METROBANK V. CABLIZ 510 SCRA 259 FACTS: Cablizo maintained an account with petitioner.

It drew a check payable to cash payable to a certain Marquez, for the latters sales commission. The check was subsequently deposited in Westmont bank and the latter submitted it with Metrobank for clearing. The check was cleared. Thereafter, the banks representative asked Cablizo if he issued a check for P91,000. The answer was in the negative. This prompted Cablizo to call Metrobank and ask for the recrediting of P90,000 but petitioner failed to recredit the amount prompting Cablizo to file an action against it. HELD: An alteration is said to be material if it alters the effect of the instrument. It means an unauthorized change in the instrument that purports to modify in any respect the obligation of a party or an unauthorized addition of words or numbers or other change to an incomplete instrument relating to the obligation of the party. In other words, a material alteration is one which changes the items which are required to be stated under Section 1 of the NIL. The check in issue was materially altered when its amount was increased from P1000 to P91000. Cablizo was not the one who authorized or made such increase. There is no showing that he was negligent in exercising what was due in a prudent man which could have otherwise prevented the loss. Cablizo was never remiss in the preparation and issuance of the check. The doctrine of equitable estoppel is inapplicable against Cablizo. This doctrine states that when one of the two innocent person, each guiltiness of an intentional or moral wrong, must suffer a loss, it must be borne by the one whose erroneous conduct, either by omission or commission, was the cause of the injury. Negligence is never presumed. Metrobank was actually the one remiss in its duties. The CA took into consideration that the alterations were actually visible in the eye and yet the bank allowed someone not acquainted with the examination of checks to do the same. Furthermore, it cannot rely on the indorsement of Westmont Bank of the check. It should have exercised meticulous care in handling the affairs of its clients especially if the clients money is involved.

PLDT vs CA FACTS The Estebans jeep ran over a mound of earth and fell into an open trench, an excavation undertaken by PLDT for the installation of its underground conduit system. Mr. Esteban failed to notice the open trench which was left uncovered because of the darkness and the lack of any warning light or signs. The Estebans allegedly sustained injuries. PLDT, denies liability on the contention that the injuries sustained by the spouses Esteban were the result of their own negligence and that the entity which should beheld responsible, Barte an independent contractor which undertook the construction. The lower court ruled in favor of the Esteban, However the CA found that the relationship of Barte and PLDT should be viewed in the light of the contract between them and under the independent contractor rule, PLDT is not liable for the acts of an independent contractor. But still CA affirmed the decision of the trial court. ISSUE Whether or not PLDT is liable for the injuries sustained by the Estebans.. RULING The accident which befell the Estebans was due to the lack of diligence of respondent Antonio Esteban and was not imputable to negligent omission on the part of PLDT. The accident was not due to the absence of warning signs, but to the unexplained abrupt swerving of the jeep from the inside lane. That may explain plaintiff-husbands insistence that he did not see the ACCIDENT MOUND for which reason he ran into it. The jeep was running at 25 km an hour. At that speed, he could have braked the vehicle the moment it struck the ACCIDENT MOUND. The jeep would not have climbed the said mound several feet as indicated by the tire marks. The jeep must have been running quite fast. Mr. Esteban had not exercised the diligence of a good father of a family to avoid the accident. The negligence of Antonio Esteban was not only contributory to his injuries and those of his wife but goes to the very cause of the occurrence of the accident, as one of its determining factors, and thereby precludes their right to recover damages. The presence of warning signs could not have completely prevented the accident; the only purpose of said signs was to inform and warn the public of the presence of excavation on the site. The Estebans already knew of the presence of said excavations. It was not the lack of knowledge of these excavations which caused the jeep of the Estebans to fall into the excavation but the unexplained sudden swerving of the jeep from the inside lane towards the accident mound. Furthermore, Antonio Esteban had the last clear chance or opportunity to avoid the accident. A person claiming damages for the negligence of another has the burden of proving the existence of such fault or negligence causative thereof. The facts constitutive of

