Kirch Heim 6

Kirchheimer-Edition
Herausgegeben von Hubertus Buchstein 6
Hochstein | Schale [Hrsg.]
Otto Kirchheimer –
Gesammelte Schriften
Band 6:
Politische Analysen für das OSS und
Department of State
Nomos
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845290027
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Herausgegeben von Prof. Dr. Hubertus Buchstein,
Universität Greifswald
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845290027
Otto Kirchheimer, ca. 1928
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845290027
Kirchheimer-Edition
Band 6:
Politische Analysen für das OSS und
Department of State
Herausgegeben von Henning Hochstein und Dr. Frank Schale

unter Mitarbeit von Henning Hochstein, Lisa Klingsporn,
Moritz Langfeldt, Merete Peetz und Eike Christian Schmieder
Nomos
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845290027
Gedruckt mit Unterstützung der Deutschen Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG; BU 1035/8-1).
Die Deutsche Nationalbibliothek verzeichnet diese Publikation in

der Deutschen Nationalbibliografie; detaillierte bibliografische
Daten sind im Internet über http://dnb.d-nb.de abrufbar.
ISBN 978-3-8487-4736-8 (Print)
ISBN 978-3-8452-9002-7 (ePDF)
1. Auflage 2021
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https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845290027
5
Inhalt
Einleitung zu diesem Band 7
[1.] The Abrogation of Nazi Laws in the Early Period of MG

[1944] 155
[2.] Administration of German Criminal Justice under Military
Government [1944] 183
[3.] General Principles of Administration and Civil Service in
Germany [1944] 225
[4.] Civil Affairs Handbook Germany Section 3: Legal Affairs
[1944] 245
[5.] The General Character of a Future German Government
[1946] 340
[6.] Current Political Tendencies in Germany Bearing on Its
Future Governmental Structure [1946] 350
[7.] A Constitution for the Fourth Republic [1947] 357
[8.] The Refugee Problem in Western Germany [1949] 426
[9.] Communist Strength in the Trade-Union Organizations of
Western Europe [1950] 443
[10.] The State of East Germany 1949 – 1950 [1950] 457
[11.] The Status of Labor in East Germany, 1951 [1951] 473
[12.] Prospects for the Development of Control Measures Against
the Communist Parties of Western Europe [1951] 494
[13.] The Current Status of the Socialist Unity Party (SED) in
Eastern Germany [1952] 506
[14.] Communist Influence in Sensitive Positions in Western
Europe [1952] 515
[15.] Implications of Chancellor Adenauer’s Removal from the
German Political Scene [1952] 529
[16.] Higher Education in East Germany [1952] 534
[17.] Probable Course of German Constitutional Court Crisis
[1952] 551
[18.] The West German Election Campaign [1953] 556
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6
[19.] Austria Attempts Independent Foreign Policy [1953] 568

[20.] The West German Bundestag Elections of 1953 [1953] 574
Abkürzungen 599
Otto Kirchheimers Schriften im amerikanischen

Nachrichtendienst 605
Personenregister 609
Sachregister 613
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7
Einleitung zu diesem Band
von
Henning Hochstein & Frank Schale
1. Die Research and Analysis Branch im Office of Strategic Services 9

2. Die Bedeutung der R&A-Studien für die Civil Affairs Division 25
3. Das Civil Affairs Handbook Germany: Legal Affairs 39
4. Vorschläge zur Nachkriegsplanung im besetzten Deutschland 46
4.1. Die unmittelbare Aufhebung der nationalsozialistischen Gesetz‐
gebung 47
4.2. Die Verwaltung der Strafjustiz unter der Militärregierung 56
4.3. Die Leitlinien der Nachkriegsverwaltung in Deutschland 59
5. R&A im State Department 63
5.1. Eine Erfolgsgeschichte geht zu Ende 63
5.2. Truman und Smith 68
5.3. Keine neue Heimat für Research and Analysis 71
5.4. Otto Kirchheimer im State Department 78
6. Anmerkungen zur alliierten Besatzungspolitik und zum deutschen
Wiederaufbau 88
7. Der Kampf um die französische Verfassung 96
8. Betrachtungen über das besetzte Deutschland 104
9. Beobachtungen des ostdeutschen Staates 109
10. Gegen die westeuropäischen Kommunisten 119
11. Das politische Leben der jungen BRD 126
12. Vorüberlegungen zur »catch-all«-Partei? 137
13. Zur österreichischen Außenpolitik 139
14. Editorische Hinweise 142
Dieser sechste und letzte Band der Gesammelten Schriften von Otto
Kirchheimer mit dem Titel Politische Analysen für das OSS und Depart-
ment of State beinhaltet jene Arbeiten, die Kirchheimer im Rahmen
seiner Tätigkeiten für die US-amerikanische Regierung zwischen 1944
und 1953 verfasst hat. Die thematischen Schwerpunkte entsprechen
nicht immer den persönlichen Interessen Kirchheimers; denn auch
wenn im OSS noch einige Studien auf die Initiative einzelner Analys-
ten zurückzuführen waren, blieb er über diese Jahre hinweg Weisungs-
empfänger und hatte im Allgemeinen Fragen zu beantworten, die von
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8 Einleitung zu diesem Band
militärischer und ziviler Seite an die Geheimdienstorganisationen her-

angetragen wurden. Seine Reports dienten zunächst der US-amerika-
nischen Militärregierung in Deutschland und dem Militär, später wid-
mete er sich im Auftrag des US-Außenministeriums den westlichen
Besatzungszonen, der jungen Bundesrepublik, der DDR, Österreich
und den westeuropäischen kommunistischen Parteien. Als Experte für
Deutschland und dessen Rechtssystem konnte Kirchheimer seinen Auf-
traggebern zunächst das nationalsozialistische Erbe im deutschen Jus-
tizwesen darlegen. Nach erfolgter Besatzung verschob sich der Fokus
seiner Analysen auf die innenpolitischen Dynamiken und zu erwar-
tenden politischen Entwicklungen im westlichen Teil des besetzten
Deutschlands. Diese Blickrichtung behalten seine Reports auch nach
Gründung der Bundesrepublik. Seine DDR-Analysen stellen dagegen
einen Blick hinter den Vorhang der Propaganda dar und können im
Zusammenhang als eine kleine Geschichte der Sowjetisierung der DDR
gelesen werden. Eine gewisse Ausnahme in diesem Band stellt A Con-
stitution for the Fourth Republic von 1947 dar, der ohne Autorenangabe
als selbstständige Schrift erschien und Kirchheimers stetes Interesse an
der politischen Entwicklung in Frankreich dokumentiert.
Von einer Rezeption im akademischen Sinne kann bei den in diesen
Band aufgenommenen Texten keine Rede sein. Kirchheimers Reports
sind für den US-amerikanischen Regierungs- und Geheimdienstappa-
rat entstanden und dort auch verblieben. Eine Schwierigkeit bei der
Zusammenstellung dieses Bandes ist in der Tatsache begründet, dass
es eine Menge weiterer Reports gibt, die sich zwar mehr oder weniger
eindeutig Kirchheimer zuordnen lassen könnten, aber in den Archiven
nur noch dem Titel nach auffindbar sind. Auf dieses Problem wird im
Anhang dieses Bandes im Zusammenhang mit der dort befindlichen
Auflistung seiner Schriften für die US-amerikanischen Regierungsbe-
hörden noch einmal aufmerksam gemacht. Bisherige Publikationen sol-
cher Texte Kirchheimers erfolgten aufgrund des Interesses der jeweili-
gen Herausgeber an der deutschen akademischen Emigration oder der
Kritischen Theorie der Frankfurter Schule.
Den im Vorwort des Herausgebers zum ersten Band erläuterten Prinzi-
pien dieser Edition entsprechend erscheinen die in diesen Band aufge-
nommenen Texte in chronologischer Reihenfolge. Die Einleitung grup-
piert die Texte demgegenüber anhand thematischer Gesichtspunkte,
weil sich auf diese Weise die Themenkonjunktur unter Kirchheimers
Auftraggebern besser nachvollziehen lässt. In der vorliegenden Einlei-
tung werden Kirchheimers biographische Umstände nur mehr angeris-
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sen, da sie bereits in den Bänden zwei und fünf ausführlich dargelegt
wurden.
Stattdessen widmet sich diese Einleitung stärker dem institutionellen
Kontext, in dem Kirchheimer sich bewegt hat. Es wird zunächst die
Geschichte der Research and Analysis Branch (R&A) im Office for Stra-
tegic Services (OSS) beleuchtet (1) und danach der Beitrag der R&A-
Abteilung zu den Studien der Civil‐Affairs‐Division (CAD) dargelegt
(2). Im Anschluss stellen wir die Arbeiten für die Legal Affairs des Civil
Affairs Handbook über Deutschland für die US-amerikanische Militärre-
gierung vor (3), bevor die Analysen zur Nachkriegsplanung im besetz‐
ten Deutschland (4) eingeführt werden. Im Anschluss daran werden
der Transfer der R&A-Abteilung in das State Department und Kirch-
heimers weitere Karriere in der R&A rekonstruiert (5). Darauf folgt
die weitere inhaltliche Vorstellung seiner Arbeiten zur alliierten Besat-
zungspolitik (6) sowie die Einordnung seiner Monographie zum Kampf
um die Verfassungsordnung der vierten Französischen Republik. Im
Anschluss werden seine weiteren Arbeiten im State Department über
die besetzte Bundesrepublik (7), die Neuorganisation des ostdeutschen
Staates (8), den Kampf gegen die Kommunisten Westeuropas sowie das
politische Leben der jungen Bundesrepublik (9) und schließlich seine
Analyse der österreichischen Außenpolitik von 1953 (10) erläutert. Der
letzte inhaltliche Abschnitt widmet sich noch einmal gesondert der
Frage nach Kirchheimers Vorüberlegungen zur »catch-all party« (11).
Ihren Abschluss findet diese Einleitung im letzten Abschnitt (12) mit
editorischen Hinweisen für diesen Band.
1. Die Research and Analysis Branch im Office of Strategic Services
Die Charakteristik des hier versammelten Materials liegt in seinem

nachrichtendienstlichen Charakter. Es handelt sich um Textsorten, die
für den internen Gebrauch im US-amerikanischen Verwaltungsappa-
rat und keine akademische, politische oder allgemeine Öffentlichkeit
geschrieben wurden. Viele Texte wurden nach internen oder exter-
nen Anordnungen verfasst, mitunter von wechselnden Autorenteams
geschrieben und durchliefen ein politisch-administratives Auswahl-
und Prüfungsverfahren. Entsprechend ist in der Forschung immer wie-
der darauf hingewiesen worden, dass eine exakte Zuordnung zu einem
bestimmten Autor kaum möglich sei. Zugleich lässt sich – sofern die
Aktenlage es zulässt – der administrative Prozess durchaus rekonstru-
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ieren, so dass zumindest die jeweiligen Beteiligten an einem Text ermit-

telt werden können (Katz 1989; Marquardt-Bigman 1995). Jedoch selbst
dort, wo der Autor identifiziert wurde, müssen die hier versammelten
Analysen als strategische Texte gelesen werden, die den Anforderun-
gen administrativer und militärischer Disziplin entsprechen sollten –
in den Worten des Historikers und R&A-Veteranen Arthur M. Schlesin-
ger: »There should be no personal pronouns, no wisecracks, no slang or
cliches, and care should be taken about the use of color words such as
›reactionary,‹ ›progressive,‹ ›left or right,‹ etc.« (zitiert nach: Smith 1983:
362). Doch diese eingeforderte, fast schon szientistische Zurückhaltung
war keineswegs durchgängige Praxis. Die angestellten Wissenschaftler
arbeiteten zwar in Wortwahl und Diktion den Vorgaben entgegen, ver-
suchten aber die eigene Position zu bemänteln. Das wurde jedoch nicht
selten sowohl vom internen Review Board als auch den anderen Abtei-
lungen inner- und außerhalb der R&A erkannt. Das Neutralitätsgebot
der nachrichtendienstlichen Abteilung folgte der Absicht ihres Leiters
William L. Langer. Er nahm an, dass die Forschungsabteilung nur dann
Bestand haben könne, wenn sie für ihre Analysen sowohl im OSS als
auch in der US-amerikanischen Administration genügend Kunden für
sich gewinne. Daher sei es unerlässlich, dass die Analysten das eigene
Erkenntnisinteresse und die jeweiligen politischen Vorlieben hinter das
Interesse der Forschungsabteilung als Ganzes stellen. Die entsprechen-
den Bedingungen der nachrichtendienstlichen Arbeit in der R&A fasst
der Historiker Bradley Smith wie folgt zusammen:
»There were three cardinal principles. First, the ›objective and neu-
tral‹ report preparation procedure, including full regard for the team
method and close supervisorial control, had to be followed by all R.
and A. personnel whether they were in the Library of Congress or
Istanbul. Second, the production of strategic intelligence reports in
Washington had to be accepted as the raison d'etre of R. and A., and
every dispersal of R. and A. personnel that cut into the production of
these reports was to be avoided. Third, all R. and A. people, even those
immediately subordinate to O.S.S. or army commanders in the field,
had to recognize that they were primarily Langer's people and their
chief duty was to R. and A. Washington« (Smith 1983: 368).
Eine institutionelle Kontextualisierung der vorliegenden Studien
dämpft falsche Erwartungen, wie sie sich in wissenschaftsgeschicht-
lichen Darstellungen, der persönlichen Erinnerungsliteratur oder in
historischen Sachbüchern finden. Aus unterschiedlichen Gründen nei-
gen deren Autoren zu einer Überschätzung des Beitrags der Analyti-
ker innerhalb des OSS. Insbesondere die Vorstellung, hier seien nam-
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hafte Vertreter der Frankfurter Schule für die Vereinigten Staaten in

den Krieg gezogen und hätten die im Schutz des Instituts für Sozial-
forschung elaborierten Theorien über den totalitären Monopolkapitalis-
mus in die Praxis der nachrichtendienstlichen Arbeit gewendet, so als
wäre »der linkshegelianische Weltgeist vorübergehend in der Mitteleu‐
ropäischen Abteilung des OSS angesiedelt« (Herz 1984: 136), muss als
retrospektive Idealisierung begriffen werden. Dies betrifft zunächst die
pauschalisierende Zuordnung von Franz L. Neumann und Otto Kirch-
heimer zur »Frankfurter Gruppe«1. Mit solchen kollektiven Zuordnun-
gen werden ihre Positionen am und Spannungen im Institut für Sozi-
alforschung eingeebnet. Zudem übersieht eine nur am Gestaltwandel
kritischer Gesellschaftstheorie orientierte Perspektive die Heterogenität
der an der R&A-Branch vertretenen Positionen und die damit verbun-
denen Konflikte zwischen den jeweiligen Sachverständigen, die Kom-
plexität der Entscheidungsfindung in der US-amerikanischen Kriegs-
und Nachkriegspolitik und schließlich den wissenschaftssoziologischen
Unterschied zwischen Experten und Intellektuellen. Die Annahme, in
den frühen 1940er Jahren hätten US-amerikanische Regierungsstellen
»raffinierte, von emigrierten Intellektuellen durchdachte Gesellschafts-
analysen des Feindeslandes [finanziert], mit denen man hoffte, den
Krieg siegreich führen und danach das besiegte Land sinnvoll umge-
stalten zu können« (Claussen 2007: 15), überschätzt die randständige
Funktion der angestellten Experten und unterschätzt den politischen
Entscheidungsfindungsprozess im US-amerikanischen Verwaltungsap-
parat. Die Arbeit der Rechts-, Politik- und Sozialwissenschaftler im OSS
kann zwar als eine bestimmte Form der politischen Praxis verstanden
werden, es war jedoch nicht ihre Aufgabe, politische Empfehlungen zu
geben. Hierzu waren sie nicht befugt.
Das Office of Strategic Services war ein Produkt der britisch-US-ameri-
kanischen Kooperation im Zweiten Weltkrieg. Anders als in Großbri-
tannien, wo bereits seit 1909 mit der Gründung des Secret Service
Bureau und des Auslandsgeheimdienstes Secret Intelligence Service
(SIS) geheimdienstliche Stellen existierten, verfügten die USA bis zu
Kriegsbeginn über keinen zentralisierten Geheim- und Nachrichten-
dienst. Nicht zufällig wurde deren Ausbau von jenen forciert, die
im Isolationismus und in der Appeasement-Politik eine verheerende
Strategie gegen den Aufstieg des nationalsozialistischen Deutschlands
1 So etwa bei Raffaele Laudani und Axel Honneth. Die Formulierung findet sich in
Barry Katz‘ Aufsatz »The criticism of arms. The Frankfurt School goes to war«,
jedoch zeigt er in seiner Monografie die Komplexität und Kontroversität der
Arbeit in der Forschungsabteilung des OSS.
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sahen und sich für eine militärische Partnerschaft der beiden Staaten
aussprachen. Die Geschichtsschreibung zum OSS hat dabei auf zwei
maßgebliche Promotoren hingewiesen: auf US-amerikanischer Seite
den im Ersten Weltkrieg hochdekorierten republikanischen Wallstreet-
Anwalt William J. Donovan, der sich bereits in der Zwischenkriegszeit
als Privatmann nachrichtendienstlich engagierte, und auf britischer
Seite das spätere James-Bond-Vorbild William S. Stephenson (Hyde
1962; Brown 1982; Dunlop 1982; Troy 1981; Troy 1996). Voraussetzung
einer britisch-US-amerikanischen nachrichtendienstlichen Zusammen-
arbeit war die Schaffung eines zentralen US-amerikanischen Geheim-
dienstes, die Donovan erfolgreich mit der propagandistischen Inszenie-
rung einer drohenden nazistischen Unterwanderung der US-amerika-
nischen Gesellschaft forcierte (Donovan/Mowrer 1940).2
Das OSS3 war nicht der erste Geheimdienst der Vereinigten Staaten;
auch die Marine, die Armee, das Außenministerium und das FBI ver-
fügten über nachrichtendienstliche Abteilungen. Was diesen Abteilun-
gen fehlte, war eine umfassende Abstimmung der nachrichtendienstli-
chen Erkenntnisse. Diese sollte mit der nur kurzlebigen Vorgängerorga-
nisation des OSS erreicht werden: Am 11. Juli 1941 wurde Donovan
zum Coordinator of Information (COI) berufen. Obwohl die entspre-
chende Presidential Order dem ausschließlich Roosevelt unterstellten
Donovan umfangreiche Kompetenzen übertrug – Sammlung und Ana-
lyse aller Informationen und Daten zur nationalen Sicherheit, Einset-
zung von Ausschüssen aus geeigneten Vertretern verschiedener Abtei-
lungen und Agenturen der Regierung sowie Einstellung des dafür not-
wendigen erforderlichen Personals –, blieben Auftrag, innere Organisa-
tion und institutionelle Einbindung eher vage. Entscheidend war, dass
die Kompetenzen des COI auf keinen Fall »interfere with or impair the
duties and responsibilities of the regular military and naval advisers of
2 Das Vorwort zu dieser Broschüre verfasste Roosevelts republikanischer Mari-

neminister Frank Knox. Die erfolgreiche deutsche Außen- und Kriegspolitik
erklären sich die Autoren mit der ausgemachten psychologischen Kriegsführung
der Nationalsozialisten, dessen »minuteness and vastness of its muliple orga-
nizations« (Ebenda: 13) sowie der permanenten Mobilisierung der deutschen
Gesellschaft sowie einer millionenfachen fünften Kolonne in den USA. Entspre-
chend fordern Donovan und der Pulitzer‐Preisträger Mowrer »to study and
combat the entire Nazi Auslandsorganization«. Es ist dieser geheimdienstliche
Zugriff, den auch Knox in seinem Vorwort interessiert; vgl. MacDonnell (1995).
3 Die Literatur zum OSS sowie zu dessen Unterabteilungen und einzelnen operati-
ven Einsätzen ist nicht mehr zu übersehen: Casey (1988); Chalou (2002); Mauch
(1999); Persico (1979); Pinck/Jones/Pinck (2000); Roosevelt (1976); Rudgers (2000);
Smith (1983); Smith (1972); Troy (1981).
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the President as Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy« (zitiert

nach: Troy 1981: 423).
Offiziell standen beim COI drei nachrichtendienstliche Branches im
Zentrum: die Radio News Branch, die Research and Analysis Branch
und die Visual Presentation Branch. Hinzu kam der operative Bereich
der Special Activities, die zur Geheimdienstinfiltration, Subversion,
Sabotage sowie Bildung von Widerstands- und Guerillaaktivitäten die-
nen sollten. Zudem begann das COI damit, in London ein entsprechen-
des Büro aufzubauen.4
Abb. 1: Organisation des Coordinatorr of Information

9
Abb. 1: Organisation des Coordinatorr of Information

Das Radio News Branch, bald als Foreign Information Service (FIS)
reorganisiert, diente als Nachrichten- und Presseagentur, nachrichten-
dienstliche Abteilung und Propaganda- bzw. Gegenpropagandaabtei-
lung. Diese durchaus widersprüchlichen Aufgaben des FIS führten
rasch zu Spannungen, die sich durch persönliche Konflikte zwischen
dem Weltkriegsveteran Donovan und dem Leiter des FIS, dem Schrift-
steller Robert Sherwood, verschärften. Ihren sachlichen Grund hatte
der Streit in der Frage, wie der FIS propagandistisch vorgehen sollte:
Als überzeugter Liberaler wollte Sherwood von den »schmutzigen«
4 Zur organisatorischen Struktur des COI: vgl. Roosevelt (1976: 29-92).
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Geschäften schwarzer Propaganda, also der bewussten Fehlinforma-

tion, nichts wissen. Entsprechend schuf er 1942 den wichtigsten Nach-
richtensender der USA weißer Propaganda: die »Voice of America«
(Winkler 1978; Shulman 1990; Laurie 1996). Zudem kollidierten die
Aktivitäten des FIS in Lateinamerika mit denen des Office of the Coor-
dinator of Inter-American Affairs (OCIIA), einer 1940/41 nach präsiden-
tiellem Erlass gegründeten panamerikanischen Agentur zur Verbesse-
rung der Handels- und Kulturbeziehungen, die stark propagandistisch
in jene Staaten abzielen sollte.5 Solche internen und externen Auseinan-
dersetzungen trugen zur Auflösung und Restrukturierung des COI bei.
Hingegen wertete die R&A, geleitet von dem Harvard-Historiker James
P. Baxter III, öffentliche und klassifizierte Quellen aus. Hierbei han-
delte es sich um politische, ökonomische, soziologische, geografische
und kulturelle Analysen, die als Hintergrundinformationen zur militä-
rischen oder strategischen Planung dienten. Thematisch beschäftigte
sich die R&A mit der Analyse des militärischen Feindes, der operativen
Planung, den zu erwartenden diplomatischen Problemen sowie später
mit Fragen des Wiederaufbaus und dem politischen und juristischen
Umgang mit den besiegten Gegnern. Hierzu kooperierten ein Groß-
teil der Wissenschaftler, die der Division of Special Information (DSI)
zugeordnet waren, frühzeitig mit der Library of Congress. Dass die
DSI nach bestimmten Kriegsschauplätzen strukturiert war, während
andere Divisions der R&A funktional organisiert wurden (Economics
Division, Geographic Division, Psychology Division), führte zwangs-
läufig schnell zu Friktionen.
Das Personal der R&A setzte sich mehrheitlich aus Historikern, Sozial-
und Wirtschaftswissenschaftlern der Ivy-League-Universitäten der Ost-
küste zusammen, was ihr vonseiten der Militärs und der operativen
Einheiten den despektierlich gemeinten Ruf »the Campus« (Winks
1996: 60-115) einbrachte. Trotz des Spotts der Militärs über die ver-
meintlich weltfremden Theoretiker wurden deren analytische Dienst-
leistungen in anderen Behörden durchaus geachtet – was sich über die
operativen Einheiten und die propagandistischen Abteilungen so pau-
schal nicht sagen lässt. Auch Donovan, der ein ausgesprochenes Faible
für Geheimoperationen denn für dröge nachrichtendienstliche Tätig-
keiten hatte, sah in der Forschungsabteilung einen zentralen Bereich:
»These efforts, in combination with R&A's many other activities, rep-
resent substantial progress made toward the ultimate intelligence tar-
5 Zur Radiopropaganda und den internen Zwistigkeiten: Soley (1989: 45-79).
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get, a thorough knowledge of the other great powers' capabilities

and intentions, on which the strategic decisions of this nation will be
based« (zitiert nach Roosevelt 1976: 179).6
Die Bereitstellung von Hintergrundinformationen musste nicht
zwangsläufig zu Konflikten mit anderen militärischen und zivilen
staatlichen Stellen führen – jedenfalls solange nicht, bis die Nachkriegs-
planung stärker ins Zentrum trat. Zudem: Gerade in der frühen Zeit
des COI war die R&A die einzige Abteilung, die überhaupt greifbare
Ergebnisse vorweisen konnte (Roosevelt 1976: 51).
Anders verhielt es sich mit der Arbeit der Visual Presentation Branch.
Hierzu kooperierte Donovan mit Regisseuren und Kameraleuten aus
Hollywood, welche nicht nur propagandistische Dokumentar- und
Spielfilme produzieren (Willmetts 2016: 12-76), sondern auch mittels
modernster Techniken im »war room« dem Präsidenten und der Joint
Chiefs of Staff die Kriegsereignisse präsentieren sollten (Katz 1996).
Die ambitionierten, aber von missgünstigen Militärs belächelten Pläne
konnten aus Kostengründen nicht umgesetzt werden (Troy 1981: 108f),
das Branch nach einem Jahr aufgelöst. Deren geografische Abteilung
wurde der R&A zugeordnet. Neben diesen drei Branches gab es noch
weitere Units oder Sections, deren bekannteste die von Walter Charles
Langer geleitete Psychoanalytic Field Unit war (Pick 2012: 108-127). Ihr
berühmtester, aber bei weitem nicht einziger Ertrag war die von Langer
veröffentlichte und maßgeblich von Henry A. Murray erarbeitete Stu-
die »A Psychological Analysis of Adolph Hitler: His Life and Legend«,
die 1972 unter dem Titel »The Mind of Adolf Hitler« veröffentlicht
wurde (Langer 1972).7
Obwohl die Bilanz des COI eher ambivalent ausfiel – viele hochflie‐
gende Ideen blieben unverwirklicht, die interne Struktur wies beachtli-
che Widersprüche auf und letztlich fand eine Koordination der geheim-
dienstlichen Aktivitäten nicht statt –, zeigt die finanzielle Ausstattung
des COI, dass sich Donovan in Washington mit seinen Beziehungen zu
Roosevelt gut etablieren konnte. Erhielt der COI 1941 zunächst ein
6 Bereits in seinem an den Präsidenten adressierten Gründungsmemorandum vom

10. Juni 1941 heißt es: »Although we are facing imminent peril, we are lacking in
effective service for analyzing, comprehending, and appraising such information
as we might obtain, (or in some cases have obtained,) relative to the intention
of potential enemies and the limit of the economic and military resources of
those enemies« William J. Donovan: Memorandum of Establishment of Service of
Strategic Information vom 10. Juni 1941, abgedruckt in: Troy (1981: 419).
7 Zu den bedenklichen Unternehmungen der psychoanalytischen Abteilung vgl.
Müller (2017: 223-235).
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Budget von 10-12 Millionen Dollar, das jedoch nur monatlich und nach
schwierigen Verhandlungen zwischen Donovan, dem Bureau of the
Budget und dem Präsidentenbüro zum Teil rückwirkend ausgezahlt
wurden, konnten bereits ein Jahr später 50 Millionen Dollar beantragt
werden. Eine Zuweisung erfolgte aufgrund der Auflösung des COI
jedoch nicht mehr. Die steigenden Zuweisungen dokumentieren den
späteren Ausbau des OSS, dem Nachfolger des COI: 1943: 22 Mio. Dol-
lar, 1944: 35 Mio. Dollar und 1945: 43 Mio. Dollar (Roosevelt 1976: 91f,
246f). An anderer Stelle heißt es, dass das Gesamtbudget des OSS von
1942 bis 1946 über 115 Mio. Dollar betrug (McDonald 2002: 81). Die
Finanzierung des COI/OSS erfolgte aus Zuweisungen durch den Kon-
gress und dem kaum kontrollierten Notfallfond des Präsidenten. Das
Personal umfasste insgesamt über 12000 Mitarbeiter. Die umfangreiche
finanzielle Unterstützung sollte jedoch nicht mit dem politischen Ein-
fluss der zivilen Behörde verwechselt werden; sie zeugt eher von den
enormen Aufwendungen im Zweiten Weltkrieg. Aber die Verteilung
der Mittel dokumentiert die Präferenzen der einzelnen Abteilungen
innerhalb des COI: In der ersten Beantragung des COI vom September
1941 waren von den 10 Millionen Dollar 10% für die R&A geplant,
während der FIS den Löwenanteil von 30% und das Visual Branch
knapp 25% erhalten sollte. In dem ein Jahr später gefundenen Kompro-
miss mit dem Bureau of the Budget erhielt die R&A lediglich 4%, wäh-
rend für die operativen Einheiten 32% bereitgestellt wurden (Roosevelt
1976: 13).
In der Leitung des COI haben bereits Zeitgenossen eine Melange aus
Innovation, Aktivismus und Dilettantismus gesehen. Exemplarisch ist
hierfür die rückblickende Äußerung von Ludwell Lee Montague, Mit-
glied des Joint Intelligence Center, einer geheimdienstlichen Koopera-
tion aus Army und Navy:
»Donovan had no idea of coordinating these studies with anyone. He
was responsible only to the President. One can readily imagine how
professional Army, Navy, and Foreign Service officers reacted to the
idea that a lot of johnny-come-lately professors would be telling the
President what to think about political and strategic matters« (Mon-
tague 1972: 64).
Die missgünstig beäugte unorthodoxe Amtsführung ermöglichte vielen
späteren Analysten die Aufnahme in den US-amerikanischen Staats-
dienst. Was sich für Kirchheimer und viele andere Emigranten als Ret-
tung erwies, musste von außen als nicht unbeachtliches Risiko erschei-
nen. In den Worten Donovans: »I'd put Stalin on the OSS payroll if I
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thought it would help us defeat Hitler« (zitiert nach: McDonald 2002:

93). Diese Bereitschaft, unorthodoxe Entscheidungen zu treffen, hatte
lückenhafte Sicherheitsüberprüfungen für neue Mitarbeiter zur Folge,
die schon frühzeitig von konkurrierenden Geheimdienstabteilungen
beäugt wurden. Genüsslich konnten sie auf die politische Unzuverläs-
sigkeit einzelner (vermeintlicher und tatsächlicher kommunistischer)
Mitarbeiter hinweisen. Dies betrifft vor allem die klandestine Privat-
organisation »The Pond«, die zunächst selbst dem COI zugeordnet
war, aber 1942 vom Military Intelligence Service des War Departments
finanziert wurde und inoffizielle Kontakte zum FBI unterhielt (Stout
2004; 2018). Im Weltkrieg, in Zeiten der Anti-Hitler Koalition, konnten
solche Vorwürfe gegen das OSS noch leicht abgetan werden, jedoch
trugen sie nach Kriegsende maßgeblich zur Abwicklung von Donovans
Behörde bei. »The Pond«, eine der wichtigsten antikommunistischen
Organisationen der Nachkriegszeit, wurde hingegen dem State Depart-
ment, später der Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) zugeordnet.8
Das strukturelle Hauptmanko des COI war, dass es als zivile Behörde
die militärisch bzw. bundespolizeilich gewonnenen geheimdienstlichen
Informationen koordinieren sollte, ohne in deren Kompetenzen eingrei-
fen zu können. Es war aber nicht nur dieser im Prinzip zum Scheitern
verurteilte Auftrag, der den Aufbau und die Arbeit der Behörde belas-
tete. Hinzu kamen persönliche Animositäten – etwa zwischen zwischen
Donovan und FBI-Chef J. Edgar Hoover – oder grundsätzliche Vorbe-
halte, wie sie Kriegsminister Henry L. Stimson später offen bekundete:
»Gentlemen do not read each other's mail« (Stimson/Bundy 1948: 188).
Mitursächlich für die Ungunst anderer Behörden war schließlich das
wenig routinierte verwaltungstechnische Agieren Donovans sowie des-
sen Vorliebe für »bizarre Projekte« (Mauch 1999: 54). Eine zentrale
Koordination der geheimdienstlichen Dienste haben weder der COI
noch das später aus ihm hervorgegangene OSS leisten können – nicht
zuletzt, weil Roosevelt selbst nach inoffiziellen nachrichtendienstlichen
Quellen suchte (Persico 2002).
Schließlich wurde der COI durch die Executive Order 9182 vom
13. Juni 1942 aufgelöst. Der FIS wurde in das neugeschaffene Office of
War Information überführt und der COI durch eine Military Order als
Office of Strategic Services (OSS) als Supporting Agency dem Joint
Chief of Staff (JCS) bzw. den Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS) unter-
stellt. Damit war das OSS als eine militärische Dienststelle unmittelbar
in die Kriegsmaschinerie eingebunden. Die Direktive JCS 155/4/D vom
8 Vgl. hierzu auch die Darstellung zu Ruth Fischer: Keßler (2013: 513-515).
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23. Dezember 1942 umriss die beiden zentralen Funktionen des

OSS: »the planning, development, coordination and execution of the
military program for psychological warfare« und »the compilation of
such political, psychological, sociological, and economic information as
may be required for military operations« (zitiert nach: Troy 1981:
431-433). Obwohl der nun zum Brigadegeneral ernannte Donovan die
verkleinerte Behörde bewahren und den operativen Bereich besser aus-
bauen konnte, ging das OSS aus der Umstrukturierung geschwächt
hervor, zumal alle ihm zugewiesenen Aufgaben unter militärischer
Kontrolle standen. Lakonisch stellt der OSS Biograph Kermit Roosevelt
fest: »The period of uncertainty as to the disposition of COI by the Pres-
ident gave way to the new period of uncertainty as to the future of OSS
under the Joint Chief of Staff« (Roosevelt 1976: 27). Die Einbindung in
den JCS hatte zur Folge, dass das OSS von dessen – nicht immer vor-
handener – Nachfrage abhing, weshalb die Leitungsebene ein perma-
nentes Interesse hatte, ihre Nützlichkeit unter Beweis zu stellen (Mar-
quardt-Bigman 1995: 42). Die neue institutionelle Architektur nach
Gründung des OSS, welche jedoch angesichts der sich wandelnden
Bedürfnisse im Krieg organisatorisch permanent umstrukturiert wurde
(Roosevelt 1976: 122-126), veranschaulicht das folgende Organigramm.
Die militärische Ausrichtung des OSS tritt durch die formal nun gleich-
gestellte Position der operativen Einheiten hervor:
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Abb. 2: Organisation des OSS

15
Abb. 2: Organisation des OSS

Formal bilden geheimdienstliche Operationen und nachrichtendienst-
liche Abteilungen die beiden Seiten des OSS. Dem Deputy Director
der Strategic Services Operation unterstanden: die Special Operati-
ons (für Sabotageoperationen, Untergrund- und Guerillagruppen), die
Moral Operations (für schwarze Propaganda), Maritime Unit (Siche-
rung und Sabotage), die Special Projects (ähnlich den SO, jedoch
direkt dem Direktor unterstellt), die Field Experimental Unit (techni-
sche Forschungs- und Entwicklungsabteilung) sowie die Operational
Group (uniformierter militärischer Verband). Dem Deputy Director
Intelligence Services waren zugeordnet: Secret Intelligence (Sammlung
von Spionageberichten), X-2 (Gegenspionage), R&A (Koordination von
Quellen und Verfassen von Studien zu strategischen, politischen, geo-
grafischen und wirtschaftlichen Themen), Foreign Nationalities Branch
(Überprüfung von Nationalitätengruppen in den USA), Censorship
and Document (Radioüberwachung, Zusammenarbeit mit anderen
Zensurbehörden und interne Weitergabe von Informationen, die von
Zensurbehörden gewonnen wurden).
Das inneradministrative Ansehen, das die R&A noch unter dem COI
hatte, verringerte sich nicht nur angesichts der vielfältigen operativen
Bereiche des OSS. Mit dem militärischen Vordringen der Alliierten eta-
blierte das OSS zunehmend Verbindungsbüros in Europa, Nordafrika
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und Ostasien, denen R&A‐Offiziere zugeordnet werden sollten. Damit

verlagerten sich zwangsläufig die innerbehördlichen Spannungen zu
Lasten der Intelligence-Abteilungen, die den operativen Einheiten »too
sensitive or idealistic« (Zitiert nach Smith 1983: 366) erschienen. Selbst
ohne inhaltliche Differenzen bedeutete das Vorrücken der militärischen
Verbände aufgrund der Einberufung bzw. Versetzung einzelner Mitar-
beiter der R&A eine Schwächung der Personalstärke.
Auch der Auftrag der nachrichtendienstlichen Abteilungen, als Dienst-
leistungsabteilung für die militärisch überwachte psychologische
Kriegsführung tätig zu sein, bedeutete eine markante Einschränkung
des Aufgabenbereichs der Forschungsabteilung. Es dürfte kein Zufall
sein, dass im Zuge der Umstrukturierung des COI/OSS der Leiter
der R&A Baxter aus gesundheitlichen Gründen ausschied und der
ebenfalls aus Harvard stammende Historiker William L. Langer, der
zunächst die DSI leitete, das Branch übernahm. Die organisatorisch-
institutionellen Fehlkonstruktionen der R&A wurden durch die Auflö‐
sung der funktionellen Abteilungen und Bildung der vier regionalen
Divisionen Europa-Afrika, Ferner Osten, UdSSR und Lateinamerika
behoben. Leiter der Europe Africa Division wurde Sherman Kent, der
bisher der Mediterranean and Africa Section der DSI vorgestanden
hatte. Kent konnte durch die nachrichtendienstliche Beteiligung bei der
Landung alliierter Verbände in Nordafrika im November 1942 (Opera-
tion Torch) einen der wichtigsten Erfolge für das OSS verbuchen, auch
wenn sich dieser bei genauerem Blick als ambivalent herausstellte.9
Die Europe-Africa Division hatte einerseits funktionale Untergliede-
rungen (Political Geographic und Economic Subdivision) und anderer-
seits sieben regionale Sektionen, die sich in einzelne Länderreferate
aufteilten. Kirchheimer war mit Franz Neumann, Herbert Marcuse,
Sinclair Armstrong, John Herz, Hajo Holborn, Henry Stuart Hughes,
Felix Gilbert, Edgar Johnson, Richard Krautheimer, Henry Roberts,
Hans Meyerhoff, Carl Schorske und Oscar Weigert in der von Eugene
Anderson geleiteten Central Europe Section (CES) angestellt, konkret
in der Unterabteilung Germany/Austria. Die jeweilige institutionelle
Zuordnung der Analysten konnte immer wieder variieren, so waren
Anderson, Holborn und Gilbert zwischenzeitlich mit dem Aufbau einer
9 Die »political naivety, false optimism and the selective use of intelligence mate-
rial« der R&A basiere auf der falschen Annahme, dass zwar nur wenig Fran-
zosen Sympathien für Hitler hatten, dass sie aber »were also prepared to defend
their own national interests, and would obey the orders of their leaders« (Walker
1987: 674f). Siehe auch: Smith (1983: 380-382).
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Central Information Division (CID) beauftragt. Mit dieser Abteilung

reagierte die R&A auf eine zentrale Herausforderung seit der Umstruk-
turierung des OSS und dessen Zuordnung unter das JCS: Mit dem
Aufbau der operativen Einheiten war es für die Forschungsabteilung
immer schwieriger geworden, externe und interne nachrichtendienstli-
che Berichte zu erhalten. Durch die eher schlecht ausgestattete CID
erhielt die R&A-Branch zwar entsprechendes Material – 1944 bearbei-
tete es etwa 10000 Dokumente (Marquardt-Bigman 1995: 60) –, jedoch
band dies entsprechende personelle Ressourcen. Verschärft wurde die-
ses Problem der Überlastung durch externe Zugriffe auf das Personal,
die inner- und außerhalb der OSS-Bürokratie versetzt wurden – etwa
beim Ausbau der R&A in London, Chongqing und Kairo oder als
nachrichtendienstliche Einheiten in den befreiten Staaten.10 Dennoch
verfassten die Angestellten der R&A-Branch bis Kriegsende 3000 For-
schungsberichte und ebenso viele geografische Karten (Smith 1983:
371).
Die Schwierigkeiten bei der Materialbeschaffung stellten jedoch nur
die eine Seite des Verwaltungsalltags dar. Die andere lag in der per-
manenten Suche nach Abnehmern der eigenen Arbeit. In einer archi-
vierten Prozesslandkarte wird der Arbeitsprozess der Forschungsabtei-
lung besonders plastisch dargestellt. Über die CID erhielt die R&A
Material von unzähligen kriegsrelevanten Regierungsbehörden, ande-
ren OSS-Abteilungen und OSS-Standorten. Dabei hatte die R&A keinen
Einfluss darauf, ob die gewünschten Informationen geliefert wurden,
vielmehr hielten – wie nicht wenige Behörden und selbst andere OSS-
Abteilungen – sie ihr Wissen zurück. Die von den R&A-Analysten
fertiggestellten Berichte wurden durch das Project Committee, einer
abteilungsinternen Kontrollinstanz, darauf geprüft, ob sie den Neutra-
litätsanspruch erfüllen (Roosevelt 1976: 171-173). Deshalb bestand das
vom stellvertretenden Leiter der R&A-Branch geführte Project Commit-
tee aus Mitgliedern aller Divisionen, deren Expertise durchaus mit der
Position des jeweiligen Analytikers, der eine Studie einreichte, konkur-
rierte. So konnten R&A-Reports intern auch an andere Forscherteams
zurück überwiesen und revidiert werden, bevor diese an die Auftrag-
geber übertragen oder anderen Behörden angeboten wurde. Aufgrund
der wachsenden externen Nachfrage und des eingespielten Revisions-
verfahrens konnten die Analysten immer weniger »eigene« Projekte
verfolgen. Das Projects Committee kontrollierte aber nicht erst die fer-
10 Beispiele sind etwa Arthur M. Schlesinger (2002) oder H. Stuart Hughes (Katz
1989: 180-186).
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tiggestellten Analysen, sondern entschied bereits im Voraus, ob die

jeweils beantragten R&A-Forschungsprojekte überhaupt realisiert wer-
den dürfen, was von dessen jeweiligem Zweck, der kalkulierten Dauer,
den vorhandenen Quellen und den zu erwartenden konsultierenden
oder kooperierenden Einheiten abhängig war.
Abb. 3: Verbreitung geheimdienstlichen Materials im US-amerikanischen

Geheimdienstwesen im zweiten Weltkrieg
Die nicht immer einfache Position des R&A-Branch innerhalb des OSS
konnte nur dadurch kompensiert werden, dass es sich gegenüber exter-
nen administrativen Stellen als genügsame Abteilung präsentierte und
damit nur selten in Konkurrenz mit geheimdienstlichen oder gar mili-
tärischen Behörden trat. Dies erklärt, weshalb sich einerseits R&A-Mit-
arbeiter rückblickend als schlecht behandelte Stiefkinder beschrieben
haben, während andererseits deren Leistungsfähigkeit außerhalb des
OSS durchaus geschätzt wurde (Smith 1983: 377-379). Die Stärke der
R&A lag paradoxerweise in ihrer militärischen Schwäche, lediglich
Hilfsdienstleister für operative Einheiten und politische Planungen zu
sein. Dies erklärt nicht nur die frühzeitige Anerkennung ihrer Leis-
tungen (als es noch kaum unmittelbare politische Entscheidungen zu
treffen galt), sondern auch die wachsenden Spannungen am Ende des
Krieges: Spätestens Anfang 1944 war Langer klar, dass angesichts der
abzusehenden Niederlage der Achsenmächte Fragen der Militärverwal-
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tung und Besatzungspolitik in den Mittelpunkt treten würden (Katz

1989: 82). Doch obwohl jetzt die Stunde der Deutschlandexperten hätte
schlagen können, wurde ihnen in diesem Augenblick offenbart, dass
die politische Nachkriegsplanung eben nicht zu ihren originären Auf-
gaben zählte. Sie waren nur die zivile Forschungsabteilung in einem
dem JCS untergeordneten militärischen Nachrichtendienst. So sehr
sich Langer und Donovan um eine Nachkriegsverwendung des R&A
auch bemühten, sie kollidierten zu diesem Zeitpunkt mit anderen
politischen Beratungsstellen. Zudem mussten sie sich von den Besat-
zungsoffizieren in Europa vorwerfen lassen, dass sich ihre Washingto-
ner Nachkriegspläne vor Ort als unrealistisch erwiesen. In Reaktion
auf diese frustrierenden Erfahrungen kehrten diejenigen R&A-Analy-
tiker an die Universitäten zurück, die schon vor dem Kriegseintritt
etabliert waren. Auch den in der R&A angestellten deutschen Emigran-
ten, die Führungspositionen übernommen hatten (Neumann, Holborn),
eröffnete die Leitung von Forschungsgruppen die Möglichkeit, im elitä-
ren US-amerikanischen Universitätssystem aufgenommen zu werden.
Kirchheimer, der zu Kriegsende immerhin fast 40 Jahre alt war und
anders als Neumann keine größere Monografie verfasst hatte, blieb mit
den jüngeren Kollegen (etwa Herz) in diversen Nachkriegsinstitutionen
zurück und ging dort der immerhin gut dotierten Arbeit nach.
Trotz der personellen Fluktuation lässt sich eine Kerngruppe in der
Central Europe Section ausmachen: So fanden wöchentlich Treffen zwi-
schen Gilbert, Holborn, Neumann, Marcuse, Kirchheimer, Anderson
und Harold Deutsch, Leiter der Political Subdivision der Europe-Africa
Division, statt (Marquardt-Bigman 1995: 72). Ungeachtet der unter-
schiedlichen Disziplinen und theoretischen Herkunft sind sich sowohl
Zeitzeugen als auch die Forschung einig, dass Neumann mit seinem
1942 veröffentlichten Behemoth »by far the most significant personality
among its members«11 war. Die dominante Stellung Neumanns inner-
halb der CES sollte jedoch nicht über vorhandene sachliche und per-
sönliche Differenzen innerhalb des R&A hinwegtäuschen. Dass gestan-
dene US-amerikanische Historiker der Ivy-League, die Meinecke-Schü-
ler Gilbert und Holborn und die vom Institut for Social Research entlas-
senen »Kritischen Theoretiker« eine kollektive Identität ausbildeten, ist
mehr als voraussetzungsreich. So berichtet Fritz Stern etwa von späte-
ren Diskussionen an der Columbia University zwischen dem »marxis-
11 Brief von Harold Deutsch an Barry Katz vom 10. Januar 1986, zitiert nach: Katz
(1989: 208).
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tischen Politikwissenschaftler« Neumann, dem liberalen Holborn und

dem Pragmatiker Roberts (Stern 2007: 262).
Die Charakterisierung der Mitarbeiter der CES als »a highly indivi-
dualistic and incurably academic group« und nicht zuletzt als »pri-
madonnas«12 in der internen R&A-History dokumentiert, dass ihre
unumstrittene sachliche Kompetenz keine administrative Entsprechung
fand. Leitende Posten wurden mit Freunden und Doktoranden Langers
besetzt (Smith 1983: 366f), die ihm entgegenarbeiteten, während »inter-
nally, Langer had constantly to be alert to smoldering tensions inheri-
ted from university life« (Katz 2002: 45).13 Die in der Forschungslite-
ratur immer wieder betonte Wertschätzung des hohen intellektuellen
Niveaus der deutschen Emigranten im R&A ist durchaus ambivalent.
So monierte Carl Schorske, seit 1944 als Acting Chief der Europe-Africa
Political Subdivision der Central European Section vorgesetzt: »The
Central European Section remains its brilliant but incoherent, teutonic,
and maladministered self« (zitiert nach: Katz 1989: 173f). Folgt man
der Darstellung von Barry M. Katz, so bestand ein latenter Konflikt im
R&A zwischen den älteren, etablierten Historikern, die um 1900 gebo-
ren wurden, wie William Langer, Eugene Anderson oder Walter Dorn
und den etwa 15 Jahre jüngeren, ehrgeizigen Wissenschaftlern wie Carl
Schorske, Leonard Krieger und Hughes (Katz 1989: 169-186). Die Emi-
granten am R&A gehörten generationell zur älteren Generation, waren
jedoch Nichtetablierte.
Sowohl die institutionelle Position des R&A im COI/OSS als auch die
externen Spannungen gegenüber dem ersten zentralen US-amerikani-
schen Nachrichtendienst sollten vor einer Überbewertung der hier prä-
sentierten Analysen innerhalb der US-amerikanischen Sicherheitsarchi-
tektur bewahren. Der heutige Leser der Handbooks, Guides, Reports
und Memoranden sollte sich keinerlei Illusionen hingeben. Die Wissen-
schaftler haben ihren Beitrag zur Analyse des politischen Feindes gelie-
fert, aber die Annahme, dass diese Texte einen Einfluss auf die Kriegs-
und Nachkriegspolitik hatten, muss bezweifelt werden. Die politische
Reichweite nachrichtendienstlicher Informationen blieb davon abhän-
gig, welchen Stellenwert einerseits die entsprechende Abteilung inner-
halb des Geheimdienstes einnahm und andererseits, wie gut sich
sowohl die einzelne Abteilung als auch das OSS insgesamt gegen-
über anderen konkurrierenden militärischen und nachrichtendienstli-
12 RG 226, entry 99, box 76, folder 45: Washington DC, R&A Branch Histories,
S. 76, zitiert nach: Katz (1989: 34).
13 Zu Langers softem Führungsstil vgl. Smith 1983: 370f.
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chen Einheiten durchsetzen konnte. Ob geheimdienstliche Analysen

bestimmte von den Geheimdienstmitarbeitern erwünschte politische
Folgen zeitigten, war selbst dann noch ungewiss. Im komplexen insti-
tutionellen Arrangement der zahllosen Informationsquellen und den
nicht immer ganz widerspruchsfreien Entscheidungsprozessen konn-
ten geheimdienstliche Erkenntnisse nur ein Faktor unter anderen sein –
von traditionellen Vorbehalten gegenüber geheimdienstlichen Erkennt-
nissen, insbesondere von »Zivilisten« zu schweigen.
So hat es 1962 Otto Kirchheimer in seiner ihm eigenen Art ernüchternd
konstatiert:
»Aber wie verhält es sich mit der Beurteilung des Aufwandes moder-
ner militärischer, paramilitärischer, diplomatischer und Intelligence
Betriebe? Es ist in diesen Bereichen, wo es fraglich ist, ob man irgend-
welche Schlußfolgerungen über das Verhältnis von Aufwand und
Ertrag ziehen kann. […] Es läßt sich keinerlei Nachweis dafür antreten,
daß diese oder jene Form der politischen Propaganda oder der militä-
rischen Verwendungszwecke den gewünschten Erfolg, die Erhaltung
eines noch so unsicheren und bedrohten Friedens herbeigeführt hat.
[…] Und naturgemäß kann gerade auf diesen Gebieten keine Propor-
tionalität zwischen Aufwand und Erfolg in kontrollierbarer Weise fest-
gestellt werden, während die Projekte sich jagen und die bürokratische
Proliferation ihre Hochblüte erreicht« (Kirchheimer 1961a: 467f).
2. Die Bedeutung der R&A-Studien für die Civil Affairs Division
Kirchheimer, der in der R&A primär als Experte zum nationalsozialis-

tischen Recht arbeitete, verfasste zahlreiche Schriften für die CAD.14
Deren organisatorisch-institutionelle Einordnung ist sinnvoll, weil nur
so die Reichweite seiner Analysen und zugleich Kirchheimers Wunsch,
den Staatsdienst zu verlassen, plausibel werden.
Die am 1. März 1943 vom War Department gegründete und von Gene-
ral John H. Hilldring geleitete CAD sollte als zentrale US-amerikani-
sche Stelle der militärischen Nachkriegsplanung dienen. Mit der Schaf-
fung reagierte das Kriegsministerium auf die sowohl innerhalb des
Kabinetts Roosevelt als auch in der Öffentlichkeit kontrovers diskutier-
ten administrativen und politischen Probleme nach der alliierten Lan-
dung in Nordafrika, die sich aus der Zusammenarbeit mit den Partei-
14 Zur CAD: Holborn 1947; Coles/Weinberg 1986; Marquardt-Bigman 1995:

119-145; Hudson 2015; Kostal 2019.
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gängern des Vichy-Regimes ergaben: Um nach der Landung in

Marokko und Algerien rasch nach Tunesien vorzustoßen, überließen
die militärischen Verbände die Zivilverwaltung in den Händen der
Vichy-Verwaltung, welche noch zuvor erbitterten Widerstand gegen
die Alliierten geleistet hatte. Der Waffenstillstand mit den französi-
schen Verbänden in Afrika räumte den Vichy-Generälen zunächst poli-
tisches Mitspracherecht ein, was nicht nur den Gegnern der Achsen-
mächte als politischer Affront erscheinen sein musste, sondern auch zu
massiven Verwerfungen zwischen den propagierten Repräsentanten
des freien Frankreichs im Vorfeld der Konferenz von Casablanca
führte.15 Dass diese propagandistisch desaströse Politik von den R&A-
Analytikern scharf kritisiert wurde, liegt auf der Hand.
Zugleich erwiesen sich die verschiedenen US-amerikanischen zivi-
len Behörden in Nordafrika nicht koordiniert genug, um vor Ort
eine Verwaltung der eroberten Gebiete zu gewährleisten.16 Die CAD
sollte nach den Vorstellungen des Generaladjutanten James Alexander
Ulio »inform and advise the Secretary of War in regard to all matters
within the purview of the War Department, other than those of a
strictly military nature. The Civil Affairs Division will perform such
additional advisory and administrative functions in connection with
civil matters as may be prescribed by the Secretary of War« (zitiert
nach: Coles/Weinberg 1986: 68). Unterstützt wurde die CAD von
zahlreichen Behörden: dem State Department, dem Department of
Treasury, der Foreign Economic Administration (FEA), dem Office of
Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations und dem OSS. Jedoch
war die CAD kein Zusammenschluss gleichberechtigter Behörden, son-
dern eine dem Deputy Chief of Staff untergeordnete Abteilung des
War Department. Insofern lässt sich die CAD besser als militärische
Clearingstelle gegenüber nichtmilitärischen Behörden und deren Vor-
schlägen für eine künftige Besatzungspolitik bezeichnen (Hudson 2015:
130). Aus der Teilhabe der genannten Behörden darf keinesfalls deren
15 So etwa die bemerkenswerte Einschätzung François Darlans durch Eisen-

hower: »His reputation was that of a notorious collaborator with Hitler, but
during the time that he served as the administrator of French North Africa
he never once, to our knowledge, violated any commitment or promise« (Eisen-
hower 1948: 144). Die nachlässige Haltung der Alliierten ermöglichte der fran-
zösischen Administration, antifaschistische Widerstandskämpfer noch nach der
Landung der Alliierten zu verfolgen (vgl. Smith 1972: 59-61; Krautkrämer 1989).
Nach dem Abkommen zwischen den Alliierten und Darlan/Giraud erhielten die
algerischen Juden ihre staatsbürgerschaftlichen Rechte nicht zurück (vgl. Evers
2017).
16 Zu den Verwaltungsproblemen aus militärischer Sicht: Howe 1957/1993.
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Einfluss auf die besatzungspolitischen Entscheidungen des Militärs

geschlussfolgert werden. Vielmehr ermöglichte sie dem War Depart-
ment, Planungen anderer Behörden in einer ihr unterstellten Dienst-
stelle zu koordinieren, um so eigenen gewichtigeren Einfluss auf die
US-amerikanische Nachkriegsplanung zu behalten (ebenda: 137). Alle
Zuarbeiten liefen bei Hilldring zusammen, der die entwickelten Vor-
schläge mit dem Chief of Staff George C. Marshall, Kriegsminister
Stimson oder Under Secretary John J. McCloy diskutierte.
Innerhalb des OSS sollte die R&A-Branch der CAD zuarbeiten, Verbin-
dungsmann war Holborn (Marquardt-Bigman 1995: 121). Die Haupt-
aufgabe der Deutschlandabteilung der R&A bestand konkret in der
Fertigstellung von über 80 Civil Affairs Guides und 17 umfangreichen
Civil Affairs Handbooks. Während die Handbücher enzyklopädisches
Wissen zu einem bestimmten Gegenstand versammelten, damit die US-
amerikanischen Besatzungsoffiziere in Deutschland politische Entschei-
dungen treffen können, sollten die Guides mit Verweis auf die Ziele
der Militärregierung stärker als kompakte Handlungsrichtlinie für
bestimmte Streitfälle dienen, weshalb diesen ein politischerer Charak-
ter eigen war. Neben der R&A, die mit 32 veröffentlichen Guides den
Löwenanteil der Arbeit trug, verfasste vor allem die FEA zahlreiche
Leitfäden (13); insgesamt 7 verfassten die beiden Behörden zusammen,
die restlichen steuerten andere Ämter bei.17 Gegenstand der Guides
waren jeweils mehrere Hefte zur Abrogation of Nazi Laws, Elimination of
Nazis and Pro-Nazis from Positions of Power, Elimination of the Political,
Cultural and Quasi-Governmental Institutions, Ownership and Control of
Property, Economic Planning, Trade and Financial Institutions, Manpower,
Labor Relations Institutions und Social Security. Dabei waren die Behör-
den nicht explizit bestimmten Themen zugeordnet: So steuerte die FEA
in dem für Kirchheimer zentralen Bereich der Aufhebung der national-
sozialistischen Gesetze die Guides Civil, Commercial, and Family Law
and Procedure in Germany, Courts and Judicial Administration in Germany
und Elimination of Fundamental Nazi Laws bei. Zugleich veröffentlichte
die R&A auch Beiträge zu ökonomischen, eigentumsrechtlichen oder
arbeitsrechtlichen Fragen. Der Konflikt war damit vorprogrammiert.
Auch wenn die CAD eine Beratungsfunktion innerhalb der militäri-
schen Nachkriegsplanung hatte, dienten deren Guides und Handbooks
17 Diese Zahlen beziehen sich auf die Angaben aus R&A 2438: The Civil Affairs
Guide Program for Germany. Analysis of ist Principles and Aims, S. 67-70. In
der Liste fehlen aber einige Guides (etwa German Reichsbank Policy and Con-
trol).
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ohne jegliche Bindung zur Orientierung der künftigen Besatzungsof‐

fiziere. Dabei standen die in der Division beteiligten Analysten vor
dem Problem, dass es lange Zeit weder eine klare präsidentielle noch
alliierte Entscheidung gab, welche Ziele die Militärregierung verwirk-
lichen wollte.18 Daher orientierten sie sich an den nationalen Richtli-
nien (etwa dem United Army-Navy Field Manual 27-5 of Military Govern-
ment and Civil Affairs) und internationalen Deklarationen (etwa der
Moskauer Erklärung der alliierten Außenminister von 1943).19 Wie
diese Dokumente auszulegen seien, vertiefte die bestehenden Konflikte
zwischen den innerhalb der CAD beteiligten Behörden. Angesichts
der wachsenden inneralliierten Streitigkeiten sowie der nicht immer
konsistent erscheinenden, wechselnden Verhandlungspositionen Roo-
sevelts mussten die jeweiligen Dienststellen ohne konkrete politische
Leitlinien und Vorgaben argumentieren, was die interadministrativen
Abstimmungen weiter belastete. Das letzte Wort in diesen Diskussio-
nen hatte jedoch das War Department.
Wie eine US-amerikanische oder alliierte Militärregierung aussehen
solle, war für die Streitkräfte und das War Department spätestens mit
der Landung auf dem Gebiet der Achsenmächte und ihrer Verbündeten
zu einem handgreiflichen Problem geworden. Die bisherige Strategie,
die bestehenden lokalen Verwaltungen lediglich unter militärische Auf-
sicht zu stellen, um die wirtschaftlichen und sozialen Bedingungen
zu stabilisieren und so die Militäreinheiten von der administrativen
Verantwortung zu befreien, wie es von den Militäreinheiten in Nord-
afrika noch teilweise praktiziert wurde, musste nun politisch zweifel-
haft erscheinen. Aufgrund der massiven Zerstörungen in den zu beset-
zenden Gebieten, der drohenden Unterversorgung der Bevölkerung,
aber auch aufgrund der ideologischen Feindschaft des Gegners, der
daher zu erwartenden politischen Unzuverlässigkeit der Verwaltung
sowie der Konkurrenz diverser Gegner des Nationalsozialismus, über-
nahmen die alliierten Verbände zunehmend zivile Aufgaben. Ange-
sichts der politischen Zielsetzung der Alliierten, »that Fascism and all
18 Hierzu noch Jahre später das Urteil Holborns: »As a matter of fact, many
shortcomings of American military government – shortcomings for which it
has frequently been castigated – were due to the lack of a dear definition of
American foreign policies. Delays were often unavoidable in the face of an
international situation charged with uncertainties. But waiting is not necessarily
a good strategy with which to meet such situations« (Holborn 1947: 105). Diese
Einschätzung teilte auch Dorn 1957.
19 Hierzu auch das positive Bild der Deklaration bei Holborn, die argumentations-
strategisch dem späteren Zerwürfnis zwischen der UdSSR und den Westalliier-
ten entgegengesetzt wird (Holborn 1947: 17-21).
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its evil influence and emanations shall be utterly destroyed« (zitiert

nach: Royal Institute of International Affairs 1946: 14), mussten die
bestehenden Verwaltungen entmachtet und gesäubert werden, weshalb
zwangsläufig der Militärverwaltung die Aufgabe zukam, zivile (keines-
wegs nur politische, sondern ganz elementare) Aufgaben der Adminis-
tration zu übernehmen. Obwohl die Militärkommandanten für diese
Aufgabe kaum vorbereitet waren und sie dementsprechend nur wider-
willig bewältigten, sollten konkurrierende zivile Behörden, wie etwa
das State Department oder das Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilita-
tion Operations, an dieser Aufgabe nicht beteiligt werden (Pogue 1989:
75f). Obwohl in den Plänen der Supreme Headquarters Allied Expedi-
tionary Force (SHAEF) zu einzelnen Operationen Fragen der Zivilver-
waltung einen immer größeren Stellenwert einnahmen, stand bei ihren
Überlegungen stets der militärische Nutzen im Zentrum (Hudson 2015:
160-168).
Greifbar wird diese Position in dem von der German Country Unit20
verfassten und den Führungsanspruch des Militärs unterstreichenden
SHAEF Handbook for Military Government in Germany:
»During the period of the Supreme Commander’s responsibility, the
Military Government of Germany will be a military administration,
and representatives of Allied civilian agencies will not participate
except to the extent approved by the Supreme Commander« (SHAEF
1944: § 71).
Zwar war die »Elimination of Nazism, Fascism, German militarism,
the Nazi Hierarchy and their collaborators« ein anvisiertes Primärziel,
dieses konkurrierte aber mit der »restoration and maintenance of law
and order, in so far as the military situation permits.« Der damit ver-
bundene Widerspruch liest sich dann wenige Zeilen später wie folgt:
»Although the Nazi party and all subsidiary organizations will be dis-
solved, administrative machinery of certain dissolved organizations
may be used when necessary to provide essential functions, such as
relief, health and sanitation, with non-Nazi personnel and facili-
ties« (Ebenda: § 5).
Aufgelöst werden sollte dieser Zielkonflikt durch die Orientierung an
einer »indirect rule«: Nach der Entfernung der aktiven Nationalsozia-
listen und deren glühendster Anhänger sollte die deutsche Verwaltung
unter Aufsicht der Militärregierung weitgehend weiter genutzt werden,
20 Teilweise griff die German Country Unit wohl auf Material aus der Londoner
Sektion des R&A zurück, wobei Ergebnisse der R&A-Analytiker wahrscheinlich
abgeschöpft wurden (vgl. Ziemke 1975: 80-90; Marquardt-Bigman 1995: 140f).
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»until further orders and to obey and enforce all orders of Military
Government addressed to the German Government or the German
people« (Ebenda: § 74). Bis dahin soll die Besetzung von Verwaltungs-
posten abhängig »on the basis of satisfactory performance and beha-
viour« gegenüber den Militärbehörden sein.
Im ursprünglichen Entwurf des SHAEF-Handbuchs war diese Ambiva-
lenz noch eindeutiger zugunsten der militärischen Aspekte aufgelöst:
Administrative Fragen und politische Probleme wurden hier lediglich
aus der Perspektive der Effizienz beantwortet. So hieß es etwa in einem
Memorandum Roosevelts an das Kriegsministerium:
»Your main and immediate task, to accomplish your mission, is to
get things running, to pick up the pieces, to restore as quickly as
possible the official functioning of the German civil government in
the area for which [you] are responsible. […] The first concern of mil-
itary government will be to see that the machine works and works
efficiently« (nach: Hudson 2015: 169).
Diese Beschränkung der Besetzung auf rein militärische Fragen der
Sicherheit und administrativer Effizienz hatte innerhalb der Roosevelt-
Administration zu starken Spannungen sowie Vorwürfen seitens des
Präsidenten gegenüber dem War Department geführt, zu nachlässig
gegenüber den politischen Feinden zu agieren, und stellt den Hinter-
grund für den sogenannten Morgenthau-Plan dar.21 Dessen Ziele –
Demilitarisierung Deutschlands, Auflösung des Einheitsstaates in zwei
Föderalstaaten mit markanten Gebietsverlusten, industrielle Demon-
tage des Ruhrgebiets, Entnazifizierung durch Kriegsverbrecherprozesse
und alliierte Erziehungsprogramme, Kontrolle der Volkswirtschaft
durch die Vereinten Nationen, Zerschlagung des Großgrundbesitzes
und Agrarisierungsprogramm (»Germany’s road to peace leads to
the farm.« (Morgenthau 1945: 48)) sowie direkte Kontrolle durch die
21 Beispielhaft war für Morgenthau der »Report on Reparation, Restitution, and

Property« des Executive Committee on Economic Foreign Policy aus dem
Außenministerium vom 31. Juli 1944. In diesem hieß es, die USA hätten kein
großes Interesse an deutschen Reparationszahlungen. Zentral seien vielmehr
ein System der kollektiven Sicherheit, die Rückkehr zu einem multilateralen
System des internationalen Handels und der Finanzen, die »rapid reconstruc-
tion and rehabilitation of war-torn areas«. Für Deutschland bedeute dies: »(a)
The control of German economic war potential. This, however, is not assumed
to imply a large-scale and permanent impairment of all German industry. b)
Redress of the balance of European economy. (c) The eventual integration of
Germany into the world economy. (d) The establishment of democratic institu-
tions, including a free trade union movement« (Summary: Report on Repara-
tion, Restitution and Property Rights – Germany (ECEFP D-31/44 July 31, 1944),
in: Morgenthau 1967: 403).
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Anrainerstaaten bei gleichzeitiger Einsetzung eines US-amerikanischen

Hohen Kommissars – lassen sich nur vor diesem Hintergrund und der
Sorge um eine zu nachlässige Besatzungspolitik angesichts der 1944
immer sichtbarer werdenden Massenverbrechen verstehen. So ist Roo-
sevelts Aussage zu deuten: »The German nation as a whole must have
it driven home to them that the whole nation has been engaged in
a lawless conspiracy against the decencies of civilization.«22 Obwohl
Morgenthaus Position nicht nur von Roosevelt, sondern auf der zwei-
ten Québec-Konferenz auch von Churchill geteilt wurde, regte sich
gegen solche Überlegungen umgehend ein nicht weniger energischer
und pathetischer Protest: »It would be just such a crime as the Germans
themselves hoped to perpetrate upon their victims – it would be a
crime against civilization itself«, so die Reaktion von Kriegsminister
Stimson (zitiert nach: Morgenthau 1967: 622). Die inneradministrati-
ven und öffentlichen Widerstände gegen die Nachkriegsplanungen aus
dem Schatzamt ließen schließlich den »Morgenthauplan« obsolet wer-
den. Vor allem führten sie aber dazu, dass sich Roosevelt – unabhängig
von seinen eigenen Überzeugungen – kaum noch öffentlich über die
künftige Besatzungspolitik äußerte (Holborn 1947: 26). Dies und die
Vermittlung der entgegengesetzten politischen Vorstellungen der an
der CAD beteiligten Ämter stellten die wesentlichen Herausforderun-
gen für die Analysten aus der R&A dar.
Arbeitspraktisch bedeuteten diese interalliierten Auseinandersetzun‐
gen, dass die zu erstellenden Guides und Handbücher durch das
Editorial Committee der CAD genehmigt werden mussten. Ihm gehör-
ten unter Leitung eines Offiziellen der CAD, also dem War Depart-
ment, alle beteiligten Behörden an, was quälende Aushandlungspro-
zesse nahelegt. Welche Bedeutung die von der R&A angefertigten
Guides für die Besatzungspolitik hatten, lässt sich indes nur schwer
bemessen. Selbst wenn alle an der CAD beteiligten Behörden einem
Guide im Editorial Committee zugestimmt hatten, sollte sich der
Leser im Klaren sein, dass besatzungspolitische Angelegenheiten zwi-
schen dem Außen-, Kriegs- und Marineministerium im State-War-Navy
Coordinating Committee23 konzipiert wurden, an dem weder das
OSS geschweige deren Analysten aus der Forschungsabteilung teilnah-
22 Memorandum by President Roosevelt to the Secretary of War, Foreign Relations

of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1944, General, Volume I Document 311,
online unter: https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1944v01/d311.
23 Auch sollte man keine koordinierte Planung erwarten. R. W. Kostal spricht von
»semblance of order« (Kostal 2019: 29).
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men.24 Diese Studien hatten keine bindende Wirkung für die US-ameri-
kanische Besatzungsplanung und Besatzungspolitik. Sie wurden nicht
nur vom Joint Chiefs of Staff erneut bewertet, sondern auch vom US-
amerikanisch-britischen Combined Chiefs of Staff erörtert, der diese im
Combined Civil Affairs Committee erneut begutachtete, und schließlich
von der European Advisory Commission der drei Großmächte disku-
tiert (Ziemke 1975: 34-41).25 Die hier versammelten Handreichungen
zur Militärplanung gingen implizit von einer Zusammenarbeit der
Alliierten und einer gemeinsamen Politik gegenüber dem besiegten
Deutschland aus – eine Vorstellung, die spätestens nach der Jalta-Kon-
ferenz bereits ad acta gelegt werden konnte.
Selbst die wohl von McCloy als Chairman des State-War-Navy Coor-
dinating Committee für die CAD ausgearbeitete ursprüngliche Besat-
zungsdirektive JCS 1067, die in gewisser Weise als ein Kompromiss
zwischen den Vorstellungen des Treasury und des War Department
angesehen werden kann, galt nur für die amerikanische Politik. Sie
wurde zwar von den jeweiligen Ministerien unterschiedlich interpre-
tiert, aber ihre konkrete Anwendung erfuhr sie durch die Militärregie-
rung und deren Offiziere vor Ort.26 Die Bedeutung der theoretischen
und strategischen Vorarbeiten darf nicht überschätzt werden: »Direc-
tives, manuals, and wise saws were less relevant in such a situation
than had been expected. And improvisation was the order of the
day« (Coles/Weinberg 1986: 188). Angesichts der zerstörten Landstriche
und Städte sowie der Konfrontation mit Hunger, Krankheiten und
zahllosen »Displaced Persons« ist es verständlich, dass die politische
Neuordnung zunächst zurücktrat. Und dennoch dürfte Kirchheimer
24 Abgesehen von politischen Gründen und interadministrativen Eifersüchteleien,

hatte dies eine banale Ursache, wie der ehemalige R&A-Veteran Robert G. Neu-
mann hinsichtlich der Mitarbeit des R&A an der Nachkriegsplanung betont:
»But these teams, though well trained, were far too small to provide anything
like full coverage.« Aber auch Neumann fügt nicht ohne Bitterkeit hinzu, dass
das OSS »failed to become fully integrated on either side of the Atlantic«
(Neumann 1948: 72, 81), weshalb es bei der Planung und Durchführung der
US-amerikanischen Besatzungspolitik im Chor der zahlreichen Geheimdienst-
abteilungen unterging.
25 Nach Hudson unterschied sich die US-amerikanische Nachkriegsplanung mar-
kant von der britischen auch dadurch, dass erstere sich auf Offizielle aus der
Army und Navy beschränkte, während man in London durchaus bereit war,
Zivilisten in die Nachkriegsplanung einzubinden (Hudson 2015: 149).
26 Zur JCS 1067: Hudson 2015: 171-175. Im R&A schien die Direktive durchaus
geschätzt worden zu sein, weil sie in dieser ihre eigenen Ziele wiedererkannten:
»the demilitarization of Germany comparable to denazification, the apprehen-
sion of war criminals, industrial demilitarization and future international con-
trol of German industries« (Holborn 1947: 42).
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das Urteil seines Kollegen Holborn über die Offiziere für zivile Ange-
legenheiten geteilt haben, dass sie die Herausforderungen in Deutsch-
land benutzten, um »shielding themselves by the assertion that the
exigencies of military or non-military local conditions made the rea-
lization of political aims unfeasible« (Holborn 1947: 105). In all den
entscheidenden Gremien war – anders als das OSS – stets das Kriegs-
ministerium vertreten und dominierte die Nachkriegsplanungen, auch
weil das intra- und interinstitutionelle Ringen um Worte zu Kompro-
missen führte, die vor Ort je nach Lesart der Militärregierung interpre-
tiert wurden: »[P]ostwar governance had been developed, trained, and
organized for almost entirely within the US Army« (Hudson 2015: 151).
Diese Konstellation erklärt, weshalb die R&A rückblickend betonte,
dass die eigenen Vorschläge auf dem United Army-Navy Manual of Mili-
tary Government and Civil Affairs, dem Basic Field Manual of the Rules of
Land Warfare des War Department sowie den Verlautbarungen der ame-
rikanischen Verwaltung bzw. entsprechenden internationalen Erklärun-
gen basierten.27 Tatsächlich bestanden aber schon frühzeitig Konflikte
zwischen OSS und War Department (sowie mit anderen Behörden), wie
etwa ein frühes Memorandum im War Department nahe legt. Insbeson-
dere gegenüber dem OSS insistiert das Kriegsministerium, »that in all
departments military government will be under military direction and
control« (zitiert nach: Coles/Weinberg 1986: 99). Der sachliche Hinter-
grund für diese Streitigkeiten war dem Umstand geschuldet, dass sich
Marine und Army hinsichtlich der administrativen Probleme in den
besetzten Ländern auf militärische Angelegenheiten begrenzten und
die politische Ordnung im Status Quo belassen wollten. Entsprechend
unmissverständlich reagierte das OSS:
»Both [the Army and the Navy Manuals of military government] main-
tain that in the civil government of occupied territory the law enforced
at the time of occupation should as far as possible be applied, and the
civil administration in office at the time of occupation, as far as possible
retained. No provision is made for a situation in which the legal status
quo would repugnant to the conquerors or the administrative person-
nel unacceptable. […] It is […] quite certain that any planning for mili-
tary government, based on the assumption that the legal status quo in
the territory occupied should be supported and the existing local per-
sonnel utilized, is on dangerously weak foundations. It will not always
be easy to define the legal status quo and it may be highly undesirable
to support it when it is defined. Shall we, for example, wish to give
27 R&A 2438: The Civil Affairs Guide Program for Germany. Analysis of its Princi-
ples and Aims, S. ii.
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military sanction to the legal status quo in Nazi Germany, which has
ridden rough shod over private property rights and over civil and
religious freedom? Shall we want to endorse the Nazi educational sys-
tem? […] Analogous questions will arise in other countries, some very
difficult questions in confused areas like Alsace and Lorraine. They will
have to be answered by the military governor with the uncomfortable
feeling that the answer he gives will itself establish a status quo which
will tend to perpetuate itself and profoundly influence the pattern of
ultimate peace. The same thing is true with reference to the utilization
of the local personnel. In Germany we shall hardly dare to maintain
the Nazi administration. […] Where shall we find the administrative
personnel to run the country? These are not the kinds of problems
which can be solved out of military government books« (zitiert nach:
Coles/Weinberg 1986: 145f).
Die Missbilligung an der zu zurückhaltenden politischen Planung sei-
tens des War Department für die besetzten Gebiete kollidierte jedoch
mit der strikten Vorgabe der CAD, sich auf die »strictly military
nature« der Planung zu konzentrieren. Die Abneigung der Army
gegenüber den zivilen Behörden war allgemein bekannt. Erinnert sei
etwa an die Dwight D. Eisenhower zugeschriebenen Äußerung, dass
die siebzehn zivilen Behörden, die auf afrikanischem Boden herum-
spazieren, ihm mehr Ärger als die Deutschen bereiten würden.28 Ent-
sprechend argumentierte die R&A, dass die zivile Planung selbst eine
militärische Bedeutung habe, deren mangelnde Berücksichtigung ein
Sicherheitsrisiko sei. So heißt es etwa rückblickend bei Holborn:
»The civil affairs problems of the United States Army comprised urgent
military tasks and delicate issues of American foreign policy. […] How
many combat divisions could be carried on invasion fleets, how many
combat soldiers could be kept free for combat duties after the landing,
would largely depend upon the skill of American civil affairs officers
in organizing these services with the help of personnel of the invaded
country. A handful of these officers and a minimum of civilian supplies
could make the shipment of regiments of military police unnecessary,
and would also avoid strong-handed methods in dealing with civilian
populations« (Holborn 1947: 2).
So hieß es etwa in der R&A Studie The Civil Affairs Guide Program for
Germany. Analysis of ist Principles and Aims vom 23. Oktober 1944:
»While Military Government is not advised to undertake permanent
positive reforms in Germany’s laws and institutions, yet, within the
28 Das Zitat findet sich jedoch ohne exakten Nachweis bei: Pogue 1973: 458. Die
markante Aussage dürfte eine von General Hilldring, dem Leiter der CAD,
zusammengefasste Ansicht von General Marshalls sein.
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framework on its own administration and of its legitimate influence

upon indigenous German movements, it may pursue or promote lib-
eral and democratic policies. The Guides advocate such policies on the
assumption, that the growth of a liberal German democracy will favor
Allied security immediate and eventual.«29
Das Ziel der Militärregierung läge in der »military security (both imme-
diate and ulterior), the maintenance of law and order, and the elimi-
nation of Nazism.«30 Die Civil Affairs Guides formulieren aus der Sicht
der R&A ein positives Programm der Militärregierung, welches die
Studie wie folgt zusammenfasst: a) Eliminierung des Nazismus, b) Auf-
lösung unnötiger Behörden, c) Delegation von administrativen, techni-
schen und Routineverantwortlichkeiten an ein bereinigtes Personal des
öffentlichen Dienstes, d) Kontrolle der wichtigsten Funktionen und
Positionen durch die Militärregierung, e) Errichtung eines hierarchi-
schen Verwaltungssystems, das Politik und Maßnahmen des deutschen
Systems und der Militärregierung klar koordiniert, f) gesetzliche Kon-
trolle über alle lebenswichtigen Wirtschaftsbereiche, g) Versorgung mit
Grundbedarfsgütern und Erhaltung der deutschen Sozialsysteme, h)
Wiederherstellung der kommunalen Versorgung, i) Überwachung von
Bildungseinrichtungen, kulturellen Institutionen und Medien der
öffentlichen Meinung entsprechend der »sound ideological lines«, j)
Schutz und Rehabilitierung der Nazi-Opfer und k) Förderung liberaler
und demokratischer Institutionen.31
Diese Ziele überschritten jedoch die deutschlandpolitischen Vorstell-
ungen des War Department. Wo dieses überhaupt eine aktive Besat-
zungspolitik formulierte, blieb die militärische Notwendigkeit Primat
aller weiteren Überlegungen.32 Ausführungen zur politischen und
sozialen Neuordnung fehlen bezeichnenderweise im United Army-Navy
Manual of Government and Civil Affairs fast vollständig: Während die
R&A unter der Förderung liberaler und demokratischer Institutionen
die demokratische Reorganisation in Industrie bzw. zumindest die Stär-
ples and Aims: 62.
30 Ebenda: ii.
31 Vgl. ebenda: ivf. Diese Position wurde vom State Department wohl weitgehend
übernommen (vgl. Marquardt-Bigman 1995: 123).
32 So heißt es in einem Memo Lucius D. Clays vom 11. Februar 1943: »The meet-
ing [with Governor Lehman, 10 February] as a whole demonstrated that the
several civilian agencies concerned are approaching the problem for the ›idealis-
tic‹ viewpoint of improving conditions throughout the world rather than from
a realistic viewpoint. Governor Lehman was realistic in his approach« (zitiert
nach: Coles/Weinberg 1986: 73).
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kung der Gewerkschaften verstand,33 plädierte das War Department

für eine Wiederherstellung der ökonomischen Leistungsfähigkeit, um
die Militärverwaltung so wenig wie möglich zu belasten.34 Eine Umge-
staltung der gesellschaftlichen Verhältnisse mit prodemokratischen
antifaschistischen Organisationen und selbst nur eine Übertragung der
Verwaltungsbefugnisse auf diese sich in weitgehender Isolation befind‐
lichen Gruppen musste den Militärs als eine Gefährdung der Sicherung
der öffentlichen Ordnung erscheinen.
Wenn die R&A festhielt, dass die »elimination of Nazism from Ger-
many and from Europe is not a process that can be completed effec‐
tively without disorder and pain«, so musste diese Strategie den Mili-
tärs als Gefährdung von Ordnung und Sicherheit vorkommen. Da sich
die Analysten aus der R&A über die Position des War Department
im Klaren waren, versuchten sie, dessen Prämissen strategisch entge-
genzuarbeiten: Dies betraf die Betonung einer relativ kurzen, sich auf
organisatorische Fragen begrenzenden Militärregierung, das Primat
der Sicherheit und die Beschwörung eines starken Nazi-Untergrundes
im besiegten Deutschland, der die Alliierten auch aus militärischen
Gründen zu einer grundlegenden Entnazifizierung zwänge. Nur durch
die Förderung der freiheitlichen politischen Kräfte in Deutschland, die
den demokratischen Aufbau vorantrieben, könne die Militärregierung
entlastet werden, die nur noch als Kontrollinstanz in Deutschland agie-
ren würde.35 Ob die R&A-Analysten an diese strategische Umdeutung
glaubten, muss dahingestellt bleiben. Dass die unpolitische und bloß
militärische Orientierung der in Charlottesville, Virginia an der School
of Military Government ausgebildeten Besatzungsoffiziere skeptisch
betrachtet wurde, wird durch Holborns rückblickendes Urteil über den
dortigen »death of policy thinking« (Holborn 1947: 4) bestätigt.
Die R&A-Linie hinsichtlich des Agierens der Militärregierung lässt
sich insgesamt auf drei wesentliche Punkte zusammenfassen: 1) Die
amerikanische Verwaltung soll sich in ihrer eher kurzen Besatzungs‐
zeit auf sicherheitspolitische Erwägungen konzentrieren, ohne zu stark
33 United Army-Navy Manual of Government and Civil Affairs (FM 27-5)

22. Dezember 1943: 11f.
ples and Aims: 62-64.
35 Zur Charakterisierung der R&A Position im CAD verweist Marqurdt-Bigman
auf die Denkschrift »Purpose, Objectives, and Functions of a Military Govern-
ment Program for Germany«, deren Vorversion »Proposed Outline for the
Organization of Allied Military Government in Germany« und das Memo-
randum »Conditions Affecting Military Occupation and Government of Ger-
many« (vgl. Marquardt-Bigman 1995: 122-126).
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in die soziale Struktur einzugreifen. 2) Sie führt dennoch eine umfas-

sende Entnazifizierung der am stärksten betroffenen Bereiche durch. 3)
Sie fördert durch die Anerkennung antifaschistischer Gruppen zügig
die Entstehung von demokratischen Institutionen.36 Eine solche Positio-
nierung wies aber beachtliche Ambivalenzen auf, denn die Beschrän-
kung der alliierten Militärregierung auf organisatorische Aspekte und
die rasche Übergabe der politischen Verantwortung an die demokrati-
schen Kräfte in Deutschland implizierte auch, dass strukturpolitische
Anti-Kartell-Maßnahmen durch die Militärregierung, wie sie etwa die
FEA im Geiste der New Deal Gesetzgebung vorschlug, von der R&A
zurückgewiesen werden mussten, weil sie von den demokratisch-frei-
heitlichen Kräften in Deutschland getragen werden sollten.37 Zugleich
mussten aus der Sicht der R&A neben der Auflösung der nationalso-
zialistischen Organisationen spürbare personelle Eingriffe in die Füh-
rungsebene von Armee, Verwaltung und Industrie unternommen wer-
den. Diese Interventionen würden in das politische Leben, aber auch
die administrative, soziale und ökonomische Ordnung eine Lücke rei-
ßen, in die die freiheitlich-demokratischen Gruppen hätten stoßen kön-
nen.
Die drei Grundsätze der R&A deuten aber auch ein Trilemma an:
Eine kurze Besatzungszeit und eine schnelle Übergabe der Regierungs-
verantwortung an die Deutschen müssen weder Garanten sicherheits-
politischer Erwägungen bedeuten, noch implizierte dies eine grundle-
gende Entnazifizierung. Die Beschränkung auf den Aspekt der militärischen
Sicherheit konnte auch bedeuten, dass sowohl eine forcierte Entnazifi‐
zierung als auch eine schnelle Übergabe der Regierungsverantwortung
nur zu unnötiger Erregung führen könne. Und schließlich ließe sich
die vorgeschlagene Säuberung hochrangiger administrativer Stellen auch
als Beeinträchtigung der Sicherheitslage verstehen, etwa, wenn die
bestehenden Verwaltungsorgane mit Fragen der Infrastruktur oder der
36 NA, RG 226, R&A-History, Civil Affairs Guides, S. 98 f., zitiert nach: Marquardt-
Bigman 1995: 122.
37 Zum Konflikt mit der FEA: vgl. Marquardt-Bigman 1995: 126-137. Siehe Hol-
borns spätere Aussage: »The actions of Allied military government in the first
period had also to demonstrate as clearly as possible to the German people
and to the world the general political intentions of the Allied powers, but it
was sufficient to take only key measures, leaving a full implementation and
elaboration to the post-surrender period. From this it followed that it could not
be the function of Allied military government prior to the defeat of the enemy to
assume the responsibility for the direction of German economic life« (Holborn
1947: 35).
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Sicherstellung der Versorgungslage betraut waren, von deren Verant-

wortung sich die Militärregierung nur zu gerne hätte befreit gesehen.
Rückblickend lassen sich sicherlich Zweifel an der R&A-Konzeption
anmelden: Wie kann die Militärverwaltung die Eliten des totalitären
Monopolkapitalismus entfernen, ohne dass sie zu sehr in die poli-
tische und soziale Ordnung eingreift? Wie sollen und können die
nach zwölf Jahren totalitärer Herrschaft versprengten residualen frei-
heitlich-demokratischen Gruppen die wesentlichen Leitungsaufgaben
zahlreicher gesellschaftlicher und politischer Institutionen übernehmen
und wer zählt zu jenen auserwählten Gruppen, von denen die umfas-
sende Demokratisierung erwartet wird?38 Wie weit können die pro-
gnostizierten schmerzhaften antinazistischen Einschnitte der Militärre-
gierung gehen, wenn die soziale Lage im besiegten Deutschland so
gravierend ist, dass deren ausbleibende Linderung angesichts eines
vermuteten Nazi-Untergrundes selbst ein Sicherheitsrisiko darstellt?
Wenn die Militärregierung nur defensiv und kurzfristig tätig sein soll,
welchen administrativen und ökonomischen Eliten kann sie überhaupt
vertrauen, wenn doch nahezu alle nazifiziert oder zumindest durch-
herrscht waren – ein Problem, das sich insbesondere im Sicherheitsbe-
reich ergab?
Marquardt-Bigman, eine der herausragenden Forscherinnen zur R&A
und zur CAD, betont zu Recht, dass die Vorstellungen der R&A nicht
nur zwischen einer passiven und aktiven Rolle der Militärregierung
schwanken, sondern auch gegenüber der eigenen Annahme skeptisch
bleiben, die organisierte Arbeiterschaft könne als ein Vorkämpfer der
Demokratisierung dienen – was angesichts deren Charakterisierung
etwa in Neumanns Behemoth auch kaum überrascht (Neumann 1944:
54-59). Solche Unstimmigkeiten sind das Ergebnis des Kompromisscha-
rakters der von den Analysten vorgelegten Guides. Sie mussten ihre
eigenen Ideale, denen sie mitunter selbst misstrauten, in einem insti-
tutionellen Setting mit disparaten politischen Ordnungsvorstellungen
verteidigen und an die Realität anpassen.
38 »In the defeated countries people are not primarily interested in politics. They
are preoccupied, rather, with the primitive problems of individual survival,
such as finding food, shelter and heat. They have not been accustomed to
solve their political problems by group action through voluntary and free asso-
ciations, but by currying favors with the existing authorities« (Holborn 1947:
110). Auch Holborns These, »[t]he new parties feed largely on the programs of
an unreal past«, findet sich bei Kirchheimer wieder.
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3. Das Civil Affairs Handbook Germany: Legal Affairs
Die Handbücher für zivile Angelegenheiten in Deutschland sollten als

