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Mecke: narration seems to be the antipode of dialogue. In written narration the reader is reduced to pure reception of the text, he says. Mecke: the fundamental condition for dialogue is not fulfiUed.
Mecke: narration seems to be the antipode of dialogue. In written narration the reader is reduced to pure reception of the text, he says. Mecke: the fundamental condition for dialogue is not fulfiUed.
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Mecke: narration seems to be the antipode of dialogue. In written narration the reader is reduced to pure reception of the text, he says. Mecke: the fundamental condition for dialogue is not fulfiUed.
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Intc[prdjlljou or diaIOGu(. Olicigo/London:' Chicigo (1990):
195-2IH. Dialogue in Narration (the Narrative Principle) Jochen Mecke Writing, when properly managed, (as you may be sure I think mine is) is but a different name for conversation: As no one, who knows what he is abaut in good company, would venture to t.a1.k aU;-so no author, who understands the just baundaries of decorum and good breeding, would presume to think aU: The truest respect which you can pay to the readers understanding, is to halve this matter amicably and leave rum something to imagine, in his turn, as weH as yourself Laurence Sterne, The Lift lind Opinwns of Trislrllm Sharuly: ,Gentleman Monologic versus Dialogic Narration At first glance narration seems to be the antipode of dialogue. A more striking example of monologic, one-sided, and c10sed discourse can hardly be found, it seems. Whether it is presented in its original oral form in everyday situations or presented by an author highly versed in narrative techniques using all the artistic devices of the "schema tism of traditionality" (Ricoeur 1983, 1(6), the result is apparently always same: an active author is telling a story to a listener or reader patiently and passively listening to the messages that reach hirn. In written narration the reader is even reduced to pure reception of the text without any opportunity for asking questions, for informing the narrator of his opinions, for manifesting his disap proval of or agreement with the actions of the characters or the technique of the narrator, or for expressing his desire that the story continue in a certain way. Thus the fundamental condition for dialogue is not fulfiUed: the roles of (active) speaker and (passive) hearer do not alternate. However, the reality of the complex and dynamic system of narration does not correspond at all to this oversimplified view. A doser examination of the novelistic genre, which contains both dialogue and narration, will help to establish that narration and dialogue are not mutually exdusive notions but are Mecke, Jochen, "Dialogue in Narration - (the Narrative Principle)", in: Tullio Maranhao (ed.), The Interpretation of Dialogue, Chicago/ London: Chicago UP, (1990), p. 195-218. 199 198 Literary Experiments with Dialogue dialogic character of narration itself. Trying to perceive the entire range of such polymorphie phenomenon as dialogue, Mukarovsky out the tundamental eh4uaeteristics of dialogic communication: 1. Every participant must have the opportunity to rcalize the roles of both the active and the passive partner of communica tion. Conselluently the roles of speaker and hearer alternate (Mukarovsky 1977, 86). 2. Speaker and Jistener must be able to incorporate the situation surrounding them into their exchange by making elements ofit the theme of their conversation or by designating them by means of gestures or deictic words ("there," "here," etc.) (1977, 87). 3. There must be a characteristic specific to dialogue, which defines its semantic structure: "Unlike monologic discourse, which has a single dnd continuous contexturc, several or at least two eontextufl'S interpenetrate or alternate in diaJogic dis course" (1977, 87). Of course there must be a frame of reference within which the ditferences bctween the two contextures can operate. This unity, however, is granted not by the subjcct but by the object, that is, by the theme of the conversatton. Since as a functionalist Mukarovsky conceives of language as a means appropridte to the realization of certain goals of expression (1940, 82), he presuppOSes that dialogue functions as an instrument already at hand; dialogue evolves within the framework of a preexisting Janguage. Although the participants can detcrmine the choice among different functionaJ languages (emotional, Jiterary, or intellectual), Janguage preconceived as a whole circumscribes the Indecd, if we translate Mukarovsky's aspects mto the terms ot Jakobson's model of communication, it appears that Mukarovsky takes into account only the emotive (speaker), conative (hearer), phatic (channe!), referential(context), and semantic fune tions of' linguistic signs; he comp]etely neglects the metalinguistic function, which deals with the relation between utterances and the code they are derived from. There is no reason the code should not also become the object or theme of dialogue. Moreover, metacommu nication as an extreme case of conversational practice can bc reaJized only in a dialogic way, and pcrhaps this is one of the most interesting cases of dialogic practice. Thus we can comptete Mukarovsky's list of features by adding the c1aboration of new common codes, of new languages (cf. KJoepfer 1982, 88 H.). Here, as in alJ other dimensions Dialogue in Narmtimz of diaJogical communication, a certain unity and interpenetTation is a condition for as weil as the tension that breaks up virtual monologic unity. Having thus the basis for his ,the9ry of dialogue, Mukarovsky uses the c1assical diffcrentiati0!l the concrete psychophysical individual and the subject 'to between superfidal dialogic features and a deeper 11dialogic quality." essential conditions for dialogue are provided chiefly by the thlrd aspect mentioned above, that is, by the interpenetration of eontextures. The indispensable eondition of the "interpenetratlon of two semantic contextures" is not necessarily bound to the ex istence of two individuals but can also be fulfilled by a single psychophysical individual's becoming the vehicle for two ferentiated subjects of an utterance. Thus, in the so-ca lIed soh]o quy, one individual assurnes the roles of two subjects and alter nately takes the roles of speaker and hearer. l\1ukarovsky partly anticipates what Roman Jakobson would reformulate twenty years later in Iinguistic terms: it is the possibility of splitting and thereby doubling aJI the constituents of literary communication that permits a single author to divide into two weJl-distinguished subjects or "voices" who aetually engage in a dialogue. In the light of Jakob son's terminology, Mukarovsky's claim brings to the fore how narration may be dialogic. The concrete individual author is capa ble of entering into a true dialogue with his real counterparts; such a dialogue takes place on the first level of literary communication, which is the principaJ objcct of traditional her.meneutics. Yet the problem of dialogue really asserts itself on the seeond level, that of the literary work. On this level, the participants of the internal dialogue of the novel (narrator and narratee, implicit author implicit reader) result from the doubling of the concrete author mto two different subjects. Thus the real author can address the re ceiver in qute a direct way, as Sterne does with prediJeetion in Tristram Shandy , begging his reader, for instance, to close the door or advising hirn to skip over the next chapter because it might not please hirn (Sterne 1967, 38). Narration, however, need not pouse such an explicit form of dialogue. Ev.en when .not as a figure of narration,the reader may eXlst as a kind of Imphclt counterpart to the narrator. Actually, the anecdote above about Dickens listening to his readers ilIustrates very weIl what happens between the narrator and thc implicit reader. The narrator knows very weIl the readers' "horizon of expectation" Oauss 1975, 131) 203 T 202 Litcrary Experiments with Dialogue one who controls and manipulates them in conformity to his own intentions. In parody and irony, for instance, the narrator uses the utterances of others for the purpose of unmasking and ridiculing them, thus manifesting his superiority. Bakhtin introduces another modality of polyphony, one in which the voice of the Other represented by the discourse of the Self is active and dominates the author's discourse. In the modalities mentioned above the author uses the discourse of the Other to express his own orientations. In the fourth type, which Bakhtin christens "polemic," the Other's dis course remains outside that of the author and is thus promoted to the latter's independent autonomous counterpart,acting upon it and determining it (Todorov 1984, 71). The degree of the presence and doininance of one of the voices is variable: the hero's or the reader's voice, ideological system, conception of the world, may obtain such a predominance that the narrator's voice vanishes and loses control over the making of the novel. This happens, for instance, in The Life and Opinions ofTristram Shandy and in./acques le fataliste et SO" maHre, in which the heroes, by their strange and eccentric behavior, compel the authors to modify their programs. The modification of the narrator's attitude by his own creations mayaIso affect the real author: fof. ex am pie, Louis-Ferdinand CeJine (Destouches), who adopted not only the name but also the character 01 his principal picaresque hero, progressively identifying hirnself with his creation. Thus the literary dialogue may (quite similarly to the so-called inner monologue, which is in fact a poJyJogue) induce the person to obey the voice of the fictive Other; the paranoiac execution oE the orders given by a stranger's voice is only an extreme case of this. H, on the one hand, a true dialogue may take place within a