The area under occupancy gradually increased as the years went by. In 1946, he declared the land for purposes of taxation (Exhibit 1). This tax declaration was superseded in 1948 by another (Exhibit 2), after the name of the municipality wherein it is located was changed from Tumauini to Magsaysay. Calalung's testimony is corroborated by two witnesses, both owners of properties nearby. Pedro Laman, 72 years of age, who was Municipal president of Tumauini for three terms, said that the land in question adjoins his own on the south, and that since 1940 or 1951, he has always known it to be in the peaceful possession of the defendants. Vicente C. Bacani testified to the same effect, although, he said that the defendants' possession started sometime in 1933 or 1934. The area thereof, he said, was then less than one hectare.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library We find the testimony of the said witnesses entitled to much greater weight and credence than that of the plaintiff Pedro Grande and his lone witness, Laureana Rodriguez. The first stated that the defendants occupied the land in question only in 1948; that he called the latter's attention to the fact that the land was his, but the defendants, in turn, claimed that they were the owners, that the plaintiffs did not file an action until 1958, because it was only then that they were able to obtain the certificate of title from the surveyor, Domingo Parlan; and that they never declared the land in question for taxation purposes or paid the taxes thereon. Pedro Grande admitted that the defendants had the said land surveyed in April, 1958, and that he tried to stop it, not because he claimed the accretion for himself and his co-plaintiffs, but because the survey included a portion of the property covered by their title. This last fact is conceded by the defendants who, accordingly, relinquished their possession to the part thus included, containing an area of some 458 square meters.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The oral evidence for the defendants concerning the period of their possession - from 1933 to 1958 - is not only preponderant in itself, but is, moreover, supported by the fact that it is they and not the plaintiffs who declared the

12

disputed property for taxation, and by the additional circumstance that if the plaintiff had really been in prior possession and were deprived thereof in 1948, they would have immediately taken steps to recover the same. The excuse they gave for not doing so, namely, that they did not receive their copy of the certificate of title to their property until 1958 for lack of funds to pay the fees of the surveyor Domingo Parlan, is too flimsy to merit any serious consideration. The payment of the surveyor's fees had nothing to do with their right to obtain a copy of the certificate. Besides, it was not necessary for them to have it in their hands, in order to file an action to recover the land which was legally theirs by accession and of which, as they allege, they had been illegally deprived by the defendants. We are convinced, upon consideration of the evidence, that the latter, were really in possession since 1934, immediately after the process of alluvion started, and that the plaintiffs woke up to their rights only when they received their copy of the title in 1958. By then, however, prescription had already supervened in favor of the defendants. It is this decision of the Court of Appeals which petitioners seek to be reviewed by us.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The sole issue for resolution in this case is whether respondents have acquired the alluvial property in question through prescription.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library There can be no dispute that both under Article 457 of the New Civil Code and Article 366 of the old, petitioners are the lawful owners of said alluvial property, as they are the registered owners of the land which it adjoins. The question is whether the accretion becomes automatically registered land just because the lot which receives it is covered by a Torrens title thereby making the alluvial property imprescriptible. We agree with the Court of Appeals that it does not, just as an unregistered land purchased by the registered owner of the adjoining land does not, by extension, become ipso facto registered land. Ownership of a piece of land is one thing, and registration under the Torrens system of that ownership is quite another. Ownership over the accretion received by the land adjoining a river is governed by the Civil Code. Imprescriptibility of registered land is provided in the registration law. Registration under the Land Registration and Cadastral Acts does not vest or give title to the land, but merely confirms and thereafter protects the title already possessed by the owner, making it imprescriptible by occupation of third parties. But to obtain this protection, the land must be placed under the operation of the registration laws wherein certain judicial procedures have been provided. The fact remain, however, that petitioners never sought registration of said alluvial property (which was formed sometime after petitioners' property covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 2982 was registered on June 9, 1934) up to the time they instituted the present action in the Court of First Instance of Isabela in 1958. The increment, therefore, never became registered property, and hence is not entitled or subject to the protection of imprescriptibility enjoyed by registered property under the Torrens system. Consequently, it was subject to acquisition through prescription by third persons.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The next issue is, did respondents acquire said alluvial property through acquisitive prescription? This is a question which requires determination of facts: physical possession and dates or duration of such possession. The Court of Appeals, after analyzing the evidence, found that respondents-appellees were in possession of the alluvial lot since 1933 or 1934, openly, continuously and adversely, under a claim of ownership up to the filing of the action in 1958. This finding of the existence of these facts, arrived at by the Court of Appeals after an examination of the evidence presented by the parties, is conclusive as to them and can not be reviewed by us.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The law on prescription applicable to the case is that provided in Act 190 and not the provisions of the Civil Code, since the possession started in 1933 or 1934 when the pertinent articles of the old Civil Code were not in force and before the effectivity of the new Civil Code in 1950. Hence, the conclusion of the Court of Appeals that the