Nachschlagewerke und sachliche Grundlage für künftige Entscheidun-
gen der militärischen Zivilverwaltung dienen. Thematisch behandelten
sie Geographie und Gesellschaft, Regierung und Verwaltung, Finanz-,
Wirtschafts-, Handels- und Sozialpolitik, Landwirtschaft und Boden-
schätze, Kommunikationssysteme und Fragen der Meinungskontrolle,
Transportsysteme, öffentliche Betriebe und Sicherheit, Bildung und
Kultur bis hin zu Kirchen und Museen. Sie waren, anders als die Civil
Affairs Guides, um einen neutralen Stil bemüht und untersagten sich
jegliche politische oder planerische Empfehlung. Weil aber jede Inter-
pretation sozialer Tatsachen bestimmte argumentative und theoretische
Prämissen beinhaltet, lässt sich sehr wohl Kirchheimers Handschrift in
dem Handbuch erkennen – nicht zuletzt durch direkte Verweise oder
sprachliche Übernahmen aus älteren eigenen Texten.
Das Handbuch Legal Affairs stellt nacheinander die Justizverwaltung in
Deutschland, das Reichsjustizministerium, die Rechtsanwaltskammer,
das Strafrecht, die Verwaltungsgerichtsbarkeit, das Zivilrecht, das Han-
delsrecht und die kriegsbedingten Maßnahmen bis 1943 vor. Schwer-
punkte sind die umfangreichen Kapitel zu nationalsozialistischem
Strafrecht und Justizverwaltung – zu beiden Themen hatte Kirchheimer
schon publiziert. Die Argumentation ist historisch, immer wieder wird
auf langfristige Trends aus dem 19. Jahrhundert verwiesen. Dies ver-
mittelt dem Leser den Eindruck, die nationalsozialistische Rechtspolitik
stehe nicht bloß im Widerspruch zur Weimarer Republik, sondern auch
zum Kaiserreich, welches Kirchheimer sogar als »liberal age« (319)
kennzeichnet. Die Vorstellung, die deutsche Geschichte hätte zwangs-
läufig im Nationalsozialismus geendet, wird entsprechend zurückge-
wiesen. Die Geschichte Preußens erscheint im Handbuch nicht als die
des Militarismus, sondern als die des Rechtsstaates.39
Das Handbuch beschreibt zunächst ausführlich die Struktur der sich
zunehmend territorial vereinheitlichenden deutschen Justizverwaltung,
die Mitte der 1930er Jahre ihre »logical conclusion« (251) fand. Obwohl
Kirchheimer damit der Gleichschaltung der Länder ihre Dramatik
39 Damit wendet sich Kirchheimer wie die gesamte R&A gegen die Vorstellung
vom deutschen Sonderweg, wie sie vor allem von Robert Gilbert Vansittart und
Hans Morgenthau vertreten wurde. Zugleich wird auch von den Forschern um
Neumann mit Blick auf das Kaiserreich die Ungleichzeitigkeit von wirtschaftli-
cher und politisch-kultureller Entwicklung Deutschlands konstatiert.
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zu nehmen scheint, kommt er immer wieder auf die Auflösung des

preußischen Justizministeriums zurück, insbesondere dann, wenn er
an die progressiven Reformen im Strafrecht aus der Weimarer Repu-
blik erinnert. Die territoriale Vereinheitlichung des Rechts wird im
Nationalsozialismus ohnehin aufgrund der zunehmenden Etablierung
der Sondergerichtsbarkeit unterhöhlt. Kirchheimer nennt die Erbge-
sundheitsgerichte, den Volksgerichtshof, die Militärgerichte und die
Parteigerichte. »This far-reaching process of departmentalization, the
disappearance of a unified system of law behind innumerable special
jurisdictions, is one of the distinctive features of the legal system of the
Third Reich« (255).
Kirchheimer stellt in diesem längeren Abschnitt auch Überlegungen
zu politischen Einstellungen der Richterschaft an, die durchaus an
seine Schriften aus den zwanziger Jahren anknüpfen. Politisch her-
ausgefordert durch die Niederlage im Weltkrieg und die November-
revolution sowie finanziell ruiniert durch die Inflation, »the judge felt
humiliated by all these developments and instinctively sought to take
revenge on those whom he held responsible for the evil days which had
befallen him – the war profiteers, the foreigners, the radical workers.
In following this course, he became a nationalist as well as a champion
of the cause of the newly disinherited of the nation – the independent
middle class« (259). Trotz dieser deutlichen Kritik am reaktionären und
autoritären Charakter des deutschen Justizwesens erscheinen Kirchhei-
mer die Staatsanwälte und Richter gerade aufgrund ihres Konservatis-
mus als ein Hemmnis in der nationalsozialistischen Rechtspolitik. Mit
ihrem stets vakanten Festhalten an einem ordnungsgemäßen Gerichts-
verfahren mindern sie den unumschränkten Herrschaftsanspruch des
totalitären Staates. Diese Einschätzung führt ihn später in seinem
Hauptwerk Political Justice zu der These, dass der Nationalsozialismus
zwar wenig politische Gegenwehr von den Richtern zu befürchten
hatte, diese jedoch ihren eigenen »starren Kastenvorstellungen« (Kirch-
heimer 1965a: 596) verhaftet blieben und sich nicht immer mit der Sta-
tistenrolle in Schauprozessen zufrieden stellten (Vgl. ebenda: 299-305).
Auch das Handbuch argumentiert bereits in diese Richtung, wenn es
auf die »frictions« (261) zwischen Justiz und Partei verweist. Die früh-
zeitige Politisierung der Justiz vergegenwärtigt zwar den »all-embrac-
ing character« (261) des Nationalsozialismus, jedoch konnte zumindest
bis 1942/43 die völlige Verschmelzung von Justiz und Partei nicht
erreicht werden. Mehrfach erwähnt das Handbuch denn auch Hitlers
Reichstagsrede und den folgenden Beschluss des Großdeutschen
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Reichstages vom 26. April 1942, die als Versuch der Androhung diszi-
plinarischer Maßnahmen interpretiert werden und auf Spannungen in
der »Volksgemeinschaft« hinweisen.40 Vielleicht ist dies auch der
Grund, weshalb Kirchheimer die nationalkonservativen Juristen, die
sich dem Nationalsozialismus angedient haben – neben Franz Gürtner
erwähnt er vor allem Erwin Bumke (»an authority in the field of crimi-
nal law and prison administration, is a holdover from the Weimar
period« (250)) und Franz Schlegelberger (»conservative official whose
past was calculated to inspire confidence in the old bourgeoisie« (265))
–, eher als Repräsentanten des autoritären, aber bürgerlichen Zeitalters
bezeichnet. Sie stehen den explizit nationalsozialistischen Juristen, den
»reinen Praktikern der nackten Gewalt« (Kirchheimer 1965a: 430) wie
Hans Frank oder Roland Freisler gegenüber. Angemerkt sei, dass in der
heutigen Forschung eine solche Kontrastierung angesichts der Beteili-
gung der konservativen Juristen an Euthanasiemaßnahmen nicht ver-
treten und auch die »Abseifung der Justiz« (Joseph Goebbels) 1942
nicht als Zeichen eines etwaigen Widerstandes der Juristen gedeutet
wird (Schädler 2009: 52-56).
Der im Handbuch geschilderte Konflikt zwischen einem rechtsstaatli-
chen und einem totalitären Justizverständnis folgt den Überlegungen,
die Kirchheimer vor allem in seinem Aufsatz The Legal Order of National
Socialism anstellte. Insbesondere der Begriff der »technischen Rationali-
tät« (Kirchheimer 1941: 320), den Kirchheimer in der Diskussion am
Institut für Sozialforschung über den Nationalsozialismus einführte,
wird erneut aufgegriffen:
»Under the ever increasing pressure of the Ministry of Justice and
of the Party hierarchy, the traditional motion of rational justice, involv-
40 Die in der Literatur immer wieder angeführten Sätze Hitlers aus dessen letzter
Reichstagsrede lauten: »Es kann in dieser Zeit keiner auf seine wohlerworbenen
Rechte pochen, sondern jeder muß wissen, daß es heute nur Pflichten gibt. Ich
bitte deshalb den Deutschen Reichstag um die ausdrückliche Bestätigung, daß
ich das gesetzliche Recht besitze, jeden zur Erfüllung seiner Pflichten anzuhal-
ten bzw. denjenigen, der seine Pflichten nach meiner gewissenhaften Einsicht
nicht erfüllt, entweder zur gemeinen Kassation zu verurteilen oder ihn aus
Amt und Stellung zu entfernen ohne Rücksicht, wer er auch sei oder welche
erworbenen Rechte er besitze. […] Ebenso erwarte ich, daß die deutsche Justiz
versteht, daß nicht die Nation ihretwegen, sondern daß sie der Nation wegen
da ist […], daß Deutschland leben muß ganz gleich wie immer auch formale
Auffassungen der Justiz dem widersprechen mögen […]. Ich werde von jetzt
ab in diesen Fällen eingreifen und Richter, die ersichtlich das Gebot der Stunde
nicht erkennen, ihres Amtes entheben. In dieser Zeit gibt es keine selbstheiligen
Erscheinungen mit wohlerworbenen Rechten, sondern wir alle sind nur gehor-
same Diener an den Interessen unseres Volkes« (zitiert nach: Schädler 2009: 13f).
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ing a certain degree of predictability of decisions, has been definitely

superseded by a strictly technical concept of rationality. ›Rational-
ity‹ no longer means that there are generally applicable rules, of which
the consequences of non-observance may be calculated by those whom
they affect. ›Rationality‹ now means that the entire apparatus of law
and law enforcement is exclusively subservient to those in power. The
legal system is rational only for the rulers, whose main concern finds
expression in the following question. How can a given command be so
executed as to have the maximum effect in the shortest time? Under
this system legal rules have a purely provisional character; they can
be altered without notice, even, when deemed necessary, retroactively.
And all the changes in the administration of justice have only one
aim: to make entirely certain that no difficulties arise in the necessary
process of particularizing the rapidly changing orders. No one save the
rulers is entitled to question the services which the judicial machinery
performs. The legal personnel who operates it must content themselves
with producing immediate reactions to the varying commands of their
superiors« (262f).
Die Darstellung des nationalsozialistischen Rechts wird von zwei
Tendenzen charakterisiert: dem Widerspruch zwischen konservativen
Juristen und überzeugten Nationalsozialisten einerseits sowie dem
Trend zur politischen Radikalisierung andererseits. Die Rechtspflege
– insbesondere die Anwaltschaft – scheint dazwischen zu oszillieren.
»A bureaucratized society stood in the awe of those who dispensed
justice and considered the attorney somewhat as a minor adjunct of
the judicial fraternity. This attitude of the public at large was reflected
in a rather haughty and condescending attitude of the judges and the
district attorneys and in a certain degree of submissiveness on the
part of the practicing lawyer. With the advent of the Third Reich the
lawyer ceased to be an independent representative of a client who had
confidence in his professional ability, and became rather an organ of
the state, which conceded him a certain narrowly defined leeway for
representing private interests» (271).
Angesichts der beschriebenen Indoktrinierung, Ideologisierung und
Durchherrschung der Justiz dürfte dem Leser schnell klarwerden, dass
nach dem Krieg eine grundlegende Entnazifizierung notwendig sein
wird – nicht zuletzt deshalb, weil kaum ein Mitglied der Rechtspflege
ein positives Verständnis eines demokratischen Rechtsstaates hat.
Diese implizite Forderung stellt sich hinsichtlich der jeweiligen Rechts-
gebiete komplizierter dar. Wer erwartet, Kirchheimer würde das beste-
hende deutsche Strafrecht ausnahmslos verwerfen, sieht sich schnell
getäuscht. Zwar verurteilt Kirchheimer sowohl die unter den Natio-
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nalsozialisten eingeführten Strafverschärfungen als auch die Erosion

rechtsstaatlicher Standards scharf, jedoch haben die Spannungen zwi-
schen Justiz und Partei sowie das Desinteresse der Nationalsozialisten,
sich mit juristischen Fragen zu beschäftigen, dazu geführt, dass keine
geschlossene nationalsozialistische Rechtsordnung besteht.
Ausführlich beschreibt er das Strafrecht des Kaiserreichs und der Wei-
marer Republik in den Bahnen wachsender Rechtssicherheit und lobt
die relativ frühzeitigen Bemühungen um die Aufnahme des Präventi-
ons- und Resozialisierungsgedankens sowie die Einführung eines
gesonderten Jugendstrafrechts – allein die Beibehaltung der Todesstrafe
wird mit Bedauern erwähnt. Die nationalsozialistische Strafrechtstheo-
rie schwankt hingegen zwischen einer strafverschärfenden Aufgabe der
errungenen Reformen und der bewussten Umgestaltung im Sinne einer
rassischen Gemeinschaft. Lapidar heißt es hingegen im Hand-
buch: »Theoretical discussion receded in importance before major
changes of statutory law and policy« (278). Tatsächlich dient die Umge-
staltung des Strafrechts primär der Unterstützung der eigenen Gefolg-
schaft sowie der Repression potentieller politischer Feinde. Hierzu
zählt Kirchheimer nicht nur die Aufhebung des Rückwirkungsverbots
seit dem Gesetz über Verhängung und Vollzug der Todesstrafe vom
29. März 1933 (Lex van der Lubbe), sondern auch die berühmt-berüch-
tigte Formel vom »gesunden Volksempfinden« und die Aufhebung des
Analogieverbotes nach § 2 StGB. Hinzu kommen zahlreiche Strafver-
schärfungen (die Ausweitung der Todesstrafe und die Anwendung der
Zwangskastration), die Abschaffung zahlreicher Garantien im Strafver-
fahren (insbesondere das Berufungsrecht) sowie der generelle Anstieg
politischer Verfahren. Bemerkenswert ist die explizite Erwähnung des
Gesetzes gegen gefährliche Gewohnheitsverbrecher und über Maßre-
geln der Sicherung und Besserung von 1933, welches Kirchheimer als
Verstoß gegen den Gleichheitsgrundsatz im Strafrecht deutet.
Obwohl Kirchheimer immer wieder darauf hinweist, dass es keine
geschlossene nationalsozialistische Strafrechtstheorie gäbe, eint die
verschiedenen im Nationalsozialismus vertretenen strafrechtstheoreti-
schen Positionen, dass die Straftat hinter den Werdegang des Straftä-
ters (Gewohnheitsverbrecher) oder hinter die äußeren Umstände, unter
denen die Straftat begangen wurde (Schutz der Volksgemeinschaft),
zurücktritt. Die damit verbundene Vorstellung, man könne den Gele-
genheitsverbrecher in die Volksgemeinschaft erzieherisch integrieren,
während der Gewohnheitsverbrecher die volle Härte der Verfolgung
zu erfahren habe, sei indes gescheitert – wie die regelmäßig durch-
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geführten Amnestien belegen. Sie dokumentieren eher die Auswei-

tung des Strafrechts, von dem je nach politischem Bedarf Gebrauch
gemacht werden könne, zumal die beschriebenen strafrechtlichen Ver-
schärfungen (oder auch Amnestien) kein zuverlässiges Bild der deut-
schen Strafrechtspolitik zeichnen, insbesondere, weil Inhaftierungen
in Konzentrationslagern auch ohne gerichtlichen Beschluss erfolgen
konnten. »Under the Third Reich the police has emancipated itself
completely from the public prosecutor’s office […]; the prosecutor’s
office has become an auxiliary of the police« (290). Auch wenn das
nationalsozialistisch geprägte Strafrecht insgesamt den »character of
an outright gamble« (286) aufweist, ist dessen repressive Stoßrichtung
eindeutig. Das Handbuch spricht denn auch von »threatening«, »sub-
mission«, »brutality«, »destruction of legal guarantees« und »wholesale
terrorism« (304). Dagegen erscheine das Strafrecht in der Weimar Repu-
blik und im Kaiserreich als Ausdruck rechtsstaatlicher Standards – eine
These, die sich in der Beschreibung vom Verwaltungs- und Zivilrecht
wiederholt.
Das deutsche Verwaltungsrecht vor 1933 wird als zunehmend erfolg-
reicher Versuch interpretiert, willkürliche Handlungen der Exekutive
durch ein System kalkulierbarer Normen einzudämmen. Dem wird
relativ unvermittelt die nationalsozialistische Veränderung gegenüber-
gestellt. Mit deutlichen Referenzen zu Carl Schmitt und seiner Schule
(insbesondere zu Ernst Forsthoff) heißt es:
»An authoritarian, anti-liberal philosophy of the state could not recog-
nize any system which set up courts as arbiters between state and
citizens, thus putting authorities on the same level with ›subjects‹ in
subordination to the law. In practice, however, the transformation of
the existing system and its institutions took place gradually« (308).
Wie schon im Strafrecht zeigen sich auch auf dem Gebiet des Ver-
waltungsrechts schnell markante Widersprüche: Wer die Verwaltung
als Leistungsträger versteht, wird zwangsläufig den Bereich der Ver-
waltungsgerichtsbarkeit ausbauen. Jedoch müsste dies zur politisch
unerwünschten Kontrolle des Verwaltungshandelns führen, jedenfalls
so lange, wie die Verwaltung rechtsstaatlich gebunden ist. An dieser
Stelle, die in gewisser Hinsicht die Differenz der Schmittianer zum
Nationalsozialismus andeuten könnte, greift Kirchheimer seine Kritik
an Schmitt aus den frühen 1930er Jahren wieder auf.
»[S]ince administration has lost its ›negative‹ character in being no
longer restricted to the functions imposed by law, and since ›legal-
ity‹ has been replaced by ›legitimacy‹ derived from the orders of the
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Führer, the control of the civil administration by any kind of judicial

agency, administrative agency, or court was bound to become a dead
letter« (309).
Die Folge ist die Zerstörung des Verwaltungsrechts, die das Handbuch
vor allem anhand des Bedeutungsverlustes des Rechtsbehelfs doku-
mentiert.
Das Zivilrecht wird in dem Handbuch relativ stiefmütterlich behandelt,
auch, weil Kirchheimer behauptet, »no all-embracing new modificati‐
ons have been made« (313). Obwohl Kirchheimer diese These etwas
abmindert – indem er relativ kursorisch auf die Veränderungen im Ehe-
recht verweist, während er auf Fragen des Erbrechts nicht eingeht –, ist
sie in dieser Pauschalität sicherlich zu kurz gegriffen. Erinnert sei an
dieser Stelle etwa an die bahnbrechende Arbeit von Bernd Rüthers.41 Es
lässt sich nur spekulieren, weshalb das Zivilrecht keine größere Beach-
tung findet, zumal Kirchheimer in seinen früheren Studien durchaus zu
diesem Feld arbeitete. Auch wenn das von der Akademie für Deutsches
Recht angestrebte Volksgesetzbuch angesichts des Krieges nicht mehr
zum Abschluss gelangte, waren seit 1942 erste Ergebnisse bekannt. Irri-
tierend ist die weitgehende Ausblendung des Zivilrechts nicht zuletzt
auch deshalb, weil das Volksgesetzbuch einen arbeitsrechtlichen Teil
beinhalten sollte, der Kirchheimer brennend interessierte.
Das etwas längere Kapitel zum Handelsrecht ist schon deshalb auf-
schlussreich, weil hier die von Kirchheimer und Neumann vertretene
These vom Nationalsozialismus als totalitären Monopolkapitalismus
am ehesten zu vermuten ist. Tatsächlich präsentiert das Handbuch aber
fast ausschließlich die politischen Eingriffe nach 1933, insbesondere
die Arisierung und die Einführung des Führerprinzips in Aktiengesell-
schaften. In den Ausführungen zu den Aktiengesellschaften findet sich
jedoch ein leises Echo der Monopolkapitalismusthese, wenn es heißt,
diese Form des Wirtschaftens sei »the most convenient form of orga-
nization for procuring capital« (318). Die Aktionärsversammlung wird
dabei als Ausdruck des liberalen Zeitalters gedeutet, das Führerprinzip
als Entkopplung der Betriebsleitung von jeglicher Kontrolle. Der kapi-
talismuskritischen Pointe wird im Handbuch die Spitze genommen,
wenn die Stärkung der Verwaltungsmacht der Betriebsführung als
Ausdruck eines politischen Dirigismus gedeutet wird, etwa wenn es
betont, dass das Reichswirtschaftsgericht auf Antrag des Justizminis-
ters eine Gesellschaft auflösen kann, sollte sie das Gemeinwohl gefähr-
41 Vgl. Rüthers 2017.
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den. Zugleich – und dies konterkariert die eigene These – betont Kirch-
heimer ausdrücklich, dass das hier behandelte Aktiengesetz von 1937
im Wesentlichen auf einen Entwurf von 1931 zurückgeht, um dann
mit der These zu schließen: »Among the other commercial acts of the
Nazi regime the Law of Drafts is unique in not showing any Nazi ten-
dencies« (321). Diese seltsame Argumentation dokumentiert die strate-
gische Schreibweise sozialistischer Intellektueller im amerikanischen
Kriegsapparat. Bestimmte politische Positionen, die These vom totalitä-
ren Monopolkapitalismus gehört dazu, mussten weitgehend zurückge-
nommen oder verdeckt werden, zumal sie sich kaum in die praktische
Politik eines Ratgebers für amerikanische Besatzungsoffiziere operatio-
nalisieren ließen – sofern sie sich überhaupt für die mitunter subti-
len Argumente interessierten. Einem flüchtigen Leser des Handbuches
dürfte nur in Erinnerung bleiben, dass Handlungsbedarf vor allem im
Bereich der Strafjustiz und der Entnazifizierung des Justizapparates
besteht.
4. Vorschläge zur Nachkriegsplanung im besetzten Deutschland
Bevor im Folgenden Kirchheimers (mit)verfasste Studien zum natio-

nalsozialistischen Unrecht bzw. seine politischen Vorstellungen zur
Umgestaltung von Rechtspflege und -ordnung unter der Besatzung
vorgestellt werden, sei an die komplizierte Verwaltungsarchitektur
der militärischen Wissensorganisationen und die grundlegende Unter-
scheidung zwischen Analysten und politischen Entscheidern erinnert.
Wesentliche rechtspolitische Ansichten der Vereinigten Staaten wurden
von der von John B. Marsh geleiteten Legal Division beim US Group
Control Council (USGCC) und später am Office of Military Govern-
ment for Germany US (OMGUS) getroffen (Raim 2013: 22-28). Die
USGCC unterstand gleichermaßen Hilldring als Leiter der CAD und
(insbesondere) dem SHAEF-Oberbefehlshaber Eisenhower, wodurch
sie mit der dort angebundenen German Country Unit in London
zusammenarbeitete, aus der die Special Legal Unit Germany and Aus-
tria hervorging (Kostal 2019: 34-51). Die von Fritz E. Oppenheimer
geleitete Rechtsabteilung, in der mehrheitlich amerikanische und briti-
sche Juristen, aber auch der einflussreiche Emigrant Ernst J. Cohn ange-
stellt waren, unterbreitete dem SHAEF entsprechende rechtspolitische
Vorschläge. Auf die von amerikanisch-britischen Militärs geführte Ein-
heit hatte weder das OSS noch ein an der R&A angestellter deutscher
Emigrant Einfluss.
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»For the most part, however, an inverse proportionality existed within

American planning ranks between those with the most knowledge
(German émigré law scholars) and those with the most policymaking
power (American civilian and military officials)« (Kostal 2019: 35).42
4.1. Die unmittelbare Aufhebung der nationalsozialistischen

Gesetzgebung
Der subalterne Status der von der CAD beauftragten Experten wird
auch durch die Entstehung und den Stellenwert ihrer rechtspolitischen
Empfehlungen zum nachfaschistischen Deutschland deutlich. General
Hilldring forderte zunächst das Justizministerium auf, eine Liste der
aufzuhebenden Gesetze zu erarbeiten. Das Justizministerium reagierte
auf den R&A-Bericht The Reorganization of the German Administration
of Justice in 1942, in dem die These aufgestellt wurde, dass mit der
Eskalation des Krieges »a critical situation had arisen in the German
administration of justice by reason of the conflict between Nazi princi-
ples and practices and older standards« (zitiert nach: Kostal 2019: 37).
Es lässt sich nach heutigem Wissenstand nicht klären, ob dieser Text
von Kirchheimer verfasst wurde, auf jeden Fall entspricht er der Linie
der Neumann-Gruppe: Der Nationalsozialismus basiere auf einem pre-
kären Bündnis konkurrierender Eliten, was implizit nahelegt, dass kon-
servative Juristen für den Wiederaufbau durchaus Verwendung finden
könnten. Das Justizministerium reagierte auf diesen Report, indem es
Karl Loewenstein mit einem entsprechenden Gutachten beauftragte,
der denn auch zu einem dezidiert schärferen Urteil kam: Aufgrund
ihrer antidemokratischen Einstellung haben die deutschen Juristen,
selbst wenn sie keine überzeugten Nationalsozialisten waren, kein
Problem mit dem nationalsozialistischen Recht und werden nach dem
Krieg einer kleinen Gruppe von »Nazigangstern« die Schuld geben, um
sich zugleich als Vertreter des Rechts beim Aufbau des Staates bei den
Alliierten anzudienen. Um dies zu verhindern und eine tiefgreifende
Entnazifizierung durchzuführen, bedürfe es einer von den Alliierten
konsequent betriebenen politischen Säuberung. Diese sehr starke These
fand jedoch unter den Militärs nur wenig Unterstützung.
Vor diesem Hintergrund erhielt das OSS von Hilldring – über Holborn,
Anderson und Schorske – im Januar 1944 den Auftrag, einen weiteren
42 Obwohl die Rechtsabteilung der interalliierten German Country Unit mehrheit-

lich von US-amerikanischen oder britischen Juristen besetzet war, wurde sie von
zwei Emigranten, Fritz E. Oppenheimer und Ernst J. Cohn, geleitet.
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Vorschlag über die Aufhebung nationalsozialistischen Rechts anzufer-

tigen. Jedoch kam es wieder zu Verzögerungen: Die Empfehlungen
mussten zunächst mit den in der CAD zusammengefassten und mitein-
ander konkurrierenden Organisationen (insbesondere der FEA) intern
abgestimmt werden. So beklagt sich Neumann, der das Projekt formell
leitete, es aber Kirchheimer43 überantwortete, in einem Brief an den
Leiter der R&A Branch in London Crane Brinton über »innumerable
difficulties« zwischen der FEA und der R&A sowie den Widerständen
des Editoral Committees. In letzterem würden sich konservative Juris-
ten, gemeint ist Cohn, zu Verteidigern von Eigentumsrechten gerieren
und so »the need for political and social transformation«44 bewusst
übersehen.
Schwerpunkt des so entstandenen Civil Affairs Guide The Abrogation of
Nazi Laws in the Early Period of Military Government vom März 1944
sind die ersten alliierten rechtspolitischen Maßnahmen unmittelbar
nach der militärischen Besetzung des deutschen Territoriums. Es geht
Kirchheimer weder um eine grundlegende Entnazifizierung noch um
die Demokratisierung von Staat und Gesellschaft, sondern lediglich um
die ersten Schritte der Militärregierung. Getragen wird die Argumen-
tation von der von vielen R&A-Analysten geteilten Vorstellung, dass
eine demokratische Ausgestaltung Deutschlands von unten erfolgen
müsse und im gleichen Zuge die nationalsozialistische Gesetzgebung
entsprechend zurückzunehmen wäre. Markant an dem Dokument ist
insbesondere, dass es weniger auf der sofortigen Aufhebung der unter
dem Nationalsozialismus erlassenen Gesetze beharrt, sondern ange-
sichts der Option eines demokratisches Deutschlands entsprechende
Maßnahmen pragmatisch behandelt.
Ein rigider Eingriff durch die Militärregierung führe nach Kirchheimer
lediglich zu »chaotic conditions« (156). Doch selbstverständlich argu-
mentiert Kirchheimer nicht allein aus einer den Militärs entgegenar-
beitenden sicherheitspolitischen Perspektive. Vielmehr erinnert er an
die Ideale der Vereinten Nationen und die Moskauer Deklaration,
deren besatzungspolitische Ziele für Italien (»that Fascism and all its
evil influence and configuration shall be completely destroyed and
that the Italian people shall be given every opportunity to establish
43 Im Interoffice Memorandum vom 18. Januar 1944 wird auch John Herz als Mit-
arbeiter genannt.
44 Franz L. Neumann an Crane Brinton, 30. 3. 1944. in: Entry 146: Miscellaneous
Washington Files, Box 83, Record Group 226: Records of the Office for Strategic
Services, National Archives at Maryland.
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governmental and other institutions based on democratic principles«)

er auf Deutschland überträgt. Solche freiheits- und demokratiepoliti-
schen Überlegungen werden jedoch stets an sicherheitspolitische Argu-
mente gekoppelt. Neben dieser Spannung lässt sich noch ein zweiter
Gegensatz zumindest subkutan ausmachen: zwischen dem Plädoyer
für einen schnellen demokratischen Aufbau durch die deutsche Bevöl-
kerung und den Bedenken gegenüber einer totalitär durchherrschten
Gesellschaft mit Eliten, die sich schon vor 1933 in autoritären Bahnen
bewegten.
Vier Empfehlungen enthält The Abrogation of Nazi Laws in the Early
Period of Military Government: (1) Aufhebung diskriminierender Gesetze,
(2) Wiederherstellung der (politischen) Grundrechte, (3) Aufhebung
von Gesetzen, die unmittelbarer Ausdruck der nationalsozialistischen
Ideologie sind, und (4) Reformierung des Justizsystems durch Suspen-
dierung aller deutschen Richter.
(1) Diskriminierende Gesetze sind für Kirchheimer alle Gesetze, die den
klassischen Bürgerrechten, insbesondere dem Gleichheitssatz, wider-
sprechen. Schwerpunkt bilden hierbei alle »Ariergesetze« (Blutschutz‐
gesetz und Reichsbürgergesetz), also Fragen des Staatsbürgerschafts-
und Familienrechts, die entsprechend rückwirkend annulliert werden
sollen. Neben diesen Maßnahmen, die vor allem Juden sowie Sinti und
Roma betreffen, fordert der Guide die Wiederherstellung der Grund-
rechte für »Fremdarbeiter«. Beachtenswert ist die Forderung, dass von
den Nationalsozialisten ausgebürgerte Deutsche keinesfalls automa-
tisch ihre deutsche Staatsbürgerschaft zurückerhalten sollten, sondern
diese in Deutschland beantragen müssten. Dies wird jedoch nicht näher
begründet, sondern lediglich behauptet, eine andere Reglung könne
ihnen unnötigen Schaden zufügen – offen bleibt hier, von wem. Zu
den Maßnahmen gegen die Diskriminierung zählt Kirchheimer auch
die Aufhebung besonderer Vorrechte für NSDAP-Mitglieder, Polizisten
und Wehrmachtssoldaten, die nicht nur Nutznießer des nationalsozia-
listischen Staates waren, sondern »contributed much to the rigidity
and authoritarianism of German government« (163). Unter national-
sozialistischer Herrschaft eingebürgerte »Rassedeutsche« sollen nicht
ausgebürgert werden, denn sie würden – so der Guide – kaum in ihren
Heimatländern willkommen sein. Dass damit die Strafverfolgung von
Tätern erschwert werden könnte, wird nicht diskutiert, wohl auch des-
halb, weil Kirchheimer an eine entsprechende Verfolgung in Deutsch-
land glaubte.
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(2) Die schnelle Wiederherstellung politischer Freiheitsrechte – gemeint

sind vor allem die Versammlungs- und Vereinigungsfreiheit sowie
die Meinungs-, Presse- und Religionsfreiheit – begründet Kirchheimer
primär mit der von Seiten des Militärs anvisierten kurzfristigen Besat-
zungszeit. Im Detail wird jedoch die Komplexität dieses sehr couragier-
ten Plädoyers deutlich: So soll sich die Militärregierung zunächst ledig-
lich auf das Verbot nationalsozialistischer Organisationen (explizit wer-
den die NSDAP und die Deutsche Arbeitsfront genannt) beschränken,
zugleich aber überwachen, dass etwaige Nachfolge- oder Auffangor‐
ganisationen nicht wiedergegründet werden, wozu Kirchheimer auch
die DNVP zählt. Diese Einschätzung ist auch deshalb bemerkenswert,
weil er entgegen seiner Versicherung, die Nationalsozialisten seien eine
»bellicose and rapacious minority« (165), immer wieder auf die poli-
tische Gleichschaltung, Ideologisierung und Durchherrschung breiter
gesellschaftlicher Bereiche im Nationalsozialismus hinweist.
(3) Deshalb sollen alle Bereiche, welche explizit Ausdruck nationalso-
zialistischer Weltanschauung sind, nicht erst durch eine künftige deut-
sche Regierung, sondern bereits unter alliierter Besatzung aufgelöst
werden. Die Militärverwaltung soll nicht in die Lage versetzt werden,
Recht anzuwenden, welches aufgrund seiner offenkundigen Grausam-
keit den Prinzipien der Vereinten Nationen widerspräche. Hierzu zählt
Kirchheimer neben dem Verbot nationalsozialistischer Symbole die
Gesetze zu Eugenik, insbesondere zu Zwangssterilisationen, aber auch
das Gesetz zur Ordnung der nationalen Arbeit. Diese markante Akzen-
tuierung des Arbeitsordnungsgesetzes dokumentiert eine Verbunden-
heit mit der Arbeiterbewegung: Sein Argument, die Aufhebung des
Gesetzes sei aufgrund des dort festgelegten Führerprinzips zwingend,
ließe sich auch auf andere Bereiche des sozialen Lebens anwenden –
was von der Militärregierung ein aktiveres Agieren verlangen würde,
als es der Guide auf den ersten Blick nahelegt.
(4) Auch Kirchheimers Vorschläge zur Entnazifizierung der Justiz ste-
hen in einem latenten Widerspruch zu der zunächst erklärten alliier-
ten Zurückhaltung. Der Guide fordert, dass alle Richter und Staats-
anwälte für zwei Monate suspendiert werden, was zwangsläufig zur
Aussetzung sämtlicher Gerichtsaktivitäten führen werde. Lediglich
vertrauenswürdige Angehörige der Richter- und Anwaltschaft sollen
nach gründlicher Überprüfung wieder eingestellt werden. Auch die
Option, Laienrichter zu verpflichten, scheint für Kirchheimer eine Mög-
lichkeit zu sein. Der Widerspruch zur proklamierten militärpolitischen
Linie des minimalen alliierten Eingriffes wird an dieser Stelle selbst
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von Kirchheimer thematisiert und einer entsprechenden Besatzungs‐

einheit auferlegt, die die künftigen Bewerber überprüfen solle. Den
Schwerpunkt bildet schließlich die Auflösung der Konzentrationslager
und die Freilassung der Gefangenen, wobei sich der Guide auf poli-
tische Gefangene und Juden konzentriert, während »Asoziale«, Sinti
und Roma, Zeugen Jehovas und Emigranten nicht erwähnt werden.
Sogenannte »Berufsverbrecher« dürfen nur dann freigelassen werden,
wenn sie nicht durch ein gerichtliches Verfahren inhaftiert wurden –
im Zweifel sollten sie (trotz spürbarer Vorbehalte Kirchheimers) von
deutschen Verantwortlichen erst später entlassen werden. Kirchheimer
reagiert hier auf die Politisierung des Rechts in totalitären Systemen,
in denen »many offenses which under ordinary circumstances would
appear as non-political, have assumed political color under the condi-
tions of Nazism« (174). Die Entscheidung, diese Häftlinge zu entlassen
und die Konzentrationslager umgehend aufzulösen, begründet der
Guide einsilbig: »the facilities of existing concentration camps will be
needed for the detention of the large numbers of active Nazis and
similar categories of persons to be detained by MG for reasons of secu-
rity« (173).
Sowohl die Anlage des Guides als auch die inhaltlichen Aussagen
waren nicht nur innerhalb der CAD umstritten, auch verfolgte der
Guide eine andere Linie als die Rechtsabteilung der German Country
Unit des obersten Hauptquartiers in London. Einig war man sich über
die Abschaffung von diskriminierenden Gesetzen, wobei darüber, wel-
che konkret gemeint seien, Unstimmigkeiten bestanden – nur so erklärt
sich das lange Ringen um eine entsprechende Liste der aufzuhebenden
Gesetze und Verordnungen. Ein wesentlicher Abgrenzungspunkt zur
Rechtsabteilung der German Country Unit richtete sich auf die von
Cohn anvisierte Wiederherstellung der bürgerlichen Freiheiten. Neu-
mann kommentierte dies scharfzüngig in seinem Begleitschreiben zu
dem Abrogation-Guide an Brinton von der Londoner Außenstelle der
R&A: »A man like Ernst Cohn has the interest of private property close
to his heart. MG should not consider it its job to undo property transac-
tions which have been carried out under the Nazis.«45 Eine bloße Auf-
hebung der nationalsozialistischen Gesetzgebung und Rückkehr zum
Zustand Status pro ante vor 1933 würde die sozialen Veränderungen
der letzten Jahre zementieren und die notwendigen sozialen Reformen
verhindern. Gegenüber den Vorschlägen der Rechtsabteilung der Ger-
45 Neumann an Crane Brinton 10.4.1944. In: Entry 146: Miscellaneous Washington

Files, Box 83, Record Group 226, Records of the Office for Strategic Services,
National Archives at Maryland.
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man Country Unit fordert die R&A deutlicher die Säuberung der Justiz
und die nur beschränkte Wiederherstellung bürgerlicher Freiheiten, um
ein Agieren der Militärregierung und später der deutschen (antifaschis-
tischen) Regierung nicht zu behindern.
Es ist der letzte Punkt, die Hoffnung auf eine antinazistisch ausgerich-
tete deutsche Regierung, der eine wesentliche Differenz zur FEA aus-
macht. In einer internen Kritik des Abrogation-Guide hebt Magdalene
Schoch,46 zunächst Mitarbeiterin im Office of Economic Warfare und
seit September 1943 in der FEA, hervor, dass zwischen dem OSS und
der FEA weitgehende Einigkeit bestünde.47 Tatsächlich präferiert sie
aber ein deutlich stärkeres Eingreifen der Militärregierung. Einerseits
wundert sie sich, dass der Abrogation-Guide bestimmte offenkundig
diskriminierende Gesetze nicht aufheben will, etwa das Reichserbhof-
gesetz oder (wie in dem von ihr mitverfassten FEA-Guide Elimination
of Fundamental Nazi Political Laws in Germany) die Reichstagsbrandver-
ordnung. Andererseits ist sie über die Gliederung des Abrogation-Gui-
des irritiert, denn die R&A diskutiert nicht systematisch bestimmte
Themenfelder, sondern konzentriert sich auf zeitlich beschränkte all-
gemeine Maßnahmen der frühen Besatzungszeit, weshalb zahlreiche
Gegenstände berührt werden, die von anderen Guides behandelt wer-
den sollten. Was auf den ersten Blick wie eine formalistische Kritik
oder Kompetenzstreitigkeit erscheint, ist jedoch Ausdruck der Sorge,
die Alliierten könnten zu nachlässig die Entnazifizierung vorantreiben.
Dass sie sowohl eine vollständige Aufhebung aller nach 1933 erlasse-
nen Verwaltungsgesetze als auch eine durchgreifende Entnazifizierung
mit klar definierten Strafen durch die Alliierten fordert, veranschau-
licht ihre Vorbehalte gegenüber den Deutschen, dies später selbst zu
bewerkstelligen. Die gleiche Kritik wird in einem weiteren, deutlich
polemischeren Memorandum von H. Bowen Smith, Associate Chief der
Economic Institution Staff der FEA, noch deutlicher: Die Vorbehalte des
Abrogation-Guides, bestimmte Themenbereiche den Deutschen und
nicht den Alliierten zu überantworten, werden als unnötige Gefähr-
dung der eigenen Mission zurückgewiesen. Wenn auch Kirchheimer
die Gefahr einer »bellicose and rapacious minority« (165) an National-
sozialisten sehe, so Smith, wieso präferiere er eine schnelle Übergabe
der Regierungsverantwortung an die Deutschen? Ein vorab definiertes
46 Zu Magdalene Schoch vgl.: Nicolaysen (2006).

47 Vgl. Magdalene M. Schoch an David M. Levitan vom 7. 4. 1944. In: Entry 44:
Civil Affairs Guides, Box 3, Record Group 226, Records of the Office for Strate-
gic Services, National Archives at Maryland. Levitan war Chief of the Property
Control Division der FEA sowie der Chairman des Draft Committee.
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Betätigungsverbot für die deutschen Richter und Staatsanwälte (zwei

Monate) weist Smith zurück, vielmehr solle eine langsame Öffnung
der Gerichte nach Ermessen der Alliierten erfolgen. Insgesamt sei
der Abrogation-Guide ein »failure«.48 Die skeptischere Haltung der
FEA gegenüber den Deutschen wird noch an einer anderen Stelle deut-
lich: Hatte Kirchheimer eine automatische Wiedereinbürgerung ausge-
schlossen und gefordert, die Staatenlosen müssten diese in Deutsch-
land erneut beantragen, wird dies von Schoch, die deutlich vorsichtiger
über die deutschen Behörden urteilt, als unnötige Belastung der nicht
selten staatenlosen Vertriebenen bewertetet. Stattdessen fordert sie eine
Agentur, die diese Fälle regelt.
Kirchheimers Reaktion ist mehr als deutlich. In einem an Sherman Kent
verschickten Memorandum wird dem konkurrierenden FEA-Guide Eli-
mination of Fundamental Nazi Political Laws in Germany49 grundsätzlich
abgesprochen, eine eigenständige Arbeit zu sein.50 Er sei ein bloßer
Kommentar des eigenen Textes. Einzig die Frage nach den Grund-
rechten der Ausgebürgerten wird positiv aufgegriffen, denn diese sei
aus Platzgründen zu kurz abgehandelt worden. Noch einmal bestätigt
Kirchheimer die eigene Position: Die Frage, welche Gesetze aufgehoben
werden sollen, wird als ein der Säuberung nachgeordnetes Problem
begriffen. Dies werde schon von den (antifaschistischen) Deutschen
unternommen. Genau dies bezweifelt aber Schoch. Hingegen drängt
die R&A auf eine soziale Neuordnung Deutschlands von unten, wes-
halb sowohl Dauer als auch Intensität der Militärregierung begrenzt
sein sollen. Aus dem gleichen Grund kann auf keinen Fall der ver-
fassungsrechtliche Zustand der Weimarer Republik wiederhergestellt
werden. So erhebt Neumann – sicherlich in Rücksprache mit Kirchhei-
mer und Herz – in seiner Kritik am FEA-Guide »grave objections«51
gegenüber dem dort vorgebrachten Vorschlag, die Reichstagsbrandver-
ordnung und das Ermächtigungsgesetz vom 24. 3. 1933 sollen aufgeho-
ben werden. Dies würde den zweiten Teil der Reichsverfassung und
(zumindest implizit) auch den ersten Teil wieder in Kraft setzen. Die
48 Memorandum von H. Bowen Smith an David M. Levitan vom 11.4.1944, S. 3. In:

Entry 44: Civil Affairs Guides, Box 3, Record Group 226, Records of the Office
for Strategic Services, National Archives at Maryland.
49 Der Report wurde von Magdalene Schoch, der Deutschlandexpertin Miriam
Oatman und einem Mr. Weiden verfasst.
50 Otto Kirchheimer/John Herz: Memorandum an Sherman Kent vom 9.5.1944.
51 Franz L. Neumann: Critique on FEA Guide Elimination of Fundamental Nazi
Political Laws in Germany vom 10.5.1944. In: Entry 146: Miscellaneous Wash-
ington Files, Box 83, Record Group 226, Records of the Office for Strategic
Services, National Archives at Maryland.
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damit erneut geltenden Grundrechte (insbesondere die gesetzlichen

Bestimmungen zum Eigentum) würden nicht nur das Agieren der
Militärregierung behindern, sondern auch Freiheitsrechte versprechen,
die es in der Besatzungszeit nur äußerst begrenzt geben kann. Zudem
unterstelle der Vorschlag der FEA zumindest implizit, so Neumann,
dass allein durch die Außerkraftsetzung bestimmter Gesetze und Ver-
ordnungen eine Rückkehr zur Demokratie möglich sei – eine Behaup-
tung, die angesichts der von der FEA nachdrücklich geforderten poli-
tischen Säuberung unzutreffend ist. Grundsätzlich unterscheiden sich
die beiden Guides in der Bewertung der politischen Aktivitäten der
Deutschen: Obwohl beide von einer »deep permeation of German
society by Nazism« überzeugt sind, vertrauen Neumann, Kirchhei-
mer und Herz darauf, dass die gewerkschaftsnahen antifaschistischen
Komitees eine neue Verfassung in Richtung eines demokratischen
Sozialismus verwirklichen. Eine Beschränkung der Militärregierung
darf daher nicht mit Nachlässigkeit verwechselt werden. Die grundle-
gende Entnazifizierung sollte von den Deutschen und nicht den Alliier-
ten unternommen werden. Schoch und die FEA werten jedoch diese
Erwartung als zu optimistisch, weshalb ihnen die von den R&A-Ana-
lytikern vorgeschlagenen Maßnahmen als zu sorglos erscheinen sein
mussten.
Damit stand die R&A contre cœur der Rechtsabteilung der German
Country Unit nahe, die zunehmend auf eine vergleichsweise begrenzte
Entnazifizierungspolitik durch die Alliierten einschwenkte. Ein zu
intensiver Eingriff in deutsches Recht wurde im Herbst 1944 vor allem
von Seiten der britischen Militärjuristen moniert. Sie kritisierten zum
einen prinzipiell, dass das Völkerrecht keiner Besatzungsmacht erlaube,
innerstaatliches Recht des besetzten Gebietes dauerhaft zu ändern.
Zudem machten sie strategische Gründe geltend: einerseits, ob ein alli-
ierter Eingriff selbst in Fragen des Eherechts nicht die deutsche Feind-
schaft zu sehr befeuere, und andererseits, dass eine partielle Aufhe‐
bung von NS-Recht nur unnötige Rechtsunsicherheit befördere. Ver-
langt wurde vielmehr eine detaillierte Liste mit aufzuhebenden Geset-
zen. Eine solche Aufzählung war dem Abrogation-Guide hinzugefügt,
sie spielte jedoch nach heutigen Erkenntnissen bei der Entstehung der
durch die Special Legal Unit im Winter/Frühjahr 1944/45 erarbeiteten
Liste der aufzuhebenden Gesetze keine nachweisbare Rolle – auch
wenn sie zahlreiche Übereinstimmungen aufweist. Die Liste der
Rechtsabteilung wurde in das Kontrollratsgesetz Nr. 1 betreffend die
Aufhebung von NS-Recht übernommen. Insgesamt stimmen zahlreiche
Vorschläge des Abrogation-Guides mit den Ideen der Special Legal
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Unit Germany and Austria überein: befristete Schließung der deut-

schen Gerichte, Entlassung der Richter und Staatsanwälte sowie parti-
elle Außerkraftsetzung des deutschen Rechts unter der Militärverwal-
tung. Vergleicht man die im Guide enthaltenen Vorschläge der aufzu-
hebenden Gesetze und Verordnungen mit den Maßnahmen der Alliier-
ten, so finden sich beachtliche Übereinstimmungen; zahlreiche von
Kirchheimer aufgeführte Vorschläge finden sich auch in den Kontroll-
ratsgesetzen. Bemerkenswert ist jedoch, dass der Guide nicht das
Gesetz zur Wiederherstellung des Berufsbeamtentums, aber die hiermit
verbundenen Gesetze über die Zulassung zur Rechtsanwaltschaft sowie
von Ärzten und Steuerberatern erwähnt. Auch einige rassistische
Gesetze werden von Kirchheimer nicht benannt, andere jedoch aufge-
führt, die von den Alliierten unerwähnt bleiben – auch weil sie schon
vor 1945 keine Gültigkeit mehr besaßen.
Hingegen entsprechen die alliierten Entnazifizierungsmaßnahmen nur
begrenzt Kirchheimers Vorschlägen. Die von ihm geforderte generelle
Entlassung aller Richter und Staatanwälte beschränkten die Alliierten
auf die »Mitglieder der Nazi-Partei […] und alle anderen Personen, die
an den Strafmethoden des Hitler-Regimes direkten Anteil hatten«
(Kontrollratsgesetz Nr. 4 vom 30. Oktober 1945). Auch wenn der Kreis
der nach dem Kontrollratsgesetz zu entlassenden Justizjuristen sehr
umfangreich war und in der Direktive Nr. 24 vom 12. Januar 1946 wei-
tere Gruppen genannt wurden, die unvereinbar mit einer Weiterbe-
schäftigung im Justizdienst waren (Offiziere der Wehrmacht und
Reichswehr sowie Personen aus der preußischen Junkertradition), stan-
den diese Maßnahmen stets unter dem Vorbehalt individueller Prüfun-
gen, die vor Ort nur schwer zu bewerkstelligen waren und einen enor-
men bürokratischen Aufwand bedeuteten. Zu der vorgeschlagenen
zweimonatigen Schließung aller Gerichte kam es nicht; die ersten
Amtsgerichte öffneten bereits im Mai 1945 – auch, weil viele Gerichte
bereits 1944 geschlossen waren (Raim 2013: 73-83). Der markanteste
Unterschied zwischen Kirchheimers Vorschlägen und den frühen Kon-
trollratsgesetzen findet sich im Umgang mit den nationalsozialistischen
Gesetzen zur Eugenik. Während Kirchheimer deren Aufhebung mit
Verweis auf den rassistischen Charakter empfahl, ist es weder unter der
westalliierten Militärregierung52 noch lange Zeit in der Bundesrepublik
52 Michael Bryant verweist anhand des Wiesbadener Hadamar-Prozesses auf die

mangelnde Bereitschaft der US-amerikanischen Beamten, die Tötung Kranker
als Verbrechen gegen die Menschlichkeit zu deuten. Die Verurteilung der Ange-
klagten basierte auf der Tötung von Kriegsgefangenen und erfolgte auch später
beim Nürnberger Ärzteprozess vor allem in Verbindung mit der Aburteilung
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zur Aufhebung der Gesetze gekommen,53 was sich dann sowohl auf die
Strafverfolgung (mit gewissen Ausnahmen der frühen Verfolgung,
etwa im Nürnberger Ärzte-Prozess) als auch die entsprechenden Wie-
dergutmachungsansprüche auswirkte.
4.2. Die Verwaltung der Strafjustiz unter der Militärregierung
Auch der Guide Administration of German Criminal Justice under Mili-

tary Government, ebenfalls für die frühe Besatzungszeit verfasst, ist
von dem latenten Trilemma zwischen einer schnellen Übergabe der
Regierungsverantwortung an die Deutschen, den sicherheitspolitischen
Erwägungen der Alliierten und der Rücknahme einzelner national-
sozialistischer Rechtsakte, die besonders grausam sind, erfasst. Die
notwendige Reform des deutschen Strafrechts sei einerseits »a problem
whose solution may be left to the German people«, andererseits hat
das Strafrecht »to satisfy the requirements of military occupation and
to fulfill the purposes and policies of the United Nations« (186). Diese
latent widersprüchliche Position war nur dann plausibel, wenn man
von einer kurzen Besatzungszeit ausging, in der die inhumansten natio-
nalsozialistischen Gesetze aufgehoben wurden, der sich eine Phase der
bewussten freiheitlich-demokratischen Neuorientierung mit einer ent-
sprechenden Gesetzgebung anschloss.
Dass Kirchheimer von diesem selbst entworfenen optimistischen Sze-
nario nicht völlig überzeugt zu sein schien, dokumentiert der Guide
an den Stellen, wo er auf das vornazistische Strafrecht zu sprechen
kommt. Einerseits wird das deutsche Strafrecht vor 1933 als »one of
the highly respected systems of criminal law« (186) beschrieben – eine
Charakterisierung, die sich mit Kirchheimers kriminologischen Studien
(insbesondere in Punishment and Social Structure) insofern deckt, als
auch hier Reformen aus dem späten 19. Jahrhundert und der Wei-
marer Republik eine Wertschätzung erfahren. Die in seinen krimino-
von Kriegsverbrechen bzw. dem Mord an den europäischen Juden (vgl. Bryant
2005: 63-106; siehe auch: Weindling 2005: 250-256).
53 Die Sterilisationsentscheidungen der ehemaligen Erbgesundheitsgerichte sind
seit 1998 aufgehoben. Von einer expliziten Aufhebung wurde zunächst Abstand
genommen, weil die Gültigkeit des Erbgesundheitsgesetzes mit dem Inkrafttre‐
ten des Grundgesetzes (Art. 123 Abs. 1 GG in Verbindung mit Art. 2 Abs. 2 GG)
erloschen sei. Das Gesetz wurde durch die 5. Reform des Strafgesetzes außer
Kraft gesetzt und 2007 geächtet. Ein Rechtsanspruch auf Entschädigung nach
dem Bundesentschädigungsgesetz besteht bis heute nicht (vgl. Braun/Herrmann
2015; Benzler/Perels 1996).
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logischen Arbeiten der 1930er Jahren formulierte klassentheoretische

These – jede Strafrechtsreform verfüge über eine absolute Grenze,
die es ihr nicht gestattet, Kriminelle besser als die schwächste soziale
Klasse zu behandeln, weshalb denn auch die Verbesserung des Straf-
vollzuges nur in Abhängigkeit zur ökonomischen Situation möglich ist
(Kirchheimer/Rusche 1939: 333-337; 391f) –, findet sich in dem Guide
selbstverständlich nicht. Die positive Beschreibung des deutschen Straf-
rechtssystems spricht sicherlich für eine schnelle Rückübertragung
der Regierungsverantwortung. Andererseits legt nicht nur die Bemer-
kung, »German courts worked with an antiquated system before Hitler
came to power«, sondern insbesondere die Empfehlung, auch einzelne
strafrechtliche Bestimmungen vor 1933 abzuschaffen, den Verdacht
nahe, dass das Zutrauen in die vermutete freiheitlich-demokratische
Gesinnung der Deutschen auch Grenzen hatte. Schließlich endet der
Text mit Überlegungen, unter welchen Umständen eine längere Besat-
zungsdauer notwendig sei. Bezeichnenderweise werden hier Probleme
aufgeworfen, welche einer grundlegenden Verfolgung nationalsozialis-
tischen Unrechts entgegenstanden: die Rechtfertigung des einzelnen
Handelns mit Verweis auf den Befehlsnotstand, die Ausnutzung von
Verjährungsfristen, die Berufung auf erfolgte Amnestierungen und
schließlich der Korpsgeist innerhalb der deutschen Verwaltung.
Aufschlussreich an diesem Text ist zudem, dass er nahelegt, die Militär-
regierung habe drei gleichberechtigte Ziele zu erfüllen: die Verwaltung
mit Schwerpunkt auf sicherheitspolitische Interessen, die Beibehaltung
des nationalsozialistischen Rechts, um den Deutschen rasch die Regie-
rungsverantwortung zurückzugeben, sowie die Abschaffung der gröbs-
ten strafrechtlichen Veränderungen (»outrage civilized concepts«54).
Dass in den amerikanischen Feldhandbüchern politische Ordnungsvor-
stellungen stets sicherheitspolitischen Fragen nachgeordnet blieben,
wird nur am Anfang des Textes deutlich. Zunehmend bewegen sich
die Vorstellungen des Guides in dem Spannungsfeld zwischen (alliier-
ter) Entnazifizierung und Rückgabe der Souveränität an die deutschen
demokratischen Gruppen. Ein Überblick über die zur Aufhebung emp-
fohlenen strafrechtlichen Gesetze und Verordnungen veranschaulicht,
dass der Guide der alliierten Entnazifizierung einen geringeren Stellen-
wert als der Übertragung nationaler Souveränität beimisst. Selbstver-
ständlich ist diese Forderung mit der Vorstellung verknüpft, die deut-
schen Verantwortlichen würden »the abolition of or the purge of Nazi
courts or of racial legislation« (186) betreiben.
54 United Army-Navy Manual of Government and Civil Affairs (FM 27-5), § 9n.
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So sollen zunächst vor allem Strafgesetze aufgehoben werden, die das

Verhältnis zu den Alliierten betreffen sowie unmittelbarer Ausdruck
nationalsozialistischer Herrschaft sind: die Verordnung des Reichsprä-
sidenten zum Schutze des Deutschen Volkes, die Reichstagsbrandver-
ordnung, das Gesetz zur Abwehr politischer Gewalttaten, das Gesetz
zum Schutz der nationalen Symbole, das Gesetz gegen die Neubildung
von Parteien, das Gesetz zur Gewährleistung des Rechtsfriedens, das
Heimtückegesetz und das Gesetz zum Schutz von Bezeichnungen der
NSDAP. Zudem sollen kriegsbedingte Gesetze aufgehoben werden, ins-
besondere dann, wenn sie die den militärischen Erfordernissen der
Alliierten widersprechen: etwa die Kriegsstrafverfahrensordnung bzw.
Kriegssonderstrafrechtsverordnung, die Verordnung gegen Volks-
schädlinge, die Verordnung gegen Gewaltverbrecher und die Verord-
nung über den Umgang mit Kriegsgefangenen. Bemerkenswert ist,
dass Kirchheimer auch die Strafverschärfung für Feld- und Forstdieb-
stähle und das Abtreibungsverbot nach § 5 der Verordnung zum Schutz
von Ehe, Familie und Mutterschaft von 1943 aufzählt. Auffällig ist
auch, dass der Guide von den Strafgesetzen, die vor 1939 erlassen wur-
den, nur § 2 StGB aufheben möchte. Er begründet dies nur mit der in
Absatz 2 formulierten Aufhebung des Rückwirkungsverbotes. Die
berüchtigte Formel, dass derjenige bestraft werde, der »nach gesundem
Volksempfinden Bestrafung verdient«, findet hier keine Beachtung. Die
Bedeutung dieser Formel hatte Kirchheimer jedoch in früheren Texten
mehrfach erkannt (Kirchheimer 1935: 156f.; ders. 1940: 403). Sie wird
hier lediglich in der empfohlenen Aufhebung der entsprechenden For-
mulierung nach § 240 StGB (Nötigung) indirekt erwähnt. Bemerkens-
wert ist zudem, dass der Guide die Jugendstrafrechtsverordnung von
1943, deren nationalsozialistische Ausrichtung kaum bestritten werden
kann (Jureit 1995: 75-87; Wolff 1992), abgesehen von der Herabsetzung
der Strafmündigkeit weitgehend bestehen lassen will. Auch hinsicht-
lich der Strafzumessung spricht sich Kirchheimer für eine Beibehaltung
nationalsozialistischen Rechts aus, nimmt jedoch die Entmannung nach
Gewohnheitsverbrechergesetz sowie die Todesstrafe für Delikte aus,
die nach 1933 unter Strafe gestellt wurden (insbesondere das Lex van
der Lubbe).
Prozessrechtlich zielt der Guide auf die Rücknahme der verschärften
Verhängung der Untersuchungshaft und auf die Wiedereinführung
der Berufung ab. Zudem plädiert er für die Abschaffung aller Bestim-
mungen, die Nazifunktionäre bevorteilten, insbesondere die 1935 ein-
geführte Wahlfeststellung. In dieser Linie liegt auch die Forderung,
das Rechtsberatungsgesetz erst nach einer grundsätzlichen Entnazifizie‐
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rung aufzuheben. Der empfohlene Bestand von im Nationalsozialismus

erlassenem Recht wiederholt sich in der Forderung nach Fortgeltung
des nach 1933 neu erlassenen Gerichtsverfassungsrechts, dessen Zen-
tralisierung und Konzentrierung als geeignetes Mittel angesehen wer-
den, Gerichte mit (wenigen) zuverlässigen Richtern zu besetzen, die so
besser durch die Militärverwaltung kontrolliert werden können.
Aus heutiger Perspektive sind die mit grundsätzlichen rechtsstaatstheo-
retischen Überlegungen begründeten Ausführungen zur Sonder- und
insbesondere zur Militärgerichtsbarkeit aufschlussreich. »Experience
has shown that the granting of special exemptions from general court
jurisdiction effectively protects military organizations against outside
control« (206). Zudem fordert der Guide die Amnestierung aller wegen
Desertation, Wehrdienstverweigerung und ‐zersetzung sowie Kriegs-
verrat verurteilten Straftäter – die Kluft zu der später beschrittenen
Rechtspraxis ist markant. Kirchheimers Forderung, diese Personen-
gruppen umgehend zu amnestieren, bestätigt, dass Fragen der militä-
rischen Sicherheit hinter die Frage der Entnazifizierung zurücktreten
sollten – eine Position, mit der sich die militärischen Verbände der Alli-
ierten bekanntlich schwer taten.55 Als Gegenbild zu den Deserteuren
kommt der Guide mit wenigen, aber dafür umso entschiedeneren Wor-
ten auf die Justizverwaltung zu sprechen, die er unter strikte alliierte
Verwaltung stellen will.
4.3. Die Leitlinien der Nachkriegsverwaltung in Deutschland
Die Spannung zwischen Entnazifizierung, schneller Rückgabe der

Regierungsverantwortung und sicherheitspolitischen Erwägungen wie-
derholt sich bei den Empfehlungen zum Aufbau der Nachkriegsver-
waltung in General Principles of Administration and Civil Service in Ger-
many in besonderem Maße. Denn die sowohl im Handbuch Legal Affairs
als auch in den Guides angesprochene dringende Entnazifizierung des
Justiz- und Verwaltungsapparates erhält eine zusätzliche Dramatik aus
Kirchheimers Einschätzung, dass die Besatzungsmächte auf die Zusam-
menarbeit mit der deutschen Verwaltung angewiesen seien. Der zu
erwartende totale Kollaps von Staat und Gesellschaft, die gravierenden
versorgungstechnischen Probleme und die sich abzeichnenden Interes-
sengegensätze der Alliierten werden angesichts der Zurückhaltung der
55 Das vielleicht bekannteste Beispiel: Madsen (2006). Im Überblick: Niebergall-

Lackner (2016: 120-134).
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Militärs, sich mit Fragen der Zivilverwaltung zu beschäftigen, die Posi-

tion der deutschen Verwaltung stärken und damit das Ziel, den »defeat
of Nazism as a political and social system« (227), gefährden. Eine
schnelle Rückgabe der Regierungsverantwortung, wie sie Kirchheimer
fordert, impliziert den Erhalt zumindest minimaler Verwaltungsstruk-
turen. Jene sind aber weder mit politisch zuverlässigem Personal
besetzt noch erscheinen sie ihm angesichts der von den Nationalsozia-
listen geschaffenen »administrative confusion« (229) besonders effizi‐
ent. Schließlich bringt der Guide noch ein Problem zur Sprache, das
sonst überraschend wenig thematisiert wird: das Verhältnis von staat-
licher und privatwirtschaftlicher Verwaltung. Die sonst kaum direkt
angesprochene These vom totalitären Monopolkapitalismus wird fast
unvermittelt mit ihrer politischen Pointe eingeführt. »Furthermore, the
traditional political units, the States, became more and more meaning-
less, but a new principle for the distribution of functions was still not
available. Another factor which contributes to the complexity of the
administrative machinery is not peculiar to Germany alone. It concerns
the relation of the administration to private enterprise. Although the
administration exercises a group of supervisory functions over private
economy and has a somewhat vague and confused responsibility for
the functioning of the economic system as a whole, its control nev-
ertheless is almost never exercised directly« (229, Hervorhebung die
Herausgeber). Der Nationalsozialismus erscheint hier unmittelbar als
Behemoth, ein konfuser Kompetenzwirrwarr voller interner Konflikte,
in dem nichtstaatliche Akteure administrative Funktionen übernehmen
und schließlich staatliche Garantien erodieren lassen. Dieses staatszer-
störende Moment, auch wenn es im Fortgang des Guides nicht mehr
theoretisch begründet wird, erklärt denn auch Kirchheimers empfoh-
lene verwaltungspolitische Maßnahmen.
Die administrative Lösung kann demnach nicht frei von Widersprü-
chen sein, sondern verlangt ein pragmatisches Agieren. Der Guide
schlägt vor, zunächst alle Behörden aufzulösen, die mit der Verbrei-
tung des NS-Gedankengutes beauftragt waren, die zentrale staatlichen
Aufgaben übernommen hatten und mit den militärischen, politischen
und ökonomischen Planungen des Deutschen Reiches betraut waren.
Das betrifft in einem totalitären Staat eigentlich alle Reichsbehörden.
Jedoch sollen – so die tabellarische Auflistung im Text – das Finanz-,
Post-, Wirtschafts- und Verkehrsministerium ausgenommen und ledig-
lich umstrukturiert werden. Auch die Ministerien für Ernährung und
Landwirtschaft sowie Wissenschaft, Erziehung und Volksbildung sol-
len nur teilweise abgeschafft werden. Die Ursache für diese Zurück-
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haltung liegt in der erwarteten prekären Versorgungslage sowie der

darauf reagierenden Unterscheidung von politischer und technischer
Verwaltung. »German officials will be excluded from participation in
political decisions, but in regard to administrative functions their pro-
fessional knowledge should be used to full advantage« (242). Kirchhei-
mer scheint sich darüber im Klaren zu sein, wie heikel eine solche
Unterscheidung ist, denn umgehend insistiert er darauf, dass techni-
sche Kompetenz auf keinen Fall zu politischem Mitsprachrecht führen
dürfe. Technisch versierte Beamte dürften nur dann weiterbeschäftigt
werden, wenn sie über eine »absolute political reliability« (242) verfü-
gen. Schließlich sollen alle leitenden Aufgaben innerhalb einer Behörde
mit »members of resistance groups (trade unionists, intellectual and
church opposition)« (242) besetzt werden.
Und dennoch scheint Kirchheimer gegenüber dem eigenen Vorschlag
skeptisch. Wie kann ein zuverlässiger Beamter klassifiziert werden?
Fest steht, dass Angestellte entfernt werden, wenn sie vor 1933 Mitglied
der NSDAP waren. Auch alle Beamten, die Leitungsfunktionen über-
nommen hatten, sollen entlassen werden, selbst wenn Kirchheimer der
Überzeugung ist, dass eher die mittleren Ränge überproportional natio-
nalsozialistisch durchsetzt seien. Die konservativen Leitungseliten hät-
ten sich lediglich angepasst. Aus diesem Grund dürften niedere Ränge
keine Leitungsaufgaben übernehmen und vakante Stellen müssten mit
nach 1933 entlassenen, verrenteten und nichtqualifiziertem Personal
besetzt werden. Dass die Entnazifizierung der Verwaltung einer Herku-
lesaufgabe gleichkommt, wird schließlich in der sehr allgemeinen For-
mulierung deutlich, dass all jene Beamte zu entlassen seien, die »have
become identified by public opinion with Nazi policies« (242). Unklar
aber bleibt, welche öffentliche Meinung hier ausschlaggebend sei. Die
selbst favorisierte Trennung von technischen Experten und politischen
Ideologen erweist sich angesichts des Ausmaßes, »the political bureau-
cracy have become penetrated by Nazism« (233), mehr als brüchig;
das Dilemma bleibt im Text ungelöst. Stattdessen wird empfohlen, bei
den Angestellten und Beamten ein gewerkschaftliches Bewusstsein zu
entwickeln – ein Vorschlag, der wenig wahrscheinlich war, weil er einer
Politisierung das Wort redet, die das Militär nicht fördern wollte.
Abgesehen von den grundsätzlichen Schwierigkeiten des politischen
Systemwechsels zeigt sich erneut, dass für die Analytiker der R&A
die Wiederherstellung demokratischer Souveränität Priorität hatte. Dies
erklärt zumindest die aus heutiger Sicht nicht immer plausible Aus-
wahl der aufzulösenden, umzustrukturierenden und weitgehend intakt
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zu lassenden Behörden. Warum der Guide die sofortige Auflösung des

Reichswetterdienstes und der Deutschen Seewarte forderte, während
im Reichsministerium für Ernährung und Landwirtschaft nur die Berei-
che mit völlig offenkundig rassistischen und politischen Zielen (Reich-
serbhofgericht, Reichsumsiedlungsgesellschaft, Reichsnährstand und
die Hauptabteilung 10: Erhaltung des Deutschtums) 56 aufgelöst werden
sollen, ist aus heutiger Sicht nicht ganz verständlich. So kommt die
neuere Forschung dem Ergebnis, dass das Reichslandwirtschaftsminis-
terium eine »starke ideologische Ausrichtung des Ministeriums mit der
Übernahme des Ministerpostens durch den NS-Agrarpolitiker Richard
Walther Darré« aufwies (Dornheim 2011: 137) war. Sicherlich handelt
es sich um eine pragmatische Konzession gegenüber der Sicherstellung
der Versorgungslage. Aus diesem Grund werden auch die Gesund-
heitsabteilung des Reichsinnenministeriums sowie die Abteilung IIb
(Wohlfahrtspflege, Internationale Sozialpolitik) und IV (Siedlungs- und
Wohnungswesen, Städtebau und -planung) des Reichsarbeitsministeri-
ums als Nukleus einer Wohnungsbau- und Sozialfürsorgebehörde im
Text vorgestellt. Dennoch: Beide Institutionen waren tief in die natio-
nalsozialistische Politik involviert.57
Obwohl die Auflösungen auch regionale und lokale Behörden betref-
fen und sogar die Schaffung von »some new German central agency
in order to implement MG policies« (229) notwendig werden könne,
scheut sich Kirchheimer vor weitergehenden strukturellen Maßnah-
men. Insbesondere die Schaffung einer eigenen Zonenverwaltung lehnt
Kirchheimer ab, vielmehr sollen auf der Ebene der Provinzverwaltung
entsprechende koordinierende Stellen der Militärregierung geschaffen
werden. Damit widersprach der Report recht offen den Ergebnissen der
56 Der Reichsnährstand war keine Abteilung des Ministeriums, unterstand jedoch

Minister Darré. Eine Abteilung 10: Erhaltung des Deutschtums konnte nicht
nachgewiesen werden. Vielleicht ist damit die Abteilung VIII gemeint, die seit
1938 die Bezeichnung »Neubildung deutschen Bauerntums« trug und ebenfalls
mit Siedlungspolitik beauftragt war.
57 Die Leiter der Gesundheitsabteilung des Reichsinnenministeriums Gerhard
Wagner und Leonardo Conti waren zugleich die Führer des Nationalsozialisti-
schen Deutschen Ärztebundes. Wagner war sowohl an den Nürnberger Geset-
zen und der NS‐Erbgesundheitsgesetzgebung beteiligt, Conti und andere Mitar-
beiter aus der Abteilung an Krankenmorden. Vgl. Hansen/Kühnemund/Tenns-
tedt (2018: 31-33; 210f). Zur Bedeutung beider Institutionen für die NS-Gesund-
heitspolitik: Vgl. Süß 2003: 43-52. Auch die beiden genannten Abteilungen aus
dem Reichsarbeitsministerium folgten der nationalsozialistischen Politik, sei
es bei der Verweigerung von Rentenansprüchen gegenüber Juden (vgl. Klimo
2017: 241-243) oder der »totalen Wohnungspolitik« (Führer 2017: 211) der nach
1942 de facto Reichswohnungskommissar Robert Ley unterstellten Hauptabtei-
lung IV.
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Konferenz von Teheran. Hingegen liebäugelt der Guide mit der früh-
zeitigen Bildung einer Reichsregierung. Deshalb sollen folgende Minis-
terien nach Restrukturierung und Entnazifizierung rasch wiederbesetzt
werden: Finanzen, Justiz, Wirtschaft, Ernährung und Landwirtschaft,
Arbeit, Bildung und Post. Unklar bleibt dabei, welche Kompetenzen
diese besitzen dürfen, wenn es heißt, »they should not be associated in
the responsibility for policy-making« (230).
Im Fall einer deutschen Teilung müssten selbstverständlich alle Reichs-
behörden aufgelöst werden. Die zonale Militärregierung müsse dann
auf Strukturen der Regionalverwaltung zurückgreifen, die mit Beam-
ten aus dieser Region (aufgrund ihres praktischen Wissens) besetzt
werden. Da in diesem Szenario sehr viele Beamte aus den aufgelös-
ten höheren Verwaltungsebenen freigesetzt sind, besäße die Militär-
regierung »full freedom in recruiting the German professional staff
from the best available materials« (243). Angesichts der Tatsache,
dass dies nicht nur die technische Kompetenz, sondern auch die poli-
tische Zuverlässigkeit betrifft, besäße aus der Perspektive der Entnazi-
fizierung eine zonale Verwaltung durchaus Vorteile gegenüber einer
gesamtdeutschen Verwaltung. Jedoch präferiert der Civil Affairs Guide
eindeutig eine »speedy reconstitution of a full‐fledged German govern-
ment responsible to the German people« (241).
5. R&A im State Department
5.1. Eine Erfolgsgeschichte geht zu Ende
Um die Situation, in der Kirchheimer und die Analysearbeit sich im

State Department befanden, näher zu beleuchten, bedarf es eines
historischen Rückgriffs. Die R&A war gleichermaßen am Erfolg wie an
den Problemen des OSS beteiligt. Selbst unter anderen Institutionen des
amerikanischen Regierungs-, Verwaltungs- und Verteidigungssystems
hatte sich die Forschungsabteilung einen guten Ruf erarbeitet.58 Aber
als integraler Bestandteil des OSS gehörte sie ebenfalls zum mittler‐
weile massiv angewachsenen und in Teilen auch ineffizienten Geheim-
dienstsystem, dessen Struktur spätestens seit dem 8. Mai 1945 auf dem
Prüfstand stand. Mit Ende des Zweiten Weltkrieges verfügten die Ver-
58 Selbst Harold Smith, später maßgeblich mitverantwortlich für die Abwicklung

des OSS und den Transfer von R&A ins State Department, betrachtete R&A als
»crown jewel« (Waller 2011: 338) des OSS.
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einigten Staaten über drei militärische Geheimdienstorganisationen:

G-2 für die Army, A-2 für die Air Force und ONI59 für die Navy. Auf
ziviler Seite standen diesen das OSS und die Foreign Economic Admi-
nistration gegenüber. Das waren aber nur die größten Agenturen, dazu
gesellten sich auf dem Feld der »Intelligence« noch eine Menge weite-
rer Organisationen. So betrieben auch das FBI, das United States Mari-
nes Corps (USMC), die Küstenwachen, das Office of War Information
(OWI), das Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs (CIAA)
und die Federal Communications Commission (FCC) eigene Geheim-
dienstarbeit im Ausland (Troy 1981: 209).
Das OSS hatte gegenüber den meisten anderen Organisationen zwei
Besonderheiten aufzuweisen: Erstens war es eine zivil geführte Orga-
nisation, was es besonders von den anderen »Großen« unterschied.
Zweitens und wichtiger, war das OSS als einzige Geheimdienstorgani-
sation nicht Teil einer übergeordneten Behörde. Die untergeordneten
Geheimdienste sahen sich weniger als Geheimdienststelle denn als
Dienstleister ihrer jeweiligen Behörde, was ein sehr geringes Maß an
Kooperation zwischen ihnen und einen Drang zur ständigen Vergröße-
rung zur Folge hatte. »Operating departmentally – a government virtue
as far as it went – the intelligence services tended toward an exagge-
rated self‐sufficiency: seeking to satisfy fully their own departmental
requirements, they tended unduly to enlarge and expand their own
activities« (Troy 1981: 210).
Innerhalb dieser komplexen Geheimdienstlandschaft stach das OSS
heraus, nicht nur wegen seiner schillernden Führungsfigur Donovan,
sondern auch aufgrund seiner stattlichen Größe. Der später unwillent-
lich für den Transfer der R&A in das State Department zuständige
Under Secretary Dean Acheson beschrieb das Größenverhältnis zwi-
schen Donovans Organisation und der (damals im Prinzip noch nicht
existenten) Intelligence-Abteilung des Außenministeriums folgender-
maßen: »By the end of the war, he had twelve thousand people in all
branches of his intelligence operation. A year before the State Depart-
ment had eighteen persons specifically assigned to this work« (Acheson
1969: 158).
Obwohl die meisten Geheimdienste (bis auf die militärischen in einigen
gemeinsamen Projekten) kaum miteinander kooperierten, war beson-
ders die R&A vielen von ihnen zu Diensten und hatte sich einige Aner-
kennung erarbeitet (Troy 1981: 213). Insbesondere das State Depart-
59 Office of Naval Intelligence.
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ment profitierte ganz erheblich von der Analysearbeit, die in R&A

geleistet wurde. So schickte R&A allein von Januar bis Juli 1945 9026
Arbeiten an das Außenministerium (Smith 1983: 375). Die Analyseab-
teilung hatte sich im Verlauf des Zweiten Weltkrieges zu einer Dienst-
leistungsbehörde innerhalb des komplexen Institutionengefüges ent-
wickelt und wurde in dieser Funktion hochgeschätzt. »The inordinate
lengths to which R. and A. went to please its customers helped to make
[William] Langer’s branch seem to be a friend to everyone and a mortal
enemy to none« (Smith 1983: 377). Selbst aus dem Bureau of the Budget
und dem Außenministerium, den Institutionen, die später wesentlich
für dessen Auflösung verantwortlich zeichneten, bekam die R&A Best-
noten. Noch 1944 schrieb der damalige Außenminister Edward Stet-
tinius Jr. einen Brief an Donovan »declaring that the department placed
a high value on R. and A. work« (Smith 1983: 382).
Das sowohl das OSS als auch seine wohlgelittene Analyseabteilung
nach dem Krieg so schnell verschwanden oder sich in anderen Organi-
sationen auflösten, hatte vor allem zwei Gründe: Das Kriegsende und
Donovans Scheitern im nachrichtendienstlichen Ensemble unter Tru-
man. Das Ende des Zweiten Weltkrieges entzog dem OSS die Existenz-
berechtigung, denn es war explizit als Kriegsorganisation neu gegrün-
det worden. Im OSS hatte man zwar versucht, sich recht früh auf Auf-
gaben in Friedenszeiten auszudehnen, diese Bestrebungen wurden aber
von konkurrierenden Organisationen, wie dem War Department und
dem FBI, abgeblockt. Als Dienstleistungsbehörde maß sich die Bedeu-
tung des OSS und insbesondere der R&A am Wert, der den Arbeiten
von ihren Empfängern zugebilligt wurde. Wurden deren Reports nicht
zur Kenntnis genommen oder griff auf diese nicht zurück, konnte man
das OSS ausbremsen, wie es auch von Seiten des Außenministeriums
ab Frühjahr 1945 geschah.
»State Department officials had countered O.S.S. by simply stalling
on such efforts as one to get the department to depend on R and A.
as its main source of maps because some State Department officials
recognized that this effort was part of ›the natural human desire of OSS
to seek self-perpetuation.‹« (Smith 1983: 385)
Im Vergleich zu seinen nun um die Führungsrolle im Geheimdienstsek-
tor konkurrierenden Nachbarbehörden hatte das OSS »als ›Neuling‹
unter den Washingtoner Behörden – ohne die Unterstützung ehrwürdi-
ger und einflussreicher ›Alumni‹ und ohne eigene Lobby im Kongress
– eine denkbar schwache Position in seinem Kampf um das eigene
Fortbestehen« (Marquardt-Bigmann 1995: 205).
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Gleichzeitig sollte sich der energische und ambitionierte Kampf um die

Neuorganisation der amerikanischen Geheimdienstarbeit insgesamt,
den Donovan führte, später als Problem für das OSS und die R&A
herausstellen. Mit der Landung der Alliierten in Europa und dem
absehbaren Ende des Krieges wurden entsprechende Reformvorschläge
innerhalb der US-amerikanischen Administration diskutiert. Entspre-
chend der Struktur des OSS lassen sich zwei mögliche Zielrichtungen
unterscheiden: eine zivile und eine militärische. Die militärischen Pläne
zeichneten sich dabei dadurch aus, dass trotz gewisser Reformen die
verschiedenen Arme des US-Militärs ihre spezifischen Geheimdienste
behalten sollten und diese auch keiner zivilen Kontrolle unterstellt
worden wären. In der Hochphase der Auseinandersetzungen um die
Neuorganisation der Geheimdienstarbeit legten die Joint Chiefs of Staff
1945 ihren Vorschlag JCS 1181/560 vor. In diesem Plan war zwar die
Schaffung einer National Intelligence Agency (NIA) vorgesehen, aber
das Gremium wäre in seiner Zusammensetzung »composed of the
Secretaries of State, War and Navy and a representative of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff« (JCS 1181/5) vollständig unter militärischer Kontrolle
verblieben. Die ebenfalls zu schaffende CIA sollte zwar einem vom Prä-
sidenten zu ernennenden Direktor unterstellt sein, wäre aber letztlich
nur eine unterstützende Dienststelle der NIA gewesen. Unterhalb die-
ser Ebene sollten sich die »principal military and civillian intelligence
agencies« (JCS 1181/5) befinden. Ziel war die Reform der organisatori-
schen Spitze, ohne die eigentlichen Organisationen und ihre ministeri-
elle Führung zu berühren.
Donovans Pläne, die er seit 1941 vorangetrieben hatte, lassen sich leicht
zusammenfassen:
»He insisted that there should be a central, independent intelligence
service headed by an appointee of the President who should be respon-
sible to the President and charged with the conduct of secret opera-
tions, the production of national intelligence and the coordination of
the activities of the departmental services« (Troy 1981: 220).
Donovan sah eine wirkliche Zentralisierung der Geheimdienstarbeit
unter der zivilen Führung des Präsidenten als unbedingt notwendig
an, was auch die Federführung gegenüber den anderen Geheimdienst-
organisationen beinhaltete. Die Reaktionen der Militärs mit ihren kon-
servativen Plänen waren entsprechend heftig. Ihrer Ansicht nach »they
[Donovans Vorschläge] would over-centralize the national intelligence
service and place it at such a high level that it would control the depart-
60 Abgedruckt in: Troy 1981: 459.
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mental intelligence organizations without responsibility, either individ-

ually or collectively, to the heads of the departments concerned« (Mar-
quardt-Bigmann 1995: 211). Mit der Schaffung dieser in ihren Augen
übermächtigen Behörde würde die für Militärs immens wichtige »chain
of command« unterbrochen, da sich ihr Chef über die Vorgaben, die
den einzelnen Geheimdiensten aus ihren Ministerien gemacht werden,
einfach hinwegsetzen könne. Aufgrund seiner Dominanz werde er das
Personal von anderen geheimdienstlich agierenden Agenturen rekru-
tieren und die dort erstellten Geheimdienstberichte politisch in seinem
Interesse umdeuten. Schließlich dupliziere diese übergeordnete Agen-
tur nur jede geheimdienstlich gewonnene Information, die in den ande-
ren Ministerien und ihren Geheimdienstorganisationen erstellt würde.
Major General Bissell Clayton kam in seiner Funktion als Assistant
Chief des Armeegeheimdienstes G-2 zu dem Schluss: eine Organisation
mit einem derart mächtigen Leiter »is not in the best interest of a
democratic government. I think it is in the best interest of a dictator-
ship« (Troy 1981: 245).
Die Führungsrolle, die Donovan dem neu zu schaffenden zivilen
Geheimdienst zudachte, sollte in erster Linie koordinativen Zielen
dienlich sein. Die zugespitzte Ablehnung dieses Vorschlags kann als
Selbstbehauptung der Ministerien gegen einen präsidentiellen Füh-
rungsanspruch interpretiert werden, was der letztlich für die Reorgani-
sation verantwortliche Präsident Truman entweder nicht so sah oder
nicht als Problem betrachtete. Auch die Behauptung der Duplikation
setzte den Widerstand der militärischen Stellen bereits voraus, denn die
Koordinationsfunktion durch Donovans zentrale Organisation sollte
gerade dies zu verhindern helfen. Eventuelle Duplikationen wären nur
dann entstanden, wenn die Militärgeheimdienste sich dieser Koordina-
tion widersetzt hätten.
Der Abwehrkampf der Militärs gegen Donovan wurde allerdings nicht
nur mit Memoranden und Gegenvorschlägen geführt. Im Frühling 1945
erscheinen am zweiten Februar, während der Kongress den Haushalt
für das OSS im Jahr 1946 berät, gleichzeitig in Tageszeitungen in
Chicago, New York und Washington D.C. lancierte Berichte, die auf
Geheimdokumenten basieren, die Donovans Pläne beinhalteten. Unter
Überschriften wie »New Deal Plans to Spy on World and Home, Folks,
and Super Gestapo Agency is under Consideration« des Chicago Tri-
bune (Troy 1981: 255) wird behauptet, die Mitarbeiter des OSS, deut-
sche Unternehmer und Bankiers, seien eigeninteressiert an einem »soft
peace«, es gebe Kommunisten im OSS und Kriege würden allgemein
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von Soldaten, nicht »joy-riders« gewonnen (Marquardt-Bigmann 1995:

206). Dass das OSS unterwandert sei, wurde dabei teilweise sogar aus
der engen Zusammenarbeit zwischen dem OSS und dem britischen
Geheimdienst abgeleitet.
An dieser Episode zeigt sich die zunehmende Isolation, in der Donovan
sich 1945 befand. Für den Geheimdienstchef dürfte besonders peinlich
gewesen sein, dass die Berichte auf Informationen beruhten, die der
Presse aus seiner eigenen Behörde zugespielt worden waren. Er wandte
sich zur Aufklärung des Vorfalls direkt an den noch von Roosevelt
bestimmten Justizminister Francis Biddle. Dieser kam seinem Gesuch
aber nicht nach. Donovan müsse sich selbst erkundigen, wie die Doku-
mente zur Presse gelangt waren.
»Donovan fought to control the rage boiling in him. Biddle was the
nations top law enforcement officer. He had been presented with evi-
dence that a highly classified document had been stolen from the U.S.
government and he sat on his hands. It further convinced Donovan
that Biddle, Hoover, and enemies in the Pentagon were in cahoots with
Trohan, Pearson and other hostile journalists intent on destroying his
agency« (Waller 2011: 330).
Die Pressekampagne wird sicher nicht allein der Auslöser dafür gewe-
sen sein, aber der Haushalt des OSS blieb nicht verschont von der
zunehmenden Ablehnung, die Donovan und dem OSS entgegenschlug.
Von den ursprünglich anvisierten 45 Millionen US-Dollar Haushalts-
mitteln flossen schließlich nur noch 24 Millionen an das OSS. Für den-
selben Zeitraum wurden dem FBI 43 Millionen US-Dollar zugestanden
(Troy 1981: 283).
5.2. Truman und Smith
Der Widerstand gegen Donovan war massiv, aber bis zum 12. April
1945 hatte er einen entscheidenden Vorsprung gegenüber seinen Kon-
kurrenten: Zugang zu Präsident Roosevelt (Marquardt-Bigmann 1995:
206). Mit dessen Tod musste Donovan anerkennen, dass sich seine Posi-
tion im Prozess der Reorganisation der Geheimdienste zunehmend ver-
schlechterte.
»›This is the most terrible news I’ve ever had,‹ he said at one point.
Roosevelt was the last person protecting his agency. Donovan hardly
knew Truman. It probably means, he told his aides, that their dream of
a postwar central intelligence service has died« (Waller 2011: 319).
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Mit dem neuen Präsidenten dagegen verband Donovan nichts. Truman

war hingegen »entschlossen, dem Wunsch der breiten Öffentlichkeit
zu entsprechen und den kriegsbedingten Wildwuchs des Regierungs-
und Verwaltungsapparats radikal und unverzüglich zurückzustutzen«
(Marquardt-Bigmann 1995: 208).
Schon 1944 war das Bureau of the Budget von Präsident Roosevelt
beauftragt worden, einen Plan für den Rückbau der Kriegsbehörden zu
entwerfen und es behält diese Verantwortung auch unter Truman.
Harold Smith, Direktor des Bureau, fordert Donovan folgerichtig am
23. August 1945 auf, seine Pläne für eine Liquidation des OSS vorzule-
gen. Donovan antwortet: »We are working on what is effectively a liq-
uidation budget« (zitiert nach Troy 81: 455). Im selben Brief weißt er
Smith nochmals darauf hin, dass es zumindest einen Ersatz für das OSS
geben müsste: »In our Government today there is no permanent agency
to take over the function which OSS will have then ceased to per-
form.« Bemerkenswerterweise hebt er besonders die R&A-Abteilung
hervor: »As an integral and inseparable part of this service there is a
group of specialists to analyze and evaluate the material for presenta-
tion to those who determine national policy.« Wenigstens diesen Hin-
weis scheint Smith angenommen zu haben, wie der weitere Verlauf der
Geschichte zeigt. Zum damaligen Zeitpunkt war Donovans Ziel nicht
mehr der Erhalt seines Geheimdienstes gewesen; er versuchte stattdes‐
sen, die Reorganisation der Auslandsgeheimdienste der Vereinigten
Staaten in seinem Sinn zu beeinflussen.
Allgemein hielt Smith, bis auf die von ihm überlieferte Wertschätzung
für die Arbeit der R&A-Abteilung, nicht viel von Donovans Plänen. Im
Gegenteil, er warnte Truman vor Donovan, der zu sehr auf »immediate
action« (Troy 81: 266) setze. Stattdessen verfüge seine eigene Behörde
über besondere Kompetenzen im Geheimdienstwesen. Das Bureau of
the Budget hatte 1942 und 1943 Studien über das ONI und Abteilungen
der FCC sowie G-2 angefertigt, bei denen nach Smiths Aussage auch
die Geheimdienstarbeit im State Department, der FEA, des OWI und
des OSS mit einbezogen worden waren. Die Expertise von Smith und
seinem Bureau trifft bei Truman auf offene Ohren, ist doch sein Ver-
ständnis von Geheimdienstarbeit kurz nach seinem Amtsantritt eher
schlicht.
»Truman’s thought on intelligence was, in the spring and summer of
1945, far removed from the sophisticated concepts of the experienced
General Donovan. Truman had barely gotten beyond discontent with
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the existing situation, tended to confuse intelligence and information,

and also tended to equate ›espionage‹ with ›gestapo‹« (Troy 1981: 270).
Er dürfte Donovans Pläne bestenfalls als hochtrabend angesehen
haben, jedenfalls wollte er bei seinem ersten Treffen mit ihm, dem
er ganze 15 Minuten einräumte, wenig davon hören. »Afterwards the
president noted mockingly in his diary that Donovan ›came in to tell
how important the Secret Service [sic]61 is and how much he could do
to run the government on an even basis‹« (Waller 2011: 322).
Am 23. August 1945 wurde ein »special committee« eingerichtet, in
dem sich Harold Smith, Samuel Irving Rosenman, damals Rechtsbera-
ter des Weißen Hauses, und John W. Snyder, Chef des Office of War
Mobilization, dem OSS widmeten. Das Ergebnis dieser Beratungen war
klar: Das OSS soll im War Department liquidiert und ausgeschlachtet
werden, die Visual Presentation Branch und die R&A im State Depart-
ment eine neue Heimat finden. Donovan war wenig überraschend
bestürtzt und ließ es Harold Smith auch wissen. »He could not believe
Smith had foisted such a naively dumb idea on the president, he told
the budget chief« (Waller 2011: 334). Noch am selben Tag, dem 13. Sep-
tember 1945, feuerte er ein verärgertes Memorandum an Truman ab,
um ihn persönlich im Weißen Haus zu treffen. Abermals zeigte Truman
ihm die kalte Schulter. Was er nicht wusste: Am gleichen Tag traf Tru-
man auch Smith und gab diesem grünes Licht für den von Donovan
rundheraus abgelehnten Plan. Spätestens zu diesem Zeitpunkt dürfte
klar gewesen sein, dass Truman auf die ständigen Eingaben und Vor-
schläge seines Geheimdienstchefs wenig Wert legte.
»He had refused to discuss the subject with Donovan. He had not
picked up the statement of ›Principles‹. He had not solicited Donovan’s
advice on the subject. He had no need for either Donovan or OSS,
and clearly the sooner they were gone the better – as far as he was
concerned« (Troy 81: 296).
61 Anmerkung von Douglas Waller.
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5.3. Keine neue Heimat für Research and Analysis
So erging am 20. September 1945 die Executive Order 962162, mit der
Truman die Auflösung des OSS zum ersten Oktober und den Transfer
von der R&A und Visual Presentation Branch ins State Department ver-
fügte. Die R&A sollte entsprechend dieser Anordnung bis Ende des
Jahres als Interim Research and Intelligence Service (IRIS) im State
Department aufgehen und nach erfolgreicher Konsolidierung dort 1946
als Office of Research and Intelligence (ORI) firmieren (Müller 2010:
59).
Das Außenministerium war bereits am 12. September über die Pläne
des Weißen Hauses informiert worden, aber mit der Executive Order
9621 erreicht den neuen Außenminister James F. Byrnes auch ein ent-
sprechendes Schreiben63 Trumans mit einer besonderen Bitte: »I parti-
cularly desire that you take the lead in developing a comprehensive
and coordinated foreign intelligence program for all Federal agencies
concerned with that type of activity« (Troy 81: 463). Byrnes und sein
Ministerium erhalten also nicht nur zwei neue Organisationen, die sie
einzugliedern haben, sondern auch die Aufgabe, die Donovan so lange
zu erfüllen versucht hatte. Das Außenministerium war aber weder
darauf vorbereitet, seine neuen Teile sinnvoll zu absorbieren64, noch
hatte Byrnes irgendwelche ausgereiften Pläne, um im Bereich der Orga-
nisation des neu zu schaffenden amerikanischen Auslandsgeheim-
dienstes eine Führungsrolle einzunehmen. Im Gegenteil, Under
Secretary Acheson wies Byrnes im Zuge der Übernahme der R&A
darauf hin, dass das Außenministerium bisher stark von der Arbeit des
OSS profitiert habe und selbst nicht in der Lage sei, die Geheimdienst-
arbeit zu übernehmen (Marquardt-Bigmann 1995: 208). In einem Brief
an Byrnes schreibt er: »We do not have even the nucleus of an office of
intelligence in the Department at present. During the past, we have
depended heavily upon OSS for intelligence, research and analysis«65.
In Achesons eigenen Worten stellt sich die Geschicklichkeit, mit der

64 Byrnes beispielsweise war selbst von Donovans Abwicklungsplan ausgegangen
und hatte damit gerechnet, sein Haus zunächst bis Anfang 1946 darauf vorbe-
reiten zu können, die neuen Einheiten zu integrieren. Diesen Plan durchkreuzte
Truman mit seinem straffen Zeitplan (Vgl. Acheson 1969: 159f).
65 Telegramm vom 13. September 1945, Dean Acheson an Außenminister Byrnes;
Folder: BIOSD I; Box 19; Lot 58D 776; Entry A1 1561: Subject Files of the Bureau
of Intelligence and Research (INR), 1945-1960; Record Group 59: General Files of
the Department of State; National Archives at College Park, Maryland.
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845290027
69
Department at present. During the past, we have depended heavily upon

OSS72 for intelligence, research and zu
Einleitung analysis«
diesem Band. In Achesons eigenen
65
Worten stellt sich die Geschicklichkeit, mit der Byrnes und sein Haus sich
dieser zwei Aufgaben, Absorption und Neuorganisation, annahmen,
Byrnes und seindar:
folgendermaßen Haus»The
sich dieser zwei Aufgaben,
Department muffled Absorption
both ofund Neu-
these
organisation, annahmen, folgendermaßen dar: »The Department
opportunities. The latter, research and intelligence, died almost at once muf-
fled both of these opportunities. The latter, research and intelligence,
as the result of gross stupidity« (Acheson 1969: 127). Wie sehr die neue
died almost at onceORI
Forschungsabteilung as the
im result of gross stupidity«
Zusammenspiel (Achesonund
der Sicherheits- 1969:
127). Wie sehr die neue
Geheimdienstorganisationen Forschungsabteilung
der Vereinigten ORI im Zusammenspiel
Staaten auch
der Sicherheits-
organisatorisch und Rand
an den Geheimdienstorganisationen
gedrängt worden war, wird der Vereinigten Staa-
auch aus einer
ten auch organisatorisch an den
grafischen Darstellung 66 der Sammlung Rand gedrängt worden war,
und Verteilung von »Raw wird auch
aus einer grafischen
Intelligence« ersichtlich: Darstellung 66 der Sammlung und Verteilung von
»Raw Intelligence« ersichtlich:
Abb. 4: Sammlung und Verteilung von »Raw Intelligence«

Abb. 4: Sammlung und Verteilung von »Raw Intelligence«
Zur inadäquaten Führung durch den Minister kam Widerstand gegen
die neuen Abteilungen, denn insbesondere die R&A stellte eine, so
Hughes, »organisatorische Bedrohung dar, zumindest für den traditio-
nellen diplomatischen Dienst« (Söllner 1986b: 48). Die R&A war, wie
auch das State Department, in regionale Abteilungen untergliedert,
daher lagvom
Telegramm es nahe, eine Verbindung
13. September 1945, Deanzwischen beiden
Acheson an zu ziehen
Außenminister – oder
Byrnes;
65
Folder: BIOSD I; Box 19; Lot 58D 776; Entry A1 1561: Subject Files of the Bureau of
zu befürchten. Denn die »regional desks« im Außenministerium
Intelligence and Research (INR), 1945-1960; Record Group 59: General Files of the ver-
fügten über
Department drei
of State; bis vier
National Mitarbeiter
Archives pro Abteilung,
at College Park, Maryland. »wir hingegen
66
kamen
Für mit 15
das Orginal oder
siehe: 20 Leuten
Folder: daher«
Briefing (Ebenda).
and Debriefing Diese Ablehnung
of Washington Personnel,schien
Box
3, Entry A1 1561, Record Group 59: Central Files of the Department of State. National
Archives at Maryland.
66 Für das Orginal siehe: Folder: Briefing and Debriefing of Washington Personnel,
Box 3, Entry A1 1561, Record Group 59: Central Files of the Department of State.
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845290027
rein professioneller Natur gewesen zu sein, wie Kirchheimers Freund

Herz bestätigte:
»Persönlich standen wir gut mit ihnen, wir waren oft zusammen, offi‐
ziell oder inoffiziell. Aber man gab uns zu verstehen, daß man uns
von der R&A Branch nur widerwillig übernommen hatte, daß man uns
nicht wollte« (ebenda: 43).
Insbesondere die nachrichtendienstlichen Kompetenzen und Zustän-
digkeit, die die Analysten aus der R&A mitbrachten, schien Byrnes‘
Mitarbeiter gestört zu haben, denn nach der Übernahme »the geogra-
phic divisons were moving into solid opposition to intelligence work
not in their organizations and under their control« (Acheson 1969:
159). Grundlegend hierfür war weniger eine allgemeine Ablehnung
der Analysten aus dem OSS durch die regionalen Abteilungen im
Außenministerium als ein strukturelles Problem: Auch die Mitarbeiter
der »regional desks« hatten Analysen zu erstellen. Brachte nun die
Research-Abteilung im eigenen Haus eine Analyse zum selben Thema
heraus, die eine andere Position vertrat, »[t]he desk officer feels his
whole position is jeopardized and wants no competition with his ana-
lysis.«67 In der Konsequenz würde er den Report aus der Analyseabtei-
lung dann zurückhalten und nicht zur Veröffentlichung freigeben.68
Außenminister Byrnes hatte eine Aufgabe übernommen, die ihn offen‐
sichtlich überforderte und in seinem Haus Unzufriedenheit erzeugte.
Um die Probleme zu lösen, entledigte er sich des einen Teils seiner
Verantwortung und setzte den zweiten Teil so um, wie es sich seine
alteingesessenen Mitarbeiter wünschten. Anfang 1946 schloss er sich
den Plänen der Militärs zur Bildung von NIA und CIG69 an. Tru-
man verlagerte nun die Verantwortung für die Gesamtorganisation
des amerikanischen Geheimdienstwesens in sein Haus. »The President
accepted it in a directive of January 22, 1946, in which he changed his
position by moving primacy in intelligence from the State Department
to the Executive Office of the President« (Acheson 1969: 161). Zu die-
sem Zeitpunkt verfügte das Außenministerium über eine ehemals hoch
angesehene Analyseabteilung, der im eigenen Haus mehrheitlich kaum
Beachtung geschenkt wurde und die deshalb auch keine besondere
Verantwortung im Bereich der Geheimdienste mehr besaß. Folgerichtig
67 Report of Interviews with DRW Personnel, p. 11; Folder: Survey by Morgan,

May 1954; BOX 73; Lot 58D528 – Intelligence Bureau, Office of the Director;
Record Group 59: General Files of the Department of State; National Archives at
College Park, Maryland.
68 Ebenda, p. 9.
69 Central Intelligence Group. Hierzu siehe: Darling 1990: 75-105.
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845290027
schließt sich Byrnes einem Plan an, den einer seiner Mitarbeiter, Francis
H. Russell, entwickelt hatte. Dieser sah vor, die regionalen Abteilungen
auf die »regional desks« des State Department aufzuteilen und deren
Arbeit dann durch das Office of Intelligence Coordination and Liaison
(OCL) zu organisieren (Marquardt-Bigmann 1995: 213). Dieser Plan
wird im April 1946 umgesetzt und die R&A hört zwischenzeitlich auf,
zu existieren.
Mit dem frühen Rücktritt Byrnes‘ bot sich jedoch eine neue Chance
für den nachrichtendienstlichen Bereich im State Department: Im
Februar 1947 nahm der neue Außenminister Marshall den Russell-Plan
zurück und die R&A-Abteilung entsteht wieder als eine innerhalb des
State Departments eigenständige Abteilung, das Office of Intelligence
Research (OIR) (Montague 1971: 31). In der Umgangssparche innerhalb
der Verwaltung etablierte sich mit »R« auch eine neue Bezeichnung.
Damit hat »R« im State Department ihre endgültige Form erhalten, die
sich bis zu Kirchheimers Ausstieg nicht mehr grundsätzlich veränderte
und in der er seine Karriere absolvieren konnte.
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845290027
und die R&A-Abteilung entsteht wieder als eine innerhalb des State
Departments eigenständige Abteilung, das Office of Intelligence
Research (OIR) (Montague 1971: 31). In der Umgangssparche innerhalb
der Verwaltung etablierte sich mit »R« auch eine neue Bezeichnung.
Damit hat »R« im State Department ihre endgültige Form erhalten, die
sich bis zu Kirchheimers Ausstieg
Einleitungnicht mehr
zu diesem grundsätzlich veränderte 75
Band
und in der er seine Karriere absolvieren konnte.
Abb. 5: Organisationsplan von »R«von

Abb. 5: Organisationsplan im »R«
State
imDepartment, Agust
State Department, 1954
Agust
70
195470
ZurKarreire
Zur KarriereKirchheimers
KirchheimersimimState
StateDepartment
Department muss
muss man
man allerdings
allerdings
bemerken,dass
bemerken, dass
es es sich
sich hierhier weniger
weniger um einen
um einen aktiven
aktiven Aufstieg
Aufstieg denn um denn
umNachrücken
ein ein Nachrücken handelte.
handelte. So kamSoerkam
1947erin1947
die in die Position
Position des Leiters
des Leiters der
der German
German Section
Section der Central
der Central European
European Branch, Branch,
nachdemnachdem
Neumann Neumann
den
den Absprung
Absprung in Richtung
in Richtung Columbia Columbia
University University geschafft
geschafft hatte hatte und
und Marcuse
Marcuse
ihm in derihm in der im
Hierarchie Hierarchie im OIR
OIR gefolgt war gefolgt war (Marquardt-Big-
(Marquardt-Bigmann 1995:
mann
217). Als1995: 217).1951
Marcuse Als Marcuse
selbst an 1951 selbst anUniversity
die Columbia die Columbia
ging University
(Müller
ging (Müller 2010: 186), rückte Kirchheimer nach und war von nun an
Chief der Central European Branch71.
Die
70
ehemalige
Für das R&A-Abteilung
Orginal siehe: desDebriefing
Folder: Briefing and OSS warofdamit seit Personnel,
Washington 1947 in relativ
Box
3, Entry A1 1561, Record Group 59: Central Files of the Department of State. National
ruhigem
Archives Fahrwasser angelangt, aber das State Department sollte nie
at Maryland.
eine wirkliche Heimat für die Analyseabteilung werden. Auch wenn
Hughes meint, »[a]n der internen Struktur und der sozialen Organi-
sation der Forschungsarbeit dürfte sich wenig verändert haben,« (Söll-
ner 1986b: 47) hat »R« in ihrer Zeit im State Department nie wieder
den organisatorischen Rang erlangt, den sie im OSS innehatte. Viel-
70 Für das Orginal siehe: Folder: Briefing and Debriefing of Washington Personnel,
Box 3, Entry A1 1561, Record Group 59: Central Files of the Department of State.
71 Strukturplan der Division of Research for Western Europe, Folder: Proposed
Reorganization for DRW, 31.3.52; Box 72; Lot 58D528 – Intelligence Bureau,
Office of the Director; Record Group 59: General Records of the Department of
State; National Archives at College Park, Maryland.
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845290027
mehr wurde es zum Ort, an dem die verbliebenen Analysten beinahe

existenzielle Ohnmacht verspürten. Wo Hughes nach eigener Aussage
»die schwierigsten [Jahre] in meinem ganzen Leben« (Ebenda: 43) ver-
brachte. Die scheinbare Isolation des OIR in der »Intelligence Commu-
nity« der Vereinigten Staaten ging so weit, dass manche Mitarbeiter
darauf hofften, es gäbe noch Rezipienten ihrer Analysen, von denen
sie gar nicht wussten: »He [Tom Fina, Research Analyst, zuständig
für Italien] sometimes hopes that there is an unseen, higher audience
which uses his material, that it may have an intangible influence on the
policy makers«72.
Die Rede vom bürokratischen Untergrund, die Müller (2010: 88) auf-
greift, kann so auch ganz wörtlich Sinn ergeben. Die Analysten befan-
den sich in den Tiefen des Außenministeriums, über die politische
Unwetter und einige Reformstürme hinwegfegten – die sie, abgesehen
von der Zwischenepisode des Russell-Plans, kaum betrafen. Die eigene
Bedeutungslosigkeit im Untergrund der Versenkung gewährte ihnen
letztlich Sicherheit. Kirchheimer selbst schreibt in einem Brief an Rudolf
Smend 1949 davon, im State Department »am Rande der Dinge«73
zu sitzen. Darüber hinaus setzt sich die Geschichte von »R«, wie der
Bereich der Intelligence-Arbeit im State Department allgemein genannt
wurde74, nicht als Erfolgsgeschichte fort. Es scheint, als hätte der Impe-
rativ des Rückbaus des amerikanischen Geheimdienstwesens »R«, nun
als ORI, auch im State Department beständig belastet75. Im Jahr des
Transfers, 1945, verfügte die Forschungsabteilung über 1655 Planstel-

May 1954; Box 73; Lot 58D528 – Intelligence Bureau, Office of the Director;
Record Group 59: General Files of the Department of State; National Archives at
College Park, Maryland.
73 Brief von Otto Kirchheimer an Rudolf Smend vom 13. Februrar 1949. Staatsund
Universitätsbibliothek Göttingen, Nachlass Rudolf Smend, Cod. Ms. R.
Smend, Briefwechsel Kirchheimer.
74 Draft: What is R?, in: Folder 1: Planning, Emergency 1951; Box 68; Lot 58D528 –
Intelligence Bureau, Office of the Director; Record Group 59: General Records of
75 Interessanterweise sah Trumans Executive Order 9621 vor, dass dem State
Department mit R&A auch die Mittel zukommen sollten, die für die Neuorgani-
sation des US-amerikanischen Geheimdienstwesens voraussichtlich benötigt
würden. Siehe Office Memorandum vom 25. September 1945, Mr. Daimel to Mr.
Saugstad; Folder II: Office of the Budget; Box 488; dec. file 111.963-111.99;
Record Group 59: General Records of the Department of State; National
Archives at College Park, Maryland.
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845290027
len, wovon 1953 noch 47076 übrig geblieben. Auch der Russell-Plan77
geisterte noch 1953 durch das Außenministerium. In den Akten, die
heute noch in den National Archives in Maryland aufbewahrt werden,
findet sich in den Beständen des Direktors von OIR, Allan Evans, ein
ganzer Ordner mit der zunächst kryptischen Bezeichnung »RIF«78. Das
Kürzel bedeutet »reduction in force« und der Ordner ist gefüllt mit
Briefen79, in denen Direktor Evans seine Kontakte bemüht, um Anstel-
lungen für die Mitarbeiter zu finden, die er im Sommer 1953 hätte
entlassen müssen. Kirchheimer war von diesen ständigen Kürzungen
nicht direkt betroffen, da er schon zum altgedienten Personal des
Außenministeriums gehörte und damit vom internen Statussystem des
öffentlichen Dienstes profitierte.80
Insgesamt muss die Übernahme der R&A ins Außenministerium als
Scheitern gewertet werden. Sowohl dem Präsidenten als auch seinem
damaligen Außenminister Byrnes schien nicht klar gewesen zu sein,
was sie mit der Reorganisation der Forschungsabteilung bezwecken
wollten. Trumans Hauptinteresse richtete sich auf die Liquidation des
OSS. Byrnes konnte hingegen der prestigeträchtigen Aufgabe nicht
widerstehen, die Reorganisation des Geheimdienstes zu übernehmen,
die ihm Harold Smith zugespielt hatte. Genutzt hat er die Chance
jedoch nicht. Die allgemeine Orientierungslosigkeit zeigt sich 1953 etwa
im Haushaltsausschuss des Kongresses 1953: Dort behauptete der anti-
kommunistische Hardliner J. Anthony Panuch sieben Jahre nach der
Auflösung des OSS sogar, dieses sei bestrebt gewesen, mit der R&A
das State Department feindlich zu übernehmen, indem Donovan das
Außenamt mit seinen ideologisch81 verlässlichen Leuten überflutete. In
76 Confidential Security Information; in: Folder 1: Planning, Emergency 1951; Box