single person, on the other hand, the existence of several participants in communication does not guarantee its dialogic character. As the example oE so-caUed discussions in totalitarian systems illustrates, one voice or subject may be disseminated through different individ uaIs having the same opinions, 'sharing the same value system and the same language. Even though all external premises for dialogue arefulfilled, the internal condition, the tension between two or more semantic contextures, is completely missing. The case of the nove] illustrates very weH the opposite phenomenon, that of a dia)ogue taking place within a single individual. If one accepts Mukarovsky's explicit replacement of the concrete individual by the subject of dialogue, apresupposition that also underlies Bakhtin's definition of dialogism, then the objection that the dialogue between narrator and Dialogue in Narration herD is not real because one of the partners controls the other is no longer pertinent. Of course, authors can manipulate their characters for their own purposes (Ehre 1984, 176). But the "manipulations" of the individual and concrete author are a result of a dialogue between two or more voices that has already taken place hirnself; this is so irrespective of whether it was the narrator's' the reader's, or the hero's that got the upper hand. Here the Lahn etymology of the word "concrete" (from concrescere, "to mergelt) reveals its fuH sense: the concrete author is a result of the polylogue between different voices merging with different degrees of predom inance. On this basis we can shqw that it must not be that the more-or-Iess implicit narrator dominates the dialogue in the novel, but that the actual writing and final position of the concrete author can also be due to a predominance of the reader's voice. If we admit, on the basis of Mukarovsky's distinction between subject and individual, that the main premise of dialogue is not the existence of two individuals exchanging messages but the tension of two penetrating each other, then the dialogue is reaL even though thls might not be the case for the individuals it. . The commonsense objection to Bakhtin s thesIs m fact has ItS roots elsewhere. lt is an objection not so much to the fictionality of the participants of dialogue as to the hidden narrative base that sustains dialogic communication. The argument that the. concrete a.uthor manipulates his heroes as a marionette play.er hiS pupp.ets. not primarily concerned with the fact that there IS onJy one mdlvldual supporting the conversation. In particular it is based on the presup position of an author completely unmodiEied by the concrete and material process of writing, which is carried out in time and ,in !he course of which the author may himseIf change. The obJerhon excludes from dialogue the very element within which it evolves: it presumes that the concrete authoris an already and forever finished subject and thus eliminates time. In fact the concrete author of.a work does not exist before the act of writing, but only after the dlalogue with his persons has come to an end. The authoris author only after writing the book, not before. As author he is the result the of writing, which progresses in the form of a conversabon wlth hiS characters and with the implicit reader. The gist of the argument against the virtually dialogic nature of narration consists in the reversal of the actual perspective. lt looks back on the narrative process from the point of view reached by the author at its end" explaining the whole as a realization of his initial 207 206 Literary Experiments with Dialog!Je i encompasses mere ontological difference without reducing it to a final identity but unfolds the diiference between the land the Other, time constitutes the dimension in which the dialogic relation can evolve. The ontologicaJ foundation of dialogue in time is confirmed by the anthropological analysis of the constitution of identity. Identity cannot he realized in a kind of Munchausen act in which one extricates oneself from the morass by pulling on one's own hair. The process of self-identification can be c10sed only in relation to others: Being, abstracted from the relation binding it to the Other, is inconceivable. According to Bakhtin, we can neither conceive nor perceive ourselves as a unity without referring to something that transcends and encompasses us. "I achieve self-consciousness, I hecome myself only by revealing myself to another, through another and with another's help. The most important acts, constitutive of self-consdousness, are determined by their relation to another consdousness.... I must find myself in the other, finding the other in me" (Todorov 1984, 96). Just as the body is initially formed in the womb of the mother, so human consciousness awakens surrounded by the of others (p. 96). Moreover, the I hides in the Other and in others: it wants to be but another for others, to juUy penetrate the world of others as another. Despite this congruence between narration and dialogue, con sisting of their common foundation in time, there seems to be a fundamental difference: the dialogic mode of time is contingent, while the time of the story is teleological, because it is founded on our preconception of action. Although both are rooted in time, dialogue and narration seem to be incompatible, espedally because of the different modes that time espouses in them. Perhaps the analysis of dialogue in the light of Buber' s philosophy of time may heIp to make c1ear the real structure of dialogic time. Buber differentiates two fundamental attitudes of man toward the world; The relation from the I to It as a relation of subject to object is only one human possibility, which exists in addition to the encounter of the I and the You. In contrast to the It, the You cannot be fixed by notions or serve' as means to our ends (Buber 1984, 16 H.). The encounter with the You transcends the subject-object relation. Nevcrtheless, the You must hecome an It when dialogic communication is not actually realized or finished. This is, for instance, the case in memory, where the You is perceived as an object and thereby transformed into an lt (Buber 1984, 37). One might object that this reification of the Other at the end of a dialogic relation must not at all confer a narrative structure on dialogic Dialogue i" Narration temporality, because the end itself might oceur as a mere gency. Dialogic time thus would stiJI lack any of the orgamc developments characteristic of traditional narration. 1?: resolve the apparent ineompatibility between the specific times of narration and of the dialogic relation, we have to examine how rite fundamental contingency resulting from the relation between the l.and the Other is transformed into the narrative time of concrete dialogue. From DiaJogic Relation to DiaJogue: Narrativization of Dialogic Temporality by the Pragmatic Rules of Dialogic Speech The narrative transformation of the contingency of the relation' between the You and the I is due to the pragmatic rules of dialogue taken as a specific form of speech, as established by Plato. In the Gorgias, Socrates reminds Polos that the dialogic genre and Hs rules are quite different from the rules of the agonistics of sentences composed for validity before a tribunal and in dialectics (Gorgias 471e-472c). In dialogue, only the opinions of the two partidpants are relevant,. and the aim of their conversation is their assent alone (475d). In contrast to the participants of the agon, those of dialogue are witnesses and judges at once (Republic 348b). The simultaneous accomplishment of the two roles naturally requires a higher nicative competence, a condition that some partidpants do not fulflU (cf. Sophist 346c; UlWS 893a-b). Hs specific pragmatic rules confer a teleological structure on dialogue, which places it in opposition to other communicative genres. The participants in dialogue are forced to arrive at a consensus by themselves, since no judges are available to propose a solution to their conflict. A final consensus thus constitutes the aim toward which the is directed. Therefore it is necessarily progressive; the participants solve one problem after another, establishing agreement first on the premises and rules and then on the content of their confrontation. By contrast, progression is not obligatory for the agonistic genre, since the final sentence of the judge is not necessarily the natural and organic result of a maturing process, but rather puts an external and in some sense artificial end to speech. The partners can maintain their position from beginning to end because the judgment is the duty of a third party. Since they are not provided with this higher third party, the participants in dialogue (pleading and judging at the same time) are obliged to constitute a judgment of by finding a consensus that functions as this higher instance. Actua11y, the is credible only if. the partners can be sure it was arrived at by a dialogue of coerClon. 