respondents acquired alluvial lot in question by acquisitive prescription is in accordance with law.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The decision of the Court of Appeals under review is hereby affirmed, with costs against the petitioners. So ordered. Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Paredes and Dizon, JJ., concur. Reyes, J.B.L., Regala and Makalintal, JJ., took no part. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila THIRD DIVISION G.R. No. 92161 March 18, 1991 SIMPLICIO BINALAY, PONCIANO GANNABAN, NICANOR MACUTAY, DOMINGO ROSALES, GREGORIO ARGONZA, EUSTAQUIO BAUA, FLORENTINO ROSALES, TEODORO MABBORANG, PATRICIO MABBORANG and FULGENCIO MORA, petitioners vs. GUILLERMO MANALO and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents. Josefin De Alban Law Office for Petitioners. FELICIANO, J.:p The late Judge Taccad originally owned a parcel of land situated in Tumauini, Isabela having an estimated area of twenty (20) hectares. The western portion of this land bordering on the Cagayan River has an elevation lower than that of the eastern portion which borders on the national road. Through the years, the western portion would periodically go under the waters of the Cagayan River as those waters swelled with the coming of the rains. The submerged portion, however, would re-appear during the dry season from January to August. It would remain under water for the rest of the year, that is, from September to December during the rainy season. The ownership of the landholding eventually moved from one person to another. On 9 May 1959, respondent Guillermo Manalo acquired 8.65 hectares thereof from Faustina Taccad, daughter of Judge Juan Taccad. The land sold was described in the Deed of Absolute Sale 1 as follows: . . . a parcel of agricultural land in Balug, Tumauini, Isabela, containing an area of 8.6500 hectares, more or less; bounded on the North by Francisco Forto on the East by National Road; on South by Julian Tumolva and on the West by Cagayan River; declared for taxation under Tax Declaration No. 12681 in the name of Faustina Taccad, and assessed at P 750.00. . . . Later in 1964, respondent Manalo purchased another 1.80 hectares from Gregorio Taguba who had earlier acquired the same from Judge Juan Taccad. The second purchase brought the total acquisition of respondent Manalo to 10.45 hectares. The second piece of property was more particularly described as follows:

13

. . . a piece of agricultural land consisting of tobacco land, and containing an area of 18,000 square meters, more or less, bounded on the North by Balug Creek; on the South, by Faustina Taccad (now Guillermo R. Manalo); on the East, by a Provincial Road; and on the West, by Cagayan River assessed at P 440.00, as tax Declaration No. 3152. . . . 2 During the cadastral survey conducted at Balug, Tumauini, Isabela on 21 October 1969, the two (2) parcels of land belonging to respondent Manalo were surveyed and consolidated into one lot, designated as Lot No. 307, Pls-964. Lot 307 which contains 4.6489 hectares includes: (a) the whole of the 1.80 hectares acquired from Gregorio Taguba; and (b) 2.8489 hectares out of the 8.65 hectares purchased from Faustina Taccad. As the survey was conducted on a rainy month, a portion of the land bought from Faustina Taccad then under water was left unsurveyed and was not included in Lot 307. The Sketch Plan 3 submitted during the trial of this case and which was identified by respondent Manalo shows that the Cagayan River running from south to north, forks at a certain point to form two (2) branchesthe western and the eastern branchesand then unites at the other end, further north, to form a narrow strip of land. The eastern branch of the river cuts through the land of respondent Manalo and is inundated with water only during the rainy season. The bed of the eastern branch is the submerged or the unsurveyed portion of the land belonging to respondent Manalo. For about eight (8) months of the year when the level of water at the point where the Cagayan River forks is at its ordinary depth, river water does not flow into the eastern branch. While this condition persists, the eastern bed is dry and is susceptible to cultivation. Considering that water flowed through the eastern branch of the Cagayan River when the cadastral survey was conducted, the elongated strip of land formed by the western and the eastern branches of the Cagayan River looked very much like an island. This strip of land was surveyed on 12 December 1969. 4 It was found to have a total area of 22.7209 hectares and was designated as Lot 821 and Lot 822. The area of Lot 822 is 10.8122 hectares while Lot 821 has an area of 11.9087 hectares. Lot 821 is located directly opposite Lot 307 and is separated from the latter only by the eastern branch of the Cagayan River during the rainy season and, during the dry season, by the exposed, dry river bed, being a portion of the land bought from Faustina Taccad. Respondent Manalo claims that Lot 821 also belongs to him by way of accretion to the submerged portion of the property to which it is adjacent. Petitioners who are in possession of Lot 821, upon the other hand, insist that they own Lot 821. They occupy the outer edges of Lot 821 along the river banks, i.e., the fertile portions on which they plant tobacco and other agricultural products. They also cultivate the western strip of the unsurveyed portion during summer. 5 This situation compelled respondent Manalo to file a case for forcible entry against petitioners on 20 May 1969. The case was dismissed by the Municipal Court of Tumauini, Isabela for failure of both parties to appear. On 15 December 1972, respondent Manalo again filed a case for forcible entry against petitioners. The latter case was similarly dismissed for lack of jurisdiction by the Municipal Court of Tumauini, Isabela. On 24 July 1974, respondent Manalo filed a complaints 6 before the then Court of First Instance of Isabela, Branch 3 for quieting of title, possession and damages against petitioners. He alleged ownership of the two (2) parcels of land he bought separately from Faustina Taccad and Gregorio Taguba for which reason he prayed that judgment be entered ordering petitioners to vacate the western strip of the unsurveyed portion. Respondent Manalo likewise prayed that judgment be entered declaring him as owner of Lot 821 on which he had laid his claim during the survey.

Petitioners filed their answer denying the material allegations of the complaint. The case was then set for trial for failure of the parties to reach an amicable agreement or to enter into a stipulation of facts. 7 On 10 November 1982, the trial court rendered a decision with the following dispositive portion: WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing premises, the Court renders judgment against the defendants and in favor of the plaintiff and orders: 1. That plaintiff, Guillermo Manalo, is declared the lawful owner of the land in question, Lot No. 821, Pls-964 of Tumauini Cadastre, and which is more particularly described in paragraph 2-b of the Complaint; 2. That the defendants are hereby ordered to vacate the premises of the land in question, Lot No. 821, Pls-964 of Tumauini Cadastre, and which is more particularly described in paragraph 2-b of the Complaint; 3. That the defendants are being restrained from entering the premises of the land in question, Lot No. 821, Pls-964 of Tumauini Cadastre, and which is more particularly described in paragraph 2-b of the Complaint; and 4. That there is no pronouncement as to attorney's fees and costs. SO ORDERED. 8 Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals which, however, affirmed the decision of the trial court. They filed a motion for reconsideration, without success. While petitioners insist that Lot 821 is part of an island surrounded by the two (2) branches of the Cagayan River, the Court of Appeals found otherwise. The Court of Appeals concurred with the finding of the trial court that Lot 821 cannot be considered separate and distinct from Lot 307 since the eastern branch of the Cagayan River substantially dries up for the most part of the year such that when this happens, Lot 821 becomes physically (i.e., by land) connected with the dried up bed owned by respondent Manalo. Both courts below in effect rejected the assertion of petitioners that the depression on the earth's surface which separates Lot 307 and Lot 821 is, during part of the year, the bed of the eastern branch of the Cagayan River. It is a familiar rule that the findings of facts of the trial court are entitled to great respect, and that they carry even more weight when affirmed by the Court of Appeals. 9 This is in recognition of the peculiar advantage on the part of the trial court of being able to observe first-hand the deportment of the witnesses while testifying. Jurisprudence is likewise settled that the Court of Appeals is the final arbiter of questions of fact. 10 But whether a conclusion drawn from such findings of facts is correct, is a question of law cognizable by this Court. 11 In the instant case, the conclusion reached by both courts below apparently collides with their findings that periodically at the onset of and during the rainy season, river water flows through the eastern bed of the Cagayan River. The trial court held: The Court believes that the land in controversy is of the nature and character of alluvion (Accretion), for it appears that during the dry season, the body of water separating the same land in controversy (Lot No. 821, Pls-964) and the two (2) parcels of land which the plaintiff