68; Lot 58D528 – Intelligence Bureau, Office of the Director; Record Group 59:
General Records of the Department of State; National Archives at College Park,
Maryland.
77 Restricted: The Russell Plan; in: Folder 1: Planning, Emergency 1951; Box 68;
Lot 58D528 – Intelligence Bureau, Office of the Director; Record Group 59:
General Records of the Department of State; National Archives at College Park,
Maryland.
78 Folder: Chronological June-September 1953 – the RIF; Box 66; Lot 58D528 –
Intelligence Bureau, Office of the Director; Record Group 59: General Records of
79 Etwa am 4. Juni an Max Millikan vom MIT in Boston, die Hoover Library und
Wallace Sterling von der Stanford University. Alle a.a.O.
80 Evans formuliert das in seinem Brief an Millikan folgendermaßen: »Our bright
new professionals will suffer out of proportion, for lack of status«, a.a.O.
81 »The end of this ideology may fairly [sic] be described as a socialized America
in a world commonwealth of Communist and Socialist states dedicated to peace
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dieser Darstellung wird das State Department zum Opfer der R&A und
die R&A selbst zur Gefahr für die nationale Sicherheit:
»Thus, in September and October of 1945 the State Department – there-
fore a relatively small, but compact policy agency – became a huge,
bloated organization with a confused mission, swamped with inexperi-
enced, untrained – and what is worse, unscreened – personnel« (Ache-
son 1969: 162).
5.4. Otto Kirchheimer im State Department
Die Nachweise zur Arbeit Otto Kirchheimers in den Akten des State
Department, die man heute noch in den Beständen der National Archi-
ves finden kann, sind dünn gestreut. Es dominieren Verwaltungsak-
ten, in denen man den andauernden Überlebenskampf der verschie-
denen Forschungsabteilungen nachvollziehen kann. Die Arbeit wurde
beständig von Mittelkürzungen, auf Auflösung zielenden Reformplä-
nen und Auseinandersetzungen mit anderen Behörden, insbesondere
der CIA, bedroht. Direkte Nachweise über Kirchheimers konkrete, all-
tägliche Arbeit finden sich kaum. Sein Aufstieg lässt sich allerdings
über Strukturpläne belegen. In einer Übersicht zu einem Neuorganisa-
tionsvorschlag der Division of Research for Western Europe (DRW)
aus dem Jahr 195282 findet sich Kirchheimer als Chief der Central Euro-
pean Branch. In dieser Position ist er sein eigener Chef, denn in dem
Strukturplan finden sich keine weiteren Analysten. Er steht mit der
Gehaltsstufe GS-1383 einem Sekretär und einem »Document Clerk« vor.
Darüber hinaus enthält seine Abteilung noch eine politische und eine
ökonomische Unterabteilung mit insgesamt fünf weiteren Analysten.
Diese Periode kann aber nicht allzu lange angedauert haben, denn in
einer späteren Übersicht,84 die aus dem Folgejahr stammen dürfte85,
through collective security, political, economic and social reform; and the redis-
tribution of national wealth on a global basis« (Acheson 1969: 162).
82 Strukturplan der DRW, in: Folder: Proposed Reorganization for DRW, 31.3.52;
Box 72; Lot 58D528 – Intelligence Bureau, Office of the Director; Record Group
59: General Files of the Department of State; National Archives at College Park
Maryland.
83 Der Leiter der Divison of Research for Western Europe, Richard M. »Dick«
Scammon, erhält ein Gehalt der Stufe GS-14. A.a.O.
84 OIR Professional Staffing Pattern, in: Folder: 7; Box 67; Lot 58D528 – Intelligence
Bureau, Office of the Director; Record Group 59: General Files of the Depart-
ment of State; National Archives at College Park Maryland.
85 Hier tauchen Kollegen auf, mit denen er nachweisbar ab 1953 gemeinsam
Reports produziert. Siehe: CER Scheduled Program for Six Months, August
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sind die Unterabteilungen verschwunden. Kirchheimer ist inzwischen

eine Gehaltsstufe aufgestiegen und hat jetzt mit George Muller und
Robert W. Schleck zwei Kollegen, die ebenfalls Analysten sind. Muller
stammt aus Wien und hat die amerikanische Staatsbürgerschaft 1944
erworben. Er kommt nicht aus der alten Forschungsabteilung des OSS,
sondern hatte sich 1948 direkt beim Außenministerium beworben86
und findet sich auf dem Schema von 1952 als Analyst für Österreich
und die Schweiz in der Political Section der von Kirchheimer geleiteten
Central European Branch. Auch Schleck, 1925 in New Jersey geboren,
kam 1952 von außen und gehörte ebenfalls nicht zur Gruppe der altein-
gesessenen Analytiker aus R&A. Er wechselte 1956 als Botschaftsmitar-
beiter nach Tel Aviv.87
Seit 1951 wurde Kirchheimers Arbeit durch seine Führungsposition in
der Central European Branch bestimmt. Das bedeutete, dass er nur
die Hälfte seiner Zeit als Analytiker arbeitete, also Material verarbei-
tete und Reports erstellte. Etwa ein Viertel seiner Arbeitszeit nahm
er an Treffen und Konferenzen in der »Intelligence Community« teil,
die übrige Zeit galt der Personalführung und der Verwaltung88. Als
Verantwortlichkeiten auf der Branch-Ebene werden in einem zum
schon erwähnten Strukturplan von 1952 gehörenden Dokument89 fol-
gende Aufgabenbereiche aufgezählt: (1) Planung und Verwaltung des
Forschungsprogramms der eigenen Abteilung, (2) Zuarbeit für den
Division Chief in der Planung und Durchführung des Forschungs-
programms der Division, inklusive der Bereitstellung von Expertise,
(3) Vertretung der Division in Komitees des Außenministeriums und
1- December 31, 1953, in: Folder: Provisional Program Aug. 1 to Dec 31 1953;
Maryland.
86 Department of State, 1951: The Biographic Register of the Department of State,
April 1, 1951, Washington DC, p. 319f.
87 Die Nachweissituation zu ihm ist, abgesehen von der in Fußnote 86 erwähnten
Programmübersicht, äußerst schlecht. Zu ihm findet sich selbst im »Biographic
Register of the Department of State«, das eigentlich alle Angestellten verzeich-
nete, kein Eintrag. Lediglich eine Trauerseite seiner Alma Mater Princeton ent-
hält einige wenige biographische Angaben zu ihm.
88 Siehe: The Administration of Intelligence in the Department of State. Volume
I – The Summary Report, p. 24. In: Box 9; Lot 58D528 – Intelligence Bureau,
Office of the Director; Entry A1 1561: Subject Files of the Bureau of Intelligence
and Research (INR); Record Group 59: General Files of the Department of State;
National Archives at College Park Maryland.
89 Strukturplan der DRW, in: Folder: Proposed Reorganization for DRW, 31.3.52;
Maryland.
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interministeriellen Komitees, (4) Erstellung von »intelligence«-Studien,

(5) Vorbereitung langfristiger grundlegender Studien, die zur Formu-
lierung von Politiken beitragen sollen, (6) Zusammenarbeit mit den
geografischen Abteilungen des Außenministeriums und den Geheim-
dienstabteilungen anderer Ministerien, der CIA und allen anderen
Agenturen, die in diesem Feld arbeiteten90 und (7) schließlich Beratertä-
tigkeiten für das eigene Haus und die eben erwähnten Behörden und
Abteilungen91. Kirchheimer trat im Verlauf seiner Zeit in der Research-
Abteilung des Außenministeriums als Experte auf, der zu bestimmten
Themen in Komitees oder direkt gegenüber Kollegen des eigenen Hau-
ses und anderer Behörden Auskunft gab. Zudem fungierte er ab 1951
als Redakteur und Verwalter der Produktion seiner Abteilung und als
Autor eigener Studien.
Für seine Expertentätigkeit lassen sich immerhin zwei Nachweise in
den Beständen des State Department finden. Ein »office‐memoran‐
dum«92 aus dem August 1949 führt Kirchheimer als »Analyst on Ger-
many«. Das betreffende Meeting fand anlässlich der Berlinblockade
statt. Was Kirchheimer dort zu Protokoll gab, wurde hingegen nicht
festgehalten. In einem Treffen der »Estimates Group«93 am 17. Juni
90 In Kirchheimers Fall »Central Europe« – Deutschland, Österreich und die

Schweiz. A.a.O.
91 Im Originaldokument:
»1. Planning, coordinating, and directing program of intelligence research on
the political, social, and economic aspects of the area of responsibility as deter-
mined by the needs of the Department and other US Government agencies.
2. Assisting Division Chief in planning, developing and administering Divi-
sional intelligence research program and providing evaluated or spot intelli-
gence and advice on research and intelligence problems falling within the com-
mittee’s terms of reference.
3. Representing the Division on ad hoc departmental and inter-departmental
committees […].
4. Preparing intelligence research studies […}.
5. Preparing long-range basic studies and surveys in aid of policy formulation.
6. Collaborating with the geographic divisions of the Department, the intelli-
gence groups of the Department of Defense, Central Intelligence Agency, other
Government agencies, and with other offices and divisions of R area coordinat-
ing research in the area of responsibility.
7. On the basis of intelligence research conducted in the area of responsibility,
furnishing consultative services to other offices of the Department, the intelli-
gence groups and authorized recipients in other Government agencies on politi-
cal, social, and economic developments and their implications« (A.a.O.).
92 Office Memorandum vom 24.8.1949. In: Folder 3: Communication between
OFD, State, EP; Box 488; dec. file 111.963-111.99; Record Group 59: General Files
of the Department of State; National Archives at College Park Maryland.
93 In dieser Gruppe wurden die »Intelligence Estimates« besprochen, die das OIR
in Kollaboration mit der CIA, hauptsächlich mit deren Unterabteilung »Office
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845290027
195394 äußert sich Kirchheimer zur Ausrichtung der westdeutschen

Regierung im internationalen politischen und wirtschaftlichen Kontext:
»Mr. Kirchheimer agreed with Mr. Komer’s impression of West Ger-
man prosperity, but pointed out that this prosperity was vulnerable to
any marked slump in international trade. In the event of such a slump,
or of a marked deterioration in the international situation, a regime of
the extreme right would be more likely to come to power. This was
particularly true in view of the relative weakness of the moderate left.
An opportunistic and/or aggressive foreign policy might, in this case,
be pursued.«95
Einschätzungen dieser Art lassen sich auch in den hier abgedruckten
Berichten zu Bundesrepublik finden. Seine Arbeit als Chefredakteur
der eigenen Abteilung lässt zudem Rückschlüsse über den Arbeitsstil
innerhalb der Forschungsabteilungen zu und ermöglicht die Identifika‐
tion der Autorschaft einzelner Studien. Kirchheimer entschied über die
Weitergabe der Analysen aus seiner Abteilung an den Divison Chief
und die Mitarbeiter der »regional desks« des Außenministeriums, wel-
che die weitere Verbreitung außerhalb des Ministeriums verantworte-
ten. In dieser Funktion hatte er weitreichende editorische Freiheiten,
denn die Analysen sollten die aufeinanderfolgenden Stufen der Veröf-
fentlichung nicht unverändert durchlaufen:
»His [the individual researcher’s] drafts move up though successive
levels of persons who have successively broader areas of responsibility;
the papers are thus checked against successively broader views which
are not merely added on, but which, in fusion with the analyst’s origi-
nal ideas, may alter the very substance of his original presentation«96.
Umso wichtiger werden für die Zuordnung von Texten zu bestimm-
ten Autoren die identifizierbaren qualitativen Merkmale, wie die oben
of National Estimates« (ONE), produzierte. Die Gruppe war innerhalb des OIR
unterhalb des Direktors des OIR angesiedelt. Siehe: The Administration of Intel-
ligence in the Department of State. Volume I – The Summary Report, p. 65. In:
Box 9; Lot 58D528 – Intelligence Bureau, Office of the Director; Entry A1 1561:
Subject Files of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR); Record Group
Maryland.
94 Fortnightly Summary, 8.6.-19.6.53; in: Folder: Chron. 1951-53, Box 66; Lot
58D528 – Intelligence Bureau, Office of the Director; Record Group 59: General
Files of the Department of State; National Archives at College Park Maryland.
95 A.a.O.
96 Thoughts on Planning in R, p. 2, in: Folder I: Planning, Emergency 1951; Box
68; Lot 58D528 – Intelligence Bureau, Office of the Director; Record Group 59:
General Files of the Department of State; National Archives at College Park
Maryland. Hervorhebung von mir [HH].
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erwähnte Einschätzung Kirchheimers zu erwartbaren westdeutschen

Regierungen in Abhängigkeit des politischen und wirtschaftlichen
Kontextes oder typische Formulierungen und Begriffe, wie beispiels-
weise »catch-all«, auf die an späterer Stelle noch eingegangen wird. An
dieser »Abteilungsräson« wurde über die gesamte Zeit Kirchheimers
im Außenministerium festgehalten, was sich auch in einem Brief97 von
Philip Trezise, Kommunismusexperte und stellvertretender Direktor
des OIR, an zwei Analysten der Abteilung für Nordeuropa zeigt:
»All of our intelligence output is to be viewed as group production.
Otherwise, the readiness of R and OIR to stand behind every report
would have to be modified or abandoned. So I am unhappy at every
instance in which intelligence, as distinct from personal views, goes
forth under a signature and not as an IR.”
Die Arbeiten, die im ORI, IRIS und OIR verfasst wurden, sollten formal
und inhaltlich als Gemeinschaftswerk erstellt und auch nach außen
entsprechend präsentiert werden. Ihren Namen, so zumindest die Ein-
stellung von Trezise, dürften die Analysten nur unter unveröffentlichte
persönliche Meinungen setzen. In einer externen Studie über das OIR
wird »the analyst’s pride of authorship«98 sogar als explizites Problem
betrachtet, das es für die Redakteure zu überwinden gelte.
Die im OIR hierarchisch organisierte intellektuelle Zusammenarbeit
sollte durch formale Kriterien erreicht werden, für deren Einhaltung
die Branch und Division Chiefs zuständig waren. Sie hatten dafür zu
sorgen, dass die Studien aus ihren Abteilungen über kurze, maximal
eine Seite in Anspruch nehmende Abstracts verfügten99. Für die Arbeit
an nachrichtendienstlichen Einschätzungen galten noch einmal geson-
derte Ansprüche. Die Analysten sollten nicht einfach die in den Aufträ-
gen100 formulierten Fragestellungen abarbeiten, sondern einen eigenen
97 Geheimer Brief vom 22. September 1954, in: Folder: Chrono. File July-Sept.
1954; Box 67; Lot 58D528 – Intelligence Bureau, Office of the Director; Record
Group 59: General Files of the Department of State; National Archives at Col-
lege Park Maryland.
98 CM & P Progress Report: Recommendations on Style and Format, p. 3. In:
Folder: I. Survey; Box 74; Lot 58D528 – Intelligence Bureau, Office of the
Director; Record Group 59: General Files of the Department of State; National
Archives at College Park Maryland.
99 Memorandum von Allan Evans an alle OIR Chiefs vom ersten Februar 1954; in:
Folder: Chrono I. 1954; Box 67; Lot 58D528 – Intelligence Bureau, Office of the
Director; Record Group 59: General Files of the Department of State; National
Archives at College Park Maryland.
100 Den meisten Studien, nicht nur Estimates, lagen konkrete Fragestellungen mit
daran angehängten Teilfragen zu Grunde., Vgl. Revised draft of Part C of OIR
Program Guide, 8.8.1950, in: Folder: Program Guide, 2nd Ed.; Box 20; Entry A1
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Zugriff auf das Problem finden. Wobei Allan Evans in seinem Brief an
die Divisions- und Abteilungsleiter101 nicht müde wird, zu betonen,
dass die gestellten Fragen selbstverständlich ebenfalls zu beantworten
sind. Außerdem sollen die Analysten ihre Einschätzungen und Schluss-
folgerungen so bündeln, dass sie direkt zitationsfähig sind. Dies war
keine bloße stilistische Gängelei, sondern die Konsequenz der adminis-
trativen Position des OIR. Als Dienstleister nicht nur für das eigene
Ministerium, sondern prinzipiell für die gesamte »intelligence commu-
nity« in den Vereinigten Staaten, fanden ihre Arbeiten weite Verbrei-
tung und angesichts der teilweise herrschenden Konkurrenzsituation
insbesondere zwischen CIA und OIR wollte Evans so vermeiden, dass
die Arbeiten aus seinem Haus nur als Informationsquelle für andere
dienen würden: »In short, our contributions should be written so that
they could be used directly in the NIE102, and not as grab bags of facts«.
Zuständig für die Einhaltung dieser Prinzipien waren, so Evans, die
Chiefs der Divisionen und Branches.
Als Autor eigener Studien hatte Kirchheimer diese Vorgaben selbstver-
ständlich einzuhalten. Die grundlegendste Richtlinie für alle Reports
aus dem State Department findet sich auf den Titelseiten der meisten
Arbeiten: »This is an Intelligence Report and not a statement of depart-
mental policy«. Der organisatorische Hintergrund dieser Angabe ist
klar, denn so sichert das OIR den Regionalabteilungen des Außenmi-
nisteriums zu, dass sie nicht in deren Arbeitsbereich eingreifen wol-
len. Das Formulieren von Politiken war diesen Regionalabteilungen
oder anderen Ministerien, denen OIR zuarbeitete, überlassen und diese
Aufgabentrennung wurde eifersüchtig überwacht. Was aber genau
der Unterschied zwischen der Formulierung von »intelligence« und
»policy« sei, darüber herrschte nur wenig Übereinstimmung. So wusste
sich ein Mitarbeiter im Außenministerium nur mit einer Analogie103
1561: Subject Files of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR), 1945-1960;
Record Group 59: General Files of the Department of State; National Archives
at College Park, Maryland.
101 Brief vom 8. Juli 1953 von Allan Evans an alle Divisions- und Branch-Chiefs;
in: Folder: Chronological June-September 1953 – the RIF; Box 66; Lot 58D528 –
Intelligence Bureau, Office of the Director; Record Group 59: General Files of
the Department of State; National Archives at College Park Maryland.
102 National Intelligence Estimate. Diese Geheimdienstdossiers beinhalteten Infor-
mationen, Analysen und Empfehlungen mehrerer Geheimdienste und wurden
vom Office of National Estimates, einem Vorgänger des National Intelligence
Council herausgegeben.
103 »If an intelligence officer and a geographic division officer met a man walking
toward the edge of a cliff it would be the function of the intelligence officer
to say to him, ›If you continue walking in that direction, you will fall off a
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mehr Klarheit zu verschaffen: Man stelle sich vor, ein Analyst aus
der Forschungsabteilung und ein Angestellter der Regionalabteilung
beobachteten einen Mann, der auf eine Klippe zulaufe. Der Analyst
dürfte im Prinzip nur konstatieren, dass der Mann herunterfallen und
voraussichtlich sterben werde, wenn er seinen Kurs nicht ändere. Den
Hinweis, dass der Mann besser stehen bleiben oder umdrehen sollte,
durfte lediglich die Regionalabteilung geben.
Die Ausgangsposition für Kirchheimer als Analyst und Autor seiner
eigenen Studien war so schon allein auf Grund der inhaltlichen Vor-
gaben prinzipiell schwierig. Er durfte einerseits keine reinen Fakten-
sammlungen verfassen und sollte gleichzeitig Einschätzungen liefern,
die unmittelbar einsichtig und weiter nutzbar waren, andererseits durf-
ten seine Schlussfolgerungen nicht so weit reichen, dass er die Regio-
nalabteilungen gegen sich aufgebracht hätte, was der Zirkulation seiner
Arbeiten nicht förderlich gewesen wäre.
Auch wenn noch in der Zeit im OSS zumindest teilweise von einem
selbstbestimmten Forschen gesprochen werden kann, war schon dort
die Textherstellung stets von Überlegungen geprägt, wie die eigenen
Analysen auch das Überleben der Abteilung sichern könnten. Im State
Department scheint dieser Gedanke dann zum produktionsleitenden
Prinzip aufgestiegen zu sein (Müller 2010: 120). Die meisten Reports
waren Auftragsarbeiten, denen konkrete Fragestellungen zu Grunde
lagen. Anhand eines Planungsdokuments104 von 1950 lässt sich gut
nachvollziehen, wie akribisch das Erkenntnisinteresse den Analysten
gegenüber formuliert wurde. Unter »Topic C« finden sich für Kirch-
heimers Abteilung einschlägige Aufträge. Die gewünschte Analyse
wird hier mit einer politischen Hauptfrage105, gefolgt von mehreren
cliff and kill yourself.‹ It would be the function of the geographic division
officer to tell the man ›As a matter of policy, you should turn around and
walk in the other direction because if you continue in the way you are going
you will fall off a cliff and be killed.‹ To me, these are two ways of saying
the same thing,« Office Memorandum vom vierten Dezember 1947, Mr. Pen-
field an Mr. Butterworth; in: Folder II: Office of the Budget; Box 488; dec. file
111.963-111.99; Record Group 59: General Records of the Department of State;
National Archives at College Park, Maryland.
104 Revised draft of Part C of OIR Program Guide, 8.8.1950, in: Folder: Program
Guide, 2nd Ed.; Box 20; Entry A1 1561: Subject Files of the Bureau of Intelli-
gence and Research (INR), 1945-1960; Record Group 59: General Files of the
Department of State; National Archives at College Park, Maryland.
105 Diese wird als »policy problem« [a.a.O.] bezeichnet, dessen Lösung allerdings
ohne die Formulierung von »policy statements« geschehen sollte. Hier zeigt
sich ein weiteres Mal, wie eingespannt, ja eingeklemmt die Analyseabteilung
zwischen Erwartungen und Animositäten war.
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damit zusammenhängenden Fragestellungen – »intelligence aspects«

–, vorgegeben. Im konkreten Fall lautet das formulierte Hauptprob-
lem: »Should the US strategic policy, in view of the Korean crisis,
increase its emphasis on the bolstering of European military establish-
ments?«106 Hier schließen sich zahlreiche spezifische Fragen an, etwa
nach (1) dem westeuropäischen Verteidigungswillen gegenüber der
Sowjetunion, (2) der Verlässlichkeit der europäischen Verteidigungsin-
stitutionen, (3) der sowjetischen Reaktion auf die verstärkte Wieder-
bewaffnung in Westeuropa oder (4) den wirtschaftlichen und politi-
schen Implikationen der Integration Westdeutschlands für die europäi-
sche Verteidigung. Auch hier wiederholte sich für die Analysten die
heikle Situation, dass sie bei aller Akribie der Problemstellung in ihren
Reports über die einfache Beantwortung der vorgelegten Fragen hin-
ausgehen und einen eigenen Standpunkt entwickeln sollten.
Aber so wie der Ausgangspunkt der Analysen stets vorgegeben war,
unterlag auch das Endprodukt administrativen Vorgaben. Wie bereits
bezüglich Kirchheimers editorischer Arbeit erwähnt, wurden fertige
Reports nicht einfach an höhere Ebenen durchgereicht, sondern auf
jeder höheren Ebene in den amerikanischen Geheimdienstorganisatio-
nen – mitunter grundlegend – diskutiert und verändert. Insbesondere
bei den »Intelligence Estimates« waren die Eingriffe weitreichend. Im
IAC trafen sich die Chefs der größten Geheimdienstorganisationen (vor
allem State Department, Navy, Army, Air Force und CIA). Die Verant-
wortung für das Ergebnis oblag dem CIA-Direktor, dem folgerichtig
volle Freiheit bei der Modifikation der Vorlagen eingeräumt wurde:
»in theory a National Intelligence Estimate is the intelligence judge-
ment of the Director of Central Intelligence: there is no ›voting‹ in the
IAC or ›majority and minority view‹, in the usual sense; the view of the
Director of Central Intelligence is107 the National Intelligence Estimate,
even though all members of the IAC might disagree or dissent from
it.«108
106 Revised draft of Part C of OIR Program Guide, 8.8.1950, in: Folder: Program
Guide, 2nd Ed.; Box 20; Entry A1 1561: Subject Files of the Bureau of Intelli-
gence and Research (INR), 1945-1960; Record Group 59: General Files of the
Department of State; National Archives at College Park, Maryland.
107 Hervorhebung im Original.
108 Responsibilty for Production and Dissemination of Intelligence Estimates in
Washington; in: Folder: CIA Estimates, Reports etc.; Box 2; Entry A1 1561:
Subject Files of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR), 1945-1960;
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Aus einem Protokoll109 zur Diskussion eines »Estimate« zum »Outlook

in West Germany«, dessen Grundlage wahrscheinlich von Kirchhei-
mer stammt, geht etwa hervor, dass die Teilnehmer mit der Einschät-
zung nicht einverstanden waren, dass die verfassungsmäßige Regie-
rung in Westdeutschland voraussichtlich die nächsten vier bis fünf
Jahre Bestand haben dürfte. Hier wurde eine Fußnote hinzugefügt,
die darauf verweist, dass dies von der ökonomischen Entwicklung
abhänge und eine Verschlechterung durchaus ein »extreme left or
extreme right government« zum Vorschein bringen könnte. Derartige
Aussagen finden sich auch in Kirchheimers Reports zur Lage in West-
deutschland, die unter weniger starkem editorischen Einfluss standen.
Außerdem hatte Kirchheimer eine sehr ähnliche Einschätzung ziem-
lich genau einen Monat zuvor bereits bei einem Treffen der Estimates
Group110 vertreten. Dass ein General einen solchen Passus später ein-
fügen ließ, spricht dafür, dass auch Kirchheimers Erkenntnisse Verbrei-
tung im amerikanischen Geheimdienst- und Sicherheitsestablishment
fanden. Nicht alle Vorschläge wurden aufgegriffen, denn nach einge-
hender Unterredung und offen geführten Diskussionen im IAC muss-
ten die entsprechenden Änderungsvorschläge teilweise wieder zurück-
genommen werden.
Eine persönliche Einschätzung seiner Arbeit und seiner Arbeitsbedin-
gungen gibt Kirchheimer im Mai 1954 in einem Interview.111 Darin
zeigt sich, dass er sich über die Produktionsbedingungen seiner eige-
nen Arbeit mehr als im Klaren war. Er gab zu Protokoll, dass er keine
Reports mehr selbst initiiert, die auf Desinteresse stoßen könnten, und
äußert gleichzeitig die Vermutung, dass es deutlich mehr selbstiniti-
ierte Arbeiten geben würde, wenn dieser Fakt nicht auf den Reports
vermerkt würde. Selbst wenn er, etwa in einem Telefonat mit einem
interessierten Mitarbeiter der Deutschlandsektion feststelle, dass ein
Report zu einem gewissen Thema erwünscht ist, ließe er sich solche
Wünsche dennoch schriftlich als Memo zukommen. Zugleich räumt er
in dem Interview ein, am Telefon eher schroff und ablehnend zu sein:
109 Notes on IAC Meeting, July 14, 1953. In: Folder: 2 IAC Meeting; Box 72; Lot
110 Fortnightly Summary, 8.6.-19.6.53; in: Folder: Chron. 1951-53, Box 66; Lot
111 Report of Interviews with DRW Personnel, p. 4f; Folder: Survey by Morgan,
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»He gets calls from G-2 and ONI for spot information, meets with them
on the NIEs; he has never had a call from A-2. He has no contacts to
other agencies. However, he says, he is ›blunt and not very polite‹ and
quickly shunts questions to somebody else to discourage calling.«112
Und dennoch zeigte er großes Interesse daran, ob seine Reports »use-
less or […] not opposed«113 seien. Er nutzte dafür aber kaum die vor-
handenen offiziellen Kanäle. Hinsichtlich seiner eigenen Region blieb er
mehr als skeptisch, ob die verlautbarten positiven Reaktionen auf seine
Arbeiten tatsächlich authentisch sind.
»The field writes in to say that a certain report was good, but he is
cynical about this response, saying that it is a ›mutual appreciation
society‹ with the field man saying nice things because he wants K. to
say good things about his own reports.«114
Die eigenartige Aufspaltung der Analysearbeit im Außenministerium
in die Felder »intelligence« und »policy« wiederholt sich hier, aber
diesmal nicht als Ursprung gegenseitiger Blockade. Stattdessen zeigt
Kirchheimers Aussage, dass die Mitarbeiter in der Analyseabteilung
durchaus zu einvernehmlicher Arbeit mit den Regionalabteilungen
fähig waren. Die Kooperation konnte so weit gehen, dass man sich
gegenseitig mit gutem Leumund absicherte. Kirchheimer erweitert
diese Einschätzung in dem Interview auf die gesamte Geheimdienstar-
beit in der amerikanischen Administration. Wenn er etwa direkt nach
einem bestimmten Report frage, bekomme er fast immer eine günstige
Antwort. Dies läge in der Natur der Bürokratie. Direkte Anrufe erhalte
er selten, »but he will know that a report has been used because he
finds people discussing it or will find the report used ›elsewehere‹.«115
Eine Besonderheit in Kirchheimers Arbeitsstil stellt sein Bemühen um
eine möglichst gute Verteilung seiner Arbeiten dar. Dabei achtete er
wenig auf die »standard distribution list«, vielmehr notierte er, wenn es
die Zeit zuließ, alle Personen namentlich, denen er den Report zukom-
men lassen wollte. Es offenbart sich hier einmal mehr, dass Kircheimer
zu diesem Zeitpunkt sehr genau um die Funktionsweise seiner Behörde
wusste. Kirchheimers Vorgehen impliziert auch, dass manche seiner
Adressaten seine Arbeiten dann nicht bekamen, wenn er ihre Namen

113 Ebenda.
114 Ebenda.
115 Ebenda.
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nicht explizit mit aufführte – obwohl ihre Büros auf der Distributions-
liste standen. Sarkastisch meint er schließlich, er habe zwar mitunter
offizielle Anerkennung für bestimmte Arbeiten erfahren, er gehe aber
nicht davon aus »that formal recognition is a good yardstick for perfor-
mance.«116
6. Anmerkungen zur alliierten Besatzungspolitik und zum deutschen

Wiederaufbau
Die ersten Studien im State Department fallen bereits in die Zeit des
immer sichtbarer werdenden Zerbrechens der Anti-Hitler-Koalition.
Davor hatten die Analysten schon vor dem Kriegsende gewarnt, weil
sie hierin eine Gefährdung des demokratischen Wiederaufbaus vermu-
teten. Das wachsende Misstrauen zwischen den Alliierten war bekannt-
lich ein schleichender Prozess und hatte mehrere Ursachen: man-
gelnde strategische Abstimmung, Streit über Rüstungszusagen, feh-
lende Kooperation bei den Kapitulationen auf den jeweiligen Kriegs-
schauplätzen, geopolitisch kollidierende Vorstellungen, divergierende
Absichten, wie mit Widerstandsgruppen zusammengearbeitet und mit
feindlichen Einheiten umgegangen werden sollte, sowie wechselseitige
militärische Spionage (Stöver 2017: 28-88; Gaddis 2008: 17-68; Loth
2000; Dülffer 1998). Spätestens seit der Konferenz von Potsdam waren
die Konflikte in Europa, im Nahen und Mittleren Osten sowie in
Ostasien kaum mehr zu vermitteln. In der Deutschlandpolitik führte
die divergierende Auslegung der im Potsdamer Abkommen vereinbar-
ten »endgültigen Umgestaltung des deutschen politischen Lebens auf
demokratischer Grundlage«, zu Streitigkeiten über Reparationszahlun-
gen zu Spannungen, die sich hinsichtlich der Frage über die wirtschaft-
liche bzw. politische Einheit schnell verschärften.
Die Analytiker in »R« reagierten auf diese Konstellation mit einem
»Anti-Antikommunismus« (Hughes). Denn obwohl sie sich über das
Agieren der Kommunisten keinerlei Illusionen machten – sie wurden
abwechselnd als autoritär bzw. totalitär charakterisiert –, versuchten
sie, die wechselseitigen Sicherheitsinteressen und jeweiligen politischen
Entscheidungen in Ost und West nicht als Systemkonflikt zu verewi-
gen, um den politischen Gestaltungsraum zwischen den beiden sich
als Blöcke formierenden Kontrahenten hervorzuheben. Entsprechend
wird in dem Memorandum The General Character of a Future German
116 Ebenda.
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Government die amerikanische Forderung nach der Beibehaltung der

deutschen Einheit gleichermaßen begrüßt wie die potentielle Notwen-
digkeit ökonomischer Verstaatlichung – was als implizite Zustimmung
zur Bodenreform in der SBZ verstanden werden kann. Diese rückbli-
ckend vielleicht etwas tollkühne Argumentation ist nur vor der schon
im Krieg befürchteten Entwicklung zu verstehen: die Stärkung reak-
tionärer Kräfte zulasten einer gesellschaftlichen Demokratisierung im
Zuge der sich verfestigenden Systemkonfrontation.
Das Memorandum diskutiert vier allgemeine Leitlinien eines künfti-
gen politischen Systems: die Frage der föderalen Ordnung, des Wahl-
rechts, des Parlamentarismus und der Grundrechte. Argumentativer
Fluchtpunkt ist wie schon in den Studien zu Nachkriegsplanungen im
OSS die Frage nach einer stabilen Demokratie. Die Verknüpfung von
Stabilität und Demokratie wiederholt die schon in früheren Reports
und Guides in der formulierten Überzeugung, dass ein Ausspielen
von Sicherheitsinteressen gegenüber demokratischer Teilhabe nicht nur
gegen freiheitliche Prinzipien verstoße, sondern die Glaubhaftigkeit der
westlichen Alliierten untergraben würde. Das Problem der Lebensfä-
higkeit wird bezeichnenderweise nur kursorisch am Anfang berührt,
indem auf die ausreichende Größe des Territoriums und vorhandenen
Ressourcen zur wirtschaftlichen Aktivität hingewiesen wird. Zudem
plädiert das Memorandum für eindeutige und definitive Friedensbe-
dingungen, die den Deutschen ein gewisses Maß an Selbstbewusstsein
zurückgeben sollen, und begrüßt die seit Juni bzw. August erfolgte
Zulassung der politischen Parteien. Zugleich wird eine gewisse Skepsis
gegenüber der Übergabe von Souveränitätsrechten deutlich, wenn es
heißt, dass allein die Sozialdemokratie »fully guarantees liberal-demo-
cratic policies in the western zones« (341), während sowohl die KPD als
auch die bürgerlichen Parteien – mit Ausnahme der CDU in Großhes-
sen und Berlin – letztlich »authoritarian parties« darstellten. Die Her-
vorhebung der Berliner und Frankfurter CDU dürfte mit der dort
mehrheitlich vertretenen Konzeption des christlichen Sozialismus in
Zusammenhang stehen (Bösch 2001: 21-51; Uertz 1981).
Die Frage der föderalen Ordnung beantwortet Kirchheimer prägnant:
Sie sei mit Blick auf die demokratische Stabilität weitgehend irrelevant
und »has depended on the policies of its government and the charac-
ter of the groups supporting it« (342). So wie der Föderalismus ein
Übergreifen autoritärer Parteien (konkret: der KPD) auf den gesamten
Staat verhindere, könnten sich autoritäre Parteien in einer föderalen
Ordnung in regionale Autonomie flüchten. Grundsätzlich geht der Text
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– ähnlich wie Kirchheimers Aufsatz in World Politics (Kirchheimer 1951)

– von einem Niedergang des innerstaatlichen Föderalismus aus. Ursa-
che sei die wachsende administrative Zentralisierung und die damit
verbundene finanzielle Ausstattung der Bundesverwaltung. Im deut-
schen Fall verschärfe sich diese Tendenz aufgrund der Zerschlagung
gewachsener regionaler Strukturen im Nationalsozialismus und der
Notwendigkeit einer starken Zentralgewalt beim Wiederaufbau. Sollte
der demokratische Wiederaufbau nicht gelingen, sei die Frage der föde-
ralen Ordnung ohnehin »altogether academic« (343). Die Absage an
den Fortbestand gewachsener föderaler Strukturen schlägt sich auch in
der Kritik an einem Zweikammersystem nieder. Bemerkenswert ist hin-
gegen die Hervorhebung kommunaler Strukturen, verfügten doch die
Städte über eine gewisse demokratische Tradition. In solchen Neben-
sätzen findet sich ein leises Echo auf die vor Monaten noch erhoffte
demokratische Neugründung von unten (Borsdorf/Niethammer 1976a).
Auch die Kapitel zum Wahl- und zum Regierungssystem lassen den
späteren Politikwissenschaftler erahnen. Seine Ausführungen zum
Wahlrecht richten sich gegen einen institutionalistischen Ansatz, der
meint, verfassungsrechtlich definierte Vorkehrungen könnten politisch
gewünschte demokratieschützende Effekte erzielen: »Constitutional-
structural provisions would not seem to be able to alter these condi-
tion« (348). Neumann hat dies in Anlehnung an Ernst Fraenkel »Ver-
fassungsfetischismus« (Neumann 1950: 331)117 genannt. Konkret wen-
det er sich gegen den insbesondere von Ferdinand A. Hermens und
später von Rudolf Wildenmann sowie Dolf Sternberger vertretenen
»electionist determinism«, der im Verhältniswahlrecht einen wesentli-
chen Faktor für den Niedergang der Weimarer Republik sah (Hermens
1941; Wildenmann 1955; Sternberger 1964).118 Kirchheimer verweist
demgegenüber nicht nur auf die deutsche Tradition des Verhältnis-
wahlrechts, sondern betont wie später Giovanni Sartori (Sartori 2005),
dass Mehrheitswahlsysteme nur dann zu einem gewünschten Zwei-
parteiensystem führen, wenn es eine geografisch gleichmäßige Vertei-
lung der Stimmen über alle Wahlkreise gäbe. Da eine solche Situation
in Deutschland angesichts regionaler Hochburgen nicht vorläge, sei
der heilsame Charakter des Mehrheitswahlrechts lediglich eine »fata
morgana of many German political scientist« (Kirchheimer 1957: 345).
117 Der Begriff findet sich bei: Fraenkel (1932: 521).

118 Kirchheimer kritisiert das von der Kölner Schule vorgebrachte Argument
immer wieder, ohne Hermens überhaupt zu nennen (vgl. Kirchheimer 1954a).
Zur zeitgenössischen Wahlsystemdiskussion (Groh 2018; Poscher 2003; Stoffre‐
gen 2002: 166-176).
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Kirchheimer weist durchaus den Weg der späteren bundesrepublika-

nischen Lösung: personalisierte Verhältniswahl mit einer gemäßigten
Sperrklausel. Aber solche Überlegungen treten hinter das eigentliche
Schlüsselproblem zurück: die »internal structure of German political
parties« (345).
Ob Deutschland nach einer parlamentarischen oder präsidentiellen
Demokratie organisiert werden solle, beantwortet der Report – gemes-
sen an Kirchheimers früheren Studien (Kirchheimer 1940a; Schale 2011)
wenig überraschend – zugunsten der ersten Option. In einem unabhän-
gigen, plebiszitär gewählten Präsidenten mit unbegrenzter Notstands-
gewalt der Exekutive wird eine Ursache für den Niedergang der
Weimarer Republik gesehen, weshalb auch sämtliche Notstandsbefug-
nisse nur unter der Bedingung einer Bindung an den parlamentari-
schen Gesetzgeber zulässig sein sollen (Kersten 2003; Requate 2003).
Der künftige Präsident dürfe lediglich repräsentative Funktionen inne-
haben, ohne die tatsächliche Politik zu beeinflussen. Das Parlament
könne durch eine zweite Kammer zwar geschwächt werden, jedoch
dürfe diese nur über ein aufschiebendes Veto verfügen. Gegen den zu
erwartenden Vorwurf, ein parlamentarisches System könne sich nicht
gegen die totalitären Parteien erwehren, heißt es, dass »the danger
of power being captured by a totalitarian or otherwise undemocratic
party or group has traditionally derived from too much concentration
of power in the executive, rather than in the legislative branch« (347).
Gleichwohl wendet sich Kirchheimer gegen ein zu umfassendes Selbst-
auflösungsrecht des Parlaments und ein zu einfaches Misstrauensvo-
tum, denen er mit entsprechenden Sperrfristen und Quoten begegnet.
Trotz dieser Skepsis gegenüber der Allgewalt des Parlaments – sie wie-
derholt sich im Abschnitt zu den Grundrechten – bleibt er seiner prinzi-
piell parlamentarischen Position treu. Die Stabilität der demokratischen
Ordnung sei von der Struktur des Parteiensystems bzw. den darin
sich äußernden gesellschaftspolitischen Rahmenbedingungen abhängig
– eine wesentliche Pointe seiner späteren organisationssoziologischen
Parteistudien.
Grundrechte werden in dem Text zunächst weitgehend konventionell
als Abwehrrechte vor exekutiver Willkür definiert. Jedoch greift der
Text die schon in der Weimarer Republik geführte Debatte über die Bin-
dung der Gesetzgebung an die Grundrechte (Gusy 1997: 272-286;
Mager 2003) auf und beantwortet diese durchaus anders als zwanzig
Jahre zuvor; bestimmte Grundrechte (Meinungsfreiheit, Vereinigungs-
freiheit und persönliche Freiheit) sollen durchaus gegenüber dem
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Gesetzgeber immunisiert werden. Das Vertrauen in den parlamentari-

schen Gesetzgeber ist nicht unbegrenzt. Jedoch sollten sich – und hier
lässt sich das Echo auf die Studien zu Art. 153 der Weimarer Reichsver-
fassung vernehmen (Kirchheimer 1930a: 227-236; ders. b-d) – nicht alle
Grundrechte unter die Gesetzgebung binden, denn: «The condition
under which economic reconstruction in Germany must proceed will
not permit of absolute protection of private property« (349). Die Ver-
staatlichung von Eigentum sei nicht nur aus pragmatischen Gründen
des Wiederaufbaus nötig, auch stünden breite Teile der Bevölkerung
hinter entsprechenden sozialstaatlichen Maßnahmen. Der absolute
Schutz von privaten Eigentumsrechten diene lediglich »reactionary
forces as the remnants of the Junker class« (349). Die dennoch im Ver-
gleich zur Weimar Republik gesteigerte Bedeutung der Grundrechte –
auch gegenüber dem Gesetzgeber – schlägt sich schließlich in dem vor-
sichtigen Votum zugunsten einer Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit nieder
(Schale 2020).
Vergleicht man den Text mit früheren Arbeiten Kirchheimers, so fällt
neben der neu justierten Bewertung der Gegengewichte zum Parlamen-
tarismus auf, worüber das Memorandum nicht mehr spricht: die einst
beschworenen freiheitlichen Kräfte eines demokratischen Wiederauf-
baus. Hierzu passt der fehlende Appell, man solle den Deutschen die
politische Verantwortung zurückgeben. So macht der Text zwar Vor-
schläge zur politischen Nachkriegsplanung, jedoch wird eine gewisse
Distanzierung und damit verbunden die Handschrift des Politikwissen-
schaftlers Kirchheimer erkennbar. Rückblickend oszillieren diese Texte
zwischen konkreter politischer Beratung, wie eine nachnationalsozialis-
tischen Ordnung im Sinne der USA aussehen sollte, und wissenschaft-
licher Analyse, die zu grundsätzlichen politiktheoretischen Fragen Stel-
lung bezieht.
Die skeptische Deutung des ersten Besatzungsjahres wird im Memo-
randum Current Political Tendencies in Germany Bearing on Its Future
Governmental Structure noch greifbarer. Ursache dürfte die thematisierte
Entnazifizierungspolitik sein. Eigentlich will sich der Text nur zum Par-
teiensystem und zur Reorganisation der Regierung äußern, denen er
jedoch kein befriedigendes Zeugnis ausstellt: Das Parteiensystem in
den westlichen Besatzungszonen sei aufgrund der »considerable politi-
cal apathy« (355) der Jüngeren von den Akteuren der Weimarer Repu-
blik geprägt und trage deutlich restaurative Züge.119 Anlass für dieses
119 Kirchheimer bewegt sich hier in deutlicher Nähe zur Zeitdiagnose Hans-
Werner Richters und Walter Dirks, aber auch Helmut Schelskys. Die heutige
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Urteil ist die Wahl zur Verfassunggebenden Landesversammlung in

Bayern vom 30. Juni 1946, in der auf die CSU 58,3%, auf die SPD knapp
28,8% und auf die KPD bzw. die Wirtschaftliche Aufbau‐Vereinigung
jeweils reichlich 5% der Stimmen entfielen.120 Bemerkenswerterweise
vergleicht der Text diese Ergebnisse mit der Situation von 1928, weil
dies die letzten regulären Wahlen in der Weimarer Republik gewesen
wären: Bei der Landtagswahl zum 4. Bayerischen Landtag 1928 entfie‐
len auf die BVP (31,6%), BBB (11,6%), DVP (6,5%) und DNVP (9,3%)
zusammen mit 59% also annähernd das Ergebnis der CSU von 1946,
während die SPD mit 24,2% und die KPD mit 3,8% ebenfalls in der
Nähe der Ergebnisse von 1928 lagen.121 Aber wo sind die Wähler der
NSDAP – 1928 bereits 6,3% und 1932 32,5%? Kirchheimer vermutet sie
in der CSU. In dieser Pauschalität dürfte diese Deutung unzutreffend
sein.122 Zugleich führt Kirchheimer diese Einschätzung zu der These,
geschichtswissenschaftliche Diskussion der Flakhelfergeneration akzentuiert

eher politische Interventionen und deren Leistungen in der frühen Bundesre-
publik (vgl. Moses 1999; Fröhlich 2008).
120 Der Text gibt die Stimmengewichte in Bezug zur Gesamtzahl der abgegebenen
Stimmen an.
121 Bei den Reichstagswahlen 1928 zeigte sich für Bayern folgendes Ergebnis:
27,88% BVP, 11,11% BBB, 9,99% DNVP, 3,81% DVP, 24,37% SPD, 3,83% KPD
und 6,37% NSDAP. Die 58% der CSU von 1946 wurden bei den Reichstagswah-
len von 1928 nur durch die Hinzufügung der Stimmen der NSDAP erreicht.
Die Beschränkung auf die Wahlen von 1928 hat zur Folge, dass der Nieder-
gang der SPD bei den Reichstagswahlen in Bayern unerwähnt bleibt: 24%
(1928), 20% (1930), 17% (1932 I) und 16% (1932 II).
122 Hintergrund für eine solche Einschätzung dürften die von der Information
Control Division im Auftrag des OMGUS erfolgten Umfragen sein. Die Ana-
lysten kommen anhand von Befragungen in der US-amerikanischen Zone zwi-
schen November 1945 und März 1946 zu dem Ergebnis, dass der Ausschluss
von NSDAP-Mitgliedern von politischen Ämtern vor allem von großstädti-
schen SPD-Sympathisanten und weniger aus dem bürgerlichen Lager gefor-
dert wurde. In der gleichen Erhebung präferieren 28% der ehemaligen
NSDAP-Wähler die SPD, jedoch 52% konservative Parteien (vgl. Merritt/
Merritt 1970: 72). In einer weiteren Befragung von Gemeindevorstehern vom
April 1946 heißt es: »Most of the former Nazi Party members preferred the
CDU or the CSU. […] Sixty per cent of those who preferred the CSU or the
CDU were former members of the Center Party, the Bavarian People's Party, or
the German National People's Party« (Ebenda: 75). In einer anderen Erhebung
wird betont, dass vor allem die CSU eine flüchtlingsfeindliche Einstellung ein-
nehme und politische Gleichheit gegenüber den Evakuierten zurückweise
(ebenda, S. 91). Dem entsprach, dass die US-amerikanische Militärregierung
einzelne CSU-Mitglieder von ihren Ämtern absetzte oder ihnen die politische
Tätigkeit entzog, weil diese Sympathien für NS-Funktionäre hatten. Zugleich
waren solche Eingriffe auch Ausdruck politischer Auseinandersetzungen
innerhalb der CSU (vgl. Mintzel 1975: 110-118). Ein zu pauschaler Vorwurf
ignoriert jedoch die Robustheit der BVP und des katholischen Milieus gegen-
über der NSDAP: So profitierte ab 1930 die NSDAP vom Abstieg der DNVP
und vor allem des Bayrischen Bauernbundes, während die BVP konstant bei
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dass der CDU/CSU im Nachkriegsdeutschland eine Schlüsselrolle

zukommen werde: Inwieweit gelingt es ihr, reaktionäre, antidemokrati-
sche Wähler in das politische System zu integrieren? Der Text bleibt mit
Blick auf die regionale und konfessionelle Spaltung skeptisch, erst spä-
ter wird Kirchheimer angesichts der zentripetalen Kraft der Union zu
einem anderen Ergebnis kommen.123 Doch die genannten regionalen
und konfessionellen Konflikte werden letztlich nur beiläufig erwähnt.
Mehr Aufmerksamkeit erhalten die Vertriebenen, deren Antibolsche-
wismus »will constitute an influence toward rightist radicalism«, der
wahrscheinlich einen »growing trend toward a revived Nazism« (352)
befördere. Diese Gruppe werde sich, so die düstere Prognose, in den
konservativen und bürgerlichen Sammlungsparteien engagieren,
zunehmend die eigene Camouflage fallen lassen und den demokrati-
schen Aufbau torpedieren.
Als Beleg gilt ihm die Entnazifizierungspolitik. Führten die frühen
Bestrebungen der Amerikaner bei allen Defiziten der mechanischen
Überprüfung durch Fragebögen zu einer politischen Säuberung der
Verwaltung, bedeutete die Übertragung der Entnazifizierungsbefugnis
auf deutsche Verantwortliche im Spruchkammerverfahren eine »Rena-
zifizierung« (Neumann 1948: 324; Herz 1948; Niethammer 1972) der
deutschen Verwaltung:
»Intimidation of tribunal members through threats of economic boy-
cott, social ostracism, and personal violence has been reflected in
extremely lenient sentences imposed even upon active Nazis, many
of whom are permitted to rescue the administrative posts which they
were forced to vacate under US procedures« (355).
Die in älteren Reports vermutete Befürchtung, die Westalliierten könn-
ten die angestrebte Entnazifizierung angesichts Widrigkeiten des not-
wendigen Wiederaufbaus und der aufziehenden Systemkonfrontation
preisgeben, wird auch hier am Beispiel der britischen Besatzungszone
aufgegriffen. Dass die Briten einer »funktionierenden Verwaltung Prio-
rität vor einer konsequenten Entnazifizierung« (Seggern 2005: 35;
Foschepoth/Steininger 1985; Turner 1989) einräumten, indem sie zwar
politische Eliten entnazifizieren, jedoch in fortdauernder Anwendung
des Beamtenrechts von 1937 die Bürokratie als technischen Garanten
des Wiederaufbaus verwenden (Reusch 1985), wird von Kirchheimer
über 28% lag (vgl. zu den Wählern der NSDAP in Bayern: Pridham 1973:
264-294; grundsätzlich: Falter 1991).
123 So wird die Union 1954 als »conservative catch-all-party« (Kirchheimer 1954b:
262) bezeichnet, also eine Partei, die weltanschauliche Konflikte aufgegeben
hat.
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mit Blick auf die angestrebte Entnazifizierung als »opposite of the desi-
red effect« (354) gerügt.
Gegenüber den Maßnahmen zum Wiederaufbau der deutschen Regie-
rung fällt das Urteil trotz markanter Bedenken weniger bissig aus. Der
verfassungsgebende Prozess in der amerikanischen Besatzungszone
findet prinzipielle Unterstützung, jedoch moniert er, dass die politische
Reorganisation auf Länderebene partikularistische Tendenzen beför-
dere, worin er eine Bedrohung der gesamtstaatlichen Integration und
ein Aufleben autoritärer Tendenzen in der Provinz vermutet. So wirft
er den Entwürfen zur Bayrischen Verfassung, hinter denen er primär
die CSU vermutet, eine parlamentarismusfeindliche Position vor: die
Schaffung eines mit Notstandsrecht und Parlamentsauflösung ausge-
statteten bayrischen Staatspräsidenten, die Bildung einer ständischen
Berufs- und Verbändevertretung als zweite Parlamentskammer sowie
ein Mehrheitswahlrecht – Kritikpunkte, die auch die SPD mehrheitlich
monierte (Fait 1998; Schmidt 1997). Zugleich sollte die Missbilligung
nicht überbewertet werden, zum einen, weil die kritisierten Passagen
im angenommen Entwurf deutlich aufgeweicht wurden, zum anderen,
weil die Verfassungsgebung von der Zusammenarbeit zwischen CSU
und SPD getragen und sogar maßgeblich von Wilhelm Hoegner (SPD)
vorangetrieben wurde. Vergleicht man Kirchheimers Kritik an den Ent-
würfen mit der Position des OMGUS (Heydenreuther 1994: 207-210), so
stimmen beide mit ihrer Kritik an einer zweiten, berufsständigen Kam-
mer und der Absage gegenüber einem bayerischen Separatismus über-
ein. Die nach Art. 48 der Bayrischen Verfassung von amerikanischer
Seite geforderte Bindung des Notstandsrechts des Ministerpräsidenten
an das Parlament mochte für Kirchheimer ein zumindest akzeptabler
Kompromiss gewesen sein. Hingegen dürfte die vom OMGUS vorge-
nommene Streichung der anvisierten Bestimmungen über die Planwirt-
schaft bzw. staatliche finanzpolitische und außenwirtschaftliche Über-
wachung bei Kirchheimer wenig Zustimmung gefunden haben.
Ernüchtert konstatiert er an anderer Stelle: »no social-economic reforms
have been inaugurated comparable to those in the Soviet Zone« (352).
Das schließlich in Art. 14 Abs. 1 BV verbesserte Verhältniswahlrecht
(Unterpaul 1992: 56-62) wird nicht explizit diskutiert, für Kirchheimer
dürfte es aber – auch aufgrund der 10%-Sperrklausel – diskussionswür-
dig sein.
Insgesamt dokumentieren beide hier präsentierten Texte die politi-
sche Defensivstellung der Sozialdemokraten: Sowohl die westliche
Besatzungspolitik als auch der deutsche Widerstand gegen eine Demo-
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kratisierung und Entnazifizierung – Kirchheimer spricht von Sabo-

tage – begünstigen restaurative Effekte und konservative Parteien.
Zugleich werde die demokratische Linke in der Ostzone entweder
durch Druck oder durch »›natural‹ attraction« (353) zu bedeutungslo-
sen »figureheads« der SED degradiert, während sie sich im Westen in
administrativen Tätigkeiten aufreibe, ohne entsprechende sozioökono-
mische Transformationen anzugehen. Gemessen an den Erwartungen
einer demokratischen Neuordnung, wie sie in den Kriegsstudien for-
muliert wurde, ist die Enttäuschung –nicht nur gegenüber den Westal-
liierten, sondern auch den vermeintlich demokratischen Kräften – mit
Händen zu greifen.124 Diese Distanzierung bereitet den Boden für eine
Form der kritischen Theorie, die kaum noch einen politischen Adres-
saten finden kann. Dies betrifft nicht allein einen politischen Akteur
in Deutschland, sondern auch entsprechende Dienststellen in der ame-
rikanischen Verwaltung. Die beiden hier versammelten Memoranden
sprechen wenige politische Empfehlungen aus, sondern diagnostizie-
ren lediglich den immer schmaler werdenden politischen Gestaltungs-
raum.
7. Der Kampf um die französische Verfassung
Kirchheimers Beschreibung der verfassungsrechtlichen Entstehung der

Vierten Französischen Republik ist ein genuin politikwissenschaftliches
Buch. Zwar diskutiert er zahlreiche Probleme des französischen Ver-
fassungsrechts, die Perspektive ist jedoch die eines nüchternen, mit-
unter sarkastischen Realisten, der weder von einzelnen Institutionen
eine unbedingt heilsame Wirkung gesellschaftlicher Herausforderun-
gen erwartet, noch daran glaubt, dass ein verfassungsgebender Prozess
allein in rechtlichen Bahnen beschrieben werden kann. Die Entschei-
dung für eine bestimmte verfassungsrechtliche Ordnung werde von
den handelnden Akteuren nicht mit Blick auf eine gelungene Verfas-
sungsarchitektur getroffen, sondern ist Ausdruck eines Ringens der
politischen Parteien in einem verfassungsrechtlich nicht abgeschlosse-
nen Mächtearrangement. Auch die in den Verfassungsverhandlungen
124 Rückblickend meinte der einstige Leiter der Central European Section Eugene
N. Anderson: »Ich glaube, Neumann und Kirchheimer haben zuviel und zu
schnell etwas erwartet. Wenn ich irgendeine Kritik habe an den Bürokraten
und Akademikern, auch an den emigrierten Gelehrten, dann ist es die, daß
sie zu begierig, zu rasch Ergebnisse erwartet haben. So schnell läßt sich eben
nichts machen. Speziell Kirchheimer habe ich da im Auge« (Söllner 1986b: 30).
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immer wieder mit Blick auf die Phasen der Französischen Revolu-
tion beschworenen ideen- und geschichtspolitischen Bezüge erscheinen
Kirchheimer als bloße taktische oder strategische Verlautbarungen in
einer zunehmend durch internationale Konflikte geprägten Konstella-
tion. Die zunächst referierten Fragen der verfassungsrechtlichen Neu-
ordnung Frankreichs werden bezeichnenderweise zunächst nur knapp
und im Verlauf des Textes immer weniger erörtert, wobei weniger die
Normativität und die Leistungsfähigkeit verfassungsrechtlicher Ideen
bewertet werden, sondern allein der Blick auf die Durchsetzungsfähig‐
keit der jeweiligen Partei im Zentrum steht. Schließlich unterstreicht
der sich durch nicht wenige ironische Glossen auszeichnende Tonfall
des Buches Kirchheimers merkliche Distanz zu den Akteuren, die
sich zwar stolz geben, aber zunehmend in Selbstwidersprüchen ver-
heddernden. Folgt man der Rahmenerzählung des Textes, so beginnt
Kirchheimer mit dem von den Résistance-Kämpfern vorangetragenem
selbstbewussten und notwendigen Bruch mit der Dritten Republik
angesichts der Kompromittierung der kollaborierenden politischen Eli-
ten des Vichy-Regimes nach 1939/40 und endet mit der politischen
Pattsituation, aus der heraus eine weitgehend ungeliebte und nur aus
pragmatischen Gründen akzeptierte Verfassung verabschiedet wurde.
Die Schlüsselrolle der Vierten Republik komme zwei Akteuren zu, die
im verfassungsgebenden Prozess keine große Rolle spielten: der algeri-
schen Unabhängigkeitsbewegung und Charles de Gaulle.
Aufschlussreich an dem Buch ist zunächst, dass Kirchheimer dem
ersten, abgelehnten Verfassungsentwurf fast dreiviertel des Platzes ein-
räumt, auch wenn er bereits einleitend anmerkt, dieser sei »today only
of historical interest« (360). Ursache für dieses seltsame Ungleichge-
wicht dürfte Kirchheimers Sympathie für das von der politischen Lin-
ken dort noch stärker akzentuierte parlamentarische Regierungssystem
sein, welches im zweiten und angenommenen Entwurf, der stärker die
Handschrift der Konservativen trägt, verwässert wurde. Ausführlich
dokumentiert er die zum Auseinanderbrechen der Résistance führen-
den Verhandlungen der drei großen Parteien, der Kommunisten, Gaul-
listen und Sozialisten, in der provisorischen Regierung und der Natio-
nalversammlung. Als Hauptstreitfrage im französischen Tripartismus
macht Kirchheimer neben dem Umgang mit Kollaborateuren – gegen-
über der großzügigen Haltung der rechten Parteien und der Mitte zeigt
Kirchheimer durchaus ein gewisses Maß an Verständnis angesichts des
»shortage of experienced parliamentary personnel in the middle class
parties« (365) – die Frage nach dem künftigen Regierungssystem aus.
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Dreh- und Angelpunkt der Darstellung sind die drei großen politischen
Parteien, wobei die katholisch geprägte Mouvement républicain popu-
laire (MRP) als »the new meteor among the French parties« (366)
und die Parti communiste français (PCF) mit ihrer starken Gewerk-
schaftsanbindung von Kirchheimer als dominante Parteien präsentiert
werden, während die sozialistische Section française de l’Internatio-
nale ouvrière (SFIO) trotz ihres Beitrags insbesondere zum ersten Ver-
fassungsentwurf eher in ihrer Defensivposition beschrieben wird. Sie
würde zwar gutwillig am Verfassungswerk mitarbeiten und bereitwil-
lig Kompromisse eingehen, jedoch fehle ihr strategisches Geschick
bzw. politischer Weitblick – jedenfalls kommt Kirchheimer wenig auf
deren programmatische Forderungen zu sprechen. Zudem verfüge sie
über eine diffuse Wählerschaft eher außerhalb der Arbeiterschaft. Die
Konzentration des Parteiensystems, das wohl wesentlichste Merkmal
des Tripartismus im Nachkriegsfrankreich, erklärt sich Kirchheimer als
Reaktion auf den Erfolg der Kommunisten, der die Konflikte zwischen
anderen Parteien reduziert. Inwiefern dies dauerhaft gelingt, bleibt
offen. Entgegen der faktischen Entwicklung in den folgenden Jahren
zeigte sich Kirchheimer gegenüber einer »substitution of political pro-
grams for men and the accompanying rationalization of political life«
(370) zunächst optimistisch.
Als Hauptstreitpunkt beschreibt er das Verhältnis von Parlament und
Präsident; hier lassen sich auf den ersten Blick die parteipolitische
Programmatik, aber noch vielmehr das strategische Agieren am deut-
lichsten erkennen: Die PCF trete für einen starken Parlamentarismus
mit beträchtlichen plebiszitären Elementen ein, um die von Gaullisten
besetzten Stellen in Verwaltung und Justiz politisch zu isolieren. Sol-
che Forderungen dokumentieren ihre augenblickliche Stärke und das
damit verbundene Selbstbewusstsein, keine Minorität zu werden, die
Minderheitenrechte benötige. Dem steht die MRP gegenüber, die ein
korporatives Verständnis von Pluralismus vor sich hertrage:
»Pluralism in this connection meant the recognition of rights of all sorts
of corporate entities, especially of families, along with the Rousseauis-
tic conception of Parlement as the instrument for the transformation
of the will of the individual voter into the general will through the
medium of the representative system. The theoretical concept of plura-
lism thus served as a justification for any checks which were proposed
against the omnipotence of an Assembly, offspring of an individualisti-
cally conceived popular sovereignty« (373).
Verfassungspolitisch schlägt sich dies in der Akzentuierung zahlrei-
cher Vetospieler gegenüber dem Parlament nieder. Tatsächlich stünden
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die MRP und die anderen konservativen Parteien, welche sich nun
zum Anwalt eines Systems von Checks and Balances stilisieren, für
eine autoritäre Präsidialdemokratie. Zwischen MRP und PCF falle der
SFIO »the ungrateful role of ›eternal mediator‹« (374) zu, die zwar
prinzipiell für einen starken Parlamentarismus plädiere, jedoch diesen
um einige Kontrollen ergänzt wissen möchte – auch um eine unge-
bremste Parlamentsherrschaft bei einer dominanten kommunistischen
Fraktion zu verhindern. Dies schlägt sich im Bekenntnis zu individu-
ellen und sozialen Grundrechten nieder, das dem Vorschlag der PCF
fehlte. Lakonisch kommentiert Kirchheimer: »The Socialists included it
not only to achieve the ›economic 1789‹, but also politely to remind
the CP that the Socialists’ version of future society endeavors to recon-
cile personal freedom with delivery from ›economic servitude‹« (375).
Man hört Kirchheimers Skepsis gegenüber einer ungebremsten Parla-
mentsherrschaft, wenn er die Haltung der Sozialisten mit den Worten
beschreibt, diese hätten eine »deep-seated suspicion of any anti-demo-
cratic moves, whether from a strong extreme Leftist or Rightist majo-
rity« (375).
Die schwachen Gegengewichte zum Parlament waren denn auch das
wesentliche Argument der Parteien der Mitte und der Rechten gegen
den ersten Verfassungsentwurf. Das zentrale Argument des bürgerli-
chen Lagers, der Verfassungsentwurf entspreche der »diktatorischen«
Jakobinerverfassung von 1793, wird von Kirchheimer zurückgewiesen.
Diktaturen entstünden nicht aus Parlamentsmehrheiten, sondern aus
präsidialen Ermächtigungsgesetzen. Dessen ungeachtet plädiert auch
Kirchheimer für keinen schrankenlosen Parlamentarismus, sondern
votiert für grundrechtliche und formelle Blockaden jedoch ohne einen
institutionalisierten Gegenspieler, sei es eine zweite Kammer oder gar
ein Präsident. Trotz immer wieder angedeuteter Vorbehalte gegenüber
einem starken Parlamentarismus schlägt sich Kirchheimer auf dessen
Seite. Während er etwa kommentarlos dessen Rechtfertigung durch
den linkssozialistischen Luftfahrtminister Pierre Cot referiert, wird jede
Stärkung des Präsidenten nicht nur als unparlamentarisch abgelehnt.
Dahinter vermutet er stets die Ambitionen von de Gaull, dessen politi-
sche Vorstellungen einer starken und unabhängigen Exekutive in der
Tradition der Action Française stünden. Kirchheimer verstärkt seine
Absage an die Idee der Gewaltenteilung mit dem lapidaren Kommen-
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tar, beachtliche Teile von Justiz und Verwaltung hätten mit dem Vichy-
Regime kollaboriert.125
Besonderes Augenmerk schenkt Kirchheimer der Debatte um die
Grundrechte, insbesondere der Pressefreiheit, dem Privatunterricht
und dem Eigentum. Sie veranschaulicht für ihn, dass ein grundrecht-
licher Schutz keine bloß rechtstheoretische Frage, sondern stets Aus-
druck politischer Kämpfe im verfassungsgebenden Prozess ist. So stellt
die von den drei großen Parteien angestrebte Kontrolle der Presse
zwar einen Eingriff in deren grundrechtlichen Schutz dar, dient aber
letztlich der Verteidigung einer freiheitlichen Ordnung vor ausländisch
finanzierter und antidemokratischer Propaganda. Gleiches will der Text
anhand des Eigentumsrechts veranschaulichen, denn die Möglichkeit
der Enteignung wird von den Sozialisten nicht aus bestimmten Prinzi-
pien, sondern aus dem gesellschaftlichen Nutzen abgeleitet, »assailing
the abuses of the monopolists rather than discussing property as an
institution« (394). Diese pragmatische Haltung – die er bei allen drei
Parteien in den verfassungsgebenden Ausschüssen zum ersten Entwurf
ausmacht und die erst später von Seiten der MRP aufgekündigt wor-
den sei – zeigt sich für Kirchheimer in der Bereitschaft der Linken,
Formeln aus der katholischen Soziallehre aufzunehmen. Ironisch kom-
mentiert Kirchheimer das Ringen um soziale Grundrechte als »a one-
way ticket to a known destination – a democratic society free of want
– with the means of transportation yet to be furnished« (396). Strittiger
war die Frage der privaten, d.h. konfessionellen, Schulen, die – anders
als von der MRP gefordert – keinen verfassungsrechtlichen Schutz
erhalten sollten, was aufgrund des Widerstands der Kirche maßgeblich
zum Scheitern des Entwurfes führte. Überschaut man das längere Kapi-
tel zum Grundrechtsteil, so wird Kirchheimers undogmatische und
anwendungsorientierte Deutung von Grundrechten mehr als plastisch.
Das feierlich verkündete Bekenntnis zu allgemeinen Prinzipien wird
merklich karikiert, wenn er die Einigung auf den Grundrechtsteil als
Erfolg all jener bezeichnet, »who want to believe that a reconciliation
of the personal freedoms and liberties of 1789 with the promised land
of a better society is possible« (395). Nur wenig später heißt es weit
prosaischer: »[A] great number of the principles enunciated in the Bill
of Rights were neither applicable nor enforceable without implemen-
tation. They were simply guideposts for future legislators.« (397) Das
125 In seinem Hauptwerk greift Kirchheimer die ausbleibende Aufarbeitung und

mangelhafte Säuberung der »tatkräftige[n] Beteiligung an der Zwangsarbeits-
und Judenausrottungspolitik« (Kirchheimer 1965a: 621) der französischen Ver-
waltung erneut auf.
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Echo auf die Weimarer Verfassung mit ihren zahlreichen Programm-

sätzen ist noch zu hören. »[T]he question of enforcement remained a
weak spot« (398).
Das politische Manko im Nachkriegsfrankreich liegt für Kirchheimer
ohnehin weniger in den konfligierenden verfassungspolitischen Ideen
der Parteien des Tripartismus, sondern der politischen Organisation
seiner Kolonien, die seit der Konferenz von Brazzaville 1944 auf eine
Neuordnung warteten. Der Verfassungsentwurf sieht die völlige recht-
liche Gleichstellung aller auf französischem Boden lebenden Bewohner
vor, auch wenn nicht völlig klar werde, wer französischer Bürger und
wer nur Bürger der Französischen Union sei. Die rechtliche Gleichstel-
lung würde zwar in den Kolonien zunächst positiv registriert, zugleich
ist die Frage der politischen Repräsentation der Überseegebiete auf-
grund der offenkundigen Diskriminierung – ironisch spricht Kirch-
heimer vom »time-honored slogan regarding the correlation between
taxation and representation« (403) – eine kaum zu lösende Herausfor-
derung. Eine durchaus gerechtfertigte stärkere Repräsentation dieser
Gebiete würde einen Trend verschärfen, den Kirchheimer ohnehin
beobachtet: Die politischen Vertreter aus den Kolonien steigen auf-
grund des Patts zwischen linken und rechten Parteien zum Schiedsrich-
ter über die französische Politik auf, zumal sich in Algerien die Zurück-
weisung der Verfassung frühzeitig andeutet: »These native nationalists,
who were hostile or at best completely indifferent to French interests,
became the virtual arbiters of French politics« (408).
Die Ablehnung des ersten Verfassungsentwurfs am 5. Mai 1946, die
sich Kirchheimer mit der katholischen Ablehnung der Bestimmungen
zum Unterricht, aber auch einer wachsenden Ablehnung der Kommu-
nisten erklärt, belastete den Tripartismus und führe zur Abgrenzung
der Sozialisten von der sich nun kämpferischer gebenden PCF – ein
Richtungswechsel, der jedoch den Sozialisten nachhaltig schade. Die
siegreiche MRP habe zwar nun ihre Forderungen verstärkt, jedoch sei
sie aufgrund der Mehrheitsverhältnisse nicht in der Lage, diese auch
umzusetzen. Zudem stünde hinter diesen Forderungen kein wirkliches
Programm, läge doch ihre Stärke »in the personalities of their indivi-
dual candidates rather than in their outworn doctrines and decrepit
organization« (408). Die MRP erscheint an solchen Stellen fast schon als
Honoratiorenpartei, die den Anforderungen modernen Regierens, d.h.
einer organisierten und verantwortungsbewussten Parteipolitik, nicht
gewachsen sei. Insbesondere moniert er, dass die MRP als Partei zwar
am parlamentarischen Spiel teilnehme, sich aber zugleich als Erfül-
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lungsgehilfe von de Gaulle verstehe, der ohne jegliche Verantwortung

politische Forderungen öffentlichkeitswirksam präsentiere. Daher über-
rascht es Kirchheimer nicht, dass die Änderungen im zweiten Verfas-
sungsentwurf gegenüber den im ersten eher symbolischer Natur blei-
ben: Die Stärkung der institutionellen Gegengewichte zum Parlament –
der Präsident, der Conseil de la République sowie der Conseil supéri-
eur de la magistrature – habe prinzipiell am parlamentarischen Regie-
rungssystem nichts geändert. Auffällig sei eher die Ausdünnung der in
die Präambel verschobenen Grundrechte, insbesondere die Bestimmun-
gen zum Eigentum.126 Wie wenig durchsetzungsfähig die MRP trotz
ihres Sieges gewesen sei, zeige aber insbesondere ihr Scheitern in ihrem
Vorhaben, die Stellung der konfessionellen Schulen zu verbessern.
Bezeichnenderweise ist die staatliche Anerkennung der privaten Schu-
len am Widerstand der algerischen Nationalisten gescheitert – erneut
ein Argument für Kirchheimers These, dass eine Gruppe, die letztlich
eine völlige Loslösung vom Mutterland anstrebt, zum »virtual arbiters
in all constitutional issues« (418) Frankreichs aufgestiegen sei. Dies und
die Fortschritte der Gleichstellung der indigenen Bevölkerung führte
zugleich zum erbitterten Widerstand der französischen Kolonisten.
Er war insofern erfolgreich, als die autonomen föderalen Strukturen
nun zugunsten der zentralstaatlichen Souveränität zurückgedreht wur-
den: »[T]he federalist element is at best a draft on the future; at the
worst, simple window-dressing« (420). Der in die Verfassungswirklich-
keit hineingeschleuderte Widerspruch, von einer unterrepräsentierten
Gruppe politisch abhängig zu sein, werde sich als schwere Hypothek
für die Republik erweisen. Auch andere destabilisierende Faktoren
zeichnen sich bereits ab: einerseits die allgegenwärtige Bedrohung
durch die präsidentiellen Pläne de Gaulles, andererseits das »minor
comeback« (424) der kleinen Parteien zu Lasten des Tripartismus, der
im Mai 1947 mit der Entlassung der kommunistischen Minister ein
Ende fand, nachdem diese der Regierung in ihrer Indochinapolitik
126 Im ersten Entwurf heißt es in Art. 35, dass das unverletzliche Recht, Eigentum
zu nutzen, zu genießen und darüber zu verfügen, zwar jedem gesetzlich garan-
tiert sei, es aber für einen gesetzlich festgelegten öffentlichen Zweck unter der
Bedingung einer gerechten Entschädigung auf gesetzlicher Grundlage entzo‐
gen werden könne. Diese Bestimmung, anders als die zur Kollektivierung von
Monopolen, fehlt im zweiten Entwurf. Kirchheimers Einschätzung, dass der
wesentliche Unterschied zwischen dem ersten und zweiten Entwurf in den
Grundrechtsbestimmungen liege, wird auch heute noch durchaus mit explizi-
ten Verweis auf das Buch bestätigt (Scheppele 2007/2008).
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die Gefolgschaft verweigerten. Aber weder der Indochinakrieg,127 die

europäische Mai-Krise 1947 (die auch in Italien zur Entfernung der
kommunistischen Minister führte)128 noch der Marshall-Plan werden
im Text thematisiert. Fast abrupt endet der Text mit der konstituieren-
den Sitzung des Conseils de la République im Dezember 1946, durch
die die Verfassung der Vierten Republik in Kraft tritt.
Kirchheimers Broschüre wurde wohlwollend aufgenommen, auch
wenn sein Verfasser anonym bleiben musste. So urteilt der kanadische
Historiker S. Mack Eastman: »[T]he work of a master in this field,
gives a clear, concise, and factual description of the background of
present-day social and political conflict« (Eastman 1947/1948: 75). Der
am Sidney Sussex College in Cambridge lehrende Historiker David
Thomson, der den von Kirchheimer herausgearbeiteten Kompromiss-
charakter der Verfassung bemerkenswert findet, lobt den »admirable
and immensely valuable survey« (Thomson 1948: 277). Dass Thomson
parallel sein sehr erfolgreiches Buch Democracy in France: The Third and
Fourth Republic vorlegte, veranschaulicht auch die begrenzte Reichweite
einer anonym veröffentlichten Broschüre, der trotz des Lobes keine
breite Rezeption beschieden sein konnte. Auch der an der University
of Colorado, am Dartmouth College und an der McGill University in
Montreal lehrende Politikwissenschaftler und Frankreichexperte Henry
W. Ehrmann – wie Kirchheimer sozialdemokratischer Emigrant und
wissenschaftlicher Berater für das Office of War Information und das
War Department im Kriegseinsatz – begrüßt in einer Sammelrezension
anderer Bücher die »very useful study« (Ehrmann 1948: 468)129. Eine
große Besprechung erfährt das Heft trotz des attestierten »high stan-
dard« (Hyslop 1948: 382) nicht. Kritisch ist lediglich die Rezension von
Robert Kent Gooch von der University of Virginia, der neben nicht
näher genannten Ungenauigkeiten die unterschiedliche Gewichtung
vom ersten Verfassungsentwurf und der angenommenen Verfassung
moniert (Gooch 1948). Bezeichnend ist schließlich das Urteil der in
The Western Political Quarterly erschienenen Rezension von Russell H.
Fitzgibbon von der UCLA. Er lobt die realistische Beschreibung »of
127 Kirchheimers Frankreichbild wird zunehmend kritischer, insbesondere de

Gaulle erscheint zunehmend als autoritärer Potentat (Kirchheimer 1958).
128 Über das Herausdrängen der kommunistischen Minister: vgl. Kirchheimer
1965a: 383f.
129 Ehrmann kannte Kirchheimer seit 1930 und erklärte gegenüber dem FBI, dass
sich dieser von seiner Frau aufgrund ihrer kommunistischen Orientierung
trennte (Results of Investigation vom 16. Mai 1950 (Seite 1). U.S. Department
of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Files on Subject Otto Kirchheimer,
unnummeriert).
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the intricate and often subtle conflict of party positions and maneuver-
ing«, um euphorisch zu schließen: »We need more of them« (Fitzgibbon
1948: 329). Zugleich konstatiert er, dass die Anonymität des Buches
den Autor um dessen verdiente Anerkennung bringt: »it would be a
pleasure to give credit in this fashion where able credit is due.«
8. Betrachtungen über das besetzte Deutschland
Die »R«-Studien zum besetzten Deutschland zeichnen sich durch eine

Gemeinsamkeit aus: Sie haben stets ein zukünftiges Gesamtdeutsch-
land im Blick. Die Möglichkeit einer Trennung der verschiedenen
Besatzungszonen wird nicht erörtert. Was sich aber im Verlauf der
Arbeiten immer deutlicher abzeichnet, ist die Tendenz, die grundsätz‐
lichen Unterschiede zwischen amerikanischer und sowjetischer Besat-
zungspolitik wahrzunehmen, anzuerkennen und zur Grundlage der
eigenen Analyse zu machen. Auffällig ist hierbei, dass in der frühen
Phase die später dominante Atmosphäre des Kalten Krieges kaum zur
Sprache kommt, fast so, als würden die Reports dies bewusst herab-
mindern. Insbesondere die von der UdSSR forcierte Umstrukturierung
der wirtschaftlichen Besitzverhältnisse und die versprochene grundle-
gende Entnazifizierung erhält in den Beiträgen der Forschungsabtei-
lung des State Departments durchweg bessere Noten als die Bemühun-
gen der westlichen Alliierten auf diesem Gebiet. Der später immer
wieder hervorgehobene instrumentelle Charakter sowjetischer Außen-
politik, die Ostzone bzw. die DDR als Faustpfand für eigene Interessen
zu benutzen, fehlt in den frühen Reports merklich.
Der erste Report aus dem State Departement The General Character of a
Future German Government stellt die Frage in den Mittelpunk, wie eine
zukünftige, sowohl stabile als auch demokratische Regierung Deutsch-
lands aussehen könnte. Das Problem teile sich auf drei Ebenen auf:
(1) Überlebensfähigkeit, (2) Stabilität und (3) demokratischer Charakter
des zukünftigen politischen Systems. Erstere sei in so hohem Maß von
äußeren Vorgaben abhängig, dass sie nicht Teil der Betrachtungen sein
solle. Die zweite und dritte Ebene stünden dagegen in einem Zusam-
menhang, denn »insuring the stability and democratic character of the
future government is a problem partly of a constitutional-structural
and partly of a political nature« (340). Den Zusammenhang von Demo-
kratie und Stabilität vergegenwärtigt Kirchheimer am Beispiel autokra-
tischer Parteien, mit deren Einbeziehung man wohl die Stabilität des
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Gesamtsystems erhöhen könne, aber gleichermaßen dessen demokrati-

schen Charakter gefährde.
Auf politischer Ebene fällt die Analyse noch recht einfach aus. Außen-
politisch sollten die Friedensbedingungen feststehen, bevor Deutsch-
land eine eigene Regierung bekomme, ansonsten wirke diese abhän-
gig von den Besatzungsmächten. Im Bereich der Innenpolitik sei ent-
scheidend, ob es demokratische Parteien gebe, auf die die Besatzungs‐
mächte sich stützen könnten. Vorhersagbar könne dies nur für die
Sozialdemokratie gelten. »It is upon those [liberal] portions of the mid-
dle-class parties and upon the Social Democratic Party (SPD), that US
policy can chiefly rely for the implementation of a democratic govern-
mental program« (341).
Die Betrachtung der strukturellen Probleme fällt dagegen deutlich
komplexer aus, hier müsse nach dem Maß an Föderalismus, dem
Wahlsystem, dem Verhältnis von Legislative und Exekutive sowie der
grundsätzlichen Beschränkung der Macht des Staates gefragt werden.
Solch politikwissenschaftlichen Fragen an werden stets vor dem Hin-
tergrund einer Gefährdung der eigenen (amerikanischen) Interessen
durch ein mögliches Wiederauftauchen eines deutschen Militarismus
und deutscher Aggressionen diskutiert. Der Föderalismus sei aber kein
Hauptfaktor an dem sich Autoritarismus und Demokratie scheiden
würden:
»Whether Germany has been democratic and peace-loving or authori-
tarian and aggressive, has depended on the policies of its government
and the character of the groups supporting it rather than upon the
distribution of power between Reich and member states« (342).
Priorität genieße die die Sicherung der Demokratie, die wiederum von
der Zustimmung der Bevölkerung abhängig sei. Auch in der Frage
nach dem Wahlsystem liefert der Report eine recht kühle Antwort,
die dem sozialen Kontext den Vorrang vor verfassungs- und wahlrecht-
lichen Lösungen einräumt. Kirchheimer widerspricht dem Vorwurf,
dass eine starke Orientierung des Wahlsystems an der proportiona-
len Repräsentation die Parteien mit ihrem Apparat übermäßig stärke.
Tatsächlich könne man dafür nicht das Wahlsystem verantwortlich
machen: »They have their sources in the internal structure of german
political parties« (345). Die hier angedeutete Bedeutung des Parteien-
systems spielte bereits in Weimar… Und was dann? (Kirchheimer 1930a)
eine beträchtliche Rolle, seine Entfaltung fand sie aber erst in den
Schriften des reifen Parteienforschers. Ähnliches zeigt sich auch bei der
Frage nach dem Regierungssystem, die ganz entschieden in Richtung
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eines Parlamentarismus beantwortet wird. Der mitunter geäußerte Vor-

wurf, dieses System ermögliche eine Einparteienherrschaft oder schwä-
che die Regierung, gehe aber fehl, denn die Herrschaft der NSDAP
sei gerade durch exekutiven Machtmissbrauch ermöglicht wurden und
die Stärke einer Regierung hänge nicht vom Regierungssystem ab:
»Its real basis is in the respective party systems and the socio-politi-
cal conditions which they reflect« (348). Ebenfalls sehr deutlich fällt
das Urteil zum Grundrechtsschutz aus: Bestimmte Grundrechte soll-
ten verfassungsmäßig geschützt und mit einer Ewigkeitsklausel verse-
hen werden. Besonderes Augenmerk wird zum Schluss dem Privatei-
gentum gewidmet. Ein gewisser Schutz wird ihm eingeräumt, jedoch
könne dieser nicht bedingungslos sein. Insbesondere der deutsche Wie-
deraufbau stünde dem entgegen, genauso wie die noch immer recht
populären Forderungen nach Landreform und Nationalisierung von
Schlüsselindustrien. Im Zuge dieser Überlegungen kommt der Report
zu einem recht speziellen Thema, das er auf seine ganz eigene Art
angeht: die Normenkontrollklage. Prinzipiell unterstützt Kirchheimer
deren Einführung, betont aber umgehend die Notwendigkeit einer ent-
sprechenden rechtlichen Bindung. Sonst bestünde die Gefahr, dass die
deutschen Richter »in view of their traditionally conservative and even
reactionary attitude« (349) als Bollwerk gegen die zu gründende Demo-
kratie aufträten. Genau das, so fügt er in einer abschließenden Fußnote
hinzu, hätten sie in Weimar bei Fragen des Eigentumsschutzes getan.
Ein Hinweis, den wohl kaum einer seiner Adressaten in der amerikani-
schen Regierung und Verwaltung, dafür aber viele seiner emigrierten
Weggefährten in »R« verstanden haben dürften.
Dieser Report zeichnet sich durch eine typische Kirchheimerperspek-
tive aus: Rechtliche Fragen betrachtet er nicht aus legalistischer Sicht-
weise, sondern deutlich sozial- und politikwissenschaftlich. Die kon-
krete politische Wirkung von juristischen Verfahren und verfassungs-
rechtlich gesetzten Institutionen hängen stets vom historischen, sozia-
len, politischen und ökonomischen Kontext ab, weswegen er auch
keine generellen Handlungsempfehlungen ausspricht, sondern einige
Mühe darauf verwendet, die Fragen unter Bezugnahme auf den kon-
kreten herrschenden Kontext zu beantworten.
Der Report Current Political Tendencies in Germany Bearing on its Future
Governmental Structure lässt bereits eine andere Stoßrichtung erkennen.
Während im vorhergehenden Text noch von einem Gesamtdeutschland
ausgegangen wird, konzentriert sich dieser Report speziell auf die
Frage, welche strukturellen politischen, sozialen und wirtschaftlichen
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Folgen die unterschiedlichen Besatzungsregime in Deutschland haben

werden.
In den westlichen Besatzungszonen, wo das traditionelle deutsche Par-
teiensystem aus der Weimarer Zeit wiederbelebt worden sei, schienen
die Zeichen auf Kontinuität zu stehen. Schon das allein könnte eine
desaströse Folge haben. Sofern die wiedergegründeten Parteien von
ihrer alten Führungsriege aus vorfaschistischen Zeiten geführt würden,
müsse mit einer »considerable political apathy, notably among the
youth« (355) gerechnet werden. Die anfängliche gemeinsame Front der
antifaschistischen Gruppen in den Westzonen sei schnell zerbrochen
und durch ein System konkurrierender Parteien ersetzt worden. In die-
sem System erscheinen besonders die Christdemokraten von Interesse,
die inzwischen eine innere Spaltung erlitten hätten, da sie einerseits
über einen demokratischen linken Flügel und andererseits über einen
dominanten rechten Flügel verfügten. Dieser dürfte noch an Stärke
gewinnen, da chauvinistische Strömungen innerhalb der Bevölkerung
keine offen nationalistische Partei zur Auswahl hätten. Die Kräftever-
hältnisse ähnelten, mit Mehrheiten für die Christdemokraten in Bayern
und Baden‐Württemberg sowie für die Sozialdemokratie in Hessen,
ebenfalls denen in Weimar. Die letzten Wahlen in der US-Zone bestä-
tigten diesen Trend. Die Versuche, insbesondere der amerikanischen
Besatzer, eine demokratische Regierung und Verwaltung zu revitalisie-
ren, seien kaum gelungen. So würden die in der US-Zone eingeführ-
ten Verfassungsgebungsprozesse in den Ländern einerseits genutzt,
um deren Autonomie übermäßig zu betonen, und andererseits trügen
die Entwürfe für Baden‐Württemberg und Bayern teilweise betont kon-
servative oder sogar autoritäre Züge. Gemeinsam ist den westlichen
Zonen eine verfehlte Denazifizierung, die spätestens mit der Übergabe
der Aufgabe an die Deutschen gescheitert sei.
Die sowjetische Zone hebe sich markant stark ab. Hier seien zwar
alle Parteien der ehemaligen antifaschistischen Gruppen noch zugelas-
sen, jedoch werde eine unabhängige Politik außerhalb der SED immer
schwieriger. Von der Politik der Kommunisten profitierten lediglich
ihre Parteigänger und Unterstützer, während nicht kommunistische
Parteien zunehmend diskriminiert und unter Druck gesetzt wurden.
Die gesamte Reorganisation von Regierung und Verwaltung werde von
der SED geleitet. Zu diesem Prozess gehöre auch, dass Demokratisie-
rung »the elimination from public life of the traditionally antidemocra-
tic ruling groups« (353) zur Voraussetzung habe. Dementsprechend
seien konservative Verwaltungsbeamte durch Vertreter antifaschisti-
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scher Parteien und Gruppen ersetzt worden. Auch der eingeführte

Föderalismus diene nicht der Dezentralisierung, hänge doch die Poli-
tik der einzelnen Länder zentral von der SED ab. Die zentrale Steue-
rung durch die SED gehe so weit, dass der nach außen gewahrte
Proporz in der sowjetischen Zone die nichtkommunistischen Parteien
von den administrativen Schlüssel- und Spitzenpositionen ausschließe:
»But while the governments and chief administrative offices are staffed
with representatives of all antifascist parties, the Communists hold the
strategic positions and determine policy« (353).
In diesem ersten Report zur politischen Lage im Nachkriegsdeutsch-
land lassen sich bereits einige Linien finden, die in den folgenden
Reports immer wieder auftauchen werden. Offenkundig spaltet sich
die Besatzungspolitik in der Betrachtung durch »R« in zwei Richtungen
auf: einerseits vorsichtige Demokratisierung von unten, jedoch in den
Bahnen der alten Weimarer Strukturen, und andererseits umfassende
soziale und politische Umgestaltung nach sowjetisch-sozialistischem
Vorbild im Osten. In den westlichen Zonen zeichnet sich für die Ana-
lysten in der »R«-Abteilung das Bild misslungener Entnazifizierung
plus Wiederaufleben überkommener Weimarer Muster ab: Ehemalige
Nationalsozialisten und Konservative verblieben in den oberen admi-
nistrativen Positionen, der Parteienwettbewerb entspräche alten Kon-
fliktlinien und das politische Leben sei insgesamt durch Apathie und
mangelnde Initiative gekennzeichnet.
In der sowjetisch besetzten Zone würde die Gesellschaft dagegen tief-
greifender transformiert: Aufgrund der sozialistischen Ausrichtung der
Politik trieben die UdSSR die Entnazifizierung voran, wozu auch die
grundlegende Veränderung der sozioökonomischen Struktur gehöre.
Gleichzeitig werde die Politik in zunehmendem Maße in der SED kon-
zentriert und das politische System im Osten stark unter kommunisti-
scher Führung zentralisiert. In dieser frühen Phase wird in »R« jedoch
darauf verzichtet, die Politik der sowjetischen Besatzer einer tieferge-
henden Kritik zu unterziehen, wodurch der Eindruck entstehen kann,
deren Politik sei aus Perspektive der Analysten besser gelungen. Die-
ser Umstand mag der damaligen Quellenlage geschuldet sein, wahr-
scheinlicher ist jedoch, dass diese Maßnahmen im Kontrast mit denen
der westlichen Alliierten in einem besseren Licht erschienen, weil sie
durchaus der deutschlandpolitischen Position der Emigranten in der
»R«-Abteilung entsprachen, die eine tiefgreifende Entnazifizierung und
sozioökonomische Umstrukturierung für notwendig erachteten. In spä-
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teren Reports wird diese Bewertung der sowjetischen Besatzungspolitik

kritischer aussehen.
9. Beobachtungen des ostdeutschen Staates
Wie bereits erwähnt, änderte sich seit der Gründung der DDR die
Perspektive auf Ostdeutschland augenfällig: Erschien die sowjetische
Besatzungszone zunächst als bloßes Provisorium und Faustpfand sow-
jetischer Außenpolitik, stehen zunehmend die repressiven und antide-
mokratischen Elemente der Diktatur im Mittelpunkt. Alle vier hier auf-
genommenen Studien sind von einer immer kritischer werdenden Ana-
lyse kommunistischer Politik gekennzeichnet. Diese diene ausschließ-
lich als Herrschaftsinstrument der SED bzw. der sowjetischen Besatzer.
Ob es sich um die DDR als »Arbeiter-und-Bauern-Staat«, die SED oder
das System akademischer Bildung handelt. Immer wieder legen die
Reports offen, dass die politischen Entscheidungen in der DDR von
der Sowjetunion diktiert würden und primär deren Interessen dienten.
In den Berichten mag der Leser heute den sich verschärfenden Kalten
Krieg erkennen, jedoch unterscheidet sich die Darstellung der DDR
markant von den Politiken westlicher Kommunisten. Anders als in den
späteren Reports zu den westeuropäischen Kommunisten finden sich
in Kirchheimers Analysen hier keinerlei Abschwächungen oder gar
Revisionen dieser Perspektive. Die Geschichte der DDR und der sow-
jetischen Besatzungspolitik wird als Diktatur- und Verfallsgeschichte
erzählt.
Der Report The State130 of East Germany aus dem Jahr 1950 beschäftigt
sich mit dem erreichten Stand der Entwicklung des Staates, der sich in
der sowjetischen Besatzungszone gebildet hatte. Dieser Staat entwickle
sich nicht aus sich selbst heraus, sondern er »is now being transformed
into a Soviet satellite state« (457). Bei weitgehend gleicher Ausgangspo-
sition (Hunger, Zerstörung, Obdachlosigkeit und Besatzung), verlaufe
die Entwicklung in beiden Teilen Deutschlands äußerst unterschiedlich.
Der westliche Teil Deutschlands sei gekennzeichnet durch »a blend of
revived Weimar patterns and survivals of the Nazi period« (458). Die
westlichen Besatzungszonen zeichneten sich durch eine freie Wirtschaft
und die Erhaltung sowie teilweise auch wissentliche Rekonstruktion
althergebrachter Besitzverhältnisse aus.
130 Der englische Begriff »state« kann hier sowohl Staat als auch Zustand meinen.
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Die sowjetischen Besatzungsbehörden dagegen »made it clear that they

would not maintain a neutral attitude toward all political and social
groups« (458). Sie drängten auf die »destruction of the social and eco-
nomic institutions which had given rise to the Nazi system« (459) und
ergriffen Maßnahmen, die sie für geeignet erachteten, um die Klassen-
struktur in Ostdeutschland fundamental zu verändern; vornehmlich
durch die Verstaatlichung von Schlüsselindustrien und die Neuvertei-
lung von Grundbesitz. Die dadurch gewonnenen Umgestaltungsmög-
lichkeiten seien von der Sowjetunion stets so ausgestaltet, dass sich der
Zugriff der SED auf die Bevölkerung maximal steigert. So würden zwar
hochqualifizierte technische Berufe auch an Nicht-Kommunisten verge-
ben, aber Verwaltungs- und Richterposten würden zunehmend durch
Absolventen SED-eigener Parteischulen besetzt. Die Bauern, die eigent-
lich von der Landreform profitiert hätten, seien nun völlig abhängig
von der staatlichen Plankommission, da sie meist weder über Wohnun-
gen noch Werkzeuge verfügten, sondern diese nur von behördlicher
Seite zugewiesen bekämen. Die weniger werdenden Privatunterneh-
men blieben abhängig von den Aufträgen staatlicher Unternehmen.
Der demokratische Zentralismus wird als Fassade enthüllt: »The East
German Republic has adopted an ostensibly democratic constitution,«
(463) aber dieses parlamentarische System sei »for the most part make
believe« (463). Die Einheitsliste zur Wahl der Volkskammer gilt Kirch-
heimer als Beleg. Die Länderkammer im ostdeutschen Staat könne
Gesetze nur einbringen oder verzögern, diese nicht jedoch verhindern
und die richterliche Unabhängigkeit würde durch die Neubesetzung
mit Absolventen von SED-Parteischulen und die Abschaffung des Prin-
zips der Unabsetzbarkeit ausgehöhlt. Der Entzug des Haushaltsrechts
unterstelle die Landesparlamente der Kontrolle durch die Zentralregie-
rung. Die Zweijahrespläne erstreckten sich auf alle Gebiete der Ver-
waltung, neben der Wirtschaftsplanung auch auf das Bildungswesen.
»Thus, administratively the East German Government embodies typical
dictatorial institutions, and the dominant party, the SED, maintains
power through its control of top government posts« (464).
Bereits im Abstract unterstreicht der Report, dass das politische Leben
in den zentral gelenkten Massenorganisationen monopolisiert werde.
Deren Funktionen seien einerseits »[to] mobilize, indoctrinate and
direct various social and occupational groups outside the SED« (467)
und andererseits »to increase SED strength by giving these groups
an ostensibly independent vote and choice« (467). Der Freie Deutsche
Gewerkschaftsbund (FDGB) stelle dabei einen wesentlichen Transmissi-
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onsriemen für die SED-Arbeitspolitik in den Gewerkschaften dar: So

eng wie die Führung des FDGB mit der SED-Parteiführung verzahnt
sei, hätten seine Mitlieder »almost no independence« (467). Die Freie
Deutsche Jugend (FDJ) habe dagegen ein »complete monopoly on all
sports and social activities« und die Mitgliedschaft in ihr werde zuneh-
mend zur Voraussetzung für eine Karriere in der Verwaltung.
Die organisatorische Spitze der Massenorganisationen stellt für Kirch-
heimer die Nationale Front der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik
dar, in der die SED, die Blockparteien und die schon erwähnten
Massenorganisationen versammelt sind. Die Nationale Front wirke
gleichermaßen nach innen und nach außen: Nach innen setze sie die
Blockpolitik durch, mit der die lizenzierten nichtkommunistischen Par-
teien auf die Unterstützung von SED-Politik verpflichtet wurden. So
hätte sie zuletzt für die Einheitsliste für die im Oktober 1950 anstehen-
den Volkskammerwahlen gesorgt. Die nach außen gerichtete Funktion
der Nationalen Front beschreibt Kirchheimer folgendermaßen: »The
National Front has become the catch-all organization for political activ-
ities emanating from Eastern Germany which are designed to appeal
to a non-Communist public all over Germany« (466). Sie richte sich
mit ihrem Programm an alle Deutschen, die sich eine Vereinigung
unter freundschaftlichen Beziehungen zur Sowjetunion vorstellen kön-
nen. Die Nationale Front beanspruche für sich, ein geeintes, demokra-
tisches Deutschland durch den Kampf gegen alle Formen westlicher
Dominanz zu verwirklichen, und habe insofern eine gesamtdeutsche
Agenda.
Angesichts dieser politischen Wirklichkeit in der DDR ergeben sich
für das Verhältnis der beiden deutschen Staaten zueinander komplexe
Zusammenhänge. Einerseits erschwere die bloße Existenz eines ost-
deutschen Staates die Konsolidierung eines westdeutschen Staates,
denn die Westorientierung werde problematisch, so lange eine Verei-
nigung angestrebt würde und die Propaganda der Nationalen Front
die nationalistischen Tendenzen und das Interesse am Handel mit Ost-
deutschland in Westdeutschland ausnutze. Andererseits könne auch
die westdeutsche Gesellschaft für den Staat in Ostdeutschland prinzipi-
ell problematisch sein, vor allem, da die ostdeutsche Bevölkerung in
Westberlin die Möglichkeit habe, »to compare its existence with that
in Western Germany« (458). Dementsprechend sei »a better functioning
society in Western Germany […] a very real attraction and a constant
threat to the regime« (471). Eine Vereinigung würde von der überwäl-
tigenden Mehrheit der Ostdeutschen gewünscht, aber nur, wenn das
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Ziel ein freies Deutschland mit Westorientierung sei. Die Vereinigung

unter sowjetischer Ägide würden hingegen nur SED-Kreise und einige
antiwestliche Rechte begrüßen.
In diesem Report verschiebt sich die Perspektive zu den bisherigen
Analysen Ostdeutschlands und zu der sowjetischen Politik markant:
Statt die Maßnahmen zur Umgestaltung der ökonomischen und sozia-
len Struktur im Osten Deutschlands zu registrieren und teilweise
zuversichtlich zu begrüßen (auch weil diese den eigenen Forderungen
entsprechen), wird jetzt hinter die Fassade der sowjetischen Politik
gesehen. Nun wird offen ausgesprochen, dass die ostdeutsche Politik,
mag sie auch vom Ziel der Entnazifizierung ausgegangen sei, auf eine
dauerhafte Einbindung der DDR in den sowjetischen Orbit abzielte.
Allein für diesen Zweck muss der Zugriff der SED auf alle Bereiche der
ostdeutschen Gesellschaft gefestigt werden. Diese antidemokratische
Entwicklung wird von Kirchheimer scharf gegeißelt.
Für die Kirchheimerforschung von herausragendem Interesse ist die
Einführung einer zentralen Begrifflichkeit seiner späteren Parteitheorie:
die Catch-all-Party. Zwar kann man nicht erwarten, an dieser Stelle
konzeptionelle Vorarbeiten für seine Catch-all-Partei zu finden. Den-
noch gibt es deutliche Ähnlichkeiten. Die Nationale Front ist, genau
wie die Catch-all-Partei, weniger an der ideologischen Durchdringung
der Massen (467) interessiert, dafür sind einige ihrer Mitgliedsorganisa-
tionen zuständig. Sie umfasst nicht nur die gesamte Bandbreite der
zugelassenen politischen Einstellungen im ostdeutschen Staat, sondern
will sogar auch noch möglichst viele Bürgerinnen und Bürger in West-
deutschland erreichen. Die Forderungen, die sie erhebt, entsprechen
genau den Vorgaben, die Kirchheimer 1965 in Der Wandel des Westeuro-
päischen Parteiensystems (Kirchheimer 1965b) macht: »Noch wichtiger ist
die absolute Konzentration auf Fragen, mit denen solche Ziele berührt
werden, die in der Gemeinschaft kaum Widerstand hervorrufen« (siehe
Band 5 dieser Edition, S. 611). Man kann davon ausgehen, dass die Auf-
hebung des Besatzungsstatuts, das Ende der Demontagen, der
Abschluss eines Friedensabkommens für Gesamtdeutschland und der
Abzug der Besatzungstruppen von einem Großteil der deutschen
Bevölkerung begrüßt worden sind. Vor diesem Hintergrund ist zu ver-
muten, dass Kirchheimer sein Konzept nicht nur auf der Grundlage der
beobachteten Parteipolitik entwickelt hat. Angesichts des instrumentel-
len Charakters der Nationalen Front ist der Begriff gut gewählt.
Schließlich ging es um das »Einfangen« möglichst vieler Deutscher für
die strategischen Forderungen der UdSSR. Die Vereinigung Deutsch-
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lands unter sowjetischer Führung, und nur so wäre sie mit der Natio-
nalen Front zustande gekommen, würde letztlich die Umwandlung
Gesamtdeutschlands in einen sozialistischen Satellitenstaat ermögli-
chen.
Auch der Report The Status of Labor in East Germany zeigt sehr deut-
lich, wie sehr die Politik in der DDR ideologischen und besatzungs‐
politischen Zwecken der Sowjetunion verpflichtet war. Ausgegebenes
Ziel der Arbeitspolitik sei die Steigerung der Produktivität, die den
Proletariern einen nie gekannten Lebensstandard ermöglichen sollte –
so jedenfalls das völlig utopische Ziel. Umgehend benennt der Report
die alltägliche Realität. »This goal apparenty justifies to the East Ger-
man regime the ruthless exploitation of the workers and the complete
subordination of their needs and interests to the requirements of the
state« (475).
Im Zentrum der Studie steht die veränderte Rolle der Gewerkschaften
in Ostdeutschland und die bis zum damaligen Zeitpunkt vorgenom-
menen Umgestaltungen im Arbeitsrecht. Darüber hinaus zeigt Kirch-
heimer auf, dass auch die bemerkenswerte Entwicklung der Erwerbstä-
tigkeit von Frauen in Ostdeutschland auf diese instrumentelle Arbeits-
politik zurückzuführen ist. Die im FDGB zusammengefassten Gewerk-
schaften hätten nun zwei Funktionen zu erfüllen: Sie sollen die Produk-
tivität der Arbeiterschaft steigern sowie deren generelle ideologische
Einstellung kontrollieren. Sie gerieten dabei aber in einen unüberbrück-
baren Widerspruch zwischen der Interessenvertretung im Namen der
Arbeiterschaft und dem »productivity drive«, den sie mit durchzuset-
zen hätten. Statt Tarifverträgen, die Löhne, Arbeitszeiten und Arbeitsbe-
dingungen absicherten, würden in Ostdeutschland nun branchenweite
Kollektivverträge mit klar deklarierten Produktionsquoten abgeschlos-
sen. In diesem Prozess seien die Gewerkschaften eingebunden, was
einen entscheidenden Positionswechsel darstelle, denn so würden die
Gewerkschaften »auxiliary to management and to the industrial minis-
tries in carrying out increased production drives.« (481)
Zur tieferen Verankerung der Produktivitätsvorgaben aus den Kollek-
tivverträgen würden diese ergänzt durch Betriebskollektivverträge, die
zwischen der jeweiligen Betriebsleitung und den Betriebsgewerkschaf-
ten ausgehandelt würden. »[T]his contract, like the collective contract,
is an instrument exerting pressure for the utmost productivity on
the labor force« (481). Die zugrundeliegende Annahme sei, dass die
jeweilige Verankerung in den konkreten Betrieben die Akzeptanz der
Verträge steigern würde. Jedoch ist für Kirchheimer klar, dass die
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Arbeiterschaft die Einführung dieser neuen Verträge nicht begrüßte.