210 211 Literary Experiments with Dialogue, subjects; they even presuppose the dispersal of the members of a community (1986, 78), creating their unity by relating them not to a common origin but to a common future or end of history. For example, the narrative script of enlightenment is that of a continuous progression toward the emancipatilln of the subject from ignorance by cognitionj the Marxist script is that which progresses toward a liberation from alienation and exploitation by the socialization of work; and the capitalist script narrates the emancipation from poverty by technoscientific development. Yet according to the pragmatics of narration, these scripts legitimate the subject to speak in the name of the liberty toward which history is striving and to assurne the role of the universal subject who and absorbs aB particularity. The differences between theindividuals in dialogue are transcended by a collective singular, a process that creates the universal subject of his tory . Analogous to the double position of the narrator of the nove] (who, onthe one hand, is himself included in the time of narration as one subject among others but, on the other hand, transcends narrative time, anticipating the final point of the story and thus authorizing himself to speak in the name of all his characters), the particular individual derives his legitimation to speak in the name of others through. the anticipation of the aim of his tory that will bl'fng about a unitarian subject. In both cases dialogue takes place within the limits of a virtually collective monologue, and the individuals become the inner voices of a universal subject to be realized in the future. This universal subject will also encompass the persons who as yet are admitted only as objects of the dialogueand who later will acquire the competence necessary to participate as autonomous subjects in the course of the formation of universal history. This does not at all mean that dialogue is ;11 reality monologic and that it consists only of the' monologue of reason excluding its Other; itsimply relativizes the notions of dialogue and monologue with regard to the level and to the temporal dimension of communication. However, the metanarrative apriori of dialogue, which confers a narrative structure on dialogic communication, is not transcendental in the Kantian sense but historical in the sense of Foucault's notion of discourse (Foucault 1966, 13 H.). The End of the Erao! Metallarratives: Dialogue beyond Narratioll? Since metanarratives of emancipation refer not to the past but to the future, they are virtually subject to falsification. And according to Dialogue in Narratioll Lyotard, falsification by history has taken place. For hirn all metanar ratives are rejected without exception. Like Adorno, he states that the speculative narration was refuted by Auschwitz, the capitalist one by the economic crises of 1917, 1929, and 1974-79, the Marxist discourse by the bloody crushing of the revolts in Hungary (1959); the German Democratic Republic (1958), Czechoslovakia (1968), and1!oland (1982) (Lyotard 1986, 53). One could add the refutation of thitechnoscien tifie discourse by the increase of pollution and the accident of Chernobyl (1986). The progress of scientific and technical knowledge has not liberated human beings, but rather has sub.ugated them to the necessities of technical and economical reason, thus producing a further alienation instead of liberating mankind. In this situation the universal metanarratives of emancipation lose their credibility, a loss that fundamental1y transforms the pragmatic conditions of the grand narratives. The subjects of the narration' are no Ion ger universal but are dispersed among many particular individuals. The fundamental ontological structure of dialogue that was bound to the narrative a priori breaks down. The You the I of dialoguebecome particular instanccs, no longer authorized to speak in the name of the emancipation of mankind. . Yet the delegitimation of the grand narrations destroys the atmosphere surrounding and protecting dialogue. Since there is no more authority to legitimize the sender and receiver, the presupposed metalanguage disseminates into a multiplicity of particular autono mous languages. This has theconsequence that an utterance belonging to one language will be a victim of injustice through its exposition to another. The sequence of speech acts is 00 longer regulated: the initial contingency of the dialogic relation breaks through and also determines the concrete dialogic speech. The subjects of communication lose their universal character and are cut down to particular voices amqng a multiplicity of others. Since dialogue is no longer synthesized by a consensus or a common metalanguage, no universal pragmatics can dose the gaps opening between the utterances. Dialogue no longerfollows narrative scripts conforming to certain rules: rather, the latter are incorporated into and made the objects of conversation itself. Thus they emphasize one element of narration, the event that transforms the structure of dialogue itself, changing the rules of communication and allowing for the development of new codes and thus new ideas. In dialogue within the framework of the grand narratives, the rules preceded communication: now theyare induded in it. This is exactly the case Wittgenstein refers to: 11And is there not also the case where we play 214 215 Literary Experiments with Dialogue tal tension between language games and the dissemination principle is grounded upon a negative history . The end of this history would be a universal languagc, some Orwellian Newspeak that has become real, quite independent of whetherit was achieved by consensus or by coercion. Thus, Lyotard's concept of dialogue as constantly transgressing and modifying its own rules does not presuppose the abolition of all narrative, but rather assumes their negative transfor mation. The negativity of the telos changes the temporal form of dialogic time by emphasizing the c0r:'tingency of Iinguistic events. But still narrative remains what it has always been to dialogue in the modem epoch: Hs temporal structure and historical apriori. Refererzces Bakhtin, M.1981. Tht! dialogic Four essays by M. M. Bakllti", Ed. M. Holquist, trans. C. Emerson and M. Holquist. Austin: University of Texas Press. Benjamin, W. 1977. 1IlIwlillatiotu:,,: Ausgewahlte Schriften. Frankfurt: Suhr kamp. Buber, M. 1984. OIlS diulogiscllt' Pri1lzil'. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchge meinschaft. . Derrida, J. 1967. Oe la grammatoJogit'. Collection Critique. Paris: Minuit. ---. 1972. La dissbtlillatioll. Collection Tel Quel. Paris: Seuil. --. 1977. Limited, Inc. In GIY/)Ir, 2:162-254. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Diderot, D. 1972. Jacqut'S le fillalis/t' cl s,'" maUr,'. Paris: Librairie Generale Fran
Eagleton, T. 1983. Literary tJrt'ory: Au iutroductiotl. Oxford: Blackwell. Ehre, M. 1984. M. M. Bakhtin: The dialogic imagination. Poetics Today 5:1:172-77. Foucault, M. 1966. US mots et les dlOses. Paris: Gallimard. ---. 1974. ScJrriftt!tI :ur Liftratur. Munieh: Nymphenburger Verlagshand lung. Cadamer, H. 1960. Wahrheit tutti lvkthodt': Grtrdzuge ei1ler I,Jlilosoplrisdle1l Hermcueutik. 4th cd. Mohr. Genette, G. 1972. Figures IIl. Paris: Seuil. Habermas, J. 1971. Vorbcreitendl' Bemerkungen zu einer Theorie der kommunikativen Kompetenz. In Theorie der Gesellschaft oder S01.ialtecJ, nologie- Was leistt't Jit' S.I/stemrorsc}luug, ed. J. Habermas and N. Luhman. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp. Jakobson, R. 1979. Linguistik und Poetik. In Pot'lik: Ausgewlllte Aufstu, 1921-1971, ed. E. Holenstein and T. Schelbert, B2-121. Frankiurt: Suhrkamp. Origindlly published 1960. Jauss, H. 1975. Literaturgeschichte ab Provokation dcr literaturwissenschaft. In Reuptiuus,'sthdik, ed. R. Warning. Munich: Fink. Dialogue i" Narratioll Kloepfer, R. 1980. Dynamic structures in narrative literature: The dialogic principle. P"t'lics Tvdtl.'/ 1:115,-34.. " __. 1982. des dialogischen Pnnzlps in der Literatur. In Dialogizitt, ed. R. Lachmann. 85-106. Levinas, E: 1979. Le temps t't l'alllre. Paris: Quadrige. . .' Lyotard, J. 1979. La comiition postmoderne: Rapport sur savo,!r. Pans: MmUlt. __. 1986. Le postmodeme explique dUX eufauts: Corresporidance, 1982-1985. Paris: Galilee. Mukarovsky, J. 1977. Two studies of dialogue. In The W?rd and t'erbal art: Sekcted ESSllro/s, trans. and ed. J. Burbank and P. Stemer. 65-80. New Haven: University Press. Originally published 1940. Plato. 1961. Wake. Heidelberg: Lambert Schneider. Ricoeur,P. 1983. Tt'mps el rkit. Vol. 1. Paris; Seuil. Saussure, F. deo 1979. Cours de generale. Ed. Tuillio de Mauro. Paris: Payot. . Sterne, L. 1967. rl,e life atrJ opilliotls of Tristranr Slratldy, gentleman. Mlddlesex: Penguin. Originally published 1760. '.. .. Todorov, T. 1984. MikJUlii BakJrtitr: The dralogrcal prmClple. Trans. Wlad Godzich. Minnea'polis: University of Minnesota Press. Wittgenstein, L. 1958. PlrilosopJrical itrt'estigations. Trans. G. E. M. Anscombe. New York:" Macmillan. Jochen Mecke. Dialugue i,. IIarraliulI (lire Mrrative prillcipleJ. IN: Tullio Maranhao (ed.). ]laG ImeUlU:IM1jou or Oliclgo/London: Chic.go Univeniry (Im):
Dialogue in Narration (the Narrative Principle) Jochen, Mecke Writing. when properly managed. <as you may SUM 1t.hink lJ'ne is) is but a different name for conversation: As no one, who knows whal he is about in good company, would venture to talk aU;-50 no authc:w, who understands the just boundaries ot decorum and good breeding, wouJd presume to think all: The truest respect which you can P'lY to Ihe readers understanding. is to halve this matter amicably and leave Nm IClIDething to imagine. in histurn, a5 weU u yourself .. ;.:;Ih ' Laurence Sterne, Tht Lift lind Opillions of Trist"," , . 1.1 Monologic versus Dialogic Narration At first g)ance narration seems to be the antipode of dIlOgtie. A more striking example of monologic, one-sided, and cloSed. discourse an hardly be found, it seems. Whether it is presented in ilS original oral . form in everyday situations or presented by an author highly versed in narrative techniques using an the artistic devices of the "schema tisrn of traditionality" (Ricoeur 1983, 106), the reswt is apparently always the same: an active author is telling a story to a'listener or reader patiently and passively listening to the messages that reach hirn. In written narration the reader is even reduced. to pure reception of the text without any opportunity for asking' questions, for infonning the narrator of his opinions, for manifesting bis disap proval of or with the actions of the characters or the technique of the narrator, or for expressing his desire lIlat the story continue in a certain way. Thus the fundamental condition for dialogue is not fulfilJed: the roles of (active) speaker and (passive) hearer do not alternate. However, the reallty of the complex and dynamic system of narration does not correspond at a1J to this oversimplified view. A doser examination oi the novelistic genre, wh ich contains both ,dia)ogue and narration, will help to estabUsh that narration and diaJogue are not mutuaUy exdusive notions but are 196 Lilerary Experiments wilh Di,lIogue