14

purchased from Gregorio Taguba and Justina Taccad Cayaba becomes a marshy land and is only six (6) inches deep and twelve (12) meters in width at its widest in the northern tip (Exhs. "W", "W-l", "W-2", "W-3" and "W-4"), It has been held by our Supreme Court that "the owner of the riparian land which receives the gradual deposits of alluvion, does not have to make an express act of possession. The law does not require it, and the deposit created by the current of the water becomes manifest" (Roxas vs. Tuazon, 6 Phil. 408). 12 The Court of Appeals adhered substantially to the conclusion reached by the trial court, thus: As found by the trial court, the disputed property is not an island in the strict sense of the word since the eastern portion of the said property claimed by appellants to be part of the Cagayan River dries up during summer. Admittedly, it is the action of the heavy rains which comes during rainy season especially from September to November which increases the water level of the Cagayan river. As the river becomes swollen due to heavy rains, the lower portion of the said strip of land located at its southernmost point would be inundated with water. This is where the water of the Cagayan river gains its entry. Consequently, if the water level is high the whole strip of land would be under water. In Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Colegio de San Jose, it was held that According to the foregoing definition of the words "ordinary" and "extraordinary," the highest depth of the waters of Laguna de Bay during the dry season is the ordinary one, and the highest depth they attain during the extra-ordinary one (sic); inasmuch as the former is the one which is regular, common, natural, which occurs always or most of the time during the year, while the latter is uncommon, transcends the general rule, order and measure, and goes beyond that which is the ordinary depth. If according to the definition given by Article 74 of the Law of Waters quoted above, the natural bed or basin of the lakes is the ground covered by their waters when at their highest ordinary depth, the natural bed or basin of Laguna de Bay is the ground covered by its waters when at their highest depth during the dry season, that is up to the northeastern boundary of the two parcels of land in question. We find the foregoing ruling to be analogous to the case at bar. The highest ordinary level of the waters of the Cagayan River is that attained during the dry season which is confined only on the west side of Lot [821] and Lot [822]. This is the natural Cagayan river itself. The small residual of water between Lot [821] and 307 is part of the small stream already in existence when the whole of the late Judge Juan Taccad's property was still susceptible to cultivation and uneroded. 13 The Court is unable to agree with the Court of Appeals that Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Colegio de San Jose 14 is applicable to the present case. That case involved Laguna de Bay; since Laguna de Bay is a lake, the Court applied the legal provisions governing the ownership and use of lakes and their beds and shores, in order to determine the character and ownership of the disputed property. Specifically, the Court applied the definition of the natural bed or basin of lakes found in Article 74 of the Law of Waters of 3 August 1866. Upon the other hand, what is involved in the instant case is the eastern bed of the Cagayan River.