»In addition to indifferent resignation on the part of the workers, there
have been sporadic outbreaks of open resistance to the introduction of
the new contracts.« (482)
Auch die Lohnpolitik wird komplett der wirtschaftlichen Planung
untergeordnet, denn die Höhe der Löhne in verschiedenen Branchen
richte sich ganz nach den industriepolitischen Prioritäten der politi-
schen Führung. Das betreffe die Lohnhöhe ganz allgemein, aber auch
gewisse Innovationen in der Entlohnung der Arbeiterschaft, nämlich
Leistungs- und Stücklöhne, die von der Produktivität des Einzelnen
und des jeweiligen Betriebskollektivs abhängen. Zusätzlich dazu wür-
den die zu erfüllenden Normen durch den Einsatz von Stoßbrigaden
erhöht. Die unter optimalen Bedingungen erwirtschaftete Produktions-
quote werde allgemein verbindlich gemacht. Zudem wird versucht,
unter der Arbeiterschaft Konkurrenz zu verursachen, indem soge-
nannte ›Aktivisten‹ Boni aus der gesamten Lohnsumme des Betriebes
gezahlt werden. Die Gewinne der Aktivisten schlagen sich als Verluste
in den Lohnbüchern all jener wieder, die keine Planübererfüllung vor-
zuweisen haben. Die Übererfüllung der Quoten verdeckt den wenig
rühmlichen Umstand der Notwendigkeit, den normalen Lohn abzusi-
chern. »The pseudo-liberal character of this rivalry is not changed by
calling it ›socialist competition.‹«(483) Auch die hohe Quote von werk-
tätigen Frauen sei kein Ausdruck besonders fortgeschrittener Emanzi-
pation und Gleichstellung. Die Gleichstellungspropaganda diene letzt‐
lich nur dazu, bei Frauen die Akzeptanz von Vollzeitstellen zu erhöhen.
Es sei meist die schlichte ökonomische Dringlichkeit, die Frauen zur
Arbeit zwinge: »At the same time, economic conditions in Eastern Ger-
many make it necessary for the wives of lower-paid workers to help
support the family« (491).
Die Arbeiterschaft der DDR reagiere auf diese Politik zurückhaltend bis
ablehnend: »East German labor policies designed to meet increasing
productivity goals have encountered unwilling obedience rather than
enthusiastic collaboration.« (474) Hieran schließe die Frage an, ob die
Solidarität untereinander inzwischen soweit gestört wurde, dass sie
keine Gefahr mehr für das Regime darstellen könnte. »The very beha-
vior of the SED agencies, their never-ending attempts to tighten psy-
chological and social controls over the worker, belies such conclusion.«
(S. 493) Die Arbeiterschaft sei der »stärkste Gegner der SED« (493).
In dem Report The Current Status of the Socialist Unity Party (SED)
in Eastern Germany von 1952 werden die ein Jahr zuvor stattfindende
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parteiinterne Säuberung der SED, die Überprüfung der Mitglieder und

Kandidaten der SED, sowie die darauffolgenden recht kritischen Selbst-
analysen aus der Partei heraus zum Anlass genommen, den Zustand
der SED grundsätzlich zu bewerten. Im Rahmen dieser Säuberung
hätten etwa 300.000 Mitglieder, also etwa ein Fünftel aller Genossen,
ihre Parteimitgliedschaft verloren oder niedergelegt. Der Report sieht
die Ursache in der Ablehnung der der kommunistischen Vorherrschaft
bzw. der Unterordnung der SED gegenüber Moskau, welche die ost-
deutsche Bevölkerung desillusioniere. In dem beträchtlichen Ausmaß
derjenigen, die ihre Mitgliedschaft verloren oder abgegeben hatten,
erkennt der Report einen »lack of substantial roots among the popula-
tion« (506) als eines der Hauptprobleme, mit denen die SED zu kämp-
fen hatte. Zudem verpflichte das Selbstverständnis die SED zu einem
überproportional hohen Anteil von Arbeitern unter ihren Mitgliedern.
Diesem Problem nahm sich die Leitung der SED durch eine eher tech-
nische denn politische Maßnahme an: stark erhöhte Zulassungsquoten
zur Parteimitgliedschaft unter Arbeitern. Doch nicht nur die Arbeiter-
schaft zeichne sich durch eine mangelnde ideologische Durchdringung
aus, auch Funktionäre und Gewerkschafter erscheinen der Partei als
politisch unzuverlässig. So seien einige Gewerkschafter noch immer
nicht bereit, einzelne ökonomische Probleme der Arbeiterschaft, etwa
Ernährung und Wohnen, der politischen Generallinie unterzuordnen.
Außerdem kämpfe die SED gegen einen verbreiteten »Sozialdemokra-
tismus«, der sich »in a refusal to accept the inequities and inequalities
of the new social structure« (511) manifestiere.
Auf beide Schichten, Arbeiter und Funktionäre, wolle die SED daher
verstärkt ideologisch einwirken. Das ideologische Niveau der Partei-
mitgliedschaft solle ebenso erhöht werden wie die Durchdringung der
Bevölkerung mit kommunistischen Lehren.
»The cure for these alleged evils, the Politbüro has recommended,
is wider diffusion of Soviet methods, and persuading the workers
that ›because of the splitting of Germany […] a series of additional
exertions must be undertaken.‹« (512)
Zudem solle die prosowjetische Propaganda verstärkt und ein kulturell
geprägter deutscher Nationalismus gefördert werden. Leider enthält
sich der Report einer Einschätzung darüber, wie sinnvoll und erfolgver-
sprechend diese Maßnahmen sind. Die einzige greifbare Konsequenz
aus der Säuberung sei die Reduzierung der Gesamtmitglieder durch
die Entfernung aller ideologisch abweichender Elemente. Dies habe
die innere Kohärenz der Partei gestärkt und damit ihre Effektivität als
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Instrument sowjetischer Politik gesteigert: »Consequently, Moscow can

now rely to an increased extent on the SED for the execution of Soviet
policy in Germany« (514).
Inwiefern das allerdings der SED helfen wird, die selbst gesteckten
Ziele zu erreichen, lässt der Report offen. Als effektives Werkzeug
der sowjetischen Politik kann die SED als willfähriges Herrschaftsin-
strument keinerlei innenpolitische Legitimität für sich beanspruchen.
Entsprechend betont der Report immer wieder die ideologische Domi-
nanz der SED, für die die faktischen politischen Meinungen und Ein-
stellungen der Bevölkerung lediglich als Rohmaterial sei, das nach
sowjetischen Vorbild zu formen gelte. Darauf kommt der Report in der
Schlussbetrachtung zu sprechen. Die ostdeutsche Bevölkerung identifi‐
ziere sich weiterhin mit dem Westen und die SED verstehe das als
Auftrag: »The eradication of this state of mind is the largest, and from
the party viewpoint, most important task to which the SED is now
addressing itself« (514). Auch dieser Report reiht sich in die kritische
Betrachtungsweise der beiden vorangegangenen ein: Die Umstruktu-
rierung des ostdeutschen Staates diene nicht dem Wohlergehen der
Bevölkerung, sondern den Ansprüchen sowjetischer Besatzungspolitik,
einen ostdeutschen Satellitenstaat zu schaffen.
Diese Perspektive setzt sich schließlich im Report Higher Education in
East Germany aus dem Jahr 1952 fort. Hier werden die Zielsetzung
und der Prozess der Sowjetisierung der akademischen Bildungsland-
schaft mehr als deutlich. Die DDR benötige ein »completely reliable
cadre of professional people, both administrative and academic« (550),
um ihre gesellschaftliche Transformation nach stalinistischen Vorbild
voranzutreiben und abzusichern. Die zu diesem Zweck ergriffenen
Reformen im System der akademischen Bildung stehen im Fokus. Die
akademische Bildung und Forschung werde auf allen Ebenen grundle-
gend umgebaut: Lehrstuhlbesetzung, Bezahlung und soziale Fürsorge,
Forschung, Zulassung und Förderung von Studierenden sowie die aka-
demischen Lehrpläne würden der zentralen Steuerung durch die SED
und ihrer Massenorganisationen unterstellt.
Die universitäre Selbstverwaltung sei abgeschafft, wie insbesondere die
veränderte Berufungspraxis dokumentiere: Vakante Lehrstühle würden
nicht mehr universitätsintern, sondern vom Zentralamt für Forschung
und Technik besetzt. Einmal im Amt, würden Professorinnen und
Professoren durch Individualverträge bestimmten Forschungsaufgaben
zugeordnet, für deren Erfüllung sie dann persönlich verantwortlich
seien. Über ihre staatlichen Aufgaben hinaus würde auch weiteres
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wissenschaftliches Engagement nur im Rahmen staatlicher Aufträge

gefördert. Nur durch die Erfüllung dieser Aufträge seien die Wissen-
schaftlerinnen und Wissenschaftler in der Lage, entsprechende Boni
erhalten, mit denen sie ihre Pension von 60 auf 80 Prozent des letzten
Gehalts vor Verrentung steigern könnten. Da auch die außeruniversitä-
ren Forschungseinrichtungen von staatlichen Mitteln abhingen, sei die
Erfüllung staatlicher Forschungsaufträge Voraussetzung für das Beste-
hen dieser Forschungseinrichtungen. Die Kontrolle auf institutioneller
und individueller Ebene verfolge dabei ein konkretes Ziel: Unterord-
nung. »Secretariat control over university administration in matters of
appointments, salaries and pensions provides a direct method of secur-
ing submission from each member of the university faculty« (539).
Ebenfalls umfassend wird die Umstellung der Zulassung von Studie-
renden dargestellt. Der selbst proklamierte Arbeiter- und Bauernstaat
verfüge über Zulassungsquoten, die Kinder aus mittleren und höhe-
ren Schichten systematisch benachteiligten. Gleichzeitig würde die Mit-
gliedschaft in den Massenorganisationen FDGB und FDJ zur zwingen-
den Voraussetzung für eine Zulassung zum Studium, nicht zuletzt,
weil die Massenorganisationen in den Zulassungsgremien säßen. Die
Inkaufnahme gravierender, vom wissenschaftlichen Standpunkt aus
unbedingt zu vermeidender Folgen der Nivellierung des akademischen
Niveaus macht den instrumentellen Charakter dieser Politik deutlich:
»While this procedure inevitably results in drastically lowering intelle-
cual standards, it has the advantage from the viewpoint of the goverm-
nent of greater ease in the indoctrination of the student body« (549).
Auch die Lehrpläne der ostdeutschen Universitäten seien den Bedürf-
nissen der sowjetischen Transformation und wirtschaftlichen Planung
unterworfen. Propagiert und gefördert würden die mathematisch-
naturwissenschaftlichen Fächer, etwa durch die Aussicht auf sofortige
Anstellung nach Studienende. Geistes- und Sozialwissenschaften wür-
den dagegen sehr stark der sowjetischen Ideologie untergeordnet. So
müssten etwa alle im Germanistikstudium verwendeten Texte mit der
Doktrin des offiziellen Marxismus-Leninismus übereinstimmen: »Even
Goethe is made to conform, and classic traditions of German literature
are related to Communist doctrines« (546). In den Sozialwissenschaften
sei die dargestellte Transformation noch ausgeprägter, da hier nur noch
Ideengeschichte des Marxismus-Leninismus, Dialektik und historischer
Materialismus, sowie politische Ökonomie unterrichtet würden, um die
Überlegenheit des sowjetischen Sozialismus zu beweisen.
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Im Ergebnis sei die Sowjetisierung des akademischen Betriebs in der

DDR geeignet, die Spaltung zwischen Ost- und Westdeutschland wei-
ter zu vertiefen. Die ideologische Durchdringung sei so tiefgreifend,
dass sich abweichende Teile der Bevölkerung dem diktatorischen Sys-
tem nur durch Auswanderung entziehen könnten. Innere Emigration,
wie sie aus dem Dritten Reich bekannt sei, stehe bestenfalls Angehöri-
gen der älteren Generationen zur Verfügung, denn »the educational
reorganization which has been described above is designed to convert
any merely mechanical obedience into a system of fool-proof convic-
tions and self-evident, quite uncritical attitudes« (550).
Die Politik der Sowjetisierung und Indoktrinierung wird als so erfolg-
reich eingeschätzt, dass sich implizit auch die Perspektive auf das Pro-
letariat (in der DDR) ändert. Wird noch in früheren Reports, zum Teil
vorsichtig, darauf hingewiesen, dass dieses ein Reservoir des Wider-
stands sei, erscheinen die Kinder der Proletarier nun als vielverspre-
chendes Material sowjetischer Indoktrinierung und kommunistischer
Elitengenerierung: »These circumstances should hasten the rise of a
new intellectual and technical elite committed to the doctrines of the
new state« (549).
Mit der gewandelten Perspektive auf das ostdeutsche Proletariat
erreicht die veränderte Bewertung der DDR ihren Endpunkt. Die ehe-
mals die letzte Bastion des Widerstands gegen die Politik der SED,
die Arbeiterklasse, ist zum Reservoir der Elitenrekrutierung für das
neue System geworden. Die Monopolisierung der ostdeutschen Politik
unter der SED erscheint in den Reports insgesamt als unumschränkt.
Der eigentliche Sinn der Arbeiterorganisationen hat sich durch deren
ideologischen und administrativen Wandel ins Gegenteil verkehrt.
Die Gewerkschaften seien von Organen der kollektiven Selbstverwal-
tung und des Arbeitskampfes zu Transmissionsriemen der Vorgaben
der »sozialistischen« Wirtschaftsplanung umgewandelt worden. Die
»sozialistische« Arbeitsorganisation habe nicht mehr Solidarität, son-
dern mehr Konkurrenz zwischen den Arbeiterinnen und Arbeitern
verwirklicht. Die SED sei im Prinzip ein wurzelloses Herrschaftsinstru-
ment, die ihre Macht allein durch die sowjetische Besatzungsmacht
erhält. An die Stelle der verkündeten demokratischen Willensbildung
tritt die ideologische Indoktrinierung der ostdeutschen Bevölkerung.
Aus diesem Grund gehörten Freiheit der Wissenschaft und akademi-
sche Selbstverwaltung der Vergangenheit an. Die Universitäten dienten
den von der SED und ihren Massenorganisationen diktierten Zielvor-
gaben: der Wirtschaftsplanung oder der ideologischen Indoktrinierung.
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10. Gegen die westeuropäischen Kommunisten
Als Teil des State Department war »R« auch von weltgeschichtlichen
Entwicklungen betroffen. Das Außenministerium war aus Sicht der
Mitglieder der Forschungsabteilung schon seit 1946 auf Kurs in Rich-
tung Kalter Krieg (Hughes in: Söllner 1986b: 51). Man kann die zuneh-
mend schonungslose Analyse der DDR in den oben erwähnten Reports
bereits als ein entsprechendes Indiz nehmen, aber die drei Studien zu
den Kommunisten in Westeuropa offenbaren noch eindrücklicher die
neue Ausrichtung der Arbeiten von »R«. Dass in diesen Reports die
Kommunisten explizit als Feinde begriffen werden, ist vor allem der
jeweiligen Fragestellung der Auftragsgeber geschuldet. Nur mehr sel-
ten verfassten die mehrheitlich linken Analysten aus eigener Initiative
Reports, sondern warteten meist auf einen konkreten Auftrag warteten.
Die Auftragsgeber fragten immer wieder nach dem kommunistischen
Einfluss auf westeuropäische Gesellschaften, konkret in den Parteien
und Gewerkschaften, sowie den effektivsten Maßnahmen zu deren
Bekämpfung.
Der von der Forschungsabteilung vertretene »Anti-Antikommunis-
mus« brachte deren Mitglieder durchaus in Bedrängnis. Kirchheimer
war darüber hinaus mehrmals ins Visier des FBI131 geraten. Aufgrund
seiner Verbindung zu seiner Ex-Frau Hilde Neumann, die mittlerweile
in der DDR eine Karriere im Justizsystem machte, stellte sich die Frage
nach seiner Zuverlässigkeit als Staatsbediensteter. Die letzte Untersu-
chung, die freilich mit der Feststellung seiner Loyalität endete, zog sich
etwa von 1948 bis 1952.
Der 1950 entstandene Report über die Communist Strength in the Trade-
Union Organizations of Western Europe liest sich wie ein Sedativum für
die Auftraggeber. Schon im ersten Satz wird die Stoßrichtung klar:
»Communist support in the trade unions of Western Europe is cur-
rently at its lowest level since the end of the war« (443). »Communist
Strength« bezieht sich dabei auf den Einfluss auf die verschiedenen
Gewerkschaften sowie die Stärke dezidiert kommunistischer Gewerk-
schaften und Parteien in den untersuchten Staaten.
Den stärksten Rückgang hätten die Kommunisten in Skandinavien,
den Niederlanden und Belgien erlitten, wo »firm control [is] exerci-
sed over the bulk of organized labor by the non-Communist trade
131 Siehe hierzu auch die Ausführungen von Hubertus Buchstein in der Einleitung
zum fünften Band dieser Edition.
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union leaders« (443). So seien in Belgien nur noch sieben Prozent

aller Gewerkschaftsmitglieder Kommunisten. Ein vielschichtigeres Bild
ergebe sich dagegen in Frankreich und Italien, wo die größten Gewerk-
schaften in kommunistischer Hand seien. Hier profitieren die Kommu-
nisten von der Verschiedenartigkeit und Fragmentierung der gegneri-
schen Gewerkschaften. Gleichermaßen würde die bloße Existenz ande-
rer Gewerkschaften die Dominanz der kommunistischen verhindern
– etwa in Italien, wo » several anti-Communist trade-union organiza-
tions were formed and have increasingly challenged the Communist
position in the labor movement« (445). Auch der in den Niederlanden
unternommene Versuch, andere Gewerkschaften zu unterwandern, sei
an deren heftiger Gegenwehr gescheitert sei.
Auf der Ebene der Politik stelle sich das Problem sogar noch weniger
brisant dar: »Politically the Communist decline has been more pro-
nounced than in the trade unions« (443). Ein Blick auf die Wählerunter-
stützung von kommunistischen Parteien zeige, dass der politische Nie-
dergang teilweise bis zur parlamentarischen Eliminierung reichte. Eine
mögliche Korrelation zwischen kommunistischen Gewerkschaften und
politischem Einfluss von Kommunisten wird nicht konstatiert. Dem
stünden jeweils spezifische Gründe im Weg. So hätten die Kommunis-
ten und Sozialisten in Italien 1948 eine gemeinsame Liste gebildet, was
eine realistische Einschätzung der jeweiligen elektoralen Stärke schwer-
mache.
Obwohl der Report ein akutes Bedrohungsszenario durch kommunisti-
schen Einfluss auf die westeuropäische Politik verneint, geht er selbst-
verständlich von einem geschlossen stalinistisch-kommunistischen
Expansionsbestreben aus. Auch wenn die Analytiker das Ausmaß der
kommunistischen Herausforderung herabminderten, Kirchheimer und
seine Kollegen also von der offiziösen Außenpolitik abwichen, folgten
sie schon aufgrund des ihnen vorgesetzten Problems der Logik des Kal-
ten Krieges (Schale 2006: 210). Die zugrundeliegende Fragestellung war
offensichtlich so begrenzt, dass die »Kommunisten« zunächst einmal
homogenisiert und schließlich als Gefahr behandelt werden mussten.
Diese Vorgaben stellt der Report selbstverständlich nicht in Frage, so
dass eine gewisse Diskrepanz zwischen der teilweise sehr detaillierten
Analyse der Quellen kommunistischer Stärke in einzelnen Staaten und
einer Pauschalisierung der verschiedenen kommunistischen Parteien
Westeuropas entsteht. Auf eine interne Differenzierung zwischen den
Kommunisten in verschiedenen westeuropäischen Staaten mit Blick auf
ihre unterschiedliche Abhängigkeit von Moskau oder ihre jeweiligen
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konkreten politischen und strategischen Ziele wird verzichtet. Dieser

Widerspruch war Ausdruck ihrer durchaus prekären Lage: Die eigene
anti-antikommunistische Haltung konnte angesichts der Ächtung des
State Department durch Joseph McCarthy132 nur durch diesen Kom-
promiss gegenüber den antikommunistischen Auftraggebern verteidigt
werden: kein Eingehen auf die kommunistische Ideologie oder Politik,
keine Belehrung der Auftraggeber über die Gefahr, die von diesen aus-
gehen könnte, sondern nur eine umfassende Untersuchung und nüch-
terne Darstellung der Schwäche der westeuropäischen Kommunisten.
Der Report hatte entweder nicht die richtigen Leser erreicht oder sie
nicht überzeugt, denn bereits im Jahr darauf musste »R« die Frage
beantworten, ob und welche Maßnahmen im Kampf gegen die westeu-
ropäischen Kommunisten noch ergriffen werden könnten.
Zu diesem Zweck befasst sich der Report Prospect for the Development
of Control Measures against the Communist Parties of Western Europe
zunächst mit den national vorherrschenden Einstellungen gegenüber
den bisher ergriffenen antikommunistischen Maßnahmen. In einem
zweiten Schritt diskutiert er verschiedene Szenarien, wie weiterge-
hende Schritte gegen kommunistische Parteien und Gewerkschaften
aussehen könnten, um schließlich deren Erfolg abzuschätzen.
Bereits zu Beginn des Reports wird erklärt, dass in Westeuropa eine
durchaus tolerante Einstellung gegenüber Kommunisten vorherrsche.
Diese bildeten in Europa eine »openly organized political force in all
countries save Ireland, Portugal and Spain« (495). Kommunisten hät-
ten auch durchaus sensible Posten in Regierungen, Polizei und Mili-
tär inne. Entsprechend richteten sich die Staatsschutzmaßnahmen eher
gegen kriminelle Aktivitäten wie Sabotage und Spionage. Die Toleranz
gegenüber Kommunisten, mögen sie auch antidemokratisch eingestellt
und vom Ausland kontrolliert sein, gehöre in Westeuropa immer noch
zum demokratischen Selbstverständnis. Entsprechend zurückhaltend
blieben die bisher unternommenen Versuche, die kommunistischen
Parteien und Gewerkschaften zu bekämpfen. Sie »probably have con-
tributed to some reduction of communist espionage and sabotage capa-
bilities« (496), was weder die Anhängerschaft der kommunistischen
Parteien reduziere, noch ihr politisches Agieren markant gestört hätte.
132 Senator Joseph McCarthy hatte in seiner berühmten Rede »Enemies from
Within« das State Department am neunten Februar 1950 direkt als »thoroughly
infested with communists« angegriffen und ihnen »traitorous actions of those
who have been treated so well by this nation« unterstellt. Siehe: McCarthy,
Joseph: Enemies from Within, in: Major Speeches and Debates of Senator Joe
McCarthy delivered in the United States Senate, 1950-51, Washington, p. 9, 16.
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Einer offenen Diskriminierung der Kommunisten stünde nicht nur das

demokratische Selbstverständnis entgegen, entsprechende Repressio-
nen werden auch als nicht zielführend und sogar gefährlich angesehen:
»The majority are opposed to such action in principle and apparently
fear that repressive measures to suppress communists might ›get out of
hand‹« (494).
Ob weitergehende Schritte ergriffen würden, hängt nach Einschätzung
des Reports vom (außen)politischen Kontext, aber auch dem Verhalten
der Kommunisten ab. Der Kampf gegen Kommunisten bleibe wenig
intensiv, »unless there are significant growths in Communist strength,
extensive Communist provocations, or the development of a feeling of
national emergency« (495). In diesem Fall sieht der Report drei Optio-
nen: Behinderung, Auflösung und physische Auslöschung der kommu-
nistischen Kräfte.
Zur Behinderung werden einige, teilweise recht weitreichende Instru-
mente vorgeschlagen, etwa die Neufassung von Wahlgesetzen zum
Nachteil von Kommunisten, der Ausschluss von Kommunisten von
sensiblen Posten in Regierungen und Privatwirtschaft, die Änderungen
im Streikrecht zu Gunsten von nicht-kommunistischen Gewerkschaften
oder eine restriktivere Ausgestaltung des Demonstrationsrechts. Aller-
dings sei es unwahrscheinlich, dass außer der westdeutschen Regie-
rung überhaupt eine Regierung in Westeuropa es für nötig halten
würde, die kommunistischen Parteien in ihrem Land zu unterdrücken.
Die Einstellung dazu hänge vom politischen Kontext ab: Nur ein »war
or extreme Communist provocation« (502) könnte sie ändern.
Eine Auflösung sei zumindest in den Staaten mit nur kleinen kommu-
nistischen Parteien unproblematisch, da diese »would not involve any
far-reaching political adjustment nor would it endanger the traditional
democratic bases of these countries« (503). In den beiden betrachteten
Staaten mit signifikanten kommunistischen Parteien und Gewerkschaf-
ten, Frankreich und Italien, gehe von solchen Methoden allerdings eine
Gefahr aus.
»In both France and Italy, the suppressed Communists would be more
numerous than the Socialists and the greater likelihood would be that
the Commmunists would take over the democratic Socialist parties,
posing to the French and Italian governments the problem of further
suppressive moves, this time against the subverted but previously anti-
Communist Socialist parties« (504).
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Die Auflösung kommunistischer Parteien und Vereine würde ange-

sichts ihrer breiten Unterstützung nicht nur einen desintegrativen
Effekt haben, sondern den sehr gut arbeitenden Propagandaabteilun-
gen der kommunistischen Parteien neues Material verschaffen.
Als letzte Möglichkeit blieben noch »police-state methods to physically
eradicate the party and its membership« (495). Besonders für Frank-
reich und Italien seien derartige Forderungen zu erwarten. Jedoch
stammen sie vornehmlich aus dem extrem rechten Bereich. Da man
zur Durchsetzung einer solchen Politik »state controls of a Fascio-Com-
munist type« (505) benötige, sei es unwahrscheinlich, dass sie von »any
government that wished to remain democratic« (505) ergriffen würden.
Auf den ersten Blick erscheint dieser Report ein im Geist des Kalten
Krieges verfasstes Dokument zu sein: Differenzierungen der kommu-
nistischen Kräfte werden nur angesichts ihrer organisatorischen Stärke
und Position gemacht, während die Illegitimität jeglicher kommunisti-
schen Aktivitäten stets vorausgesetzt wird. Dies war angesichts der
vorgegebenen, direkt zu Beginn als Problemdefinition formulierten
Fragestellung auch nicht anders zu erwarten. Ob die westeuropäischen
Kommunisten tatsächlich eine Gefahr darstellten, konnte nicht im Rah-
men eines Reports erörtert werden. Gegenstand ist allein die Diskus-
sion der zu unternehmenden Maßnahmen.
Die vorgelegten Antworten des Reports dürften für einen kalten Krie-
ger frustrierend sein: Denn obwohl hier sehr eingreifende staatsschüt-
zende Methoden diskutiert werden, verbleiben alle drei Optionen im
hypothetischen Bereich. Die weitere Behinderung der Kommunisten
hänge vom Wandel des politischen Kontexts und dem Verhalten der
Kommunisten selbst ab. Eine Auflösung der kommunistischen Parteien
sei nur dort unproblematisch, wo sie sich aufgrund eigener Schwäche
(wie in der Bundesrepublik) nicht notwendig erweise. Wo sie hingegen
vielleicht geboten wäre, bestehe Grund zu der Annahme, dass sie,
wie in Frankreich und Italien, einen gegenteiligen Effekt zeitigt. Die
radikale Auslöschung schließlich wird als ein für Demokratien gänz-
lich ungeeignetes Mittel verworfen. Der wiederholte Verweis darauf,
dass eine repressivere Politik ein aggressiveres Agieren der Kommunis-
ten zur Voraussetzung hat, bedeutet im Umkehrschluss, dass die Kom-
munisten zum damaligen Zeitpunkt nicht stark genug gewesen sind.
Damit wird letztlich die Grundannahme der kommunistischen Gefähr-
dung in Frage gestellt. Wer diesen Report las, musste nicht nur von
der Vorstellung einer Bedrohung in Westeuropa durch Kommunisten
Abstand nehmen, sondern auch eine aktivere Verfolgung ihrer Parteien
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und Vereinigungen in Frage stellen. Der Report ist somit weniger Aus-
weis einer alles absorbierenden Kalten-Kriegs-Perspektive als vielmehr
ein gelungenes Stück strategischen Schreibens in einem antikommunis-
tischen Kontext.
Im spätesten der hier aufgenommenen Reports zum Communist Influ‐
ence in Sensitive Positions in Europe wird die Analyse dort weitergeführt,
wo der Report über die Stärke kommunistischer Gewerkschaften in
Westeuropa endete. Zwei Jahre zuvor hatte diese Untersuchung festge-
stellt, dass die Kommunisten auf allen Ebenen an Einfluss verloren
und die besten Möglichkeiten für sie in der Besetzung strategischer
Positionen, beispielsweise die Kontrolle über kleine, aber funktional
wichtige Gewerkschaften, bestanden.
Vor diesem Hintergrund fragt der Report gezielt nach den »Sensitive
Positions«, die möglicherweise in kommunistischer Hand sind. Diese
erstreckten sich auf drei Gebiete: Regierung, Gewerkschaften und wei-
tere Posten, etwa in sensiblen Wirtschaftsbereichen oder den bewaffne‐
ten Ordnungsbehörden. Wie der ältere Report beginnt die Fortsetzung
zunächst mit der Feststellung des allgemeinen Niedergangs kommu-
nistischer Kräfte in Westeuropa, wogegen auch deren vereinzelte par-
lamentarische Stärke kein Schutz zu sein scheint. »Although the Com-
munists are represented in the parliaments of nearly all the Western
European countries, they do not by virtue of this fact alone have access
to positions of influence« (515).
Insbesondere in den Beneluxstaaten ergriffen »aggressive measures
against the Communists« (515), um den Transfer von elektoraler Stärke
in politischen Einfluss zu verhindern. Wo Kommunisten Regierungs-
posten errungen hatten, würden sie entweder wieder entfernt oder
systematisch übergangen. So habe etwa die niederländische Regierung
die Funktionen der Gemeinde Finsterwolde übernommen, nachdem
die Kommunisten dort eine Mehrheit errungen hatten.
Geschwächt sind die Kommunisten insbesondere in der Bundesrepu-
blik, wo sie als Werkzeug der SED betrachtet werden. Dies habe maß-
geblich zu ihrem Niedergang beigetragen. Traditionell schwach seien
auch die Kommunisten in Österreich, sowohl auf Partei- als auch
Gewerkschaftsebene. Die einzige Möglichkeit, in wichtigen Funktionen
zu verbleiben, stellten einige Polizeiposten in der östlichen Besatzungs‐
zone Österreichs dar, deren Neubesetzung nur durch sowjetischen
Druck verhindert worden sei. Auch im Vereinigten Königreich und den
skandinavischen Staaten würden Anstrengungen unternommen, Kom-
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munisten aus strategisch bedeutsamen Positionen zu entfernen oder sie

von sicherheitsrelevanten Angelegenheiten fernzuhalten, sofern sie im
öffentlichen Dienst beschäftigt blieben.
Diese Techniken seien in Westeuropa ein weit verbreitetes Mittel und
fänden vor allem in Italien und Frankreich Anwendung, »for exclu-
ding Communists from positions of parliamentary leadership and for
reducing Communist representation in local governmental bodies«
(515). Zusätzlich würden beide Staaten Militär, Polizei, öffentlichen
Dienst und staatliche Unternehmen gründlich überwachen, um eine
eventuelle kommunistische Unterwanderung zu verhindern. Das, so
der Report, sei auch erfolgreich, wie man an der effektiven Polizeiar-
beit gegen kommunistische Demonstrationen in Frankreich erkennen
könne. Obwohl die kommunistischen Gewerkschaften in beiden Staa-
ten die stärkste Gewerkschaft stellten, gingen von ihnen keine gro-
ßen Gefahren aus. Die CGT in Frankreich könne ohne Unterstützung
nichtkommunistischer Gewerkschaften keine nationalen Streiks mehr
einberufen. Ihr blieben nur noch ihre Hochburgen in der Schwerindus-
trie, Metallurgie und im Bergbau: »In these areas they can and do
call nuisance strikes, and Communist sabotage constitutes a potential
hazard« (518). Die italienische CGIL stünde dagegen unter Druck, ihre
Position als größte Gewerkschaft Italiens zu halten, da sie, nicht zuletzt
aufgrund zahlreicher Austritte, mit den anderen Gewerkschaften kon-
kurriere.
Das einzige Land, in dem Kommunisten noch Einfluss auf Politik
und Gewerkschaften hätten, sei Island. Dort hätten Kommunisten
dank ihrer Kabinettsmitgliedschaft bis 1947 einige ihrer Mitglieder
im Regierungsdienst platzieren können, insbesondere in den Berei-
chen Luftfahrt, Bildung und Radio. Entsprechend sei die kommunisti-
sche Gewerkschaft für ungelernte Arbeitskräfte die größte im Land.
Diese gute Ausgangsposition konnten sie aber offensichtlich nicht
ausnutzen: »They have failed, for example, to prevent or interfere
with Iceland’s participation in NATO, the return of American troops
to the Keflavik airfield, or the governments continued pro-Western
course« (527).
Mit diesem Report schließt sich die Trias der in diesen Band aufgenom-
menen Texte zur Kommunismusforschung in Westeuropa durch die
»R«-Abteilung im State Department. Alle drei lassen sich als Beispiele
für die von Hughes erwähnte »anti-antikommunistische« Haltung in
»R« lesen. Dank einer differenzierten Analyse, die darauf verzichtet,
kommunistische Abgeordnete und Gewerkschaften als grundsätzliches
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Problem zu beschreiben, legt dieser Report erneut dar, dass es eine

kommunistische politische Gefahr in Westeuropa bestenfalls auf dem
Papier gab. Unter Bezugnahme auf die konkreten Begleitumstände
in den analysierten Staaten zeigt er auf, dass die Kommunisten in
Westeuropa seit Ende des Zweiten Weltkriegs einen kontinuierlichen
Niedergang hinnehmen mussten, der es den bürgerlichen Kräften
ermöglichte, sie weitgehend zu marginalisieren und ihres Einflusses
auch dort zu berauben, wo er elektoral vorhanden war. Dass sich die
Reports jeglicher Kritik an bereits ergriffenen, möglicherweise undemo-
kratischen Mitteln im Kampf gegen die Kommunisten enthalten, zeigt,
dass die Analysten im State Department sich durchaus bewusst waren,
in welchem Umfeld sie sich bewegten und welche Einstellung zum
Kommunismus ihre Auftraggeber pflegten.
11. Das politische Leben der jungen BRD
Alle Reports in dieser Kategorie befassen sich bis auf einen mit
der Politik in der jungen Bundesrepublik unter Adenauer. Themati-
siert werden das potentielle Erbe Adenauers, die Krise des Bundes-
verfassungsgerichts im Zuge der Debatte um die Europäische Vertei-
digungsgemeinschaft und die Bundestagswahlen 1953 – jeweils der
Wahlkampf und der Wahlausgang. Die Reports unterscheiden sich
markant von früheren Arbeiten, aber auch von thematisch anders gela-
gerten Reports. Die Deutschlandanalysen lassen deutlich Kirchheimers
Arbeitsweise erkennen, politische Systeme bei voller Aktivität zu dia-
gnostizieren und zu dechiffrieren (vgl. Kirchheimer 1964). Man kann
davon ausgehen, dass seine Arbeit im State Department diese Arbeits-
technik weiter forcierte. Insbesondere die späteren Reports zur politi-
schen Dynamik der jungen Bundesrepublik zeichnen sich durch große
Sachlichkeit aus. Die Reports erscheinen im Vergleich zu früheren
Arbeiten von ideologischen Restriktionen befreit. Statt sich auf ideolo-
gisch und analytisch möglichst neutral formulierte Beschreibungen zu
beschränken, erlaubt Kirchheimer sich in den Reports zur Bundesrepu-
blik stärkere Analyse und Kritik der beschriebenen Zustände. Betrach-
tet man Kirchheimers Überlegungen zum Verhältnis von SPD und
CDU, werden schnell Verbindungen zu seinem Konzept der »catch-
all«-Partei, wie er es später dargelegt hat, erkennbar (Kirchheimer
1965b).
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Die erste Arbeit in der Reihe bildet aber ein Bericht aus dem Jahr
1949, der sich mit The Refugee Problem in Western Germany beschäftigt.
In diesem hebt Kirchheimer mehr als deutlich die Belastungen der
westdeutschen Nachkriegsgesellschaft durch die Kriegsfolgen hervor.
Die Beschreibung bleibt nüchtern, auch wenn der Verweis auf den
Nationalsozialismus den Finger in die Wunde legt. Die Charakterisie-
rung der Flüchtlingspolitik wiederholt sich in seinem zehn Jahre später
verfassten Text Gegenwartsprobleme der Asylgewährung, der sich ebenfalls
durch eine sehr sachliche Schilderung unrühmlicher Umstände aus-
zeichnet. Darüber hinaus ergibt sich eine überraschende Ähnlichkeit in
der Analyse der Rahmenbedingungen. Für Kirchheimer ist nichts für
das Schicksal der Flüchtlinge im Zeitalter des Massenexodus so wichtig
wie »die jeweilige Haltung der herrschenden politischen Systeme und
die veränderte Zusammensetzung der Masse der Asylsuchenden, die
auf politische Machtverschiebungen zurückgeht« (Kirchheimer 1959:
47f). Ebenso verfährt der hier abgedruckte Report. Rechtliche Rahmen-
bedingungen spielen in der Analyse eine untergeordnete Rolle. Im
Zentrum steht die Haltung der jeweiligen Besatzungsmacht einerseits
sowie die jeweilige sozioökonomische Lage und die kulturellen Merk-
male von Flüchtlingsgruppen und Alteingesessenen andererseits.
Kirchheimer lässt den Report mit einer Problemdefinition auf allgemei-
ner Ebene beginnen. Dem folgen detailliertere Ausführungen zu demo-
graphischen, ökonomischen, soziologischen und politischen Dimensio-
nen, um schließlich konkrete Maßnahmen zur Lösung der Flüchtlings-
problematik vorzuschlagen. Dass Kirchheimer zunächst die Erwerbs-
arbeit und die konfessionelle Ausrichtung der Flüchtlinge in den
Mittelpunkt stellt und in diesen Faktoren wesentliche Konfliktlinien
gegenüber der ansässigen Bevölkerung erkennt, dokumentiert seine
materialistisch grundierte Perspektive, wie auch Horst Ehmke in einem
Empfehlungsschreiben an die Universität Freiburg attestierte. Kirchhei-
mer hätte sich neben dem Problem der politischen Justiz vor allem
»dem Zusammenhang von sozialer Struktur, industrieller Organisation,
Parteienstruktur und Regierungssystem in Europa und den Vereinigten
Staaten«133 gewidmet.
Ein erstes Problem besteht in der Aufteilung der bis 1948 eingewan-
derten 7 Millionen Flüchtlinge in die westlichen Besatzungszonen. Sie
seien nicht nur sehr unterschiedlich zwischen der amerikanischen, bri-
tischen und französischen Besatzungszone verteilt, sondern auch in
133 Siehe: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Archiv für soziale Demokratie, Horst Ehmke

Depositum, Nr. 504.
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bedenklich hohem Maß auf die ländlichen Räume konzentriert: Flücht-

linge machten hier 19,5% der Bevölkerung aus, im Gegensatz zu 6,6%
in den städtischen Ballungszentren. Auf ökonomischer Ebene würden
die Flüchtlinge vornehmlich von drei Problemen belastet: dem Verlust
ihrer Lebensgrundlagen, der Neuansiedlung in ländlichen Gebieten, in
denen sie keine Erwerbsmöglichkeiten vorfänden, und dem Verlust des
persönlichen Eigentums. In der Folge leiden sie – nicht wenige leben in
Flüchtlingslagern – aufgrund wirtschaftlicher Härten und Arbeitslosig-
keit, so Kirchheimer, an einem allgemein niedrigen Lebensstandard.
Kirchheimers soziostrukturelle Analyse der Flüchtlinge lässt sich in
einem Satz zusammenfassen: »The refugees do not constitute a homo-
genous group« (430). Sie können in verschiedene Gruppen je nach Dia-
lekt, Gebräuchen, Erwerbstraditionen und religiösen Präferenzen diffe‐
renziert werden. Das Aufeinandertreffen dieser heterogenen Gruppen
mit der alteingesessenen Bevölkerung Westdeutschlands stärke diese
Gruppenidentitäten noch und belastete deren Verhältnis zueinander.
Beide Gruppen weigerten sich, sowohl die Entwurzelung als auch die
Notwendigkeit des forcierten Zusammenlebens mit als fremd empfun-
denen Deutschen als dauerhaft anzuerkennen.
»This attitude has resulted among the natives in a mass refusal to
accept psychologically any responsibility for the refugee problem, and
has led to constant discrimination against refugees by the native popu-
lation and in particular by German officials« (431).
Die lokale Bevölkerung reagiere mit nationalistisch grundier-
ten Schuldzuweisungen gegenüber den Alliierten. Ähnlich die
Flüchtlinge: »Their mixed feelings of self-righteousness and self-pity
have centered on the belief that in expelling the refugees the Allies
have committed a great wrong on an innocent population« (433). Ihre
Verbitterung über die Vertreibung, die beständige Diskriminierung in
Deutschland, den sozialen Abstieg und vor allem die drückende öko-
nomische Not machten die Flüchtlinge anfällig für politischen Extre-
mismus. Man könne kaum erwarten, dass sie die Situation still hin-
nehmen. »They are ripe for political action even though the course
of such action is not yet clear« (433). Kirchheimer unterstreicht die
Brisanz mit einem historischen Verweis: Die Flüchtlinge »now consti-
tute a group similar to that which gave the Nazi Party its greatest
support« (433).
Das Problem ist für Kirchheimer groß genug, »to warrant a conti-
nued active American interest in it« (433). Die Politik müsse zwei
Ziele verfolgen: die ökonomische und psychologische Rehabilitation.
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Dafür empfiehlt er die Umverteilung der Flüchtlinge zwischen den

Besatzungszonen nach ökonomischen Kriterien, die Reurbanisierung
und Industrialisierung ländlicher Gebiete, die Schaffung von Ausbil-
dungsprogrammen sowie die entschiedene Unterstützung der Flücht-
linge gegen amtliche Diskriminierung durch die Gründung einer dafür
zuständigen alliierten Behörde. Zugleich müsse den Flüchtlingen und
der westdeutschen Bevölkerung deutlich gemacht werden, dass die
Rückkehr in die Ostgebiete ausgeschlossen ist. An diesen Empfehlun-
gen wird die besondere Perspektive der Forschungsabteilung deutlich.
Auch wenn die reaktionären Ressentiments unter den Vertriebenen
offen benannt werden, erörtert der Text ihre Interessen und Probleme,
deren Lösung in der Verantwortung der Alliierten liege – schon um die
eigenen Ziele nicht zu gefährden.
Drei Jahre später widmet sich Kirchheimer erneut der jungen Bundes-
republik, allerdings unter wesentlich veränderten Vorzeichen. Weder
die Fragen alliierter Besatzungspolitik noch die Herausforderungen
des wirtschaftlichen und politischen Wiederaufbaus stehen im Mittel‐
punkt, sondern die bundesrepublikanische Demokratie mit ihrer nicht
ganz so neuen Parteiendynamik. Der Intelligence Report Implications of
Chancellor Adenauer’s Removal from the German Political Scene von 1952
beschäftigt sich mit den Konsequenzen eines etwaigen verfrühten Able-
bens des Bundeskanzlers – wahrscheinlich ausgelöst durch das miss-
lungene Attentat vom März desselben Jahres. Im Zentrum stehen die
Folgen hinsichtlich möglicher Koalitionsbildungen und der deutschen
Außenpolitik. Die Einschätzung im Report fällt zunächst recht eindeu-
tig aus: Auch ein neues Kabinett würde nicht »lead to any decisive
changes in the basic political alignments or in the policies of the Federal
Republic of Germany« (529). Die aussichtsreichsten Kandidaten für
das Kanzleramt seien der Fraktionsvorsitzende der CDU im Bundestag
Heinrich Brentano oder der Bundestagspräsident Hermann Ehlers, mit
dem der CDU eine stärkere Orientierung am protestantischen Milieu
eröffnete worden wäre.
Auch zu einer Neubildung der Regierungskoalition würde es kaum
kommen. Die kleinen, rechts von der CDU angesiedelten Koalitionspar-
teien, die Deutsche Partei (DP) und die Freie Demokratische Partei
(FDP), würden kaum auf ihren Anteil an Adenauers Erbe verzichten
wollen. Besonders reizvoll könne diesen der Versuch erscheinen, sich
an der Wählerschaft der soeben verbotenen Sozialistischen Reichspartei
(SRP) zu orientieren, dies dürfte aber wenig Erflog versprechen.
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»Even if the FDP and the DP succeeded in amalgamating all the elec-
torate to the right of the CDU and, in addition, gained a substantial
number of the CDU’s more conservative and Protestant adherents,
however, they would not be in a position by 1953 to assume, unilater-
ally, the reign of government« (530).
Diese Annahme wird durch die These gestützt, dass der harte Kern
moderater sozialistischer wie christlicher Wähler in Deutschland ihren
jeweiligen Parteien, namentlich der SPD und der CDU, sichere Mehr-
heiten verspreche. Die These wird an dieser Stelle nicht weiter unter-
mauert, weshalb sich ein Blick in den ORI-Report Nr. 3200 zur Wieder-
belebung des politischen Lebens in Deutschland von Franz Neumann
lohnt (Borsdorf/Niethammer 1976b: 275-311). Dort wird auf die zuneh-
mende Polarisierung des politischen Spektrums im damaligen Gesamt-
deutschland hingewiesen. Das mag paradox klingen, aber ein Blick in
die dem Report angehängte Tabelle zeigt, dass sich das gesamte von
Parteien abgedeckte politische Zentrum zur Mitte hinbewegte. Die
Annahme, dass hier die größten Wählergruppen zu finden seien, ist
insofern nicht fernliegend. Was zu erwarten sei, ist ein gewisser Druck
von Seiten der rechten Koalitionspartner auf die CDU, sich zu mehr
»nationalem Bewusstsein« (531) zu bekennen, so Kirchheimer.
Die Möglichkeit einer großen Koalition wird im Report von Kirchhei-
mer als äußerst unwahrscheinlich bezeichnet. Die SPD sei entschlossen,
durch eine stärker nationalistische und CDU-feindliche Haltung »to
break through the 35 percent electoral limit to which it has been
restricted by the social and denominational structure of West German
society« (531). Sollte diese Strategie erfolgreich sein, könne die SPD
sogar allein regieren. Jedoch deutet die Rede vom »electoral limit«
(531) auf Probleme der SPD hin, die in späteren Reports noch stärker
herausgearbeitet werden. Dennoch erscheint die junge Bundesrepublik
in dem Report bei aller Skepsis als stabiler Staat. Ein Impuls für tie-
fergreifende Veränderungen im politischen Leben der Bundesrepublik
könnte dagegen von außen kommen. Sollte Frankreich die Europäische
Verteidigungsgemeinschaft (EVG) nicht ratifizieren, könnte die Politik
Adenauers einen herben Dämpfer erfahren. Weil »no coalition partner
would like to be associated with the failures of the previous regime«
(529), könnten die DP und FDP eine stärkere politische Neuausrichtung
nach rechts forcieren, was wohl zur Abkehr der bisherigen Politik der
CDU führen würde.
In Probable Course of German Constitutional Court Crisis wird der Frage
nachgegangen, wie sich die Krise des Bundesverfassungsgerichts ange-
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845290027
sichts der Einführung der Wehrpflicht bzw. der Ratifikation der Ver-
träge zur EVG weiter entwickeln werde. Die Krise war zustande
gekommen, weil die Regierung die erwähnten Verträge mit einfacher
Mehrheit vom Bundestag bestätigen lassen wollte, was insbesondere
die SPD nicht akzeptieren mochte. Dem folgten mehrere Anträge
sowohl von Seiten der Opposition als auch der Regierung, die das
junge Verfassungsgericht auf ihre jeweilige Seite ziehen wollten, an
deren Ende jedoch die Etablierung der Karlsruher Richter stand. Über
die Chancen einer verfassungsgerichtlichen Beruhigung des Streits um
die EVG spricht sich der Report gleich zu Beginn sehr klar aus:
»The Adenauer government has little chance of obtaining a clear cut,
favorable Constitutional Court decision removing the doubts as to the
legality of passing the EDC treaties with a simple parliamentary major-
ity« (551).
Die geringen Chancen, von denen hier die Rede ist, ergeben sich vor
allem aus dem komplexen institutionellen Aufbau des Verfassungsge-
richts. Denn abgesehen davon, dass die Bundesregierung ihr Ansehen
und das des Gerichts beschädigt habe, indem sie die Frage aufgrund
erwarteter Benevolenz dem zweiten Senat vorgelegt habe, sei dessen
Zuständigkeit nicht eindeutig festzustellen. Der Report folgt dem vom
Bundesverfassungsgericht vertretenen Standpunkt, dass die Bundes-
regierung nicht die beiden Senate gegeneinander ausspielen dürfe
(BVerfGE 2, 79). Kirchheimer betont, dass die alleinige Zuständigkeit
des zweiten Senats nur im Falle eines Organstreits gegeben wäre, wäh-
rend die Prüfung der Verfassungsmäßigkeit der Verträge allein dem
ersten Senat zusteht. Der erste Senat könne aber nur dann tätig werden,
wenn die Verträge in Bundestag und Bundesrat angenommen worden
seien. Deshalb betreffe die Frage des EVG-Vertrages das Plenum des
Bundesverfassungsgerichts, das »faced with the request for an advisory
opinion […], tried to enlarge on its procedural rights and render a
binding decision instead of an advisory opinion, thus obviating the
possibility and the necessity of additional decisions by the separate
divisions« (552).
Der noch vor dem Ausgang der Entscheidung verfasste Report erkennt,
dass das Machthandeln der Regierung im komplexen Zuständigkeits-
geflecht nur schwer Erfolg haben wird. Eine mögliche Verschleppung
der Entscheidung im Sinne der Regierung müsse vier Richter aus
einem Senat zum Rücktritt bewegen. Erst dann seien der entsprechende
Senat und das Plenum lahmgelegt. Diese Strategie könnte sich aber
rächen, denn der Bundespräsident »has to promulgate them [die Ver-
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träge] if they have been enacted according to the provisions of the Basic
Law« (555). Der Report vermutet, dass der Bundespräsident jedoch die
Meinung des Verfassungsgerichts einholen und achten wird. Träfe er
dann auf ein stillgelegtes Bundesverfassungsgericht, sei zu erwarten,
dass er seine Unterschrift zurückhält. Obwohl der Report unschlüssig
bleibt, welchen Ausgang die Krise nimmt, werden die Grenzen des
Regierungshandels mehr als deutlich, wie sie dann in der Entscheidung
des Bundesverfassungsgerichts vom 7. März 1953 plastisch wurden.
Die verfassungsrechtliche Diskussion um die Wiederbewaffnung und
den EVG-Vertrag spielt in den späteren Schriften Kirchheimers keine
Rolle. Zugleich findet sich hier ein Paradebespiel von Politischer Justiz
im Sinne des Autors: die machtpolitische Verwendung juristischer Ver-
fahrensmöglichkeiten zu politischen Zwecken.
Die beiden letzten hier aufgenommenen Reports zur Bundesrepublik
befassen sich mit der Bundestagswahl 1953. Der Report The West
German Election Campaign liefert einige Einschätzungen der Hauptein-
flussfaktoren und wagt Prognosen über den Ausgang des Bundestags-
wahlkampfes. Wichtig sei die Wahl aufgrund des turbulenten interna-
tionalen Kontextes: »The balance of political forces within this new
assembly will determine German state policy on a number of interna-
tional issues of vital importance to the Western powers« (556). Neben
dem im Hintergrund stehenden Koreakrieg und der atomaren Auf-
rüstung der beiden Supermächte sind vor allem die Gründung der
Europäischen Gemeinschaft für Kohle und Stahl, die Etablierung der
EVG, die Diskussion um die deutsche Wiedervereinigung im Zuge
der Stalin-Note und die militärische Rolle der Bundesrepublik im Ost‐
West‐Konflikt gemeint.
Der erste im Report eingehend analysierte Faktor ist das neue deutsche
Wahlsystem. Die 1953 auf nationaler Ebene eingeführte Fünf-Prozent-
Hürde bevorteile die größeren Parteien (CDU/CSU, SPD, FDP, DP und
BHE) und zementiere damit deren Abgrenzung. Die kleineren Parteien
hingegen werden kaum Erfolgschancen bekommen. Dies betreffe etwa
die Zentrumspartei, die mit ihren Bündnisversuchen erfolglos bleiben
werden, was insbesondere der Union nützen werde: »The Center’s
main competitor, […], the CDU, seems determined to destroy this
party as an independent group« (558). Die aufgrund ihrer Fixierung auf
außenpolitische Themen marginalisierte Gesamtdeutsche Volkspartei
(GVP) mag zwar eine Kooperation mit den Kommunisten in Betracht
ziehen, letztlich sei dies aber wenig Erfolg versprechend. »Open Com-
munist support would lessen the appeal of the GVP for many middle
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class supporters of neutralism« (558). Und die radikale Rechte sei der-
artig fragmentiert, dass sie mit kaum mehr als symbolischer Repräsen-
tation rechnen könne.
In seiner Einschätzung des bevorstehenden Wahlkampfes geht der
Report auch auf Kandidaten und Interessengruppen ein. Dabei seien
alle Parteien bemüht, ihre jeweils populärsten Persönlichkeiten für die
Wahl einzusetzen. Häufig griffen die Parteien (CDU, FDP und SPD) auf
Veteranen und Militärs zurück, wobei die Sozialdemokraten aber vor
allem Gewerkschaftsvertreter auf ihre Listen setzen. Hingegen unter-
stützen die Industriellen das bürgerliche Lager in einem beträchtlichen
Ausmaß: »the total industrial campaign funds prorated among the non-
Socialist parties is larger than the funds of the SPD« (561).
Der Wahlkampf selbst dürfte sich nach der Einschätzung im Report
von der ersten Bundestagswahl unterscheiden. Vor allem die politi-
sche Apathie der unmittelbaren Nachkriegszeit dürfte deutlich abge-
schwächt sein. »Political interest in the 1953 election will be more
intense, but also more diversified« (562). Das gesteigerte Interesse
erklärt sich der Report auch aus der internationalen Situation: die
Deutschen wüssten um die Reichweite der Entscheidungen, die ihre
neue Regierung außenpolitisch zu treffen habe. Insbesondere Adenauer
wolle die Wahl nur zu gern zu einem Plebiszit über seine auch außen-
politisch beeindruckende Bilanz machen. Jedoch bezweifelt der Report
den Erfolg dieses Vorhabens, denn insbesondere Stalins Tod und der
ungewisse Ausgang der EVG-Problematik untergrabe die Vorstellung
von der alternativlosen Außenpolitik Adenauers. Da die SPD aufgrund
der weltpolitischen Situation nicht in der Lage sein werde, einen klaren
außenpolitischen Gegenvorschlag zu präsentieren, würde der Wahl-
kampf wahrscheinlich nicht durch außenpolitische Themen entschie-
den.
Die CDU werde versuchen, Adenauer als ihren größten Trumpf in
den Vordergrund zu stellen und gemeinsam mit der FDP und der DP
den Schwerpunkt auf die Außen- und Wirtschaftspolitik zu legen »in
an effort to establish a record as the most uncompromising defenders
of middle class interests against encroachment of SPD and organized
labor interests« (563). Die SPD wechsle dagegen ihre Strategie. Ihre
frühen Versuche, die Mittelklasse zu erreichen, habe sie aufgrund der
feindlichen Haltung, die ihren Vertretern dort entgegenschlug, wieder
fallengelassen und konzentriere sich nun darauf, ihren Zugriff auf ihre
Stammwählerschaft zu stärken und zu erweitern.
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Wahlsieger werde wahrscheinlich die CDU, die entweder allein oder in

Koalition mit der Flüchtlingspartei BHE und eventuell der Bayernpartei
(BP) die Regierung stellen werde. Als Haupteinflussfaktor wird die
große Zahl neuer Wähler – Erstwähler und Flüchtlinge – genannt.
»[A]pproximately eight percent of the total vote will be cast by persons
who have not previously participated in West German politics, and
among them the young voters, rather than the fugitives from the East,
will play the decisive role« (565).
Am Ende des Reports erwägt Kirchheimer etwaige Stimmenverluste
der CDU: die Flüchtlinge an den BHE, die protestantische Mittel‐
klasse an die FDP und die katholischen Arbeiter an die SPD, die viel-
leicht auch Wiederbewaffnungsgegner und Erstwähler an sich binden
könnte. Dennoch würden solche Zugewinne nicht dazu führen, dass
die SPD die Regierung übernehmen könnte: »Even though the SPD will
probably nose out the CDU-CSU as the strongest party, it is not likely
to obtain more than one third of all valid votes cast« (566f). Diese Ein-
schätzung ist schon deshalb bemerkenswert, weil der CDU markante
Stimmenverluste prognostiziert wurden.
Zur Einordnung dieser Prognosen eignet sich der Intelligence Report
The West German Bundestag Elections of 1953, der im Anschluss an die
Wahl durchgeführt wurde. Zunächst heißt es in dem Report recht lapi-
dar, dass vor allem der Anstieg auf 28 Millionen Wähler (fast 4 Millio-
nen mehr als 1949) den Sieg der CDU verursacht habe. Hinter dieser
etwas technisch anmutenden Argumentation steht aber der zentrale
Befund: die Unfähigkeit der SPD, neue Wähler zu gewinnen.
Das eindrucksvollste Ergebnis der Wahl sei aber der Erdrutschsieg der
CDU, die 3,5 Millionen Wähler hinzugewinnen konnte. Damit habe
sie auch ihre bürgerlichen Konkurrenten FDP und DP »virtually elimi-
nated« (574), denen es nicht gelungen sei, sich als Alternative zu posi-
tionieren. Die Vorherrschaft von politischen und ökonomischen Überle-
gungen unter den Wählern hätte der CDU zudem geholfen, konfessio-
nelle Grenzen zu überwinden und insbesondere im protestantischen
Lager neue Wähler zu finden. Ihren »character of a conservative mass
party« (584) erhalte sie auch aufgrund des überragenden Einflusses des
allseitig geschätzten Kanzlers: »Adenauer’s personality and prestige as
head of government in a period of rapid recovery, which made him
– rather than the CDU as such – a rallying point for the entire West
German middle class« (574).
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Die Erfolge Adenauers in der Außen- und Wirtschaftspolitik hätten

dazu geführt, dass Angestellte, Geschäftsinhaber, Pensionäre, Flücht-
linge und eine Minderheit der Handwerker für die CDU stimmten.
Selbst einige rechte und ultrarechte Wähler, so der Report, hätten für
die CDU votiert, weil sie mit der von Adenauer geschaffenen Situa-
tion zufrieden gewesen seien. Damit ist vor allem die neugewonnene
Bedeutung Deutschlands auf internationaler Bühne und die Allianz
mit den USA als Garanten für die Sicherheit der Bundesrepublik
gemeint. Indirekt habe auch der gewachsene Antikommunismus, der
vor allem durch den Volksaufstand in der DDR Nahrung fand, zu
Adenauers Popularität beigetragen. Die wesentliche Ursache sieht der
Report jedoch in der Persönlichkeit Adenauers, während die CDU als
Parteiorganisation nur eine nachgeordnete Rolle spiele.
Trotz der Stimmengewinne von einer Million Wähler habe die SPD die
Wahl verloren, weil sie »found no effective method of expanding its
electorate outside labor’s ranks, failing to penetrate the middle class or
to draw large blocs of supporters from other parties with the exception
Communist Party (KPD), from whom it obtained an estimated 50 per-
cent of its total gain of 1,000,000 votes since 1949« (574f). Das Haupt-
problem der SPD sei die relative Inflexibilität ihrer Wählerschaft, was
auch daran deutlich werde, dass sie noch nicht einmal in der Lage war,
einen proportionalen Anteil an Neuwählern zu gewinnen. Die ein Jahr
zuvor im Intelligence Report Nr. 6052 zu Adenauers möglichem Tod
(siehe S. 529-533) erwähnte Strategie zur Erweiterung der Wählerschaft
sei nicht gelungen, denn die Partei gelinge es nicht »to provide accepta-
ble political or cultural alternatives« (592), was in Zeiten der herrschen-
den Prosperität umso wichtiger wäre.
Dem BHE wird angesichts seines schwachen Abschneidens eine düs-
tere Prognose gestellt. In dem Maße, wie die Flüchtlingsproblematik
an Brisanz verliere, werde er sein Einfluss einbüßen und wahrschein-
lich bei der nächsten Bundestagswahl keine Sitze mehr gewinnen.
Auch die Gesamtdeutsche Volkspartei unter Gustav Heinemann dürfte
nach Einschätzung Kirchheimers in Zukunft keine große Rolle spielen.
Sie »failed entirely to qualify as a serious competitor to the CDU« (589).
Die Niederlagen an den extremen Enden des politischen Spektrums
erklärt sich der Report aus Adenauers Attraktivität bzw. der starken
Wählerwanderung von den Kommunisten zur SPD.
Angesichts dieses Befundes stellt Kirchheimer sich in dem Report die
Frage, »whether Germany is on the way to developing a one and one
half-party system (i.e. a permanent majority party versus a permanent
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845290027
minority party) to replace its traditional multiparty system« (575). Er

beantwortet sie jedoch negativ. Wahrscheinlicher sei die Entstehung
eines Zwei- oder Mehrparteiensystems. Davon schätzt er die erste
Variante allerdings als recht unwahrscheinlich ein, was in erster Linie
auf die Schwäche der SPD zurückzuführen sei. Die Chancen auf eine
Regierungsübernahme stünden denkbar schlecht: »Its social basis is too
narrow, its outlook too provincial and its apppeal to the German elec-
torate too limited for such a role« (582). Die Schwäche der SPD verrin-
gere die beschworene Angst vor einer sozialistischen Regierung, was
die Kohärenz im bürgerlichen Lager verringere und letztlich ein Mehr-
parteiensystem forciere. Zugleich gebe es einen Mangel an »remain-
ing points of difference between the CDU and other West German
parties« (583). Würde sich die wirtschaftliche Properität abschwächen,
könnten sich die Interessen innerhalb der CDU stärker ausdifferenzie‐
ren und möglicherweise mit der Ausbildung neuer Cleavages einherge-
hen. Der internationale Erfolg Adenauers stelle insofern eine Art Hypo-
thek dar: Die großen Gewinne auf diesem Gebiet der CDU verdecken,
dass weitere Erfolge »more difficult and more limited in scope« (583)
seien. Ein Misserfolg, etwa bei der Frage der Wiedervereinigung, könne
auch eine neue nationalistische, nicht sozialistische Partei entstehen
lassen.
Kirchheimer stellt der Bundesrepublik eine positive Prognose
aus: »[T]he CDU and the SPD will remain strong enough and clear
enough in their loyalty to democratic government to insure the stability
of future German regimes« (584). Knapp zehn Jahre später greift Kirch-
heimer diese Überlegung in seinem Aufsatz für World Politics auf. Man
könne bei allen Defiziten den 1950er Jahren immerhin zugutehalten,
dass die Deutschen in diesen keine Angst vor den »self-propelled engi-
nes of national destruction« (siehe Band 5 dieser Edition, S. 488) haben
spüren müssen. Seine Prognose, dass die Demokratie in der Bundesre-
publik mit den beiden großen Parteien CDU/CSU und SPD sowie ihrer
Wählerschaft eine belastbare Basis erhalten habe, hat sich bestätigt.
Insgesamt ergeben die Studien zur jungen Demokratie in Westdeutsch-
land ein zunehmend beruhigendes Bild ab, das noch in einigen anderen
Dimensionen gewisse Ähnlichkeiten mit der Diagnose in German Demo-
cracy in the 1950‘s offenbart. Das betrifft vor allem die herausragende
Rolle von Adenauer, der in allen Reports eine zentrale Rolle einnimmt.
Der »all-Federal coach« (a.a.O., S. 484) überragt die politische Nach-
kriegslandschaft, er bestimmt die außen- und wirtschaftspolitische
Ausrichtung und dominiert den Wahlkampf in der jungen Bundesrepu-
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blik. Selbstverständlich ist Kirchheimer misstrauisch und bleibt gegen-

über dem Kanzler stets ambivalent: Die stark integrierende Wirkung
seiner Politik und seiner Person steht letztlich in Abhängigkeit zur wirt-
schaftlichen Prosperität. Adenauer mag es gelungen sein, auch (extrem)
rechte Wähler aufgrund der enormen Erfolge auf dem Gebiet des wirt-
schaftlichen Wiederaufbaus an sich gebunden zu haben. Ob diese Wäh-
ler politisch und ideologisch integriert seien, darüber schweigen die
Reports augenfällig. Die Entideologisierung der politischen Landschaft,
ein Befund den Kirchheimer in seinen späteren Analysen immer wieder
zur Sprache bringt, finden die Reports auch auf der linken Seite des
politischen Spektrums. Die Sozialdemokratie, die von ihren alten sozia-
listischen Forderungen abrückte und zumindest den Versuch unter-
nahm, Wählerschichten außerhalb ihrer einschlägigen Wählergruppe
der Arbeiter zu erreichen, versuche ihren ideologischen Ballast abzu-
werfen – wenngleich erfolglos. Von ganz besonderem Interesse für die
Kirchheimerforschung ist die Tatsache, dass in diesen frühen Studien
immer wieder die Formulierung »catch-all« auftaucht – allerdings nicht
in der einschlägig bekannten Form, die sie rund fünfzehn Jahre später
in »Wandlungen des Westeuropäischen Parteiensystems« (siehe Band 5
dieser Edition, S. 600-629) annehmen wird.
12. Vorüberlegungen zur »catch-all«-Partei?
Wie Kirchheimer den Begriff der »catch-all«-Partei in den für das State
Department verfassten Studien einführte und verwendete, dürfte den
Kenner seiner parteitheoretischen Studien erstaunen. Anders als in der
späteren Verwendung, insbesondere in seinen berühmten Studien zum
westeuropäischen Parteiensystem, dient der Begriff nicht dazu, eine
Politik der bewussten Vermeidung ideologischer Konflikte zu beschrei-
ben.
Seine erstmalige Verwendung findet sich bei der Charakterisierung
der Politik der Nationalen Front der DDR und ihrem Versuch, eine
breite Unterstützung für eine Wiedervereinigung zu finden. Sicherlich
war deren Ansinnen insofern »entideologisiert«, als hier nicht auf den
gesellschaftlichen Systemkonflikt abgehoben wurde, weshalb eine klas-
senkämpferische Mobilisierung unterblieb. Adressaten dieser Politik
waren alle Deutschen, die sich für eine Wiedervereinigung ausspra-
chen. Gleichwohl meinte »catch-all« in diesem Kontext keineswegs die
genügsame Integration durch einen bewusst herbeigeführten alltägli-
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chen Charakter einer modernen Massenpartei, sondern zielte letztlich

doch auf die bewusste Mobilisierung gegen die Politik der Westintegra-
tion der Bundesrepublik ab. Eine solche Mobilisierung für die nationale
Sache verlangt ein Moment der aktionistischen Streitbarkeit der Mit-
glieder gegenüber jenen, die sich nicht zu den ideologisch begründeten
Zielen bekennen. Insofern lässt die Verwendungsweise in The State of
East Germany erkennen, dass »all« hier noch nicht »alle« meint, sondern
lediglich den nicht weiter konkretisierten Versuch einer umfassenden
Integration.
So erstaunt es nicht, dass er den Begriff auch in anderen Zusammen-
hängen eher allgemein und ungenau benutzt. So wird in seiner Studie
zum Bundestagswahlkampf 1953 der BHE als »catch-all All-German
Bloc« (557) bezeichnet. In der Analyse der Bundestagswahl heißt es
über die FDP, sie hätte die Chancen gehabt, als »catch-all for the protes-
tant vote« (587) aufzutreten, und die Entwicklung der CDU wird als
»expansion into a middle class catch-all« (575) beschrieben. Offensicht‐
lich bezeichnet die Formulierung hier noch einen Zusammenhang, den
Kirchheimer später eher den »demokratischen Massenintegrationspar-
teien auf Klassen- oder Konfessionsbasis« (siehe Band 5 dieser Edition,
S. 608) zuordnen wird: den exklusiven und umfassenden Zugriff auf
eine bestimmte Bevölkerungsgruppe. Solche Unklarheiten werden
noch deutlicher, wenn man erkennt, dass Kirchheimer der CDU im
gleichen Text attestiert, sie habe gerade durch die Überwindung kon-
fessioneller Grenzen den »character of a conservative mass party« (584)
erhalten.
Der Begriff befindet sich schon zu diesem frühen Zeitpunkt in Kirch-
heimers Arsenal, wird aber teilweise konträr zu seiner späteren Bedeu-
tung verwendet. Klare Hinweise auf das Konzept der »catch-all«-Partei,
wie er es später entwickeln und präsentieren wird, finden sich aber
bereits zur Charakterisierung des Verhältnisses von SPD und CDU.
Versteht man die Begriffe Allerweltspartei und Massenintegrationspar-
tei so, wie sie von Kirchheimer 1965 dargelegt wurden, und überträgt
sie auf die Wahlanalyse, wird ihr analytischer Wert mehr als deutlich:
Die CDU gewinnt ihre Stärke aus ihren außen- und wirtschaftspoliti-
schen Erfolgen, verbunden mit dem Prestige und Charisma ihrer unbe-
strittenen Führungspersönlichkeit Konrad Adenauer. Teilweise durch
strategisches Handeln (Verweigerung eines Wahlbündnisses mit dem
Zentrum) und teilweise durch ihren Erfolg bei den Wahlen erlangt die
CDU den Charakter einer Art gesamt(west)deutscher Partei, die über
alle Klassen- und Konfessionsgrenzen hinaus Attraktivität entfaltet.
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Die SPD dagegen erscheint als proletarische Massenintegrationspartei

– sowohl ihre Wählerschaft, als auch ihre größten Unterstützer, die
Gewerkschaften, stammen fast ausschließlich aus der Arbeiterklasse.
Dies wird ihr in den Wahlen 1953 zum Verhängnis. Sie erreicht ihr »35
percent electoral limit to which it has been restricted by the social and
denominational structure of West German society« (531).
Insgesamt stimmt die Beschreibung der CDU mit dem fünfzehn Jahre
später entworfenen Konzept der »catch-all«-Partei weitgehend überein
– auch wenn die konkrete Begriffsverwendung eher zur Verwirrung
beiträgt. Die »catch-all«-Formulierung ist früher als das gleichnamige
Konzept entstanden und wohl seiner Neigung zur begrifflichen Zuspit-
zung (vgl. die Einleitung zu Band 5, S. 8, 115f) zu verdanken. So cha-
rakterisiert Kirchheimer noch 1961 in The German Democracy in the
1950’s die Wählerschaft der CDU, die privatisierten Bürger der Massen-
gesellschaft, im Sinne der »catch-all«-Partei, ohne jedoch den Begriff
explizit zu benutzen:
»He is content to opt for parties converted by the inherent logic of
industrial society into catch-all aggregates, or, like the CDU, into vast
interest markets held together by the prestige of the chief and the
magic of prosperity.« (In dieser Edition Bd. 5, S. 487)
Obwohl er die CDU schon an anderer Stelle als »catch-all«-Partei
bezeichnet hatte, greift er hier nicht auf den Begriff zurück. Vielmehr
heißt es nun, erneut deutlich zugespitzt, sie sei nicht einmal eine Partei.
Es sollte noch drei Jahre dauern, bis der Begriff eine konzeptionelle
Heimat in Kirchheimers Denken gefunden haben würde. Bis dahin
fungiert er auch losgelöst von konzeptionellen Vorstufen der Allerwelt-
spartei als Bezeichnung für politische Organisationen, die in einem
bestimmten Bevölkerungssegment134 einen Alleinvertretungsanspruch
erheben.
13. Zur österreichischen Außenpolitik
Die »anti-antikommunistische« Positionierung der Forschungsabtei-

lung im State Department beschränkte sich nicht allein auf die Deutsch-
landpolitik. Auch der im Vorfeld der Berliner Außenministerkonferenz
von 1954 und des Staatsvertrages von 1955 verfasste Report Austria
134 Vergleiche hierzu auch die Bemerkung von Hubertus Buchstein in der Einlei-
tung zu Band 5, S. 116, in der er darauf hinweist, dass Kirchheimer die ver-
schiedenen »catch-alls« offensichtlich entlang von cleavages gedacht hat.
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Attempts Independent Foreign Policy zeigt den Auftraggebern, dass die

Interessengegensätze zwischen Ost und West nicht zwangsläufig eska-
lieren müssen. Die Gelegenheit war nach dem Tod Stalins, der Inau-
guration Eisenhowers und dem Beginn der Kanzlerschaft von Julius
Raab durchaus günstig. Den Ausgangspunkt der Analyse bildet die
freundlichere Politik der UdSSR gegenüber Österreich seit 1953. Indi-
zien für diesen Kurswechsel sieht der Report in der Abschaffung der
Kontrollen des interzonalen Handels und Personenverkehrs, in der
Freilassung von etwa 600 zivilen und militärischen Gefangenen sowie
in der Übernahme der Okkupationskosten durch die Sowjetunion.
Diese Maßnahmen erschienen nicht wenigen Österreichern als Herab-
stufung sowjetischer Ansprüche, die noch vor wenigen Monaten als
unabänderlich galten. Die Wirkung auf die Bevölkerung sei kaum zu
überschätzen: »Taken in their entirety, the Soviet moves have dispelled
the feeling of apathy on occupation issues prevalent among Austrians
during the last few years« (569).
Die österreichische Regierung reagiere betont freundlich auf diese Poli-
tik, während sie gegenüber den Maßnahmen der sowjetischen Besat-
zung, die sie selbst im Grunde zurückwies, starke Zurückhaltung übte.
Das Ziel dieser Politik, die Wiederherstellung eines unabhängigen
Österreichs, orientiert sich an den sicherheitspolitischen Interessen der
UdSSR. Der Report betont, dass das Werben beider Blöcke um die
Gunst Österreichs der Regierung einen gewissen Verhandlungsspiel-
raum gebe. Insbesondere deren neue Außenpolitik demonstriere das
gewachsene Selbstbewusstsein in Österreich, auch allein mit der Sow-
jetunion verhandeln zu können. Dieses Selbstbewusstsein speise sich
einerseits aus der Annahme, dass die sowjetische Armee keine mili-
tärische Eskalation in Österreich anstrebe, und andererseits aus dem
Wissen um die geringe Bedeutung der einheimischen Kommunisten.
Militärisch betrachtet ziele der Vorstoß Österreichs auf die Etablierung
militärischer Neutralität ab. Jedoch beeilt sich der Report festzustellen,
dass »it is unlikely that the Austrians would accept a status of com-
pletely disarmed neutrality« (570). Auf ökonomischer Ebene demons-
triere die österreichische Regierung die Bereitschaft, den Handel zwi-
schen Osten und Westen in größerem Maß zuzulassen und Handels-
abkommen mit Staaten des Ostblocks abzuschließen. Hintergrund für
diese Öffnung sei auch die Reduktion der amerikanischen Wirtschafts-
hilfe. Umgehend fügt der Report aber hinzu, dass weiterhin erwartetet
werden könne, dass die Österreicher ein gewisses Maß an Westintegra-
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tion aufrechterhalten würden. Als Beleg gilt die fortgesetzte Mitglied-

schaft in der Europäischen Zahlungsunion.
Die Ursachen für die veränderte Außenpolitik Österreichs sieht der
Report nicht allein in der aktuell günstigen internationalen Lage. Aus
Prestigegründen habe die Österreichische Volkspartei einen außenpoli-
tischen Erfolg bitter nötig. Mit ihrer veränderten Haltung gegenüber
der Sowjetunion konnte sie auch die Sozialisten nach deren anfängli-
cher Skepsis hinter sich bringen. Die SPÖ habe recht schnell erkannt,
dass die Unterstützung dieser Politik zur Wiedererlangung der Souve-
ränität Österreichs für sie die einzig aussichtsreiche strategische Vari-
ante darstellt. Auf internationaler Ebene nennt der Report als Ursachen
einer möglichen Entspannung das Ende des Koreakriegs sowie den
Versuch, weniger konfrontativ gegenüber dem Westen aufzutreten.
Ursächlich sei auch die Zurückhaltung angesichts der Bundestagswah-
len von 1953, was die Verhandlungsmacht der österreichischen Regie-
rung stärke: »They think that by clever manipulation they may be able
to turn East-West sparring to Austria’s advantage« (569).
Dieser Einschätzung der österreichischen Regierung stimmt der Report
prinzipiell zu:
»Realizing that the West is, for political and propagandistic reasons,
unable to flout policies the Austrians themselves developed to attain
important national aspirations, they have practically committed the
West to an unqualified support of their policies« (572).
Die österreichische Außenpolitik stellt hier ein mutiges politisches
Schauspiel dar, welches bei allen Risiken durchaus vielversprechend
sein könnte. Sollte die Regierung erfolgreich sein, darf sie für sich
den Erfolg beanspruchen, maßgeblich zu einer Entspannung im Kalten
Krieg beigetragen zu haben. Sollte ihr Agieren mit einem Misserfolg
enden, müsste der Westen aufgrund seiner strategischen Verpflichtun‐
gen in Mitteleuropa Österreich dennoch die Treue halten.
Aufschlussreich an diesem Report ist die Charakterisierung amerikani-
scher Außenpolitik. Sie erscheint weitgehend passiv, was sich nicht
nur als Absage an eine Eindämmungspolitik, sondern auch einer Poli-
tik des Rollbacks deuten lässt. Die außenpolitische Initiative geht in
dem Report jedenfalls von der Sowjetunion aus. Österreich reagiert
klug auf die sowjetischen Offerten und nutzt den sich öffnenden Hand-
lungsspielraum, während die Amerikaner fast schon gezwungen sind,
dem Ergebnis Folge zu leisten. Der Kalte Krieg wird in dieser Perspek-
tive nicht als bloße Konfrontation von zwei Supermächten begriffen,
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deren Agieren von – auf den ersten Blick – bedeutungslosen Akteuren

beeinflusst werden kann. Die UdSSR erscheint als durchaus rationaler
außenpolitischer Akteur, mit dem selbst ein besetztes Land klug und
eigensinnig verhandeln und Vorteile für sich herausschlagen könnte.
Wenn man eine außenpolitische Empfehlung an die Auftraggeber aus
diesem Report ziehen will, dann ist es der Hinweis, dass nur Entspan-
nung zu mehr Freiheiten führen kann, und zwar für alle Beteiligten.
Diese Position entspricht auch der generellen Linie der Forschungsab-
teilung des State Department im Kalten Krieg, die sich jedoch erst
später durchsetzen konnte (Müller 2010: 168f).
14. Editorische Hinweise
In diesem sechsten und letzten Band der Gesammelten Schriften wurden

Arbeiten aufgenommen, die Otto Kirchheimer zwischen 1944 und 1953
im Rahmen seiner Tätigkeit im OSS sowie im State Department ver-
fasst hat. Dabei handelt es sich in der überwiegenden Mehrheit um
Beratungspapiere, die den damaligen politischen Entscheidungsträgern
eine adäquate Informationsgrundlage liefern sollten. Eine Besonderheit
stellt in diesem Kontext die von Kirchheimer verfasste Legal Section
des Civil Affairs Handbook dar, die nicht innerhalb der R&A-Abteilung
entstanden ist. Auch die aus dem State Department heraus anonym
publizierte Schrift A Constitution for the Fourth Republic wird mit aufge-
nommen.
Aufgenommen in den Band wurden nur Arbeiten, die ganz sicher oder
aber doch mit sehr großer Sicherheit Kirchheimer als Autor zugerech-
net werden können und bei denen der Hauptanteil der Arbeit erkenn-
bar auf Kirchheimer zurückgeht. Die in dieser Einleitung geschilder-
ten komplexen und nicht am akademischen Modell orientierten kol-
laborativen Produktionsbedingungen innerhalb der R&A-Abteilungen
erschweren eine eindeutige Zuordnung angesichts unvollständiger
Nachweisüberlieferungen in den National Archives der Vereinigten
Staaten. Daher waren für die Textauswahl neben den zumindest teil-
weise vorhandenen Autorenverzeichnissen von Reports auch interne
Briefwechsel und Dokumente zu Auseinandersetzungen über Arbei-
ten zwischen verschiedenen Geheimdienstabteilungen maßgeblich.
Erleichtert wurden die Bestimmungen durch die bekannten themati-
schen Spezialisierungen und offiziellen Zuständigkeiten Kirchheimers,
Kenntnisse über seine konkrete jeweilige Arbeitssituation sowie inhalt-
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liche Analysen der aufgefundenen Quellen. In diesem Zusammenhang

muss allerdings auch erwähnt werden, dass eine Vielzahl von Arbeiten
heute nicht mehr auffindbar ist und daher nicht durch uns zu über-
prüfen war. Nicht aufgenommen haben wir Texte, deren Provenienz
nicht mit hinreichender Sicherheit geklärt werden konnte ebenso wie
solche, die wahrscheinlich Kirchheimer zugerechnet werden können,
aber bereits andernorts publiziert135 worden sind. Im Anhang dieses
Bandes findet sich eine Aufstellung136 aller Schriften aus dem Arbeits-
zusammenhang des OSS und des State Department, die wir Otto Kirch-
heimer zurechnen.
Mit einer Sternchenfußnote (*) am Titel der Texte ist jeweils verzeich-
net, welche konkrete Druckvorlage in diesen Band aufgenommen
wurde. Alle Anmerkungen der Herausgeber erscheinen in eckigen
Klammern […]. Kirchheimers Rechtschreibung und sein »teutonisches«
Englisch wurden nur dort behutsam korrigiert, wo offensichtliche Feh-
ler enthalten sind. Beibehalten blieben uneinheitliche Abkürzungen,
etwa die abweichende Bezeichnung für die Sozialdemokratische Partei
Deutschlands (SPD, die in einigen Reports mal in der bekannten Weise,
mal als »SDP« auftaucht). Im Hinblick auf weitere editorische Fragen
gelten die im Vorwort des Herausgebers für die Gesamtedition erläuter-
ten Editionsprinzipien, die auf den ersten Seiten des ersten Bandes
nachzulesen sind. Jedoch können wir der Natur der Sache nach nicht
Sicherheit behaupten, jeweils die von Kirchheimer zuletzt autorisierte
Fassung abgedruckt zu haben. Zu einer Letztautorisierung war er unter
den Produktionsbedingungen im OSS und im State Department nicht
befugt.
Für ihre unschätzbare Hilfe bei der Organisation der Arbeit möchten
wir Moritz Langfeldt und Lisa Klingsporn herzlich danken. Ihre andau-
ernde Aufmerksamkeit und Mitarbeit insbesondere bei der Digitalisie-
rung und Registererstellung hat uns die Konzentration für die inhalt-
liche Arbeit und Textauswahl für diesen Band ermöglicht. Auch den
studentischen MitarbeiterInnen Sophie Friedrich, Konstantin Hofmann,
Jonas Meyerhoff, Hannes Siebert und Daniela Weber gilt unser herzli-
cher Dank für die teilweise ausgesprochen schwierige Digitalisierung
der produktionstechnisch nicht optimalen historischen Vorlagen und
ihren Beitrag bei der Erstellung des Manuskripts. Steffi Krohns Unter-
stützung insbesondere bei den Korrekturarbeiten an dieser Einleitung
135 Vergleiche hier insbesondere Laudani (2016).