AIR FRANCE VS. CARRASCOSO 18 SCRA 155

FACTS Respondent Rafael Carrascoso, a civil engineer, was a member of a group of 48 Flilipino pilgrims that left Manila for Lourdes. Petitioner Air France though it authorized agent, Philippine Airlines, Inc. issued to Carrascoso a first class round trip airplane ticket from Manila to Rome. From Manila to Bangkok, Carrascoso travelled in first class but at Bangkok the Manager of Air France forced Carrascoso out of his seat because as alleged by the Manager, there was a white man who has a better right to the seat. Carrascoso refused to vacate and commotion had started. Many Filipino passengers got nervous in the tourist class and after they had found out that Carrascoso was having a hot discussion, they pacified the latter to give his seat. Reluctantly, respondent Carrascoso gave his first class seat in the plane. Thus, he was constrained to file a case before the CFI of Manila, which sentenced the petitioner to pay the respondent P25,000 by way of moral damages, P10,000 as exemplary damages, P393.20 representing the difference in fare between first class and tourist class and P3000 for attorney's fees. The CA affirmed the decision of the CFI but slightly reduced the amount of refund to Carroscoso. ISSUE Whether or not Carrascoso is entitled to damages? RULING Yes. The manager not only prevented Carrascoso from enjoying his right to a first class seat. Worse, he imposed his arbitrary will, he forcibly ejected him from his seat, made him suffer the humiliation of having to go to the tourist class compartment just to give way to another passenger whose right thereto has not been established. Certainly, this is bad faith . Unless, of course, bad faith has assumed a meaning different from what is understood in law. For bad faith contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or with some motive of self-interest or ill will or for ulterior purpose. Passengers do not contract merely for transportation. They have a right to be treated by the carrier's employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and due consideration. They are entitled to be protected against personal misconduct, injurious language, indignities and abuses from such employees. So it is, that any rule or discourteous conduct on the part of employees towards a passenger gives the latter an action for damages against the carrier. Petitioner's contract with Carrascoso is one attended with public duty. The stress of Carrascoso's action as stated is placed upon his wrongful expulsion. This is a violation of public duty by the petitioner air carrier a case of quasidelict. Damages are proper. The responsibility of an employer for the tortious act of it employees need not be essayed. It is well settled in law. For willful malevolent act of petitioner's manager, petitioner, his employees must answer. The court held that the New Civil Code gives the court ample power to grant exemplary damages in contract and quasi-contracts. The only condition is that defendant should have acted in wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner. The manner of ejectment of respondent Carrascoso from his first class seat fits into his legal precept. The right to attorney's fee is fully established. The grant of exemplary damages justifies a similar judgment for attorney's fee. The least that can be said is that the courts below felt that it is just and equitable that attorney's fees be given.

CANTRE vs. SPS. GO 522 SCRA 547 Petitioner Dr. Milagros Cantre is a specialist in Obstetrics and Gynecology at the Dr. Jesus Delgado Memorial Hospital. She was the attending physician of respondent Nora S. Go, who gave birth to her fourth child. However, Nora suffered profuse bleeding inside her womb due to some parts of the placenta which were not completely expelled from her womb after delivery. Consequently, Nora suffered hypovolemic shock, resulting in a drop in her blood pressure. While petitioner was massaging Noras uterus for it to contract and stop bleeding, she ordered a droplight to warm Nora and her baby. Nora remained unconscious until she recovered. In the recovery room, her husband, respondent John David Z. Go noticed a fresh gaping wound in the inner portion of her left arm, close to the armpit. When he asked about it, he was informed it was a burn. Consequently, John David filed a request for investigation. The medical director of the hospital, called petitioner and the assisting resident physician to explain what happened. Petitioner said the blood pressure cuff caused the injury. Later, John David brought Nora to the National Bureau of Investigation for a physical examination, which the medico-legal officer testified that Noras injury appeared to be a burn and that the droplight might have caused it and that the wound was not caused by a blood pressure cuff. Nora later went through skin grafting and skin revision which were shouldered by the hospital. However, Nora's aram cannot be restores as the pain in her arms remains. Thus the respondent spouses filed a complaint for damages. The trial court ruled in favor of the spouses. On appeal, CA affirmed with modification the trial court decision. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denies, thus this petition.. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners are liable for the injury suffered by Nora Go.

RULING Yes. The Hippocratic Oath mandates physicians to give primordial consideration to the well-being of their patients. If a doctor fails to live up to this precept, he is accountable for his acts. This notwithstanding, courts face a unique restraint in adjudicating medical negligence cases because physicians are not guarantors of care and, they never set out to intentionally cause injury to their patients. However, intent is immaterial in negligence cases because where negligence exists and is proven, it automatically gives the injured a right to reparation for the damage caused. In cases involving medical negligence, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur allows the mere existence of an injury to justify a presumption of negligence on the part of the person who controls the instrument causing the injury, provided that the following requisites concur: 1. The accident is of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someones negligence; 2. It is caused by an instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant or defendants; and 3. The possibility of contributing conduct which would make the plaintiff responsible is eliminated. As to the first requirement, the gaping wound on Noras arm is certainly not an ordinary occurrence in the act of delivering a baby, far removed as the arm is from the organs involved in the process of giving birth. Such injury could not have happened unless negligence had set in somewhere. Second, whether the injury was caused by the droplight or by the blood pressure cuff is of no moment. Both instruments are deemed within the exclusive control of the physician in charge under the "captain of the ship" doctrine. This doctrine holds the surgeon in charge of an operation liable for the negligence of his assistants during the time when those assistants are under the surgeons control. In this particular case, it can be logically inferred that petitioner, the senior consultant in charge during the delivery of Noras baby, exercised control over the assistants assigned to both the use of the droplight and the taking of Noras blood pressure. Hence, the use of the droplight and the blood pressure cuff is also within petitioners exclusive control. Third, the gaping wound on Noras left arm, by its very nature and considering her condition, could only be caused by something external to her and outside her control as she was unconscious while in hypovolemic shock.. Hence, Nora could not, by any stretch of the imagination, have contributed to her own injury.