We believe and so hold that Article 70 of the Law of Waters of 3 August 1866 is the law applicable to the case at bar: Art. 70. The natural bed or channel of a creek or river is the ground covered by its waters during the highest floods. (Emphasis supplied) We note that Article 70 defines the natural bed or channel of a creek or river as the ground covered by its waters during the highest floods. The highest floods in the eastern branch of the Cagayan River occur with the annual coming of the rains as the river waters in their onward course cover the entire depressed portion. Though the eastern bed substantially dries up for the most part of the year (i.e., from January to August), we cannot ignore the periodical swelling of the waters ( i.e., from September to December) causing the eastern bed to be covered with flowing river waters. The conclusion of this Court that the depressed portion is a river bed rests upon evidence of record. Firstly, respondent Manalo admitted in open court that the entire area he bought from Gregorio Taguba was included in Lot 307. 15 If the 1.80 hectares purchased from Gregorio Taguba was included in Lot 307, then the Cagayan River referred to as the western boundary in the Deed of Sale transferring the land from Gregorio Taguba to respondent Manalo as well as the Deed of Sale signed by Faustina Taccad, must refer to the dried up bed (during the dry months) or the eastern branch of the river (during the rainy months). In the Sketch Plan attached to the records of the case, Lot 307 is separated from the western branch of the Cagayan River by a large tract of land which includes not only Lot 821 but also what this Court characterizes as the eastern branch of the Cagayan River. Secondly, the pictures identified by respondent Manalo during his direct examination depict the depressed portion as a river bed. The pictures, marked as Exhibits "W" to "W-4", were taken in July 1973 or at a time when the eastern bed becomes visible. 16 Thus, Exhibit "W-2" which according to respondent Manalo was taken facing the east and Exhibit "W-3" which was taken facing the west both show that the visible, dried up portion has a markedly lower elevation than Lot 307 and Lot 821. It has dike-like slopes on both sides connecting it to Lot 307 and Lot 821 that are vertical upward and very prominent. This topographic feature is compatible with the fact that a huge volume of water passes through the eastern bed regularly during the rainy season. In addition, petitioner Ponciano Gannaban testified that one had to go down what he called a "cliff" from the surveyed portion of the land of respondent Manalo to the depressed portion. The cliff, as related by petitioner Gannaban, has a height of eight (8) meters. 17 The records do not show when the Cagayan River began to carve its eastern channel on the surface of the earth. However, Exhibit "E" 18 for the prosecution which was the Declaration of Real Property standing in the name of Faustina Taccad indicates that the eastern bed already existed even before the sale to respondent Manalo. The words "old bed" enclosed in parenthesesperhaps written to make legitimate the claim of private ownership over the submerged portionis an implied admission of the existence of the river bed. In the Declaration of Real Property made by respondent Manalo, the depressed portion assumed the name Rio Muerte de Cagayan. Indeed, the steep dike-like slopes on either side of the eastern bed could have been formed only after a prolonged period of time. Now, then, pursuant to Article 420 of the Civil Code, respondent Manalo did not acquire private ownership of the bed of the eastern branch of the river even if it was included in the deeds of absolute sale executed by Gregorio Taguba and Faustina Taccad in his favor. These vendors could not have validly sold land that constituted property of public dominion. Article 420 of the Civil Code states: The following things are property of public dominion:

15

(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character; (2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some public service or for the development of the national wealth. (Emphasis supplied) Although Article 420 speaks only of rivers and banks, "rivers" is a composite term which includes: (1) the running waters, (2) the bed, and (3) the banks. 19 Manresa, in commenting upon Article 339 of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 from which Article 420 of the Philippine Civil Code was taken, stressed the public ownership of river beds: La naturaleza especial de los rios, en punto a su disfrute general, hace que sea necesario considerar en su relacion de dominio algo mas que sus aguas corrientes. En efecto en todo rio es preciso distinguir 1. esta agua corriente; 2. el alveo o cauce, y 3. las riberas. Ahora bien: son estas dos ultimas cosas siempre de dominio publico, como las aguas? Realmente no puede imaginarse un rio sin alveo y sin ribera; de suerte que al decir el Codigo civil que los rios son de dominio publico, parece que debe ir implicito el dominio publico de aquellos tres elementos que integran el rio. Por otra parte, en cuanto a los alveos o cauces tenemos la declaracion del art. 407, num 1, donde dice: son de dominion publico . . . los rios y sus cauces naturales; declaracion que concuerda con lo que dispone el art. 34 de la ley de [Aguas], segun el cual, son de dominion publico: 1. los alveos o cauces de los arroyos que no se hallen comprendidos en el art. 33, y 2. los alveos o cauces naturales de los rios en la extension que cubran sus aguas en las mayores crecidas ordinarias. 20 (Emphasis supplied) The claim of ownership of respondent Manalo over the submerged portion is bereft of basis even if it were alleged and proved that the Cagayan River first began to encroach on his property after the purchase from Gregorio Taguba and Faustina Taccad. Article 462 of the Civil Code would then apply divesting, by operation of law, respondent Manalo of private ownership over the new river bed. The intrusion of the eastern branch of the Cagayan River into his landholding obviously prejudiced respondent Manalo but this is a common occurrence since estates bordering on rivers are exposed to floods and other evils produced by the destructive force of the waters. That loss is compensated by, inter alia, the right of accretion acknowledged by Article 457 of the Civil Code. 21 It so happened that instead of increasing the size of Lot 307, the eastern branch of the Cagayan River had carved a channel on it. We turn next to the issue of accretion. After examining the records of the case, the Court considers that there was no evidence to prove that Lot 821 is an increment to Lot 307 and the bed of the eastern branch of the river. Accretion as a mode of acquiring property under Article 457 of the Civil Code requires the concurrence of three (3) requisites: (a) that the deposition of soil or sediment be gradual and imperceptible; (b) that it be the result of the action of the waters of the river (or sea); and (c) that the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks of rivers (or the sea coast). 22 The Court notes that the parcels of land bought by respondent Manalo border on the eastern branch of the Cagayan River. Any accretion formed by this eastern branch which respondent Manalo may claim must be deposited on or attached to Lot 307. As it is, the claimed accretion (Lot 821) lies on the bank of the river not adjacent to Lot 307 but directly opposite Lot 307 across the river. Assuming (arguendo only) that the Cagayan River referred to in the Deeds of Sale transferring ownership of the land to respondent Manalo is the western branch, the decision of the Court of Appeals and of the trial court are bare of factual findings to the effect that the land purchased by respondent Manalo received alluvium from the action of the aver in a slow and gradual manner. On the contrary, the decision of the lower court made mention of