136 Auch diese Liste kann aus den erwähnten Gründen keine Vollständigkeit
beanspruchen.
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845290027
ist wie immer unverzichtbar gewesen. Zu herzlichem Dank sind wir

auch den MitarbeiterInnen der National Archives in Maryland ver-
pflichtet. Ihre Hilfe ermöglichte das Auffinden der historischen Doku-
mente und ihre ständig spürbare Aufmerksamkeit machte die Besuche
dort zu einem besonderen Erlebnis.
Für kritische Kommentare und hilfreiche Anmerkungen bei der Arbeit
an dieser Einleitung danken wir Hubertus Buchstein, Sara Gebh, Lisa
Klingsporn, Moritz Langfeldt und Tobias Müller. Hubertus Buchstein
sei an dieser Stelle nochmals herzlich gedankt. Die unnachahmliche
Ausübung seiner Leitungsfunktion als Editionsherausgeber hat die
Arbeit an diesem Projekt zu einem beruflich wie sozial sehr schönem
und unvergesslichen Erlebnis gemacht.
Die Forschungen für die Edition der Gesammelten Schriften von Otto
Kirchheimer sind durch eine Projektfinanzierung der Deutschen For-
schungsgemeinschaft (DFG) ermöglicht worden (BU 1035/7-1). Die
DFG hat großzügig auch eine Druckkostenbeihilfe für diesen Band der
Kirchheimer-Edition gewährt.
Unser besonderer Dank gilt abschließend auch für diesen Band Hannah
Kirchheimer-Grossmann, Peter Kirchheimer und deren Kindern. Konn-
ten wir auch selbst nicht mit ihnen zusammenkommen, so war die
durch Hubertus Buchstein übermittelte wohlwollende Begleitung der
Edition durch sie für uns eine besondere Ehre.
Greifswald & Chemnitz, Henning Hochstein & Frank Schale

im Herbst 2021
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juristischer Bewältigung. Frankfurt am Main/New York, 15-58.
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faschistische Ausschüsse und Reorganisation der Arbeiterbewegung in
Deutschland. Wuppertal.
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155
[1.]
The Abrogation of Nazi Laws in the Early Period
of MG*
[1944]
[Handschriftliche Anmerkung: Kirchheimer has the only corrected

copy of 1655.7 I know of]
NOTE
Civil Affairs Guides are designed to aid civil affairs officers dealing
with problems in liberated areas, each guide being focused upon a spe-
cific problem in a particular area. These guides are not basic collections
of factual information, as are the Civil Affairs Handbooks, nor are the
recommendations contained in the Guides intended to take the place
of plans prepared in the field. They are rather designed to point the
factual information toward the making and executing of plans by those
civil affairs officers assigned to this work in the theaters of operation.
In no sense is a Guide to be taken as an order. Orders will be issued in
the normal manner.
I. Analysis of the Problem
This Guide deals with the immediate measures in the field of Nazi
legislation and judicial administration which the MG Administration
may desire to take directly upon occupying German territory or very
early in the first stage of occupation. Less urgent measures will be
treated in various Guides dealing with the respective fields of criminal
law and procedure, family law, civil law, etc.
While it is sometimes suggested that all legislation enacted by the
Nazis should be considered unconstitutional and therefore invalid,
* [Als R and A No. 1655.7 und Teil des Civil Affairs Guides-Programm produziert.
Die hier abgedruckte Version ist ein Entwurf und wurde schlussendlich nicht in
den Civil Affairs Guide aufgenommen. Zu diesem Text vergleiche in der Ein-
leitung S. 48-56.]
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845290027
156 [1.] The Abrogation of Nazi Laws in the Early Period of MG [1944]
there are in practice serious objections to such a drastic policy. The

Nazi regime, whether constitutionally or not, has issued year by year
an endless stream of laws, decrees, and ordinances which have affected
and transformed life and institutions in Germany to such an extent
that the immediate wholesale abrogation of this legislation, though not
without psychological benefit, would lead to chaotic conditions. More-
over, a piece of German legislation is not necessarily objectionable sim-
ply because it has been issued by Nazi authorities. Many regulations
issued by whatever authority are of technical character, such as the
rules concerning the installation and supervision of boilers. Moreover,
Nazi legislation frequently amounts simply to a consolidation or codifi‐
cation of previous statutes.
There are, however, a number of provisions which are incompatible
with either the requirements of military security and public order or
with the ideals for which the United Nations stand. In respect to such
laws and institutions immediate abolition will be desirable.
The principle that laws incompatible with public order and safety
may be invalidated by the occupying powers has been accepted for
a long time and has been incorporated into the Hague Convention gov-
erning military occupation. In addition, the Moscow Three-Power Dec-
laration concerning Fascism has corroborated this doctrine that laws
may be invalidated because of their incompatibility with occupying
powers’ basic concepts of »public-order«. According to this statement,
Allied policy should be based upon »the fundamental principle that
Fascism and all its evil influence and configuration shall be completely
destroyed and that the (Italian) people shall be given every opportu-
nity to establish governmental and other institutions based upon demo-
cratic principles«.
There are three major groups of laws which would appear to contra-
dict basic concepts of public order prevailing among the Allies and
the immediate abrogation of which will therefore be necessary. Those
groups comprise:
1. Laws, and other legislative rules, which contradict the principle
of the equality of all citizens before the law. Under this heading
would come all acts embodying racial discrimination, acts discriminat-
ing against political opponents, and, by analogy, acts unreasonably
discriminating against foreigners residing in Germany, such as foreign
workers. The principle of racial and similar discrimination has been the
very basis of Nazi ideology and has formed the political and propagan-
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[1.] The Abrogation of Nazi Laws in the Early Period of MG [1944] 157
dist entering-wedge for Nazi propaganda all over the world. Allowing
any part of this legislation to continue, if only for a brief transition
period, would compromise the occupying powers not only in their own
public opinion but also in the eyes of all non-Nazi Germans, and might
lead to disturbances and confusion. Under this heading would likewise
fall the judicial institutions and procedures set up for the special pur-
pose of persecuting political opponents of Nazism.
2. The second group consists of measures wholly abrogating or restrict-
ing fundamental rights of freedom of individuals or social groups.
Since the basis for the abrogation by Nazism of these freedoms has
been the establishment of the Nazi Party and its organizations and
institutions, the elimination of the institutional aspects of Nazism will
constitute the first and most elementary measure to be undertaken
in this field. In the wording of the Moscow Declaration regarding
Italy, »all institutions and organizations created by the Fascist regime
shall be suppressed«, and »all Fascist and pro-Fascist elements shall
be removed from the administration and from institutions and organi-
zations of a public character«. However, the first question, that of the
elimination of the Party and its organizations, will be taken up in a spe-
cial Guide on »The Elimination of Nazism«, while the second problem,
that of the de‐Nazification of public administration, etc., will be dealt
with in a special Guide on »General Problems of Administration«.
Measures to be dealt with here concern the abolition of restrictions
upon the traditional »freedoms«. Again in the words of the Moscow
Declaration on Italy, »freedom of speech, of religious worship, of polit-
ical belief, of press and of public meeting shall be restored in full
measure to the people, who shall also be entitled to form anti-Fascist
political groups«. Measures concerning the release of political prisoners
of the regime, both in prisons and concentration camps, would likewise
come under this category. While measures of the first category (legal
discrimination) would have to be abolished in toto, those of the second
group (abrogation of freedoms) would have to be carefully scrutinized
in order to determine those provisions which can be abrogated immedi-
ately and those whose abrogation will have to be accompanied by the
simultaneous enactment of a new body of administrative law and regu-
lations. But the most objectionable measures in this field cannot well
await the building up of a new administrative machinery. Again, as
in the case of the discriminatory legislation, certain parts of Nazi legis-
lation concerning freedom have been so closely connected with the fun-
damental theories and policies of Nazism that for MG to preside over
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their enforcement, however briefly, would be impossible. A substantial

part of the German people would oppose their continued enforcement
and a general state of insecurity might ensue during which no one
would know exactly which laws were in force.
3. There are certain legislative measures which do not fit into the cat-
egories either of discriminatory laws or of laws restricting freedom,
but the immediate abrogation of which would likewise appear to be
imperative. For example, the continued validity of any of the acts
concerning Nazi symbols (Swastika, uniforms, etc.) would not only
endanger the security of the occupying forces but would also be in total
disagreement with Allied principles, likewise, the enforcement of Nazi
eugenic legislation, although not endangering the security of the Allies,
would seem undesirable even during transitional period, since it has
been one of the mainstays of Nazi ideology and propaganda.
4. Another group of measures where immediate action seems imper-
ative concerns the de‐Nazification of the judiciary and the ensuing
necessity of suspending the activities of the courts for a certain period.
It would appear at first glance that the fate of the judiciary is not
of immediate concern. It could be argued that the abolition of spe-
cial courts and jurisdictions for the prosecution of political opponents
would eliminate the most objectionable parts of the judicial system and
its most undesirable elements, and that other reforms of the judiciary
could therefore well be left to a later stage of MG Administration. This,
however, would overlook the role which the judiciary has played in
German politics since 1918. For instance, without the active abetting
of the German judiciary, Germany’s illegal rearmament effort starting
in the early twenties with the organization of the »Black-Reichswehr«,
and the hiding away of munitions and armaments from the Allied con-
trol commissions, would have encountered great difficulties. Moreover,
without the discrimination between nationalist and Leftist political
opposition on the part of the judiciary, the various nationalist groups,
including the Nazis, would never have been able to build up terroristic
organizations undisturbed by official interference. The attitude of the
judiciary, particularly of the criminal courts in »political« cases, was
always the symbol of »official« reaction towards the group in question.
Thus the judiciary constituted one of the chief benefactors of groups
thriving upon aggressive nationalist policies.
Under the Third Reich the judiciary, although increasingly deprived of
its political influence, has become increasingly »coordinated« with the
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Nazi regime both in its functions and in its personnel. The new masters
did not leave the judiciary any latitude for using their own political
judgement in deciding cases, and any remaining »neutrals« among the
judiciary have been weeded out during the repeated and vigorous
purges of the judiciary which have been undertaken since early 1942.
It would, therefore, be a mistake to base a favorable judgment of the
judiciary on the few cases of opposition to the Nazi regime or of resis-
tance to certain measures which occurred during the early stages of
the regime, and thus to rely on any large amount of neutral or even
anti-Nazi feeling in the judiciary.
Continuance of most of the members of this judiciary in office, even
if under probation and MG supervision, would contribute neither to
Allied security nor to the re-establishment of the confidence of the Ger-
man people and might encourage continued Nazi activities. Besides,
a considerable number of German judicial personnel have been used
for the administration of occupied European territories and are now
returning to their previous positions. Since most of them may be sub-
ject to prosecution as war criminals, MG could not possibly delegate
judicial authority to them even for a very brief transitional period.
It might seem sufficient to suspend only judges who have functioned
as criminal judges, or who were members of the Special Courts (Sonder-
gerichte), and the People’s Court. But such a distinction does not seem
practicable. Since 1937 the assignment of duties to judges has come
under the direct supervision of the Ministry of Justice, and care has
been taken to rotate the assignments. Thus each judge at one time or
another has had to function in criminal cases. Moreover, in the smaller
local courts there has been no division of functions between civil and
criminal assignments. Also, in most cases the Special Courts did not
function as separate courts but were simply criminal divisions of the
District Courts (Landgerichte) sitting as Special Courts.
For all these reasons, it seems necessary that all the 12-13,000 judges
and public prosecutors be suspended from office until each of them
has been thoroughly investigated. This means that the activities of the
courts must be suspended for a certain period.
Under the impact of war conditions the Nazis were obliged to suspend
in 1943 most of the functions of the courts concerning civil cases. There-
fore, a system of suspension extending to the civil activities of the
courts for a short period would mean but little change for the popula-
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tion. Suggestions for the solution of ensuing problems and difficulties

will be found in a later part of this Guide.
II. Recommendations
A. General
The preceding pages have already indicated the necessity of four major
groups of measures to be taken immediately by MG in relation to Nazi
legislation and judicial institutions: first, the abrogation of »discrimina-
tory« laws; second, the abrogation of laws restricting fundamental lib-
erties; third, the abrogation of certain other laws intimately connected
with Nazi ideology and Nazi policies; and, fourth, the immediate
reform of the judicial system. In order to implement four general rec-
ommendations it now becomes necessary to consider the details of the
measures to be taken, in respect to both substance and form.
It might be suggested, at least with respect to the first two groups,
that laws and decrees could be declared invalid by reference to broad
categories and without a detailed enumeration. This method, however,
would open the way to all kinds of uncertainties and differences of
interpretation. The enumeration of at least the major legislative acts
in the respective fields is therefore necessary. In the Appendix to this
Guide, there will be found a list of laws and decrees which, it is
suggested, should be specifically referred to in the proclamation invali-
dating Nazi legislation. While this list contains, as far as possible, an
exhaustive enumeration of the laws and decrees, it does not contain
executive orders issued on the basis of a law or decree, or intra-admin-
istrative instructions and regulations resting on them, because it is
assumed that such enactments become invalid automatically with the
abrogation of the main law or decree. On the other hand, wherever
this seems possible, there should be added to the detailed enumeration
a general clause to cover gaps which might otherwise invalidate the
abrogations.
B. Abrogation of Discriminatory Legislation
Discrimination against groups and individuals has been at the basis

of Nazi thought and Nazi practice; both start from the assumption
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of the inequality of races. Even within the »higher« racial group, the
right of an elite to rule without restrictions over the mass of the pop-
ulation is implicit. The abrogation of Nazi laws in this field means
the re-establishment of the principle of equality before the law as tradi-
tionally held in democratic societies. Re-establishment of this principle
requires measures in connection with several groups of Nazi laws, e.g.,
the so-called »Aryan« legislation, the legislation discriminating unduly
against foreign workers, and similar measures. It is worth considering
whether the new penal regulations to be issued by MG should not pro-
vide imprisonment or fines or both, for those who foment race hatred
as well as those members or personnel of public agencies, private per-
sons of corporations who commit acts of discrimination on the basis of
race or creed.
1. Aryan Legislation. It is recommended that all Nazi legislation discrim-
inating against »non-aryans« (defined negatively as persons of non-
German blood; defined positively as Jews or as Jewish-mixed blood)
be immediately abolished; special regulations are necessary concern-
ing citizenship. Nazi measures against non-Aryans have never been
enacted in one general statute but have been invoked in a process
extending over several years. It is necessary, therefore, to revoke all
kinds of legislative enactments in this field ‒ from laws in the realm of
citizenship to laws or decrees concerning economic disqualifications. A
complete list of laws and decrees to be rescinded will be found in the
Appendix. A few words, however, need to be added here in order to
explain certain problems.
In 1935, through the so-called Nuremberg laws, a new concept
of citizenship was enacted. The new laws introduced a distinction
between »subjects« and full »citizens«, but the distinction was made
only in order to deprive so-called »non-Aryans«, as defined by this law,
of the rights traditionally deriving from citizenship ‒ access to public
offices, to the professions, etc. This law, therefore, must be retroactively
rescinded. In principle, citizenship questions should be solved on the
basis of the citizenship law of 1913, which is still in force. Questions
concerning loss of citizenship should be treated as if this law had never
been modified by the law of 1935. At the same time, the individual
and general measures of expatriation which have been carried through
by the German Government after 1933 should be declared invalid. As,
however, many of those who have lost German citizenship after 1933
have left Germany and in the meantime have acquired citizenship or
declared their intention to become citizens in other countries, the valid-
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ity of this retroactive revocation of German laws and orders should be

restricted to residents of Germany. This does not exclude other persons
living outside Germany from filing an application to recover their citi-
zenship after returning to Germany. But automatic restoration might
at present unnecessarily harm the position of former Germans, who
voluntarily or otherwise are residing abroad. As regards the acquisition
of German citizenship on the basis of Nazi laws either by individual
order or general decree, no revocation is recommended. Most of the
persons here affected are the so-called »Racial Germans«, South Tyro-
lians, Baltic Germans, etc., who were repatriated under Nazism. Since
a large number of them had been, or had become, ardent Nazis, their
former countries will hardly welcome them back, and they will thus
have to stay in Germany, whether individually they prefer this solution
or not.
Under Nazi legislation and practice, Gypsies, as well as Jews, were the
only important groups discriminated against as »non-Aryans«. There-
fore, measures similar to those mentioned above, which apply to this
group, should likewise be abrogated.
2. Discriminatory Legislation against Foreign Workers. It is recommended
that all legislation discriminating against foreign workers in Germany
be immediately abolished.
The Nazis, since the outbreak of the war, have deported millions of
foreign civilians to Germany and forced them to work for their war
machine. Since the repatriation of these foreign workers will have to
be effected gradually, it is necessary to eliminate immediately any legal
discrimination under which they have been put by Nazi legislation ‒
restrictions with respect to free movement, marriage restrictions, wage
discriminations, etc.
C. Abrogation of Special Privileges
It is recommended that legislation be immediately abolished concern-

ing special employment-privileges of former members of the armed
forces and the police in the German civil service.
The legislation of most countries contains provisions for special
employment-privileges of former members of the army and police.
German legislation has probably gone farther in this direction than any
other national legislation. It has always been a German principle to
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reserve clerical and other minor positions in the civil service for former
soldiers and policemen. The Third Reich, while continuing this tradi-
tion, added the category of Party members, in particular »old fighters«,
providing for them various preferences with respect to the length of
required training period, the required examinations, or generally the
availability of openings to them. While obviously the immediate abro-
gation of these privileges will work hardship in individual cases, it
should nevertheless be enforced. The very fact that the authorities
in Germany had always to rely on army and police veterans to fill
their middle and lower ranks contributed much to the rigidity and
authoritarianism of German government. In addition, during the ten
years of Nazi domination the police and SS have been packed with
the toughest and most reliable Party members. To maintain the employ-
ment-privilege of police veterans would be tantamount to filling up
the administrative ranks with the very people whose elimination from
public positions should be one of the foremost aims of MG. To maintain
the privilege for all ex-service men would practically prohibit MG from
using its discretion in replacing the Nazified civil service with persons
of its choice. As all openings and waiting-lists would be swamped
with war veterans, the public employment of those persons who spent
the war in prisons and concentration camps would be automatically
excluded. Of course, disabled and partially employable war veterans
must be taken care of, but this should be a problem of general social
welfare legislation, and the difficult problem of recruiting a new civil
service should not be complicated by this additional burden.
D. Non-Discrimination in Criminal Law and Procedures
It is recommended that there be abolished immediately such special

courts as the People’s Court and the Sondergerichte, as well as all legisla-
tion referring to their jurisdiction. It is further recommended that laws
be rescinded which put »racial« crimes under penalty.
The Nazis have established an elaborate system of special courts in
order to deal with political crimes and political opponents or, in a
particular ruthless manner, with certain other types of crimes. The var-
ious types of courts and procedures have been described in sections
2E and 2 of the Civil Affairs Handbook on Germany. The People’s
Court and the Special Courts (Sondergerichte) erected at the ordinary
criminal courts should be immediately abolished. Military courts as
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well as special SS and Police Courts will be eliminated automatically

with the demobilization of the armed forces and the abolition of the SS.
No ordinary court should be permitted to apply any of the special laws
which are applied by the courts martial and the SS courts.
With regard to criminal law, Nazism has profoundly changed the
whole system, completely obliterating the protection of the accused in
order ruthlessly to assert state authority. While MG must carry through
a number of fundamental changes in the second stage of occupation,
only a few reforms would seem immediately necessary because, in
spite of the proposed suspension of all court activity in the first period,
their mere existence in the statute-book would give rise to misunder-
standing. Thus the crime of »race defilement«, part of the Nuremberg
race legislation, should be revoked immediately, together with similar
criminal laws concerning racialism. It should further be immediately
proclaimed that the crimes of treason and high treason, major weapons
in the hands of Nazism in its persecution of political opponents, will
lapse automatically during the occupation and will be replaced by the
ordinances concerning the security of the occupying forces. It is an
established principle of international law that during occupation the
sovereignty of the occupied country is replaced by that of the occupy-
ing powers.
E. General Clause Concerning the Elimination of Discrimination
It is recommended that, in addition to the enumerated abrogations, a

general rule be proclaimed which forbids the application of discrimina-
tory laws and regulations.
The principle of discrimination against certain groups and individuals
and of consequent inequality before the law has permeated Nazi legis-
lation and its application so completely that a general clause forbidding
the application of any such rule or regulation not already expressly
repudiated would appear desirable. Such a clause would state that the
application of any statute or other legislative rule or any regulation,
instruction or other administrative rule, or any part of a law or regu-
lation, which provides for, or refers to, discriminatory treatment of
individuals or groups not warranted by ordinary and traditionally
accepted standards of justice, on the part of any authorities, judicial
or administrative, is forbidden. This would mean, for instance, that
financial authorities, now advised to apply discriminatory standards
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with regard to taxation to »Aryans« and »non-Aryans«, or Party mem-

bers and non-Party members, or foreign workers and German workers,
would not be allowed to continue this policy. On the other hand,
higher income taxes for higher income levels would, of course, not
constitute »undue« discrimination.
III. Abolition of Legislation Restricting Political and Civil Liberties
Ten years of Nazi rule have made a shambles of the liberties of the peo-
ple. Regimentation has been practised in all fields, and the hand of the
state and Party has lain heavily on everybody not conforming to official
patterns. Because MG has no desire to perpetuate its rule, it should be
pledged to a program of speedy restoration of liberties. Government
cannot be turned over to native German authorities as long as MG
must fear that the government would revert to the hands of a bellicose
and rapacious minority. This experiment can be undertaken only when
the German people have gained some experience once more in the full
development of social and cultural patterns of their own. Therefore it
should be one of MG’s earliest steps to grant the German people as
much political and individual liberty as is compatible with the security
of MG, and with the energetic suppression of all attempts to indulge
openly or in veiled manner in Nazi activities.
A. Political Activities
It is recommended that the laws concerning the outlawry of political

parties and the monopoly of the Nazi Party be immediately abrogated.
The legal monopoly of political organization enjoyed by the Nazi Party
rests on the Act against the Reconstitution of Political Parties of 14
July 1933 and the Act for the Safeguarding of the Unity of Party and
State of 1 December 1933. The immediate abolition of these laws opens
the way to the reconstitution of political parties. But the right to form
associations of political and economic character cannot be an unlimited
one. Obviously, the NSDAP as well as all its affiliated organizations
and any possible front or »Ersatz« organization must be dissolved, and
it is one of the foremost tasks of MG to see to it that they are not
reconstituted under any disguise. The elimination of the Nazi Party and
its affiliated organizations, however, is more a problem of abolishing
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institutions than one of invalidating legislation and will be treated in a

special Guide on the Elimination of Nazism.
The Nazis had established a monopoly of organization in the realm
of labor by giving the German Labor Front the status of the sole
organization in this field (Decree of 24 October 1934). The abolition
of this monopoly is also one of the first tasks of MG in the interest
of the re-establishment of political freedom. While trade unions will
thus be given the same freedom of organization as the political parties,
an exception must be made, first, for any organization which may
appear as a continuation of the Nazi Labor Front or similar Nazi orga-
nization, and second, for the German Nationalist Business Employees
Association (Deutschnationaler Handlungsgehilfenverband). This associa-
tion, which was closely connected with the German Nationalist Party,
heavily contributed to the development of Nazism among business
employees and can, for this reason, be assumed to constitute a possible
refuge for disguised Nazis. While the outlawing of the Labor Front
constitutes an immediate measure to be taken by MG, details on the
re-establishment of free trade unions will be dealt with in a special
Guide on Labor Problems.
B. Social Economic, and Cultural Activities
It is recommended that there be restored, with certain restrictions, free-

dom of association and freedom of assembly. It is further recommended
that freedom of opinion be restored by abrogating the Editor’s Act and
the laws underlying the Nazi Chamber of Culture. The freedom of the
Protestant Church should be restored through the abrogation of the
Law concerning the Constitution of the Protestant Church. This would
not be necessary for the Catholic Church; relations between Church
and State have been governed by the Concordat of 1933 which, being a
bilateral treaty, could not be unilaterally changed at any rate.
Under Nazism, the previously existing freedom to form associations
in the field of social, economic, and cultural activities was restricted,
since the Decree for the Protection of People and State of 28 February
1933 subjected this right to administrative control and supervision.
Henceforth cultural and sports organizations as well as associations in
the field of trade and commerce, e.g., employers’ organizations, should
be permitted, although during the transitional period, care must be
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taken that these organizations are not replicas of the extinguished Nazi
organizations utilizing the old personnel.
In order to achieve this aim, these organizations should be required
to register their by-laws, officers, employees, and members, as well as
periodical financial statements, with MG authorities.
In the transitional period it also would be advisable to introduce a
system of permits for meetings, at least for meetings to be attended by
more than a certain number of persons. The granting of permits should
belong to the discretion of local MG, since the individual decisions will
largely depend on local circumstances.
But the re-establishment of freedom of cultural activities is not com-
pleted with the restoration of the freedom to form organizations of all
kinds in this field. It is intimately connected with the establishment
of freedom of opinion in the realm of the press, radio broadcasting,
movies, theater and other artistic activities, and religious freedom of
the Churches. Since Nazism, in most of these fields, has abolished
freedom by the simple means of compulsory membership of all partici-
pants in such activities in Nazi institutions with a monopoly of organi-
zation, the restoration of freedom of opinion is closely connected with
the elimination of these institutions.1
There are, however, in this field, certain laws whose immediate aboli-
tion is imperative.
1. Press. Since 1933 publishing of any kind of printed material (books,
periodicals, newspapers, etc.) has been dependent on the author’s as
well as the publisher’s membership in the strictly controlled Culture
Chamber. With the abolition of the Culture Chamber and the trans-
formation of its affiliated organization, freedom of expressing one’s
opinion in writing will be reestablished in principle. The exercise of
the profession of newspaper editor (including editors of political perio-
dicals) has further been made dependent on admission to the Reich
Union of the German Press which could be refused at the discretion
of the Nazi leadership of this association. Although the Editor’s Act
(Schriftleitergesetz) of 4 October 1933 should be abolished, the publishing
of newspapers and political periodicals should too come under MG
supervision in order to prevent Nazi or pro-Nazi elements from gai-
ning or maintaining influence over public opinion. No editor-in-chief or
1 This problem is dealt with in the special Guide on Press, Radio and Control of
Public Opinion.
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deputy chief of a German newspaper between 1933 and the occupation

should be permitted any journalistic activity. Moreover, the publisher
and editor-in-chief of any newspaper or political periodical should be
required to have a license from MG authorities to be given only after
close scrutiny; he must be held responsible for the policy of his paper.
Any additional pre-censorship should be discarded, but MG, of course,
will have the right to confiscate and forbid publications if their content
endangers public safety and the right to punish or discipline the editor
or author.2
2. Church. In a long struggle the Nazi regime tried to establish close
control over Church affairs. For this purpose, a Reich Ministry for
Church Affairs was established. The Protestant Church was officially
centralized as a Reich Church with a Reich Bishop at its head. Contro-
versies among Protestant groups were to be decided by a specially crea-
ted office in the Church Ministry, thus excluding recourse to ordinary
courts. The Law concerning the Constitution of the German Protestant
Church of 14 July 1933, which sought to centralize the Protestant
Church under Nazi control and which even the Nazis were not able to
fully apply, should be abolished. As the Church Ministry, together with
its special office for the decision of church conflicts, should likewise be
abolished, authority within the Protestant Church will revert to the still
existing constituent parts, the Landeskirchen.
The relation between Catholic Church and the state in Germany is
based on a Concordat of 1933 between the Holy See and the Reich,
and can therefore not be abrogated or changed unilaterally. Relations
concerning the Catholic Church will therefore continue to be governed
by the Concordat.
Laws restricting the right of churches and religious groups to make
collections should be abolished. (For all details concerning the future
status of the Churches see special Guide on Churches.)
2 Concerning details of MG control in this field, see the Guides on [Satz

abgeschnitten].
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IV. Abolition of Legislation Possessing a Particularly Strong Nazi

Character
There are certain parts of Nazi legislation the immediate elimination of

which is not so much a security measure as a step to abrogate »the evil
configuration of Fascism« symbolized by such laws.
A. Abolition of Nazi Symbolism
It is recommended that laws, decrees, and other regulations dealing

with political symbols be immediately abrogated. Political symbols,
such as flags, colors, uniforms, songs, slogans, have always played a
considerable role in German political life and have been cleverly used
by the Nazis to influence the emotions of large masses of people and
to instill successfully an almost mystical sense of loyalty to such Nazi
symbols as the Swastika, the various colored shirts, etc. Therefore, it
is of importance that the use of these symbols, whether as signs of
state authority or as symbols of a creed and a party, be immediately
outlawed and suppressed by MG authorities. At the same time, MG
must make sure that no substitute symbols make their appearance.
Whether new symbols are merely »Ersatz« symbols of a continuing
Nazi movement will need to be inferred not so much from any outward
likeness or similarity with the original symbol but rather from the
intention of the users. On the other hand, legitimate groups and parties
should have the right to use or create symbols of their own choosing
without interference on the part of MG. The creation of a new official
flag and other official symbols should be left to the reconstituted Ger-
man authorities.
In this field, however, rules of all kinds are too abundant to be abro-
gated by exhaustive enumeration. Therefore, in addition to a list of
certain major enactments in the field, a general provision should be
issued forbidding the use of Nazi symbols and the application of any
law or other rule which refers to such symbolism. A general clause
such as the one suggested would with one stroke eliminate all flags and
uniforms, official songs and slogans, but also of festivals and holidays
introduced by Nazism, names given to cities, literary contests and art
prizes, and so on.
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B. Eugenic Legislation
It is recommended that there be abolished immediately the Nazi legis-

lation concerning sterilization as well as the legislative rule concerning
castration of certain criminals.
Nazi ideas in the field of »race biology« have produced the Law for
the Prevention of Hereditarily Diseased Offspring of 14 July 1933,
which provided for the sterilization of persons with more or less
well‐defined hereditary diseases. The law has been extensively applied
under Nazism and charges of grave abuses have been made against it.
The law, which thus is considered as a typical example of Nazi legisla-
tion, should therefore be immediately abrogated, without prejudice to
any future eugenic legislation which the German people may venture
to adopt.
Besides sterilization ordered by special »Eugenic Courts«, the Nazis
introduced castration as a special punishment for certain sexual crimes,
to be meted out by the criminal courts. This is a type of punishment
which is to be considered as »cruel and unusual« and should not be
allowed under the authority of MG.
C. Labor Legislation
It is recommended that the basic Act for the Regulation of National

Labor be immediately abrogated.
While the re-organization of labor law constitutes a matter not to be
dealt with in the period immediately following the occupation, but
rather in the next stage, details will be treated in the special Guide
on Labor. There is, however, in the realm of labor legislation, one
statute which, because of its »symbolic« character, should be abrogated
immediately: the Act for the Ordering of National Labor (Gesetz zur
Ordnung der nationalen Arbeit) of 20 January 1934. This law contains the
basic principles of Nazi regulation of labor, including such institutions
as »leadership« of the enterprise and »followers«, labor trustees, Coun-
cils of Trust, etc. Since it has been made symbolic of the Nazi spirit in
the realm of labor, its immediate elimination is advisable.
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V. De‐Nazification of the Judiciary
A. Reorganization of the Judiciary
It is recommended that German judges and public prosecutors be

superseded for a period of two months. It is further recommended
that immediately upon the start of the occupation, the investigation
of the record of the suspended personnel and the recruitment of new
members of the judiciary be initiated. No new appointment to a judicial
or prosecutor’s position should be made without public hearing, and
appointment should only be made on a provisional basis.
As has been pointed out in »Analysis of the Problem«, the removal of
all members of the German judiciary from office seems necessary both
in the interest of the security of the occupying forces and in the interest
of the elimination of Nazism. »Member of the German judiciary« may
be defined as every civil servant who is employed under the authority
of the Reich Ministry of Justice and fulfills the prerequisite of becom-
ing a judge (Befähigung zum Richteramt), i.e., not only actual judges
but also public prosecutors, substitute-judges (Assessor), and law candi-
dates (Referendare). New appointments, to be made by MG during the
two-month period of suspension of courts, should proceed on the basis
of petitions to be submitted by those desiring to be appointed or re-
employed. All those who fulfill the prerequisites of becoming a judge,
i.e., judges, prosecutors, and attorneys‐at‐law, should be entitled to sub-
mit petitions. This means that there would be two main groups from
which to select judicial personnel: first, those among the dismissed
persons found to be reliable, and second, trustworthy members of the
bar. Should these two groups prove insufficient, MG might consider
persons who appear specially qualified without having the required
professional qualifications. It should however be remembered that this
would be likely to meet with more resistance on the part of the legal
profession than any merely political step.
With the submission of a petition, the personal files of the petitioner as
well as any professional act (e.g., lawyers’ briefs, judges’ decisions) of
the petitioner will become part of the record to be scrutinized. Further-
more, no decision should be made by MG authorities without previous
public hearing to be held in the communities where the officials have
been recently employed. The public should be allowed to take part in
these proceedings. However, care should be taken to avoid personal
controversies.
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The suggested proceedings seem to be complicated and time-consum-

ing; it should be kept in mind that there are now about 13,000 judges
and prosecutors in »Greater Germany«. Considering that MG will have
to deal with pre-1938 Germany only, and that many proceedings will
belong to the jurisdiction of MG, not more than 9-10,000 positions will
need to be filled. Assuming that one MG official will be able to deal
with seven cases a day, twenty officials would be able to carry through
the reorganization within two and a half months.
In case of re-employment of a suspended official, MG should be free
to employ him in whatever position deemed suitable without regard to
his former rank and position. Considering the importance and respon-
sibility of the job, moreover, appointments should be revocable in case
he proves unreliable.
B. Suspension of Court Activities
It is suggested that all German courts be closed for a short period. For
the same period, legal transactions which according to German law
require authentication by a notary public or a similar public formality,
should be forbidden, and any transaction made in violation of this rule
should be considered null and void. Also, for this period, the effect of
the Statute of Limitations should be suspended.
Closing of the courts is necessary in order to give MG a chance to
reorganize the judiciary and because of the necessity speedily to revise
certain parts of German legislation. It would, for example, be awkward
to have pending divorce cases decided on the basis of Nazi marriage
law under the authority of MG. If courts are closed, all criminal and
civil proceedings must be suspended. While pending or new criminal
investigations can either be taken over by MG or be postponed, civil
law cases will be suspended entirely. This means that during this
period not only no new suits will be accepted and no pending ones will
be carried through, but also that the legal transactions mentioned above
are prohibited in order to prevent Nazis from making transactions
intended to secure immovable or movable properties against possible
attachment. Thus during this period, no new entries can be effected in
the land register (Grundbuch) kept by the local courts, no inheritance
certificates (Erbscheine) can be issued, no entries can be made in the
trade register (Handelsregister), etc.
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In order to protect the legal rights and claims of persons who are
affected by the closing of the courts, it should be proclaimed that
according to articles 69 of the German Penal Law Code as well as 203 of
the Civil Law Code the effect of the Statute of Limitations is suspended
for the period during which the courts are suspended.
C. Release of Prisoners
All inmates of concentration camps or similar detention camps, who

are not detained by virtue of a judicial sentence, should be released
immediately.
Inmates of prisons should be released if their crime is either a political
crime or has been committed for political reasons.
Reduction of excessive sentences for other crimes and, quite gener-
ally, the review of other sentences should constitute part of a general
amnesty for all but serious crimes to be proclaimed as soon as possible.
1. The liberation of political inmates of concentration camps should be
one of the urgent immediate concerns of MG authorities. Concentration
camps are the epitome of all that is shameful in Nazism, and the camps
should be immediately investigated and closed. However, it must be
kept in mind that besides political opponents, Jews, etc., the regime has
also used the concentration camps to detain certain categories of crim-
inals deemed particularly reprehensible, such as »dangerous habitual
criminals« and black-market operators. Insofar as such persons found
there are detained without trial or have already served their sentences
in prison and are merely being detained in concentration camp in addi-
tion, they should be released as in the case of political prisoners, since
there would be no legal basis for detaining them further in prisons.
As the facilities of existing concentration camps will be needed for the
detention of the large numbers of active Nazis and similar categories
of persons to be detained by MG for reasons of security, a speedy
dissolution of the Nazi camps seems imperative.
2. One of the most urgent measures, which large parts of the German
public will expect the new authorities working under MG supervision
to resort to immediately, is the liberation of those political prisoners
who have been convicted by Nazi courts. For this purpose a line
must be drawn between those convicted for political crimes and »ordi-
nary crimes«: those which are intrinsically political, such as treason,
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desertion, mutiny, etc., and, second, those which, although ordinarily

non-political, may assume political character by being motivated politi-
cally, as, e.g., murder committed for political reasons, or arson, perjury,
libel, under the same circumstances. The task of MG is, however, com-
plicated by the fact that many offenses which under ordinary circum-
stances would appear as non-political, have assumed political color
under the conditions of Nazism. There is, for example, a combination
of both individual motives and desires to revolt or protest against the
regime in such »crimes« as »breach of labor contract«, »absenteeism«,
and similar acts. In doubtful cases, it should be the policy of the new
German authorities working under MG supervision to decide in favor
of the respective prisoner in all such cases. Relief for a large percent-
age of all convicts will be brought by the proclamation of a general
amnesty, which will remit or considerably scale down sentences. The
working out of such a measure, however, will require one or two
months, and the release of political prisoners should not be retarded
by waiting for this amnesty.3
Appendix: List of Nazi Laws Requiring Abrogation
Citizenship:
Page4
1. Gesetz über den Widerruf von Einbürgerungen und
die Aberkennung der deutschen Staatsangehörigkeit,
7-14-1933 (Statute on Revocation of Citizenship and Expa-
triation) 480
Version of 7-10-1935 1015
2. Verordnung zur Durchführung des Gesetzes über den
Widerruf von Einbürgerungen und die Aberkennung der
deutschen Staatsangehörigkeit, 7-26-1933 {Dec. f. Ex.
(Decree for Execution) of Statute on Revocation of Citizen-
ship and Expatriation} 538
3 This constitutes only a summary of the detailed discussion of the amnesty prob-
lem in the guide on criminal law.
4 Page numbers refer to Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I. If not specifically indicated, the
volume number corresponds with the year in which the law was issued.
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3. Reichsbürgergesetz, 9-12-1935 (Statute on Reich Citizen-

ship) 1146
4. Erste Verordnung zum Reichsbürgergesetz, 11-14-1935
(First Decree on the Statute on Reich Citizenship) 1333
5. Zweite Verordnung zum Reichsbürgergesetz, 12-21-1935
(Second Decree on the Statute on Reich Citizenship) 1524
Special provisions required to supplement the abrogation of Nos. 3, 4

and 5:
a. Expatriated persons who are in German territory when these decrees
are abrogated shall re-acquire German citizenship as of the date of this
abrogation
b. Expatriated persons who are outside German territory at this time
may apply for re-naturalization.
c. In general, the acquisition and the loss of German citizenship shall be
regulated by the Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetz of 7-22-1913 (RGBl. 1913,
I, p. 583). However, paragraph 1 of the Verordnung über die deutsche
Staatsangehörigkeit of 2-5-1934 (RGBl. 1934, I, p. 85) remains in force:
there shall be no »Landes-Staatsangehörigkeit«.
Discrimination
a. Against »Non-Aryans«:
Page
1. Gesetz über die Zulassung zur Anwaltschaft, 4-7-1933
(Statute on Admission to the Bar) paragraphs 1 and 2 188
2. Verordnung über die Zulassung von Ärzten zur Tätigkeit
bei den Krankenkassen, 4-22-1933 (Decree on the Admis-
sion of Physicians to Public Social Insurance Institutions)
paragraph 22 222
3. Gesetz gegen die Überfüllung deutscher Schulen und
Hochschulen, 4-25-1933 (Statute for the Elimination of
Overcrowding in German Schools and Universities) para-
graph 4 225
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4. Gesetz über die Zulassung von Steuerberatern, 5-6-1933

(Statute on the Admission of Tax Consultants) Article I 257
5. Gesetz zum Schutz des deutschen Blutes und der deut-
schen Ehre, 9-15-1935 (Statute for the Protection of Ger-
man Blood and Honor) 1146
6. Reichsärzteordnung, 12-13-1935 (Federal Physicians’ Sta-
tute) paragraph 3 (2) No. 5 1433
7. Reichstierärzteordnung, 4-6-1935 (Federal Veterinarians’
Statute) paragraph 3 (2) No. 5 347
8. Deutsches Beamtengesetz, 1-26-1937 (German Civil Ser-
vice Act) paragraph 25 2539
9. Bestallungsordnung für Apotheker, 10-8-1937 (Law on
the Licensing of Pharmacists) section I, paragraph 2 1116
10. Gesetz über die Rechtsverhältnisse der jüdischen Kultus-
vereinigungen, 3-28-1938 (Statute on the Legal Status of
Jewish Religious Communities) 338
11. Verordnung gegen die Unterstützung der Tarnung jüdis-
cher Gewerbebetriebe, 4-22-1938 (Decree against Further-
ing the Concealment of the Jewish Character of Commer-
cial Enterprises) 404
12. Gesetz zur Vereinheitlichung des Rechts der Eheschlie-
ßung und der Ehescheidung im Lande Österreich und im
übrigen Reichsgebiet, 7-6-1938 (Law on the Unification
of Marriage and Divorce Proceedings in Austria and all
other parts of Germany) paragraph 4 807
Special provision required to supplement the abrogation of No. 12:

Divorce and annulment suits pending at the time of this abrogation
shall be suspended for a period of three months.
Page
13. Gesetz über die Zulassung zur Patentanwaltschaft,
9-4-1938 (Law on the Admission of Patent Lawyers) Arti-
cle III, section I paragraph 3 1150
14. Verordnung zur Ausschaltung der Juden aus dem deut-
schen Wirtschaftsleben, 11-12-1938 (Decree on the Elimi-
nation of Jews from German Economic Life) 1580
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15. Verordnung über den Einsatz des jüdischen Vermögens,

12-3-1938 (Decree on the Utilization of Jewish Assets) 1709
16. Gesetz über Mietsverhältnisse mit Juden, 4-30-1939 (Law
on Leases with Jews) 864
17. Polizeiverordnung zur Kennzeichnung der Juden,
9-1-1941 (Police Decree on Badges for Jews) 547
18. Verordnung über die Beschäftigung von Juden, 10-3-1941
(Decree on Employment of Jews) 675
b. Against Foreigners and Foreign Workers:
Page
1. Verordnung über die Behandlung von Ausländern,
9-5-1939 (Decree on the Treatment of Foreigners) 1667
2. Reichstarifordnung für polnische landwirtschaftliche
Arbeitskräfte, 1-8-1940 (Federal Regulation on Wage and
Labor Conditions of Polish Workers) (quoted in Birkenholz
and Siebert, Der ausländische Arbeiter in Deutschland, p.
813)
3. Verordnung über die Behandlung von Vermögen der
Angehörigen des ehemaligen polnischen Staates, 9-17-1940
(Decree on the Disposition of the Assets of Citizens of the
Former Polish State) 1270
4. Anordnung des Reichsarbeitsministers über die Behand-
lung polnischer Beschäftigter, 10-5-1941 (Order of the Reich
Labor Minister on the Treatment of Polish Employees)
(quoted in Birkenholz and Siebert, Der ausländische Arbei-
ter in Deutschland, p. 705)
5. Verordnung über die Besteuerung und die arbeitsrechtliche
Behandlung der Arbeitskräfte aus den neu besetzten Ostge-
bieten, 1-20-1942 (Decree on Taxation and Labor Conditions
of Laborers from the Newly Occupied Eastern Territories) 41
6. Erlass des Reichsministers der Finanzen betreffend Steuer
der Arbeitskräfte aus den neubesetzten Ostgebieten,
2-25-1942 (Order of the Reich Minister of Finance Con-
cerning Taxes or Laborers from the Newly Occupied Eas-
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tern Territories) (quoted in Birkenholz and Siebert, Der aus-

ländische Arbeiter in Deutschland, p. 968)
7. Anordnung über die Beschäftigung von Zigeunern,
3-13-1942 (Order on the Employment of Gypsies) 138
8. Verordnung über die Einsatzbedingungen der Ostarbeiter,
6-30-1942 (Decree on the Conditions of Employment of
Eastern Workers) 419
Special provision required to supplement the abrogation of Numbers a.

1 to 18 and b.1 to 9:
No authority or other organization chartered or licensed by public
authorities shall issue or apply any law, decree, police ordinance, regu-
lation or by-law which discriminates against an individual or group of
individuals for reasons of race, religion or nationality.
Preferences for Members and Veterans of Party, Police, and Armed forces:
Page
1. Gesetz über die Schutzpolizei der Länder, 7-17-1922 (Statute
on the Protective Police of the States) paragraph 2 597
2. Wehrmachtsversorgungsgesetz, 8-4-1921 (Law on Preferen-
tial Treatment and Pensions Granted to Former Army
Members) paragraph 30 Version of 9-19-1925 349
3. Gesetz über die Versorgung der Kämpfer für die nationale
Erhebung, 2-27-1934 (Law on Preferential Treatment and
Pensions for the Fighters for the National Revolution) 133
4. Wehrgesetz, 5-21-1935 (Law on the Organization of the
Army) paragraph 32 609
5. Verordnung über Fürsorge für Soldaten und Arbeitsmän-
ner, 9-30-1936 (Decree on the Care of Soldiers and Workers) 865
6. Runderlass des Reichs- und Preußischen Ministers des
Innern, 4-2-1937 (Circular of the Prussian Ministry of Inte-
rior) (published in Reichsministerialblatt der Inneren Ver-
waltung, vol. 1937, p. 515)
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7. Wehrmachtsfürsorge und Versorgungsgesetz, 8-26-1938

(Law on the Care and Pensioning of Former Army Mem-
bers) paragraphs 37 to 45, and 201 1077
Version of 8-20-1940 1162
8. Gesetz über die Versorgung der Militärpersonen und
ihrer Hinterbliebenen bei Dienstbeschädigung (Reichsver-
sorgungsgesetz), 5-12-1920 (Law on the Pensioning of Mili-
tary Personnel and Their Survivors in the Event of Injuries
Suffered in the Line of Duty) paragraph 33 989
Version of 4-1-1939 663
Special provisions required to supplement the abrogation of Nos. 1

to 8: All employment directives issued in connection with the listed
regulations are to be abrogated also.
»Versorgungsanwärter« shall have no preference with regard to
appointments in public administration.
Criminal Law and Criminal Procedure:
Page
1. Verordnung der Reichsregierung über die Bildung der Son-
dergerichte, 3-21-1933 (Decree of the Reich Government on
the Organization of Special Courts) 136
2. Strafgesetzbuch, 5-15-1871 (Penal Code) paragraphs 2, 80 to
93 A 127
Version of 4-24-1934 341
3. Verordnung der Reichsregierung über die Bildungvon Son-
dergerichten, 3-21-1933 (Decree of the Reich Government
on the organization of Special Courts) 136
4. Gesetz über den Volksgerichtshof, 4-18-1936 Statute on the
People’s Court 369
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Restrictions of Individual Freedom in the Fields of
a. Political and Labor Activities:
Page
1. Verordnung des Reichspräsidenten zum Schutze von Volk
und Staat, 2-28-1933 (Decree of the Reich-President for the
Protection of People and State) 83
2. Gesetz gegen die Neubildung von Parteien, 7-14-1933 (Law
Against the Revival of Old and the Organization of New
Parties) 479
3. Gesetz über die Einziehung volks- und staatsfeindlicher
Vermögen, 7-14-1933 (Law on the Confiscation of Assets
and Property of Persons Hostile to the People and State) 479
4. Gesetz zur Sicherung der Einheit von Partei und Staat,
12-1-1933 (Law on Securing the Unity of Party and State) 1016
5. Verordnung des Preußischen Ministerpräsidenten in »Deut-
sche Justiz«, 3-11-1934 (Decree of the Prussian Minister Pre-
sident 341
6. Reichsarbeitsdienstgesetz, 6-26-1935 (Reich Labor Service
Law) 769
7. Gesetz über die Hitlerjugend, 12-1-1936 (Law on Hitler
Youth) 993
b. Cultural Activities:
Page
1. Reichskulturkammergesetz, 9-22-1933 (Law on the Reich
Culture Chamber) 661
2. Gesetz über die Einrichtung einer vorläufigen Filmkammer,
7-14-1933 (Law on the Organization of a Provisional Film
Chamber) 483
3. Schriftleitergesetz, 10-4-1933 (Act on Editors) 713
4. Lichtspielgesetz, 2-16-1934 (Act on Moving Pictures) 95
5. Theatergesetz, 5-15-1934 (Act on Theaters) 411
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c. Church Activities:
Page
1. Gesetz über die Verfassung der Deutschen Evangelischen
Kirche, 7-14-1933 (Law on the Constitution of the German
Protestant Church) 471
2. Gesetz zur Regelung der Öffentlichen Sammlungen und
sammlungsähnlichen Veranstaltungen, 11-5-1934 (Law
Regulating Public Collections) paragraph 5 to be abrogated
with regard to churches. Churches shall be unrestricted in
their collection activities 1086
3. Gesetz zur Sicherung der Deutschen Evangelischen Kirche,
9-24-1935 (Law Guaranteeing the Existence of the German
Protestant Church) 1178
Nazi Ideology:
a. Symbols:
Page
1. Erlass über das Setzen der Hakenkreuzflagge auf Kauffahr‐
teischiffen, 4-29-1933 (Edict on Hoisting the Swastika on
Merchant Vessels) 244
2. Gesetz zum Schutz der nationalen Symbole, 5-19-1933 (Law
for the Protection of the National Symbol) 285
3. Gesetz gegen heimtückische Angriffe auf Staat und Partei
und zum Schutze der Parteiuniformen, 12-20-1934 (Law
Against Malicious Attacks against State and Party and for
the Protection of the Nazi Uniform) 1269
4. Reichsflaggengesetz, 9-15-1935 (Reich Flag Law) 1145
5. Verordnung über die Hoheitszeichen des Reiches, 11-5-1935
(Decree on Official Reich Symbols) 1287
6. Erlass über die Reichssiegel, 3-7-1936 (Edict on the Reich
Seal) 147
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Special provision required to supplement the abrogation of Nos. a 1

to 6: The display of the Swastika flag or the wearing of Swastika or
NSDAP party symbols is forbidden.
b. Eugenics:
Page
1. Gesetz zur Verhütung erbkranken Nachwuchses, 7-14-1933
(Law on the Prevention of Hereditarily Diseased Offspring) 529
2. Strafgesetzbuch, (Penal Code) paragraphs 42 a. no. 5 and 42
k
Version of Gesetz gegen gefährliche Gewohnheitsverbre-
cher, 11-24-1933 (Law against Dangerous Habitual Crimi-
nals) 995
3. Gesetz zum Schutz der Erbgesundheit des deutschen
Volkes, 10-18-1935 (Law for the Protection of the Hereditary
Good Health of the German People) paragraph 1d 1246
c . Labor:
Page
1. Gesetz zur Ordnung der Arbeit in öffentlichen Verwaltun-
gen und Betrieben, 3-23-1934 (Law on the Organization of
Labor in Public Administration and Enterprises) 220
2. Gesetz zur Ordnung der nationalen Arbeit, 1-20-1934 (Law
for the Regulation of National Labor) 34
Version of 11-30-1934 1193
Note:
A number of the laws listed require abrogation for a variety of reasons.

The Schriftleitergesetz, for instance, contains regulations discriminating
against non-Aryans. At the same time, it represents a restriction of
individual freedom in the field of cultural activities.
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183
[2.]
Administration of German Criminal Justice under
Military Government*
[1944]
Summary 185
I. Analysis of the Problem 185

A. Introduction 185
B. Nazi Changes in Criminal Law 186
C. Substantive Law 187
1. General Criminal Legislation under the Nazi Regime. 188
a. Political Crimes. 188
b. Basic Changes in the Criminal Code. 188
D. Procedural Law 192
1. Preventive Detention. 192
2. Right to Representation. 192
3. Right to Bring a Case to Trial. 193
4. Right to Introduce Evidence. 194
5. Right to Appeal and to Ask New Trial. 194
6. Basis of Decision. 195
E. Problems of Jurisdiction 195
F. Problems of Administration 196
1. Prosecutors. 196
2. Courts. 197
II. Recommendations 197

A. MG’s Approach to Criminal Law 197
B. Substantive Law 198
1. General Criminal Legislation under the Nazi Regime. 198
a. Political Crimes. 198
b. Basic Changes in the Criminal Code. 200
* [Als R and A No. 1655.8 und Teil des Civil Affairs Guides-Programm produziert
und fertiggestellt am 30. Juni 1944. Hier abgedruckt ist ein Entwurf, der noch
nicht vom ›Editorial Committee‹ der Civil Affairs Studies autorisiert wurde.– Zu
diesem Text vergleiche in der Einleitung S. 56-59.]
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184 [2.] Administration of German Criminal Justice [1944]
C. Procedural Law 203

1. Preventive Detention. 203
2. Right to Representation. 204
3. Right to Introduce Evidence. 204
4. Right to Appeal and to Ask a New Trial. 205
5. Basis of Decision. 205
D. Problems of Jurisdiction 205
1. Distribution of Functions. 207
2. Division of Jurisdiction between MG Courts and the German
Courts. 208
3. Jurisdictional Conflicts between MG Courts and the German Cri-
minal Courts. 209
E. Amnesty Problems 210
1. Need for Action by MG. 210
2. Short-Term Occupation. 211
a. Persons in Concentration Camps. 211
b. Definition of Political Crimes. 212
c. Definition of Military Crimes. 213
d. Treatment of Short-Term Sentences. 214
e. Action by MG. 214
3. Long-Term Occupation. 215
a. First Phase of Occupation. 215
b. Subsequent Action by MG 215
F. Prosecution of Nazi Offenders against German Citizens 217
G. Problems of Administration 218
1. Supervision of German Courts. 218
2. Executive Revision of Sentences. 218
Appendix 219
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[2.] Administration of German Criminal Justice [1944] 185
Summary
1. While fundamental reforms of criminal law should be left to Ger-

man authorities, the re-establishment of public order in Germany
requires a number of immediate changes.
2. Provisions of German criminal law which become inapplicable
because of the replacement of German authority by that of MG
should be suspended. Statutes of typical Nazi character should be
abrogated.
3. The application of the death penalty should be restricted to those
crimes punished by death before 1 February 1933. Courts should be
given a general right to mitigate sentences.
4. Special courts should be abolished, and the criminal jurisdiction
should revert in principle to the pre-Nazi system.
5. Legal guarantees in criminal procedure should be re-established,
as far as possible, but the scarcity of personnel and the need for
speed and efficiency may delay a complete return to the pre-Hitler
procedural rules.
6. Persons detained in concentration camps should be released at once.
Immediate amnesty should be granted to political and military pris-
oners sentenced by courts.
7. Provisions should be made to facilitate the criminal prosecution of
Nazi offenders against German citizens.
8. Supervision of criminal prosecution should rest with the MG dele-
gate at the district or appeal court; he should operate through the
district attorneys at the various district courts.
A. Introduction
German criminal law, as it stands today, conflicts in many respects not

only with the theories and practices for which German criminal law
had previously stood but also with the theories which, in Anglo-Ameri-
can countries, are traditionally connected with the functions of criminal
law. This conflict alone does not suffice to impose upon MG a duty
to revise or revoke criminal legislation. Every country has the right
to formulate its own policy on the balance between the rights of the
individual and those of the community at large. This freedom of action
has been recognized in international law in the rule that an occupant
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should retain local laws, customs, and institutions of government in so

far as they are consonant with the purposes of military government
(Article 43 of »The Hague Convention on the Rules of Land Warfare«,
FM 27-10, Par 282, see also FM 27-10, Par. 285). The United States has
accepted this rule, as is shown in the existing directive to retain such
laws (FM. 27-5, Par. 9 h). The thorough overhauling which the whole
system of German criminal law is thought to require is, therefore, a
problem whose solution may be left to the German people, and is not a
matter of concern for MG until it is explicitly directed to take such
action.
Recognition of, and respect for, such freedom of action in the German
people does not, however, imply that MG has no liberty to act in
criminal matters. In contrast to these provisions, which would seem
to indicate a duty to retain the existing system, MG has been charged,
both under international law (Article 43 of »The Hague«, supra) and
under policy directives already in existence (FM 27-5, Par. 12 b), with
the maintenance of law and order in the areas subject to its jurisdiction.
In addition, MG has been directed, as far as the situation permits, to
annul laws which are discriminatory on the basis of race, color, creed
or political opinion and, at all events, to respect such discriminatory
practices only if they do not »outrage civilized concepts« (FM 27-5, Par.
12 n). The problem for MG will, therefore, resolve itself into two issues:
first, how far, in view of the military situation, MG may find it possible
to retain any or all of the existing system of criminal law, second,
what additions, if any, must be made to satisfy the requirements of mil-
itary occupation and to fulfill the purposes and policies of the United
Nations.
This Guide will, consequently, concern itself only with those changes
in the German criminal system which are necessary not only for the
security of the occupying army and the orderly development of Ger-
man political and social life, but also for the execution of the policies
and purposes of the United Nations. It will not consider in detail the
abolition of or the purge of Nazi courts or of racial legislation, problems
which are considered in other Guides.
B. Nazi Changes in Criminal Law
Prior to 1933 German criminal legislation and practice was one of

the highly respected systems of criminal law. While there had been
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no systematic codification since the 1870’s, progressive legislation had

maintained and developed the standards set in the early codes. These
codes sought to establish legal security and protection against arbitrary
procedures both for the offender and for the community. This tradi-
tion was continued under the Weimar Republic. Criminal law and
procedure were to some extent influenced by progressive reforms.
The political pressures, which finally brought about the breakdown
of the parliamentary machine prevented the introduction of a new
and consolidated code of criminal law and restricted the legislative
contribution of the last two years of the Republic to emergency decrees
formulating new provisions in the simplification of criminal procedure
and new devices in the fight against political extremism.1
The Third Reich departed abruptly from the philosophies and practices
which had hitherto governed the development of German criminal law.
It saw in criminal law a major opportunity to create weapons for throt-
tling resistance to its policies. It fused the political enemy with the ordi-
nary criminal. The Nazis took the position that the transgressor was
an arch enemy of society ‒ an enemy to be ruthlessly destroyed. They
were at great pains to make abundantly clear the abyss separating their
policy, which was aimed at the extermination of the criminal element,
from that of the Weimar Republic, which was characterized as »weak
and inefficient« humanitarianism. To this purpose the whole body of
regulations on substantive law, criminal procedure, and execution of
punishment was thoroughly purged and amended.
C. Substantive Law
In pursuance of these goals, the Nazi regime effected many alterations,

both theoretical and practical, in the framework of substantive criminal
law. In the field of criminal theory, the National Socialist contribution
glossed over the objective elements in the definition of a criminal act
and sought to wipe out all distinction between criminal attempt and
the consummated act.2 However, the importance of these shifts in tradi-
tional theory vanish before the flood of legislative changes.
1 The details of this historical development are traced in Civil Affairs Handbook
Germany, Section 3, »Legal Affairs«, pp. 43 ff. [auch abgedruckt in diesem Band,
S. 245-339].
2 For full discussion of these changes in theory, see Civil Affairs Handbook Ger-
many Section 3, »Legal Affairs«, pp. 43-49[auch abgedruckt in diesem Band,
S. 245-339].
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1. General Criminal Legislation under the Nazi Regime.
In order to achieve its political objectives and to maintain an impreg-

nable position for its administration, the Third Reich gradually brought
the substantive side or criminal law into harmony with its philoso-
phies. This operation at times required recasting of the definition of
crimes and allied matters. In a number of cases minor changes in spe-
cific fields were deemed sufficient.
a. Political Crimes.
Since 1932, a never ending stream of legislation concerning crimes

against public order introduced new crimes, redefined and widened
the scope of old ones, or increased the punishment for such crimes.3
Concerned in the first instance with the fortification of its place within
the German political system, the Nazi regime early introduced statutes
which banned the formation of new parties,4 suppressed and penalized
the activity of the existing opposition, and imposed heavy punishments
for attacks upon the Party5 and for political terrorism.6
The legislation concerning treason was changed several times by
enlarging its scope and by increasing the penalties.7
b. Basic Changes in the Criminal Code.
These changes in the direction of the German criminal code did not
suffice to produce the results which the Nazi regime required. It
3 See for example, the decree of 4. February 1933, RGBl., I, 35 and 28 February
1933, RGBl., I, 83 on the protection of the German people and country, the statute
of 19 May 1933, RGBl., I, 285, on the protection of the national symbols, and that
of 13 October 1933 on the guarantee of internal peace, RGBl., I, 723.
4 Statute of 14 July 1933, RGBl., I, 398.
5 See, for example, the statute of 20 December 1934, RGBl., I, 1269, on surreptitious
attacks on the state and the Party and the protection of the Party uniform, and
that of 7 April 1937 on the protection of NSDAP labels, RGBl., I, 442.
6 See, for example, the statute of 4 April 1933, RGBl., I, 163.
7 The provisions on treason as contained in the Criminal Code had been revised
by the statute of 24 April 1934, RGBl., I, 341, that of 2 July 1936, RGBl., I, 532 and
that of 16 September 1939, RGBl., I, 1941, and the statute of 22 November 1942
supplementing the provisions on treason, RGBl., I, 669.
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became necessary to cut deeply through the existing code provisions

and to redraft their details.
i. Article 2.
Article 2 of the Criminal Code had originally forbidden the analogous

application of penal rules. It formulated a rule designed to serve the
same purpose as that served in Anglo-American law by the axiom »No
punishment without a law«. As changed in 1935 by the Nazis, this
article now permits punishment, even though there is no statutory vio-
lation squarely in point, by permitting the invocation of an existing law,
provided that the fundamental purpose of the invoked statute could be
applied by analogy to the case in hand, and further, that the »sound
feelings of the people« required it. The latter ground, pregnant with
possibilities for subjective reasoning, appeared increasingly as a basis
of decision.
ii. Pre-War Changes in the Criminal Code.
In addition to the expanded definition of treason, already mentioned,

other changes in the criminal code were found necessary in order to
synchronize it with the requirements of Nazi policy.
No less vital than the need for protection afforded by a changed defini‐
tion of political crime was the adjustment found necessary in such cases
as the provisions on habitual offenders,8 duels, breach of trust,9 corrupt
practices of civil servants,10 and offenses against the security of commu-
nications.11 It was also found expedient to frame special provisions on
highway robbery with the use of auto traps.12
In many instances the change involved an increase in penalties for
existing crimes13 or the application of a penalty on a retroactive basis.14
8 Statute of 24 November 1933, RGBl., I, 995.

9 Statute of 26 May 1933, RGBl., I, 295.
10 Statute of 2 July 1936, RGBl., I, 532.
11 Statute of 28 June 1935, RGBl., I, 839.
13 See, for example, statute of 26 May 1933, RGBl., I, 295.
14 See, for example, statute of 22 June 1938, supra n. 2.
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The latter amounts directly to a violation of the well-known legal

axiom »No punishment without a law«.
iii. Changes in the Criminal Code Necessitated by the War.
The preparation for war and the outbreak of war itself served as the
motive for additional changes in German criminal law. The decree
against the enemies of the people15 and the decree against perpetration
of crimes of violence,16 with their broad definitions and their wide
range of death penalties, became the cornerstone of criminal jurispru-
dence in wartime.
Specific legislative provisions were found necessary to regulate espi-
onage, guerrilla warfare, and similar issues.17 It was also felt neces-
sary promptly to impose penalties for damages to munitions, interfer-
ence with important enterprises, participation in anti-military organiza-
tions,18 and relations with war prisoners.19 As the war progressed, it
was considered expedient to issue regulations protecting the collection
of winter clothing for the soldiers at the front,20 imposing penalties for
theft of food from fields,21 and for the protection of marriage, family,
and maternity.22
iv. Penalties.
The introduction of new crimes and shifts in the definition of the essen-
tial elements of familiar crimes were not the only devices by which
the Nazis sought to make criminal law a weapon of their political
purposes. One of the chief alterations made by the Nazis in the German
criminal code has been the introduction of severe penalties, designed to
force conformity with the Nazi pattern.
As has been pointed out, the change often involved only an increase in
penalties for existing crimes.
15 Decree of 15 September 1939, RGBl., I, 1679.

16 Decree of 5 December 1939, RGBl., I, 2378.
17 Decrees of 17 August 1938 and 26 August 1939, RGBl., 1939, I, 1455.
18 Decree of 25 November 1939, RGBl., I, 2319.
19 Decree of 11 May 1940, RGBl., I, 769.
21 Statute of 20 September 1942, RGBl., I, 558.
22 Decree of 9 March 1943, RGBl., I, 140.
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Two further examples of this technique are the introduction of the

penalty of castration and the increased use of the death penalty.
Castration was introduced as penalty in 1933, when an all-embracing
program of measures of security against habitual criminals considered
dangerous was launched.23
Before 1933, the death penalty was restricted to a very few crimes,
such as murder in the first degree, white slavery, and the use of high
explosives with foreseeable results. The use of the death penalty had, in
fact, been hotly disputed during the Weimar Republic. With the rise of
Nazism and especially since the beginning of the war, there has been a
tendency to use the death penalty extensively.24 Since 1940 it has been
imposed in those cases in which hitherto the punishment had been long
or medium terms of imprisonment or hard labor.
v. Juvenile Cases.
The Third Reich codified its numerous provisions in the field of crimi-
nal law as to juvenile offenders in November 1943. Previously, the Nazi
regime had given special attention to the juvenile problem, following in
many instances the pattern which depression and then the war brought
to the rest of the world. It partly continued progressive features of
earlier legislation and partly returned to earlier repressive measures.25
The Nazis have varied the rule that a child under fourteen years of age
should not be held criminally responsible for his criminal acts by low-
ering the age limit to twelve years. The juvenile courts have jurisdiction
over children up to eighteen years of age, but it should be pointed out
that it lies within the discretion of the prosecutor to refuse the benefit
of trial before juvenile courts to youths between sixteen and eighteen
years of age, whom he considers »dangerous criminals«.
23 Statute of 24 November 1933, RGBl., I, 995.

24 The details of this tendency are set forth in Civil Affairs Handbook Germany,
Section 3, »Legal Affairs«, pp. 55-56, 60-62 [auch abgedruckt in diesem Band,
S. 245-339].
25 A summary of Nazi action as to juvenile problems is given in Civil Affairs
Handbook Germany, Section 3, »Legal Affairs«, p. 75 et seq. [auch abgedruckt in
diesem Band, S. 245-339].
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D. Procedural Law
As in the case of substantive criminal law, the Nazi regime has found it
possible to make criminal procedure the servant of its policies without
the introduction of an entire new code. In sharp contrast to the Anglo-
American policy of protecting personal freedom in criminal litigation,
the position of the defendant in Nazi criminal procedure has steadily
deteriorated. This has resulted not only from the changes wrought in
procedure itself but also from the new social and political climate. It is
apparent in many aspects of criminal procedure, but only a few such
problems need now be brought to MG’s attention.
1. Preventive Detention.
One of the chief instruments used in securing obedience to Nazi dic-

tates has been the abuse of preventive detention (Untersuchungshaft)
orders. This term covers only detention in jail pending trial. The pre-
Nazi code surrounded its use with provisions safeguarding the indi-
vidual. The so-called Lex Hoefle was enacted as a result of the fact
that a Reich Minister committed suicide while undergoing a prolonged
period of preventive detention. This statute required hearings on the
question of the desirability and necessity of maintaining a preventive
detention. It was annulled by a statute of 24 April 1934.26 Not content
with removing these safeguards, by one of the provisions of the statute
of 28 June 193527 the Nazis considerably expanded the reasons for
which preventive detention could be ordered. They directed that public
sentiment caused by the offense should be considered in weighing the
necessity of a preventive detention order. The removal of the require-
ments for hearings and the introduction of subjective considerations
in the need for detention opened the way for the issuance, and the
continuance in operation, of arbitrary preventive detention orders.
2. Right to Representation.
The right of the defendant, at this and other stages of criminal litiga-
tion, to representation by counsel has been recognized by German
26 RGBl., I, 341.
27 RGBl., I, 844.
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criminal procedure. In contrast to the Anglo-American stress upon the

right to have counsel, in the majority of cases in which appearance by a
defense lawyer is not made mandatory by criminal procedure the
defendant in a German criminal trial has customarily had no attorney
because of the cost of retaining counsel. With the change from liberal
constitutionalism to the concept of a racial community, the field of
action for defense counsel has been reduced both in fact and in law.
Under the Third Reich, practice before the People’s Court was allowed
only to those lawyers who, upon special tests, were found politically
reliable. In the practice before other courts, the supervision of all
lawyers by the Party, the NS Lawyers’ Organization, and the courts
was considered sufficient guarantee of the lawyers’ »correct behavior«.
Thus, for all practical purposes, the defense lawyer, when he exists, has
become an auxiliary of the state rather than the representative of the
defendant.
In addition to this shift in the conception of the function of the defense
counsel, statutes enacted since the outbreak of the war have reduced
the number of cases in which representation by counsel is mandatory.
3. Right to Bring a Case to Trial.
Exposed to the new drastic procedure of preventive detention and

practically divested of an efficient representative, the defendant is fur-
ther handicapped by his inability under German procedure to take
active steps in his own defense. The statute of 28 June 193528 and sub-
sequent emergency decrees, abolished, among other things, the prelim-
inary judicial investigation (Voruntersuchung), which had been manda-
tory in cases in which there was no appeal on the facts.29 The position
of the state’s attorney has been considerably strengthened since the
courts are now only in very exceptional cases in a position to reject the
state attorney’s request to bring a case to trial.
This shift in practice cannot be ascribed to hostility to the decisions
made by the courts, for they had exercised their right to reject the
prosecutor’s request for trial sparingly. It is to be explained probably
28 RGBl., I, 844.
29 A discussion of the nature and function of preliminary judicial investigation
will be found in Civil Affairs Handbook, Germany, Section 3, »Legal Affairs«,
pp. 71-72 [auch abgedruckt in diesem Band, S. 245-339].
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by the fact that the existence of this right delayed the clearing of the
docket, because its exercise was based upon the presumption that the
court was familiar with the whole record of the case, and not merely
with the indictment or information.
4. Right to Introduce Evidence.
The rules of evidence, familiar to Anglo-American lawyers, have no

counterpart in German criminal procedure, in which the judge directs
the trial and freely weighs the evidence offered.30 For MG’s purposes,
the most important innovation as to criminal evidence is the rule that
a court may refuse to hear evidence. Paragraph 24 of the decree of 1
September 193931 provided that a court may reject a motion to hear
evidence if it deems that evidence unnecessary. Added to the other
impediments placed in the way of presentation of the defendant’s case,
such as the statute requiring special permission before Nazi officials
could be called to give evidence,32 this rule makes a formidable contri-
bution to the silencing of the defense.
5. Right to Appeal and to Ask New Trial.
Under pre-Nazi procedure, all decisions of the local courts were subject
to two appeals, the first of which was heard in the district court and
could lead to complete retrial. This procedure was criticized as produc-
tive of delay, especially in its requirement of complete retrial. A decree
of 14 June 193233 had rectified this in part by sending more important
cases directly to the criminal division of the district court, which sat
with three professional judges and two lay judges. It allowed an appeal
but not complete retrial on appeal. Homicide cases and certain other
cases continued to go to the assize courts.
This improved procedure did not satisfy Nazi purposes. In order to
guarantee the unification of its repressive agencies, the Third Reich
gradually abolished criminal appeals by the defendant. The statute of
30 For description of this function of the judge, see Civil Affairs Handbook Ger-
many, Section 3, »Legal Affairs«, (M-356-3), pp. 72-75[auch abgedruckt in
diesem Band, S. 245-339].
31 RGBl., I, 1658.
32 Statute of 1 December 1936, RGBl., I, 994.
33 RGBl., I, 285.
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28 June 1935,34 among other things, discouraged appeals by the defen-

dant by abolishing the rule that the defendant could never make his
position worse through an appeal. Thereafter the defendant’s right to
appeal was progressively curtailed.35
Further, in designing the new courts which were to give special force
and vitality to its program, the Third Reich was careful to hold that
their decisions should not be subject to review.
The next step was the creation of an elaborate new procedure exclu-
sively reserved for the State’s requests for review of decisions. This
concept is foreign to Anglo-American legal thinking, which tends to
confine the right of appeal in criminal cases to the defendant and only
rarely gives the state an appeal and then only on questions of law. The
requests for such review are addressed to the special »senates« of the
Supreme Court, and later to those of the appeal courts, and amounted
to requests for new trial, the desired new sentence being clearly indi-
cated in the request.
6. Basis of Decision.
While there has been no change in the letter of the rule that decisions
as to guilt and punishment are by vote of a two-thirds majority of
the court, the spirit of the rule has been nullified by the »leadership
principle« in the courts. The »leadership principle« as applied to courts
refers to the ideology which requires the associate judges to accept the
guidance of the president of their panel.
E. Problems of Jurisdiction
Under the Third Reich the setup of the criminal courts has undergone
a profound change. Criminal courts for special categories of persons
have replaced the ordinary run of law courts.36 Even there, where
34 RGBl., I, 844.
35 The details of this procedure given in Civil Affairs Handbook Germany, Section
3, »Legal Affairs«, pp. 75-76 [auch abgedruckt in diesem Band, S. 245-339]. See
the statute of 16 September 1939, RGBl., I, 1841, and the decree of 21 February
1940, RGBl., I, 405.
36 Such courts are: military tribunals, SS and Police Courts, Labor Service Courts.
The People’s Court has jurisdiction in treason and other political cases.
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the old law courts still have jurisdiction, their criminal functions have
been largely shifted to specially picked divisions of the courts, which
in turn are called special courts. Lay judges, a familiar device in Ger-
man courts, were gradually eliminated and completely discarded in
1939. The reestablishment of special military jurisdictions necessitated
the reintroduction of rules for court-martial procedures.37 They were
streamlined for the exigencies of war in the wartime procedural rules
of 1938–1939.38 The substantive military penal code was thoroughly
revamped and a new version was published in 1940.39 With the deteri-
oration of the German political and military situation, the system of
penalties in the military penal code was revised, and very recently the
most severe penalties were laid down.40
While the changes in the criminal code referred primarily to the sup-
pression of crime within the Reich, successful military campaigns and
the desire to control the population of occupied areas made it necessary
to consider changes in the concept of territorial jurisdiction. It was held
expedient to include within the jurisdiction of courts inside the Reich
the punishment of offenses committed outside the Reich. To this end,
the decree of 6 May 1940 materially widened the jurisdiction enjoyed
by German courts over crimes committed in other countries.41
F. Problems of Administration
For purposes of administration, the German system of criminal justice

falls into two parts: first, the functions of the prosecutor in preparing
and initiating litigation, second, the functions of the court.
1. Prosecutors.42
In the pre-Nazi period the prosecutor or state’s attorney was in a key

position as he was in charge of the investigation of offenses and ini-
37 Statute of 29 September 1936, RGBl., I, 756.

38 Decree of 17 August 1938, RGBl., I, 1938, 1457.
39 Decree of 10 October 1940, RGBl., I, 1347.
40 DNB of 5 June 1944.
41 RGBl., I, 754.
42 The functions of this office are described in detail in Civil Affairs Handbook
Germany, Section 3, »Legal Affairs«, pp. 65-68 [auch abgedruckt in diesem
Band, S. 245-339].
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tiated criminal litigation. The Third Reich has changed this in many
respects and reduced criminal prosecutions to a basis of arbitrary and
selective action. Criminal investigation has become an independent
police function. Statutes have cut down the prosecutor’s discretion as
to the offenses to be tried, often transferring the decision to the Minis-
ter of Justice. Amnesties containing nolle prosequitur clauses granting
wide exemptions from prosecution, together with the impossibility of
prosecuting Nazi supporters, have prevented an independent policy of
prosecution. The centralization of criminal investigation in the police
has reduced the prosecutor to a kind of secondary transmitting agent,
acting only when the police for reasons of propaganda elect not to deal
summarily with cases.
2. Courts.
The Nazi regime has brought the courts into line with its policies
not only through purge of personnel but also through increasing the
administrative duties in which the court presidents act on the order of,
and as the representative of the Minister of Justice.43 The assignment
of the judges is now made by the court president alone, acting for
the Minister of Justice. Judges are also subject to reassignment during
the fiscal year for any reason and are bound to accept any type of
assignment within the jurisdiction of the Minister of Justice. The fact
that court presidents were increasingly transformed into top adminis-
trators, bound to execute the Ministry’s wishes, suggestions, and orders
through their »corps of judges«, has become especially evident during
the latter years of the Nazi regime.
II. Recommendations
A. MG’s Approach to Criminal Law
At first glance, it may seem sufficient to give the state’s attorney new
instructions as to what kind of criminal prosecutions to initiate, to
replace the death penalty as introduced by the Nazis by milder forms
43 Decree of 20 March 1935 on Unification of Judicial Organization, RGBl., I, 403;

Statute of 24 November 1937 on Organizational Measures for the Courts, RGBl.,
I, 1286; Decree on Measures in the Field of Jurisdiction and Judicial Organiza-
tion, 1 September 1939, RGBl., I, 1658.
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of punishment, and, generally, to recognize in the judge a wide discre-

tion in fixing penalties. Thus, a liberalization of punishment would be
achieved, while the task of reforming the law itself would be left to the
German people. Such a policy would not suffice, because Nazi legisla-
tion has changed the whole framework of criminal law and created
entirely new concepts. On the other hand, a complete abrogation of the
criminal legislation of the Third Reich cannot be considered, as such a
project of reform is no concern of MG’s. The issue resolves itself finally
into a problem of abrogation of those features wholly objectionable. A
system of limited abrogation is particularly in keeping with MG’s func-
tions as it will reduce the number of acts of the occupant which may
require validation by the new German state.
It is therefore recommended that, in the absence of explicit directives to
the contrary, MG approach the problem of criminal law on the assump-
tion that the revision of the criminal system is an issue for the German
people and that MG should make only such changes as are necessitated
by requirements of military security, MG’s obligation to maintain law
and order, and its duty to implement the policies and purposes of the
United Nations.
The effect of this recommendation, as well as of the more specific rec-
ommendations which follow, is to leave a residue of some rather loose
redefinitions of old crimes and definitions of new crimes introduced by
the Nazis, together with the bulk of the narrowly defined rules of the
code of 1871. The German courts worked with an antiquated system
before Hitler came to power and will presumably be able to go on with
a purged code and subsidiary statutes, until reforms can be completed
by those immediately concerned.
B. Substantive Law
1. General Criminal Legislation under the Nazi Regime.
a. Political Crimes.
One of the first problems confronting MG is the treatment to be given

the Nazi definitions of treason and public order.
The ties of allegiance between MG and the individual within the occu-
pied areas are not identical with those existing between the individual
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and the German government, and thus would not justify MG’s reten-
tion of the statutory provisions on treason even if their philosophies
were acceptable to MG. Their revision is essentially a problem for the
German people. However, this is not an impediment to MG’s regulation
of the performance of the duties of allegiance which the population of
the occupied areas owes it or to its penalizing of the breach thereof (FM
27-10, Pars. 205, 350).44
The duties imposed upon MG as to the maintenance of law and order
and the protection of the occupying forces under international law and
the terms of existing directives (see supra, pp. 1 ff.) likewise authorize
MG to pursue an equally independent line of action in questions of
public order.
It is therefore recommended that MG declare suspended the operation
of German legislation on treason, sedition, military secrecy, and similar
matters, and that it put in operation its own proclamations governing
these problems. It is further recommended that MG suspend the oper-
ation of German regulations on public order and political terrorism,
and place in effect its own proclamations on the subject. It is suggested
that MG restrict the jurisdiction of German criminal courts to the appli-
cation of those public order and security statutes and code provisions
which were on the statute book before the Papen regime took power (31
May 1932).
Paragraphs 80 to 104 of the Criminal Code, which deal with treason,
should be suspended. The following provisions on public order associ-
ated with special statutes or decrees should be specifically abrogated:
1. Presidential Decree of 4 February 1933 (Protection of German Peo-
ple) ‒ RGBl., I, 35.
2. Par. 4 of the Presidential Decree of 28 February 1933 (Protection of
People and Country) ‒ RGBl., I, 83.
3. Statute of 4 April 1933 (Defense Against Political Terrorism) ‒ RGBl.,
I, 163.
4. Statute of 19 May 1933 (Protection of National Symbols) ‒ RGBl., I,
285.
5. Statute of 14 June 1933 (Formation of New Parties) ‒ RGBl., I, 398.
6. Statute of 13 October 1933 (Guarantee of Internal Peace) ‒ RGBl., I,
723.
44 See Feilchenfeld, The International Economic Law of Belligerent Occupation

(Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1942), pp. 90-91; Oppenheim,
International Law (5th ed., Lauterpacht, 1935), II, 339, 458-59.
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7. Statute of 20 December 1934 (Surreptitious Attacks on State and

Party and Protection of Party Uniform) ‒ RGBl., I, 1269.
a. Statute of 7 April 1937 (Protection of NSDAP Labels) ‒ RGBl., I,
442.
There may be other laws or decrees enacted or promulgated prior to
30 January 1933, that encroach upon civil and political liberties and
therefore require invalidation. This may be accomplished either by
suspension of such laws or by military proclamation stating contrary
regulation. To this category belong the following decrees:
1. Presidential Decree of 3 May 1932 (Dissolution of Communist Athe-
ist Organizations).45
2. Presidential Decree of 9 August 1932 (Political Terrorism).46
3. Presidential Decree of 19 December 1932 (Maintenance of Internal
Peace).47
b. Basic Changes in the Criminal Code.
The revisions which MG will need to make in other fields of criminal

law are not as simply ascertained. In some instances, MG may desire to
retain a portion of the Nazi legislation.
i. Article 2.
From the point of view of psychological effect and political reaction, no

more vital decision will be made by MG in the field of German criminal
law than its decision as to Article 2 of the Criminal Code (See supra,
p. 7). Even in the early period of the Nazi regime, this Nazi revision
served as a continuing reminder of the fact that the non-existence of
legislation squarely covering the offense in question was no ground for
acquittal. Legislation of this type has already been condemned by an
international tribunal.48 It is therefore recommended that MG abrogate
45 RGBl., I, 185.
46 RGBl., I, 403.
47 RGBl., I, 548.
48 See condemnation of a similar provision, enacted for the Free City of Danzig,
by the Permanent Court of International Justice, Publications of the Permanent
Court of International Justice, Series A/B No. 65.
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the Nazi version of Article 2 and restore the version under which the
German criminal system had previously operated.
ii. Pre-war Changes in the Criminal Code.
MG may find it advisable to eliminate those changes in the Penal Code

and special statutes introduced by the Nazis to facilitate the execution
of their oppressive policies and the preparation for war. It is therefore
recommended that MG abrogate the following statutes:
Statute of 26 May 1933 (Changes in the code) ‒ RGBl., I, 295;
Statute of 28 June 1935 ("""") ‒ RGBl., I, 839;
Statute of 2 July 1936 ("""") ‒ RGBl., I, 532;
Statute of 22 June 1938 (highway robbery with auto traps) ‒ RGBl., I,
651.
The abrogation should be absolute except for the following substantive
provisions49 which MG may desire to retain:
1. The provisions as to abortions (Arts. 219-20), maltreatment of minors
and incompetents (Art. 223 b), violation of fiduciary (Untreue) relations
(Art. 266), and prostitution (Art. 361, No. 6) of the statute of 26 May
1933.
2. Misuse of automatic fare collection devices (Art. 265a), forest fires
(Art. 310a), and the failure to give assistance in an emergency (Art. 330
c) of the statute of 28 June 1935.
iii. Changes in the Criminal Code Necessitated by the War.
Those changes made in the criminal system for war purposes (see
supra, p. 7 ff.) are not in harmony with the military requirements of the
occupant and should therefore be abrogated.
49 Any procedural provisions which it is suggested should be retained are dis-

cussed infra, p. 25.
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It is therefore recommended that MG abrogate the following statutes

and decrees:
Decree of 17 August 1938 and 26 August 1939 ‒ RGBl., I, 1455;
Decree of 9 September 1939 (extraordinary measures in the field of
broadcasting) ‒ RGBl., I, 1683;
Decree of 15 September 1939 (enemies of the people) ‒ RGBl., I, 1679;
Decree of 16 September 1939 (changes of procedure, court martial,
and criminal code) RGBl., I, 1841.
Decree of 25 November 1939 (supplementary protection of war
potential) ‒ RGBl., I, 2319;
Decree of 5 December 1939 (perpetrators of crimes of violence) ‒
RGBl., I, 2378;
Decree of 11 May 1940 (relations with war prisoners) ‒ RGBl., I. 769;
Decree of 10 October 1940 (new version of military penal code) ‒
RGBl., l, 1347;
Statute of 4 September 1941 (change of penal code) ‒ RGBl., I, 549
(except par. 3)
Decree of 23 December 1941 (winter clothing collection) ‒ RGBl., I,
797;
Decree of 20 September 1942 (larceny in the fields) ‒ RGBl., I. 55;
Paragraphs 5 and 8 of the decree of 9 March 1943 (protection of the
family), ‒ RGBl., I, 140.
Arts. 9-10 of decree of 29 May 1943 (slander, duress) ‒ RGBl., I, 339.
iv. Penalties.
One of the chief devices by which the Nazi regime forced conformity
to its policies was the manipulation of the penalties decreed for various
crimes.
It is recommended that MG abrogate the provisions as to the penalty
of castration contained in paragraphs 42a and 42k of the penal code.
It is suggested that the abolition of the security measures of which
this penalty is a part is a question for the German people and not for
MG, and that in this respect MG has discharged its obligations when it
restores the procedural guarantees surrounding its application.
It is further recommended that MG by proclamation confine the impo-
sition of the death penalty to those instances in which it was used
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before, February 1933, and that the method of execution be that used
prior to the same date.50
As it is neither feasible nor advisable for MG to revise the bulk of Ger-
man criminal legislation, MG may find it advisable to permit the courts,
when reopened, to deviate from the scale of punishment imposed by
the Nazis in those cases in which MG has decided to retain the crime
as defined by the Nazis or in pre-existing German law. If MG should so
decide, it is suggested that MG consider the advisability of vesting in
the judge a broad discretion to depart from the standards of minimum
penalty fixed in Nazi legislation which is otherwise retained. MG may
well bear in mind that uniformity in this matter has been secured in
practice through exercise of the state´s right to appeal in criminal cases.
v. Juvenile Cases.
While opinion may be divided on the innovations made by the Third

Reich in the jurisdiction over juveniles, there seems no urgent need for
revision. It is therefore recommended that the Youth Correction Act of
6 November 199351 be retained, except for Nazi features contained in
certain paragraphs.52 The law should thus be made applicable not only
to German youth but to all youth coming within the jurisdiction of the
German courts. It should also revert to the pre-Hitler rule that children
under fourteen are not criminally responsible for their acts, and that the
juvenile courts have exclusive jurisdiction of offenses by children under
eighteen years of age.
C. Procedural Law
1. Preventive Detention.
In view of Nazi practices, MG will desire for political and psychological

reasons, to make it clear that the use of preventive detention is to be
held to the irreducible minimum and that the accused is free to request
an oral hearing on the necessity of maintaining such an order. Release
on bail is permissible under German law.
50 This requires specific abrogation of the law of 29 March 1933, RGBl., I, 151.
51 RGBl., I, 647.
52 Paragraphs 1 (2), 3 (2), 25 (1) and (2), 35, 60, 76-80.
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The solution thus lies in the return to an adequate system of protection

against arbitrary detention orders. It is therefore recommended that
the guarantees contained in the pre-Nazi codes be restored. This will
require abrogation of the appropriate sections of the statute of 24 April
193453 and that of 28 June 1935.54
2. Right to Representation.
The question of the restoration of the right to representation is a deli-

cate one. If the criminal courts are reopened before the bar has been
completely purged, there may be a tendency on the part of some
lawyers to indulge in political obstruction. In such instances, neither
the methods nor the ends of the Anglo-American »contempt« proceed-
ings would constitute an adequate remedy. The issue for MG hinges,
therefore, upon its willingness to continue a highly restricted right to
representation.
It is recommended that, if the bar has been completely purged when
the courts are reopened, there be no restriction of the right to repre-
sentation and that the mandatory representation provisions of the pre-
Nazi period be restored.
If, on the other hand, the bar has not been completely purged, MG may
decide to control the admission to practice before the criminal courts.
In this case, it may establish its own tests for admission to practice. In
addition, it may vest in the presiding judge the right at any stage of the
proceedings to remove a defense attorney and to permit the defendant
to choose a successor. If MG should elect to give the presiding judge
this right, it is suggested that an appeal from his decision be given to
the highest zonal administrative agency dealing with judicial affairs.
3. Right to Introduce Evidence.
It is recommended that Nazi provisions giving all criminals courts the

discretionary right to refuse or admit evidence should be abrogated.
As, however, Art. 3, par. 1 of the presidential decree of 14 June 193255
53 RGBl., I, 341.
54 RGBl., I, 844.
55 RGBl., I, 285.
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remains in force, criminal courts dealing with less important cases will
retain the right to exercise full discretion in the admission of evidence.
It is further recommended that all barriers to securing evidence, such
as the rule established by the statute of 1 December 1936,56 that Nazi
officials and Party members could not be called, without special per-
mission, to give evidence as to Party matters, be abrogated.
4. Right to Appeal and to Ask a New Trial.
It is recommended that the right to appeal or to ask a new trial,

whether exercised by the state or by the defendant, be restored in the
form which it had before 1 February 1933.
It is further recommended that the state’s right within one year to
appeal from a final decision be abrogated.57
5. Basis of Decision.
It is recommended that MG take whatever action, over and above the

purge of judicial personnel, it deems necessary to restore to the German
criminal courts a genuinely independent decision. On the other hand,
MG will have little or no interest in abolishing such procedural rules as
the rule that, when several laws seem applicable to a particular factual
situation, the judge may elect to apply the milder in fixing guilt and
punishment rather than acquit the defendant,58 or the rule that the
Supreme Court is free to depart from precedents.59
D. Problems of Jurisdiction
It is recommended that all special courts established after 1 February

1933 be closed and that all jurisdictional changes made after 1 February
1933 whose retention is not specially recommended in this Guide be
abrogated.
56 RGBl., I, 994.
57 See statute of 16 September 1939, RGBl., I, 1841.
58 Art. 2b of the statute of 28 June 1935, RGBl., I, 839.
59 See Art. 2 of the statute of 28 June 1935, RGBl., I, 844.
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The abolition of courts created by the Nazis requires no comment

in justification. The abolition of the special military courts may be
thought to require justification on different grounds. The Weimar Con-
stitution did not allow the existence of any military tribunals in peace-
time except for personnel on board warships. While in theory only
the peace treaty can restore full peace in Germany warranting the
restoration of this Weimar rule, certain other factors may well enter
into consideration. The restoration of military courts was one of the
first acts of the Third Reich. Experience has shown that the granting of
special exemptions from general court jurisdiction effectively protects
military organizations against outside control. During the period of
demobilization, it will be important not to encourage the formation or
maintenance of nuclei of possible political resistance. It would seem
advisable, therefore, for MG to couple military courts with special Nazi
courts, to abrogate the statutes authorizing their existence, and to revert
to pre-Nazi jurisdictions.
It is recommended that MG, in order to effect the necessary changes
in criminal procedure and criminal jurisdiction, abolish the following
statutes, decrees, and provisions. This list mentions only rarely impor-
tant executive or other decrees based on enabling clauses of laws and
decrees. Therefore MG´s proclamation of abrogation should be drawn
to include all executive decrees as well as decrees implementing or
amending prior legislation.
Decree of 21 March 1933 (formation of special courts) ‒ RGBl., I, 136.
Statute of 12 May 1933 (reestablishment of military courts) ‒ RGBl.,
I, 264.
Statute of 24 April 1934 (procedural changes) ‒ RGBl., I, 844.
Statute of 28 June 1934 with the exception of Art. 1, sec. 2, secs. 4a,
4b; Art. 2; Art. 4, sec. 2; Art. 6 (changes in criminal procedure and
jurisdiction). The exceptions concern convictions on alternative
grounds, admissibility of changes in sentences to the defendant’s
disadvantage even in cases of the defendant’s own appeal, restric-
tions of preliminary judicial investigation, free discretion of the
state’s attorney to ask for trial or to nolle pro’s in cases involving
blackmail, proceedings against fugitives from Justice ‒ RGBl., I, 844.
Statute of 26 June 1936 (reestablishment of Supreme Court martial) ‒
RGBl., I, 517.
Statute of 18 April 1936 (People’s Court) ‒ RGBl., I, 369.
Statutes of 19 September 1936 (new version of code of criminal
procedure for court martials) ‒ RGBl., I, 751, 756.
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Statute of 1 December 1936 (examination of NSDAP members in

civil courts) ‒ RGBl., I, 994.
Decree of 17 August 1938 and 26 August 1939 (court-martial proce-
dures in wartime and for special duties) ‒ RGBl., 1939, I, 1457.
Decree of 1 September 1939 with the exception of pars. 1-4 and par.
24; (jurisdiction and criminal procedure).
Exceptions concern the right of the court president to distribute
functions within the court as representative of executive power and
discretionary powers granted to the court in regard to the admission
of evidence ‒ RGBl., I, 1658.
Statute of 16 September 1939 (criminal procedure, court martial pro-
cedure) ‒ RGBl., I, 1841.
Decree of 17 October 1939 (special jurisdiction for members of SS
and police formations for special tasks) ‒ RGBl., I, 2107.
Decree of 31 January 1940 (jurisdiction of criminal courts and proce-
dural provisions) ‒ RGBl., I, 405.
Decree of 3 December 1940 (special criminal jurisdictions for labor
service members) ‒ RGBl., I, 485.
Decree of 6 May 1940 (territorial extension of German criminal law ‒
RGBl., I, 754.
Edict of the Führer of 21 March 1942 (simplification of judicial
administration) with the exception of par. 1. The exception concerns
the abolition of the court’s right to reject the state’s attorneys request
to bring a case to trial ‒ RGBl., I, 139.
Decree of 13 August 1942 (further simplification of the administra-
tion of criminal justice) except Art. 1. The exception concerns the
same point as was mentioned in the preceding ‒ RGBl., I, 508.
Decree of 29 May 1943 (simplification of criminal procedure) and
criminal law administration) ‒ RGBl., I, 342.
Decree of 29 May 1943 (further personnel economies in administra-
tion of criminal justice ‒ RGBl., I, 346.
1. Distribution of Functions.
It is suggested that MG may find it expedient to retain the decree and

laws of 1935, 1937 and 193960 which made the distribution of functions
within a court a purely administrative function exercised on the order
60 Decree of 20 March 1935 on Unification of Judicial Organization, RGBl., I, 403;

Statute of 24 November 1937 on Organizational Measures, RGBl., I, 1286; pars.
1-4 of the Decree of 1 September 1939 on Judicial Reorganization, RGBl., I, 1658.
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and in behalf of the Ministry of Justice. It is further suggested that

MG should consider the wisdom, during the first phases of occupation,
of establishing procedures which would enable the district attorney or
prosecutor (or the attorney general in the appeal courts), or the defen-
dant, at any stage of litigation to move for a change of venue, in order
that cases which have political significance may be heard by a special
chamber. The power to assign judges to special functions, which the
president of each court now enjoys, would permit the creation of such
special chambers within the framework of existing German procedure.
This will put the administration in a position to secure conditions for
fair trial for both the state and the defendant.61
It is also suggested that the lay members of the criminal courts be
selected from lists submitted by reliable and representative organiza-
tions, and that selection from such lists be made by the MG officer
supervising court activities, on recommendations from a committee
consisting of one member of the local court and six persons appointed
by the MG officer in question.62 Both the committee and the personnel
of the lists in question should be screened in order that Nazi supporters
may be excluded.
2. Division of Jurisdiction between MG Courts and the German

Courts.
A considerable part of the German criminal law will be suspended

by proclamations issued by MG. For example, the enforcement of the
treason provisions and the extensive special legislation in the same
field will be suspended by MG and new regulations enacted for the
purposes of occupation. Further, in discharge of its obligations to pro-
tect the occupying forces and to maintain law and order, MG will be
obliged to issue other regulations.
In view of the conditions which may be expected to prevail in Ger-
many, at least during the first phases of occupation, the prosecution of
even the politically less important cases to German courts would seem
clearly inadvisable.
61 See Civil Affairs Guide Courts and Judicial Administration in Germany, p. 51 et

seq.
62 For further details, see Civil Affairs Guide Courts and Judicial Administration
in Germany, p. 65 et seq.
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It is therefore recommended that in the first phase of occupation the

prosecution of breaches of MG regulation be the exclusive function
of MG courts and that the shifting of all or any of this function to
German courts should not be considered until the German courts have
been thoroughly purged and have demonstrated their reliability for a
satisfactory period of time.
3. Jurisdictional Conflicts between MG Courts and the German

Criminal Courts.
Very often cases will arise in which it may be genuinely doubtful

whether the case falls within the jurisdiction of German or MG courts.
It is recommended that MG courts be given exclusive jurisdiction to
decide such conflicts of jurisdiction.
It is also recommended that, if there is any question of such conflict
of jurisdiction, arising at any stage of litigation, the state’s attorney
or prosecutor should move for a stay of process. It is further recom-
mended that, while the state’s attorney or prosecutor may so act of his
own motion, his duty to act and the issuance of the stay of process
should be mandatory if a request for such action is forwarded to the
state’s attorney by the MG officer supervising court officers. It is sug-
gested that, if the state’s attorney secures the stay of his own motion
and forwards the records to the MG officer supervising court affairs,
that officer be charged with the duty of deciding the issue himself or
submitting it within thirty days to the appropriate MG court, and that
such cases be given precedence on the dockets of MG courts.
It is also recommended that the decision rendered by MG courts be
made binding on German courts and that a judgment entered in any
ease by an MG court preclude consideration by German courts of the
same case. This last should be construed as an application of the princi-
ple »ne bis in idem« which is the basis of paragraph 264 of the code of
criminal procedure. This rule goes beyond the concept of double jeop-
ardy as commonly applied in Anglo-American jurisdictions. It not only
prohibits the court from sentencing a defendant for the same offense
for which he has already been sentenced or of which he has previously
been acquitted, but also prevents the court from considering the case
again under a new and somewhat varied legal theory. For example, a
defendant who had been acquitted by an MG court for having stolen
some ration cards could not be brought before a German court for
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having embezzled the same ration cards. Utilization of this principle,

familiar to the German legal world, would remove from the German
courts any pretext for assuming jurisdiction in cases in which MG had
entered judgment.
It is, finally, recommended that MG enact regulations defining the per-
sonnel over which MG courts have exclusive jurisdiction.63
E. Amnesty Problems
1. Need for Action by MG.
One of the questions which will confront MG even in the earlier phases
of occupation will be the treatment of prisoners whose imprisonment
was caused primarily by oppressive Nazi practices. The liberation of
political prisoners alone will constitute a prime problem. The psycho-
logical effect of the speedy release of political prisoners and the prompt
review of other cases cannot be overestimated. The population in occu-
pied areas would find in such measures a harbinger of their right to
build a new regime. On the other hand, if MG fails to take immediate
steps for the release of political prisoners, it is likely that a wave of
jail deliveries will take place. Such a development would not only
undermine the authority and prestige of MG but also lead to an indis-
criminate release of all criminals, including those common offenders
whose liberation would increase the difficulties of administration for
MG. It is submitted that this psychological factor alone, without regard
to the traditional Anglo-American amnesty practice, would require MG
to consider to what extent it should first, release prisoners in concentra-
tion camps and, second, grant amnesty and the review of oppressive
Nazi sentences and to what extent it should leave the correction of
these issues to the future German state.
It is suggested that the need for MG action should hinge upon the
length of the occupation and should recognize that its course of action
may differ according to whether the occupation is long or short.
63 For full discussion of this issue, see Civil Affairs Guide, »Courts and Judicial
Administration in Germany«, pp. 58-60.
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2. Short-Term Occupation.
If the period of occupation is short, the time factor will limit to some
degree the scope of MG’s action. However, it seems unquestionable
that, in view of the established American tradition and the existing pol-
icy statements by the United Nations, even in a short-term occupation,
MG should immediately provide release for prisoners in concentration
camps and a full amnesty for political prisoners as sentenced by courts.
a. Persons in Concentration Camps.
Concentration camps are the epitome of all that is shameful in Nazism

and should be immediately investigated and closed. However, MG may
well bear in mind that, in addition to political opponents, Jews, etc.,
the Nazi regime may have used such camps to detain certain categories
of criminals deemed particularly reprehensible from the Nazi point
of view such as »dangerous criminals«, black-market operators, those
charged with absenteeism in industry, etc. To the extent that the per-
sons found there were detained without trial or have already served
their sentences in prison, it is recommended that they be released as
in the case of political prisoners, as there would be no legal basis for
further detention.
Some of those found in concentration camps may have been sentenced
by judicial action but sent there rather than to ordinary prisons. It is
recommended that, to the extent that they have not served their terms,
they be treated under the amnesty procedure, shortly to be described.
It is further recommended that the persons to whom the amnesty pro-
cedure does not apply should be transferred to regular prisons to serve
the balance of their terms.
In addition to concentration camps, the Nazi regime has established
a number of similar camps for the extra-legal detention of certain cat-
egories of persons, such as the »Protective Youth Camps« (Jugendschutz‐
lager) for unruly juveniles. These camps should likewise be dissolved,
and the inmates released.
While this action may be regarded in general as essential, MG should
bear in mind that probably it will not wish to apply this procedure
to all persons found in such camps. It may desire to except from this
procedure, first, Nazis who, although Nazi in sympathy, have opposed
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the regime in some respect; second, Nazis who have been »planted« in
such camps; and, third, Nazis who caused their own detention in an
attempt to avoid popular reprisals or Allied punitive measures. The
detail of the methods by which MG may achieve this purpose will
depend upon the conditions existing at the time of occupation and
should therefore be fixed only at that time. It is suggested, however,
that MG may wish to give the first category some special consideration.
b. Definition of Political Crimes.
The difficulty for MG will lie not in the determination of the need for
such an amnesty but rather in the definition of political crime and of
the machinery by which to implement that definition.
The traditional definition of »political crime« includes two distinct cat-
egories: first, those which are intrinsically political, such as treason,
desertion, sedition, espionage, and the like; and second, those which
are ordinarily non-political but become political through political moti-
vation, such as murder committed for political reasons. The problem
for MG is complicated by the fact that, while the Nazis have by statute
widened the content of political crimes, the second category, always
more delicate of determination, has been even more vastly increased
under the conditions of Nazism. The totalitarian regime has so much
suppressed all normal methods of opposition, that, for example, a com-
bination of economic motive and of the desire to revolt against the
regime may underlie such crimes as »breach of labor contract«.
Nor are these positive factors the only difficulties in the definition of a
political crime. There are two negative factors which require considera-
tion.
It is essential for psychological reasons that the definition of political
crime should be drawn to exclude any implication of amnesty for those
Nazis who have taken part in unlawful operations against persons and
property and who, for the first time, may be held accountable.
It is no less vital for the success of MG administration that the amnesty
program should not in any way undermine MG’s support of such
programs as rationing and price control. Deliberate rebellion against
Nazi authorities, desire for profit, or simply hunger may all have been
factors in such offenses. However, MG’s interest in such cases should be
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review and adjustment of arbitrary and unjust punishments rather than

automatic amnesty.
The need for immediate action is circumscribed not only by the time
factor present in short-term occupation but also by personnel limita-
tions. It would seem inevitable that MG draw its definition of politi-
cal crimes and of the scope of amnesty with these considerations in
mind. It is recommended, therefore, that, holding in view in its drafting
the two negative factors mentioned above, MG should define political
offenses as embracing the following: first, offenses traditionally recog-
nized as political; second, those which the Nazis have included in their
widened concept of political crimes; and, third, those cases in which
the offense was a violation of laws which it is the fixed purpose of the
United Nations to abrogate. The third category would include violation
of those statutes restricting relations between individuals on account of
their race or nationality or their status as foreigners or prisoners of war,
as well as those directed against persons exclusively because of their
origin and religious affiliation.64
c. Definition of Military Crimes.
It is suggested that MG consider also an amnesty for criminal offenses

against the Military Criminal Code as well as for offenses of soldiers
coming under the Decree on Wartime Criminal Law of 17 August
193865 and of subsequent amending and executive decrees to the latter
decree. It seems justifiable to include these offenses under the amnesty
since the majority have been committed under the stress of war, and,
where they cannot be labeled political crimes proper, they may often
have been so motivated that MG would not be interested in continuing
the punishment.
Two important exceptions, however, present themselves. The first con-
cerns the abuse of authority, e.g., insulting or maltreatment of subor-
dinates, or the instigation of a subordinate to commit a crime. The
second exception concerns offenses such as marauding, looting, rape,
or robbery. Many of the last-mentioned offenses will have their specific
war criminal aspect and thus fall outside the scope of amnesty. In so
far as cases coming under the two excepted categories are of little con-
64 This type of legislation is defined in Civil Affairs Guide Elimination of Funda-

mental Nazi Laws.
65 RGBl., 1939, I, 1457.
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sequence, the proposals for a general amnesty discussed below could

be made applicable to them.
d. Treatment of Short-Term Sentences.
It may be felt that even in the first phase of the occupation MG may
consider the release of a larger group of persons who have been pun-
ished under the Nazi regime. Without doubt the reopening of the Ger-
man courts will be marked by a flood of petitions for retrial of cases
which were not adequately heard because of harsh rules introduced
by the Nazis (see above, p. 9). The granting of amnesty to most of
the persons who received an original sentence of not more than eigh-
teen months would go far to stem this tide, since it would remove
two-thirds of such petitions. In granting amnesty a clause would be
attached to the proclamation stating that the reimprisonment can be
ordered for those who have committed serious crimes, but whose
sentences have been reduced because of their standing as Nazi Party
members (old party fighters, etc.)
e. Action by MG.
In a short-term occupation, MG will scarcely have the time or personnel

available to devise or sponsor a screening of cases in which cruel and
unjust punishments have been inflicted under the Nazi regime. The
following recommendations are therefore made:
(a) That in these circumstances MG confine its action to the liberation
of persons convicted of political and military crimes as defined above
and that it treat conviction for such offenses as establishing eligibility
for immediate and automatic amnesty. It is suggested that the amnesty
for political crimes entail as its logical consequence the expunging of
the entry in the criminal register concerning each case. In all other cases
MG may leave this restoration of full civil rights to the normal German
procedure.
(b) That an amnesty be given to all offenders on whom an original
sentence of not more than eighteen months imprisonment or hard labor
was imposed and that at the same time the state’s attorneys be ordered
not to start new proceedings for offences committed before the date of
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effective military occupation of their district when the expected punish-

ment would not exceed eighteen months.
(c) That the proclamation establishing this definition make it clear that
this is only the preliminary step and does not preclude further action in
the field.
This procedure is suggested because it affords a quick method of iden-
tifying the person and the offense, without any need to screen evidence
or review records, and involves a minimum of personnel for MG. How-
ever, this action should not preclude the simultaneous establishment of
review procedure.
3. Long-Term Occupation.
The possibility of long-term occupation requires prompt consideration

by MG of measures for the review of the cases of victims of Nazi
oppression in the courts. Such measures should be considered as an
essential part of the de‐Nazification program for Germany.
a. First Phase of Occupation.
It is suggested that in the first phase of occupation MG follow the

pattern previously laid down for short-term occupation.
b. Subsequent Action by MG
i. Agency to Administer Program.
While there can be no question of the political and psychological neces-

sity of the liberation of those whose offenses fall within the above-men-
tioned concept of political and military crimes, grave questions arise in
the case of other types of cases, in which review of records is necessary
to reveal the political motive in the crime, or in which the adjustment
of the penalty would seem to amount to a substantial revision of the
German criminal system. If MG is obliged to continue to operate as the
governing unit in Germany and no indigenous German government
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grows up to assume the responsibility for such action, it would seem

inevitable that MG provide some machinery to handle this problem.
As a first step it is recommended that the decree of 11 June 194066 be
abolished. This decree provides that sentences of hard labor imposed
during wartime against any offender should start to run only after the
war. This rule also applied to judgments of courts martial, and police
or SS courts, if the judgment stipulates the loss of civil rights. The
automatic effect of this abrogation would be to release many prisoners
whose cases would otherwise have to be considered for review.
Another step of equal importance is the provision of review machinery
for sentences of more than eighteen months. In this group many politi-
cal offenders are likely to be found whose cases were not automatically
recognized as political crimes. For these cases MG should set standards
of procedure in order to obtain a minimum of uniformity. Often polit-
ical questions are involved which make close MG control desirable.
However, the need for speedy action and the probable shortage of
trained MG personnel may require the utilization of a German agency.
The office of the state’s attorney at the district court in whose area the
prisoner was originally sentenced seems to be best equipped for this
undertaking. The files of the prisoner are kept in this office and the
same agency is entrusted by law with the function of supervising the
execution of the punishment. Moreover, some measure of uniformity of
procedure and decision will be facilitated by the fact that the district
attorney will probably work under MG supervision, exercised either at
the district or at the appeal court level.
The district attorney should submit to the MG delegate a list of cases to
which, in the opinion of the district attorney, the amnesty should apply.
If, after a lapse of time fixed by MG, the delegate raises no objections
to the proposed list, the prisoners should be released, or their sentences
reduced.
However, MG may find it practicable to provide at the same time for
a board of inquiry in each appeal-court district. Such a board would
consider the cases of prisoners who were not included on the district
attorney’s list for release or partial remittance of sentence, as well as the
cases which the delegate failed to approve.
66 RGBl., 1940, I, 877.
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F. Prosecution of Nazi Offenders against German Citizens
A problem no less serious in its psychological implication will confront

MG, in case of long-term occupation, in the treatment of Nazi offenders
against German citizens. While a considerable number of Nazi crim-
inals will probably face trial before Allied courts as war criminals,
there will remain many who will presumably not be subject to those
courts because they committed the offenses in question in German
territory against German citizens. These persons have escaped prosecu-
tion either because their misdeeds were amnestied by the Nazi Govern-
ment or because no prosecutor dared to initiate proceedings against
them. Because of the failure of prosecution, the statute of limitations
may have run in their favor. While some of them may be arrested for
interference with MG’s discharge of its duties or for disturbance of
public order, it may be expected that many of this group will escape
such detention. Some of the crimes may have been so atrocious and
some of the offenders so prominent in public life that popular demand
for prosecution may be great.
It may be assumed that, after the courts have been reopened, and the
statutes and practices abrogated which formerly protected Nazi offend‐
ers, prosecutors will not be afraid to initiate action upon such flagrant
offenses. It is recommended that MG take whatever steps are in its
power to assist and encourage such action.
There will remain, however, a group of offenders of this category who
cannot be convicted or prosecuted (a) because the German courts, even
if purged, may invoke the doctrine of superior orders, or (b) because
the statute of limitations will have run in favor of the defendant, or (c)
because a Nazi amnesty or the statute on Measures of State Emergency,
of July 1934, may have intervened.67 The problem of the disposition
of this group of offenders is fundamentally a problem for the German
people. To open the way for their prosecution in German courts, even
during the period of occupation, by abrogation of the statute of limita-
tions as to such offenses or by action on the above measures would
be so drastic a change in the system of German criminal law that MG
should not take such a step in the absence of a specific directive to that
effect from the political authorities.
67 RGBl., I, 529. The statute retroactively legalizes murder of political opponents of

the Nazis.
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G. Problems of Administration
1. Supervision of German Courts.
After MG has reopened the German courts, it will be confronted with

the problem of how far it should supervise their activities. It is sug-
gested that some degree of supervision is advisable in all phases of
occupation, but that supervision may be relaxed as the German courts
demonstrate their strength and reliability.
In the first period after the reopening of the courts, it seems inevitable
that MG should set up a system for supervising the operation of the
courts. It is recommended that the supervision be centralized in the
hands of one MG officer, and that he assigns his subordinates to every
appeal court and to the more important district courts.
The special function of the MG officers assigned to the individual
courts would be to follow closely criminal proceedings initiated in the
German courts. To that end, the prosecutors in the district court should
be required to send him two types of reports: first, daily reports on all
cases which may directly or indirectly affect the interests of the occupy-
ing powers; second, weekly reports on indictments, information, and
notices of appeal in all cases which originally are not brought before
a single judge in the local court. They should also report acquittals,
sentences, and all written opinions handed down in their courts, as well
as cases terminated by nolle pro´s (Einstellungsbeschlüsse).
This procedure would permit the MG officer to keep close watch over
the dockets of the criminal courts, and to form judgements as to their
strength and independence. It would further enable him to have close
contact with the work and personality of the judges and prosecutors.
The sum total of this information, evaluated by the MG officer in whose
hands supervision was centralized, would be valuable evidence to be
considered by those officers within MG in deciding shifts in personnel
or, more vital, continued operation of the German courts.
2. Executive Revision of Sentences.
In contradistinction to the Rhineland occupation, where the preroga-

tives of the executive exercised by the Ministry of Justice remained in
principle in German hands, MG should exercise all executive authority.
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It will have consequently the prerogative of pardon and of commuta-

tion of sentences, not only in regard to those cases which come before
MG tribunals, but also in regard to those cases where German criminal
courts will retain Jurisdiction.
Appendix
The following laws and decrees are recommended for abrogation.