c1usely link....d in a wid.... o( rdlltlons. The purpose uf lhis c1mpter is tu analyze sl'veral dimensiolls u( thl'ir intt'rrelation. The first secliun examines the virtu"lIy di.llugic lilialily ur narrative; in thesecund seclion I disClISS fhe narr.llive struchln' of di.lloguc; the third sectillil uUllines smnl' dl.lngl's inll", disCtmrsl' on narration "nd c.li"tngul' lhat have lllkl'n pl.Kl' "'(,Plltlr, TIze Dilliogic Slrllclure Of Narrnl;oll DiaJugue N.trfillion It is perhaps wurth asking whelher the reader is reaJly condemned tu Ihe passive roje sketched uutabovt.', In reaJity he has the uppurtunity .. tointervene in literary communkalioll in various ways. He may communicate his npiniun uf thl' work lu the illithnr and illflu('ncc..' the latters writing by means u( this nitilJul. If we consider the econornic dimension uf th.... lillrary institutiun as a p.1rt uf its communkative situation, lhal is, as a dim(,llsion o( lhe semiulic system wilhin which it functiol1s, ahen lhe success ur f.lilllrc..' uf onl' bonk mighl innuel1ce the l'ompusitiol1 of the l1ex1. Furthermore, thl i re"der's not apply unly tu thl' cuml1lunic.'live sp.we hl'lween olle novl'l and the ensuing une, but can also innuence the aelual compositiun of a book. Prt'publicatinn of variuus ch"plers in newspapers or literary reviews, which happens so Ufll'll in lhl' era of mass media, give the reader occasiun tn mudify lhe compusition of a nuvel and thus to assume the rule uf an actiVl' counll'rpart. rinaJly, the possibililies of feedback lhat are at the dispns'll of Ihe Ust'rs of nt'w media (e.g., lhe eJectronic novels) levl'l most uf the diHl'rcnces in the degree o( a(live participatinn ui aulhor and n'.ldl'r; llwst" pllssibilities will probably deeply transfurm, i( not ddinitdy dissulve, nur lJolions ul" the author/reader rles more e'fl'clivcly than ilil Foucauldian crilicism ever could do (cf. roucault 1974, 17 rf.) Wl' can also resort to literary history to find examples ur dialogkaI narration: the most famuus (ase of an author's including his readers directly in lhe writing prucess is probably Charlt's Dkkells, WhOSl' Ilnvels were prepuhlisht'd by instaUments in lhe feuilll'lons o( important newspapt'rs. This gave occasion for Dickens to invert rules and tu hecome in the pubs uf London the attentive listener of his rt'aJers; they explained tn hirn how they imagined the continuation of the story and what they thought about its characters and compusilion. These " grea t !xpecta. lions" or the public m.lde it possible to cnntin\le the dialngue thus lw"lIn \\'ilhi" Ilw n.I\'I1 il .... t1f TI", rl'.,d.'r... look p;ut in thC" enmpn... i .. ill Nt",,,tio,, 197 t 1 tion of the work, and thl' author conceived his actual writing partly as an answer tu thcir requests ilnd anticipations. By such a procedure readers' reactions are systematically incorporated into. the signifying process ilself, and lhe author can use them as i! 'basis for further development. He may (ulfill readers' lhern ironkally allli IIms inili"le a pleasant, stimulating game withthem. In his thenry u( h.... rl1lelleutics Gadamer shows that this di.tlog ical element ofliterary communication is not acddental to under standing. 5ince the rneaning and sense contained in a_ work exceed the intentions of the author (Gadamer 1960, 354)-an assumption shared by both deconstruction and hermeneutics-and since no reconstruclion of the question to which the work is an answer coincides with Jater reconstructions, since the two are separated, by lhe necessary pr!judice given by their respective horizons of sense (1960, 282), understanding means more than mere reaJization of the aulhur's intentions. Heading ,operates in a never-ending diaJugue belween past and present, the actual understanding consisting of a fusion between the horizon of our own historical sense and the one in which the work is plac('d (1960, 2R9). llowl'vl'r, Oll(! is indined to uhjt'ct, all these exarnples are nut villic..l illustrations for the dialogical nature of narration itself, since they only elucidate the fact that narration might be inc1uded in a dialogue belween past author and present reader. They are far removed from showing the dialogic fundamentals of narration itseJe. In other words, the exampJes given confirm that narration can engt'nder a diaJugue E."xternal to itself, but not at aJl that narration ilself functions as a dialogue. The remarks made above deal only with the work as an ubject of a dialogue between author and reader, but nut wilh th(' nuvel itself as a semiotic system realizing dialogue within its huund.uies. UntiJ 1l0W nuthing has been advanced t.o suspend the strict opposition between d.ialogue and narration within the work itself. 50 (ar I have shown only an alternation of the rofes between author and reader, which occurs not within the confines of the text hut outside them, on a level of cornrnunication that transcends the work in lluestion. Nllrralioll IlS Dilliogu/! Mu karovsky' s Definition of Dialogue It was lhe Russian semiotician Mikhail Bakhtin and the structuralist lim whn thp h!\c:1C fn.. sr. .......... 1........ ,..1 J<JH Expl'riments with Dllogue dialogic dlclr,lctl'r uf n,lrration itselL Trying to perceive the entire rangl' o( sUl'h ,} polymorphie plwnomenon ,1S dialoguc, Mukarovsky stttkl'S out thl' lund.mwnl.,lch.lractt."ristks 01' di.lIngic: cmnmunication: J. EVllry p,lrtkip,mt musl h.lve the opportunity to rC'aIize lhe roles "f holh lhl" .. clivl' ,Ind tlw fMssive p'lrtnt"r uf communica lion. tlw rol,IS Clf SIll'dktlr ,md hl'.IH'r "Ih."rnalt' 1'J77, HII). 2. Speakl'r and lisll'lll'r must be ,lble lu incorpurate the situation surruunJing lht!m inlo lheir exchange by making elemC'nls of it llw lheml" 01' lhl"ir conVt'rslltion ur hy designating tlll'm by me... ns ur gl'slurt.'S ur dl'ktic words ("lhere," "here," etc.) (1977, H7). 3. Thert! must be a chtlraclerislic specific to dialogue, which ddines its sl'IIMnlic struclure: "Unlike monologic discourse, which 11&\S ..1singll' ,u1d l'ontinuous contexture, sevl'ral ur at least twu c:ontexturl's inll'rptml'trate or alternate in diaJogic dis course" (1')77, H7). Of Course there must be a frame of rderence within which the diffl'rencl's the two can 0pl'rllh.'. Thb unity, hOWl'Vl'r, is gri.lnled not by litt' slIhjl'ct hut hy tlw ohjt,t'I, Ih"t b. tlw IIwnw of tl1l' COl\Vl'rs,lloKm. SincL' ,lS ,l t"lIlll'tion,llisl Muj..,lrovsky cOllceives o( 1,1Ilguagc llS a medns i.lpproprltlle to the walization 01 certain glmls of expression (1<J40, H2), hl' tlhtt di.\logue functions as an already at hdnJ; di"loglll' L'volves within the framework 01' a l... ... ge. the participi.lnts Ciln lhe diiferellt iunctional langudges (emotional, literary, or ... I), preconccived as a whnle circumscribes the actual communit'<ion. Indeed, if we Mukarovsky's aspects into the terms of Jakobson's of communication, it appears that Mukarovsky tclkl's into ,1ccounl only the emolive (speaker), conative (hearcr), ph... tic (l'hanne/), rderential (euntext), anti semantic (une tions of linguistic signs; he completely neglects the metalinguistic functiun, whieh deals with the relation between uttcranees and the code they ... rl' dcrived trum. There is 110 rl'ason lhe COdl' shoutd not also become lhe ohjl'ctor thl'nw uf dilliogul'. Mon>ovl'r, mel.lcommu nicatioJ) ,IS dU extreme rdSl' of l'()Il\,ersaliunal praclice Call be realized only in a di,tJogic way, and perll'lps this is one of thc most intl'resting Cdses uf Jialogic Thus Ciln complclc Mukarovsky's lislof by lhe d ... boratiun o( new cornmon codes, of new languages (cl. Kluepfl'r J9H2, XH tf.). Iiere, as in all other dimensions Dill/agile in Ntlrratiotl of dialogical commllnication, a certain unity and interpenetration is d condition for as weil as the tension that breaks up virtuell monologic unity. Having thus estabHshed thc basis "or his. uf di ... lugul.', Mukaruvsky uses lhe. dassieal differentiation .t;t!tween the concrete psychophysica. individual ,md the slIbjel't" to .distinguish ol.'lwel'n supt.'rfidlll lti.llogil' It.',lhtl't.'s ;.md ,I dt.''''pcr "Ji... logic qu.lIity." lht.' essential conditions for diillogue are provided chiefly by the third aspect mentioned above, that is, by the interpenetration ot .several contextures. The condition of the "interpenelrdtitll1 of two semanlic contextures" isnot necessarily bound tu tht! ",x istence of two individuals but can also be fulfilled by a single psychophysical individual's becoming the vehicle for two ferentiated subjects of an utterance. Thus, in the so-called quy, individual assumes the roles of two subjects dnd altl.'r nately takes thc r(lles or speaker and hearer. Mukarovsky pdrtly anticipates what Roman Jakobson would refonnulate twenty yeJrs laler in linguislic terms: it is the possibility of splitting and therl.'?