several floods that caused the land to reappear making it susceptible to cultivation. A sudden and forceful action like that of flooding is hardly the alluvial process contemplated under Article 457 of the Civil Code. It is the slow and hardly perceptible accumulation of soil deposits that the law grants to the riparian owner. Besides, it is important to note that Lot 821 has an area of 11.91 hectares. Lot 821 is the northern portion of the strip of land having a total area of 22.72 hectares. We find it difficult to suppose that such a sizable area as Lot 821 resulted from slow accretion to another lot of almost equal size. The total landholding purchased by respondent Manalo is 10.45 hectares (8.65 hectares from Faustina Taccad and 1.80 hectares from Gregorio Taguba in 1959 and 1964, respectively), in fact even smaller than Lot 821 which he claims by way of accretion. The cadastral survey showing that Lot 821 has an area of 11.91 hectares was conducted in 1969. If respondent Manalo's contention were accepted, it would mean that in a span of only ten (10) years, he had more than doubled his landholding by what the Court of Appeals and the trial court considered as accretion. As already noted, there are steep vertical dike-like slopes separating the depressed portion or river bed and Lot 821 and Lot 307. This topography of the land, among other things, precludes a reasonable conclusion that Lot 821 is an increment to the depressed portion by reason of the slow and constant action of the waters of either the western or the eastern branches of the Cagayan River. We turn finally to the issue of ownership of Lot 821. Respondent Manalo's claim over Lot 821 rests on accretion coupled with alleged prior possession. He alleged that the parcels of land he bought separately from Gregorio Taguba and Faustina Taccad were formerly owned by Judge Juan Taccad who was in possession thereof through his (Judge Taccad's) tenants. When ownership was transferred to him, respondent Manalo took over the cultivation of the property and had it declared for taxation purposes in his name. When petitioners forcibly entered into his property, he twice instituted the appropriate action before the Municipal Trial Court of Tumauini, Isabela. Against respondent Manalo's allegation of prior possession, petitioners presented tax declarations standing in their respective names. They claimed lawful, peaceful and adverse possession of Lot 821 since 1955. If respondent Manalo had proved prior possession, it was limited physically to Lot 307 and the depressed portion or the eastern river bed. The testimony of Dominga Malana who was a tenant for Justina Taccad did not indicate that she was also cultivating Lot 821. In fact, the complaints for forcible entry lodged before the Municipal Trial Court of Tumauini, Isabela pertained only to Lot 307 and the depressed portion or river bed and not to Lot 821. In the same manner, the tax declarations presented by petitioners conflict with those of respondent Manalo. Under Article 477 of the Civil Code, the plaintiff in an action for quieting of title must at least have equitable title to or interest in the real property which is the subject matter of the action. The evidence of record on this point is less than satisfactory and the Court feels compelled to refrain from determining the ownership and possession of Lot 821, adjudging neither petitioners nor respondent Manalo as owner(s) thereof. WHEREFORE, the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR CV No. 04892 are hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent Manalo is hereby declared the owner of Lot 307. The regularly submerged portion or the eastern bed of the Cagayan River is hereby DECLARED to be property of public dominion. The ownership of Lot 821 shall be determined in an appropriate action that may be instituted by the interested parties inter se. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED. Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Bidin and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.

16