The enumeration lists only rarely executive or other decrees based on
enabling clauses of laws and decrees. Therefore, the MG proclamation
of abrogation should be drawn to include all executive decrees, as well
as decrees implementing or amending prior legislation, which automa-
tically become inoperative together with the laws or decrees on which
they are based.
Page68
1. Verordnung des Reichspräsidenten über die Auflösung
der Kommunistischen Gottlosenorganisationen, 3 May
1932 (Presidential Decree on the Dissolution of the
Communist Atheist Organizations). 185
2. Verordnung des Reichspräsidenten gegen politischen
Terror, 9 August 1932 (Presidential Decree against Poli-
tical Terrorism). 403
3. Verordnung des Reichspräsidenten zur Erhaltung des
inneren Friedens, 19 December 1932 (Presidential
Decree for the Maintenance of Internal Peace). 548
4. Verordnung des Reichspräsidenten zum Schutze des
deutschen Volkes, 4 February 1933 (Presidential Decree
for the Protection of the German People). 35
5. Par. 4 of the Verordnung des Reichspräsidenten zum
Schutze von Volk und Staat, 28 February 1933 (Presi-
dential Decree for the Protection of People and Coun-
try). 83
6. Verordnung über Bildung von Sondergerichten, 21
March 1933 (Decree on the Formation of special
Courts). 136
68 Page numbers refer to Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I. If not specifically indicated, the

volume number corresponds with the year in which the law was issued.
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7. Gesetz über Verhängung und Vollzug der Todesstrafe,

29 March 1933 (Statute on the Application and Execu-
tion of the Death Penalty). 151
8. Gesetz zur Abwehr politischer Gewalttaten, 4 April
1933 (Statute on the Defense against Political Terror-
ism). 163
9. Gesetz zum Schutze der nationalen Symbole, 19 May
1933 (Statute on the Protection of National Symbols). 285
10. Gesetz über Wiedereinführung der Militärgerichtsbar-
keit, 12 May 1933 (Statute on the Re-establishment of
Military Courts). 264
11. Gesetz zur Abänderung strafrechtlicher Vorschriften,
26 May 1933 (Statute on Change of Criminal Provi-
sions) (except insofar as it changes or introduces the
following articles of the criminal code 219, 220 – Birth
control advertisement and abortion. 223 b. Maltreat-
ment of minors and incompetents. 266. Violation of
fiduciary relation. 361,6 Prostitution). 295
12. Gesetz gegen Neubildung von Parteien, 14 June 1933
(Statute against Formation of New Parties). 398
13. Gesetz zur Gewährleistung des Rechtsfriedens, 13
October 1933. 723
14. Par. 42a, 5, and 42k castration of Gesetz gegen Gefähr-
liche Gewohnheitsverbrecher, 24 November 1933 (Sta-
tute on Dangerous Habitual Criminals). 995
15. Gesetz zur Änderung von Vorschriften des Strafrechts
und des Strafverfahrens, 24 April 1934 (Statute on
Changes of Provisions of Criminal Law and Criminal
Procedure). 341
16. Gesetz gegen heimtückische Angriffe auf Staat und
Partei und zum Schutze der Parteiuniform, 20 Decem-
ber 1934 (Statute against Surreptitious Attacks on State
and Party and for the Protection of the Party Uniform). 1269
17. Gesetz zur Änderung des Strafgesetzbuchs, 28 June
1935 (Statute on Changes of the Criminal Code) except
insofar as it changes or introduces the following provi-
sions 2b, conviction on alternative grounds; 265a mis- 839
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use of automatic fare collection devices; 310a forest

fires; 330c failure to give assistance in an emergency.
18. Gesetz zur Änderung von Vorschriften des Strafver-
fahrens und des Gerichtsverfassungsgesetzes, 28 June
1935 (Statute on Changes of Provisions on Criminal
Procedure and Jurisdiction) except Art. 1, sec. 2, Art. 2;
Art. 4, sec. 2; Art. 6, Changes in Criminal Procedure
and Jurisdiction, exceptions concern convictions on
alternative grounds, restrictions of preliminary judicial
investigation, free discretion of the State attorney to ask
for trial or to nolle pro’s in cases involving blackmail,
proceedings against fugitives from justice. 844
19. Gesetz zum Schutze des deutschen Bluts und der deut-
schen Ehre,69 15 September 1935 (Statute on Protection
of German Blood and Honor). 1146
20. Gesetz über die Wiedereinrichtung eines obersten
Gerichtshofs der Wehrmacht, 26 June 1936 (Statute on
Re-establishment of Supreme Court Martial). 517
21. Einführungsgesetz zur Militärstrafgerichtsordnung
und Neufassung der Militärstrafgerichtsordnung, 29
September 1936 (Statute Initiating the Code of Criminal
Procedure for Court Martials and New Version of the
Code of Criminal Procedure for Court Martials). 751,756
22. Gesetz zur Änderung des Strafgesetzbuchs, 2 July 1936
(Statute on Changes in the Criminal Code). 532
23. Gesetz über den Volksgerichtshof, 18 April 1936
(Statute on the People’s Court). 369
24. Gesetz über Vernehmung der Angehörigen der NSDAP
und ihrer Gliederungen, 1 December 1936 (Statute on
Examination of Members of the NSDAP Organizati-
ons). 994
25. Gesetz zum Schutze von Bezeichnungen der NSDAP, 7
April 1937 (Statute on Protection of NSDAP labels). 442
26. Gesetz gegen Straßenraub mittels Autofallen, 22 June
1938 (Statute against Highway Robbery with the Help
of Auto Traps). 651
69 This enumeration does not list the remainder of the racial legislation; it has been
dealt with in the Guide »The Abrogation of Nazi Laws in the Early Period of
MG« [auch abgedruckt in diesem Band, S. 155-182].
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27. Verordnung über Sonderstrafrecht im Krieg und bei

besonderem Einsatz, 17 August 1938 and 26 August
1939 (Decree on Special Wartime Criminal Law and for
Special Duties). 1939 1455
28. Verordnung über das militärische Strafverfahren im
Krieg und bei besonderem Einsatz, 17 August 1938 and
26 August 1939 (Decree on Court-martial Procedure in
Wartime and for Special Duties). 1939 1457
29. Verordnung über ausserordentliche Rundfunkmaßnah-
men, 1 September 1939 (Decree on Extraordinary Mea-
sures in the Field of Broadcasting). 1683
30. Verordnung über Maßnahmen auf dem Gebiet der
Gerichtsverfassung und Rechtspflege, 1 September
1939 (Decree on Measures in regard to Administration
of Justice) with the exception of Par. 1-4. Exceptions
concern the function of the Court President to dis-
tribute the functions within the court as representative
of executive power. 1658
31. Verordnung gegen Volkschädlinge, 15 September 1939
(Decree against Enemies of the People). 1679
32. Gesetz zur Änderung von Vorschriften des allgemeinen
Strafverfahrens, des Wehrmachtstrafverfahrens und
Strafgesetzbuchs, 16 September 1939 (Statute on Chan-
ges of General Criminal Procedure, Procedure before
Court-Martials, and in the Criminal Code). 1841
33. Verordnung über Sondergerichtsbarkeit in Strafsachen
für Angehörige der SS und Polizeiverbände bei beson-
derem Einsatz, 17 October 1939. (Decree on Special
Jurisdiction in Criminal Cases for Members of SS and
police Formations for Special Tasks). 2107
34. Verordnung zur Ergänzung der Strafvorschriften zum
Schutze der Wehrkraft des deutschen Volkes, 25
November 1939 (Decree Supplementing the Penal Pro-
visions Protecting the War Potential of the German
People). 2319
35. Verordnung gegen Gewaltverbrecher, 5 December 1939
(Decree against Perpetrators of Crimes of Violence). 2378
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36. Verordnung zum Schutze des Reichsarbeitsdienstes, 12

March 1940 (Decree for the Protection of Labor Ser-
vice). 485
37. Verordnung über Zuständigkeit der Strafgerichte, die
Sondergerichte und sonstige Strafverfahrensrechtliche
Vorschriften, 3 February 1940 (Decree on Jurisdiction
of Criminal Courts, on Special Courts, and on Other
Procedural Provisions). 405
38. Verordnung über den Geltungsbereich des Strafrechts,
6 May 1940 (Decree on the Extension of the Criminal
Law). 754
39. Verordnung über Umgang mit Kriegsgefangenen, 11
May 1940 (Decree on Relations with War Prisoners). 769
40. Verordnung über Vollstreckung von Freiheitsstrafen
wegen einer während des Krieges begangenen Tat, 11
June 1940 (Decree on the Execution of Punishment for
Crimes Committed during the War). 877
41. Verordnung über die Neufassung des Militärstrafge-
setzbuchs, 10 October 1940 (Decree on the New Version
of Military Penal Code). 1347
42. Gesetz zur Änderung des Reichstrafgesetzbuchs, 4
September 1941 (Statute on Changes in the Criminal
Code) with the exception of paragraph 3 ‒ usury. 549
43. Verordnung zum Schutze der Sammlung von Winter-
sachen für die Front, 23 December 1941 (Decree Pro-
tecting the Collection of Winter Clothing for Soldiers at
the Front). 797
44. Erlass des Führers über die Vereinfachung der Rechts-
pflege, 21 March 1942 (Führer Edict on the Simplifica‐
tion of Judicial Administration). 139
45. Verordnung zur weiteren Vereinfachung der
Strafrechtspflege 13 August 1942 (Decree on Further
Simplification of the Administration of Criminal Jus-
tice). 508
46. Verordnung über Feld und Forstdiebstähle, 20 Septem-
ber 1942 (Decree on Larceny from the Fields). 558
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47. Gesetz zur Ergänzung der Vorschriften gegen Landes-

verrat, 22 November 1942 (Statute Supplementing Pro-
visions against Treason). 668
48. Paragraphs 5 and 8 of Verordnung zum Schutze von
Ehe, Familie und Mutterschaft, 9 March 1943 (Para-
graphs 5 and 8 of Decree for Protection of Marriage,
Family, and Maternity). (Increase of punishment in
abortion cases, range of application.) 140
49. Arts. 9 and 10 of Verordnung zur Angleichung des
Strafrechts des Altreichs und der Alpen und Donau-
gaue, 29 May 1943 (Arts. 9 and 10 of Decree on Assim-
ilation of Criminal Law of Reich and Alpine and Danu-
bian Districts) (slander, duress). 339
50. Dritte Verordnung zur Vereinfachung der Strafrecht-
spflege, 29 May 1943 (Third Decree on Simplification of
the Administration of Criminal Law). 342
51. Verordnung zur weiteren Kräfteersparnis in der
Strafrechtspflege, 29 May 1943 (Decree on Further Per-
sonnel Economies in the Administration of Criminal
Justice). 346
52. Reichsjugendgerichtsgesetz, 6 November 1943 (Youth
Correction Act) par. 1 (2) should be suspended, par.
3 (2) should read as follows: »Wer unter 14 Jahren
eine Verfehlung begeht, ist strafrechtlich nicht verant-
wortlich« anyone who, being under 14 years of age,
commits a criminal offense, will not be held criminally
responsible. 637
Par. 25 (1); par. 25 (2); par. 35: delete reference to Hitlerjugend and
Jugendhilfe der Nationalsozialistischen Volkswohlfahrt (Hitler Youth
and Youth Assistance of NS Welfare Organization).
Par. 60, pars. 76-80 should be suspended.
**********
To be abrogated Pars. 42a, 5; 42k of the criminal code as introduced by
the statute against dangerous habitual criminals of 24 November 1933,
RGBl., I, 995.
To be suspended in their entirety pars. 80-104 of the criminal code.
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225
[3.]
General Principles of Administration and Civil
Service in Germany*
[1944]
Foreword 226
Summary 226
I. Analysis of the Problem 227

A. The Administrative Problems Facing MG 227
B. Characteristics of the Present-day Administration 228
C. The Fate of the German Central Agencies 229
D. Relation between German and MG Agencies 230
E. Civil Service 231
F. The Nazis and the Civil Service 232
G. The Problem of Civil Service Replacements 233
II. Recommendations 235

A. Policy towards German Agencies 235
1. Agencies Automatically Superseded by Agencies of the Occupy-
ing Power. 235
2. Agencies to be Dissolved because They Disseminate Nazi Ideo-
logy. 236
3. Agencies for War Preparation and for Coordination of Political or
Economic Life. 236
a. Agencies which Must Be Dissolved 237
b. Agencies to be Dissolved unless Found Necessary for Prosecu-
tion of MG Policies 237
c. Agencies to be Reorganized 238
4. Remaining German Central Agencies. 240
B. Personnel Problems 241
* [Als R and A No. 1655.12 und Teil des Civil Affairs Guides-Programm produziert
und fertiggestellt am 12. Juni 1944. – Zu diesem Text vergleiche in der Einleitung
S. 59-63.]
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226 [3.] General Principles of Administration and Civil Service in Germany [1944]
Foreword
This is one of a series of Guides dealing with problems of administra-

tion.
The other Guides are:
1. Adaptation of German Administrative Machinery on the Regional
Level.
2. Adaptation of German Administrative Machinery on the Local
Level.
3. Police and Public Safety in Germany.
4. Territorial Units to be Used by Military Government in Germany.
Summary
1. The tasks facing MG in the administration of Germany will be much

more far-reaching than those confronting the Interallied High Com-
mission during the Rhineland occupation. MG itself will have to
carry on a number of administrative duties, but the bulk of the rou-
tine work will have to be carried on by the German administration.
2. A great number of agencies created by the Nazis can be dissolved
entirely; their remaining functions can be transferred to other agen-
cies. If German central agencies should be continued, the unification
of all social welfare activities in a single agency is recommended.
3. The purging of Nazis from the German administration should be
entrusted to a special MG officer with powers to carry through
uniform purge measures in all branches of the administration.
4. Only key positions will be filled by MG officials; therefore, the
purge of German personnel is of paramount importance.
5. In addition to all German civil servants designated as »political
civil servants« by the Civil Service Act, every active Nazi should
be dismissed from public service. No pensions should be granted to
dismissed Nazi officials.
6. It is recommended that former civil servants of the Republic as well
as qualified members of resistance groups replace the dismissed
Nazi officials.
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[3.] General Principles of Administration and Civil Service in Germany [1944] 227
A. The Administrative Problems Facing MG
The administrative tasks of MG will be of greatest magnitude and

importance and surpass by far those which fell to the Interallied High
Command after the signing of the armistice in November 1918.
First, the territory to be administered by MG will be many times the
size of the zone occupied under the clauses of the Compiègne armistice.
Second, as in 1918, the occupation forces will be of various nationalities,
but coordination will be more difficult than in 1918. Third, the defeat of
Germany implies the defeat of Nazism as a political and social system.
Given the forms and means of domination applied in Germany within
the last ten years, and considering the impact of the war on the German
social and economic system, it can be safely assumed that the German
administrative machine will have suffered a much graver disruption
than in 1918. A large proportion of public utilities and transportation
and housing facilities will have been destroyed; medical installations
and supplies will be deficient. The demobilization of the German army,
the repatriation of more than 10,000,000 foreign laborers and prisoners
of war, and the reconversion of German industry to the production
of consumer goods present weighty problems to those concerned with
the operation of the German administration in the immediate post-war
period.
For security reasons alone, the extent of the administrative functions to
be carried out by MG will not be comparable with the scope of similar
functions performed during the first two years of the military occupa-
tion of the Rhineland. This was restricted to contacts with a German
government which was still intact and functioning outside the zone
of occupation, and to a mild form of supervision of this government’s
regional and local machinery in the zone of occupation.
Today, MG administration must be prepared to assume much greater
responsibilities in regard to German territory and population. How-
ever, MG cannot itself carry out the tasks of administration except
in marginal cases (disarmament). In general, it must confine itself to
giving the directives and to supervising their execution. Therefore,
national administrative units and German personnel are needed from
the very beginning. Yet, the central German agencies, as they now
stand, could not be profitably integrated into the new administration,
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because they will have to be adapted to the administrative organisation

to be set up by MG. Closely connected with the question of adapting
German agencies to the needs of military government is the question
of personnel policy. The thorough permeation of the German admin-
istration by Nazis creates tremendous difficulties for the satisfactory
handling of the personnel problem.
B. Characteristics of the Present-day Administration
The German administrative organization, though under the supreme

authority of Hitler, has in recent years been dominated by two features:
the emergence of the Ministerial Council for the Defense of the Reich
as supreme governmental authority, and the cropping up numerous
special commissioners, who are appointed whenever regular agencies
fail or new urgent tasks arise.
The Defense Council has taken over legislative and coordinating func-
tions. This council is composed of Göring as Chairman, Himmler as
Commissioner of Administration, Funk as Commissioner of Economics,
Keitel as Commander of the Armed Forces, Borman as Chief of the
Party Chancellery, and Minister Lammers (the head of the Reich Chan-
cellery) as executive secretary. Thus, the other ministries were trans-
formed into executive organs of the Ministerial Council. Many of the
ministries have lost part of their functions to special commissioners
(Delegates, Commissioner General, Inspector General) who are per-
sonal appointees of Hitler and are personally responsible to him. The
regional administration, which previously had some measure of auton-
omy, has been made completely subordinate to the central authorities.
Reich Governors and, as far as they still exist, State Governments as
well, are merely executive agents of the central authorities. Beside these
agencies of general administration, there are several branches of spe-
cial administration which are entirely federalized and whose regional
agencies are, therefore, directly under the respective ministries. Thus
regional administration is partly general administration, coordinated
by the Provincial Presidents in Prussia and the Reich Governors in the
other States. It is also partly special administration, such as Justice,
Labor, and Communications; these are handled by special Reich agen-
cies.
In order to appraise the nature of the specific tasks facing German’s
future administration, some features which are responsible for the
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unwieldy character of the German administration should be men-

tioned. To some extent even before the rise of the Third Reich, but
with increasing frequency since 1933, new administrative functions
were not handed over to the old cadres which united all services on
the Provincial or the State level. Germany’s administrative landscape
is dotted with special administrations integrated with the old units
very loosely, or not at all. Furthermore, the traditional political units,
the States, became more and more meaningless, but a new principle
for the distribution of functions was still not available. Another factor
which contributes to the complexity of the administrative machinery
is not peculiar to Germany alone. It concerns the relation of the admin-
istration to private enterprise. Although the administration exercises
a group of supervisory functions over private economy and has a
somewhat vague and confused responsibility for the functioning of the
economic system as a whole, its control nevertheless is almost never
exercised directly. It operates through the so-called Self-administrations
of Industry, which, for their part, have assumed many public functions.
However, no redefinition of the relationship between administration
and private economy has taken place in Germany. If the Nazi political
system binding together the administrative bureaucracy and the self-
administration of industry should break down, the ensuing separation
of government and industry will create new administrative problems.
C. The Fate of the German Central Agencies
A partial solution of the German administrative confusion may be

found in the suspension of a number of unnecessary special adminis-
trations and in the merging of the remaining ones with other agencies
to be continued. If a central German administration should be main-
tained in one form or another, only these central agencies should be
allowed to function which correspond to actual social needs. For the
same needs, indeed, it might actually become necessary to establish
some new German central agency in order to implement MG policies.
But even if all central German agencies should be totally discarded,
the various agencies often had local branches; a decision on the highest
level seems imperative as to which of them should be closed down
entirely and which of them should be transferred to agencies which
will continue to function on the regional or local level.
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Three major groups of central agencies and of branches thereof can

be totally abolished. The first group consists of those agencies which
have been created to disseminate Nazi ideology, as for example, the
Ministry for Popular Enlightenment and Propaganda. The second com-
prises those agencies which in any event will be completely superseded
by the occupation authorities, such as the Foreign Office, the High
Command of the Armed Forces, the Presidential Chancellery, and the
Reich Chancellery. The third group comprises those agencies which
were created in order to prepare and carry on the war and to coordi-
nate political and economic life in Germany – the office of the Delegate
for the Four-Year Plan, and the office of the Reich Leader of the SS and
Chief of the German Police.
D. Relation between German and MG Agencies
The relationship between German and MG agencies will depend upon

the degree of MG participation in internal German affairs.
On whatever level German administration may continue to function,
it will do so satisfactorily only after a thorough purge of its Nazis. In
order to be effective, such a purge must be carried out according to uni-
form directives. A sub-agency of the filled central occupation authority
and endowed with power over the personnel policies of all agencies
having German personnel, might best be able to achieve the necessary
unification of personnel policies.1 Furthermore, whatever may be the
extent to which German officials and agencies continue to take part in
the administration on the national or zonal level, final responsibility
during military government will rest exclusively with MG. All execu-
tive power should be concentrated in MG for German officials (or
advisory bodies) should not exercise responsibility for policies whose
elaboration would lie almost exclusively in the hands of MG officials.
The responsibility for the forms and manner of execution may to some
degree be left to native officials and groups, but they should not be
associated in the responsibility for policy-making.
The different zones agreed upon by the Allied powers will not form a
uniform administrative whole; every zone contains side by side with
the former smaller states some Prussian provinces or parts of provinces
which do not have all the administrative divisions usual in a state
1 As regards the principles and methods of personnel policy see I. E.
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government. The offices of the Prussian Provincial President and of the

Prussian District President have a strictly regional character. The
question arises as to whether a native German administration should
be set up in the zone through the consolidation of the different provin-
cial agencies with the ministries of the states. This seems inadvisable.
Setting up a German zonal agency would result in duplication and a
top-heavy administrative structure; it would also cause a great deal of
administrative waste because the concentration of executive tasks in the
MG agency would leave the higher German zonal authorities without
important functions of their own. MG may therefore, have to find other
methods to achieve some measure of coordination of the German agen-
cies throughout the zone. MG may assume responsibility for transmit-
ting all orders to the German authorities on the regional level, e.g. the
Provincial Presidents, the District Presidents, and the Ministries of the
smaller states. If such a procedure seems too cumbersome, MG may
decide to make the provincial administration at the seat of the zonal
commander into a sort of transmitting agency. The zonal commander
would thus be able to channel his orders to the various regional author-
ities through a single German agency. If, for example, the seat of the
zonal commander was in Hanover, he could designate the Provincial
President in Hanover as his transmitting agent for questions of general
administration. The same would correspondingly apply to a Reichsbahn
Division Management or to a Gau Labor Exchange. The transmitting
agency, however, would not acquire the function of a German Zonal
authority. It would be confined merely to the technical functions of a
transmitting agent; executive authority would rest exclusively with
Zonal MG.
E. Civil Service
Although in the period of occupation the responsibility for Germany’s

administration will lie primarily in the hands of MG, it would be
impossible to think of replacing the whole range of German admin-
istration by MG personnel. If there should be a native German gov-
ernment to which a number of functions could be delegated at the
beginning the problems would be simplified. Although in this case
the recruitment of the German Civil Service would be in the hands of
the native government, the range of questions which will come up is
nearly identical with that which would arise in the absence of a native
government.
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In 1933, before the increase in the number of bureaucracy, and although

the tasks of war preparation and war economy had been started, the
number of Federal, State, and municipal civil servants in the public ser-
vices (Öffentliche Dienste) was 661,449.2 The number of the academically
trained civil servants working in all branches of public administration
was 77,172. Even assuming that the great majority of the non-academi-
cally trained civil servants can be retained in office, it would seriously
tax MG to find a substitute for every academically trained civil servant.
Therefore, principles should be established according to which the
reorganization and the purge of the German administration should be
carried out.
F. The Nazis and the Civil Service
The influx of new officials varied according to the importance of the

respective offices and branches of administration. It was more marked
in the general internal administration than in more specialized fields
like transportation or social security. In 1942, for example, 81.9 per-
cent of all higher officials attached to the general internal administra-
tion on the State, Provincial, District, and County levels were Nazi
appointees. The fact is, especially in the first three years of Nazi domi-
nation, that appointment by the Nazi government was not tantamount
to the appointee’s being an active member of the Nazi Party. Only
gradually was the membership card made a prerequisite for entry into
public office. However, if official pressure forced moat office‐holders to
acquire, pro forma membership in the Party, mere membership alone
would not be a sufficient indication of the unfitness of the official
for the job. Many an official whose duties were of a more technical
nature, like the officials of a Water Construction Office (Wasserbauamt),
may, even after becoming a member of the Nazi Party have confined
himself within the limits of his official duties, and restricted his partic-
ipation in Nazi affairs to the minimum required to keep his position.
In some cases however, a »specialist« may have been an ardent Nazi,
although the vast majority, of the fifty thousand members of the Nazi
Party among the civil servants before 1933 came from the intermediate
ranks of the Civil Service, not from its lower and higher ranks. On the
other hand, those officials who worked in the field of the general inter-
2 Statistisches Jahrbuch für das Deutsche Reich, vol. 1934, p. 456. This figure does
not include civil servants in the post and railway services; they numbered about
500,000 in 1933.
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nal administration, even if they were holdovers from the Republican

regime, became identified in eyes of the public with the Nazi regime,
whose policy they were forced to represent and carry out.
A study which has been made on the subject of the recruitment of
Prussian County Presidents (Landräte), the chief representatives of the
government in rural counties, shows that after nine years of Nazi dom-
ination, only one‐fifth of them were Hitler appointees. About half the
new appointees joined the party before 1933; about 42 percent of the
new appointees were non-professionals, the majority of whom case
from the ranks of the Nazi Party bureaucracy. Those older County
Presidents who survived the Hitler regime and those professionals who
owed their positions to the Nazi government had to give strong and
repeated proofs of loyalty and had to take a prominent part in Nazi
Party activities in order to keep their jobs. The example of the County
Presidents shows to what degree the ranks of the political bureaucracy
have become penetrated by Nazism. Anyone who participated in the
formulation of policy or who had considerable responsibility in the
carrying out of political decisions might be considered a political civil
servant to be removed by MG. Under the Republic and under the Third
Reich the Civil Service Act has contained a list of »Political Civil Ser-
vants« who were liable to instantaneous removal from office according
to the Civil Service Act. The concept of Political Civil Servant as derived
from our definition would be much broader. In addition to a great
number of the closer collaborators of the Political Civil Servants as
enumerated in the Civil Service Act, as well as the Mayors and the Pres-
idents and Vice Presidents of the technical branches of the administra-
tion, it might include everyone who has been an »active« Nazi. It may
be assumed that between seven thousand and eight thousand higher
officials will have to be dismissed during the early stages of occupation.
However, as a number of the positions need no longer be filled, and
as some would be taken over by MG, the immediate replacement need
would not be as high as the number of dismissals.
G. The Problem of Civil Service Replacements
The gaps in the German administration caused by an extensive purge

cannot be filled by MG officials because of insufficient trained person-
nel. However, it would not be good policy to defer the arduous task
of selecting new German personnel. This would be especially true in
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the event that a native German government quickly comes into power.
During a transitional period, many administrative tasks would remain
undone, yet experience has shown that the life of society goes on even
if the traditional administrative machinery ceases to function normally.
In principle, it might seem possible to fill the administrative vacuum
by replacing the higher officials by the middle ranks of officialdom.
Versed in the daily routine, they could carry on under the supervision
of MG the tasks which had been previously handled by academically
trained officials. However, given the peculiar German situation, such
a solution cannot be recommended. Generally speaking, the clerical
service contained a greater proportion of convinced Nazis than did
upper levels; this was especially true of the higher clerical ranks. These
officials, occupying a rank intermediate between the clerical staff and
the academically trained officials, did not develop a trade-union men-
tality to any considerable degree. Their special outlook, which kept
them apart from the lower ranks, made them an easy prey for the Nazi
ideology. That may be one of the reasons why the Nazis were able
to restrict the purge of this category to far fewer officials than those
dismissed in the high category. Only 2.33 percent of the higher clerical,
clerical, and custodial ranks were purged or demoted in Prussia as
against 15.5 percent of the high officials. Therefore, only in exceptional
cases should an official of the clerical or higher clerical service take the
place of a high official.
It thus becomes necessary to consider the problem whether replace-
ments can be obtained outside the present ranks of the German Civil
Service. One source of replacements may be found among the civil
servants who were dismissed or demoted by the Nazis. Although their
number would by no means be sufficient, their employment would
be useful both for psychological and for service reasons. It would
serve notice on the population that the Nazi hold on the Civil Service
has been definitely broken. At the same time, they would provide a
nucleus of civil servants who are not only absolutely trustworthy but
thoroughly familiar with the conditions and practices of the service.
Furthermore, new civil servants may be recruited from the opposition
groups. One might consider the employment of members of opposition
groups wherever feasible, even if they lack the necessary training for
the positions. Their wide range of political and social experience and
the trust which the population places in them would amply compen-
sate for their lack of formal training. A reservoir of administrative
knowledge may also be found in the members of municipal assemblies
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and state diets of the pre-Hitler period, although many of them may be
too old to be of any great service.
If a policy of replacement of unreliable civil servants by energetic
members of the opposition groups is actively pursued there may be a
chance that the narrow esprit de corps of the German bureaucracy, which
proved strong enough to neutralize the few outsiders appointed dur-
ing the Weimar Republic, might be broken. The new elements would
face their task with much greater confidence if they are assured that
they have full MG support to their endeavor to ferret out saboteurs
and hidden attempts to continue Nazi policies and organizations. MG
officials might find themselves confronted with various methods of
passive resistance like slowdowns and all sorts of intentional »misun-
derstandings« which might be difficult to cope with in the absence of a
loyal group of German collaborators. If the new elements should again
be dominated by the old guard, a »united front« of a nationalist civil
service might become the focus of all the forces wishing to oppose the
foreign conqueror. Much therefore depends on a democratic reconstitu-
tion of the German Civil Service. One of the ways in which its structure
might be democratized may be the granting of the right for most classes
of civil servants to organize on trade-union lines.
II. Recommendations
A. Policy towards German Agencies
The following list should be regarded as illustrative rather than defini‐

tive. Agencies and divisions established in order to exploit occupied
countries have not been specifically mentioned but should of course be
dissolved.
1. Agencies Automatically Superseded by Agencies of the

Occupying Power.
a. Presidential Chancellery of the Führer

b. Reich Chancellery
c. High Command of the Armed Forces
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Insofar as disarmament and demobilization come under the authority

of the High Command, they should be transferred to the respective
political and administrative agencies.
d. Reich Air Ministry3
e. Reich Weather Bureau and the German Marine Observatory
It should come under the jurisdiction of the transportation authorities.
Civil aviation should come under the jurisdiction of the transportation
authorities. Questions of international aviation, as far as Germany is
concerned, should be handled by the Allied political authorities.
f. Reich Ministry of Foreign Affairs
The remaining tasks should be transferred to the political authorities.
2. Agencies to be Dissolved because They Disseminate Nazi

Ideology.
a. Reich Ministry of National Enlightenment and Propaganda, includ-

ing the Reich Chamber of Culture. Censorship activities should be
transferred to the office of the political authorities.
b. Reich Ministry of Church Affairs.
c. Academy of German Law under the supervision of the Ministry of
Justice.
d. Reich Ministry of Food and Agriculture: Main Department 10: Con-
servation of Germandom.
e. Agencies under the supervision of Reich Ministry of Science, Edu-
cation, and National Culture, e.g.: Institute of History of New Ger-
many
3. Agencies for War Preparation and for Coordination of Political or

Economic Life.
Some agencies of this character should be dissolved in any case; others

should be dissolved only in case MG finds it unnecessary to use them
for prosecution of its policies in Germany; If they are dissolved their
functions will in certain cases have to be transferred to other agencies.
3 For disarmament and demobilization see 1*c.
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Still others, though they should be retained as a whole, will require

reorganization involving in some instances a closing down of certain
sections.
a. Agencies which Must Be Dissolved
(1) Reich Commissioner for Strengthening of the German Folkdom

(2) Youth Leader of the German Reich
(3) Commissioner General for the Allocation of Labor
b. Agencies to be Dissolved unless Found Necessary for Prosecution

of MG Policies
(1) Offices of the Delegate for the Four-Year Plan and of its sections and
its Commissioners General
The activities of the Reich Commissioner for Price Control should be
transferred to the economic authorities.
The activities of the Section »Currency« should be transferred to the
finance authorities.
The activities of the Section »Forests« should be transferred to the agri-
cultural authorities.
(2) Inspector General for the German Highway System
The functions of the section L, »Reich Highways«, should be trans-
ferred to the transportation authorities.
(3) Inspector General for Water and Power
The functions of the section »Water and Power Division Econ-
omy« should be transferred to the central German authority for trans-
port.
The functions of the Section »Power Economy« should be transferred to
the economic authorities.
(4) Inspector General for Building Activities
Functions to be transferred to health and social welfare authorities (to
be mentioned below).
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(5) Inspector General for Motor Transport

(6) Reich Commissioner for Ocean Shipping
Functions to be transferred to the transportation authorities.
(7) Reich Commissioner for Housing
Functions to be transferred to health and social welfare authorities (see
below).
(8) Reich Ministry of Armaments and Munitions
(9) Office of Large Space Planning
(10)Reich Forestry Office
The functions of the Reich Forestry Office should be transferred to the
agricultural authorities.
(11)Delegate General for Sanitation and Health Service
Functions to be transferred to health and social welfare authorities (see
below).
c. Agencies to be Reorganized
(1) Ministry of the Interior
The following sections of the Ministry of the Interior should be closed

down immediately:
(a) Reich Leader of the SS and Chief of the German Police.
(b) Reich Labor Leader of the Labor Service
(c) Department I, except for Constitution, Legislation, Administration
(d) Department of »Civil Defense and Occupied Territories«
(e) Department IV »Maintenance of Germandom in Frontier Areas«
(f) Department VIII »Sport«
(g) Reich Genealogical Office
(h) Reich Chamber of Physicians
(i) Reich Chamber of Veterinarians
(j) Reich Chamber of Pharmacists
(k) Reich Office of Sports
(l) Reich Academy of Physical Exercise
(m) Technical Corps for Public Emergencies
(n) Office for the Cultivation of the German Language
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Thefollowing offices should be made independent of the supervision of

the Reich Ministry of the Interior or its successors:
(a) Commissioner for Voluntary Nursing
(b) Central Information Office for War Losses and War Graves.
(c) German Local Government Assembly.
(d) Reich Archives
(e) German Red Cross
The activities of the following agencies and divisions of the Ministry of
the Interior should come under the jurisdiction of the health and social
welfare authorities:
(a) Reich Health Office
(b) German Institute for Youth Aid
(c) Department III Veterinary Affairs
(d) Department IV Public Health
(2) Ministry of Justice
The following agencies working under the supervision of the Ministry

of Justice should be abolished:
(a) People’s Court and Special Courts (Sondergerichte)
(b) Reich Chamber of Attorneys
(c) Reich Notary Chamber
(d) Reich Chamber of Patent Attorneys
The abolition of these agencies should not be construed as a prohibition
of the revival of free professional associations in the respective fields.
Care, however, must be taken that Nazi influence is excluded from
these free organizations.
(3) Ministry of Food and Agriculture
The following agencies working under the supervision of the Reich

Ministry of Food and Agriculture should be abolished:
(a) Reich Hereditary Farm Court
(b) Reich Board of Resettlement
(c) Reich Food Estate
(4) Ministry of Labor
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The following divisions and subdivisions of the Ministry of Labor

should be transferred to the agency responsible for housing and social
welfare:
(a) From the Department II b: Social Welfare.
(b) Department IV: land settlement, housing, and city planning.
4. Remaining German Central Agencies.
After the suspension of the agencies mentioned above the structure

of the remaining German central agencies would have the following
pattern:
(1) Finance
(2) Justice
(3) Economic Affairs
(4) Food and Agriculture
(5) Labor
(6) Education
(7) Post
(8) Transportation
(9) Health and Social Welfare
(10)Interior
This pattern may be used, if it is decided to retain German central
agencies, but the pattern might also be useful for the establishing of
administrative MG agencies on the zonal level.
A word seems necessary to explain the presence of a special health
and social welfare agency. No central German welfare administration
existed. Such functions have been handled by the various State welfare
departments and local agencies. Federal functions such as housing or
unemployment relief were handled by the Reich Ministry of Labor.
Some of the public health functions were centralized in the Reich Min-
istry of the Interior. In the post-war period the specific health and wel-
fare problems will increase considerably. A great part of the German
people will have to rely on one or another form of public assistance
– outright dole, assistance for disabled war veterans, or temporary
shelter. These welfare problems should be dealt with separately from
the wage, bargaining, and work problems of those who are gainfully
employed and which will come under the jurisdiction of the Labor
Department. While close collaboration between both departments is
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required, the specific welfare, relief, health, and housing responsibil-

ities should, nevertheless, receive the attention of a separate depart-
ment. At the same time, the Health and Welfare Department would
be utilized by the demobilization section to carry through many of its
administrative acts. Therefore, the Health Department of the Ministry
of Interior, Department IV, should become one of the main departments
of a new Housing and Social Welfare Agency. So also, should Depart-
ment IV of the Ministry of Labor, which centers around housing, and
part of its Department II b, which would form the nucleus of the social
welfare division of the new agency. If war veterans’ care should be
put on a straight welfare basis, it should likewise be included in the
new agency. If, however, legal claims of veterans should be maintained,
it should remain within the Labor Agency. Social insurance, although
many of its aspects are connected with social welfare problems, is more
closely related to the wage structure of gainfully employed workers. Its
transfer to a social welfare agency, indicating a weakening of the legal
position of the insured, would meet vehement political opposition and
should therefore not be considered. The Reich Health Office and the
German Institute of Youth Aid should come under the supervision of
the Housing and Social Welfare Agency.
B. Personnel Problems
If central German agencies should be allowed to function under the

supervision of joint MG, a certain freedom of action might conceivably
be granted to their German personnel. Most positions within the agen-
cies would continue to be filled by Germans, as few MG officials would
have the necessary technical experience to perform these functions sat-
isfactorily. It may even be preferable to name reliable German officials
as heads of the central agencies. In reality, the agencies would in this
case form the initial nucleus for a future German government. They
would, of course, work under general directives of Joint MG and be
subject to its orders. This arrangement may lead to serious frictions.
The German Under-secretaries and their staffs will in all probability
be blamed by their compatriots for orders actually issuing from »Head-
quarters Staff«. Such a state of affairs, however, is best remedied by the
speedy reconstitution of a full‐fledged German government responsible
to the German people.
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Responsibility for administration on the zonal and regional level

should rest with MG officials by the very nature of their work. These
MG officials are, of course, solely responsible in turn to the Allied
central authority. German officials will be excluded from participation
in political decisions, but in regard to administrative functions their
professional knowledge should be used to full advantage. However,
no division of authority between MG and German officials should
be contemplated. Where German officials are employed, they should
function subordinate to the responsible MG official. MG, however, will
hold power only on a temporary basis. Therefore, the question as to
the relation between an MG position and any rights which the official
may possibly derive by virtue of earlier employment in Civil Service is
to be left to the decision of a reconstituted German government. The
personnel should be used wherever its services are most profitable for
MG. In the higher ranks, however, the previous German ratings should
be binding neither for the employment of the official nor for his salary.
MG should refrain from automatically confirming German officials in
their positions. A great number of German central agencies will have
to be closed with the result that automatic confirmation would lead to
overstaffing. It would make it more difficult to dismiss officials or to
transfer them to other agencies. Any order issued at the start of military
occupation concerning the duty of officials to continue work at their
assigned jobs should therefore draw attention to the purely provisional
character of such a measure. Only those higher officials qualified by
their specialized professional knowledge and their absolute political
reliability should be confirmed by MG. No position whatsoever should
go to any official on any level of the service who was a Nazi Party
member before 1 February 1933, or to any official who has participated
in formulating or carrying out political decisions and whose office and
functions have become identified by public opinion with Nazi policies.
Members of resistance groups (trade unionists, intellectual and church
opposition) should be given preference over members of the Civil Ser-
vice in responsible non-technical jobs.
As it does not seem desirable to create special committees to advise
MG, the assignment of members of resistance groups to impor-
tant administrative positions would minimize the danger of MG los-
ing contact with the population. Even if such employment of »out-
siders« should be a source of friction, the value of such a step for MG
as well as for the members of resistance groups would justify such an
undertaking.
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From the very beginning, the German population should be given a

chance to collaborate in the choice of German officials to be used by
MG on every level of the administration.
The fate of the ministerial bureaucracy will vary according to whether
or not there is a central MG for the whole of Germany. If there is,
a part of the central bureaucracy may be utilized, although the prin-
ciple given above will automatically exclude many of its members
from reemployment. Special attention should be given to the difference
between technical and political functions. The Finance, Transportation,
or Labor Ministries will offer more candidates likely to fulfill the MG’s
conditions of employment than the Interior or Justice Departments.
Yet the dissolution of the numerous central agencies will give MG
sufficient material from which to pick the candidates for specialized
employment. On the other hand, if there should be only a zonal MG,
the central agencies will have to be suspended altogether. The function
of their officials should automatically cease with the suspension. Oth-
erwise, central German agencies would continue to function in the
absence of a central MG agency. All central functions being transferred
to zonal MG, no native zonal German MG machinery would exist and
MG with its various departments would have to assume the functions
of all central agencies. It does not seem probable that zonal MG could
absorb a great number of the members of the central bureaucracy. As
zonal MG must concentrate on the problems of a comparatively small
number of regions, it seems more advisable to consider the employ-
ment of officials domiciled in these regions, as they are not only in pos-
session of the necessary technical knowledge, but are also conversant
with the special problems of those regions.4 No employment privileges
for public service should be granted to former members of the police,
the professional army and uninjured war veterans. MG will have full
freedom in recruiting the German professional staff from the best avail-
able materials.5
No pension should be granted to those who have not been reemployed
by MG. Whatever the hardships which may be imposed on some of
them, it would seem unjustified to grant former officials’ preferential
treatment in the form of pensions. A special decision should be made
in each case when an official asks to be pensioned while working under
MG. Each case should be decided on its merits, that is, by taking into
4 As to Civil Service problems on the regional and local level see the Guides on
local and regional administrations.
5 See the Guide »Elimination of Fundamental Nazi Political Laws«.
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consideration the achievements and the political attitude shown by the

official during his employment with MG. The right of MG to decide
each request on its own merits will be a powerful influence for keeping
the older officials in line during the MG period. It should, however, be
made clear from the outset that the ultimate decision on all pension
rights will lie in the hands of the next constitutional German govern-
ment and that MG measures are valid only during the period of MG
government.
The purge and reform of the German Civil Service will necessitate
changes in Civil Service legislation.6 Most of the provisions of the Ger-
man Civil Service Act of 26 January 1937,7 which has replaced most of
the State Civil Service regulations in force under the Weimar Republic,
are of a merely technical nature, as are the numerous executory decrees
and rules appended to this act. But the law establishes a number of
principles based on and permeated by the Nazi ideology; these should
be annulled. The principles to be abrogated may be put in the following
categories:
(1) Provisions which establish a duty of loyalty towards the Führer and
the National Socialist State.8
(2) Provisions granting the party authorities certain rights in connec-
tion with Civil Service appointments or dismissals,9 or ranking
party membership a prerequisite for Civil Service appointments,10
or granting preferences and special privileges to party members.11
(3) Provisions legalizing discrimination on racial grounds.12
6 Cf. CA Guide »Elimination of Fundamental Nazi Political Laws«.

7 RGBl., I, 1937, H, 39, 186.
8 E.g., Preamble; pars. 1, 2, and 3; pars. 3, 1 and 2; par. 4; par. 26, 3; par. 42, 2 of the
Civil Service Act.
9 E.g. par. 31, Civil Service Act; par. 26 of the executory decree of 29 June 1937
(RGBl., I, 669); decree of the Führer of 26 March 1942 (RGBl., I, 1942, H, 153).
10 E.g. par. 2 of Decree Concerning the Training and Career of German Civil
Servants, of 28 February 1939 (RGBl., I, 1939, H, 371).
11 E.g. par. 85, Civil Service Act; Decree of the Führer Establishing General Princi-
ples for the Appointment and Promotion of Civil Servants of the Reich and the
Länder of 14 October 1936 (RGBl., I, 893), 4 (3), 8, 12: order of the Reich Minister
of the Interior of 4 April 1937 (RGBl., I.V., 515); Law Concerning Preferential
Treatment and Pensions for the Fighters for the National Revolution, of 27
February 1934 (RGBl., I, 133).
12 E.g., Civil Service Act pars. 5, 25, 59, 72.
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245
[4.]
Civil Affairs Handbook Germany
Section 3: Legal Affairs*
[1944]
Introduction
Purpose of the Civil Affairs Handbooks.
The basic objectives, of Civil Affairs Officers are: (1) to assist the
Commanding General by quickly establishing those orderly conditions
which will contribute most effectively to the conduct of military opera-
tions, (2) to reduce to a minimum the human suffering and the material
damage resulting from disorder, and (3) to create the conditions which
will make it possible for civilian agencies to function effectively.
The preparation of Civil Affairs Handbooks is a part of the effort to
carry out these responsibilities as efficiently and humanely as possible.
The Handbooks do not deal with plans or policies, which will depend
upon changing and unpredictable developments. It should be clearly
understood that they do not imply any given official program of action.
They are, rather, ready reference source books containing the basic
factual information needed for planning and policy-making.
I. Administration of Justice in Germany
A. The Development of a Unified Legal System
In 1869 the German states convened to organize a Supreme Commer-

cial Court (Reichsoberhandelsgericht) in Leipzig. As its name shows, the
jurisdiction of this court was restricted to commercial cases only. Inso-
far as commercial law is concerned, there existed at an early period
a unified legislation for the German states – first in the Uniform Law
of Bills of Exchange (Wechselrecht) of 1848 and then in the Uniform
* [Erschienen am 29. Februar 1944 im Civil Affairs Handbook, das Teil des Army
Service Forces Manual war. – Zu diesem Text vergleiche in der Einleitung
S. 38-46.]
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246 [4.] Civil Affairs Handbook Germany Section 3: Legal Affairs [1944]
Commercial Code (Handelsgesetzbuch) of 1861. After the foundation of

the empire, in 1871, the complete unification of German law made
quick progress. Procedural rules and principles of court organization as
well as bankruptcy proceedings were unified between 1877 and 1879. In
1879 the former Supreme Commercial Court became the German
Supreme Court (Reichsgericht) with judges chosen from the ranks of the
judiciary of the several states. The unification of the civil law, the rules
of executing judgments against real property, land registration, and
rules for ex parte procedure had to wait until the turn of this century.
Yet the last step, the unification of the various ministries of justice, did
not take place. Under the empire as well as under the Weimer Republic,
some of the most vital administrative tasks, the right to appoint judges
and prosecutors as well as the execution of sentences, remained a jeal-
ously guarded prerogative of the individual states. Under the empire,
and to a considerable extent under the Republic, the Reichsjustizrat or,
as it was called under the Republic, the Reich Ministry of Justice, was
predominantly a ministry of legislation. Legislation, to an increasing
extent under the Empire, and almost exclusively so under the Weimar
Republic, had become federal legislation. Yet, the anomaly of a highly
unified federal law and a court system administered by the individual
states lasted until 1934 – 1935. In the summer of 1934 the Prussian
Ministry of Justice was merged with the Reich Ministry of Justice. In
April 1935 the entire administration of justice was transferred to the
Reich and the ministries of justice of the individual states ceased to
function.
B. The Court System
In spite of this divided authority of supervision and appointment, the

German court system was well organized and highly unified even
before the advent of Hitler.
1. The Local Courts (Amtsgerichte).
The basis of the court system is formed by 2,052 local courts.1 They
have jurisdiction in small civil cases, and in probate and guardianship
1 The figures are given by Secretary of State Rothenberger in his book on the »Ger-
man Judge«, 1943, as quoted in National Zeitung Essen, 9 October 1943; they
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[4.] Civil Affairs Handbook Germany Section 3: Legal Affairs [1944] 247
cases; at the same time they are registrars of deeds, they supervise
the execution of judgments, and decide on complaints against their
execution. Recently the local courts have been given wide power to
clear up the small creditor-debtor relations, which were affected by
the pre-Hitler crisis and more recently by the war.2 Before the war,
appeal was permitted from most decisions of the local courts except
very trivial ones. Appeals from the local courts went to the district
courts, and second appeals, whenever they were admitted, went to the
court of appeals. The local courts, at least until 1932, also exercised
original criminal jurisdiction in all cases except those which went to a
jury. Whenever the law requires the local court to sit with lay assessors
this, the Schöffengericht, was attached to a large local court including in
its ranks judges specializing in criminal cases.
»Lay assessors are laymen selected to sit on the bench with the judges,
occupying a position somewhat in between that of juryman (the Schöf-
fengericht is not a jury court) and referees (the lay assessors do not act
independently of the judges).«
Less important criminal cases are handled by the single judge of the
local courts.
A local court, outside of cities, exercises jurisdiction over areas inhab-
ited by approximately thirty thousand to forty thousand people. There
existed 649 local courts with one judge only, generally serving rural
areas and small towns. In the course of the war a large number were
closed and their activities were transferred to local courts in larger com-
munities. In the summer and autumn of 1943 the government began
tentatively to build up a system of justices of the peace (Friedensrichter),3
who took over part of the work of the single-judge local courts. These
justices of the peace are not required to have legal education, but are
picked for their political services. They are more »reliable« than the
small-town judge, who sometimes seems to have shown a tendency
to form the backbone of the local opposition against Party and gov-
ernment. There are 633 local courts having two judges and 330 with
three judges. The remaining judges are attached to courts in the larger
probably compare the pre-1938 territory only, and do not take into consideration
the recent closing of numerous small local courts.
2 Decree of 3 September 1940, RGBl. (Reichsgesetzblatt), I, 1209 (a reformulation of
earlier decrees).
3 These have a somewhat different function from that of American justices of the
peace.
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localities.4 The jurisdiction of those local courts may extend to several

hundred thousand people, and in such a case the various duties of the
local courts are split up among several judges. Internally the organiza-
tion and supervision of the work of the local courts with more than one
judge is in the hands of a senior judge (Aufsichtsführender Richter). He
is sometimes given the title of Oberamtsrichter, Amtsgerichtsdirektor, or
Amtsgerichtspräsident in accordance with the size or importance of the
court.
2. The District Courts (Landsgerichte).
Original jurisdiction in more important civil cases and certain cat-

egories of criminal cases, and some appellate jurisdiction concerning
decisions of local courts, is exercised by 183 district courts serving
an average of five hundred thousand people. The president of the
district court is called Landgerichtspräsident. The presiding judge of a
division of the court bears the title Landsgerichtsdirektor. As a civil court,
its divisions – at least until the outbreak of the war – sat with three
professional judges; its commercial division (Kammer für Handelssachen)
and its labor division (Landesarbeitsgericht), with one professional judge
and two expert lay assessors.5 Since the beginning of the war a single
professional judge has in most cases superseded the three professional
judges.
As a criminal court the Landgericht sat until 1924 in divisions consisting
of five professional judges (Strafkammer), or as a jury court (Schwurge-
richt) composed of three professional judges and twelve jurymen. After
1924 the Landgericht, except in respect of the jury court, lost its original
jurisdiction in criminal cases, and the composition of the jury court
was drastically changed (See Section IV F). The jury court convened
periodically at the seat of the district court. In 1932 the Strafkammer
was reconstituted as a court of three professional judges and six lay
assessors to take charge of very big, so-called »monster« trials. At the
outbreak of the war, the lay element was completely eliminated and the
4 See New Digest 1,284, quoting National Zeitung Essen, 9 October 1943, reviewing
the book of Dr. Rothenberger, until December 1943 Secretary of State in the Min-
istry of Justice. [Diese Anmerkung ist im Original nicht eindeutig zugeordnet.].
5 See Chapter 2 on Labor Law in Section IX of this Handbook. [Diese Anmerkung
verweist auf ein Kapitel aus dem Civil Affairs Handbook, das nicht von Otto
Kirchheimer verfasst wurde und daher auch nicht in diesen Band aufgenommen
wurde.]
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jury court abolished. The chairman of the Strafkammer was empowered

to bear cases alone if the issue should be simple, in respect to questions
of both law and fact.
3. The Courts of Appeal.
Appeals from decisions of the district courts and second appeals from
decisions of the local courts go to appeal courts (Oberlandesgerichte)
of which there are thirty-four. The court is presided over by an Ober-
landesgerichtspräsident. He is the administrative head of all the courts
in his district and is directly responsible to the Minister of Justice. It
is through the Oberlandesgerichtspräsident that the Ministry of Justice
recently initiated a system of close controls over the judges in the differ‐
ent districts. The presidents of the appeal courts are called more and
more frequently to the Ministry of Justice in order to receive the most
recent directives. The president of a division sitting with three members
is called Senatspräsident.
In some cases the boundaries of an appeal court district coincide with
the territory of one of the small states; in this event the appeal court
also exercises final jurisdiction insofar as questions of state law are
concerned. In Prussia, the largest individual state, in which at least
one appeal court was established for each province, final jurisdiction in
questions of state law rests with the Kammergericht, the historic court
of the electors and kings of Prussia, which later became the appeal
court of the province of Brandenburg and of the capital, Berlin. Bavaria,
with its particularism, had a special State Supreme Court of its own
for questions concerning State law. It existed side by side with three
regular Bavarian appeal courts, one of which also sat in Munich.
4. The Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court (Reichsgericht) in Leipzig forms the apex of this

pyramid. The more important legal questions involving the interpreta-
tion of Reich law are referred to it. Appeals from the decisions of the
appeal courts, whenever such are admitted, go to the Supreme Court.
To the Supreme Court go also appeals from the decisions of the Court
of Assizes as well as those of the criminal divisions of the district
courts. German jurisprudence professes a strict separation between
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appeals leading to a re-examination of factual questions (Berufung)

and those restricted to questions of law (Revision). Whereas the appeal
courts exercised jurisdiction in some categories of Berufung as well as
of Revision, the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court was restricted to the
examination of legal issues (Revision). Of course, in Germany no more
than in any other country was this distinction rigidly observed. »Mixed
questions of law and fact« came up as often as they do in the United
States, and the Supreme Court, especially in criminal cases, invented
the category of »judicial facts«, when it felt a need to probe below the
surface.
The President of the Supreme Court (Reichsgerichtspräsident), the Pres-
ident of the divisions (Senatspräsident) and the members (Reichgerichts-
rat) are appointed by the Führer. The present President, Bumke, an
authority in the field of criminal law and prison administration, is a
holdover from the Weimar period. Because he passed the statutory
retirement age of sixty-eight in 1939, his tenure of office was extended
by special decree.6 The Supreme Court functions in divisions of five
members (Senat). Though principles of law laid down by the divisions
of the Supreme Court bind only the parties before the court, there are
certain devices used to secure a minimum of uniformity among the
various divisions of the court. When one division wishes to deviate
from a rule laid down by another division, »Great Senates« or, in some
cases, the Plenum consisting of all members, is convened. The cumber-
some procedure was simplified somewhat in 1935, but in most cases
the divisions avoid open conflict between their decisions by a highly
sophisticated art of distinguishing the cases and principles in question.
The binding force of precedent has never played the same role in Ger-
man law as in the Anglo-American system. The Supreme Court, like
any other court, may freely reverse itself. Decisions of the Supreme
Court are binding upon the lower courts only in the particular case
in question. If a case is sent back from the Supreme Court to a lower
court, the law must be applied as laid down by the Supreme Court.
Otherwise a lower court is free to follow legal constructions of its own
choosing, even though they do not follow the lines elaborated by the
Supreme Court. Generally, however, the courts follow well-established
rules laid down by the Supreme Court. Yet under the Third Reich, more
often than in the past decisions of the lower courts have deviated from
established principles, thus pointing the way for the Supreme Court.
6 Decree of 4 July 1939, RGBl., I, 1089.
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Under the Weimar Republic only three courts or court-systems func-

tioned independently of the civil courts: (1) the administrative courts;
(2) the Kartelltribunal, which was later incorporated into the Reich Eco-
nomic Court (Reichswirtschaftsgericht) (See Chapter V)7; and (3) the sys-
tem of finance courts headed by the Reichsfinanzhof in Munich, which
was the highest authority for controversies between the tax collector
and the tax payer.
Administratively, these courts did not stem from the Ministry of Justice.
The Patent Office (Reichspatentamt), however, under whose jurisdiction
come controversies over patent rights, and against whose decisions
appeal could be taken to the Reichsgericht, has from its beginning been
under the authority of the Reich Ministry of Justice.
C. Development of the Court System under the Third Reich
The policy of the Third Reich has led to a unification of the judicial
system on a territorial basis. State courts henceforth ceased to exist.
Thus, development that had been long under way has found its logical
conclusion. Today there are only Reich courts. But in another important
respect, the Nazi system of administration of justice has moved far
away from the concept of a unified body of law administered, if not
exclusively, at least preponderantly, by the civil courts. The Third Reich
has rapidly dissolved the liberal system of civil courts and has replaced
it more and more by a twofold system of special jurisdiction. In sharp
contrast to the liberal system, special courts abound for special cases
and special groups of persons.
1. Special Courts for Special Categories of Cases.
Except for the above-mentioned administrative courts, the courts deal-

ing with special classes of cases (such as the commercial divisions
of the district courts and the labor courts) had under the Weimar
Republic already been integrated into the System of civil courts. In
some instances this system of coordination continued under the Third
Reich. Thus, the Eugenics Court (Erbgesundheitsgericht) was installed
7 [Diese Anmerkung verweist auf ein Kapitel aus dem Civil Affairs Handbook, das
nicht von Otto Kirchheimer verfasst wurde und daher auch nicht in diesen Band
aufgenommen wurde.]
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at the seat of certain local courts, and the Superior Eugenics Courts
(Obergesundheitsgerichte) at the seats of certain courts of appeal. They
sat with two physicians. The local Hereditary Farm Court (Anerbenge-
richt), sitting with one professional judge and two landowners, likewise
was established at the seat of the local courts. Against their decisions
an appeal could be taken to a Superior Hereditary Farm Court, func-
tioning at the seat of the court of appeal with three judges and two
landowners (Erbhofgericht). In Prussia the jurisdiction of the Superior
Hereditary Farm Court has been centralized in a State Hereditary Farm
Court sitting in Celle (Landeserbhofgericht). Under certain conditions the
decisions of the Superior Hereditary Farm Court could be attacked
before a Supreme Hereditary Farm Court (Reichserbhofgericht), function-
ing in divisions with three judges and three landowners. This court has
been installed at the Ministry of Food and Agriculture, its president
being the Minister of Agriculture. It sits with career judges or officials
of the Ministry as its professional members.8 This arrangement guaran-
tees the centralization of the hereditary farm jurisdiction in the hands
of the agricultural bureaucracy.
The most important special agencies deciding particular types of cases
are, however, to be found in the realm of criminal law. After the first
war there were established certain special courts to deal with cases aris-
ing from the social and political disturbances of the post-war period.
Although their scope of activity as well as the period for which they
had been installed was strictly limited, they immediately met serious
opposition on political and constitutional grounds and were never
revived under the Republic. Directly after their access to power the
National Socialists adopted the practice of establishing special courts
(Sondergerichte). They were created on an extensive scale after the von
Papen government took the first tentative step in this direction. After
the Reichstag fire, on 21 March 1933, special courts were installed to
combat the political activity of the adversaries of the Nazi system. Their
jurisdiction continued to increase, and every new decree has added
new crises or has transferred to them jurisdiction in regard to old
laws, with the result that they are now to be considered as the regular
criminal jurisdiction for more serious offenses. They are established at
the seat of the district courts and function with three members sitting.
Even before the procedural innovations of the Third Reich did away
with judicial independence and procedural guarantees, these courts,
the members of which were picked by the Ministry of Justice and
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for the benefit of which procedural rules were discarded, became the
foremost vehicles for the enforcement of the government’s criminal law.
The most conspicuous of the new criminal agencies is the People’s
Court (Volksgerichtshof). It was established in June 19349 to handle all
cases of high treason, which after the defeat of the prosecution in the
Reichstag fire trial, in the autumn of 1933, had been removed from the
jurisdiction of the Reichsgericht. The jurisdiction of the People’s Court
has several times been extended to include attacks on members of the
Reich government, damage to materials of national defense (Wehrmittel‐
beschädigung), and sabotage. The court is destined to place the finishing
touch to the work of the Gestapo in cases where a certain amount of
publicity and the observation of a formal procedure seems desirable.
The court, first presided over by Thierack, the present Minister of
Justice, is now headed by Roland Freisler, who until the summer of
1942 was Secretary of State in the Reich Ministry of Justice. He is a
zealous executor of Nazi concepts of criminal law and acts at the same
time as self-appointed drill-sergeant for the entire legal profession. The
court has different sections, which travel, if need be, throughout the
country in order to act swiftly and ostentatiously. The sections sit with
five members – two of them professional judges and three of them
members appointed by Hitler from the SS and Party ranks »on account
of their special knowledge of defense against subversive activities, or
because they are intimately connected with the political trend of the
nation«. The abolition of lay assessors in 1939 has not affected the »spe-
cialists« of the People’s Court. Less important treason cases may be
turned over to the criminal divisions of the appeals courts. There is no
appeal against decisions of the special courts of the People’s Court, or
the criminal division of the appeal courts.
2. Special Courts for Special Categories of Persons.
Military courts, which had been abolished by the Weimar Constitution

except for personnel on board men-of-war, were reestablished by the
Law of 12 May 193310 in fulfilment of a pledge given to the army.
Following the old imperial code of Military Procedure (Militärgerichts-
ordnung) of 1898, Lower Military Courts (Kriegsgerichte), Military Courts
of Appeal (Oberkriegsgerichte) were set up. All offenses committed by
9 Decree of 12 and 29 June 1943, RGBl., I, 492617.

10 RGBl., I, 264.
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members of the armed forces, as well as of the administrative personnel

of the forces, fall under their jurisdiction. Gradually the Labor Service
members also were exempted from the jurisdiction of the civil courts
and were made subject to the criminal jurisdiction of the Labor Service
hierarchy. Relatively early, too, the Party Tribunal under Major Buch
was established. Not only does it rule exclusively over the relationship
between the Party and its members, but its rather informal proceedings
extend to all acts of important Party members which are prejudicial to
the Party’s good name. On this basis Buch took a preeminent part in
the »blood purge« of 30 June 1934. The Party also places restrictions on
members who wish to take personal differences with other Party mem-
bers before the civil courts; they are discouraged from doing so without
the permission of the Party hierarchy, although failure to ask for this
permission seems to affect only the standing of the members within the
Party and not to exclude the admissibility of the complaint by the civil
court. In 1939 and 1940 the exemption of the Higher SS staffs, of the
SS Troops for Special Tasks (SS-Verfügungstruppe), of the SS Deathhead
Formations (SS-Totenkopfverbände), the SS Junker Schools, and of police
forces for special operations, from the jurisdiction of the civil courts –
an exemption which de facto had been largely in existence for some
time – was formally confirmed.11 The 1939 and 1940 decrees remove
such organizations from the jurisdiction not only of civil courts but
also of the military courts and the courts-martial. A complete hierarchy
of SS courts has been built up instead. The SS courts sit with one pro-
fessional judge and two assessors from the ranks of the above-named
organizations; superior courts sit with two professional judges and
three assessors, as does the Hauptamt-SS Tribunal in München-Starn-
berg, which is the highest SS court. While Himmler has the power to
inaugurate, supervise, and cancel, as well as to confirm and execute
proceedings and sentences, the actual presidency of the Hauptamt-SS
Tribunal, with its three subdivisions for disciplinary matters, legal
affairs, and liaison, is held by Franz Breithaupt, the Lieutenant-General
of the Military SS. The SS courts not only have jurisdiction over the
entire personnel working in the above-named organizations, but also
replace civil courts in proceedings against persons who have attacked
members of the SS and police forces. The fact that disciplinary as well
as penal proceedings against members of special organizations such
as the Labor Service and the SS are reserved to special service courts
11 Decree of 17 October 1939 and Executive Decree of 1 November 1939; RGBl., I,

2109, 2293, and Decree of 17 April 1940, RGBl., I, 649.
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guarantees the complete subservience of the service members to the

hierarchy of their organization.
This far-reaching process of departmentalization, the disappearance of
a unified system of law behind innumerable special jurisdictions, is one
of the distinctive features of the legal system of the Third Reich. The
process is supplemented by the frequent denial of court review for the
most divergent types of cases. At the beginning of 1934, when the so-
called »Statute for the Adjustment of Civil Law Claims«12 closed access
to civil courts to all those who had been forced to transfer their prop-
erty to Party-sponsored enterprises for purely nominal consideration, it
could still be argued that this was an exceptional measure for a strictly
limited period. Not only was the life of the above-mentioned statute
extended, but the number of statutes and decrees which excluded
recourse to civil courts kept on increasing. They are predominant in the
numerous orders regulating agriculture, prohibiting or restricting cer-
tain lines of production, or giving administrative sections of the Food
Estate (Reichsnährstand) the right to grant, restrict, or deny quotas. They
also dominate the numerous expropriation decrees superseding Article
153 of the Weimar Constitution, which granted full indemnity and free
access to the courts for all expropriation claims. The new legislation
leaves the decision in the hands of the administrative agencies; at best it
provides for some form of administratively sponsored arbitration.13
In general, civil courts have lost much of their earlier importance as
impartial agencies for deciding differences between various groups and
between individuals. Moreover, even if a party should be able to obtain
a favorable judgment in a civil suit, the numerous legal as well as extra-
legal restrictions which render the execution of a judgment a difficult
and intricate affair often make recourse to legal action inadvisable. The
statistics clearly bear out the decline of the civil courts. Thus the regis-
ters of the district courts, the main agencies for the handling of more
important civil suits, show a decline from 319,000 civil cases in the
prosperity year 1929 to 112,000 for the Nazi prosperity year, 1937.14 The
decline has affected the district courts more than the local courts, the
latter increasingly taking on the character of administrative offices for
12 30 December 1934, RGBl., I, 1235.

13 A list of the different forms of expropriation procedures in W. Weber, »Das
Problem der öffentlich‐rechtlichen Entschädigung«, in Das Deutsche Verwaltungs-
recht (ed. by H. Frank, Berlin 1937), pp. 468-484.
14 Deutsche Justiz, C (1938), 1140.
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the handling of the more individualized affairs of the average lower-

middle or lower-class citizen.
D. The Court Personnel
1. Legal Training.
The career of a prospective judge, a prosecutor, or lawyer, as well as

of higher administrative officials, begins with three years’ study of law
at a university. The curriculum embraces the major fields of public and
private law. The other social sciences are taught only in their broad
principles. Under the Nazis the study of the principles of Roman law
was replaced by a greater emphasis on the historical foundations of
Germanic law. The curriculum was generally rearranged to bring out
the beneficial impact of the Nazi revolution on the development of
social as well as legal institutions. At the end of this three-year period,
the candidate appears before a board of examiners composed of univer-
sity professors, judges, and higher administrative officials. He is sub-
jected to a written as well as an oral examination. Since September 1943
only two years of study have been required from candidates who have
been wounded in the war or have fought in the front lines.15 Soldiers
and ex-soldiers are examined by special boards composed »exclusively
of former front-line combatants«. After having passed the examination,
an »Aryan« and politically reliable candidate must undergo a three
years’ training period designed to make him conversant with all phases
of legal administration. In principle no remuneration is paid during
this period, but beginning in 1919 needy and deserving Referendare, as
they were called, could be granted a small stipend, rarely exceeding
100 RM a month. During this time the Referendar sits in with all the
sections of the local and district courts, and works half a year with an
attorney; a few months are spent in the prosecutor’s office and with
an appeal court; since 1933 the Referendar has been required also to
spend two months in an educational camp which provides a semi-mil-
itary training and emphasizes political education. At the end of the
training the Referendar is called before the central examination board
which has been attached to the Reich Ministry of Justice since 1935.
The examination, which is both written and oral, stresses the practical
aspects of legal training. Special privileges were granted in 1933 to
15 Decree of 1 September 1943, Deutsche Justiz, p. 432.
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those candidates who have spent part of their time in the service of
the National Socialist Party, and similar provisions reappear in the war
legislation in favor of soldiers or ex-soldiers.
Theoretically, every Gerichtsassessor (as a candidate who has success-
fully passed the examination before the central board is called) is eli-
gible for the position of a judge or prosecutor. Yet as the number of
Gerichtsassessoren was always several times greater than the number of
available positions under the Jurisdiction of the Ministry of Justice, only
the best‐qualified people could hope for an appointment; the majority
had to look for positions elsewhere or enter private practice. But only in
very exceptional circumstances could even those qualified for appoint-
ment to the judicial administration hope to obtain a permanent position
before a number of years; if there existed no vacancy which could be
temporarily filled by a substitute, they simply remained unemployed.
National Socialism solved the problem of the overcrowding of the judi-
cial and prosecutor’s career by eliminating all substitutes who had
not found a permanent job within ten years after having passed the
examination. From 1935 on, every Gerichtsassessor was automatically
withdrawn from the service if he had not been formally admitted to
the administration of justice after a probationary year.16 The number of
Gerichtsassessoren had meanwhile increased rather markedly in spite of
the elimination of all Jews from the ranks of the judicial administration.
From 3,855 in 1933 the number increased to 5,696 in 1935. The number
of all permanent judgeships and public prosecutors17 does not exceed
fourteen to fifteen thousand. The war preparation, with the ensuing
extension of all administrative services, gave at least a temporary
respite to the supernumerary substitutes, who could easily be placed in
the ranks of the numerous new administrative offices, especially after
the beginning of the policy of territorial aggrandizement.
2. The Judiciary.
Under the Republic judges were appointed by the respective State gov-
ernments. Since the unification of judicial administration under the
Third Reich they have been appointed by the Führer on the recommen-
dation of the Ministry of Justice. The Chief of the Party Chancellery,
however, has a right to be heard before the appointment takes place.

17 The prosecutors among them number between 1,000 and 2,500.
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Before the advent of National Socialism, a judge once appointed was

irremovable; he had a right not only to his salary but also to the office
to which he had been appointed. Within a tribunal composed of several
members he could be assigned to new duties only at the beginning
of the administrative year. The court presidency, which did the assign-
ing, was not subject to administrative orders. The government could
remove a judge only by offering him advancement or by instituting a
formal disciplinary action before a disciplinary court composed of his
peers. This security of tenure (guaranteed by Article 104 of the Weimar
Constitution) was qualified by the Ministry’s right to appoint a legally
qualified substitute for a temporary vacancy. For reasons of economy
– substitutes were drawing much smaller salaries – the practice of
appointing substitutes was very widespread. As the advancement of
the substitute was entirely dependent upon the recommendation of
the judges with whom he was working, this system, far from securing
greater influence for the Ministry of Justice, only helped to cement the
solidarity of the judiciary as a whole.
It is rather obvious that the prospect of six to seven years’ study and
professional preparation, and of several years more as a poorly paid
and insecure substitute, automatically excluded from a judicial career
those who had to earn their livelihood and could give only a minimum
of time to professional education. The statistics bear out this fact. In
1931, 46.8 percent of the students enrolled in German law schools came
from the upper class, 49.1 percent from the middle class, and 3.5 per-
cent from the lower classes. In the middle class itself the number of
students coming from families of clerical civil servant status is dispro-
portionately high. Twenty-eight percent of all university students come
from the group of clerical government employees.18
During the first half of the nineteenth century the legal profession,
recruited principally from the ranks of the professions, merchants,
and industrialists, as well as from the middle ranks of government
employees, sided with moderate liberalism in its fight against the pre-
rogatives of the crown and the conservatives. However, by the end
of the century the interests of the landowning and industrial classes
had been reconciled. Political liberalism broke up into a doctrinaire
left-wing progressive party and the national liberals who became more
and more bent upon an imperialist policy of expansion. When the
administrative bureaucracy took to coordinating all »healthy« elements
18 The figures are taken from Svend Riemer, »Sozialer Aufstieg und Klassensich-
tung« in Archiv für Sozialwissenschaften und Sozialpolitik, LXVII (1932), p. 531.
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against the ever increasing ranks of the Social Democrats, the judiciary
had already become stronghold of all »loyal« forces. Its conservativism
continued to increase under the Weimar Republic for social as well
as for political reasons. The judiciary had always been proud of its
proverbial incorruptibility. Nevertheless, in a rigidly hierarchical Ger-
man society it had to maintain a certain standard. Under the monarchy
the meager salaries – meager at least in comparison with the rewards
which society offered to the successful lawyer, banker, and business
administrator – were often supplemented by a private income acquired
through inheritance or marriage. This private income was swept away
during the inflation, and the official was forced to rely exclusively on
his salary. At the same time, the revolution increased the power of the
working classes, thereby shattering the hierarchical structure of society,
which, if it did not give great power to the judge, at least gave him
unquestioned authority and security. The judge felt humiliated by all
these developments and instinctively sought to take revenge on those
whom he held responsible for the evil days which had befallen him –
the war profiteers, the foreigners, the radical workers. In following this
course, he became a nationalist as well as a champion of the cause of
the newly disinherited of the nation – the independent middle class.
In the trial of the German war criminals following the First World
War, the Supreme Court Justices, vigorously seconded by Attorney
General Ebermayer, assumed leadership in the fight for revision of the
Versailles treaty. The Supreme Court continued this policy by covering
up the Army’s rearmament policy with a rather extensive interpretation
of the treason articles of the penal code, and tried to catch in this trap
all those writers and journalists who had ventured to probe into the
secrets of the »Black Reichswehr«. By inventing the concept of an extra-
legal necessity (Übergesetzlicher Notstand), the Court was able to leave
unpunished the numerous assassinations perpetrated by the »Black
Reichswehr« and its nationalist allies against alleged traitors in their
ranks.
In the period after 1924 the courts attempted to come to the aid of
the hard-pressed middle class. They blasted away at the fiction »Mark
-Mark«, thus forcing the government to enact legislation in favor of
some of the middle-class elements which had suffered grievously dur-
ing the inflation. At the same time the courts, especially the Supreme
Court, became the champion of real-estate interests, whose fight against
progressive housing policies it aided by a rather broad interpretation of
the concept of expropriation. During these battles the German Supreme
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Court fortified its position by assuming a right to examine the constitu-

tionality of federal laws. Under the monarchy the courts had exercised
such a right only in regard to executive decrees and State laws, and the
Weimar constitution had avoided taking a stand on the question.
This judiciary, irremovable as it was, was the less responsive to govern-
mental pressure from its awareness that it represented the attitude of
very powerful social groups. As the administration had the power of
appointment, some State administrations, notably the Prussian, made
timid attempts to place in office judges whose opinions were more
in sympathy with the opinions of the moderate left-wing parties. But
even in Prussia, where between 1920 and 1932 the Ministry of Justice
was held by successive appointees of the Catholic Center Party, this
policy never went very far. Generally speaking, the esprit de corps of the
German judges, united in the powerful and authoritative Judges’ Asso-
ciation (Deutscher Richterverein), was very strongly developed. The few
outsiders had only the alternative of conforming to the prevailing social
pattern or of exhausting themselves in ineffectual protests. The associa-
tion of Republican Judges (Republikanischer Richterbund), founded in the
late twenties, may have helped an occasional democrat or socialist to
a better position and have criticized some judgments. It was, however,
completely powerless to make any inroad upon the spirit and activities
of the judiciary at large.
Thus it was quite natural that in 1935 the overwhelming majority of
the German judiciary, although they had voted or held membership in
more conservative groups, welcomed the new government. In numer-
ous political defamation and perjury trials, and in some isolated trea-
son trials of the 1931 – 1933 period, the German judiciary as a whole
showed itself sympathetic towards the National Socialist Party and
its propaganda needs. Sentences of Party members in general were
light; protection of Nazis who came into conflict with left-wing groups
was efficacious and swift. More often than not, Nazi Party members
were offered every opportunity to use the courtroom for propaganda
purposes.
Immediately after the rise of National Socialism to power, the political
and social role of the judiciary declined. To a certain degree, it even
formed the nucleus for a conservative opposition to the new power.
Whereas under the Republic the judges had arrogated to themselves
the roles of defenders of the realm against the political and social
ambitions of the Left, as well as guardians of the rearmament effort,
the new government considered these tasks as its exclusive domain.
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The claim of the judiciary to control of the constitutionality of all fed-

eral laws immediately became obsolete under a regime which in effect
had replaced the written constitution by the changing commands of
the Führer. The judge’s power to interpret the law became ineffectual
when an irksome judicial decision could immediately, if need be, be
retroactively nullified by governmental decree or law. Yet, occasions for
frictions were numerous, and they invariably resulted in a further nar-
rowing of the sphere conceded to the judiciary and in its replacement
by numerous special agencies.
The first major difficulties arose from the Reichstag fire trial, where
it became evident that the judges, though in general sympathy with
the political aims of the government, were not sufficiently inclined to
take shortcuts in the established procedural rules in order to save the
government from a defeat. Private claims against the state, as well as
claims for acts of officials in the exercise of their office, fall under the
jurisdiction of the civil courts, which had always spent much of their
time prior to the Third Reich in examining such damage claims. Torts
committed by officials result primarily in their own liability, but the
Weimar Constitution had taken over the principle, already established
in many federal states, that the state must assume liability and defend
the case in ordinary courts. In revolutionary times the boundary line
between private and public action is bound to become indistinct and
therefore to give frequent occasion for such damage suits. But whereas
after the Revolution of 1918 the civil courts were powerful enough
to enforce obedience to their writs and to establish the civil and crimi-
nal responsibility of the revolutionary authorities, the Nazi authorities
refused from the outset to subject their acts to the scrutiny of the courts.
The courts were not regarded as competent to examine »political ques-
tions«; these were declared to come under the exclusive jurisdiction
of the government. The concept of »political question« assumed in the
Third Reich an all-embracing character, and extended from measures
of protective custody to granting or refusing of drivers’ licenses or
granting or refusing of birth certificate copies by the registrar.
As early as April 1933 the politically unreliable judges were either dis-
missed or demoted.19 In 1937 all judges were made subject to the pre-
scriptions of the Civil Service Act (Reichsbeamten‐Gesetz) and of the dis-
ciplinary rules for Reich officials (Reichsdienststrafordnung).20 Although
the judges retain the right to be tried for offenses committed in per-
19 RGBl., I, 175.
20 26 January 1937, RGBl., 39, 71.
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formance of their judicial duties before a special disciplinary court

constituted by judges appointed for three years, they may be dismissed
or pensioned for political reasons like any other state employee. Since
1917, moreover, assignments have no longer been made by a body
composed of the president of the court, the various division presidents,
and the highest-ranking associate judge, functioning as an independent
organ of the court. They are now made by the court president alone as
representative of the Ministry of Justice, to whose orders he is subject.
The assignments may be changes during the administrative year not
only for specific reasons, as for illness, but, as the law euphemistically
says, »in the interest of the administration of Justice«.21 This develop-
ment finds its logical conclusion in new regulations, issued at the
beginning of the present war, abolishing the irremovability of judges by
ordering them to accept all assignments within the jurisdiction of the
Ministry of Justice.22 All special prescriptions relating to the removal
of judges have apparently been swept away by the permission granted
to Hitler, in the Reichstag Session of 26 April 1942, to dismiss indiscrimi-
nately all those officials whose loyalty seems doubtful.
Since the changes in the personnel of the Ministry of Justice in the
summer of 1942, the pressure on the judges has sharply increased, and
even the pretense of judicial independence has been abandoned in the
definitions proffered by Minister of Justice Thierack in his declaration
of 24 September 1942:
»The judge is a living member of the national community, he is not
an organ of supervision but an assistant of the leadership. The right
to issue decisions untrammeled by superior orders should and will
remain with the judge. But the political leadership may and will give
the judge general directives which he must follow if he wishes to
measure up to his task.«23
The general directives of the Ministry are forwarded in the form of
confidential letters (Richterbriefe) which are sent regularly to the judges
and prosecutors.
Under the ever increasing pressure of the Ministry of Justice and of
the Party hierarchy, the traditional motion of rational justice, involving
a certain degree of predictability of decisions, has been definitely super-
seded by a strictly technical concept of rationality. »Rationality« no
longer means that there are generally applicable rules, of which the
21 RGBl., I, 1286.
22 RGBl., I, 1658.
23 Deutsche Justiz, 16 October 1942.
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consequences of non-observance may be calculated by those whom

they affect. »Rationality« now means that the entire apparatus of law
and law enforcement is exclusively subservient to those in power. The
legal system is rational only for the rulers, whose main concern finds
expression in the following question. How can a given command be so
executed as to have the maximum effect in the shortest time? Under
this system legal rules have a purely provisional character; they can
be altered without notice, even, when deemed necessary, retroactively.
And all the changes in the administration of justice have only one
aim: to make entirely certain that no difficulties arise in the necessary
process of particularizing the rapidly changing orders. No one save the
rulers is entitled to question the services which the judicial machinery
performs. The legal personnel who operates it must content themselves
with producing immediate reactions to the varying commands of their
superiors. As the strategy of the moment requires, they are ordered to
proceed more or less boldly or more or less cautiously; they are ordered
to show a different attitude to different groups of people, and a differ‐
ent attitude even towards the same people according to the demands
of rapidly shifting policy requirements. The already mentioned »con-
fidential letters« addressed to all judges and district attorneys make
them conversant with these requirements from week to week. From the
viewpoint of the holders of political power, it is essential that every
order issued to the judicial corps produce the expected reaction and be
translated into judicial practice without delay.
There arose some resistance among the judges against this policy. Such
as the implication of the curious reference to the judges in Hitler’s
Reichstag speech of 26 April 1942, as well as of the numerous refer-
ences to the crisis of confidence (Vertrauenskrise) in the administration of
justice that can be found in the speeches of the newly appointed Mini-
ster of Justice Thierack and his then Secretary of State, Rothenberger.
Beside direct pressure, some indirect devices were applied in order to
induce the judges to comply with the political directives of the leader-
ship. For several years Nazi literature has abounded in proposals for
a thorough reform of the administration of justice. The gist of these
reform proposals is always the introduction of the so-called »royal
judges« (Richterkönigtum), a system where the number of judges is
diminished to three or four thousand well-paid judges, while most of
the functions of the judges of the local courts would be taken care of
by legally half-trained justices of the peace (See also Sect. I, B.I). The
administration hopes that this bait, which promises a splendid future
to the obedient judges and threatens those recalcitrant with permanent
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retirement, may influence the conduct of the judges in a way favorable

to the political leadership.
3. The Minor Court Officials.
Of the approximately sixty‐five thousand court officials, only fourteen

to fifteen thousand are judges or public prosecutors. The major part
of the work is carried out by clerical officials. Since 1926 these clerical
officials have been called Urkundsbeamte der Geschäftsstelle (registrars).
Before 1914 they mainly taxed costs and issued court orders to pay
a stated sum on the simple request of the creditor without further
investigation. If the debtor objected, trial took place; if he did not, the
order was made absolute by the registrar and execution could be levied
against the debtor. In the course of time, more and more quasi-judicial
functions were entrusted to the registrars; thus they took over most
of the often complicated functions of registry of deeds. For some of
the more difficult functions a new category of registrars (Rechtspfleger)
was created, with a higher status and salary than that of the ordinary
registrar. A complaint to the judge to whose courts they are attached
lies against all decisions of minor court officials.
A »sheriff« levies execution and serves summonses. Since the outbreak
of the war however, summonses are served by the court alone. The
party must approach the sheriff through an official distributing agency
(Verteilungsstelle), which allots the business to the individual sheriff –
the sheriff, in most cases, being an official with a fixed salary.
II. The Reich Ministry of Justice
After the unification of the German administration of justice in 1934

– 1935 and the transfer of all administrative and supervisory tasks to
the Reich, the Reich Ministry of Justice expanded considerably. From 71
civil servants of professional and clerical rank in 1933 its staff increased
to 559 in 1939.24 Yet there were fewer personnel changes in its top
ranks than in any other departments of government. This fact is easily
explained. Under the leadership of its permanent head, Secretary of
State Joël, the small professional staff in which the prosecution of trea-
son was centered, had always been as generous a protector of all right-
24 Figures are taken from F. Sauer, Das Reichsjustizministerium, Berlin, 1939.
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wing movements as it was an implacable foe of the left. With such a

record the ministry seemed destined to become a major cog in the new
administrative machinery. Dr. Gürtner, the Minister, who presided over
its administration on until his death in January 1941, was a holdover
from the Papen cabinet, but had already earned Hitler’s gratitude in
the early twenties for his role as Bavarian Minister of Justice. From
the time of the merger of the Prussian Ministry with the Reich Min-
istry to Gürtner’s death, sections of the Ministry worked under two
Secretaries of State. These two Secretaries, Freisler and Schlegelberger,
represented two different generations with widely divergent political
and legal ideologies. Schlegelberger, who presided over the civil and
commercial law divisions and who had made his whole career in
the Ministry, was a conservative official whose past was calculated to
inspire confidence in the old bourgeoisie. Freisler came to the Ministry
as the trustee of the Nazi Party and took over the personnel and the
criminal divisions. He had earned the Party’s confidence in 1933 by
his speedy action against Jewish lawyers. He immediately undertook
the task of Nazifying the administration of original law and of indoc-
trinating the legal profession. His efforts may have been somewhat
hampered by the fact that he did not gain any hold over the propa-
ganda machinery of the Party in the legal field. The principal lawyer’s
association, the Nationalsozialistische Rechtswahrerbund (National Social-
ist Legal Workers’ Association), as well as the more refined propaganda
agency for home and for foreign consumption, the Akademie für deut-
sches Recht (Academy for German Law) was headed by Hans Frank,
the top-ranking Party lawyer. The ministry and Frank’s organizations,
to which must be added the Reichsrechtsamt in Munich (the chief legal
office of the Party), often worked at cross-purposes. This split lasted
until 1942. After Gürtner’s death Schlegelberger had provisionally been
entrusted with the administration of the Ministry. But the necessity of
stepping up the fight against internal enemies, political or criminal,
coupled with the mounting displeasure of the Party with the laxity
and weakness of judicial support, called for sweeping changes. After
Hitler’s Reichstag speech of April 1942, the existence of »a crisis in the
administration of justice« was widely proclaimed. For its solution »the
confidence of the Führer« fell upon the former president of the Peo-
ple’s Court, Thierack, as Minister, and the president of the Hanseatic
Court of Appeal, Rothenberger, as Secretary of State. The split between
the Ministry and the Party influenced legal organizations was done
away with. The Reichsrechtsamt had already been dissolved at the begin-
ning of 1942. Thierack and Rothenberger were made president and
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vice-president, respectively, of the Akademie für deutsches Recht. Personal

antagonisms were banned and the new masters settled down to their
main tasks of amalgamating completely the judicial apparatus with the
administrative and Party machinery. For that purpose the idea of a
fundamental reform of the legal machinery, which had always been a
Leitmotiv of Nazi propaganda, was taken up again by instituting three
new »research« divisions. In January 1944, Rothenberger was suddenly
put on the reserve list. He has been replaced by Herbert Klemm, former
District president of Münster, and lately commissioner-general at Zhit-
omir.
Structure of the Reichministry of Justice 194325

Reichminister of Justice and Presi- [Otto] Georg Thierack
dent of the Academy for German
law.
Secretary of State and Vice-Presi- [Herbert] Klemm
dent of the Academy for German
Law
Section I: Personnel and general Lenz26
administration
Section II: Criminal legislation [Ernst] Schäfer
Section III: Criminal prosecution, [Günter] Vollmer
criminal procedure, prisons
Sub-section III A: International [Wolfgang] Mettgenberg
penal law, extradition
Sub-section III B: Economic penal L. Schäfer27
law, indemnity cases
Sub-section III C: Prison adminis- [Rudolf] Marx
tration
Section IV: Civil law, civil proce- Josef Altstötter
dure, lawyers
25 [Otto Kirchheimer hat lediglich die Nachnamen der Personen angegeben. Die
Vornamen wurden von den Herausgebern ergänzt.]
26 [Es ist zu vermuten, dass Otto Kirchheimer Baptist Lentz meint. Baptist Lentz
war seit 1933 im Reichsjustizministerium Abteilung I Personal und Gerichtsor-
ganisation beschäftigt, bis er 1942 aus dem Ministerium entfernt wurde.
Anschließend war Lentz bis 1945 beim Reichskommissar für die Behandlung
feindlichen Vermögens tätig. Vergleiche hierzu Hermann Wentker, Justiz in der
SBZ/DDR, München 2011, S. 67.]
27 [Es ist zu vermuten, dass Otto Kirchheimer Leopold Schäfer meint.]
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Section V: Commercial law, mar- Leo Quassowski

itime law
Section VI: Budget, buildings Otto Schneller
Section VII: Legal education and Otto Palandt
president of the Central Board of
Examination
The three new divisions dealing with legal reforms were attached to
the existing sections in 1942: judge and registrar, to Section I; popular
participation in the exercise of judicial functions, to Section II; reform of
the administration of justice, to Section VI.28
Under the direct administrative supervision of the Ministry of Justice:

Reichsgericht (Supreme Court) President: [Erwin] Bumke
Attorney General: [Emil] Brettle
People’s Court President: [Roland] Freisler
Attorney General: [Ernst] Lautz
Oberprisenhof (Supreme Prize [Walter] Kriege
Court)
Reichspatentamt (Reich Patent President: [Georg] Klauer
Office)
Landeserbhofgericht in Celle (State President: [Walter] von
Hereditary Farm Court) Steinäcker
Gemeinschaftslager Hanns Kerrl Unknown
Jüterbog (serving as training
camp for Referendare)
III. The Bar
The same rules cover admission to the bar as to the judiciary. Although
the legal prerequisites for both professions were identical, shifting from
one to the other was relatively rare. Aside from some political appoint-
ments, infrequent under the Republic, and not too numerous before the
28 Recently an additional section has been created in view of the manpower

problem of the judicial administration. This section will take care of retaining
returning and disabled soldiers for judicial offices.
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war even under the Third Reich, few‐attorneys have been appointed
to the bench, whereas somewhat more frequently pensioned judges
sought admission to the bar.
In civil proceedings before the district courts (Landgerichte), the appeal
courts, and the Supreme Court, it was necessary for the litigant to
be represented by counsel. A lawyer was required to attach himself
to a particular court. In civil cases he could plead only before the
district court or appeal court to which he was attached, although it
was permissible to deputize for another attorney in the latter’s court.
Admission to civil practice before the Reichsgericht was restricted to a
limited number of attorneys (approximately twenty). In criminal cases
every German lawyer could appear before any German court, but rep-
resentation by counsel was mandatory only in very few instances. The
lawyers who had specialized in practice before administrative tribunals
were allowed to carry the title of »administrative lawyer« (Verwaltungs-
rechtsrat). Under the Third Reich special admission was a prerequisite
of practice before the People’s Court. In the interest of speed and cheap-
ness lawyers were excluded under the Republic from practicing before
the local labor courts. Although the lawyers fought this restriction very
bitterly, the Third Reich permitted them to practice before the local
labor courts only in the more difficult cases and with the consent of the
Labor Front.
In contrast to Anglo-Saxon practice, in civil cases a lawyer was not
allowed to agree with his client on a contingent fee based upon a cer-
tain percentage of the amount received. Such practice was considered
unethical, and in principle the lawyer was paid according to a statutory
system of fees calculated according to the amount in question. When
the object of the controversy had no calculable value a hypothetical
value was fixed by the court (e.g., in divorce proceedings). Only in
special cases, where the case required a disproportionate amount of
work, might an additional remuneration be agreed upon by the client
and his attorney.
In the later years of the Weimar Republic, as well as in the Third Reich,
a substantial part of the average lawyer’s income was derived from
German Poor Law fees. According to the legal stipulations established
after the First World War, and only slightly changed under the Third
Reich, the benefits of legal assistance were granted to a litigant by the
court under the following conditions: 1) inability of the party to defray
the costs of legal proceedings without resultant difficulties for the sup-
port of his family; 2) the understanding that the intended lawsuit was
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in good faith. Legal assistance was not confined to paupers, but was
extended to any person of the lower income brackets whose means
could not be considered adequate for the type of law suit required.
Assistance took the form of remitting all advance fees of the lawyer as
well as fees of the courts; attorney’s fees were paid in full by the state to
counsel chosen by or assigned to the party. As both requirements were
liberally construed by the courts, a large number of suits, especially
divorce suits, were conducted upon this basis.
Without the income derived from these legal assistance fees, the finan‐
cial situation of the majority of German lawyers would have been
extremely precarious. The number of lawyers admitted to practice in
Germany was around 19,200 at the beginning of the Nazi regime. The
overcrowding of the profession was steadily becoming more and more
serious. For, as the judiciary and the prosecuting agencies could absorb
only a very limited number of those qualified for the office of a judge
or prosecutor, the majority of all those who had successfully passed the
examination before the Central Board were inevitably compelled to ask
for admission to the bar. As the law stood until 1934, it was necessary
that admission be more or less automatically granted to everyone who
had passed the examination. On the other hand, many fields of legal
activity, though open formally to all lawyers, had passed into the hands
of the permanent advisers of the great economic associations and cor-
porations. How far were the Nazis able to bring relief to the profession?
The chief end simplest remedy was the removal of the Jews. The 4,500
Jews active as lawyers in April 1933 were eliminated in two stages.
About 1,500 were dismissed immediately by restricting the number
of Jews to those admitted to the bar before 1914 or who had taken
an active part in the World War. A decree of 1938 provided for the
exclusion of all Jews from the profession as of 30 November 1938.29
Thenceforth a limited number of Jews were to be admitted for the sole
purpose of taking care of Jewish interests; they were not considered as
lawyers but as »legal advisors« (Rechtskonsulenten). These legal advisors
became unnecessary when Jewish affairs were formally placed under
the exclusive jurisdiction of the police in 1942.
The removal of the Jews, however, proved an insufficient remedy, as
the influx of new lawyers continued unabated. Thus, in 1934, 1,016
lawyers (mostly Jews) had been removed from the lists, but 1,364
29 Noack, »Die Entjudung der deutschen Anwaltschaft«, in Juristische Wochen-

schrift, 1938, p. 2796.
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had to be admitted as new members. In 1935, therefore, the »numer-

ous clausus« was finally introduced and the principle of admission of
everyone who had passed the examination was abandoned. In order
to be eligible for admission to the bar, the prospective lawyer had to
serve an additional year with a lawyer as Anwaltsassessor.30 After the
candidate had passed successfully this year, the Ministry of Justice,
in agreement with the Reich Leader of the NS Lawyers Association,
decided whether or not the candidate should be admitted to the bar.
A regulation of 1937 requiring three years of work as a substitute for
a full‐fledged lawyer, as a prerequisite to admission to the bar, was
rescinded in 1941.31 In the final decision on admission, the lawyer’s
political reliability, as well as the individual needs of the respective
communities for the services of an additional lawyer, were to be taken
into consideration. But even under these stringent conditions of admis-
sion the number of lawyers in the Old Reich was still as large as 16,734
at the beginning of 1943.
Under the Third Reich the average income of all lawyers showed an
increase from 9,490 RM in 1933 to 13,909 RM in 1938, but this increase
seems to have been due partly to a considerable increase in the income
of the top bracket group:
Percentage of Income over No. of lawyers earn-

lawyers earning 50,000 RM in ing more than 10,000
more than 50,000 percentage of RM.
RM total lawyers’
income
1934 1.3 10.9 1934 32
1936 1.8 13.0 1938 118a
a.Taken from the income tax statistics in Wirtschaft und Statistik.
The government has no illusions on the prospects of the profession as

a whole, and, therefore, in March 1943 issued a decree in preparation
for the necessary post-war adjustments. This decree sets a mandatory
post-war age limit at sixty‐five. In the absence of a mandatory old age
insurance for lawyers, the decision as to the cases in which pensions
30 See Rechtsanwaltsordnung of 21 February 1936, RGBl., I, 107.