>' doubling all thl' l'Onstitlll'nts uf Hterary communication that pt'rnllis a single allthor Lu divide into two well-distinguished sub!t!cts ur "vuices" who .Il"llli.llly l'ng,lgl' in i.l dii.llogue. In the light ot Jakoh sun's terrninulogy, Mukarovsky's claim brings to the fore how narration may be dialogic. Thc concrete individual authllr is capa ble of entering into a true dialogue with his real counterparts; such a dialogue takes place on the first level of literary communication, which isthe principal object of traditional henneneutics. Yet the problem of dialogue really asserts itself on second level,. thai of the literary work. On this level, the parhclpants of the mternal dialogue of the novel (narrator and narratee, implicit author. and implicit reader) result from the doubling of the concrete author into two differC'nt the real author can address the re ceiver in quite a direct way, as Sterne does with predilection in Trislram Shmuly , his reader, for instance, to elose the door or advising hirn to skip over the next ehapter because it might not please him (Sterne 1967, 38). Narration, however, need not pouse such ancxplkit form of dialogue. Ev.en when .not as a figure of narration, the reader may eXlst as a kind ot lmphnt counterpart to, the narrator. Act':lally, the anecdote above aooul Dickens listening to his readers illustrates very weIl what happens between the narrator and the implicit reader. The narrator knl)WS very weil the readers' "horizon of expectation" Oauss 1975, 131) I _I 200 Experiments wHh Oialogue and C.ln Stllisfy, just play with those expecll.Hlcies to tlw l'xtent tiMt thl' narr.dee finally l''Il'comes an clutonollltlllS "vuin'," ilu:.,rn,lting .1 Lerlain cunn'plion ui the world .lltogelher different from tiMt of thl' narr.ltor. Thoughconfretc real rCclJers is ahst'nt, tlwir Iltlrr.ltive. vniee is present in thc Jialogue uf wriling. If tlw dislinclivt' mark of cunvl'rs,1tion is abovl' ,,1/ lhe inkrpt'lll'trdlion 01 dillt'n'lIl ('OIll't'plioIlS uf IIw world, thPIl t1u.' tl'llsion hl't\vl't'n lwo nmtl'xtllfl'S will slIHiet, lur tlu.. ' reclJizdtion 01' dicllugue. Instt'cld of .1 slrict Sc"paralion between monologue and diCJlogUl', we h.1VC .1 !'lc"I" o( sc"vt'r.ll of dialngul' according tu thc rddtivl' dumin.l/\l"c ()f tlw two cunlcxtures. Uakhtin's Conn'pt o( Di.llogism in the Novcl In dist.lgrcenlt'nt with wh,\l Sl'l'nlS lu OC the commonsense opinion, Uclkhtin d.lims that tht, novl'l is the di.llogic genre p.u and tiMt novclizillion subvl'rts llll kinds 01 .monologic speech. Since Jilerature cnnsists of a discoursl' that represents anolher discourse, it oficrs a gl:'nuinc Ofc.lsion (ur dicllogUl" In the novel even the sm,lllest l'ntity uf diM'ours(', tlw ... ingl" word, is not as h0ll10gl'l1l'OllS as il Sl:'t..'IIl!'J. In tlll' sl,lrdllir.hl "I U.I"-hlin's IIwllry 01' ditllogisllI il dbsL'min.ltl.J. . Thl' rl',lson fur this virlu'll tlissl'mination belongs tu tJw very structure of Icillguage ,lnd clllllnllillication: thl' identity uf cm lItterance (its bl'ing prt'sl'nl to itsl'lf) ,llrt'"dy has lhe structure uf diffl1rentiation, becausc the nmslitutioll uf linguistie uttL'rances presupposcs thcir iterability, which givt..'s to dl'viations uf sellse. the semi otie mark grounds in the rcmark (Derrida 19771 186). The sameness of an utterllilce ....onstqulnlly is gUclrilnteed not by the permanence of a sense but by a "nunprl:'Seflt rt'mainder" (n'sttllln' mm l'"h:it.'IltcJ that subverts aB "hsolult> prt'Sl'nce (p. 191). Sinn) the reiteration presumes by virtue of a genuinl:' tt'mporaJ gap the possibiJity of the absence uf initial intcntiolls anel meanings, alternation uf sense is already inherent in l.lnguage tlll' nl'Cl:'SSary condition fur ils funclioning. Every mark is divided (1I1<.t dl.'porll'd in advance, by its iter.lbility, toward othl'r wortls, rell1ovld in advancl' (rom il:il'lL This removc makes its mOVl:'mcnt pussibll. This rcmove is its o( possibiHty; it b not .lln l'vl'ntlldlil y. sOfllelhing that befalls it here and there, by accidl'nl (Dt'rrida IY77, IY4). The dialogic prindpJe as it is exposeJ by Bakhtin is only lhe systematic application of this basicalJy diHerential structurl' 01 nunmllnicalion to thc discourse of the noveL In his essay in litt' Nm'd, Bakhtin cxtends the dialogic dis ...t'min,llll)u 111 11", ... ingll wort!: :!Ol Dialogllt' in Nar",tio" Whal wc are calling a hybrid construction.is an utterance thai by its grammalical (syntactic) and compositional markers, 10 a spc.lkcr, but lh'll aClually cUIlI,tins mixed wilhin it twu utlt..'rQn(... lwu speech manncrs, two styles, two "languages," _two semantic and axiological belief systems.... It frequenlly happens lhat t'VCIl Uflt' i.md lhe S,lnll' wurLt will belung simullancous!y tu-two Iwu lwlil" tlMI in 11 hybriti ((Iaht' tJlll'lIlly, IIIl' wonl Iwu l'tlnlr.,dlllory two .hlllIh (Utlkhlin 304 ff.) Uy tht, same word, which belongs simullaneously to two languages l)r two belief systems, the iluthor can rl)present in his own speech the worldview of one llf his heroes and thereby make hirn eonverse nut only in the dialogues with other characters on the level of the s/t1ry (direct speech), but also on the level of narrative (d. Genette 1')72, 74). The characters as weil as the readers can change the le"c1 oE fictionality by a narrative metalepse (pp..234 H.) and beClunc autonomOUS voices conversing with the author within the of the work. Sinee there is no "transcendental word" dusing the dif.llngk strlll'lurl> of and since no word can be dost'li It) ulht..'r lISi.lgtS, every wonl h.IS dlre.ldy served fur other subll'lots .md b dCl'ply m.Hked by lhis previous lIs,tge. Uy virluc of its cvery word necessarily estabJishes a relation not only with thc ob jects but also with other individuals who used it before and will lIse it I,ller. Bakhtin's concept of dialogism brings tu the fore that contains a temporal kerne!, which unfolds under appropriate condi tions. Of course every word, simply by virtue of its diacritic nature. by drawing its meaning from its relation lo other words (Saussurc 1979, 166), already carries the marks of these others. Narration, however, owing to its temporal dimension, is especiaJly appropri.lte for the development of this dialogicality. Particularly the noveI, with its syntagmatic dimension, is able to unfold the story ot the dilferent uses of utlerances made by different subjects and thereby to set oif .1 tension between different conceptions of the world. In the cuurse ot a novcJ words acquire thcir own history and assume thl' mark!'t of different users, with whom they rnaintain a elose relation. One is immediately indined to object that the pulyphlmic structure of the noveIistic word, which aJlows the hero and the impJicit reader to become autonomous entities of narrative discourse, is only superficial, beeause it will always be basically hierarchie and therefore rnonologic. ActualJy, it is to the author that the words bdong: he pronounccs them with the voices oE the uthers; he is the 202 203 f Explrimlnts wilh Didlogue one who controls.md lll.mipul.lllS ttwlll in nmformity to his .own intentions. Jn parody dtut irony, ior inst.lncl, the narrlltor uses the ulleranl'cs of ulhl'rs fur thl' purpose of unmasking ,md ridiculing thein, thus manife!'lting his slIpl'riority. Bdkhtin introduces ,lnother mudality o( polyphony, OfW in which the voke of the Other reprl'sented by ttw oi tlw St'l( is al'liVl' and domin.lhli llw ,mthor' s d bc.:oUr!'ll'. In I hl' IIlUd,llilil'!-I IIwntitHll'J ilbllVl' I.lll' ,111 thor uses the discourse uf lhe Othl'r to l'Xpfl'SS his own orientations. In the fourth type, whic.:h H.lkhtin duistens "poll-mie," the Other's dis cuurse rernains outside thlll ui tlll' ,Ulthor emd is thus promotl'd to lhe Jdller's independ('1I1 dutOIlOIl\OUS counll'rp.lrl, ,lcting upon it mut determining it (ToJorov 1lJX.j, 71). Thc degree of tht.> presl'nce and dominance of one uf lhe voices is v,uiable: the hero's or the reader's voice, ideologkaJ system, cOIKt:'plion of the world, may obtain such a predominance tl\clt the narratnr's VUkl' vanishes and luses control over the making uf the novel. This happlns, for instance, in 'fhe Li/e ami 0l'li<ms 0/ Trist "'111 Slw",Iy and in 11lt.''ll/es le fataliste et SOli mai/re, in which the hl'roes, l1y their str.lOge and eCl'entrk behavior, compel the authors to moJify tlwir pro).;r.ulls. Ttll' modification uf the ni.lrrlltor's attitude hy hi!'t own IlhlY .dso "((Pl't tlw rt'al duthor: for ,'X ampll', Louis-Fl'rdin.md Cdillt' (I h'SIOUl'Iws), who adoph.'d I\ot o";lly lhe name hut d!sO t11l.' rh.tr.ll'ter u( hb prindpal picaresque hero, progressivl'Jy idl'llti(ying himsclf with his cH'alion. Thtls the Jialugue m... y (lluitt., similllrly to lhe so-c:.llleJ inner monologue, which is in fact a poJyJogue) inducl' the person to obey the voiee uf the fictive Other; the paranoi,lc executiun of the orders given by a stranger's voice is unly an extreme case of this. H, on the one hand, a true dialogue may take place within a single person, on thl l olher hand, thl' existence of severa) participants in communication does not guarantee its dialogic character. As the example of so-called disCllssions in totalitarian systems ilhJstrates, one voice or suhjt!ct may bt! disst.:'Olinalt!d thruugh different individ uaJs having the same upininns, sharin h the same va)ue system and the same language. Even tholl).;h aJl external premises for dialogue are fulfilled, the illlerndl condition, Ihe tension between two or more semantic contexlures, is completl'ly missing. The case of the novel iIIustrates very welJ the oppusitl' phenomcnon, that of a dialogue tak.ing place within a single individu,ll. If one accepts Mukarovsky's explicit replacement 0; the conen'tl' individual by the subject of diaJogue, apresupposition thlt ,jJso underlies B,lkhtin's definition of dia)ogism, then the objl'ction that lhe di,tlohue oetween narrator and Dialogllt' ill Narratioll hero is not real becauseone of the partners controls the other is no longer pertinent. Of course, authors can manipulate their characters for their own purposes (Ehre 1':#84, 176). But the "manipulations" of the individual and concrete author are a result of a between two or more voices that has already taken place wi!hiqhimself; this is sn irn'slwctiv(' of wlll'ltwr it was the the reader's, ur the herds thi.lt hut the upper hand. Here the utan etymology of the word "concrete" (from COIIcrescere, "to mergelt) reveals its fuH sense: the concrete author is a result of the polylogue octween diffl'"rent VOiCl>S nlllrging with different degrees of predom inllnce. On this basis we can show that it must not be that the more-or-Iess implicit narralor dominates the dialogue in the nove!, but that the actual writing and final position of the concrete author can also be due toa predominance of the reader's voiee. If we admit, on the basis of Mukarovsky's distinction between subject and individual, that the main premise of diaJogue