SICAM vs. JORGE G.R. No. 159617 August 8, 2007 FACTS Lulu Jorge pawned several pieces of jewelry with Agencia de R. C. Sicam to secure a loan. On October 19, 1987, two armed men entered the pawnshop and took away whatever cash and jewelry were found inside the pawnshop vault. Sicam sent respondent Lulu a letter informing her of the loss of her jewelry due to the robbery incident in the pawnshop. Respondent Lulu expressed disbelief stating that when the robbery happened, all jewelry pawned were deposited with Far East Bank near the pawnshop since it had been the practice that before they could withdraw, advance notice must be given to the pawnshop so it could withdraw the jewelry from the bank. Respondent Lulu then requested petitioner Sicam to prepare the pawned jewelry for withdrawal on but petitioner Sicam failed to return the jewelry. Respondent Lulu is seeking indemnification for the loss of pawned jewelry and payment of damages. Petitioner is interposing the defense of caso fortuito on the robber committed against the pawnshop. ISSUE Whether or not Sicam is liable for the loss of the pawned articles in their possession. RULING Fortuitous events by definition are extraordinary events not foreseeable or avoidable. It is therefore, not enough that the event should not have been foreseen or anticipated, as is commonly believed but it must be one impossible to foresee or to avoid. The mere difficulty to foresee the happening is not impossibility to foresee the same. Robbery per se, just like carnapping, is not a fortuitous event. It does not foreclose the possibility of negligence on the part of herein petitioners. A review of the records clearly shows that petitioners failed to exercise reasonable care and caution that an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation. Petitioners were guilty of negligence in the operation of their pawnshop business. No sufficient precaution and vigilance were adopted by petitioners to protect the pawnshop from unlawful intrusion.. There was no clear showing that there was any security guard at all. Sicams admission that the vault was open at the time of robbery is clearly a proof of petitioners failure to observe the care, precaution and vigilance that the circumstances justly demanded. Petitioner Sicam testified that once the pawnshop was open, the combination was already off. Instead of taking the precaution to protect them, they let open the vault, providing no difficulty for the robbers to cart away the pawned articles. In contrast, the robbery in this case took place in 1987 when robbery was already prevalent and petitioners in fact had already foreseen it as they wanted to deposit the pawn with a nearby bank for safekeeping. Moreover, unlike in Austria, where no negligence was committed, we found petitioners negligent in securing their pawnshop as earlier discussed.

ONG vs METROPOLITAN WATER DISTRICT FACTS

Metropolitan Water District owns and operates 3 swimming pools in Balara, QC.In July 5, 1952, Dominador Ong, 14, went with his brothers to the pool.. Between 4:40-4:45, some boys noticed him swimming underwater for a long time. The lifeguard Manuel Abao was then informed and he immediately jumped and retrieved the apparently lifeless body of Ong from the bottom. They exerted efforts to revive him but the boy died. ISSUE Whether or not the death of the Ong can be attributed to the negligence of defendant and/or its employees so as to entitle plaintiff to recover damages.

RULING No. The spouses Ong who were claiming for damages had the burden of proving that the damage is caused by the fault or negligence of MWD or one of its employees and were not able to do so. The operator of swimming pools will not be held liable for the drowning or death of a patron if said operator had exercised due diligence in the selection of and supervision over, its employees and that it had observed the diligence required by law under the circumstances - in that it had taken all necessary precautions to avoid danger to the lives of its patrons or prevent accident which may cause their death. In this case, there is sufficient evidence to show that MWD had taken all necessary precautions:1.Swimming pools are equipped with ring buoy, toy roof, towing line, oxygen resuscitator and first aid medicine kit.2.Bottom of pool is painted w/ black colors to insure clear visibility.3.Rules and regulations governing use of pools are on display at conspicuous places.4.6 trained and proficient lifeguards were employed and are on duty two at a time.5.A male nurse and sanitary inspector were employed.6.There is a clinic provided with oxygen resuscitator.7.Security guards are always available. The employees of MWD also did everything possible to bring the boy to life.. Abao gave him manual artificial respirator, the nurse and sanitary inspector injected camphorated oil and applied oxygen resuscitator, a doctor was sent for. All of these show that MWD has done what is humanly possible under the circumstances to restore life to Ong and for that reason it is unfair to hold it liable for his death. Lastly, the Doctrine of last clear chance can never apply where the party charged is required to act instantaneously and if the injury cannot be avoided by the application of all means at hand after the peril is and should have been discovered.