31 Decree of 21 June 1941, RGBl., I, 333.
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should be paid out of funds of the local lawyers’ chamber remains with
the Ministry of Justice.32
Even under the Republic, when the exercise of the lawyer’s profession
was free from all legal restrictions – no punishment could be imposed
against a lawyer for contempt of court – his prestige and social position
were decidedly lower than those of the average judge or district attor‐
ney. A bureaucratized society stood in the awe of those who dispensed
justice and considered the attorney somewhat as a minor adjunct of
the judicial fraternity. This attitude of the public at large was reflected
in a rather haughty and condescending attitude of the judges and the
district attorneys and in a certain degree of submissiveness on the
part of the practicing lawyer. With the advent of the Third Reich the
lawyer ceased to be an independent representative of a client who had
confidence in his professional ability, and became rather an organ of
the state, which conceded him a certain narrowly defined leeway for
representing private interests.
The lawyer is supervised and indoctrinated by the National Socialist
Lawyers’ Association. This organization forms a branch of the general
organization of legal workers (NS Rechtswahrerbund) membership in
which is compulsory. One of the chief tasks of the local branches
of the NS Lawyers’ Association, performed in collaboration with the
legal section of the local Party office, consists in the staffing of the
various official legal-aid clinics (Rechtsbetreuungsstellen) with voluntary
workers. In these clinics, instituted in 1934, legal aid is offered free to
every applicant; counsel is found for the more difficult cases, but most
differences are composed amicably. These offices, which handle about
two hundred and fifty thousand cases each year, fulfill a need which
prior to the Third Reich had been taken care of by various voluntary
associations. At the same time the legal-aid clinics form a valuable local
channel through which the official agencies are rapidly informed of
social danger-spots. To the average lawyer, the increase of the activity
of the legal aid clinics as well as of the similar activity of the Labor
Front, together with the tremendous decrease of civil suits before the
district and appeal courts, shows that a totalitarian society has no last-
ing solutions for this problems.
Until 1943 a semblance of independence existed within the official bar
association. The bar associations installed at the seats of the appeal
courts were united in a Reich Bar Chamber (Reichsrechtsanwaltkammer).
32 RGBl., I, 123.
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Professional discipline was supervised by these associations, against

whose decisions an appeal could be taken to the Central Honor Court
(Ehrengerichtshof), composed of members of the Reich Bar Chamber and
the Reichsgericht. In the Weimar period the Honor Courts had been
engaged exclusively in enforcing professional discipline by combat-
ing unfair competition, undue collaboration and fee‐splitting between
lawyers and legally-untrained consultants, embezzlement, and various
kinds of dealings disadvantageous to the client. But after 1933 their
sphere of activity was extended also to the supervision of the lawyer’s
political reliability. In 1943 the disciplinary functions were concentrated
in the hands of the appointed presidents of the regional bar asso-
ciations, who were empowered to impose punishment upon lawyers.
The more serious cases, which might entail the lawyer’s disbarment,
were transferred to the disciplinary chambers of the court of appeal,
thus marking the complete subordination of the practicing lawyer to
the organs of judicial administration.33
Prior to the National Socialist regime the office of notary was consti-
tuted differently in the different States. In most Prussian provinces
every lawyer of good standing could, after a certain time, be appointed
a notary upon application; in some states e.g., Bavaria, Württemberg,
Baden, as well as in the Rhineland, there existed independent notarial
offices.
It was their exclusive function not only to authorize signatures, as in
the United States, but also to draft and attest conveyances and mort-
gages, draw marriage settlements and wills, protest bills of exchange,
etc. In 1937 the law on notaries was unified. Whereas those who were
already notaries may continue to combine the office of notary and
lawyer, new joint appointments are no longer made. In the future, at
least in principle, the offices are to be exercised separately. The condi-
tions for the career of notaries as well as their professional organiza-
tions are regulated similarly to those of the lawyer, but only four years
of study and preparatory service are demanded of the future notary.34

34 Reichsnotarordnung of 13 February 1937, RGBl., I, 321.
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IV. German Criminal Law and Procedure
A. The Sources of Criminal Law
1. Substantive Law.
The principal source for German criminal law is the old Penal Code of
15 May 1871, which is almost identical with the Criminal Code of the
North German Union of 5 May 1870. It contains the bulk of the German
criminal law. But there are numerous individual penal statutes which
have not been incorporated into the criminal code, mainly comprising
those fields and rules which by their very subject‐matter concern only
a small segment of the population. There is set apart a whole field usu-
ally called »administrative penal law«, dealing with penal sanctions for
disobedience of administrative orders. It is contained in the federal as
well as the State statutes concerned with administrative law and proce-
dure. It has found its most systematic treatment in the Prussian Statute
on Police Administration of 1 June 1941. Special fields of administrative
penal law are the economic and finance penal law; whereas the former
was not systematically assembled during the Republic, the latter, at
least in so far as the federal law is concerned, was to a great extent
laid down in the Federal Statute on Contributions of 13 December 1919
(Reichsabgabenordnung).
2. Procedural Law.
The criminal procedure has been uniformly set forth in the Code of
Criminal Procedure of 1 February 1877. Questions of jurisdiction and
principals of court organization are a part of the general Judicature
Act of 27 January 1877 (Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz). Prior to the Third
Reich the execution of criminal sentences fell exclusively within the
jurisdiction of the State authorities. But on 7 June 1923 the different
State administrations concluded an agreement on that subject laying
down certain basic principles. This agreement was superseded by new
unified rules in 1934, and in 1940 by detailed prison regulations based
on the latter rules.
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B. Principles of Liberal Criminal Law
German criminal law as it developed in the nineteenth century was,

like most penal laws of the European continent, mainly under the
influence of the widespread quest for legal security and for protection
against arbitrary procedure. As Article 2 of the German Criminal Code
states, no act is to be punished unless there exists a statute penalizing
it, and no penal legislation can punish for an act which at the time
of commission was not punishable. The same idea excludes the use
of analogy in the interpretation of penal statutes. Penal statutes are
to be construed strictly. Clearly evident is also the endeavor of the
codifications to provide a fixed frame of punishment for each individ-
ual act, leaving the judge only a restricted discretion in the choice
of punishment. At the end of the nineteenth century, however, there
arose under the leadership of Franz von Liszt a school which, though it
fully maintained the protective function of criminal procedure, fought
for a greater consideration of factors of personality in the choice of
punishment. Their ideas, built on the protective function of the penal
law for the community at large as well as on the education of the
criminal, were bitterly fought by the so-called »classical« school. This
school, following a rich tradition in the German philosophy of law,
emphasized the retributive function of criminal law, which at the same
time was supposed to be of the surest guarantees of the prevalent
German idea of »Rechtsstaat« – the idea that the criminal is answerable
only for a specific crime and that all factors transcending this crime
must be disregarded in the determination of punishment. Nevertheless,
the progressive school made headway, and it gained a deep influence
on the practice of the courts as well as on legislation under the Repub-
lic. But if there was vehement controversy over the question how the
criminal should be treated once his guilt is established, the necessity
of keeping intact all guarantees for the accused during the preparatory
and the trial stage seemed beyond discussion.
C. Criminal Law under the Republic
After the last war German crime figures soared. Under the impact of
the inflation, the increase in crimes against property was especially
large. At the same time the political unrest of the post-war period led to
many infringements of a rather insecure public order by different oppo-
sition groups. How did the law enforcement agencies cope with this
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situation? There was an unmistakable trend towards greater leniency

in the administration of criminal justice. Political cases were only in
part an exception; heavy penalties against Leftists were accompanied
by a more or less complete absence of repression against Rightists.
This tendency toward leniency – »softening of the bones«, as it was dis-
paragingly called by the adversaries of such policies – found its most
significant expression in the Law on the Imposition of Fines, 1 Decem-
ber 1922. This law enabled the courts to replace all prison sentences up
to three months by fines. At the same time the practice of conditional
remittance of punishments (conditional sentencing had been unknown
in Germany) gained wide acceptance.
As early as 1920 a great stride had been made in the solution of the
important problem of rehabilitation. A law was passed ordering the
expunging of punishments in the official criminal record as well as the
police registers after the lapse of a certain time, the respective periods
being diversified in accordance with the gravity of the offense. Even
after the lapse of considerably shorter periods, information from the
original register could be communicated to official agencies only. The
year 1923 brought passage of the Youth Correction Act. This statute
provided for special juvenile courts whose president as well as lay
assessors were to be specially qualified persons. The jurisdiction of
these courts was mandatory in all cases where minors between fourteen
and eighteen were to be tried. The district attorney, however, could
bring cases against persons between eighteen and twenty-one years of
age before a juvenile court if he thought proper to do so. The juvenile
courts had the right to refrain from meting out punishment, even if
the guilt of the accused had been proved. Instead, they could prescribe
educational measures ranging from simple admonition to forced edu-
cation in a public institution. Even in cases where they chose criminal
punishment, the range of punishments had been narrowed consider-
ably in the statute, the death penalty being excluded altogether.
Meanwhile the fight for a complete overhauling of Germany’s criminal
code, which dated from 1870, continued. Several projects had been
elaborated by the Reich Ministry of Justice and various learned com-
missions; two of them had been presented to the Reichstag; but final
agreement on certain controversial political questions, especially the
abolition of the death penalty, was never reached. The failure of total
reform, regrettable as it was, became less important, since most of the
burning problems affecting daily practice had been temporarily solved
through special legislation. As regards the death penalty, the most
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important State administration of justice, the Prussian, adhered to the

practice of automatically commuting death sentences into sentences of
hard labor for life.35
Few changes of consequence were made in the field of criminal proce-
dure during the Republic. The major change consisted in a tightening
up of legal guarantees against abuse of preventive detention. After
a former Reich Minister died in prison during an inquiry in 1926
into some graft practices, periodical review of warrants of arrest was
introduced. The least progress probably was made in the realm of
prison administration. There were no prisons attached to any branch of
the Reich administration and the execution of all sentences remained
in the hands of the different ministries of justice in the individual
States. Although in 1923 an agreement had been reached between the
different States on the execution of prison sentences (Principles for the
Execution of Prison Sentences of 7 June 1923 RGBl., II, 263) wherein the
educational function of punishment was emphasized and provision
made for lodging complaints, the individual administrations were slow
in changing traditional practices. It also proved very difficult to provide
for satisfactory prison work because of the opposition of the States,
notably Thuringia and Hamburg, and in some prisons in Prussia, def-
inite progress was made, at least so far as concerned the erection of
separate juvenile prisons and the application of more advanced meth-
ods therein.
D. Criminal Law under the Third Reich
1. Pre-War Developments.
The first period after the downfall of the Weimar Republic was marked
by the rise of authoritarian ideology. An authoritarian criminal the-
ory, mingled with elements of the old classical school, dominated the
academic field. In the criminal courts the transition was immediately
reflected in the imposition of harsher punishments and in a weakening
of the status of the defendant.
In this early period, the genuinely National Socialist contribution is
to be found in the theory of the »volitional« character of penal law
35 With a few exceptions, where public opinion demanded the carrying out of the
death penalty.
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(Willensstrafrecht). This theory, the ideological offspring of Dr. Freisler,

Undersecretary of Justice, completely shifted the emphasis from the
objective characteristics of the criminal act to its subjective elements.
It asserted that the state is justified in demanding greater self-control
from the individual and also in considering criminal intent as the main
criterion of the punitive action of the authorities. The content and even
the style of these ideas were copied from Nietzsche, who characterized
penal law as war measures used to rid oneself of the enemy.36
The most important practical consequence of this more or less delib-
erately vague theory was a disappearance of the distinctions usually
separating criminal attempt and the consummated criminal act. Neither
doctrine, however, made much headway. When German theorists dis-
covered that Germany was not an authoritarian state, but a racial com-
munity, authoritarian criminal theory lost its theoretical foundation.37
The so-called Kieler Schule (Phenomenological School) gained some the-
oretical following, and its doctrines superseded, at least to some extent,
the penal law doctrine stressing intent. In its foundation, this doctrine
shares Carl Schmitt’s theory attacking generalized concepts and stress-
ing, instead, the concrete order of life. Intuition is introduced as the
true method of discovering the criminal agent. The criminal’s innate
character can never be deduced, it is held by mere logical deduction
from the statutory requisites. »A person who takes away a movable
object not belonging to himself does not necessarily classify himself as a
burglar. Only the very nature of his personality can make him such«.38
The full implication of this theory could become clear only in later
years when war jurisprudence made it a cornerstone for the wholesale
brutalization of criminal law.
36 Cf. Freisler, in Grundzüge eines allgemeinen deutschen Strafrechts. Denkschrift des

Zentralausschusses der Strafrechtsabteilung der Akademie für deutsches Recht (Berlin
1934), pp. 13-14, and the same author in »Das kommende deutsche Staatsrecht«,
Allgemeiner Teil (2d edition, Berlin, 1935), p. 26. The National Socialist ideology
of penal law and the proposed changes in the penal code, as well as the changes
already introduced, are dealt with in more detail, though without much regard
for the actual administration of criminal justice by Donnedieu de Vabres in La
crise moderne du droit pénal. La politique des etats autoritaires (Paris, 1938).
37 Cf., for instance, Dahm Nationalsozialistisches und faschistisches Strafrecht (Berlin,
1935), p. 6 et seq., which speaks of the gulf separating the German people’s
community from the Italian ideology of State and Nation. This is especially
interesting because of the fact that the same author was one of the initiators of
the authoritarian school two years before in the book of Dahm and Schaffstein
Liberales oder autoritäres Strafrecht (Hamburg, 1933).
38 Dahm Verbrechen und Tatbestand (1936), p. 46.
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But from the outset theoretical discussion receded in importance before

major changes of statutory law and policy. One of the most significant
moves taken by the Government was the elimination of the prohibition
of punishment by analogy. Since 1933 courts have been permitted to
punish analogous application of the existing law under two conditions:
first, if the fundamental idea underlying the statute could be applied
to the case in question, and, second, if the »sound feeling of the peo-
ple« require such application.39 For a time, inference by analogy was
still eyed somewhat suspiciously by the Supreme Court, which consid-
ered it as a kind of intellectual laziness, an »unprofessional« method
of nailing down a criminal. But, at least in the earlier, more tranquil
period of the Third Reich, it served as a modest reminder to the courts
that no person placed on trial by the prosecuting agencies needed to
be freed for lack of legislative enactments. The »sound feelings of the
people« appeared more and more as an official rule of interpretation in
criminal adjudication. In 1935, moreover, the courts were permitted to
pronounce sentences on alternative grounds, e.g., to sentence a person
for stealing, or for receiving stolen goods. This permission applied to
cases where evidence was insufficient for punishing for either one, but
where it appeared from the evidence that one or the other offense had
been committed.
The conception of the criminal as the enemy of the nation was conve-
nient for the task of framing legislation destined to make the new
holders of power secure against all competition or attack. The Presi-
dential Decree for the Protection of the German People, 4 February
1933,40 initiated a never-ending stream of legislation which purported
to protect essential persons, institutions, and symbols against attacks of
political enemies. At the same time, this legislation aimed at eradicating
all political activities of the traditional political and social groups. The
field of application of the traditional treason and high-treason articles
is considerably enlarged by investing the most remote preparatory and
auxiliary acts with the character of treason. The range of application
of the death penalty, traditionally restricted to murder and some cases
of homicide committed by the use of explosives, has been considerably
widened. The »Law van der Lubbe«41 was the first of a large number
of statutes and decrees which not only introduced the death penalty
for crimes formerly punished less severely but made its application
retroactive. It applies the death penalty to offenses which, at the time of

40 RGBl., 135.
41 29 March 1933, RGBl., I, 151.
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their commission, were not punishable with death. The statute against
kidnapping and the statute against automobile hold-ups with the use of
traps,42 as well as time criminal legislation in almost all cases, provide
for such retroactive application of the death penalty. If the introduction
of analogy does away with the rule »no punishment without law«, the
appearance of retroactivity destroys its twin, »no crime without a law«.
In the year 1933 there were issued those places of legislation on which
rests the Nazis’ pretension of being the true successors of the progres-
sive school of criminal law. The statute of 24 November 1933, »Against
Dangerous Habitual Criminals and on Measures of Security and Cor-
rection«,43 relinquishes altogether the idea of uniform punishment for
specific crimes. If a criminal has been twice sentenced to punishment
exceeding six months imprisonment, and if the examination of the new
crime punishable with imprisonment results in the courts’ adjudging
this person a »dangerous habitual criminal«, he may be punished with
hard labor up to five or, in some cases, fifteen years. Whereas this pro-
vision mainly generalizes the requirements of the earlier legislation for
individual cases of habitual criminality, the statute provides at the same
time for indeterminate periods of »Security Detention« (Sicherungsver-
wahrung) for dangerous habitual criminals. At the same time, the law
allows the court to send persons to an insane asylum, a medical or
educational institution, institutions for alcoholics, or to the workhouse.
In some cases of sexual crimes, the court may order the castration of
the offender. In cases of violation of professional duties, the court may
take away the license of the offender if he has incurred a prison term of
at least three months. The legal guarantees, especially in the detention
procedure (the main pivot of the progressive ideas on measures of
security) were sketchy from the very start, release from detention being
placed at the discretion of the trial court. Since the outbreak of the war,
the power of release has been transferred to the prosecuting agencies,
who seem not to have granted any release from security detention. The
following table gives statistics on security detention and the ordering of
sterilization:

43 RGBl., I, 995.
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Number of per- Number of sexual

sons against whom offenders whose cas-
measures of secu- tration was ordered
rity detention were
employed
1934 3,723 613
1935 1,464 343
1936 946 230
1937 765 189
1938 964 195
1939 1,827 238
1940a 1,916 100
1941 1,651 –
1942a 1,095 –
a. The figures for 1942 are for the first nine months only. The figures are
taken from Statistisches Jahrbuch für das Deutsche Reich: Wirtschaft und
Statistik, 1940, Vol. 20, pp. 476, 557; 1841, Vol. 21, p. 247; F. Exner, »Wie
erkennt man den gefährlichen Gewohnheitsverbrecher« in Deutsche Jus-
tiz, 6 August 1943, p. 377.
The figures indicate that the courts relied rather heavily on the expedi-
ent of security detention in the first year following the new law, but
this seems largely owing to the fact that the statute had been made
retroactive and that therefore the figures for 1934 contain a large num-
ber of cases in which measures of security detention were taken against
persons who had been sentenced long before. This, for example, was
the case for 2,212 measures of security detention and 351 cases of cas-
tration in 1934; the corresponding figures for 1935 are only 499 and 72,
respectively.44 Castration, too, at least as a judicial measure against sex
offenders, was resorted to only sparingly after the first year, although
the number of sexual crimes has not diminished. But it would be fal-
lacious to draw conclusions from the sparing use which courts made
between 1935 and 1938 of their right to order security detention and
castration; they were quite aware of the fact that the police generally
placed these categories of prisoners in the concentration camp in any
case after they had served their regular sentences. With the beginning
of the war there was a revival of the tendency to put every criminal
44 Deutsche Justiz, 1936, p. 1431; 1937, p. 483.
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supposed to be dangerous into security detention after he had served

his regular sentence.45 The following tables show the increase in the
severity of punishment under the Third Reich:
Distribution of Punishments in Germany per 100,000 convictionsa

Year Death Life Hard Imprison- Cus- Deten- Fines
Labor ment tody tion
(Tempo-
rary)
1930 7.2 0.8 785 31,788 18.5 523 66,202
1931 8.7 1.4 813 35,981 15.9 459 62,100
1932 9.2 1.4 1,123 41,540 34.0 466 56,320
1933 16.0 3.9 1,971 44,516 7.7 517 52,607
1934 25.5 3.9 3,197 41,549 0.0 478 54,408
1935 20.6 3.2 4,843 36,796 0.2 416 59,276
1936 17.0 2.0 2,955 41,585 1.0 443 54,309
1937 12.5 2.1 4,501 38,391 0.0 393 57,712
1938 20.3 1.8 3,195 41,534 0.3 384 54,069
1939 45.7 3.7 3,377 40,322 0,3 222 55,121
1940 110.0 0.8 4,968 42,762 0.0 129 50,945
a. The figures do not comprise sentences meted out by the People’s
Court, military courts, and SS courts. They concern the pre-1938 Reich
territory only; the 1940 figures are for six months only. The figures
of Table III do not add up to 100,000 because they do not include
those juvenile offenders who have been convicted but not sentenced.
(Juvenile Court Law, Par. 9, Sect. 4). The figures above are taken from,
or calculated on the basis of statistics in the following sources: Statistik
des deutschen Reichs, Vols. CDXXIX and DVII; Kriminalstatistik, 1933 and
1934, respectively; Statistisches Jahrbuch für das deutsche Reich, 1938; Wirt-
schaft und Statistik (1940), p. 476, 537; XXI, (1941) 247.
45 The renewed downward trend of the figures in 1941 may be attributed to the
fact that since the law of 4 September 1941 dangerous habitual criminals have
been regularly sentenced to death. See p. 58 [284f].
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Length of Sentencesa
Year Hard labor of 3 Under 3 3 months to 1 Over 1 year
years or more; % months year imprison- imprison-
of whole tempo- imprison- ment; % of ment; % of
rary hard labor. ment; % of whole impris- whole
whole onment imprison-
imprisonment
ment
1930b – 64.0 30.0 6.0
1931 23.4 63.9 29.9 6.2
1932 24.7 62.5 31.0 6.5
1933 26.9 57.3 33.7 9.0
1934 29.1 53.8 35.2 11.0
1935 28.2 53.1 35.5 11.4
1936 39.9 49.0 41.2 11.8
1937 38.2 50.8 37.9 11.3
1938 29.0 48.3 41.2 12.5
1939 34.1 44.8 42.2 13.0
1940 40.6 42.2 44.6 13.2
a. The figures do not comprise sentences meted out by the People’s
Court, military courts, and SS courts. They concern the pre-1938 Reich
territory only; the 1940 figures are for six months only. The figures
of Table III do not add up to 100,000 because they do not include
those juvenile offenders who have been convicted but not sentenced.
(Juvenile Court Law, Par. 9, Sect. 4). The figures above are taken from,
or calculated on the basis of statistics in the following sources: Statistik
des deutschen Reichs, Vols. CDXXIX and DVII; Kriminalstatistik, 1933 and
1934, respectively; Statistisches Jahrbuch für das deutsche Reich, 1938; Wirt-
schaft und Statistik (1940), p. 476, 537; XXI, (1941) 247.
b. No figures are available for 1930.
Most revealing is the gradual, then abrupt rise of death sentences after
1933. Hard labor for life has altogether gone out of fashion in 1940 and
seems to have been replaced in every case by outright death sentences.
The figures for temporary hard labor show a steady rise; many people
who before 1933 were sentenced to imprisonment now receive hard
labor. Hard labor over three years has nearly doubled; so too have
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prison sentences over one year. Moreover, people who before the Third
Reich would have received only a fine are now sentenced to prison.
Hand in hand with the sharpening of penalties and the extension of
the scope of punishable activity went the attempt to widen the scope
of German criminal jurisdiction beyond its territorial and nationality
limits. This was the case with the new »racedefilement« prohibitions,
which, in spite of dubious legal authority, were applied to offenses
committed abroad.46 The extent of this »legal invasion« ran parallel to
the military invasion a pattern and reached its culminating point at
the time of the Battle of France. Probably in order to have a legal
weapon for the prosecution of anti-German activities carried on before
the German occupation took place, a decree of 6 May 194047 subjected
any foreigner who had committed crimes in any foreign country to the
jurisdiction of the German penal law. The list of these crimes, which is
made up to look like a highly reputable extension of the »principle of
universality«, includes also treason and high treason against Germany.
Thus any act of a foreigner carried out on his own territory in the
interest of his own country, yet detrimental to German interests, is
punishable as treason or high treason against Germany. To make the
political character of the decree clear, prosecution is instituted on the
order of the Ministry of Justice only: the decree also provides for unlim-
ited retroactivity.48
2. German Amnesty Practices.
It is not profitable to dwell on German crime-rate figures. Even official

and semi‐official German sources admit that these figures have little
value inasmuch as the delegation of many procedures to administra-
tive channels or special tribunals, as well as the practice of amnesties
as it developed under the Third Reich, excludes the possibility of
gaining a reliable picture of the crime-rate.49 The increasing maze of
regulations, economic hardships, and fundamental processes of econo-
mic dislocation, with their inevitable consequence of loosening moral
standards, have created an urgent problem in connection with the
46 Statute for the Protection of Blood and Honor, 15 September 1935, RGBl., I, 1146.
47 Decree on the Territorial Extension of Criminal Law, 6 May 1940. RGBl., I, 754.
48 The commentary on this decree by Graf von Gleispach in Das Kriegsstrafrecht,
Part III (1940), pp. 8-21.
49 See von Veber. »Die deutsche Kriminlstatistik, 1934«, in Zeitschrift für die gesamte
Strafrechtswissenschaft, LXVIII (1938), pp. 598-624, and Statistik der Deutschen
Reichs Bank für das Jahr 1934 (Berlin, 1938).
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enormous army of minor offenders. The theory which had identified

the criminal as such with the arch-enemy requiring extermination at
the same time maintained that the essential nature of petty offenders
raises a totally different problem. The administration coped with this
problem in its own way: it institutionalized an expedient which demo-
cratic governments use more hesitantly. In 1933, 1934, 1936, 1938, and
at the beginning of the war, in 1939, amnesties were issued for: (a)
minor offenses of all types, punishable with prison terms of one to six
months; (b) minor offenses of political enemies, covering sentences up
to six months; and (c) almost all types of offenses and sentences of
over-zealous political adherents. The amnesty laws apply to settled as
well as to pending cases. If the anticipated punishment is believed to
fall within the framework of the Amnesty Law, the case is nolle proses’d
by the prosecuting agency. The magnitude of these amnesties may be
seen from the following figures, although they are very incomplete:
Results of German Amnesties

Strafbefehle
asked for by
prosecutor
concerning
Number of trespasses
convicted for Nolle51 and misde-
crimes and Amnest prose- meanors (in
misdemeanor50 ied qui thousands)52
1928 588,492 831
1932 566,042 139,899 64,839 695
Amn. 30 up to 6
Dec. up to mos.54*
1932
193353 491,638
results for polit. up 51,933 643
Prussia to 5
years
50 All figures are taken from the official statistics given in Deutsche Justiz.
51 Amnesties and nolle prosequi refer to fines also.
52 Strafbefehl is a written order of the court issued without hearing on request
of the prosecutor and imposing prison terms up to 3 month (6 months since
September 1939) and fines.
53 Figures for 1933 amnesty are not available.
54 * Persons with more than 3 months’ record are not allowed to benefit from
amnesty.
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Results of German Amnesties

Strafbefehle
asked for by
prosecutor
concerning
Number of trespasses
convicted for Nolle and misde-
crimes and Amnest prose- meanors (in
misdemeanor ied qui thousands)
only (55%
of Reich)
Amn. 2 up to 3 193,350 120,244
Aug. mos.*
1934 383.885 (Prussia polit. 6 44,174 50,334 563
only) (55% mos.
of Reich)
1935 429,335 6305 648
Amn. Apr. 1 month* 240,340 254,674
23, 1936
1936 383,315 525
Reich as a overzeal- 1592 1940
whole ous adh.
1937 438,493 530
Amn. Apr. 1 month* 437,000 238,000
30, 1938
Reich as a pol. 6 6428 12,16355
1938 335,666 406
whole mos.
old terri- pol. 1 22,826
tory month
The table is taken from Otto Kirchheimer, »Criminal Law in National

Socialist Germany«, in Studies in Philosophy and Social Science, VIII
(1939), 457.
whereas the convictions for crimes and misdemeanors and the
amnesties and nolle prosequi relate to numbers of persons, the Straf-
befehle relate to numbers of cases. This difference is partly balanced
by the fact that about 40 percent of the penal mandates are Bavarian
55 Austrians included.
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cases (see Deutsche Juristenzeitung, 1936, p. 46). But in Bavaria the pre-
vailing practice is to handle, through judicial Strafbefehle, all kinds of
violations of police regulations (e.g., traffic) elsewhere dealt with by the
police and never appearing in any criminal record. The »number of
convicted« covers crimes and misdemeanors; the amnesties and nolle
prosequi comprise crimes of political adherents, less important misde-
meanors, and probably also some major trespasses; and the Strafbefehle
include only trespasses and minor misdemeanors.
In spite of the fact that the overlapping of the figures prevents accurate
comparison, one thing stands out very clearly: in the years 1932, 1935,
and 1937, when the amnesties could have had no practical influence
on the crime-rate, the figures for convictions and for penal orders
(Strafbefehle) are in general appreciably higher than in preceding or sub-
sequent years when the influence of the amnesty laws could be traced.
The result of these amnesties shows clearly that law enforcement in
Germany, even in relatively stable periods between 1933 and 1938, has
a purely selective character. It does not work at all against members
of the ruling hierarchy and only partially against members of the Nazi
Party. In the case of the average small sinner from the rank of the popu-
lation at large, law enforcement takes on the character of an outright
gamble.
Two amnesties of September 1939, one for prospective members of
the Army56 and one for the civilian population,57 follow the usual pat-
tern. These amnesties were followed by numerous special amnesties for
members of the different professions who experienced difficulties with
their professional organization and would have had to appear before
professional and »honor« courts. The publication of statistics on the
results of amnesties was discontinued after 1939, while general criminal
statistics have not been published since 1941.
3. Substantive Criminal Law in Wartime.
The war brought a mass of new legislation, this legislation was doubt-
less influenced by special considerations of war policy, but it also
contains matured concepts of National Socialist criminal policy. The
principal aim is to guarantee the security of the country through an
extremely harsh policy of punishment. The chief weapon is the unspar-
56 RGBl., I, 1549.
57 RGBl., I, 2000.
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ing use of capital punishment. As early as 17 August 1939, a decree

made the death penalty mandatory for any attempt at treason.58 At the
beginning of the war, the application of the death penalty was also
extended to crimes committed during the carrying out of anti-aircraft
defense measures and also, generally, to all persons who take advan-
tage of the state of war to commit crimes. Whereas in these cases the
death penalty is optional along with hard labor, it is mandatory for
crimes involving danger to the public.59 A decree of 5 December 193960
applied the mandatory death penalty to anyone committing rape, high-
way or bank holdup, or other crimes of violence involving the use
of firearms, swords, daggers, or other equally dangerous instruments.
The same decree makes it mandatory that the punishment provided
for consummated acts be applied also to anyone merely attempting
or participating in a crime. A statute of 4 September 1941 raises once
again the question of the scale of punishment.61 Dangerous habitual
criminals as well as sexual criminals receive the death penalty if the
protection of the public or the need for just retribution so requires.
Under other statutes the scale of punishment for usury and for fraudu-
lent use of identification papers, as well as the maximum punishment
for offenses committed under the influence of liquor, is raised. The
statute of 4 September 1941 contains a curious reform of the traditional
punishments, which rested on a differentiation between the degrees
of deliberation shown in homicide. Only in first‐degree cases was the
death penalty mandatory. The new law obliterates this differentiation
and introduces the death penalty for a large, not very well‐defined
number of cases. These include not only murder committed from speci-
fied degraded motives, such as lust for murder, gratification of sexual
desire, and greed, but also certain forms of committing murder, such
as treacherous or cruel methods and the use of dangerous tools. At the
same time, it permits more discretion than did the old law; it allows the
court to refrain from employing the death penalty under the aforemen-
tioned circumstances – »in exceptional cases where the death penalty
is not appropriate«. In the hands of judges susceptible to executive
pressure, this law provides a convenient pretext for giving due consid-
eration to the personal and political »antecedents« and connections of
the individual murderer.
58 RGBl., I, 1455.
60 RGBl., I, 2378.
61 RGBl., I, 549.
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Minor contraventions of the rationing system are covered in the decree

protecting the rationing of consumer goods (Verbrauchsregelungs-Straf-
verordnung).62 As in much other recent administrative penal law, this
decree leaves to the administrative authorities the decision whether
to proceed through the medium of administrative fines or to turn the
case over to the prosecuting agencies for criminal punishment. The
War Economy Decree of 4 September 1939 (Kriegswirtschaftsverordnung),
the scope of which has been broadened by a supplemental decree of
25 March 1942,63 threatens with penal servitude and, in very grave
cases, death, »whoever destroys, removes, or withholds any raw mate-
rials or processed products which form part of the vital supply of
the population«. The scope of this decree has become more and more
extensive: Retailers who withhold supplies from customers may endan-
ger the »satisfactory working of the process of circulation«. A decree
which seems to have been applied rather cautiously is that protect-
ing the armament economy.64 It is directed against entrepreneurs and
industrial administrators, threatening them with penal servitude and,
in serious cases, with death in case they intentionally make false state-
ments in regard to their needs for labor supply and raw material. After
more than four months of existence, no case of its application had been
officially reported.65 That the food scarcity is undermining traditional
respect for private property may be seen from a decree of 20 December
1942, which inaugurates punishments up to five years imprisonment
(in especially grave cases, hard labor) for larceny of food from the
fields for immediate consumption. Until then Article 370, Par. 5 of the
Criminal Code was applied, providing for fines or short periods of
detention.
In general, the new evaluation of criminal offenses shifts the emphasis
from the personal motives to the specific external circumstances under
which the offense was committed.66 The deterrent purpose prevails
above all other considerations. Where the statutory formulation still
gives equal weight to the evaluation of the offender’s character and to
62 Decree of 26 November 1941, RGBl., I., 734. See also the special decree regulat-
ing punishment in the cases of contravention of price regulations in (Verordnung
über Strafen und Strafverfahren bei Zuwiderhandlungen gegen Preisvorschriften) of 3
June 1939, RGBl., I, 999, modified by decree of 28 August 1941, RGBl., I, 539.
63 RGBl., I, 1609; also, Decree of 25 March 1942, RGBl., I, 147.
65 Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, 15 July 1942.
66 »The picture of the personality of the offender cannot be separated from the
state of war«, Freisler states in »Gedanken zum rechten Strafmaß« in Deutsches
Strafrecht, VI (1939), pp. 329-342.
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the protective needs of the community, the official interpretation makes

it abundantly clear that the latter aim has absolute predominance.
In this respect, the doctrines which lay special stress on the type of
criminal gain official recognition. The war parasite, the precociously
dangerous criminal youth, and the brutal criminal, as they appear in
the war decrees, are criminal types for which the pictorial impression
(Bildtechnik) prevails over precise legal definition (Merkmalstechnik). In
decisions deriving from the decrees, this method has led to the use of
past records for establishing guilt in the crime in question, and guilt is
determined, not in relation to the particular offense, but in relation to
the entire career and the earlier ways of life of the criminal.67 The use of
such methods, not only in deciding the punishment, but also in judging
the guilt in the offense before the judge, helps in practice to establish
the predominance of a rather crude form of social protection as the
main content of the criminal law.68 Sometimes, however, this legislative
technique did not have the desired effect. Recalcitrant courts were
able to use the vagueness of the typological characterization to assert
that the criminal in question could not be considered as an individual
who, according to his essential characteristic, belonged to those types
of enemy of the people for whom the law makes the death penalty
mandatory. But pressure from above, the release of an uninterrupted
flow of oral or written exhortations to the judges to step up the fight
against the criminal elements, and some new procedural devices (see
p. 33 [207]), produced the desired effect. The death penalty became
an ordinary punishment. It is not reserved for gangsters, spies, or
declared enemies of the Third Reich. It is meted out equally to all who
have shown themselves defeatists by spreading rumors or listening to
foreign broadcasts, and to all those enemies of the public order who
indulge in looting, thievery, black-market operations, and the like. But
whereas in 1941 or 1942 the ax fell on the thief or black-market operator
who indulged in those operations for profit, in 1943 every mail clerk or
railway employee who opened parcels or letters to bring to his family
food or food stamps became liable to the same fate as the commercial
black-market operator.
67 Cf. the decision of the Stuttgart Sondergericht, in Juristische Wochenschrift, 1940, p.

442.
68 Entscheidung des Reichsgerichts in Strafsachen, 1937, LIII. 179, anticipates this
trend when it explains that a state of diminished responsibility by no means
excludes the application of the death penalty.
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E. Criminal Prosecution
The prosecution of criminal offenses is entrusted to a special bureau-

cratic hierarchy. Its members have the same educational qualifications
as judges. Under the Weimar Republic there was scarcely any inter-
change between the judiciary and prosecuting official. The Third Reich,
however, adopting the practice customary in Prussia before the Repub-
lic, has sometimes appointed public prosecutors familiar with the basic
ideas of the administration to the presidency of district courts and of
sections of such courts. Public prosecutors are attached to the district
courts, courts of appeal, and the Supreme Court. A special prosecuting
office has been established for the People’s Court. The direction offi‐
cers, respectively called Oberstaatsanwalt, Generalstaatsanwalt, and Ober-
reichsanwalt, rank the courts to which they are attached. They are all
responsible to the Ministry of Justice, from whom they receive orders.
The Generalstaatsanwalt attached to the Court of Appeal exercises con-
trol over all public prosecutors residing in the district of the Court
of Appeals. In the local courts prosecution before the single judge is
handled by clerks (Amtsanwälte), who work under the supervision of
the Oberstaatsanwalt attached to the district court.
Public prosecutors have certain functions in civil proceedings. These
functions have been extended under the Third Reich and now embrace
the right to appear in bastardy proceedings as well as to ask for a
new trial in divorce proceedings in the interest of husbands who have
died during the war. However, the main emphasis of their office is
on matters of criminal law. Under the Weimar regime criminal proceed-
ings were initiated by them and the investigation of criminal offenses
rested with the prosecutor at the District Court, who for these purposes
availed himself of the auxiliary services of the criminal police. Under
the Third Reich the police has emancipated itself completely from the
public prosecutor’s office. The police have assumed exclusive charge
of the investigation of crimes. In the initiation of criminal proceedings
the district attorney follows closely their suggestions. Werner Best is,
therefore, fully justified in speaking of a »reversal in the traditional
distribution of tasks between police and prosecution«; the prosecutor’s
office has become an auxiliary of the police.69
The conditions under which a warrant of arrest may be issued
by the judge on the prosecutor’s demand – or in urgent cases
69 W. Best, Die Deutsche Polizei (Darmstadt, 1940), p. 28.
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by the prosecutor himself – have been considerably liberalized

by adding to them »likely abuse of liberty for committing further
offenses« and »public irritation if the offender should be left at large«.
Warrants based upon these provisions, however, have lost much of
their Importance since the police have been empowered to keep entire
categories of criminals, such as political criminals, or criminals who
have used a weapon, in custody for three months without communi-
cating the case to the prosecutor’s office. Warrants of arrest have not
been periodically reviewed by the court since 1934. Unlike the practice
prevailing in Great Britain and the United States, relatively few people
are released on bail, though the procedure as such is permitted by
law. In Germany a criminal proceeding, whether for a felony or a mis-
demeanor, is begun by an »accusation« of the public prosecutor – the
local or regional district attorney. This is not the same as an indictment;
the services of a grand jury are not utilized; but it serves the equivalent
purpose of putting the wheels of justice in motion.
Under the Republic the principle that an accusation must be drawn
up for each infraction of the legal order (the principle of legality) had
been maintained in so far as crimes were concerned. In regard to mis-
demeanors and criminal offenses the prosecutor, with the consent of
the trial judge of the local court, could refrain from framing an act of
accusation if the guilt of the offender was small, the consequences of
the act unimportant, and no public interest required the institution of a
trial. The law has remained unchanged except in minor respects, such
as that the district attorney may refrain from prosecuting victims of
extortion if punishment is not necessary for the protection of the com-
munity.70 Yet many factors – the transfer of criminal investigations from
the prosecutor’s office to the Criminal and Security Police, the issuance
of numerous new statutes and decrees, placing the question whether a
specific act should be prosecuted or not in the discretion of the Minister
of Justice, the uninterrupted flow of administrative penal regulations
entrusting decision as to criminal prosecution to the administrative
agency, the numerous amnesties with their nolle prosecuitur clauses, the
impossibility of carrying through criminal proceedings against adher-
ents of the regime – these taken together have shattered the traditional
policies of public prosecution. Law enforcement and means of criminal
prosecution operates on arbitrary and selective levels.
70 Statute of 28 June 1935, RGBl., I, 1546 (Code of Criminal Procedure 154b). A

further exception to the principle of legality is that in case several crimes have
been committed only the principal ones must be prosecuted. (Code of Criminal
Procedure, Article 154.)
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The execution of sentences, the carrying out of amnesty laws, and

the granting of releases are under the jurisdiction of the prosecutor’s
office at the district court. Commutation of sentences and pardons are
granted by the Ministry of Justice, sometimes by the Führer; the prepa-
ration of the cases, however, is entrusted to the prosecutor’s office of
the district courts. In respect of sentences imposed by the local court,
the power to suspend execution and to place offenders on probation
rests with the local court.
As during the war the Third Reich needs all the available labor power,
the prosecutors at the district courts have been empowered to expunge
the records of offenders from the criminal register before the close of
the legally stipulated periods in order to enhance the chances of these
ex-convicts on the labor market.
F. Rules of Criminal Procedure
In 1923 an emergency decree did away with the institution of assizes

or jury courts and replaced them by a court in which three professional
judges and six lay assessors decide jointly questions of guilt and pun-
ishment. The lay members are selected from lists of the population by
a body in which the judge of the local court sits together with represen-
tatives of authorities and the Nazi Party. The defendant’s right to reject
the lay member is more restricted than his right of challenging the jury
in America. The lay member may be rejected as prejudiced only if the
professional members of the court agree to the defendant’s demand of
rejection. From 1923 on, the ascendancy of the professional over the lay
element has been definitely established in the realm of criminal justice.
This development was accelerated considerably after the Nazis came
into power. Although the above-mentioned nine-judge court was not
officially abolished until the beginning of the war, a large part of its
jurisdiction had been transferred to special courts, which also received
jurisdiction over certain new crimes. Under the Third Reich the special
courts became increasingly the center of criminal jurisdiction for more
serious cases. The special court was in reality nothing other than the
old penal section of the district courts. But whereas under the Weimar
Republic the penal section functioned mainly as an appeal court, it
now became a court of first and last resort. Other criminal cases were
handled by the local courts, which prior to the war sat in the more
important cases with two lay assessors (Schöffengericht). At the begin-
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ning of the war the Schöffengericht was abolished, and it was left to the
public prosecutor to decide whether the case should be transferred to
the single judge of the local court or to the special court.
In simple matters the single judge of the local court may impose fines
or sentences of imprisonment up to six months (three months before
the war), by means of a written penal order, without a trial (Strafbefehl).
If the accused objects a trial takes place.
The position of the accused in the criminal procedure has worsened
considerably, a fact which is evident from the steadily diminishing
numbers of acquittals as shown in the following table.
Acquittals in Criminal Proceedingsa

Year Acquittals in percentage of accused persons
1930 14.04
1932 15.05
1933 12.87
1934 12.64
1936 10.50
1938 10.00
1939 9.20
1940a 5.90
a. Figures are for the first half of the year only.
Most of the »simplifications« to the disadvantage of the accused were

first introduced in the special courts and the People’s Court, only to be
extended to all judicial proceedings during the course of the war. The
principle of a public trial has not been given up, but the courts make
use more often than before of the right of excluding the public from
part of the proceedings.
The traditional criminal procedure had provided for a mandatory pre-
liminary judicial investigation before a special judge (Untersuchungsla-
ger) in all cases where appeal on questions of fact was excluded. It
shares this feature, which is alien to Anglo-American law, with many
other Continental countries. In all other cases judicial investigation
could be opened if the difficulty and scope of the case so required.
In practice, a special judge took a deposition under oath from wit-
nesses; thus the prosecuting attorney could decide whether or not
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the case should be brought before the court. The deposition, which
became part of the file and was open to the inspection of all trial par-
ticipants, facilitated concentration on essential questions and made for
a certain degree of procedural economy. Although appeals were soon
to be strictly limited, compulsory judicial investigation was abolished
in 1935. It was the responsibility of the public prosecutor to decide
whether preliminary judicial investigation should take place; the defen-
dant had no right to ask for it. The court’s right to decide whether it
wished to open a trial at the request of the prosecution or to hold the
elements of proof adduced against the accused insufficient was abol-
ished, first in proceedings before the People’s Court, then for the appeal
courts and special courts, and finally, during the war, for all criminal
proceedings. Although in most cases the court opened proceedings on
the request of the prosecution, the right to refuse to do so, coupled with
the occasional exercise of this right, had acted as a wholesome barrier
against frivolous prosecutions. It was one element of a system of checks
and balances by virtue of which German judicial procedure sought to
preserve the rights of the accused.
Summary proceedings, not requiring a written accusation and provid-
ing for trial within twenty-four hours, had been restricted under the
Republic to a small number of cases, among which the most important
was the apprehension of a criminal during commission of the crime.
This procedure found much favor under the Third Reich, especially
in dealing with lighter cases. Since 1942 summary action has been
allowable in all cases before the single judge of a local court. Sentences
pronounced in the course of the summary procedure may be executed
immediately without waiting out the interval allowed for appeals.
According to German criminal procedure, the direction of the trial rests
in the hands of the presiding judge, who interrogates the prisoner,
witnesses, and experts. Unlike the Anglo-American conception of the
judge as an umpire between contending parties, the German judge
conducts the trial as an active and official searcher of truth. For this
reason cross-examination was never proper in German courts and was
formally abolished in the great sweep of 1942, but the judge may allow
the prosecution or the defendant to put specific questions to the wit-
nesses and experts. The accused does not testify under oath and cannot
be compelled to make statements at all, although it is good practice in
German courts to hold against him his refusal to answer queries. Ger-
man criminal procedure again differs sharply from the formalized rules
of evidence of Anglo-American law and leaves the court full freedom
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to weigh the value of the evidence, the courts being bound by rules
of evidence only in very few circumstances.71 However, the code of
criminal procedure sets up certain rules as to the circumstances under
which application to hear evidence may be rejected. The strictness of
these rules varies according to whether or not the questions of fact can
be taken up again on appeal. Under the Third Reich, the special courts
were at first given a right to refuse to hear evidence. This right was
gradually extended until all criminal courts could use their discretion
in considering a request to hear evidence.
The concentration of the trial procedure in the hands of the presiding
judge lessens the significance of the role of the prosecution and espe-
cially of the defense attorney during the trial stage. The innovations of
the Third Reich have redressed the balance somewhat in favor of the
prosecution, but the task of the defense attorney has become still less
enviable. He has always been handicapped by the fact that he did not
have a legal right to inspect the entire file until after the accusation had
been transmitted to the court. With the progress of the new legislation
he became more and more dependent upon the presiding judge’s good
will in regard to requests for hearing evidence. The lawyer needed at
the same time to be very careful not to arouse the presiding judge’s
ire by unwarranted requests or by adducing facts which, however true
and important they might be for his client, might place the judge in a
difficult political position. The following remarks of R. Freisler show
the extent to which the defense is handicapped:
»If I have accepted a case which I have a right to accept as a German
lawyer as well as in consideration of the special ties which follow from
my membership in certain organizations, and if I have conducted the
defense vigorously and properly as the defendant’s representative, and
have acted within the framework of the community interests which I
am obliged to protect, then no judicial or administrative authority can
challenge responsibility.«72
But traditionally the majority of criminal trials have taken place with-
out a defense attorney. Since the war the number of cases in which a
defense attorney was required by law and, if need be, was appointed
officially, has been whittled down substantially.
71 See Sect. IV A.
72 R. Freisler, »Zur Stellung des Verteidigers im neuen Strafverfahren«, Deutsches
Strafrecht, IV (1937), p. 125. The comment is all the more interesting because the
author’s intention was to plead for greater freedom of action for the defense
attorney.
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A two third’s court majority is still necessary for trial decisions on ques-
tions of guilt or punishment unfavorable to the accused, but the intro-
duction of »the leadership principle« within the court makes this pro-
tective clause largely inoperative. The legislation of 1939 has brought a
further novelty: Prison terms start to run only at the end of the war,
thus increasing the punishment automatically by the length of the war.
G. Criminal Appeals
In criminal as in civil cases, German procedure formerly employed

two fundamental concepts: »Revision«, restricted to points of law,
and »Berufung«, involving points of fact. Complaint (Beschwerde) was
admitted against some interlocutory orders during the preparatory as
well as the trial stage. Since 1932 it has been permissible to appeal
decisions of the local court either on questions of fact, to the criminal
division of the district court, or on questions of law, to the criminal
division of the court of appeal. The procedural innovations of the Third
Reich have brought substantial curtailments of the right of appeal.
There is no appeal against decisions of the People’s Court and of
the special courts. The use of still existing channels of appeal by the
defendant was discouraged by the Law of 28 June, 1935,73 which did
away with the restriction that an appeal of the defendant could never
worsen his position. Since the outbreak of the war, decisions of the
local court have been subject only to appeals to the district court. Since
1942, appeals against decisions of all criminal courts have been admit-
ted only if the court to which the appeals were to be taken grants a
notice of admissibility: such notice will be granted if »refusal would be
inequitable«.74
Although the position of the accused had already grown worse from
the cutting down of legal remedies, the legislation of 1939 gave the
administration a new weapon to use against its enemies. In order
to achieve a criminal jurisprudence in absolute conformity with the
wishes of the political leadership, a special division was set up inside
the Reichsgericht.75 The Chief Prosecutor (Oberreichsanwalt), within one
year after a decision of a lower court, can by using the device of
an »extraordinary complaint« (Außerordentlicher Einspruch) take up the
73 RGBl., I, 844.
74 Decree of 7 August 1942, RGBl., I, 509.
75 Decree of 16 September 1939, RGBl., 1841.
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case again, before this special division. He can ask for the quashing of
the decision, in case there are great objections »against the accuracy or
justice of the judgment«. When the chief public prosecutor asks for the
quashing of the decision of the lower court and demands a new trial
before the special division, he at the same time designates the sentence
which the division is expected to give.76 A later decree of 21 February
194077 generalized the option of the chief public prosecutor of the Reich
to take exception to final decisions during a period of a year following
the decision. The decree allows him to challenge criminal sentences
before the regular divisions of the Reichsgericht if he finds faults in
the application of the law. The scope of the generalized nullification
(Nichtigkeitsbeschwerde) procedure, originally restricted to questions of
law, was extended in 1942 to »serious doubts as to the correctness of
facts ascertained and the adequacy of the sentences«.78 It seems that,
in order to obtain the desired results in questions of practical and
political importance, a new trial before the special division is resorted
to, whereas in questions of a more legal than practical significance the
unification of criminal practice is obtained by means of the nullification
procedure before the ordinary divisions of the Reichsgericht.79
No change seems to have been made in the general rules concerning
the requirements for a new trial after the decision has become final
(Wiederaufnahme des Verfahrens). But the conditions permitting such pro-
ceedings in favor of a convicted person have always been interpreted
very strictly: now the extraordinary complaint is practically tantamount
to such a procedure in favor of the prosecution.
76 Tegtmeyer, »Der außerordentliche Einspruch«, in Juristische Wochenschrift, 1939,

p. 2060. The decision of the special division, quoted in Zeitschrift der Akademie
für deutsches Recht, 1940, p. 48, shows that the judges understood the orders
given to them when they changed a sentence of penal servitude into a death
sentence. Not without justification, the position of this special division has been
compared to that of the princes in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries who
had the sovereign right of confirming or modifying decisions of criminal courts,
and therefore, the possibility of increasing or decreasing the punishment. A sub-
stantial difference, however, should not be overlooked. Frederick II of Prussia,
whose memory the new German regime sometimes takes pleasure in invoking,
exercised this jealously guarded right of »confirmation« in order to foster the
humanization of the criminal law and not, as does the present regime solely for
the purpose of intimidation and brutality.
77 RGBl., 1940, I, 405.
78 Decree of 13 August 1942, RGBl., I, 508.
79 See Graf von Gleispach, Das Kriegsstrafrecht (1941), pp. 29 ff.
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H. Treatment of Juvenile Delinquency
One of the early measures of the Nazi government whittled down

considerably the beneficial cooperation of the local welfare agencies in
the preparatory as well as the trial stages of juvenile cases. In so far as
welfare agencies still operate in the field, they are completely under the
control of the prosecuting agency.80
But even before the war, at a time when criminal law in general was
already imbued with the spirit of brutality, reform remained in general
the official slogan in the field of juvenile delinquency. For example, the
regulations of 1937 for the punishment of youthful offenders state as a
general principle:
»The administration of the punishment of juvenile offenders applies all
its energies to influencing the future behavior of the young prisoner.
The prisoner should not be lost but returned to the right path, and
should be strengthened so as to be able to return as a useful member to
the national community.«81
But the policy of suppression of spontaneous individual or group activ-
ities, coupled with the hardships resulting from the overcrowding of
the youth prisons in consequence of the central lengthening of prison
terms, was not very conductive to the rehabilitation of youthful offend‐
ers. The general trend of juvenile delinquency ostensibly remained
favorable up to the war – partly as a consequence of the already
mentioned amnesties, partly because of the improved employment sit-
uation. At the same time there is a steep rise in the youngest class of
youthful offenders in the large cities (not as a result of corresponding
increase in the ratio of these age groups to the total population).82 Espe-
cially remarkable is the disproportionate rise of sexual offenses among
the juvenile offenders. This phenomenon cannot be attributed to greater
police efficiency alone but finds its explanation largely in the consider-
able increase of homosexual habits, first favored but afterwards bitterly
fought by the Nazis.
80 Executive Decree of 7 October 1937, Deutsche Justiz, CIX, 1564-1569; See also R.
Freisler, Ermittlungshilfe und Straffälligenbetreuung (Berlin, 1937).
81 Pars. 2, 9: the regulations are reprinted in Blätter für Gefängniskunde. Vol. 67
Suppl. 4 (Heidelberg, 1937).
82 Thus in Hamburg juvenile delinquency among school children rose from 6.3
percent in 1931 to 17.4 percent in 1936; in Munich it climbed from 9.6 percent
in 1932 to 21.2 percent in 1935. H. Kruse, »Die Straffälligkeit der Jugend in
Hamburg in den Jahren 1930-36«, in Monatsschrift für Kriminalpsychologie, XXVIII
(1937), p. 499; see also K. Seibert, Die Jugendkriminalität (Munich, Leipzig, 1937)
p. 33.
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In 1940, after a protracted discussion, the so-called »Juvenile

Arrest« (Jugendarrest), which corresponded both to the propaganda
needs of the youth authorities and to the manpower needs of the labor
administration, was inaugurated.83 Fines and short-term sentences are
replaced by a special form of youth detention ranging in length from a
weekend to one month. Being applied under conditions of solitary con-
finement, it stands midway between educational measures and punish-
ment.84 The same device has been introduced, as a disciplinary mea-
sure, into the practice of the Hitler Youth, under the name of »Youth
Service Detention« (Jugenddienstarrest). Periods of youth detention not
being recorded in the criminal register proper, the offender does not
suffer any stigma because of his punishment. Whereas Youth Detention
endeavors to keep certain types of youthful offenders from contact with
criminals, an earlier decree allows the prosecutor to refuse the »danger-
ous criminal« of sixteen to eighteen years the benefit of a trial before the
juvenile courts. The prosecuting may be conducted before the special or
ordinary courts, and the »mature« youthful criminal who has shown a
reprehensible state of mind may, »if the protection of the state requires
it«,85 even be sentenced to death. A number of death sentences against
foreigners as well as against German youth have been pronounced
since the issuance of this decree. In 1941 the juvenile courts where
in general permitted to impose sentences for an indeterminate period,
with a maximum of four years.86 If at the end of the four years the
delinquent has not been »reformed«, he can be sent to a youth protec-
tion camp for an indefinite period.
On 6 November 1943 a new »Statute on Juvenile Delinquency« was
promulgated. It would appear from German Sources87 that the new
law, which supersedes the statute of 1923, amounts for the most part to
a consolidation of the then existing law. There are a few innovations.
For example, fines are no longer to be levied against juveniles; there
may be complete or partial remission of court fees if the court sees fit;
defendants permitted are permitted no appeal against the imposition of
the already mentioned Youth Detention. Rehabilitation is emphasized
in a new solemn procedure of judicial rehabilitation, which can take
83 Decree of 4 October 1940, RGBl., I, 1, 336.

84 An insight of the success of the measure may be gathered from a recent execu-
tive order (20 December 1943) permitting use of firearms by guards against
juveniles where necessary for self-defense. News Digest No. 1339, quoting Deut-
sche Justiz of 24 December 1943.
85 Decree of 9 October 1939, RGBl., I, 2,000.
87 DNB [unleserlich] of 11 November 1943, quoted in News Digest 1,290.
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place at the request of an offender who has conducted himself in an

exemplary manner for two consecutive years.
Already in 1940 the Nazis had sought to forestall unfavorable
war influences upon juveniles by a general »Youth Protection Police
Decree« (Polizeiverordnung zum Schutze der Jugend),88 which severely
restricted liberty of movement after dark and the frequenting of amuse-
ment places. This decree has remained largely a dead letter, and all
reports show a stupendous rise of juvenile delinquency. The hous-
ing situation created by air-raids, population movements, and lack
of adequate food and of recreational facilities, favored the formation
of gangs which taking up quarters in bombed-out dwellings, have
removed themselves from all supervision. A new decree issued by
Himmler on 1 July 1943 endeavors to remedy the situation. It places
still more severe restrictions on the liberty of movement of juveniles
than did the earlier 1940 decree which it replaces. In a desperate
attempt to enforce the decree, all members of the Wehrmacht, of the
Waffen‐SS, and of the patrol services of the police the Hitler Youth have
been instructed to apprehend juveniles who are found violating the
new measures. They are to be turned over to the courts for punishment.
I. The Execution of Penalties and the Prison System
The execution of penalties and the administration of prisons were

originally under the jurisdiction of the German States. Agreements
between the States in 1897 were limited to the recognition of certain
general principles; a semblance of coordination of prison practice was
not reached until 1923. The regulations of 1923 were based upon the
idea that execution of a penalty means not so much compliance with
the tenor of the judgment as achievement of the purpose formulated in
Sect. 48 as follows: »The prisoner shall become used to work and order,
and shall be strengthened morally so that he may not relapse into
crime.« He was to be treated with sternness, fairness and humanity; his
sense of honor was to be respected and promoted (Sect. 49). As a means
of achieving this purpose, the regulations of 1923 introduced a progres-
sive execution of the sentence (Sect. 130). The time which the prisoner
spends in prison is divided into successive stages characterized by an
increasing number of privileges and liberties. As the moral attitude of
the prisoner improves under the influence of regular work and instruc-
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tion, he passes from one stage to the other until he is prepared to rejoin
society and to take full advantage of the freedom he enjoys after his
release. During the detention as well as after his release the prisoner
is to be assisted in his efforts to rehabilitate himself. Upon his release
suitable living quarters and work are to be found for him to facilitate
his progress.
While in prison, arbitrariness was to be eliminated by a series of mea-
sures regarding housing, clothing, food, medical care, and leisure-time
activity. Instruction and religious care were to be provided, and the
prisoner’s relations with the outside world (visits and correspondence)
were limited only in so far as they disturbed prison order or had an
unfavorable influence on the prisoner. Work was to be provided for the
prisoner, for which he was to be remunerated. Disciplinary measures
included confinement and withdrawal of privileges, which could be
aggravated by depriving the prisoner of work, bed, part of the food,
or outdoor exercise. Such measures as flogging or confinement in a
dark cell (Dunkelarrest), were abolished; chaining was permissible only
as a security measure, not as a punishment. Special provisions dealt
with the treatment of youthful criminals. Whereas the trend of the
regulations of 1923 pointed towards a humanization of the treatment of
prisoners, National Socialist tendencies were in the opposite direction.
This became evident in the first measure of the Nazi regime, cancelling
privileges enjoyed under the 1923 principles, by »offenders from con-
viction«, that is, offenders who had transgressed as a result of moral,
religious or political convictions.89 In the eyes of the legislator of 1923
these were on a higher level than other criminals, and were entitled
from the beginning of their term of sentence to a treatment equal to the
highest grade in the progressive system. Since political offenders were
as a rule the beneficiaries of such favorable treatment, the provision
was promptly cancelled in 1933.
With the transfer of the administration of justice to the Reich in the
beginning of 1934, the subsequent changes in the principles governing
the execution of sentences were made by the Reich Minister of Jus-
tice.90 The original plan called for an act concerning the execution of
sentences, to be published after and in connection with the new Penal
Code then under discussion in the German Academy of Law. As a pro-
visional measure various changes were effected by a decree of 1934,91
89 Agreement between the States of 25 April 1933, RGBl., I, 232.

90 Authority in Sect. 5 of the decree of February 1934.
91 Decree of 14 May 1934, RGBl., I, 383.
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interpreting punishment as an expiation of the crime. Imprisonment

was to be the infliction of a substantial evil on the criminal. Accordingly
the decree introduced, as an additional disciplinary measure, what was
known as »intensified arrest«. In such cases, the officials were given
much wider powers as regards retention of letters written by the pris-
oners. In respect of instruction, the decree introduced patriotism as
one of the main objects in the re-education of the prisoner, and prison
libraries were required to eliminate all so-called subversive literature.
Finally, the right of the prisoner to appeal against administrative mea-
sures was greatly restricted.
The final step in the unification of the prison administration was taken
in 1940.92 Although couched as an administrative order, this decree
cancelled, and took the place of, all former laws and decrees of the
Reich and the States on the same subject‐matter. Administration was
centralized in the hands of the Reich Minister of Justice. Exercise of
the Ministry’s various powers was entrusted to the Prison Administra-
tion Sub-section of the Criminal Prosecuting Section. On the regional
level, the only intervening authority now is the Attorney General at the
Appeal Court, who has certain supervisory powers, as far as execution
of sentences in concerned, over local directors of prisons. The separate
higher supervisory body (Strafvollzugsamt), which formerly exist in the
several appeal-court districts of Prussia, had already been abolished.
The new decree applies to three forms of imprisonment, i.e. peniten-
tiary (Zuchthaus), prison (Gefängnis), and detention (Haft), as well as
preventive (security) detention (Sicherungsverwahrung) or workhouse
(Arbeitshaus). Preventive detention is warranted as long as is necessary
to correct the criminal habits which led to confinement. There is not
much difference in practice between the treatment meted out in peni-
tentiaries and that in prisons for preventive detection. Separate prisons
must be provided for each of the three forms of imprisonment, also
separate institutions for men and women. Penitentiaries (Zuchthäuser)
and prisons (Gefängnisse) receive those sentenced to penal servitude
and long terms of prison respectively. Detention houses (Haftanstalten)
exist in connection with local or district courts (Amtsgericht, Landge-
richt), and receive those who must remain in jail before trial (Untersu-
chungshaft).
According to the decree of 1940, the object of the execution of penalties
is threefold, namely: protection of the community, expiation of the
92 Decree of 22 July 1940, published in the official section of Deutsche Justiz, 1940,
21.
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crime, and prevention of new crimes. Incorrigible criminals must be

rendered harmless, and society must be protected against them. No
educational efforts are wasted on them, but after their release from
penitentiary they are confined to security detention or workhouses.
The progressive system has been almost abolished, except by inversely
making the beginning of imprisonment more severe. The idea of edu-
cation has not been completely abandoned, but it benefits only those
for whom a possibility of rehabilitation (Besserungsfähige) is recognized.
During the course of the offender’s first term (Erstvollzug) a differentia‐
tion between incorrigible criminals and those capable of rehabilitation
is made. The latter may be re-educated to take their place again in the
community.
There is also a differentiation between persons sentenced to penal
servitude and those sent to prison or kept in detention. The former
are subjected to the greatest strain on their physical strength and the
least consideration for their personal needs and interests. Other differ‐
ences in treatment consist in the working hours, the remuneration for
work, participation in instruction, prisoner’s clothing, and the right to
receive visits and to write and receive letters. Those sentenced to penal
servitude remain in solitary confinement during the first six months;
inmates of prisons, during the first three months of their terms.
Prisoners no longer possess the right to complain by letter to political
or charitable organizations. Writing and receiving letters in general has
been greatly curtailed. Appeals against administrative measures of the
prison director may be filed only after a cooling‐off period (Besinnungs-
zeit) of one night.
Disciplinary measures have been made much stricter by the introduc-
tion of numerous new penalties. Physical force against prisoners is
permitted to enforce compliance with orders, and the use of weapons
is allowed in case of resistance or attempt to escape. The harsh policy
of the new regime has been somewhat mitigated by the fact that the
old prison officials, usually more conservatively inclined, were as a rule
retained. Their habitual conservatism, which prevented their accom-
plishing very much under the Weimar Republic toward implementing
the progressive program of prison reform, now acts as a brake.
The decree of 1940 deals also with the treatment of juvenile delin-
quents, who must be kept separate from others.
The regulations discussed apply to security detention and confinement
in a workhouse as well as to prisons and penitentiaries. They do not
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apply to concentration camps, which are removed from the jurisdiction

of the Ministry of Justice. Concentration camps are under the supervi-
sion of the Gestapo, with the central power lodged in the hands of the
Chief of the German Police and Leader of the SS.
J. Conclusion
In the fifth year of the war, German criminal law and procedure
scarcely retain any other function than that of threatening wavering
elements of the population into submission. This is done by showing
them the dire fate which speedily befalls anyone who opposes the Ger-
man war machine, whether from deliberate political motives, criminal
impulses, or simply by the impulse of self-preservation which drives
an ever increasing number of people to violate the rationing prescrip-
tions, deal in the black markets, or steal food. This uniform brutality
of German criminal law has long overshadowed some of the more
interesting features which had been developed in the pre-war years.
Of these the most outstanding was the attempt to differentiate rather
sharply between the professional criminal and the occasional criminal
by preserving all the severity of the law for the former and trying to
assist the latter through generous amnesties and facilities to purge his
criminal record after a short period. Even this feature was marred from
the outset by the wholesale destruction of legal guarantees in criminal
procedure as well as by the steady undermining of judicial indepen-
dence, which made the criminal courts more and more subservient to
administrative pressure and thus facilitated and prepared the present
wholesale terrorism.
V. Administrative Justice and Administrative Tribunals
A. The Development of Administrative Courts
In the course of the »liberalizing« of laws and procedures in Europe

in the nineteenth century, clear-cut rules not only for the ordering of
civil relationships and the punishment of criminal offenses but also for
the protection of the citizen against acts of the executive agencies of
the state were demanded by those interested in making government
a system of calculable norms instead of unpredictable and therefore
seemingly arbitrary acts. Two different paths – the one entered on by
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the Anglo-Saxon systems, the other by the Continental countries – were

open for the realization of this aim: protection of the citizen by the
ordinary courts; or protection by a special system of courts which,
though issuing from the executive part of the government, enjoyed the
guarantees of judicial independence and were therefore in a position
to »arbitrate« impartially in an issue between citizen and authority. It
was this latter system, of administrative tribunals with a special person-
nel, which, in an incomplete form, was introduced in Germany in the
latter half of the century. Since the organization of courts, the adminis-
tration of justice, and interior administration belonged in the main to
the jurisdiction of the federal states until the advent of National Social-
ism, matters of administrative law and administrative courts were reg-
ulated by the several States in diverse ways. Certain uniform features,
however, already existed prior to the »federalization« (Verreichlichung)
of the entire system.
The uniform features were most apparent in the shortcomings of the
system. Under an ideal system, all acts of the executive authorities
which in any way concern the rights or interests of individuals or
even public entities – such as municipalities or public corporations –
would be subject to review by administrative courts upon application
of the individual or the public body concerned. The actual scheme
in Germany was far from attaining this ideal. Usually only those
acts of the authorities were open to review which in specific laws
were declared reviewable. This system of »enumeration« was in certain
important fields replaced by that of making entire categories of admin-
istrative acts reviewable by administrative tribunals. Thus, in Prussia
and most of the other States, police orders (Polizeiverfügungen) were,
by general clauses of the respective laws, subjected to administrative
judicial review. But this was far from subjecting all administrative acts
to such review. In cases where acts were not open to review they might
still be appealed against by the citizen concerned, either by means of
a so-called formal complaint, which sometimes led to a quasi-judicial
proceeding, or by means of an informal complaint, which, however, the
higher authority was not obliged to entertain.
With respect to courts and procedures, the system was likewise far
from satisfactory. In the first place, cases in which administrative juris-
diction existed were not handled by one uniform system of courts,
but were referred to many kinds of courts or semi-judicial authorities.
Thus, cases in the field of finance and taxation would come before spe-
cial finance courts, which in turn differed in the Reich and the various
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States.93 A social insurance case would come before another type of

court and authority.94 Only those cases which remained after excepting
the numerous special jurisdictions were placed under administrative
jurisdiction proper. Here, however, as in many cases of special adminis-
trative jurisdiction, the court system was still defective. For example,
though there usually existed two or even three grades of administrative
courts, these were organized to conform with the existing arrangement
of general administrative divisions and often consisted of agencies
of administration proper, which thus fulfilled the dual function of
executive agency and administrative tribunal. This, of course, meant
that they were not true »courts« independent of the influence of the
executive. In many instances they were identical with, or merely the
supervising authority of, the agency which had made the decision, and
which thus was called upon to act as judge in its own cause. Only the
highest court had the character of a genuinely independent tribunal. In
other instances complaints against administrative acts had first to be
taken up with the administrative agencies themselves, and only for a
final appeal came before a real administrative tribunal.
B. The Prussian System of Administrative Courts
To make this complicated situation a little clearer, a brief description

of the pre-Hitler Prussian system will serve in illustration. Administra-
tive jurisdiction in Prussia was introduced in the 1870’s and 1880’s
after some of the more liberal South-German states had already paved
the way. There were, in the main, three grades of administrative »tri-
bunals«, of which the two lower were bodies with the dual function of
administrative agency and »court«, while only the highest was a true
court. On the lowest level, usually concerned with cases in which local
administrative authorities were involved, there was an agency or board
known as the Kreisausschuss (in city counties Stadtausschuss). This board
consisted of six members elected by the representative assembly of the
rural county (Kreistag), with the rural prefect (Landrat) as chairman ex
officio (the Stadtausschuss correspondingly consisting of the mayor and
93 See Chapter 4 of this Handbook. [Diese Anmerkung verweist auf ein Kapitel
aus dem Civil Affairs Handbook, das nicht von Otto Kirchheimer verfasst wurde
und daher auch nicht in diesen Band aufgenommen wurde.]
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four lay members selected by the magistrate or the municipal assem-

bly). This board functioned on the County level of administration. The
next higher body with administrative jurisdiction, the Bezirksausschuss,
functioned on the District level, and was closely integrated with the
administrative machinery of the District (Regierungsbezirk). It was com-
posed of the District President as chairman, two members appointed
by the Prussian Ministry – of whom one had to be trained in law, the
other for higher administrative service – and four lay members elected
by one of the representative assemblies of the self-governing Province.
This intermediate board had jurisdiction in cases involving administra-
tive authorities of the District level and in addition beard complaints
or appeals against decisions of the Landrat or other local authorities,
the District President, and the Kreisausschuss (or Stadtausschuss). Above
the District Board was the Prussian Supreme Administrative Tribunal
(Oberverwaltungsgericht) the only agency with all the attributes of a true
court. Its members were appointed for life and were selected from the
ranks of judges and higher civil servants. It was organized in several
panels of five members each. It functioned in certain cases as a court
of original jurisdiction, in other (e.g., where the Bezirksausschuss had
original jurisdiction) as a court of appeal. As a court of appeal, it was
limited to questions of law or fact exclusive of matters of administrative
discretion, or to questions of law alone, if acting as a court of revision.
The Oberverwaltungsgericht, in the almost sixty years of its pre-Hitler
existence, developed an influential and unifying jurisdiction in many
respects comparable to that of the French Conseil d’État. Particularly in
police cases. Here, where the Prussian law of 1931 (Polizeiverwaltungs-
gesetz) had codified the substance and procedure of police administra-
tion in a relatively progressive way, this tribunal, through its power of
review of administrative orders and executive decrees, erected an effi‐
cient wall against many arbitrary interferences with individual rights.
C. The Civil Courts and the Administrative Courts
The pre-Hitler system was made still more complicated by the increas-
ing practice of transferring to the civil courts matters which logically
fell within administrative jurisdiction. Three classes of cases where civil
courts took jurisdiction may be mentioned in particular. First were
financial claims of civil servants against the state or other public bodies
arising out of their civil service relationship. The right of taking this
type of case before the ordinary civil courts was later guaranteed to all
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German officials by the Weimar Constitution (Art. 129). Second were

claims for damage done by public officials in the exercise of their func-
tions beyond their duties or in violation of the rights of others. Such a
claim would be taken by the person damaged to an ordinary court. The
action was directed against the state, which thereby was made to
assume the responsibility of its civil servants, against whom it could
seek redress if it saw fit. The right to sue the state as fisc, which also
was later guaranteed by the Weimar Constitution (Art. 131) was given a
very wide interpretation by the Supreme Court, though perhaps with
more concern for property rights and interests than for protection of
other private rights. A third class of matters within the jurisdiction of
civil courts were claims for indemnification in cases of expropriation
(eminent domain). The right of obtaining a civil court adjudication on
this type of claim was also protected by the Weimar Constitution
(Art. 153). A broad interpretation of the language (e.g., »property«),
coupled with the Supreme Court’s assumption of the right of judicial
review of Reich laws, again permitted a liberal safeguarding of the
interests of individuals and corporations.
When National Socialism took over, the existing system of administra-
tive jurisdiction was opposed in theory and undermined in practice
until it became almost extinct. An authoritarian, anti-liberal philosophy
of the state could not recognize any system which set up courts as
arbiters between state and citizens, thus putting authorities on the same
level with »subjects« in subordination to the law. In practice, however,
the transformation of the existing system and its institutions took place
gradually. At first, paradoxical as it may appear, the sphere of adminis-
trative jurisdiction was extended by the transfer of certain cases from
the even more suspect ordinary courts. Thus the German Civil Service
Act of 26 January 1937 provided that financial claims of civil servants
arising out of their relationship with the state should no longer come
before the ordinary courts but should be entrusted to administrative tri-
bunals. This provision was put into effect only after the establishment
of the Reich Supreme Administrative Tribunal in 1941. In the case of
suits against the state for damage done by its officials, though jurisdic-
tion was not transferred outright from civil to administrative tribunals,
it was limited to fixing damages, while the decision as to whether there
had been a violation of an official duty, could at the discretion of the
supervising authority be transferred to the Supreme Administrative
Tribunal. This provision likewise was put into effect only after the
establishment of the Reich Administrative Tribunal. Cases of violation
of duty by officials of the judiciary are exempt from this stipulation.
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Generally speaking, the number of administrative acts open to the

scrutiny of the administrative or the civil courts has been greatly dimin-
ished by the lengthening of the list of non-judiciable acts.95 At the
same time, administrative agencies are no longer restricted in their
activities to the duties specifically placed upon them by law. Formerly,
the presumption of the legal validity of an administrative act could be
destroyed by showing it to be ultra vires. But since administration has
lost its »negative« character in being no longer restricted to the func-
tions imposed by law, and since »legality« has been replaced by »legiti-
macy« derived from the orders of the Führer, the control of the civil
administration by any kind of judicial agency, administrative agency, or
court was bound to become a dead letter.
Elimination of administrative jurisdiction as an element in the legal
system of Germany took place in two ways: structurally, by gradually
destroying the system of courts and semi-judicial bodies; functionally,
by narrowing their sphere of jurisdiction until it comprised only an
insignificant number of cases – mostly unimportant. Two of the main
types of controversy which administrative tribunals had decided were
those between self-governing municipalities and the supervising state-
authorities, and, secondly, cases arising out of police orders or police
prohibitions against which individuals sought relief. With regard to the
former, the German Municipalities Act of 30 January 1935 provided
that, against orders of supervising authorities, municipalities were
limited to lodging a complaint with the higher supervising authority,
whose decision would be final. A large number of the complaints
against police measures were eliminated as a simple result of the fact
that the basic laws, which had protected the individual against police
interference, were abolished after the advent of Nazism. With respect
to the remaining cases not thus disposed of, a distinction was drawn
between »political acts of authority« (politische Hoheitsakte)96 and mea-
sures devoid of political import. The former comprise, for example,
all measures of the Secret State Police. Here, appeal to administrative
courts was abolished by the Prussian Law on the Secret Service Police
of 10 February 1936. The corresponding appeal to a civil court for dam-
ages, while not forbidden by express statutory provision, was removed
from their jurisdiction by the courts themselves after 1933.97
95 See Section I, D2.

96 See Koellreutter, Deutsche Verwaltungsrecht (1936), pp. 129 ff.
97 See W. Spohr, Das Recht der Schutzhalt (1937), pp. 23 ff., 67 ff.
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After that year the administrative-judicial bodies of the two lower

grades, though now designated as »courts« (Kreis-, Stadt-, Bezirksverwal-
tungsgerichte) lost still more of the character of genuine courts from
the fact that their lay members became state appointees. Actually, as
can be seen from the membership, these so-called courts were made
up of »Party Comrades« representing the various Party groups and
organizations in their respective districts. And the outbreak of the war,
what remained of the traditional functions of administrative courts was
practically abolished.98 The lower »courts« (Kreisverwaltungsgerichte as
of 10 November 1939, Stadtverwaltungsgerichte as of 1 December 1941)
were dissolved. In their place, lower administrative officials make the
decisions. Against these decisions complaint may be lodged with the
next higher administrative authority. Similarly, jurisdiction of the next
higher »courts« the Bezirksverwaltungsgerichte, is in principle replaced
by that of the corresponding administrative agency (usually the Dis-
trict President). In exceptional cases, e.g., where the decision involves
major legal problems, the administrative authorities now usurping the
place of proper tribunals may, at their discretion, permit the case to be
brought before an administrative tribunal. Appeal against its decision
is again not a matter of right, but of the discretion, permit the case to be
brought before an administrative tribunal. Appeal against its decision
is again not a matter of right, but of the discretion of the court. Review
of questions of law (Revision), in particular, will take place only because
of the special legal importance of the case, e.g., where the deciding
tribunal wishes to deviate from long-established precedents. It is obvi-
ous that cases in which the deciding agency itself agrees to submit its
decision to further review, while also remaining free to prevent the
case from going to another agency for scrutiny, will be extremely rare,
particularly since the wartime decrees for simplification of administra-
tion have strongly warned to avoid all unnecessary proceedings. On
the other hand, it has been stated authoritatively that these reforms are
not considered as mere wartime measures for the duration but as steps
preparatory of future general reform.99
As the law stands now, there are three kinds of legal remedies. First is
an informal complaint, which need not be lodged within a prescribed
time and has no prescribed form. It goes to the superior of the official
98 See Decree on the Simplification of Administration, 28 Aug. 1939, RGBl., I, 4535,

Sect. 4, Nos. 2-3. and Second Decree on the Simplification of Administration 6
November 1939, RGBl., I, 2168.
99 See, e.g., G. Schmidt, in Deutsche Verwaltung, XVII (1940) pp. 1 ff.
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whose decision is attacked. The superior may entirely disregard it if he

wishes.
The second legal remedy is a formal complaint, which must be lodged
within a prescribed time (usually two weeks) and which asserts specific
errors either in regard to the facts or the law applied. It too goes to
the official’s superior. If this superior finds that in the interest of the
administration or of the unity of the administrative system the act
should be more fully scrutinized, he may, at his discretion, permit the
act to be taken up before an administrative tribunal.
Thus the third legal remedy, formal proceedings before an administra-
tive tribunal, depends on special permission being granted by the supe-
rior of the official whose action is under attack. The administrative tri-
bunals – the Bezirksverwaltungsgerichte as courts of original jurisdiction
and the Reichsverwaltungsgericht as appeal court – become active only
if the administrative agency calls them in. The administrative court as
a remedial agency for the citizen is thus in effect abolished. The new
Supreme Administrative Tribunal is a simple adjunct of the administra-
tive agencies, called in only when an intricate legal or jurisdictional
question must be cleared up in the interest of the administration
itself.100 As often happens in National Socialist institutions, reality and
appearance differ: The impressive facade of a unified administrative
court system hides the non-existence of administrative law and juris-
diction. The Supreme Administrative Tribunal of the Reich merges two
kinds of courts: on the one hand, the hitherto highest administrative
tribunal of the States, etc., e.g., the Prussian Supreme Administrative
Tribunal and the former Austrian Supreme Administrative Court in
Vienna, and, secondly, certain special administrative courts, e.g., the
Reich Disciplinary Court (Reichsdienststrafhof), the Supreme Economic
Court of the Reich (Reichswirtschaftsgericht) and the War Damage Office
(Reichskriegsschädenamt). The Reich Minister of the Interior may merge
other special administrative tribunals with the Reichsverwaltungsgericht.
This court is organized in panels of three members each. Members
are appointed by the Führer, but the decree fails to mention the time
period. Moreover, during a certain period after the establishment of the
Court, the members taken over from courts merged in it may be tem-
porarily relegated to an »Inactive state« (Wartestand). The decree states
that the members are not subject to directives as far as their judicial
activities are concerned, but states also that they must base their deci-
100 Decree on the Establishment of the Supreme Administrative Tribunal of the

Reich, 3 April 1941, RGBl., I, 201.
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sions upon »National Socialist philosophy and legal principles«. Mem-

bers must have been active for at least five years as judges of higher
civil servants. The Court is under the administrative supervision of
the Reich Ministry of the Interior. Since January 1943, its President has
been Franz Hüber, an Austrian who became active in the Austrian Nazi
Movement and was Minister of Justice in the transition government
which delivered Austria to Nazi Germany in March 1938. He then was
placed in charge of Austrian problems in the Reich Ministry of Justice.
VI. German Civil Law and Civil Procedure
A. Civil Procedure
The basic law of civil procedure is contained in the Code of Civil

Procedure of January 30, 1877 (Zivilprozessordnung). The new regime
promulgated certain reform proposals which has been included in the
draft of the new code of civil procedure published in 1933.101 The new
article (138) contained an admonition to the parties concerned to give
their statements of fact completely and in accordance with the truth.
The enforcement of the duty of completely alleging the facts had to
wait until the war legislation of 1942, when new allegations on appeal
were precluded, the amendment of 1933 attached greater importance
to the oral hearing, and concentrated the proceedings more than ever
in the hands of the court, thus restricting the right of the parties,
and especially of their lawyers, to conduct the proceedings more or
less in their own way. Formerly all witnesses were heard under oath,
which sometimes produced what Germans used to call »epidemics of
perjury«. Since 1933 a witness has been sworn in only in exceptional
cases. There was likewise abolished the previous rule which enabled a
party, in case of doubtful evidence, to request the other party to swear
an oath (serment decisoire) regarding clearly formulated facts alleged
or denied. Refusal to take the oath meant confirmation of the facts
as stated by the other party. The new amendment comes rather close
to the Anglo-American concept of discovery by allowing a party to
request that the other party give evidence on the facts in question. But
a hearing of the party can also be ordered by the court itself without
regard to the evidence or any application by the other party. Unlike
witnesses, the parties can not in any circumstances be forced by the
101 Law of 22 October 1933, RGBl., I, 780.
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court to take the oath. Since the abolition of the serment decisoire the
court is completely free to weigh the value of the evidence, except with
respect to public documents, which are conclusive as to the facts
recorded therein.
The amendment of 1933 also attempts to arrest the tendency on the
part of powerful groups to force weaker parties to a contract to make
use of arbitration clauses under certain conditions. The effort in this
direction, however, proved to be inconsistent with the line taken by
the general run of Nazi legislation, which favors the exclusion of civil
courts from proceedings between semi‐official groups, their members
or customers, to a much higher degree than was ever done by private
standard clauses before 1933. Generally speaking, German academic
writers notwithstanding,102 the general norms and conditions imposed
by a strong, often semi‐official association, interpreted by its own arbi-
tration panel, eliminate the liberty of contract enforced and interpreted
by the civil courts.
B. Civil Law
In the field of civil law proper, in spite of the vocal opposition

of National Socialism103 against the »mercenary« and »Roman«, and
therefore »un-German«, spirit of the Civil Code of 18 August 1896,104
no all-embracing new modifications have been made. However, even
before the Third Reich the civil code had lost much of its importance
by the development of a separate body of labor law and rent law,
superseding in many respects entire sections of the Civil Code, which
assumed in these fields only the character of a subsidiary source. This
development continued under the Third Reich. First, peasant holdings
were made subject to a special regime by the Hereditary Farm Law
of September 1933.105 In 1938 the marriage and divorce law was made
102 There is a large German literature in this field. Especially noteworthy are
the scholarly discussion by Raiser, Recht der allgemeinen Geschäftsbedingungen
(Hamburg, 1935), and the very vague reform proposals by H. Brandt, »Die
allgemeinen Geschäftsbedingungen und das sogenannte dispositive Recht«, in
Deutsche Rechtswissenschaft 1940, Vol. V.
103 F. Schlegelberger, Abschied vom BGB, Berlin (1937).
104 Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch.
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subject to special regulation.106 The main reform of the remaining body

of civil law was effected through the Wills Act of 31 July 1938.107 That
statute simplifies formalities in respect to the drawing of wills, and
introduces special »emergency testaments« to be used in the armed
forces. But, aside from these simplifications, the law strictly upholds
the right of individuals to dispose of their property, thus emphasizing
a decisive aspect of an individualistic social system. The one exception
contained in Article 48 of the statute is political rather than a matter
of principle. A will can be voided if the testator has gravely violated
the regard due to his family and the national community (e.g., by a tes-
tament in favor of Jews).108 The article also takes a thrust at the Catholic
Church by voiding wills elicited by exploiting the fear of approaching
death on the part of the testator. A special law of 5 November 1937109
had already excluded persons deprived of German nationality from
inheriting or receiving gifts. Among less important changes in the law
may be mentioned the statute of 4 July 1939 in regard to the presump-
tion of death.110 A general reduction of interest rates on mortgages was
ordered by the law of 2 July 1936.111 As a rule, creditor and debtor
were supposed to reach a friendly agreement, but, in case they proved
unable to do so, they could request the assistance of the judge of the
local court. Similar facilities had already been granted to small debtors
who contracted their debts in the crisis of pseudo-prosperity112 of the
Weimar Republic and who wished to reach an accord with their cred-
itors.
VII. Commercial Law
Commercial law is the branch of law governing particularly the trans-

actions of business men, i.e., persona who own a business of a type
specified by the Commercial Code, or whose business is of such impor-
tance that it requires considerable commercial organization. There is
107 RGBl., I, 973.
108 See the decision of the Kammergericht on 2 January 1941 in Deutsches Recht,
1941, p. 869.
109 RGBl., I, 1161.
110 RGBl., I, 1186.
111 RGBl., I, 523.
112 See Section I. B.
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no all-embracing code of commercial law. Several sources must be con-

sulted, of which the most important is the Commercial Code (Handels-
gesetzbuch) of 10 May 1897. Others are the Law of Stock Corporations,113
the Law of Limited-Liability Companies,114 the Law of Cooperative
Societies,115 the Law of Drafts,116 the Law of Checks,117 the Law of the
Banking and Credit System,118 the Stock Exchange Law,119 the Law of
Inland Waterway Shipping,120 and the Law of Consignments.121
The Commercial Code contains regulations on the following matters:
1. Definition of the »business man« (Kaufmann); the necessity of regis-
tration in the Commercial Register: the books to be kept; the nature
of the enterprise, its name and significance; the power of attorney
(Prokura); agents and brokers; and employees (assistants, apprentices,
volunteers).
2. Partnerships and Companies. The Commercial Code deals with the
simple partnership (offene Handelsgesellschaft) and the Kommanditgesell-
schaft or limited partnership with undisclosed members as well. In a
simple partnership each member is responsible for debts of the com-
pany to the extent of both his investment and his personal property;
in the Kommanditgesellschaft some members are liable personally while
others are liable to the extent of their investments. This part of the Code
has been left unchanged.
Regulations complementary to those contained in the Commercial
Code are found in the Civil Code.122 The provisions concerning part-
nerships in the Commercial Code differ from those in the Civil Code
in that the former relate to management of commercial enterprises
whereas the latter cover non-commercial activity as well.
Other commercial associations are regulated by separate laws, of which
the most important is that governing stock corporations, discussed in
detail below.
113 Aktiengesellschaftsgesetz, 30 January 1937, RGBl., I, 107.