is not the existence of two individuals exchanging messages but the tension of two subje.:ts penetrating each other, then the dialogue is real, even though this might nut he the calie fnr individuals ta king it. . Thl' l'OmIllOIlSl'IlSl' ()hjl'l'tinn to ,lkhtin's thesIs 10 fact has Its roots cIsewhere. It is an Ohjl'ftioll not so much tu the fictionality uf the participants of dialugue as to the hidden narrative base that sustains Jialogic communication. The argumenl that the concrete author manipulates his heroes as a marionette his pupp:ts. not primarily concerned with the fact that there 15 onJy one mdlVtdual supporting the conversation. In particular itis based on the presup position of an author completely unmodified by the concrete and material process of writing, which is carried out in time and .in !he course of which the author may hirnself change. The obJechon exdudes from dialogue the very element within which it evolves: it presumes that the concrete aUthor is an already and forever finished subject and thus eliminates time. In fact the concrete author oE a work does not exist before the act of writing, but only after the wHh his persons hJS come to lln end. The author is author only alter writing the book, not before. As author he is the result the of wriling, which progresses in the form of a conversation wlth hiS characters and with the implicit reader. The gist of the argument against the virtually dialogic nature of narration consists in the reversal of the actual perspective. lt looks back on the narrative process from the point of view reached by the author at its end, explaining the whole as a realization of his initial -------------------------- 205 2(J.j I.ill'r.lry Experinwnts with Di.llogue intention. Tlw VOicl'S 01 his dl.lr.lch'l"s .1W thus cunsiJl'reJ to be objects uf his .lIld tlll'n'by writing is Sl.'l'n oS Ll monologue, ur lll'!'tt .IS d di.llugllt.' in which Ol1l' SUbjl'ct m.lsh.'rs the others. H thc Ilhlllipul.lll's his Cl'ccltiuns, Wl' must not forgct that the " u bjcl'IS" 01' Ihis I1hllliplll.llion Wl'H.' UlKe counterparts in with tlu.' ..1ullwr. Th\. :-ulllll' ,ul;lIl1H.'nt is valid with reSpl'l't to the hilH!"Il'It. b it pl.'rtml.'ul Iu St'Y 111.11 tlw .11 Ihe l'"lI ur thc narratinn tlw iUllhor .It Ihe bl.'ginning only because the first has attained thefin.ll point 01 ni.trrative? Surely in a c10sed system {)f narration thl.' final vuiee uf tlw ni.lrrator has the last word, but Ihis is not tlw during Ihe ",'I ul n',lding .md writing. Thus lltl' monologic charaeter ur Iill.'ri.lturl.' appl'drs only wlwn une inverts the perspective uf writillg and reading .\nd looks back on the work; to du this, une t.lke aw.1Y thl' tlmpur.11 element essential to it- the aesthetic prucess hy whieh it W.lS eonstituted. This kind uf backward prophecy pruvides a dislortl'd visiun ur narrdliun. Thc circularity uf the arguOlt-nt is ohviulIs. Thl' l:'onerl'lc author is supposed to manipulate the dialoguc with his herol's readers: however, lhis is impossible as he is bounJ tu the finaltempur.\1 slale of his wriling. The assumptiull lllt.l lill'r.lllIH' IIwnologil'tll discoursl' .lI'iSlfS unly on the grounds 01 lhl.' idl'i.llislic prl'mise tlMt the ,luthur l'xisls .\S an enlity rt.'lll.tins unch.tngl'd by tlw didlogietlJ and material procl."ss uf writing. In rl',llily, 1l1lH.ltion suppurls C"d.llller's l.'l.lim ur the th,tl Wl.' .lre" in " spel'i,1I W.1Y (ur the conerete author: he is the eOl1vl'rstllion retllil.l'd by his work, as it appears in ils final J le is- sn tu sJle&lk- the hdrmollY or disharmony of the voices uf the narrator, ut thl' implicit rl'i.lJer, and of the here). The samt- is also v"liJ (or Ihe fl'.lder, who, in Ji,tlugie narration , becmnes a true coauthor. In summary, I "rgul'd th,lt nilrrdtioll hi.1S a virtually dialugic structurt- that is l'SSl'ntial lu it. dnd tiMt this stl."IllS from the filet that both I1Jrrdtion J ittlogue "re grounded in a specific strUl'ture of time. Tht.' Telll/Joral DilllL'IISioll of Na ,-ral h", tlml Dialog ue The OntulugicaJ and Anthropologie.ll FUUlldatiun uf the Oialugic 1{c1atioll in Tl'mpor.llity The similarity hl'hvl'l'll n.lrrlllion M1U dialogue is fuunded upon their Clllllmnn hmpor.ll ch.lr,hh'r, .1 tl'"llIn' Ih.ll distingllishes tlll'1ll Irnm the epistl'mic attitude. According to Emmanuel Levinas, the dialogic relation exdudes representatiun and presence o( the Other. In contrast tu knowll'dge tiMt n'gJrds the Olher as an object, which is "present" and "at hand," the dialogic dues thl! partner to presence or cupresencl!. The Other trAPscends the representi.ltiun u( the subjel:'t-object-rel.ltion and ,ann,Qt be m.lde pl'esl'lIt. Time l'Orl'l'sponds to .1 I'el,lliun I.h.lt dOl'S nur exduUl' tlw otherness of the Other, that guarantees the nonindifference of this relation to the thinking mind (Levinas 1979, 9). Between "You" and 'T' there is no coincidence in synchrony but only the diachrony uf a fundamL'nllll dHfl'renee; henee timl' me.lns the relation ut noncorrespondence to the Other (1979, 10). However Levinas's ontological ioundation of the dialogic rela tion inHme confronts the philosophy of dialogue with two problems: first, as merely negative definitions, nonpresence and the negation o( representation are perhaps not sulficient conditions (or the constitu tion of time; second (and this is dosely linked to the first), the ontological analysis has to darify why we need the dimension of time at aJl, beCi.lUSe heteroglossia alulle might aJready serve as the ontologieal foundiltiun oi di'llogue. The Ill'n'ssity uf il Ill"gi.ltivl' Jl'finitioll ur time by nunpreSl'llL'l' stl'lllS from the ontological status uf time itself, because it resists metaphysics of presence that is firmly anchored in Western culture and langlhlf,e. The only positive statement that can be made about time is that it "temporalizes," that it engenders its own forms in contact with Western metaphysicaJ presuppositions and reduces them to substance and essence. The pure negativity of time with regard to these logocentric assumptions compels it to hyposfatize itsdf: time is already and at onee Hs difference, Hs substantified Other. The basic negativity of temporality expresses itself by different positive figurations or forms of time. Thus the impossibiHty of a positive definition oi time on the ontological level is intrinsicto temporality. For the sake uf terminological transparency a distinctinn can be made between the general principle of temporality and thl." different specific forms uf timt' it produees. If there were only the noncorrespondence between the land the Other (Illere heteroglossiil), a b,lSic condition of dialogue woulJ not be fulfilled: an element would be lacking in which this diff-:rence could be artieulated. However, since every identity that serves as a basis for the articulation of the ontological diHerence would reduce otherness to sameness, there "emains only an element whose identity consists predscly b}', in, and through differcnce itself. As temporality 206 207 Lill'rary Experiments wHh Dialoguc eneompasses mere untologieal ditfen.. ncf! without reducing it to a final idtmtity but unrolds the differt'un' lwtween the land the Other, time eonstitutes the dimt.. nsion in whi.... h the dialogic relation ean evolve. The rOlindatiull or dialogue in time is eonfirmed by the anthrnpolugical ilnalysis or thl' nmstitution of identity. Identity cann"t bc rC&llized in Il kind ur Munctlausen act in which one extrjcates olll'sclf rrom 'lw 11l0r.IS!'t hy pullil1g Oll olle's own Ihair. The process uf self-identific.. tion c.m he dused unly in relation to others: Being, abstraeted from the relation binding it to the Other, is ineoneeivabJe. Aecording to BClkhtin, we ean neither eoneeive nor pcreeive as a unity WitllOut rcfcrring to something that transcends and encompasses us. "I achieve self-conseiousness, I become myself only by revcaling myself to another, through another and with another's help. Thc most important aets, constitutive of sclf-consciousness, are determined by their relation to another consciousness.... I must find myself in the other, finding the other in me N (Todorov 19H4, 96). Just as the body is initially formed in the womb of the muttwr, so human consciuusness awakens surrounded by the consciousn\!ss uf others (p. Y6). Murcover, the I hides in the Other ,md in otlwrs: il Wemls to ht' hut anollll'r for otlwrs, to f .. lly pellelratl' lhe wurld 01 oltll'rs i:lS .HlOllll'r. 0'. Despite this congruellfl' helwl'l'll narr lion anti di.llogue, con sisting of their eommon foundatiun in time, there secms to be a fundamental difference: the dialogic mode of time is contingent, while the time of the story is becausc it is founded onour preconception uf actiun. Although both are rooted in time, dialogue and narration seem to be incompatible, especially because of the different modes that time espuuses in them. Perhaps lhe analysis of dialogue in the uf Buber's philosophy of time may help to make c1ear the relll slrueture ur timl. Buber differentiates two fundamental attitudes 01' m.. n tow.trJ the world. Thc rcldtion from the J to H as a rl'lalilHl of suhje.... t to llbjeet is only one possibiJity, which cxbts in addition tu the encounter of the land the You. In contrast to the It, the You Cilnnut be fixed by notions or serve as means tu our ends (Buber lYlH, In tf.). The encounter with the You . transcends the subjeet-objeet Nl'vertheless, the You must become an It whcn dialogic cummunication is not actually realized or finished. This is, for inst.1llCe, th4! CdSe in nll'lllory, where the You is perceived dS an objel't and thercby transiormed into an 1t (Buber 19H4, 37). One might object that this reifkation of the Other at the end of a dialogic relation must not at ,,11 l'onfer a narrative structure on dialugic Dialogllf! i" Narm/iOtI temporality, because the end itself might occur as a mere gency. time thus would stiU lack any of the orgame developments charaeteristic of traditional narration. J? resolve the apparent incompatibility between the narration and of the dialogic relation, we have to examme ho.w fh,..e fundamental contingency from the relation between and the Other is tnmsfurmed intu the n,urative time of euncreie From Dialogic Relation to Dialogue: Narrativization of Dialogic Temporality by the Pragmatic Rules of Dialogic Speech transformation of the eontingency of the relation between the You and the I is due to the pragmatic rules of dialogue taken as a specific form of speech, as established by Plato. In the Gorgias, Socrates reminds Polos that the dialogic and its .rules are quite different from the rules of lhe agomstics of sentences composed for validity before a tribunal and in dialectics (Gorgias 471e-472c). In dialogue, only the opinions of the two participants are relevant, and the aim of their conversation is their assent alone (475d). In contrast tnthe participants of the aso", those of dialogue are WitlWSSl'S ,md .tt OIll'l' (Rt',ml1Iic J4Hh). The simultaneul1s accoillplishmcnt uf the two roles naturally requires a higher nkative competcnce, a condition that some participants do not fulflll (cf. SOIJJJisl 346c; Laws 893a- b). lts specific pragmatic rules confer a teleological structure on dialogue, which places it in opposition to other eommunicative genres. The participants in dialogue are forced to arrive at a consensus by themselves, since no judges are available to propose a solution to their conmct. A final consensus thus constitutes the aim toward which the dialogue is directed. Therefore it is necessarily progressive; the participants solve one problem aiter another, establishing agreement first on the premises and rules and then on the content of their confrontation. By contrast, progression is not obligatory for the agonistic genre, since the final sentence of the judge is not necessarily the natural and organic result process, but rather puts an external and in some sense artiflClal end to speech. The partners can maintain their position from beginningto end because the judgment is the duty of a third party. Since they are not provided wilh this higher third party, the participants in dialogue (pJeading and judging at the same time) are obliged to constitute d judgment of themselvcs by !inding a consensus that functionsas this higher instance. Actually, the consensus is credible on]y if the partners can be sure it wasarrived at by a dialogue free of coercion. 20M Litt.r"ry Expl'rimenls Thus di.llogul preSlipposCS, .lS IldLwnnas dl'darcs in his thcory of (ommuniG.llivl' compl'll'ncl', .111 idl'al spl'l'ch situation with thl' following fl'.llufl'S: (1) systlm.ltic .md l'LJual distribution uf the opportunity lu seIL'cl anti perform spel'ch (lets; (2) exchange of the rules uf Spl'llker and hC&lrl'r; (3) l'qual distribution of choosing n'gul.lliVt', n'pn'spnl,llivl', ilml stativt.' spl..ch acts; (4) The pussibility 01 in ql1l'slion (\11 possible norms i.lIHt opiniuns; (5) presupposilion 01 good iaith uf lhe partners (Hi.lbermas 197141, 136-39). Tht.'Sl' t.'onditions ,ln' Ilt'Vl'r flllly rt..llizl'd, hut rwvl'rtlwl ..,ss tlu.' possibility uf tlu..ir rl.lliz.llioll is lhl' <,'priori nmdilion tht' Iltlrlicipants must anticipale if lht'y W.Hlt lhe di.lloglll' tn takl' plan'. Like Pldto, . fur Ildt>ermas is ncn'ss.trily dirl'cted tu consensus, in an appropri.lte re.1lm l'rl'.lll'd by thl' reguliuization of the moves permitted by diellogUl" Tht' It'gilinMcy (lf eilch move 41nd c.1ch speech act is given byits conlrihlilion to Ihis aim (Lyotard 1979, 106). Concrcte dialogues .lre dl'll'rmi'll'd by spl'ci 1rules uf the genre thilt cunfer a unity on lhem. Thl'}' l'volve in the sphere of a cummon mel..al.lnguilhe, the lInivl'rsillity ur whil'h huar,lntl'l's that thl' CUnSl'l\ obt"nl'd will ht., " jllst Olll'. This consl'nslIs-oril'ntl'd ll'1t.ologk of by di.llogic tlwury .lIld pr.lctlel' trol1\ PI.lto to Habermas nmlers .1 n.lrr.ltive scht'nll' 01\ di.,lohlll'. Indt.'l'.J, .,11 di.tloglws l'nlHng with a consensus Cdll bl' rel'ollllll'd dS ll.lrr41Iions; Lhe final agreenll'nt has thl) Same funclion as thc voice uf thl. .l.lrr.ttor in the novel. lf we take this inlo considerdtiun, it becomes a nMUt.'r uf Icss ,importance whether narration is dramatizcd-that is, whethl'r only one narrator is ur also thl' pt'rsons whnsc story he is teUing. I fuwever, the n,ur.,tive struclure of dialogue is grounded not only in its essentiell uril'nt.ltion 10 cnnst.'nsus, bllt also in an even more fundamenlai condition uf l"OIllIllUnkdliun. As the spl'aker presup poses the fuH understdncJing uf his utlcri.H1CeS, which never can bc by his concfl'te cuunh,'qMrl, he conn'ives his speech as dlrected not only to the red) ,llidressl'c hut illso tn a kind 01' superior receiver living in a far-removed future. In this way, every dialogue is .llso included in .) Il.lrmtiol\ lending to a full understanding: EVl'ry utlerdl\t:l' Jlw ys hJS J re..:l'ivl'r ... whose rl'sponsive under st.mding is s,'ughl ,md anlkipJil.:'d by lhe aulhor of the v('rbal work. t Il' is .. "!'tl'(ond" (11\ .1 nOIl.1filhmeti..:.l\ seIlSl'). But in addition tn this rC'l'l'iver thl' i.wlhnr im,lhll\C'!'t, ur !t ..... ". a hihlwr 209' Dialo:,:"e i" Nllrml;otl sup('r-receivcr (a third) whose absolutely appropriate responsivc is projected t:'itht:'f inttl a metaphysical distance or into a 'distant histuriei\1 timt:'. In different periods andjn different of the worJd, such super-receivers and th('ir . . . responsive under standing reccive various concrt:'te ideological expressior\s '(God, the dbsolute truth, thl' fragment, impartial human conscJente, the people, lhe jllltgnll.'lll of hislnry, Sl'il'flt'l', l'tC.). (Tudorov 19R4, 1:1(1) In order for true dialogue to take place, the fuH understanding of a superaddrcssl'e is to be presllpposed and becomes an apriori condilioll uf rOlllmunl'i.1tiul\. The possibility llt being complttt.>ly understoud must be guaranteed to the speaker, even though it is never completely realized. Inst41lling this superaddressee as a kind of transcendental apriori of dialogic discuurse, Bakhtin founds the contingent dialogic time on a continuous flow of history. Narration is relegated to lhe frdme in which diellogue takes place. As history is clevated to a transcendental category, the initial contingency is transformed into continuity. The superreceiver's fuH understanding functions as a sort of Kantian regulative idea of dialogue all spl'l'ch. It is imporl.lnl 10 undcrlinl' hl'fe thal irnplicitly Bakhtin's claim presupposes not rl1dl hislory (H'S :,:t'stlle) bul narration (tlurrillio rerum geslarllm). The speaker in a concrete didlogue, by presupposing an asolute addrcssee, relJuires not a history orhis dialogue, but rather the possibility of arranging the evenls in a story directed to a perfe(l understanding. lt is for this reason that diaJogue is rooted in narration and not in history. In summary, narration can be dialogic because dialogue is anchored in time by its pragmatic rules and its commu nica tive apriori. Grnud Nnrrntivc!$ nmt tlle Historien! n Priori of Din!ogue Lyotard (1979) asserts that the narrative structure of communication is not ilccidentill but is il slrul'lurl' that is essential tu communicative pragmatics. Dislinguishing between traditional and modern narra tives, Lyotilrd claims lhal the traditional stories confer a cuJtur41l identity on their spe41kers, hearers, and objects, separating them other communities by referring them to a cammon origin (Lyotard 1979, 40 H., 45 H.; 1986, 84). In contrasl to this, the modern meta narrations (which also conslitute a kind or apriori for the corrimuni cative community) already encou!'ter a fundamental separation pf the 210 211 Lih'r.lry Experiments with Dialugue ----------------_. subjects; they eVl'n presuppose tlw dispersal of the members of a community (19Kh, 7K), Cfealing thcir unity by rclating them not to a common urigin bUl to a common Iltlure ur end of history. Por cxample, thc narr.llive saipt o( enlightenmcnt is that of i.l continuous progression tow.lrd lhe c..nMncipatiun ur lhe subject Irom ignorance by l"llgnitiun; thl' M,trxist scripl is thal which progresses tuward a Iiher&1tion frum ,IIWI1.lllon .md ,'xpltlll.,tion hy t1w sOl'i.lli/. llion of wurk; and the l"dpit.llist n.lrr,lll'S the el1hmcipdtion (rom poverty by technoscientifif Jevdupmellt. Yl'l accorJing tu the pragmatics of n.lrration, these scripls Icgitim.llc ttll' subjcct to speak in the name of the liberty toward whirh hislory is slriving and lu assume lhe roll' of the universal suhject who encompasses and absorbs all particlilarity. The Jifferences between the individuals in dialugue are transcended by a colleclive singul.lr, a proCl'ss that creates the universal subject of history. Analogous tn the double position of the narrator of the novel (who, on tht' one IMnd, is himseH indudcd in the time of narration as one subjt."ct among uthers but, onthe uther hand, transcends narrative timt', anticipating the final point of the story and lhus authurizing himsdr to speak in tlw ...une or alt his characters), the p.lflicular individ'ItlI dt'rivl's his Jtgitinl.ltion tu stll'ak in llll' n.unl' 01' lhrough llw .snli..:ipi.llion uf llw .dul uf hislory ltMt will hriftg abuut a unit.uian subjecl. In bolh G1SCS takes place wilhin limits of a virlually monologue, and lhe individuals bl.'come the innt'r voicl's of cl univl'rs,ll suhj(\ct tu be realized in the future. This univl.'rscll subjl.'ct will .llso l.'ncompass lhe persons whu as yet are admillt'J only .lS ohjects 01 the dialogue and who taler will acquire the compl'tence necess.uy tu participate as autonomous subjecls in the course of the formatiun oi universal history. This does not 61t aU mean lhat Jidloglle is j" rt'llIity monologic and that it consists only of the monologue uf n'ason l'xcluding its Other; it simply relativizes the notions uf dialoguc and monolngue with regard to the level and to the tempr,,1 dimension o( communication. However, the metanarrativl.' apriori of dialogue, which confers a narrative structure on dialogic communircstion, is not in the Kantian sense but historieal in the sense uf Foucault's not ion of discourse (Foucault 19h6, 13 fL). 'fhe E"d of the Era Of Mt'tlllwrraljpt's: DiaJogue beyond Narrtioll? Since metanarratives of emancipation rder not to the past but to the future, they art' virtu4llly subjt'ct to (.llsifk.ltinn. And according to .Lyotard, falsification by history has taken place. For him all metanar ratives are rejected without exception. Like Adorno, he states that the speculative narration was refuted by Auschwitz, the capital.ist one by the economic crises of 1917, 1929, and 1974-79, the Marxjstdiscourse by the bluody crushing of the revolts in Hungary German Democratic Republic (1958), Czechoslovakia (1968), and l?eland (1982) (Lyot rd l'JH6, 5J). Olll' l'ulIld ,.dd lhe rdul.,tinn 01 the 1l'dlllusdl'n tific discourse by the increase of pollution and the accident oi Chernobyl (IY86).The progress oJ scientific and technical knowledge 'has not liberated human beings, but rather has subjugated them tu the necessities of technicill and economical reason, thus producing a further alienation instead of liberating mankind. In this situation the universal metanarratives of emancipation lose their credibility, a lss that fundamentalJy transforms the pragmatic conditions of the grand narratives. The subjects of the narration are no longer univerSell but are dispersed among many particular individuals. The fundamenteli ontological structure of dialogue that was bound to the narrative a priori breaks down. The You and the I of dialogue become particular instances, no Junger authorized tu speak in the name ot the ('mcuu.:ipation of mllnkind. Yc..'l lhe dcll'HitiUli.llioll of lhl' grdnd Ili.urdtiuns dcstruys lhe atmosphere surruunding and prutecling dialogue. Since there is no more authority to legitimize the sender and receiver, the presupposed metalanguage disseminates into a multiplicity oE particular autono mous languagcs. This has the consequence that an utterance belonging to one language wiJI be a victim of injustice through its exposition to another. The sequence of speech acts is no longer regulated: the initial contingency of the dialogie relation breaks through and also determines the concrete dialogic speech. The subjects of communication lose their universal character and are cut down tu particular voices among a multiplicity of others. dialogue is no longer synthesized by a consensus or a common metalanguage, no universal pragmatics can dose the gaps opening between the utterances. Dialogue no longer follows narrative scripts conforming to certain rules: rather, the laUer are incorporated into and made the objects of conversation itself. Thus they emphasize one element of narration, the t"'Vt"Plt that transforms the structure of dialogue itself, changing the rules of communication and allowing for the development of new codes and thus new ideas. In dialogue within the framework of the grand narratives, the rules preceded communication: now they are included in it. This is exactly the case Wittgenstein refers to: 11 And is there not also the case where we play 213 __ __ _______ . LiIL' ...lry Experiments with Dialogue ")_12 ________ ilnd m.IKL' IIp Ilw rull's as Wl' go .dung? And llwre is evell onL' wlll're wt. dlll'r tht.'1ll .I!'t \"l' gu '1Iong" (J lJ5H, ]9). In lhis case narmlion is not Itll' ., priori fr'lIlll'wurk ur di.lluglll'; il dOLos not l'ncomp.lssit as a tow.m.l .1 nt.'vlr-flilfilll'd idl.ll but r"llwr is indudl'd in di ..lloglll itsl,11. TIll.' n,l.llilm hl'l\vl'L'n di.llogUl ,lnd Ili:Hriltion ch.lrac ur llIodpmilV 10 ht' I'l'\'l'rsl'd: di.,luglll' is not Illgitilllall'd hy nolrr.lliun; r.IIIH'I', "01 ..... llioll 1.11-."", pl,u'l' in ., 1II "dolllH'lIlo.1 1lU'loldi "IUgLJL' or 1lll'1.lpolylogllL' 01 dilll'rl'nl 1.1Ilgu.lges UMt motiv.. llL' il. Lilerlltu rl' IhiS vl'ry ottcn tril'cJ to eSI.,hlish dialoglil' hy Cfe.lting new codL's tllld nl'W 1.1IlgU.lgl'S. Tlw nl'W 1.lIlguagl's l'ould corllJll'lls.lh..' tor thl' wrong dl. IW lu illl individlldl by tlw rllll' 01'.1 singll', monologic discoursl' bl'l"lllSl' IIll'Y proJUfl' nl'W mOVl'S, rn'll' nl'W 1,1Ilgllages that <:oulli l'xpress l'Il'nwnls rl'prl'ssl'd the Illonulogic coerdon. Perh.lps tlw surrl'.,listk C(HlCl'ptioll uf dilllogue eonstitult.*s dn extreme e,lS<.' of Ihe IW\V form uf tlw di.llogit..' fl'J.llion. In lhe first SlIrrc:alislic Iirl'loll lhlll slIrn',llism is abll' to reestablish dialogue 10 Ils truth, Il,.lving bl'llind illI obligation uf politencss. Thus lilwrateJ trorn pr.lgllMlic l'vl'ry individual lollows his own wilholll dr.,willg any di.lll'l'tic pll,.lslIrl' trolll it. In his tlt'linilioll 0' lnU' Brt'ltHl l'''plidlly viol.lhs 11H' tund.H1H"ll.,1 pn'misl' hv llwH' is nu t'lHll1ll01l tlll'lIwt thl' words 01 tlw l >t her just .IS .1 hll'pping-sloill' (or Ill'W "ppropri ,ltions and Cfl,.llivlmisundl'rst.lIldings. Thl' surrl'alistic diaJogue Lioes not C&lre .lbolll (hl.' uf the p.ulrll'rs; it pl:'rmits nll manner uf responslls .,nd tlll'fl'by the Cfl'dlinrl oj nl'W 1.1Ilgunge games. Thus surrl'alistic di.llogUl' inst.llls " nWl,ldi.,logie rdatiun tu thl:' l.mgllagl:' game 01 ntll-govc.flll'd .1I1d consc.'l1slIs-oril'ntl'd dialogul'. It makl:'s lransp.lrl'nt tlw llorms .lnd pn.supP')sitions uf univL'rsal praglmllics it l'alls into Bv hrl,.lking L1p thl' universnl pretL'nsions uf hu-c"lIl'd lll'lItr.ll ll\l't.,I.lIlglhlgl, il Illilkl's the Jalll'r lll'nmw one Idnguagl:' alllong oltll'rs, introdlldng it as a lllL're partner in a dialogue nn longl'r ruohd in .1 p".... itivl' Mr.md narmtion but hru\lnded in a J.;lnlrdl polylogut' or 1,1I1gU.lgl'S. This 'kind of Ji.IJoglW no longl'r counts on thL' possibility uf fuJl rl'pn'sL'llt.llion 01 UlW 0; thc p"rtnl'rs by tlw othL'r. By .1 common nl'utr.,1 nwt.,I.HlglJ.lgl' it Ilw l'undusion uf lhe itU'OJ1lllll'nSUra hility u( J,mgu.lgl g.anw"i .md 1.lIlgu,I).;l's. Ilowcvl:'r, thl:' "bSl'I\l'l:' uf i.l nl'utrllJ met,ll,mgu,lgl' dOl's not prl'vl'nt di.llogue, as Lyotard bdieves, from .. gr.lIld n.Hr.lliun. Nilturally, rdut.ltion of the gr,md n.lrrdlions ,lnd the J.tek oi a l'(unmnn metalanguagc to a prolifc.ration 0; gilllWS. Di.lluglllhccoml.'s n kind of !wmiotic DiaJoglie ;11 N"rmtilm "performance," or signiiying prilctice, tiMt develops its own codes through and by means of the communicative acts themselves. Also, the succcssion of different speech acts is no longer regul&lled by a priori ruJes; the rules are deveJoped throughout the oi the dialogue itself in time. Since thcre is no commlln rl:'gulating their tlw choke of speech j's ,.compltltely "rhilrary. Sinn' Olll' .lcl 1.lhll isdlOSL'1l nl'l'l'SS.uily injustke tu anotlwr, Lyot.uJ condudL's that lhe only guar.mlt.>e tur justice lies in the dissemination of the principle of continual recreation of Janguages and games. This prin.ciple, he claims, will compL'nsf.lte fur the injustiCl' th,ll thl:' choke of does to anothcr, because it supplies a guarantee tor lhe reallzatton ot a maximum of possible utterances. But does the postmodern condition reaJly pul an end to narration as structure and apriori of dialogue? Two comments can be made concerning this relation under the new circumstances Lyotilrd describes. My first point concerns narration as the structure of dialogic communication: every language game creating its own rules in the way mentioned abovL' can be considered pt,st festwll as a genre l'l.'rlain rull'S. IluWl'VL'r, tlll.'se rulL's .Ul' 10 bl.' construcll'd olt the end, i.md thl'Y do not stnll'turc cummuniClltiunin a way thc p,ulicipallts arc aware ur. Thus, postmodern signifying practicc bl'ing conlingent i" aetn can be interprcted by some rules constructed d posteriori. Hencea narrative structure can be conferred on diaJogic communication when the laUer has ceased. The only difference in the narrative structure of dialogue within the discourse of modernism resides in the pussibility of constructing st'veral rules and multiple narratives in co-occurrence wilh one another. This is the case for such astrange exnmple as surrealistic dialogue, which also functions according tn certain rules such as t:cholalies, differential repetition, dissemination of the thernc, or the possibility of choosing speech acts independent of any known rules. My sL'cond comment concerns narration as a historical apriori or regulative idea of dialogue. Indeed, the loss of legitimacy on the part of the grand narrativl:' anti the incommensurability and co-occurrence uf several languages du not prcvent Lyotard's alternative discurse ethics basL'd on the principlc ut dissemination from being Jegitimalcd bya kind of metanarrative. '1'0 have lhis new metanarrative serve as legitimation fur the postmodern ampJification of genres is no longer sustaincd by the realization of a potential aim ofhistory but rests on aprevention of it. The conclusion Lyotard draws from the fundamen 214 215 Literary Experiments with Dialogue tal hmsion bdwc..'c..'u lom).;lIol).;l' ).;.lml'S and the dissemination principle is gruunc..led UPOll ., nl'g.ltivl hislory. Tlw end of this history wouldbe a uniVl'rSoll l.ln).;lI.\).;,!, Orwl,lIiom Newspeak that has become real, quite indl'pl'nc..ll'nt oi wlll'tlwr il W,lS achieved by consensus or by l'oerdun. Thus, I.yot.lrd's nHlCl'pl uf dialogue as constantly trans).;rt:ssin).; ,md mudilyill).; ils own rull's dol's not prl'SUppOSl' tlw .lbulition 01 .. 11 .hlrr.llivl', hut .... tlwr clSSlIlIles tlwir Ill.,).;.ttivl' transfor matiun. Thc neg.ttivity of lhe klos changes the temporal form of ditllogic time by l'mphasizing lhe contingency of linguistic evenls. But still narrativl' rcmains wh.ll it has i\Jways been to dialoguc in the modl'rn l'poch: its tc..omporotl slruc..'lun ..' and historieal apriori. Refert'IIces M. IYHI. '1'11,' d;,II"S;" imll"':;'IIII;,,,,: I'CUtr t'SSlIIjS '/11 M. 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M. M. Bakhtin - 'Rabelais and Gogol - The Art of Discourse and The Popular Culture of Laughter', Mississippi Review, 11 (3), 'Essays Literary Criticism', 1983