114 Gesetz über die Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung, 20 April 1892, RGBl., 477.
115 Genossenschaftsgesetz, 20 May 1898, RGBl., 810.
116 Wechselgesetz, 21 June 1933, RGBl. 1399.
117 Scheckgesetz, 14 August 1933, RGBl., 1597.
118 Kreditwesengesetz, 5 December 1934, RGBl., I, 1203.
119 Börsengesetz, 5 March 1934, RGBl.
120 Binnenschiffahrtsgesetz, 29 July 1936, RGBl., I, 581.
121 Depotgesetz, 4 Feburary 1937, RGBl., I, 171.
122 Sects. 702 ff.
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The limited liability company (Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung) is a

semi-corporate body which upon its formation becomes automatically
a »commercial company« and must be registered in the Commercial
Register. Its members, who are not personally liable for debts of the
company, must each bring into the company his proportionate share of
the original capital.
The cooperative society (Genossenschaft) is an association of an undeter-
mined number of members created for the purpose of improving their
financial and economic situation through a joint enterprise having a
common administration. The enterprise must be registered in a special
register for cooperative societies. The purpose of the cooperative soci-
ety is not merely that of making profits and distributing dividends,
but includes improvement of the conditions of the members through
economic advantages beyond mere cash returns. The element which
holds the society together is, consequently, not the member’s share in
the capital, but his membership in the association. The cooperative
societies are self-help organizations, such as people’s banks, consumer
cooperatives, associations of dairy farmers, building cooperatives, and
the like. They are corporate bodies subject to the commercial law.
The silent partnership (Stille Gesellschaft) may also be mentioned,
although it is a purely contractual association between an owner of
a commercial enterprise and a creditor who has lent money with the
object of participating to that extent in the profits of the business.
3. The Commercial Code also contains regulations relating to the more
important types of transactions between merchants, such as sales and
purchases, exchange dealings, consignments, transportation by rail or
truck, and warehousing.
4. Finally, the Commercial Code includes laws relating to shipping on
the high seas.
National Socialism has left unchanged the conception of the »business
man« (Kaufmann). A merchant selling literature may be a member of
the Chamber of Culture, but he remains a business man within the
meaning of the Commercial Code. The only innovation is made by the
Racial Laws, requiring Jewish enterprises to be dissolved.123 Enterprises
are considered Jewish in the following cases: when the sole owner is
Jewish; in partnerships or Kommanditgesellschaften, when one or more
of the personally responsible partners are Jewish; and in corporations,
123 Decree of 12 November 1938, RGBl., I, 1580.
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where one or more of the management or of the board of directors are

Jewish, or where more than one-fourth of the shares or half the votes
are Jewish-owned or controlled.124 There is a legal presumption that an
enterprise is or is not Jewish if on 1 January 1938 there were or were
not any Jews on the board of directors. The Minister of Economics was
authorized to grant exceptions for certain enterprises up to 1 April
1940, a concession which guaranteed the continuance of a number
of enterprises despite Jewish participation. It is of interest that many
Aryan successors to Jewish business men sought for and obtained per-
mission to retain for one year the familiar Jewish firm names.
The Commercial Register, a public register listing names, location, and
legal status of business enterprises, was formally kept by the local
courts (Amtsgerichte) in conformance with State laws. By decree of
the Minister of Justice,125 instructions were issued in 1938 providing
a uniform regulation for the entire Reich on the manner of keeping the
Register. The Register is divided into two sections: Part A for individual
merchants, partnerships, and Kommanditgesellschaften; Part B, for all cor-
porate bodies. Registrations are entered only upon application by the
business man, who however may be compelled to make the request.
The public is entitled to examine the Register and to request copies of
entries, as well as certifications, either positive or negative. Formerly
only negative certifications, viz., that a fact had not been entered in
the Register, were supplied. Chambers of Commerce, which in the past
enjoyed a right to request entries and file appeals in order to prevent
inaccuracies, must now be furnished copies of practically every entry
in the Register. Another change126 facilitates control of branch offices of
business. These are registered at the court nearest the main office by
submitting copies of articles of incorporation, appropriate resolutions,
and other relevant documents. A similar regulation takes care of regis-
tration of changes in the status of branch offices or of the transfer of the
main enterprise.
Business men are required to keep books and to preserve letters
received and copies of letters mailed. The books must be so kept that
they show at all times all commercial transactions as well as assets and
liabilities. Directions on the subject have been issued by the Minister of

125 Handelsregisterverfügung of 14 June 1938, in Deutsche Justiz, 1938, p. 1251.
126 Law of 10 August 1937, RGBl., I, 897, revising Arts. 13 and 33 of the Commer-
cial Code and adding Arts. 13 a, b, c.
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Economics.127 Other regulations relating to methods of keeping books

and accounts will be found in the tax laws128 and in the decrees relating
to registers of goods received and goods shipped.129 A yearly inventory
and balance of accounts must be made by every merchant, though
this rule has been greatly relaxed as a wartime emergency measure.
Whenever public interest requires, the Minister of Justice may exempt
firms, for a single year or the duration of the war, from making and
filing a balance of accounts or publishing the balance. The Minister
may also forbid giving information on the condition of the business,
or giving access to reports of managers and the board of directors, or
allowing inspection of the books. General exemptions have been made
in favor of corporations,130 permitting them during the war to submit
only every second annual report to the examiners.
The provisions contained in Book I, Part 6 of the Commercial Code,
relating to commercial employees, have only a secondary importance
since labor contracts are governed by a special labor law.
Book III, »Commercial Transactions«, has also remained practically
unchanged. However, there have been several supplementary enact-
ments, such as the Act for Protection of Retail Trade,131 the Act for
Achievement of the Four-Year Plan, the Decree on Nomination of a
Controller of Prices,132 together with a series of related laws and regula-
tions, and the Act on Railroad Transportation of Persons and Goods.133
A more noteworthy reform of the Nazis concerns stock corporations
(Aktiengesellschaft). The organization of this type of company was of
especial importance since, to an increasing degree, big business found
this to be the most convenient form of organization for procuring capi-
tal. Revisions had been suggested and discussed long ago.134 A draft of
a new corporation law had been drawn in 1930 and 1931 but had not
been enacted.
The Code of 1897, the creation of a liberal age, introduced for stock cor-
porations a parliamentary-type rule and system of controls, with the
127 Ministerialblatt für Wirtschaft, 11 November 1937, p. 239, reprinted in Schlegel-

berger‘s Commercial Code Commentaries, 1939, p. 191.
128 Reichsabgabenordnung, Art. 12, RGBl., I, 161.
130 Decree of 24 February 1943, RGBl., I, 117.
131 Act of 9 May 1935, RGBl., I, 589.
133 Act of 4 September 1938, RGBl., I, 1149, 1188.
134 German Lawyers’ Association meeting in 1926.
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general meeting of the shareholders at the head, to the decisions and

control of which the directors were subject, at least legally. But there
was no adequate margin left for incorporating many modern economic
developments, such as trusts, cartels, holding companies, new methods
of financing, and modern tax and labor laws. In the theory of »the
enterprise as such«, developed by Rathenau in 1918, the enterprise is
considered as an independent legal entity, the interest of which takes
precedence over all other interests (shareholder’s, public interest). This
theory aims at restricting the shareholder’s control in accordance with
the more lofty principle of »ownership produces obligation« (Art. 153
of the Weimar Constitution). Most of these influences had already
found expression in the draft of 1931. The new law shows fascist ten-
dencies even though it often reflects practices developed before 1933.
Among the Nazi tendencies in the law, the principle of leadership is
the most fundamental innovation. The new law concentrates adminis-
trative power in the management instead of the general meeting of
shareholders. Formerly the main decisions on affairs of the company
were made by the shareholders in general meeting. Under the new
law the shareholders are deprived of the right to accept or reject the
yearly accounts unless the management and board of directors submit
the accounts to the general meeting, or unless the board disapproves
the accounts submitted by the management and no agreement can
be reached between them. Further, the shareholders can no longer
decide on questions relating to the management of the company unless
invited to do so. Other manifestations of the leadership principle are
the following: reduction of the number of members of the board of
directors (seven for companies with less than three million RM-capital,
twelve if more than three million RM, and twenty if more than twenty
million RM); the making of the appointment of directors irrevocable
for five years; the giving to the president of power to decide in case of
disagreement between the directors. The Reich Ministry of Economics
has recently forbidden new appointments or expansion of boards of
directors during the war, mentioning particularly over-representation
of bank appointees.135
Devices employed in the past to retain control by the administrative
group within the enterprise, such as shares with plurality of votes and
reserved shares (Vorratsaktien), became superfluous after the introduc-
tion of the Nazi principle of leadership, and have been abolished. In
Germany shares are usually bearer-shares held in custody by banks.
135 Kölnische Zeitung, 26 October 1943, p. 4.
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The banks used to reserve for themselves, by a standard contract, the

right to vote (in support of the administration). At present, in order to
exercise this right, the bank must produce a separate written authoriza-
tion given for a period of not more than fifteen months and revocable
at any time. In practice this does not amount to any very great change.
On the other hand, whereas under the old law a corporation might
repurchase its own stock without restriction, now a corporation may
make such purchases only for the purpose of averting serious damage
to the company and within the limit of 10 percent of the total shares.
According to Nazi policy, business men are shouldered with personal
responsibility. Limited liability companies may, therefore be permitted
only where the enterprise is to be organized on a broad financial basis.
Consequently the Act of 1937 restricts creation of new companies of
this type to those having a minimum capital of 500,000 RM with shares
1,000 RM par value (Sects. 7 and 8). However, the Minister of Justice,
acting with the Minister of Economics, may make exceptions, and the
sections mentioned apply only to companies registering after 1 October
1927.
The new code contains a provision that the Reich Economics Court
(Reichswirtschaftsgericht), on application by the Minister of Justice, may
dissolve a company imperiling the common welfare »by a behavior of
the board which grossly violates the law or the principles of responsi-
ble business methods«. This provision is hailed by the Nazis as an
important innovation, but it may be noted that, although no similar
ruling was provided in the Commercial Code, the power to dissolve
resulted from Section 43 of the Civil Code.
Other problems which had not found a definite solution in the draft of
1931 have been decided in the new law in accordance with the above-
mentioned tendencies. The general meeting of share-holders may not
interfere with the establishment of the yearly accounts, which are fixed
by the board of directors. Detailed instructions are given on how to
make up balance sheets, audit the accounts (obligatory every second
year during the war, see above), and publish the balance. As far as the
annual report is concerned, the board of directors may withhold any
information which, in the board’s estimation, would be detrimental to
the company’s predominant interests or to the common welfare of the
people or the Reich. Questions asked by shareholders in the general
meeting must be answered truthfully by the board if the answer does
not entail harm to the company’s interests. An answer may be refused
if, within the reasonable discretion of the board, the information would
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injure the interests of the company, an associate company, or the com-

mon welfare of the people or the Reich.
Following the draft of 1931, the new law provides several means
of attracting capital, noteworthy among which are the issuance of
privileged shares carrying no right to vote (Sects. 115-118) and the
issue of convertible debentures (Sect. 174) which permit the creditor
to exchange his debenture into shares, to buy shares (Wandelschuldver-
schreibungen), or to participate in the profits of the company (Gewinn-
schuldverschreibungen). Several provisions facilitate the procurement of
capital, for example: those permitting an increase of capital when and
if the board of directors decides that such an increase has become
necessary (Sect. 169); simplified reduction of capital (Sect. 182); merger
of companies (Sect. 233); transfer of the entirety of the assets (Sect. 235);
profit‐sharing agreements (Sect. 256); and reorganization into limited
companies (Sect. 257).
Among the other commercial acts of the Nazi regime the Law of Drafts
is unique in not showing any Nazi tendencies. It had been prepared
earlier as a result of the Geneva Agreement of 7 June 1930 for the
creation of a Uniform Law on Drafts. The text of this agreement was
based on that of the original German draft law. The new German law
consequently does not show much difference in substance from the
former law, although it is quite different in form.
What has been said of the Law of Drafts applies also to the Law of
Checks, enacted in accordance with agreements signed in Geneva dur-
ing the session of the League of Nations in February – March 1931.
VIII. Wartime Measures in the Administration of Justice 1942 – 1943
At the beginning of the war there were issued a number of measures

introducing modifications and simplifications in various legal fields,
the most important of which have been discussed in other chapters. As
German policy then consisted in leaving the home front an aspect of
normality, most courts continued to function regularly on a somewhat
reduced scale. The signification features proper receded behind those
measures which, though advertised as simplifications, served mainly to
concentrate vital positions in the hands of thoroughly reliable judges
and to eliminate the last remnants of popular participation in the judi-
cial administration.
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But when the war continued beyond expectations, and numerous judi-
cial officers were either called to the colors or placed in charge of
judicial or administrative offices in the occupied territories, a serious
personnel shortage developed, with the result that far-reaching curtail-
ment of the services became imperative. Therefore, on 21 March 1942136
the Führer issued a decree calling for a complete overhauling of the
administration of justice:
»The defense of people and Reich demands quick and frictionless
work. In order to enable courts and prosecutors to carry out their tasks
successfully in the present circumstances, proceedings in civil as well
as in criminal cases were to be simplified to the extent compatible with
the objectives of the respective proceedings.«
In pursuance of this directive a number of decrees were issued in 1942
and 1943 which have reduced the scope of judicial services to a bare
minimum. At present courts are allowed to place on the agenda merely
those cases the adjustment of which during the war seems necessary.
Urgency may be ascribed only to those cases which either have an
immediate effect on the outcome of the war or are of such far-reaching
importance for the parties concerned that any delay would cause them
irreparable damage to an extent not justified even under war condi-
tions. These regulations extend also to divorce proceedings. There is no
appeal from a decision adjourning a case until the end of hostilities.
In the framework of district and appeal courts the jurisdiction of the
single judge, already extended in 1939, has been further augmented. In
the district courts the single judge becomes the rule, the entire division
sitting only in appeal cases. The local court now has jurisdiction up to
the sum in question does not exceed 500 RM. Proceedings before the
local and labor courts can be shaped by the presiding judge according
to his discretion. In cases where the law prescribes that a reasoned
opinion must be given with the decision, the opinion is restricted to
those points which are essential to the understanding of the decision.
Appeals in civil cases on points either of law or of fact may be rejected
by the court of appeal and the Reichsgericht without oral argument if
they are judged to be »obviously unfounded«. The restriction of the
right of appeal in civil cases was counterbalanced as early as 1941 by
a nullification proceeding, framed according to the rules introduced in
the criminal practice in 1939. The attorney general of the Reichsgericht
may apply to the »Great« Civil Senate of the Supreme Court to set aside
any civil judgment and to grant a new trial »if he entertains serious
136 RGBl., I, 139.
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doubts of the correctness of a judgment, as to questions either of law or

of fact, and if, in his opinion, a new trial is necessary in the interest of
the community«.
In criminal cases the jurisdiction of the single judge of the local court
extends now to all cases where the length of expected punishment
does not exceed five years. In all other criminal jurisdictions, with the
exception of the Supreme Court, a presiding judge, either sitting alone
or with one other judge, has in the great majority of cases replaced
the full division. No clerk needs to attend the session of a court if the
presiding judge thinks the clerk’s presence unnecessary. Any appeal
in a criminal case is made dependent upon a notice of admissibility
issued by the court to which the decision appealed from is going. Such
notice may be granted only where its refusal seems inequitable. On the
other hand, the scope of the nullification and reconsideration proceed-
ings introduced in 1939 has been greatly extended, since the attorney
general of the Supreme Court may delegate to the prosecutor of the
appeal court the right of asking for nullification and reconsideration of
complete groups of cases, thus allowing the reopening of cases in the
criminal division of the appeal court. In spite of all these modifications,
eliminating most of the legal guarantees which had survived nine years
of Nazi domination, the number of judges remaining was not sufficient
to preserve a skeleton of civil courts. To remedy this, the judicial per-
sonnel has been further diluted by the appointment of auxiliary judges
and prosecutors from the ranks of persons possessing the qualification
of eighteen months of preparatory service. At the same time, the period
of preparatory service has been shortened from three years to thirty
months, with the emphasis shifting still more from legal experience to
political reliability and satisfactory war service.
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Appendix I
List of Appeal Courts (Oberlandesgerichte)
Appeal Court President of the Attorney General at

Appeal Court the Appeal Court
Bamberg During Kahl
Berlin (Kammergericht) Block Hanssen
Braunschweig Nebelung
Breslau Jung Sturm
Celle von Garssen Schnöring
Danzig Wohler Bode
Darmstadt Scriba Eckert
Dresden Beyer Jung
Düsseldorf Windhausen Hagemann
Frankfurt a. M. Ungewitter Wackermann
Graz Meldt Meissner
Hamburg Schmidt-Eck Drasoher
Hamm Semler Joel
Innsbruck Stritzl Sprung
Jena Becker Wurmstich
Karlsruhe Reinle Lautz
Kassel Delitzsch Trautmann
Kattowitz Drendel Steimer
Kiel Martin Sauer
Köln Lawall Rahnel
Königsberg Draeger
Leitmeritz David Stein
Linz Pollan Kollinger
München Stepp Helm
Naumburg Sattelmacher Becker
Nürnberg Emmert Bems
Oldenburg Reuthe Christians
Posen Froboss
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Appeal Court President of the Attorney General at

Appeal Court the Appeal Court
Prag Bruckle Gabriel
Rostock Zastrow
Stettin Kulenkamp Stacker
Stuttgart Kustner Wagner
Wien Tamele Stich
Zweibrücken Sigele Welsch
Appendix II
List of penitentiaries and of the more important prisons in Germany;

arranged in alphabetic order of the appeal court districts (Oberlandesge-
richte) as of 1 February 1941.
Source: Blätter für Gefängniskunde, LXXI (1940 – 1941), pp. 338 ff.
For translation of German technical terms and their abbreviations
occurring in this list see list at the end.
Name of Prison Capacity Director

Men Women
I. Bamberg
Zuchthaus Ebrach, Nr. 1 500 - PR. Hennermann
Strafgefängnis St. Georgen-Bay- 500 ORR. Schlager
reuth Marktgrafenallee 49
II. Berlin
Untersuchungshaftanstalt Alt- 1339 181 ORR. Strube
Moabit in Berlin NW40, Alt-Moa-
bit 12
Untersuchungshaftanstalt Lehrter 620 - Vacant for the
Str. in Berlin NW 40, Lehrter Str. 3 time being
Frauenstrafgefängnis Berlin in - 415 RR. Berg
Berlin Nr. 18, Barnim Str. 10
Strafggefängnis Ploetzensee in 1404 - ORR. Vacano
Berlin‐Plötzensee, Königsdamm 7
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Men Women
Strafgefängnis Tegel in Berlin- 1482 - RDir. (Schneide-
Tegel, Seidel Str. 39 wind)
Zuchthaus und Sicherungsanstalt
Brandenburg (Havel)-Görden,
Winterfeldthalle 22
a) Zuchthaus 1200 - Vacant for the
time being
b) Sicherungsanstalt 600 - Vacant for the
time being
Frauenzuchthaus Cottbus, - 410 RR. Bockmann
Bautzener Str. 139
Zuchthaus Luckau (Siederlausitz), 498 - Prosecutor Wie-
Kloster Str. 1 demann
Zuchthaus Sonnenburg (Neum) 656 - RR. Heider
Chaussee Str.
Attached:
Strafgefängnis Spandau, Berlin- 469 - RR. Bessler
Spandau, Wilhelm Str. 23
III. Braunschweig
Strafgefängnis Wolfenbüttel, Zei- 950 -
genmarkt
IV. Breslau
Strafgefängnis Breslau, Kletsch- 780 - ORR. Moltgen
kau Str. 31
Untersuchungshaftanstalt Bres- 446 120 RR. Grossekettler
lau, Freiburger Str. 1
Zuchthaus und Haftanstalt Brieg:
a) Zuchthaus, Lange Str. 67 550 - RR. Richter
b) Haftanstalt, Linden Str. 16 228 4 RR. Richter
Frauenzuchthaus Jauer, Schloss - 471 RR. Schlottke
Str. 17
Strafanstalt Wohlau, Kolonie 510 - RR. Niedermolle
V. Celle
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Men Women
Zuchthaus Celle, Trift 14 531 - RR. Marloh
Haftanstalt Emden with Außenar- 44 4 VOInsp. Schrader
beitsstellen
Wiesmoor, Hindenburg Str. 6 560 - VOInsp. Schrader
Zuchthaus Hameln, Am Münster- 532 - RR. Brinkord
wall 2
Strafgefängnis and Untersu- 690 124 ORR. Suffenplan
chungshaftanstalt Hannover,
Leonhard Str. 1
VI. Danzig
Frauenzuchthaus und Siche- - 362 RR. Metzinger
rungsanstalt Fordon, Albert-Fors-
ter Platz 8
Strafgefängnis und Untersu- 576 78 ORR. Bause
chungshaftanstalt Danzig, Schies-
stange 12-14
Zuchthaus Krohne an der Brahe, 562 - RR. Riegel
Hermann-Göring Str. 27
VII. Darmstadt
Sicherungsanstalt Butzbach 830 - ORR. Bausch
(Oberhessen), Kleeberger Str. 23
Jugendgefängnis Marienschloss in 300 - RR. Barth
Rockenberg
Gefangenenlager Rodgau in Die- 2000 - OPP. Mohr
burg, Straße der SA 62
VIII. Dresden
Strafgefängnis Bautzen, Gabels- 1173 - RDir. Dr. Plischke
berger Str. 10
Untersuchungshaftanstalt Dres- 755 130 ORR. Reinicke
den, George-Bahr Str. 5
Jugendgefängnis Hoheneck in 350 - RR. Mendler
Stollberg (Erzgebirge), An der
Stallburg 1
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Men Women
Untersuchungshaftanstalt Leip- 520 80 ORR. Dietze
zig, Moltke Str. 47
Frauenstrafgefängnis Leipzig- - 600 RR. Dr. Thümm-
Kleinmeusdorf, Chemnitzer Str. ler
52
Zuchthaus Waldheim (Sachs)
Anstalt Str. 1
a) Männerzuchthaus 1900 - ORR. Dr. Schiefer
b) Frauenzuchthaus - 430
Strafgefängnis und Untersu-
chungshaftanstalt Zwickau
(Sachs), Katharinenkirchhof
Nr. 12
a) Strafgefängnis 1200 - ORR. Glauning
b) Untersuchungshaftanstalt 175 33 ORR. Glauning
IX. Düsseldorf
Strafgefängnis Anrath
a) Männerstrafgefängnis, Garten 520 - RR. Dr. Combrink
Str. 1
b) Frauenstrafgefängnis Garten - 214 RR. Dr. Combrink
Str. 2
Strafgefängnis und Unter- 673 113 ORR. Schmidt
suchunghaftanstalt Düsseldorf-
Derendorf Ulmen Str. 95
Zuchthaus Remscheid‐Luettring‐ 553 - RR. Dr. Engel-
hausen, Masuren Str. 29 hardt
Strafgefängnis und Untersu- 550 19 RR. Dr. Linder
chungshaftanstalt Wuppertal,
Bendahler Str. 30
X. Frankfurt (Main)
Strafgefängnis Diez, Limburger 524 - RR. Gamradt
Str. 64
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Men Women
Strafgefängnis Frankfurt (Main)- 461 - RR. Rieck
Preungesheim, Homburgerland
Str. 112
Frauenjugendgefängnis Frankfurt - 100 Vacant for the
(Main)-Preungesheim Hombur- time being
gerland Str. 112
XI. Graz
Untersuchungshaftanstalt Graz, 586 93 RR. Schrötter
Conrad‐von‐Hoetzendorff Str. 13
Strafanstalt Graz, Herrgottswies‐ 764 - ORR. Haus
gasse 50, und Jugendgefängnis
Graz
XII. Hamburg
Strafgefängnis Glasmoor bei Glas- 370 - VAmtm. Bruhns
hütte
Jugendgefängnis Hahnöfersand, 308 - VAmtm. Hasse
Post York (at Present Glassmoor)
Haftanstalt Hamburg-Altona, 315 3 VAmtm. Hasse
Gerichts Str.
Zuchthaus und Strafgefängnis
Hamburg‐Fuhlsbütttel, Suhren-
kamp:
a) Zuchthaus 811 - ORR. Hänsel
b) Männerstrafgefängnis 614 - ORR. Hänsel
c) Frauenstrafgefängnis - 261 ORR. Hänsel
Untersuchungshaftanstalt Ham- 1089 111 ORR. Bredow
burg-Stadt, Holstenglacis 3
Bremen-Oslebshausen, Am Kam-
merberg:
a) Zuchthaus 673 - ORR. Schriever
b) Strafgefängnis 170 - ORR. Schriever
XIII. Hamm (Westfalen)
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Men Women
Strafgefängnis Bochum, Krüm- 615 - ORR. Anderson
mede 1/14
Jugendgefängnis Bochum, Krüm- 135 - ORR. Anderson
mede 1/14
Untersuchunshaftanstalt Dort- 329 37 RR. Dr. Pitz
mund, Hamburger Str. 34
Untersuchungshaftanstalt Essen, 551 106 RR. Gay
Andreas Str. 59
Haftanstalt Hagen (Westfalen), 320 30 VAmtm. Nebe
Blucherstr. 39/41
Jugendgefängnis Herford, Eimter 350 - RR. Müller
Str. 5
Zuchthaus Münster, Garten- 505 - ORR. Fuchs
stresse 26
Gefangenenlager Oberems in 1015 - VAmtm. Less-
Gütersloh, Neunkirchener Str. 15 mann
Sicherungsanstalt Werl (Kr. 604 - RR. Faber
Soest), Göring Str. 46
XIV. Innsbruck
Haftanstalt Salzburg, Schanzl- 239 33 VInsp. Willer
gasse 1
XV. Jena
Sicherungsanstalt Gräfentonna 400 - RR. Heinke
Strafgefängnis Ichtershausen (Kr 500 - RR. Sielewics
Arnstadt)
Zuchthaus Untermassfeld 586 - RR. Gericke
XVI. Karlsruhe
Bruchsal, Schönborn Str. 32:
a) Zuchthaus 400 - ORR. Backfisch
b) Strafgefängnis Hutten Str. 384 70 ORR. Backfisch
Strafgefängnis Freiburg (Breis- 502 - ORR. Dr. Kölblin
gau), Johanniter Str. 8
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Men Women
Strafgefängnis und Unter-
suchungshaftanstalt Mannheim-
Heidelberg, Herzogenried Str.
111:
a) Strafgefängnis Mannheim 597 - ORR. Dr. Weidner
b) Untersuchungshaftanstalt 150 43 ORR. Dr. Weidner
Mannheim
c) Untersuchungshaftanstalt Hei- 96 13 ORR. Dr. Weidner
delberg
XVII. Kassel
Zuchthaus Kassel-Wehlheiden, 915 - ORR. Harder
Auf dem Graß 12
Männersicherungsanstalt und
Frauenzuchthaus Ziegenhain (Bz.
Kassel), Paradeplatz 3:
a) Männersicherungsanstalt 228 - RR. Engelhardt
b) Frauenzuchthaus - 86 RR. Engelhardt
XVIII. Kattowitz
Haftanstalt Beuthen (Oberschle- 433 35 RR. Kratzig
sien), Tarnowitzer Str. 23
Zuchthaus und Haftanstalt Bati-
bor, Eichendorf Str. 14:
a) Zuchthaus 432 - RR. Hartmann
b) Haftanstalt 80 29 RR. Hartmann
Sicherungsanstalt und Haftanstalt
Groß Strehlitz:
a) Sicherungsanstalt, Lüblinitzer 516 - RR. Bachmair
Str. 50
b) Haftanstalt, Oppelner Str. 5 227 4 RR. Bachmaier
Strafgefängnis Toschen, Töpfer- 405 71 RR. Schroder
gasse 2
XIX. Kiel
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Men Women
Strafgefängnis und Untersu- 317 48 RR. Sponagel
chungshaftanstalt Kiel, Fasch Str.
8/10:
Männerstrafgefängnis und Unter-
suchungshaftanstalt Lübeck:
a) Männerstrafgefängnis Lübeck- 327 - RR. Leonhardt
Lauerhof, Marliring
b) Untersuchungshaftanstalt 126 - RR. Leonhardt
Lübeck-Stadt, Gr. Burg Str. 2
Frauenzuchthaus und Siche- - 350 Erste Oberin Elle-
rungsanstalt Lübeck-Lauerhof, ring
Marliring 41
Strafgefängnis Neumünster, Boos- 374 4 RR. Flother
tedter Str. 30/32
Jugendgefängnis Neumünster 130 - RR. Flother
Sicherungsanstalt Rendsburg, 476 - RR. Fratzscher
Neue Kieler Land Str. 33
XX. Köln
Haftanstalt Achen, Adalbertstein- 622 52 RR. Wüller
weg 92
Strafgefängnisse und Untersu- 715 259 Vacant for the
chungshaftanstalt Köln, Klingel- time being
püz 51:
Zuchthaus Rheinbach 567 - RR. Westenberger
Zuchthaus Siegburg 721 - RR. Mayr
Strafgefängnis Wittlich, Hinden- 444 2 ORR. Bithorn
burg Str. 32
Jugendgefängnis Wittlich, Hin- 250 - ORR. Bithorn
denburg Str. 32
XXI. Königsberg (Preußen)
Untersuchungsanstalt Königsberg 373 91 VAmtm. Köhler
(Pr), Bernaker Str. 2-4 und Krug
Str. 6-7
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Men Women
Strafgefängnis Plock, Hermann- 389 53 RR. Grossien
Göring Str.
Zuchthaus Ragnit, Schlossplatz 2 250 - VAmtm. Kart-
schewski
Zuchthaus Wartenburg (Ostpreu- 837 - ORR. Vierbeller
ßen) Am Markt
XXII. Leitzmeritz
Strafgefängnis Mürau, Kolnie 500 - RR. Händel
XXIII. Linz
Strafanstalt Garsten, Planettaplatz 552 - VAmtm. Blecha
1
XXIV. Marienwerder
Strafgefängnis Stuhm (Westpreu- 354 - ORR. Riemer
ßen), Bromberger Str. 14
Jugendgefängnis Stuhm (West- 350 - ORR. Riemer
preußen), Bromberger Str. 14
XXV. München
Frauenzuchthaus und – Verwah- - 659 RR. von Reitzen‐
rungsanstalt Aichach stein
a) Strafgefängnis Bernau (Ober- 580 - RR. Weber
bayern)
b) Frauenzuchthaus und -arbeits- - 360 RR. Weber
hausabteilung Laufen (Ober-
bayern)
Zuchthaus Kaisheim, Kaisheim 650 - ORR. Nagert
über Donauwörth
a) Strafgefängnis Landsberg 500 - RR. Dickmether
(Lech)
b) Frauenstrafgefängnis Rothen- - 180 RR. Dickmether
feld (Post Arling am Ammer-
see)
Strafgefängnisse und Untersu- 782 151 ORR. Koch
chungshaftanstalt München-Sta-
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Men Women
delheim, München 9, Stadelhei-
mer Str. 12
Jugendgefängnis Niederschönen- 300 - RR. Neck
feld in Niederschönenfeld, Post
Rain am Lech
XXVI. Naumburg (Saale)
Zuchthaus Coswig (Anhalt), Hin- 400 - RR. Witte
denburg Str. 44
Gefangenenlager Elberegulierung 850 - VAmtm. Baum
Post: Griebo bei Coswig (Anhalt)
Zuchthaus Halle (Saale), Am 790 - RR. Lewark
Kirchtor 20a
Strafgefängnisse und Unter- 330 114 RR. Büchner
suchungshaftanstalt Magdeburg-
Sudenburg
XXVII. Nürnberg
Zuchthaus Amberg (Oberpfalz), 838 - ORR. Hopp
Haselmuehl Str. 1
Strafgefängnisse und Untersu-
chungshaftanstalt Nürnberg, Zel-
len Str. 6:
a) Strafgefängnis Zellenstr. 414 - ORR. Paulus
b) Strafgefängnis Mannerstr. 166 30 ORR. Paulus
c) Untersuchungshaftanstalt 207 25 ORR. Paulus
Bärenschanz Str.
Sicherungsanstalt Straubing 1 120 - ORR. Badum
XXVIII. Oldenburg (Oldenburg)
Strafgefängnisse und Arbeitshaus
Vechta, Willo Str.1;
a) Männerstrafgefängnis 808 - RR. Sieber
b) Frauenstrafgefängnis - 76 RR. Sieber
c) Arbeitshaus, Zitadelle 120 - RR. Sieber
XXIX. Posen
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Men Women
Untersuchungshaftanstalt Litz‐ 330 90 RR. Vogel
mannstadt, Friedrich Gossler Str.
29
Untersuchungshaftanstalt Posen, 376 78 RR. Nummerich
Mühlenstr. 1
Zuchthaus Rawitsch, Wilhelm Str. 1,075 - RR. Lennarz
28
Strafanstalt Sieradsch 1,146 - RR. Lennarz
Strafgefängnis Wronke 906 110 ORR. Von Oube
XXX. Prag
Untersuchungshaftanstalt Prag‐ 245 25 VOInsp. Neu
Panlratz, Palackeho Nr. 988
XXXI. Rostock
Dreibergen‐Bützow:
a) Zuchthaus Dreibergen 452 112 ORR. Luttenber‐
ger
b) Strafgefängnis Bützow 272 75 ORR. Luttenber‐
ger
XXXII. Stettin
Zuchthaus Gollnow, Pommern- 831 - ORR. von Nor-
weg 10 mann
Jugendgefängnis Naugard, Burg 330 - RR. Brüssler
Str. 7
XXXIII. Stuttgart
Frauenstrafgefängnis Gotteszell in - 230 VAmtm. Fiess
Schwäbisch Gmünd, Herlikofer
Str. 19
Jugendgefängnis Heilbronn 300 - RR. Schmidthäu-
(Neckar), Stein Str. 21 ser
Zuchthaus Ludwigsburg, Schorn- 452 - ORR. Klaus
dorfer Str. 28
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Men Women
with Zewiganstalt und Tbc-Abt. 401 - ORR. Klaus
Hohenasperg
Strafgefängnis Rottenburg 419 - RR. Lupfer
(Neckar)
Sicherungsanstalt Schwäbisch 400 - RR. Kastenbauer
Hall, Salinen Str. 3
Untersuchungshaftanstalt Stutt‐ 314 41 RR. Hohl
gart, in Stuttgart 0, Archiv Str. 15a
Strafgefängnis und Untersu-
chungshaftanstalt Ulm (Donau),
Talfinger Str. 30:
a) Strafgefängnis 212 - VAmtm. Frank
b) Untersuchungshaftanstalt 115 8 VAmtm. Frank
Frauengraben
XXXIV. Wien
Strafanstalt Stein (Donau) Undstr. 977 - RR. Kodre
84
Untersuchungshaftanstalt Wien I 894 82 ORR. Bauer
in Wien VIII/65, Landesgerichts
Str. 11
Untersuchungshaftanstalt Wien II 389 53 VAmtm. Duhan
in Wien VIII, Hernalsergürtel 6-12
Anstalt für Erziehungsbedürftige 455 - ORR. Seyes-
Kaiser-Ebersdorfer-Str. 297, Wien Inquart
XI/81 mit der Landwirtschaftli-
chen Lehrabteilung »Gregorhof«
in Münchendorf
XXXV. Zweibrücken
Strafgefängnis und Untersu- 318 48 RR. Dr. Keil
chungshaftanstalt Saarbrücken
Strafanstalt Zweibrücken 785 - ORR. Schultz
XXXVI. Emsland
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Men Women
Strafgefangenenlager in Emsland 8280 RDir. Schäfer
in Papenburg (Ems) with the fol- (Commander of
lowing camps: the Emsland
camps)
Strafgefangenenlager I Borger- - - -
moor
Strafgefangenenlager II Aschen- - - -
dorfer Moor
Strafgefangenenlager III Brual- - - -
Rhede
Strafgefangenenlager IV - - -
(Walchum)
Strafgefangenenlager V (Neusus- - - -
trum)
Strafgefangenenlager VII (Ester- - - -
wegen)
XXXVII
Westgebiete (Alsace, Luxem-
bourg, Lorrains)
a) Karlsruhe
Sicherungsanstalt (Ensisheim) 600 - -
Frauenzuchthaus Hagenan - 500 -
Untersuchungshaftanstalt Kolmer 200 50 -
Strafgefängins und Untersu- 300 30 -
chungshaftanstalt Mühlhausen
Strafgefängnis und Unter-
suchungshaftanstalt Strassburg:
a) Strafgefängins 100 14 -
b) Untersuchungshaftanstalt 150 6 -
c) Köln
Strafgefängnis und Unter- 321 50 -
suchungshaftanstalt Luxemburg
d) Zweibrücken
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Men Women
Strafgefängnis und Unter- 186 29 -
suchungshaftanstalt Metz
Translation of German technical term, including abbreviations; occur-

ring in this list of penitentiaries and prisons.
German Term English Translation

Anstalt für Erziehungsbedürftige Reformatory for juveniles
Arbeitshaus Workhouse
Aussenanstalten Prison camps
Einzellager Individual prison camps (belong-
ing to a larger group of camps)
Erste Oberin Supervisor of women
Frauengefängnis Women’s prison
Frauenjugendgefängnis Prison for young women
Frauenzuchthaus Penitentiary for women
Gefangenenlager Prison camp
Haftanstalt Detention prison
Jugendgefängnis Prison for juvenile delinquents
Kr.- Kreis District
Landwirtschaftliche Lehrabteilung Section for agricultural instruction
Männersicherungsanstalt Security detention prison for men
Männerzuchthaus Penitentiary for men
Sicherungsanstalt Security detention prison
Strafanstalt Prison
Strafgefängnis Prison
Untersuchungshaftanstalt Jail for accused awaiting trail
Verwahrungsanstalt Security detention prison
Zuchthaus Penitentiary
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List of abbreviations indicating the hierarchical order within the Ger-

man administration by ranks.
Abbreviation Meaning
VInsp. Verwaltungsinspektor
VOInsp. Clerical ranks Verwaltungsoberinspektor
VAmtm. Verwaltungsamtmann
RR. Regierungsrat
ORR. Professional ranks Oberregierungsrat
RDir. Regierungsdirektor
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845290027
340
[5.]
The General Character of a Future German
Government*
[1946]
I. The Main Problems
US policy concerning an eventual government centers around three

desiderata: viability, stability, and democratic character.
The viability of any future German governmental system will to a large
extent depend upon the general conditions conceded to Germany: the
sufficiency of territory to provide the German people with a reasonable
standard of living, the sufficiency of resources, and the level of econo-
mic activity which will be authorized. These problems, more general in
nature than those of governmental structure, will not be discussed here.
On the other hand, ensuring the stability and democratic character of
the future government is a problem partly of a constitutional-structural
and partly of a political nature. Politically, democratic stability is pred-
icated upon two major factors. One is the knowledge of the future
German government concerning the basis, upon which it will be called
to function; in other words, the peace terms to be imposed on Germany.
It would heighten the prestige of the government and increase its abil-
ity to plan any work if these conditions, clearly established as final,
were made known before the government was set up. Otherwise, any
German government would appear dependent upon the will and pol-
icies of foreign powers, which would diminish its stature as the highest
political authority in the country.
The other political factor upon which future German democratic gov-
ernment is predicated is the existence of democratic parties to support
it. Here there is some discrepancy between the goal of stability and
that of democracy. Strengthening certain authoritarian parties (Com-
munists, reactionaries) might guarantee governmental stability, but
at the expense of the democratic character of government. American
* [Für das Office of Intelligence Coordination and Liaison (OCL) erstelltes Memo-
randum vom 12. August 1946. Hier abgedruckt ist der erste Entwurf, der als
OCL 3521.9 verbreitet wurde. – Zu diesem Text vergleiche in der Einleitung
S. 89-92.]
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[5.] The General Character of a Future German Government [1946] 341
policy, therefore, is more likely to pursue the aim of democracy by

strengthening those parties which are democratic in structure and pol-
icies, while at the same time seeking to incorporate guarantees of stabil-
ity in the actual structure of the future German government. So far only
one major party (the Social Democratic) has emerged which fully guar-
antees liberal-democratic policies in the western zones. The Commu-
nist party obviously has a different concept of »democracy«. The mid-
dle-class parties, while democratic in their programs have sometimes
shown strongly reactionary tendencies in policies and personalities.
Those tendencies, however, are opposed by more or less strong and
clearly defined »left« or »progressive« wings within the middle-class
parties: for example, the Greater Hesse and Berlin factions of the Chris-
tian Democratic Union, as compared with the Bavarian Christian Social
Union (CSU). It is upon these portions of the middle-class parties and
upon the Social Democratic Party (SPD), that US policy can chiefly rely
for the implementation of a democratic governmental program.
With respect to the structure of a future German government, four
main problems seem to be crucial. They concern (a) the issue of feder-
alism vs. centralism; (b) the election system; (c) the relation between
legislators and executives; and (d) the limitation of state power through
guarantee of fundamental rights and similar devices.
A. Centralism vs. Federalism
In the issue of federalism vs. centralized government, two major con-

siderations are of interest to US policy. One is the implication which
federalist and centralist solutions respectively would have for the aim
of preventing the reemergence of German militarism and aggression.
The Potsdam Agreement started from the assumption that centralized
government had been largely responsible for German nationalism and
the rise of the Nazi regime, and that consequently decentralized gov-
ernment, under which major powers would be given to autonomous
member states, should be favored as a safeguard against the reappear-
ance of a militant Germany. The second consideration concerns the
effect of federalism or centralism upon the present and future influence
of the powers in German policies: for instance, whether federalism or
centralism would be more likely to favor the extension of the Soviet
Zone system to all of Germany.
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342 [5.] The General Character of a Future German Government [1946]
Regarding the first consideration, the influence of concentration of

powers and jurisdictions in central government seems sometimes to
have been exaggerated. Whether Germany has been democratic and
peace-loving, or authoritarian and aggressive, has depended on the
policies of its government and the character of the groups supporting it
rather than upon the distribution of power between Reich and member
states. The Hohenzollern Reich was authoritarian and turned aggres-
sive despite its federalist structure, largely because its most influential
member state (Prussia) was ruled by reactionaries and militarists. On
the other hand, the Weimar Republic, under which many more powers
became concentrated in the central government, followed a relatively
peaceful and democratic policy as long as progressive middle-class
forces allied with moderate labor groups remained influential. Reac-
tionary forces, at that time, found a refuge in exactly those regional
autonomies which the Potsdam policy statement considers to be safe-
guards against their revival.
In devising a new structure for German government, therefore, safe-
guards for the democratic functioning of the Reich government itself
deserve more emphasis than does reliance upon dubious regional
autonomies. The latter could provide effective checks against the
revival of undesirable policies in a central government only in the
event that Germany could actually be partitioned into regions with a
political life and political loyalties of their own. It is perfectly clear,
however, that such autonomist tendencies and loyalties are, with very
few exceptions, altogether absent in present-day Germany. To try to
establish them despite the lack of any basis would merely encourage
a new nationalism intent on wiping out such barriers once more. On
the other hand, providing regional units with too many essential juris-
dictions at the expense of central Reich authorities might endanger
the performance of necessary governmental tasks. It has been demon-
strated in other federally organized countries like the US that under
modern conditions major state functions increasingly devolve upon
central government. Conditions in defeated Germany, faced with the
tremendous task of rebuilding its entire economic and social life, in
many respects demand even stronger central authority, at least for
planting and legislating, than in other countries.
Consequently, much can be said for a system under which major pow-
ers, notably in the field of legislation, are granted to Reich authorities,
while areas such as internal administration, education, and police, are
left to the states. In addition, an overly large concentration of power
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in the central government could be prevented by a system, customary

in German governmental-administrative structure, of delegating the
execution of Reich laws in many fields to the administrative machinery
of the member states. Moreover, the position of the states might be
strengthened by granting them a limited share in central government
through the institution within the national legislature of a second
chamber composed of representatives of the regional units. The influ‐
ence of such an institution, in the federalist sense, should not, however,
be overestimated. Due to the lack of genuine regional issues, such
a body is likely to act in accordance with the policies of the major
national parties rather than in support of the particular interests of the
regions vis-à-vis the Reich.
The question remains whether a system of extensive central author-
ity tempered by partial decentralization would be favorable to the
maintenance of democracy as the US understands it, and capable of
checking the extension of the Soviet-sponsored system with its threat
of one-party rule. Under the assumption that democratic procedures
are allowed to prevail in the creation and functioning of such a gov-
ernment, it would not appear that the adherents of the Soviet system
would have much chance of capturing it. On the other hand, given
the present territorial structure of Germany – in which the eastern
zone contains a comparatively large number of regional units – shifting
the weight of governmental authority to the states would give them a
rather larger influence in the future set-up than they would be likely to
have under the more centralized system. Developments with respect to
this system will basically depend upon whether or not the democratic
parties will be able to gain the permanent political allegiance of the
majority of the population. If not the issue of federal or central organi-
zation of the Reich would become altogether academic.
The problem of devising a reasonable territorial structure of the future
member states of the Reich also merits attention. The technical func-
tioning of a balanced federal system is predicated on the existence of
regional units of government fit for assuming their proper functions:
They should be neither too small nor too large, as far as possible
roughly equal in population, size, and economic importance, and with
rational and manageable boundaries. It is also important to provide
that a proper balance be established between east and west. At present
the elimination of Prussia and the absence of pronounced regional
loyalties on the part of the population offer an opportunity to adopt
a new and more rational territorial structure; hence the time seems pro-
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pitious to reorganize Germany into ten or twelve regional units. This

would, however, require that the units at present in the Soviet Zone be
consolidated into fewer units, more equal in size with the larger ones in
the west.1
If the autonomy of member states must be reduced, some degree of
genuine decentralization of governmental functions might be assured
by emphasizing local rather than regional autonomies. Local self-gov-
ernment, at least in cities, is a field in which a measure of democratic
tradition has obtained in Germany. Its revival, which has already made
some progress under the occupation and which is capable of extension
to rural areas, might go far in decentralizing certain essential tasks of
government, such as the establishment and maintenance of schools,
the fulfillment of many police functions, the management of public util-
ities, a good many cultural activities, and other matters. The future con-
stitution would have to guarantee this amount of local self-government
against state interference, and also guarantee the financial viability of
local units of government.
B. The System of Elections
Since a democratic government in Germany will require periodic elec-

tions on four levels (Reich, Länder, counties, and municipalities), the
issue of which election system shall be adopted is important – though
less so than certain theories of »electionist determinism« have made
it appear. There cannot be much controversy over universal, direct,
and secret suffrage of both sexes, since any restriction of it would
mean restriction of democracy. More differences might arise concern-
ing voting age and exclusion of persons from voting because of pre-
vious Nazi affiliation and activity. In the latter respect, US policy
would presumably favor a system under which persons falling under
categories of active Nazis would be permanently disenfranchised,
while »minor« Nazis would be restored to their voting rights at an
early date.
The major question here, however, centers around the issue of propor-
tional representation. These who blame PR for the weakness of Weimar
1 In the Soviet Zone at present there are five, or including Berlin, six. Merging
Brandenburg with Mecklenburg, and Thuringia with Province Saxony, would
reduce the number to three, or with Berlin, four units which would be more
equal to those established or in the process of being established in the west.
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845290027
governments dependent on party coalitions, for the emergence of splin-

ter parties, and ultimately for the fall of the Republic, seem to exagger-
ate the impact of the prevailing election system upon the structure and
developments of political life. A system of multiple parties, instead
of two strong parties which might alternate in government, has been
inherent in German politics quite independently of prevailing election
systems. In the Hohenzollern Reich, with a system of single-member
constituencies for Reichstag elections, there was about the same number
of major parties (8 to 6) as later in the Republic; if the enforced absence
of a nationalist party is taken into consideration, the same number is
emerging now. It is doubtful that substituting single-member elections
for PR would basically change this situation. It might, on the other
hand, work out undemocratically by giving over-representation to cer-
tain groups. It is by no means sure, moreover, whether the parties
profiting from such a system would be the ones favored by US policy;
Communists in what is now the Soviet Zone and in western indus-
trial centers, and the conservative wings of the middle-class parties in
the rural regions, might well gain at the expense of more democratic
groups. It is perhaps significant that the most outspoken opponents of
PR are among the right-wingers of the middle-class parties.
The emergence of too many splinter parties can be discouraged by
such measures as requiring a minimum percentage of votes for party
representation. This percentage should, however, be kept sufficiently
low (under 10 percent) to prevent its affecting major parties, as it did
in certain recent municipal elections. The major evils for which PR is
traditionally blamed in Germany – those of preventing »personal« rela-
tionships between voter and office‐holder and of favoring the growth of
a party »bureaucracy« – are not likely to be rooted out by abolition of
PR, as German party history since the middle of the nineteenth century
shows. They have their sources in the internal structure of German
political parties.
A compromise that preserves the basic assets of PR while eliminating
some of its shortcomings, and which has sometimes been resorted to
in current elections in Germany, consists in having single candidates
elected by relative majorities in comparatively small election districts
while utilizing remaining minority votes for additional minority repre-
sentation.
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C. Parliamentary vs. Presidential Democracy
The influence and functioning of democracy in Germany have always

been dependent upon the relative powers of the executive and parlia-
ment rather than upon any election system. Unlike the United States,
and rather similar to Britain and France. Germany has had a democracy
represented not by the executive but by whatever elected assembly
there was. An independent executive, whether issuing from monarchi-
cal authority or from a popularly elected president, always proved fatal
to democracy, as did the granting of unlimited emergency or other
decree power to the executive. The reason for this is that the executive
in Germany has traditionally headed a bureaucracy which, because
of its prestige and entrenched position, tended to concentrate actual
powers in itself even if formal responsibility belonged to some elected
body.
It is therefore in the interest of future democratic government in Ger-
many to have a system under which the executive is politically respon-
sible to the elected assemblies. This means in principle a parliamentary
system, any deviation from which would be likely to promote author-
itarian tendencies. US policy, therefore, will presumably oppose any
attempt to introduce in Germany the presidential system, under which
the executive would be dependent on a popularly elected head of gov-
ernment or state; such a system in Germany would have a tendency
to develop the characteristics of »plebiscitarian autonomy« rather than
genuine democracy. US policy also is unlikely to favor the somewhat
more limited form of executive independence which, based on the
Swiss model, has been proposed for Bavaria, and under which a cabi-
net elected by the assembly would be irremovable during the period
between elections.
Emergency powers granting unrestricted authority to a head of govern-
ment or to a cabinet would likewise be dangerous for future democratic
German government, as is simply proved by the use made of the pow-
ers granted to the Reich President under Art. 48 of the Weimar Consti-
tution. No head of government and no cabinet should be able to claim
any unusual or decree powers not specifically delegated to them by a
law enacted by parliament.
Future German government on the central level (and similarly in the
Länder) would thus consist of (1) a diet elected under universal suffrage
and a (possibly modified) system of proportional representation; (2) a
cabinet reflecting the relative party strength in this diet and responsible
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to it for its policies; and (3) in the Reich (not in the Länder) a head of
state and a Council of States consisting of delegates either appointed
by the Länder governments, elected by the Länder diets, or partially
appointed and partially elected. The head of state should have only
representative functions, without authority to influence actual policy.
The degree of influence which is considered desirable to give the states
in the central Reich government will determine whether the Council of
States should have the powers of a second chamber (full concurrence
in legislation), or a more suspensive veto as a check on the Reichstag,
which could override an objection by the Council, possibly with a qual-
ified majority vote. The second alternative would seem preferable.
The preponderant weight of constitutional authority would thus lie in
the elected Reich diet (Reichstag). Two objections are frequently made
to such a system of parliamentary supremacy; (1) that it endangers
governmental stability by rendering the executive weak and dependent
upon the whims of the parties represented in parliament; (2) that it
might endanger democracy by opening the way to domination by one
party, which, if it happens to be an authoritarian one, might use its
power to abolish democratic liberties.
With respect to the second argument, it has already been pointed out
that in Germany the danger of power being captured by a totalitarian
or otherwise undemocratic party or group has traditionally derived
from too much concentration of power in the executive, rather than in
the legislative branch. The way for the victory of Nazism was prepared
by presidential misuse of emergency powers; in the Reichstag itself
the Nazi Party never was able to gain a majority. Nor is it likely that
in the future Germany the Communists would be able to muster a
parliamentary majority. However, to safeguard the future constitution
against the possibility of parliamentary arbitrariness provisions could
appropriately be inserted to protect basic democratic rights and free-
dom even against changes by parliamentary majorities.2
The argument that governmental instability is promoted by parliamen-
tary supremacy seems to carry more weight. Again, however, the more
profound reason for this instability in parliamentary systems appears
to lie in conditions which have nothing to do with the system itself,
as is proved by the contrast between England on the one hand, and
France and the Germany of the Weimar Republic on the other. Nor
is the relative stability of the government dependent on the strength
2 See D, below.
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of the executive: the British Crown has the right of dissolving Parlia-
ment in case of conflict, but this right was also possessed by the Cab-
inet under Weimar. Its real basis is in the respective party systems
and the socio-political conditions which they reflect. But while constitu-
tional-structural provisions would not seem to be able to alter these
conditions, certain devices might be considered which would check the
powers of the legislative branch with a view to guaranteeing more sta-
bility and without endangering democracy by transferring power to the
executive. Among such devices is the right of dissolution, which might
be given to the cabinet, under proper safeguards such as a stipulation
prohibiting the dissolution of the diet until a specified time had elapsed
subsequent to an election. Another device would aim at rendering it
more difficult to force the resignation of a cabinet through votes of
non‐confidence. This might be done by requiring an absolute majority
of the total membership of the diet for such a vote, or by prohibiting the
vote for a certain period after the constitution of a new cabinet.
D. Fundamental Rights
Constitutional guarantees of fundamental civil and political rights in

Germany are needed above all to protect individuals and groups
against executive arbitrariness. Freedom of opinion and of assem-
bly, and the right to protection against arbitrary arrest and punish-
ment, should be constitutionally guaranteed. The authorities should
be granted only the most carefully circumscribed powers to disregard
them for short periods in cases of emergency; even in exceptional cases,
judicial reviews or, if the emergency has been proclaimed by the high-
est authorities, review by elected bodies, should always be provided
for.
In addition to protection against executive interference, protection of
rights and freedoms against being legislated away by parliamentary
statute has always been a basic problem in Germany, where, under
the Weimar Republic, most of the »fundamental« rights were liable to
be suspended »by law«. In order to safeguard fundamental democratic
liberties and procedures against such erosion by parliamentary proce-
dure, the vital ones among them, such as freedom of opinion, freedom
of organization in political groups and parties, and personal liberty,
should be insured against abolition or suspension, direct or indirect, by
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any statute. It might even be advisable to go further and protect them

against violation by amendment of the constitution itself.
One fundamental problem in this respect is whether or not protection
of property rights and similar guarantees should be included in the
system of protection of fundamental rights. While these rights would
deserve protection against executive interference, it would not appear
possible – even if it were considered appropriate – to extend such
protection to infringement by law. The condition under which econo-
mic reconstruction in Germany must proceed will not permit of abso-
lute protection of private property. Certain necessary reforms already
achieved in the eastern zone, such as land redistribution, are desir-
able in the interest of democracy and cannot be performed without
infringement upon property rights, possibly without granting full com-
pensation. The issue of nationalization of more or less comprehensive
sectors of industry, moreover, is one on which not only Communists
but also Socialists and even left-wing groups in the middle-class parties
are favorably committed. US policy could not advocate absolute protec-
tion of private property rights without estranging the most democratic
among the party groups and encouraging such reactionary forces as
the remnants of the Junker class, determined to utilize whatever econo-
mic power positions they have or might regain in order to undermine
democracy.
Another basic problem in this connection is whether or not laws should
be made subject to judicial review, so that alleged infringement of those
fundamental rights which are protected against statutory interference
could be carried to the courts, which would decide upon the constitu-
tionality of the law in question. Although granting this authority to
German judges, in view of their traditionally conservative and even
reactionary attitude, might entail certain risks, the danger would be
substantially reduced if the appropriate constitutional provisions were
drafted very clearly in order to prevent the exercise of the right of
review for purposes of blocking general progressive legislation.3
3 During the brief period, in the later years of the Weimar Republic, when the
German judiciary arrogated this right, it was mainly used in order to block any
legislation which, however indirectly and moderately, infringed upon private
property rights or even upon mere interests and expectations.
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350
[6.]
Current Political Tendencies in Germany Bearing
on Its Future Governmental Structure*
[1946]
I. The Main Problems
The development in Germany under military occupation cannot fail

to leave a deep impress upon the future structure of the country. The
purpose of this paper is to determine which of the policies and devel-
opments are likely to have an influence extending beyond the period of
military occupation and to shape the future governmental, social, and
economic structure of Germany.
The present trends in Germany are a composite of two factors: indige-
nous forces adapted to occupation policies; and occupation policies
shaped by native trends. The distinction between internal and external
forces is not always clear, and it is often difficult to separate the more
lasting from the nearly temporary phenomena.
The specific problems discussed here are the most outstanding:
1. The development of the political party system; and
2. The governmental and administrative reorganization.
A. The Political Party System
Fundamentally different versions of the political party system are pre-

sented in the eastern and western zones of Germany. ln the west, the
party system has developed in accordance with virtually the same pat-
terns as prevailed prior to Nazism. In the east, the beginnings of a
similar revival have been stifled by the development of what in practice
amounts to a one-party system.
In the west, an antifascist united front existed for a short period after
the military collapse, joining in one bloc Social Democrats (SPD) and
* [Für das Office of Intelligence Coordination and Liaison (OCL) erstelltes Memo-
randum vom 12. August 1945, das als OCL No. 3521.12 verbreitet wurde. – Zu
diesem Text vergleiche in der Einleitung S. 92-96.]
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[6.] Current Political Tendencies in Germany [1946] 351
Communists (KPD) as well as Christian Democrats (CDU) and Liberals

(LDP). However, this front soon disintegrated into a system in which
these parties are opposed to each other, and vie for predominance.
While the two parties representing labor follow their traditional pro-
grams and policies to a large extent, the parties representing the mid-
dle classes are by no means agreed upon programs and policies. The
Liberals soon to be doomed to their pre-Nazi relative insignificance,
representing the numerically weak liberal upper sector of the middle
class (such as smaller industrialists and bankers, intellectuals, etc.),
whose numerical, if not actual, influence has been further diminished
by the social upheaval of Nazism and war. The Christian Democrats
(Christian Socials, or CSU, in Bavaria) aspire to take over the heritage
of the former Catholic Center Party, at the same time including Protes-
tant groups. In both respects, they have been successful only in part,
with the Center Party being revived in Westphalia and the Rhineland
in open competition with the Christian Democrats, and with Protes-
tants joining them only in certain regions, such as Württemberg‐Baden.
Moreover, their policies are uncertain, since in the absence of a legally
recognized nationalist party, nationalists and former Nazis are inclined
to join them as the lesser evil. They are thus sharply divided into a
dominant right wing and a more outspokenly democratic left wing.
The split is above all over such issues as denazification and regard for
property rights in economic reconstruction.
The actual strength of the parties is known only in the US zone, where
recent elections have shown a striking parallel between their strength
now and under the Weimar Republic. Elections to the constituent
assemblies held in June 1946 showed the following party distribution,
in percentages of the total vote:
Christian Democrats 47.0

Liberal Democrats 6.9
Other middle-class groups 2.6
Social Democrats 32.7
Communists 7.5
Invalid 3.4
The Christian Democratic complex of parties received an absolute

majority in Bavaria, and a relative majority in Württemberg‐Baden,
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352 [6.] Current Political Tendencies in Germany [1946]
while the SDP held a relative majority in Greater Hesse. These results1
correspond very nearly to those of the parallel parties or groups of
parties in the Reichstag elections of 1928, the most »normal« year of the
Republic.
Developments in the British and French Zones, where no elections
have been held so far, are more difficult to assess. While it seems that
separatist groups command only a small following, the prospects of
the middle class parties are less clear. It is problematical whether the
CDU will be able to absorb the majority of the middle-class vote, not
only because of the competition of the revived Center groups, but also
because of the formation of various more or less »conservative« parties,
mainly in the north, where it is doubtful that the CDU will achieve
much success among predominantly Protestant population.
Another factor which makes the development of the party system in
the west difficult to estimate is the future political behavior of the large
number of eastern refugees now settling in these zones. Because of
the fact that most of these refugees are former members of the upper
classes (partly Junkers) now either fully proletarianized or in the pro-
cess of proletarianization, it may be assumed that in view of their anti-
Bolshevism, they will constitute an influence toward rightist radicalism.
This tendency may be expected to be strengthened by the growing
trend toward a revived Nazism, which has become noticeable above
all among the youth. While Nazi sympathizers have found it advisable
to operate cautiously in the first year after defeat, they have recently
appeared more overtly. Their pressure, aside from underground opera-
tions, will be felt by increased activity in the right wings of the middle-
class parties, increased support of whatever conservative parties are
allowed to operate, and increased strength among non-party groups,
both Protestant and Catholic, in support of nationalist aims.
On the other hand, it may be expected that leftist radicalism will make
inroads in the west at the expense of the SDP. The Communists in the
US Zone have been rather weak, although no weaker than before 1933
in the same region. Their main strength, however, has always been in
the industrial centers in the British Zone. They may be expected to
capitalize on the fact that, while the SDP there is increasingly saddled
with administrative responsibilities, no social-economic reforms have
been inaugurated comparable to those in the Soviet Zone. Communist
1 Taking into account the fact that in 1946 about 7 percent of the electorate was
disenfranchised from former Nazi connections.
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efforts are directed toward merging the two parties in a western version
of the Socialist Unity Party (SED); it is likely that their attempts will be
at least partly successful.
In the eastern zone, the parties forming the official anti-fascist bloc are
still in existence, but independent activity of all but the communist
(now Socialist Unity) Party has become increasingly difficult under the
impact of a double trend the »natural« attraction which the Left exer-
cises upon groups profiting from measures such as agrarian reform and
nationalization of key industries; and the pressure and discrimination
brought to bear against non-Communists, which forced the SDP into
the merger and made the political leaders of the two other parties mere
figureheads without much influence over actual policies.
B. Governmental Reorganization
Trends in governmental and administrative reorganization likewise

tend to divide Germany into sharply different eastern and west-
ern halves. In the Soviet Zone, while regional units of government
euphemistically called »federal states«, (or Bundesländer) have been
established, their policies are uniformly guided from the central van-
tage point of the SED. Democratization is considered as conditioned
upon the elimination from public life of the traditionally antidemo-
cratic ruling groups; the Junkers, »monopolists«, etc. To accomplish this
task, a very thorough purge of top administrative officials substituted
leaders of the antifascist parties and groups for the incumbent conser-
vative officials. But while the governments and chief administrative
offices are staffed with representatives of all antifascist parties, the
Communist hold the strategic positions and determine policy.
In the west, more sincere attempts have been made to revitalize a
democratic structure of government and administration, but most of
these have so for been unsuccessful. In the US Zone, efforts are being
made to introduce democracy by an elaborate process of constitution-
making in which elected constituent Länder assemblies deliberate upon
previously prepared drafts of state constitutions which then are to
be submitted to popular vote. This constitution-making, however, has
proved of doubtful value as far, for two reasons: (1) it has been used,
or misused, by German particularistic groups to emphasize the auton-
omy of the states, and even to render doubtful the future right of a
Reich constitution to override stipulations contained in the state consti-
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tutions; (2) a good many features of two of the three drafts (for Bavaria
and for Württemberg‐Baden) are of a pronouncedly conservative and
even authoritarian nature. Their emphasis is on restricting the power
of the popularly elected assembly through devices such as a second,
less representative, chamber; emergency powers of the cabinet; a state
president with powers independent of the legislature; and, most signifi‐
cant of all, the introduction of a kind of modified presidential system
denying the legislature the right to overthrow a cabinet through a
vote of non‐confidence. With these tendencies go corresponding efforts
to modify the traditional system of proportional representation, by
substituting the single-membership system for it and by establishing
minimum percentages of voting strength for representation in parlia-
ment. While the SDP is opposed to such a restrictive interpretation of
democracy, the middle-class parties favor it and have a good chance of
carrying it through in all states except Greater Hesse.
In the British Zone, the process of regularizing through elections, draft-
ing of constitutions, etc., has been retarded, partly because, in contrast
to the US Zone, where a three-state system was organized early, the
British maintained the intricate pattern of territorial units, and have
only recently started to reorganize the zone into more rational units
of government. But they have tried to guarantee democratic adminis-
trative procedures in a different manner, by separating the administra-
tive machinery on both local and higher levels from political bodies.
The political bodies (MG-appointed councils, etc.) are supposed to lay
down policies, and the executive administrators are expected to be
strictly non-political, and to follow the policy lines adopted by the
councils. While this reform is intended to be a step in the direction
of representative government, it actually represents a deviation from
traditional German procedure, and many have the opposite of the
desired effect, by transferring more power to the local and regional
bureaucracy.
In the French Zone, no changes of traditional structure of government
and administration have been made. This zone is characterized by
its division into rigid governmental compartments which the French
refuse to organize in larger, more rational, regional units. This enables
them to keep units which they may want to annex (such as the Saar and
possibly the Palatinate) entirely separate, and to establish a large num-
ber of German administrations staffed with a bureaucracy dependent
on French rule.
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All the western zones have been characterized by failure thoroughly

to purge the administrative bureaucracy. Denazification procedures
directed by MG, although sometimes exasperatingly slow and fre-
quently mechanical (purging less compromised officials and allowing
more dangerous ones to remain) at least resulted in the elimination
of most of the Nazis and Nazi sympathizers from key positions; this
applied to the American even more than to the British and French
Zones. However, the recent transfer of the denazification authority
from MG to German boards (purge tribunals) threatens to nullify all
that has been achieved during the first year. The tribunals have met
with such hostility and resistance on the part of what amounts to a
coalition of Nazi sympathizers and conservatives, that frequently they
have been prevented from functioning altogether. Intimidation of tri-
bunal members through threats of economic boycott, social ostracism,
and personal violence has been reflected in extremely lenient sentences
imposed even upon active Nazis, many of whom are permitted to res-
cue the administrative posts which they were forced to vacate under US
procedures.
In conclusion, developments in the field of party systems and govern-
mental reorganization may be summarized as follows:
1. Party system. While the traditional German party system has been
superficially revived in the western zones, with major political parties
following policies similar to the pre-Nazi pattern, a number of factors
make future trends difficult to estimate. There is considerable political
apathy, notably among the youth, which accounts for the fact political
party life at present is supported by the small remnants of pre-1933
party organizations and their often overaged leaders.
The large influx of eastern refugees, likely to develop a rightist radical-
ism because of their anti-Bolshevism, may well drive the rightist mid-
dle-class parties in a more nationalistic direction. Above all, undercover
Nazi and pro-Nazi strength, while still difficult to estimate, may make
itself felt in the future. All these point to the possibility of strongly
rightist developments in a still unstable party system.
In the eastern zone, the system has already undergone a correspond-
ing but more decisive development toward radicalism in a left-ward
direction. Although three of the original four parties of the anti-fascist
bloc still exist (most of the SDP has merged with the Communists into
the SED, signifying its virtual disappearance), the two non-Communist
parties are at the mercy of the Communists, who predominate under
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the cover of the Socialist Unity Party. They are likely to retain their
position of supremacy if occupation continues long enough to insure
further consolidation of the SED.
2. Governmental reorganization. In the west, no radical change has been
instituted, and conservative trends are allowed to prevail. Incomplete
denazification of the civil service, and recently sabotage of the purge by
German authorities, have placed conservative officials in power. This
hold on the bureaucracy has been further increased in the British Zone
by the introduction of a peculiar system of separation of public office
from »politics«. In the US Zone, particularism is fostered by allowing
state constitutions to be drafted which stress the autonomy of the Län-
der.
In the Soviet Zone, a radical purge of the administration has deprived
the official class of its hold and substituted for it an administration
dominated by members of the SED and forced to follow its lines of
policy. The same factual dominance of one party has made decentral-
ization illusory and rendered the entire zone in fact one uniform gov-
ernmental unit.
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357
[7.]
A Constitution for the Fourth Republic*
[1947]
Publisher´s Preface
The Foundation for Foreign Affairs is devoted to the dissemination of

authoritative facts, objective analyses, and significant opinions concern-
ing American foreign policy. It seeks those facts, analyses, and opinions
both at home and abroad.
It seeks to contribute to public knowledge through the publication
of books, studies and pamphlets, the issuance of press releases, and
the compilation of opinions on vital subjects in the field of American
foreign policy.
The Foundation believes that the facts, analyses and opinions expressed
under its sponsorship concerning problems of American foreign policy
merit thoughtful attention and consideration. It is not committed to
them in any other way. Members in the Foundation’s Board of Directors
and Corporation represent varying views on different aspects of such
public questions.
The members of the Foundation’s Board of Directors are: Harry R.
Rudin, Yale University, Chairman Ex Officio; Eugene Davidson, Yale
University Press; John T. Flynn, New York, N. Y.; Harrop A. Freeman,
Cornell Law School; Georgia Harkness, Garrett Biblical Institute; Fred-
erick J. Libby, Washington, D. C.; Phoebe Morrison, Washington, D. C.;
William A. Orton, Smith College; Henry Regnery, Chicago, Illinois; and
James A. Shanley, New Haven, Connecticut.
Phoebe Morrison is Executive Secretary and Director of Research.
Preface
The new states which emerged in Europe after the first World War
immediately set about the task of drafting constitutions. These docu-
* [Erschien 1947 in der Schriftenreihe der Foundation For Foreign Affairs. – Zu die-
sem Text vergleiche in der Einleitung S. 96-104.]
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845290027
358 [7.] A Constitution for the Fourth Republic [1947]
ments often foreshadowed the methods by which they hoped to work

out a stable political and economic future for themselves. While the
second World War has not created any new states in Europe, the post-
war period has been marked, even in its early stages, by constitutional
revisions which are no less significant than the extensive constitutional
changes which took place in the early twenties.
This political phenomenon has received all too little attention in the
United States. Its importance seems to elude most people outside the
narrow circle of specialists. The effect of long-term enemy occupation
and of the material and emotional devastation following a war, – the
struggle which marks the very process of revision, – the political aspi-
rations which find expression in it, – the compromises which political
expediency dictates, – these are the inevitable ingredients of the present
constitutional drafting. To these factors may be added the struggle
between the adherents of the governmental patterns familiar in the
United States and those espousing a pattern rooted in Marxism.
The FOUNDATION FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS plans to present in a
series of studies discussions and source materials on these present day
constitutional developments. The French action was selected for the
first such study, ahead of the German constitutional developments,
now taking form, and of those in the Soviet sphere of influence, not
only because of the time sequence but also because of the strong influ‐
ence which French constitutional philosophy has had in the past upon
our own constitution and upon constitutional thought in Europe, – an
influence which may or may not be perpetuated.
This study seeks no more than to describe the process by which the
new constitution for the Fourth Republic was written in France, and to
point out the basic struggles which were involved. It does not attempt
to pass judgment on the efficiency with which this constitution will
serve France. If it provokes Americans to analyze European constitu-
tional revision more carefully, it will have served its purpose.
The author who prepared the basic manuscript is a lawyer of special
competence in comparative constitutional theory and practice who, for
professional reasons, must remain anonymous.
Washington, D. C., June 1947.
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845290027
Part I. The Draft Constitution
Chapter I Introduction to the problem
The French Committee of National Liberation, headed by General de

Gaulle, was always eager to emphasize its continuity with the Third
Republic. This position, if accepted both at home and abroad, not only
enabled it more easily to challenge Vichy’s claim to be the legitimate
government of France, but also facilitated its uphill fight to gain the
confidence of and, later, recognition by the Allied powers. Yet no mat-
ter how much it stressed the fiction of a continuous republic legality,
a promise to re-establish the constitutional framework of the Third
Republic would have proven impolitic because of popular feelings cre-
ated by the fall of France. The majority of the active Resistance forces
in metropolitan France, as well as all those groups that had fled the
country and joined the cause of de Gaulle, had come to attribute a great
part of the responsibility for the 1940 defeat to the institutional set-up
and the personnel of the Third Republic. It became necessary, therefore,
to take some further positive action.
During the fateful spring of 1944, when the world was awaiting
the invasion and impending liberation of France, the Committee of
National Liberation followed the advice of its Consultative Assembly
sitting in Algiers and decided to put the question of the ultimate form
of French institutions squarely up to the French people. To this end, it
enacted the Ordinance of April 21, 1944. Here it was stated that
»the French people will decide in full sovereignty the form of their
future institutions. Therefore, when the circumstances allow for regular
elections, the National Constituent Assembly will be convoked. At the
latest, this will take place one year after the complete liberation of
French territory. This assembly will be elected through secret and direct
ballot by all adult French men and women, except those excluded from
voting by law.«1
The Ordinance, itself the first harbinger of the Fourth Republic, broke
important constitutional ground, because, for the first time in French
history, the right to vote was extended to women.
1 Journal Officiel, 1944, p. 325.
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Up to its return to metropolitan France, the Provisional Government,

as the National Committee then called itself,2 maintained the right
of the French nation to choose freely its personnel and government.
In his speech before the National Council of Resistance of September
12, 1944, General de Gaulle as head of the Provisional Government
reaffirmed this position and the promise contained in the Ordinance
of April 21, 1944 underlining the interim character of his administra-
tion. He announced that, in the intermediate period until the elections
could take place, the French Government would issue decisions but
not legislate. The Provisional Government formally affirmed the unbro-
ken existence of the republican form of government. While denying in
theory any validity to Vichy legislation, for practical reasons it issued
detailed instructions as to which of the Vichy laws were to be consid-
ered retroactively invalid, which were to be considered invalid from the
date of issuance of this decree, and which for the sake of convenience
should be applied until further notice.3
With a view to speedy and full recognition by the Allied Powers, and
generally in order to enlarge the political basis of the regime, the num-
ber of members of the Consultative Assembly was increased from 84 to
246 members. The metropolitan Resistance groups received the greater
proportion of this increase (see Appendix 1). The right of the Assembly
to be consulted, except in emergencies before decisions were issued, was
extended from general budgetary questions and the granting of large
loans to problems involving the social and economic structure, public
administration, and individual liberty.
In July, 1945 the Consultative Assembly debated on a bill prepared
by the Provisional Government concerning the respective powers of
the government and the Constituent Assembly in the interim period
between the election of such an Assembly and its drafting of a new
constitution. Although today only of historical interest, this bill and
the ensuing discussion illuminate the constitutional concepts of de
Gaullists, who were present in all parties and Resistance groups with
the exception of the Communist party and who were at that time dom-
inant in the ranks of the French Government. The bill limited the life
of the Constitutional Assembly to seven months. It deviated from the
French tradition, which customarily attributed normal legislative func-
2 After June 6, 1944, the National Committee had been issuing and signing its
ordinances as the »Provisional Government of the French Republic«. See Journal
Officiel, 1944, p. 477.
3 Journal Officiel, 1944, pp. 688-689.
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tions to a Constituent Assembly by putting severe restrictions on the

purely legislative functions of the Constituent Assembly. It made neces-
sary an Assembly vote on the budget, and a vote to approve treaties
and structural reforms in government. It reserved to the executive
the formulation of legislation involving day-to-day issues and minor
problems. The Assembly was given the right to choose the head of
the government – that is to say, presently to confirm the mandate of
General de Gaulle – but the bill left him free to choose his collaborators.
It gave the Assembly no power to dismiss the government. According
to the government proposals, this bill was to be the subject of a pop-
ular referendum. The people were to be asked whether they wanted
the popularly-elected Assembly to have the character of a constituent
assembly and, secondly, to give their consent to the distribution of
powers as defined in the bill for the interim period.
This bill was completely rejected by the Assembly in spite of repeated
personal interventions by General de Gaulle.4 The political motives
behind its rejection were many. Old time Radical Socialist parliamentar-
ians considered it a barrier to their desire to have the bicameral system
restored within the framework of the Constitutional Laws of 1875. The
Communists and many others joined them in their objection to a popu-
lar referendum which, by its very wording, had all the earmarks of a
plebiscite for the de Gaulle regime.
Although no formal agreement was reached in the Consultative Assem-
bly on any counter project, nevertheless the Ordinance as finally pro-
mulgated on August 17, 19455 comes rather close to a Socialist compro-
mise proposal made in the Constituent Assembly. The restriction of the
duration of the Constituent Assembly to be elected on October 21, 1945
to seven months remained. However, the government’s full responsibil-
ity to the Assembly was established, although a vote of nonconfidence
was hedged with procedural difficulties. The Assembly was authorized
to vote a budget but was given no initiative in regard to expenses. This
last clause was to raise the chief constitutional quarrel of the de Gaullist
period of the interim regime up to the end of December, 1945. Then the
Left successfully took the initiative and cut down the military expenses.
This move hastened the resignation of de Gaulle. In addition, although
free to legislate on all subjects, the Assembly had to reckon with the
4 See the reports of the Assembleé Consultative, July 27 and 29, 1945, pp. 1557 and
1613 (hereafter cited A. C.).
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possibility that the administration would make use of its suspensive

veto.
The referendum was divested of its character as a semi-plebiscite for
the de Gaulle regime. The bill called on the voters to decide, first,
whether the Assembly should have the character of a Constituent
Assembly. If a majority of voters should answer in the negative – a
course of action recommended by the Radical Socialists, the last-ditch
adherents of the Third Republic – the Assembly elected at the same
date was to be regarded as an ordinary chamber of the Third Republic,
and in keeping with the constitutional traditions of the Third Republic,
a Senate would then be elected within two months. If the majority
should approve granting constituent character to the Assembly, the
voters then had to decide whether the relationship between the admin-
istration and the Assembly should be that proposed by the administra-
tion, or whether the Constituent Assembly should be left free to formu-
late its own rules. The latter solution was endorsed by the Communist
Party, which from the very beginning had sponsored sovereign powers
for the Assembly.
Following the precept first enunciated in the Constitution of 1793,
the bill provided that the constitutional document worked out by the
Assembly was to be submitted to a popular referendum to be held not
later than one month after the final vote by the Assembly. Paragraph 7
of the bill wisely took into consideration the possibility that the French
people would reject the constitution as adopted by the Constituent
Assembly. In such case, a new Assembly was to be elected which was
again to be considered as a Constituent Assembly, not as an ordinary
legislative body. The same time limit of seven months was set on its
activities, and its relations with the government were ruled by the
provisions applying to the first Constituent Assembly.
The elections for the Constituent Assembly in October, 1945 as required
by this bill, inevitably brought up two closely related problems: who
should be allowed to run in the election, and according to what system
should the elections be held? The solution which gradually emerged
was shaped largely by the struggle for power between the political par-
ties. For some time during the Occupation and during the first stages of
the post-liberation period, it looked as if the old political parties would
altogether give way to the new Resistance formations. The latter had
emerged from the era of liberation as powerful factors. Through their
official representative, the National Council of Resistance, as well as
through their numerous national associations and departmental com-
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mittees, they played a considerable political role in the latter half of

1944 and the first half of 1945. Moreover, the temporary withdrawal
of political parties in favor of the Resistance formations was in line
with the tactics of the Communist Party, which planned that the Resis-
tance forces with their vague programs of reform should be the device
by which the other political parties received their coup de grace. In
December, 1944, the National Assembly of departmental liberation
committees, which at that time was a powerful force in the regional
administration and in the regional purge committees, approved single
Resistance slates for the regional elections of April, 1945, thus mark-
ing a definite victory for the strategy of the Communist-sponsored
National Front Resistance movement.
The very fact that the Communists were able to capture a great number
of key positions in the Resistance movement and that they stood out
as the driving force in the Estates General of the French Resistance
assembling in July, 1945, in Paris hastened the disintegration of the
Resistance movement. The most important of the Resistance organiza-
tions, the National Liberation Movement, split in July, 1945, into the
Communist-led MUR (the Unified Movement of Reconstruction) and
the vaguely Socialist UDSR (Union of Democratic and Socialist Resis-
tance). From then on the Resistance organizations rapidly lost direct
political importance and became more or less adjuncts, though some-
times rather useful ones, of the political parties. At the same time the
Socialists refused finally the repeated Communist invitation to combine
with them into a centralized working class party.
Therewith the stage was set for a full‐fledged resumption of the com-
petitive political struggle. The dispirited middle-class groups took new
courage. They saw a chance to identify themselves with the national
cause of General de Gaulle and accordingly began to reassert them-
selves. In this emerging political struggle the Communists held a big
advantage over all other groups, not only because their Resistance
record after June, 1941, the time of Russia’s declaration of war, was
so much superior to that of any other group, but also because their
political personnel, in so far as it survived the 1941-44 liberation cam-
paign, was available to a large extent.6 This availability resulted from
6 The official leader of the CP (Communist Party), Maurice Thorez, had spent the
war years in Moscow, and de Gaulle originally wanted to exclude him from
return to political life in France, only to be forced by the Communists and the
Trade Union propaganda campaign to allow in autumn 1944 his triumphant
reentry into French political life.
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their complete removal in 1940 from political life, which immunized

them from Vichy taint. In January, 1940, a law which was passed almost
unanimously, imposed forfeiture of their seats on Communist Deputies
and Senators who had not repudiated their affiliation with CP or the
Third International.7 About sixteen recanted. Some went into hiding.
Others were put under police observation or were in the army. Thirty‐
five were sent before military courts and, after conviction and sentence
to five years imprisonment, were shipped to African camps. In contrast,
the majority of all other prewar parliamentary figures were under a
cloud because of their continued participation in government. In Vichy,
at the time of the fateful vote for Pétain’s full powers, only eighty of all
the 649 senators and deputies who had participated had voted against
Pétain.
This was the political background against which the issue of qualifica‐
tion for public office emerged. It too was settled by a series of decisions.
An ordinance of the Committee of National Liberation of April 21,
1944 had ruled that anyone who had voted full powers for Pétain
was disqualified henceforth from membership in elective assemblies.
Opposition to this en bloc exclusion was strong, mainly in the ranks
of the Center and Right Wing political groups, who, as a consequence
of this decree, could not muster even enough acceptable candidates
in November, 1944 to fill their increased quota for the Consultative
Assembly.8
As a result of pressure by the well-organized parliamentarians who
enjoyed the strong support of the former President of the Senate,
Jeanneney, at that time Minister in the de Gaulle Administration, the
original decree was modified on April 4, 1945. A jury d’honneur was set
up under the presidency of the Vice President of the Council of State
and authorized to examine the status of members of elective assemblies
and to restore eligibility to those who had subsequently »redeemed
themselves through participation in Resistance activities«. Much to the
disgust of the extreme Left, a number of Center and Right-Wing politi-
cians passed this test successfully and were thus enabled to run again
for office as early as the October, 1945, elections. This alleviated to

8 The Socialist Party had barred all those who had given an affirmative vote for
Pétain’s powers ever running again for elective office on the Socialist ticket.
Former Socialists who were allowed to run again for office by the jury d'honneur,
like the former Minister of Agriculture, Georges Monnet, joined other political
groups.
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some degree the shortage of experienced parliamentary personnel in

the middle class parties.
The elective system for the National Assembly, which, according to
paragraph 7 of the law adopted by the referendum of October 21,
1945 and reissued on November 2, 1945,9 was also to be the election
system for the vote of the second National Assembly of June 2, 1946,
brought some important modifications to French election procedures. It
stipulated a return to the principle of proportional representation. This
had been tried in France only incompletely through the law of 1919
and abandoned in 1927. It used each of the ninety departments as an
electoral unit. It gave each department a minimum of two seats but
allowed for utilization of remainders on a departmental level.
The Left Wing organizations and the Trade Unions accused the admin-
istration of arbitrarily favoring the rural districts. This protest marked
a serious deterioration of de Gaulle’s relations with the Trade Unions.
The General refused to receive a protesting Trade Union delegation
because the existing law did not allow unions to engage in political
activities. The administration heeded their criticism to some extent,
and sixteen extra seats were added for the most densely populated
departments.
The Left Wing fears were proved unfounded in the election of October
21, 1945. The old Center parties, especially the Radical Socialists, and,
to a lesser extent, the Right very often did not secure the necessary
number of votes to obtain one seat in a department, and, as an inter-
departmental equalization was not provided by the law, the election
system worked exclusively in the favor of three parties: the Commu-
nist, the Socialist, and the newly emerging Mouvement Republicain Popu-
laire.10
In the referendum held on the same day, an overwhelming number of
voters –18,504,000 – that is to say, 96.4 per cent of those who voted,
were willing to entrust the new Assembly with the power to write
a constitution. The Radical Socialist Party could not even muster half
of the votes it received for the Assembly for its proposal to return
to the constitutional set-up of the Third Republic (699,000 – 3.6 per
cent). The majority of the voters (12,794,000 – 66.5 per cent) were also
satisfied with the Provisional Government's proposal for the distribu-
tion of powers between the executive and the Constituent Assembly.

10 See Appendix II.
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The vote cast against the de Gaullist-Socialist formula on division of

governmental powers was 6,449,000, corresponding almost exactly to
the proportion of the popular vote received by the Communist Party
and the Radical Socialists, both of which had recommended a negative
vote on the second question.
The party structure as it emerged from the October, 1945, elections
was characterized by the predominance of three big groups of almost
equal strength, the MRP, the Socialists, and the Communists. The extent
to which this result was a consequence of the change in the electoral
system should not he exaggerated. The number of seats attributed to
the Right and the Radical Socialists was, to be sure, somewhat smaller
than it would have been under a better balanced proportional system,
in which they would have had a chance to collect all their remainders
from the departmental lists. But even if arithmetical justice had allowed
five per cent more seats for the smaller groups, the essential result
of the elections, the dominance of the three majority groups who had
received more than seventy‐five per cent of the popular vote, would not
have been changed.
However, the losses of the Right, though severe, did not approach
a rout. Traditional Rightist strongholds, like the rich agricultural and
wine-growing departments Cote-d’Or and Yonne, the traditionally
nationalist Vosges, and the historical Rightist stronghold, the Vendée,
were still solidly Rightist. Altogether the Right had managed to remain
the strongest political group in nearly twenty of the departments.
Moreover, almost all of the voters who deserted the Right did so in
order to join the MRP. They were not unconditionally lost to the cause
for which the Right is fighting. The MRP, the new meteor among the
French parties, resembled closely in its structure and organization the
defunct German Center party or the present Belgian Catholic party.
Held together by common loyalty to the social and religious philos-
ophy of the Catholic Church, and by the close identification of its
members with the cause of General de Gaulle, it had become the pro-
visional political home for a number of disparate elements. Die-hard
reactionary middle-class groups may be found in its ranks, but to some
extent they are, if not balanced, checked to some extent by the presence
of a considerable number of Catholic working-class voters, who share
the general economic outlook of the Socialists.
The victory of the Left, foreshadowed as early as 1936, had been real-
ized. In October, 1945, Communists and Socialists commanded the loy-
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alty of an absolute majority of the French electorate. But their plurality

was uncomfortably small (51.9 per cent). Furthermore, it contained up
to one-half million votes of the UDSR, allied for electoral purposes
with the Socialists. This group, however, moved to the Right, once the
Socialist-Communist collaboration became more accentuated.
Some significant shifts have taken place in the composition of the Left
Wing parties. The Socialist Party was winning a large number of mid-
dle class votes which formerly went to parliamentary figures aligned
with the Radical Socialist Party, the biggest loser in the October, 1945
elections. The Socialist Party became entrenched in many dominantly
rural and small-town areas, especially in the southwest. But in the
urban districts, with the possible exception of Paris, it was at best
stationary. Most of the working class vote went to the Communists.
To some extent this may be due to the fact that the Communists now
dominate the General Labor Confederation with its five and one-half
million members. Only the central organizations of white-collar work-
ers, some government workers unions, the printing trades, and the port
and dock workers, are still outside Communist Party control. In many
industrial regions, especially the north, only the left wing of the MRP,
supported by the Christian Trade Unions and the Jeunesse Ouvrière
Catholique youth organization could still compete with the Communist
Party for the labor vote. But the Communist voters are not found only
in urban areas – they are also found in considerable number among
the sharecroppers, small landed proprietors and agricultural labor,
noticeably in the southeastern district. The Rightist propaganda that
the Communist party would expropriate even the smallest proprietor
has not deterred an increasing percentage of the agricultural popula-
tion from voting Communist. The Communists’ great success with the
peasants, in fact, has had an important effect on French food policies,
as it has kept even the Communist Party, traditionally representative of
urban consumer interests, from trying to pursue a strong policy of food
control.
The shift in the social composition of the Socialists and Communists
is to some extent indicated by the professional background of the par-
liamentary representatives of these parties. Teachers and, to a lesser
degree, lawyers are by far more prominent in the Socialist Party than
elements with white collar or manual labor background, although the
latter originally formed a high percentage of the CP functionaries and a
not negligible number of the MRP representatives (Appendix No. IV).
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The emergence of big, relatively stable parties built around programs

of definite social action rather than around personalities is not an alto-
gether new phenomenon in France. Throughout the many vicissitudes
of their existence, the Socialists had always tried to become such a
party. The 1936 elections had catapulted the hitherto small Communist
group into a prominent position. However, the single-member constitu-
encies which then prevailed made possible many temporary alliances
in run‐off elections, and effectively counteracted or delayed the build-
ing up of a well-disciplined party system.
The question arises whether the trend to concentration of political
activity in three big groups, as evidenced in the elections of October,
1945 and confirmed in those of June, 1946 is a lasting one, or whether
the French will later return to their traditional individualistic patterns
– their many small political groups and their shifting allegiances. Has
the social cataclysm of the last twenty‐five years definitely changed
the character of French politics? Are the days of the Millerands, Vivia-
nis, Briands, Lavals, Doriots and Froissarts, who all started on the
extreme Left and ended up as propagandists of the established order,
completely gone? Is the political free lance who conquers and keeps an
election district with his own personal machine rather than as represen-
tative of a well-organized social group, and whose career in the Palais
Bourbon depends on his skill in maneuvering his friendships and con-
nections rather than on a steady voting record, really a bygone figure?
This much seems to be sure: the emergence of a big, well-disciplined
Communist Party, the officers of which everywhere obey centralized
orders and which for the time being can rely also on the organizational
apparatus of the Trade Unions, has had a centralizing effect on the
whole of French party activity.
The victory of the MRP is not chiefly to be explained in terms of its
being the party most closely identified with de Gaulle. This explana-
tion, so valid in accounting for the party’s victory in the October, 1945
election, would not by itself explain the still more far-reaching success
in May, 1946, when de Gaulle had at least temporarily ceased to be
an active force in politics. It has to be interpreted as the result of the
increasing conviction of many voters that only a big middle-class party
could stem the Communist tide. The Socialists in their turn are most
acutely threatened with competition from a powerful, dynamic, and
vigorous CP party machine and have consequently tried very hard to
re-enforce party discipline and to increase the power of their executive.
However, they have never gone so far as to sacrifice completely the
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freedom of conscience of their adherents in favor of an absolute subjec-

tion to the central party machine.11 Thus during the deliberations of
the constitutional committee of the Constituent Assembly the Socialists
reversed their former stand and, together with the MRP, voted down
a proposal made by the Communists to subject the deputies to recall
by the electorate. However, the introduction of the recall and binding
instructions is still an issue for consideration.12
The extensive debate on the proportional representation system, which
began in the summer of 1945 and which culminated in the enactment
of the election statute of April 13, 1946,13 shows the same reluctance.
Although now invalid because of the negative result of the May, 1946
referendum, the machinery which would have been set up, had this
election law been approved, demonstrates clearly the conflicting cur-
rents of opinion. The three big parties had originally designed a new
variety of proportional representation, which was based on the depart-
ment as the electoral unit, but also provided for a complicated system
of interdepartmental equalization of remainders. However, admission
to the equalization scheme was to be refused to a slate not represented
in at least twenty departments. This provision would have worked
as much to the disadvantage of the political free lance and the small
parties as the allocation of one-third of the remainders to a national list
would have favored the big central party machines. In their demand for
11 Léon Blum has given eloquent expression to the Socialist viewpoint in regard
to party discipline in his recent book A L’Echelle Humaine (Paris, 1945), pp.
110-111: »Discipline within a party is a normal state of affairs, and the unity
of the party must be energetically preserved against all egotistical defections
which are inspired by private interests, ambition and temptations of all sorts.
On the other hand, there must be a strong possibility of weakening or even
breaking party ties each time when extraordinary crises make the individual
conscience of value in facing the problems posed by public life. In the lives
of parties as, in most instances, in the lives of individuals, the true criterion
of morality is disinterestedness. The breaking of party ties is immoral and
detestable when it is tainted, no matter how little, with what I shall call, in the
widest sense of the word, venality. It becomes respectable or even praiseworthy
when it is in response to an imperative demand of the conscience with regard to
a ›crucial‹ problem.«
The attitude of the Socialist Party toward this problem is discussed by Georges
Berlia in Du Mandat Imperatif in Refaites une Constitution (Paris, 1946), pp. 77-83.
12 In one of the last sessions of the Constituent Assembly a bill was accepted to
modify the law of February 22, 1945, on factory delegates. According to the
new version, factory delegates may be recalled from their functions during the
course of their term by the majority of their constituents on the recommendation
of the Trade Unions.
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the introduction of preferential voting,14 allowing the voter to pick his

own candidate without regard to the place assigned him by the party
on the list, and also in their desire to allow the voter to split his ticket,
the very vocal leaders of the Radical Socialists and the Right opposition
groups did not get satisfaction from the majority. However, they were
able to whittle down gradually all other inequalities affecting the elec-
tion chances of the small parties and the political free-lance. They were
able, for instance, to exclude the setting up of the national list. They
failed in one important respect, because participation in distribution of
remainders was allowed only for parties securing more than five per
cent of the total vote.
The substitution of political programs for men and the accompanying
rationalization of political life may not altogether be a linear process.
Solutions so far adopted need not be final, and the way back is not
irretrievably closed. It is conceivable that the French political parties,
once they no longer feel so threatened by the prospects of Communist
predominance, may still return to their old individualistic patterns.
However, the deep modifications of the French social system and the
impact of development in other European countries more likely indi-
cate that the changes which the past ten years have wrought in the
French party system will not be very easily eradicated, even after the
end of the present period of emergency.
Chapter II The Parties and the Constitution
The constitutional policies of the parties were determined by two con-

siderations. There were, first, the traditional party ideologies and politi-
cal philosophies. Second, the continuous jockeying for the best tactical
position in the inter-party competition sometimes forced the individual
group to subordinate its ideological preferences to immediate political
strategy.
The tactical approach to the constitutional problem is most markedly
evident in the policies of the Communist Party. The CP was the best
14 It should be noted, however, that at least in the Socialist Party the number of
those who would have the voter rather than the party machine determine the
individual candidate’s place on the list had still in spring, 1946, been consider-
able. A proposal to sponsor the preferential vote, discussed during the March,
1946, party congress, was voted down with the barest of margins – 2132 to
2003. This decision was reversed by a later party congress, at which the majority
decided to come out for the preferential vote.
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disciplined political group and, at the same time, the one with the
greatest number of adherents. Its official membership has recently
passed the one million mark. Its ideology and political philosophy view
collaboration with other groups only as a temporary expedient neces-
sary until the Party shall be able to seize the whole political power. Its
constitutional plans were accordingly keyed to solutions which would
most favor the transition of a multi-party to a one-party administration.
It had to hurdle two barriers to political dominance. Alone, it has no
basis for constitutional government as it represents only twenty‐five to
twenty-six per cent of the electorate. Since the liberation it has therefore
tried to cajole the Socialists into joining forces with it. Such a fusion
would give it the necessary majority for further action. Although the
Socialists have constantly refused to heed these pleas, they might be
forced to enter into a more or less stable coalition with the CP by a com-
bination of outside pressure and pressure from within their own ranks.
If the CP therefore staked all its cards on framing a constitution which
gave the majority free rein, it took a big political risk. The combination
of both parties might not be able to hold a majority of seats in future
assemblies, thus opening the way to unchecked rule by a Right-Center
coalition. It is even more likely that the Socialists would split or at least
tacitly allow enough of their members to veer to the Center to make a
Left-Center government without, or even against, the CP possible. Even
so, the CP figures that it stands a better chance of winning its objectives
through an all-powerful Parlement than through a constitutional set-up
containing numerous checks and balances, all framed to work against
the CP.
Call it a second deliberative body with its dilatory tactics, call it the
strong executive or judicial control – as long as the present French
administrative and judicial apparatus taken over largely from the Third
Republic persists, as long as there is danger of de Gaulle’s return to
executive power, these checks are so many new barriers on the CP’s
way to power. To be sure, legislative attempts have recently been made
to break the hold of the old ruling groups on the administrative appara-
tus. Even the de Gaulle regime, though with a certain hesitance, has
broken the near monopoly of the Right of Center Ecole Libre des Sciences
Politiques on the professional education of the higher administrative
officials. It has been replaced by a National School of Administration,
admission to which is dependent on educational qualifications only.15
André Phillip, then finance minister of the Gouin cabinet, had prepared
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a decree to oust the formerly all-powerful financial inspectors, who

had the habit of changing over from influential government jobs to
the service of private or semi-public industries, and vice versa. Still
more important, Maurice Thorez, the then CP Vice President of the
Council, has devised a plan for the thorough reform of the French
personnel administration which would severely limit the importance
of the upper ranks of bureaucracy.16 But all these reforms will come
into play slowly; for the time being any additional strength given to
the executive and its administrative cadres would be inimical to the
extension of Communist influence. Therefore, the acceptance of any of
these checks would double the risks of the CP without giving it any
advantages. It was this consideration which lay predominantly behind
the CP’s theoretical argument for popular sovereignty concentrated in
the all-powerful Assembly.
The constitutional program advocated by the CP17 proposed a mixture
of a representative system, carried to its logical extreme, with elements
of direct democracy. Political power seemed to be neatly concentrated
in the Assembly, which could not be dissolved during its four-year
term. The Council of Ministers would be completely subordinated to
the Assembly over whose program of action neither the Council itself
nor the purely decorative President of the Republic would have any
power. The deputies, from whose ranks – as from those of the bureau-
cracy – any person related to private or state-subsidized monopolies
would be excluded, would be directly responsible to their constituents,
who might recall them. This powerful Assembly’s only other rival in
power besides the people with their right to recall their representatives
would be the equally powerful departmental and municipal assem-
blies, on whose actions the proposal provides no check by the central
authority. The CP’s insurance against the dire fate of ever being a
minority lay in these provisions for local government. If the CP won the
day, the large amount of self-administration would not hinder its activi-
ties as it would likewise sweep all local offices; whereas if its political
adversaries should get the upper hand, the CP, at least theoretically,
could fortify itself behind the liberties of those local administrations in
which it still could hold power.
The constitutional ideas of the new MRP were as little homogeneous
as the new party itself. Yet one of its fairly constant and recurring
16 »Un Nouveau Statut des Fonctionnaires«, Le Monde, April 11, 1946.

17 The Communist constitutional project has been printed as Annexe au procès-ver-
bal de la séance du 23 novembre 1945, carrying the number 20.
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themes was what its adversaries were attacking as some kind of hidden
corporative system. Pluralism in this connection meant the recognition
of rights of all sorts of corporate entities, especially of families, along
with the Rousseauistic conception of Parlement as the instrument for
the transformation of the will of the individual voter into the general
will through the medium of the representative system.18 The theoretical
concept of pluralism thus served as a justification for any checks which
were proposed against the omnipotence of an Assembly, offspring of
an individualistically conceived popular sovereignty. The MRP desired
to implement its purpose to hedge the Assembly’s supremacy with all
kinds of restrictions, all the more eagerly because it was then engaged
in active political competition with the regrouping Rightists and, to
a minor degree, with the Radical Socialists. Both the latter groups
were trying, not very successfully, to recoup their 1945 losses and to
regain the voters who had joined the MRP by building up a record as
unflinching fighters against the omnipotence of a unicameral system
dominated by the Left. It is for this reason that the MRP, fighting with
considerable success (as shown in the June 2, 1946 elections) for its
continued existence as one of the three big political parties, had either
to extract sizeable concessions from the Left majority or join the opposi-
tion against the constitution as framed by the Left.
The concrete MRP program as developed in numerous amendments
during the constitutional debate rested essentially on four points.19 The
MRP leaders did not want to recognize the Assembly as the exclusive
deliberative organ, but they wanted to associate with it in the Parlement
the Council of the French Union, the new constitutional creation which
unites representatives of metropolitan France with those of the overseas
territories.20 While, probably under the pressure of its left wing, the
MRP refrained from asking the status of the former Senate for the
Council, it would have liked to give it a certain amount of legislative
initiative and the traditional parliamentary prerogatives (full immunity
of its members, full publication of its debates in the Journal Officiel). The
MRP furthermore insisted that the President of the Republic should
18 A. C., March 8, 1946, pp. 634, 635; April 9, 1946, pp. 1624, 1640.
19 The MRP did not submit a constitutional project of its own before the begin-
ning of the sittings of the Constitutional Committee. However, a constitutional
project was worked out by the Rightist deputy Joseph Delachenal, Annexe au
procès-verbal de la seance da 27 novembre 1945, No. 38. There were also a number
of private projects which more or less represented the Right-Center viewpoint;
one of them, the project of the Comité Général d'Etudes, established during the
German occupation, is reprinted in Les Cahiers Politiques, October 1945, pp. 1-17.
20 See their proposed amendment in A.C. of April 15, 1946, p. 1844.
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not be elected exclusively by the Assembly, and that, with the advice
of the President of the Council, he should have the right to dissolve
the Assembly in case it has twice refused a vote of confidence to
the ministry. In addition, as a further guarantee against parliamentary
omnipotence, it would have liked to minimize the importance of the
parliamentary representation in the Judicial Council dealing with judi-
cial appointments. Moreover, it played with the idea, although not
too energetically, of establishing a body outside the Parlement which
would determine the constitutionality of legislation. This sums up the
proposals of MRP, in which, so far, it had acted as spokesman for the
whole Center and Right. It had tried by these means to forestall some of
the political consequences which a Left victory might bring.
After definition of the constitutional position of the CP and the MRP,
the position of the Socialists becomes almost self-explanatory. Its mid-
dle-of-the-road position between the extreme Left and the Center
imposed on it the ungrateful role of »eternal mediator«.21 By tradition
and inclination the Socialists have inclined toward a political system
the focal point of which would he a unicameral Assembly. This ten-
dency had only become stronger after the Blum government’s unfortu-
nate experience with the French Senate in 1937. All this served to mag-
nify the Socialists’ desire for parliamentary predominance. However,
this predilection had been tempered by the realization that they might
have to share the burden of government under such conditions with
a dynamic and aggressive CP bent on absorbing the Socialist Party.
Many of them would be glad of some outside checks which would
make it easier for them to resist the Communist embraces and which
would, for the benefit of their left wing militants, put the onus of a
situation in which they could not go all the way with the Communist
Party on some impersonal constitutional provision rather than on their
unwillingness. Few would dare to go as far as their grand old man,
Léon Blum, who in later years has mellowed considerably and who
now endorses bluntly an executive-legislative relationship drafted on
the American or Swiss model.22
At any rate, the Socialists tried their best not to be left alone with the
Communists in the formulation of a Leftist constitution, the theoretical
basis of which they could applaud but the practical aspects of which on
21 Le Monde, April 3, 1946.

22 See Léon Blum, A L’Echelle Humaine, p. 151. The enemies of the omnipotent
Assembly have not failed to quote Léon Blum in their behalf. Soustelle, A. C.,
April 12, 1946, p. 1774.
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their own party they feared. They were therefore always frantically in
search of formulas which would keep both the CP and the MRP on the
job. They wished to delay the day when they themselves would have to
make a definite choice between the CP program and that of the Center,
lest their voter make the choice for them by either swelling the ranks of
the CP or transferring allegiance back to a »safer« Centrist group.
The difference between the CP’s and the Socialists’ original constitu-
tional projects was a difference of nuance and emphasis rather than of
principle.23 Both agreed on the main point, the supremacy of a unicam-
eral Assembly, although the Socialists’ project permitted the dissolution
of the Assembly by the executive. A bill of rights, with sections on
personal as well as on social rights, was entirely missing in the CP doc-
ument but appeared in the Socialists’ proposal. The Socialists included
it not only to achieve the »economic 1789«, but also politely to remind
the CP that the Socialists’ version of future society endeavors to recon-
cile personal freedom with delivery from »economic servitude«. On the
question of local freedom, the Socialists endorsed the principle of a
maximum of local self-government without impairing the necessary
amount of central co-ordination. Finally, in wishing to submit constitu-
tional amendments to the people rather than allowing ratification by a
two-thirds majority vote of the Assembly as the Communists proposed,
the Socialists showed not only their anxiousness to conform to the 1793
tradition but also their deep-seated suspicion of any anti-democratic
moves, whether from a strong extreme Leftist or Rightist majority.
The Right, which generally blew the same horn as the MRP only more
vehemently and with no apparent willingness to compromise, emerged
as protagonist of something akin to the classical nineteenth century sys-
tem of parliamentary representation. Only the adversary against which
precautionary measures are contemplated has changed; it is the strong
legislature and not the independent executive which had lately become
the object of suspicion. The »new stand« came somewhat suddenly, as
many of the new adherents of a system of sweet reasonableness and
of eternal vigilance had until a short time ago been the protagonists of
the strong and independent executive, be it the native French type –
the Action Française doctrine – or the later, more popular Mussolinian
version.
23 The Socialists’ constitutional project has been printed as Annexe au procès-verbal

da la seance du 29 novembre 1945, No. 44.
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Chapter III Towards the Framing of the Constitution
At the beginning of December, 1945, the Commission of the Constitu-

tion started its labors. Speed was essential, as according to the law
adopted in the October 21, 1945, referendum, the constitution was to
be worked out by the Constituent Assembly within seven months.
Together with the Finance Commission easily the most important com-
mission of the Assembly, the members of the Assembly competed
eagerly for one of its forty-two seats, which were parceled out to the
parliamentary groups in proportion to their numerical strength. Due to
the »unavailability« of most of the former Senators and Deputies, only
seven of its forty-two members had sat in one of the prewar chambers.
The Right and Center members were for the most part either prac-
ticing lawyers or law school teachers. Among others, there was the
Rightist former Senator Jacques Bardoux who, back in the palmy days
of Doumergue, tried his hand at authoritarian constitutional reform.
There were also Joseph Denais, Rightist Parisian lawyer and an old
parliamentary war horse, and Robert Bruyneel, a younger Rightist
lawyer and an acid critic of the Left’s project. But the chief element
was the phalanx of de Gaullist professors, led by François de Men-
thon. De Menthon had been a teacher of political economy, de Gaullist
Minister of Justice from 1943 to May, 1945, and presently became the
constitutional expert of the MRP. Up to the beginning of April, 1946,
he was general reporter of the Constitutional Committee. The former
de Gaullist Minister of Education, René Capitant, who like his father
has been a professor of law, also sat on the Committee. He was a
representative of the UDSR. He gradually became one of the chief foes
of the constitution as it emerged from the hands of the Left majority.
Paul Coste-Floret, Paul Viard, and Henry Teitgen, were also law school
teachers in the MRP ranks. And Jacques Fonlupt-Espéraber brought to
the MRP delegation his experience as Councilor of State. The prewar
parliamentarian André Marie had the task of adapting the old tradi-
tional Radical Socialist line to the new Right-of-Center position of his
group.
The Left held the presidency of the Commission in the person of Guy
Mollet, who replaced André Phillip when the latter became Minister of
Finance. Mollet, one of the many Socialist teachers, in spite of his Leftist
record, tried hard to make the ideas of the Leftist majority palatable to
the Center of the Assembly. The most brilliant member of the CP parlia-
mentary group, Pierre Hervé, philosophy professor and polemist par
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excellence, together with Jacques Duclos, the party’s secretary, marked

the main Communist contribution. However, it is striking that there
were no CP lawyers in the Commission. The Party seems to have
assigned its lawyers to more strategic tasks outside the parliament.
Most of the Communist seats as well as a goodly percentage of the
Socialist were filled with political and trade union professionals who
were readier to start a political argument than to engage in theoretical
discussion. The most experienced Socialist lawyer, Louis Noguères,
was sitting at this time as the President of the High Court of Justice
and therefore not often available. The task of advancing and defending
the Leftist viewpoint fell primarily to Pierre Cot, the anti de Gaullist,
former Radical Socialist Minister of Aircraft. He had the full confidence
of the CP. Although at loggerheads with the dominating right wing of
his own group,24 Pierre Cot presented the draft of the constitution to
the full Assembly in April, 1946, trying his best to stress those points
which would make the draft acceptable to the Center of the Assembly.
The Commission held a total of sixty sittings and was still at work
debating on controversial points which had been reserved when on
March 7th the discussion of the bill of rights began in the full Assembly.
In the beginning, as long as the de Gaulle administration was still in
office, there existed a considerable amount of co-operation between the
Socialists and the MRP. Both voted together for the introduction of
compulsory voting and also drafted a system of rules governing party
management and party finances, both measures manifestly directed
against the CP. However, from January on, the Socialists joined with
the CP, in many instances reversing former decisions they had made
with the MRP. These included reversal of their position on compulsory
voting and the rules governing party behavior.
At about the same time, the attitude of the MRP stiffened, and it was
generally expected that the Center would make a concerted drive to
break the Leftist majority at the next opportunity and to remodel the
institutions of the country under the General’s leadership. This forced
the Socialists to try to seek cover with the extreme Left. They continued,
however, to attempt to bridge the widening gulf between the CP and
the Center by a number of compromise proposals, some of which were
inserted in the constitution.
24 After he had been »excommunicated« by the Radical-Socialists, Pierre Cot sub-

sequently ran on a Communist and Resistance ticket.
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The main points of discord remained. They were the method of select-
ing the President, the President's right to dissolve the Assembly, the
question whether the Council of the French Union should be part of the
Parlement and the principles governing the selection of members of the
Judicial Council. The break between the parties became public at the
beginning of April, when François de Menthon resigned as general
reporter of the constitution and was replaced by Pierre Cot.
The bill as submitted to the Assembly showed the efforts not to
burn the bridges between the Communist-Socialist majority and the
MRP. Many of its provisions are only understandable as results of
this endeavor to compromise the Leftist desire for parliamentary
sovereignty and the Center’s wish to insert checks and balances. These
attempts to find formulas of reconciliation went on under the auspices
of the President of the Assembly, Vincent Auriol, and lasted until April
18th.
At this date a complete deadlock resulted because both the CP and
the MRP proved unwilling to make any material concessions. The full
text of the constitution had to be voted before April 21st, as the seven
month limit set to the life of the Assembly ended at that date. The con-
stitutional referendum had already been fixed for May 5th and nobody
wanted to prolong the constitutional debate, since the two remaining
weeks were needed to familiarize the voters with the features of the
constitution.25 Thus a Communist and Socialist majority of 309 against
the Center and Rightist parties’ minority of 249 voted on April 20,
1946 approval of a text drafted as a compromise with the MRP. This
genesis of the draft constitution explains its minor inconsistencies,
which, however, are not strong enough to weaken its essential point,
the supremacy of the Assembly.
Chapter IV The Draft Constitution
The enemies of the draft constitution have baptized the regime they
defeated at the polls »a rule by Assembly«.26 By calling it a »gouverne-
ment conventionel« they played a neat and effective propaganda trick
25 The Constituent Assembly eventually prorogated its life until April 27th, but
not in order to discuss constitutional issues but to take up the second batch of
nationalization measures.
26 François de Menthon, A. C., April 9, 1946, p. 1624; Teitgen, A. C., April 17, 1946,
p. 1969.
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by associating it from the outset with the political regime of the year
1793-1794, which, whatever its patriotic merits, is known to the average
Frenchman for the terroristic dictatorship of its Assembly and its com-
mittees.27
The general reporter of the draft constitution, Pierre Cot, sensing the
tack that the opposition was taking, built much of his defense of
the draft on the basis of the essential differences between the histori-
cal régime conventionel, a revolutionary regime, and the constitutional
system of the draft.28 His demonstration of the existence of a cabi-
net endowed with executive functions was unconvincing because the
draft’s adversaries looked at the latent potentialities in its constitutional
theory, not at the details of its organizational scheme.
They were concerned with the ease with which – granted luck at the
polls – this constitutional majority could give the work of the Assembly
a revolutionary turn.
The possibility of this identification of a revolutionary with a constitu-
tional regime resulted from the fact that the draft constitution pushed
the idea of representative democracy to its logical conclusion by giving
the majority of the day free rein. In the battle between the integral
democracy of Rousseau and a liberal system of balanced and separate
powers, the draft constitution had resolutely taken its stand with the
first by rejecting any »outworn« idea of separation of powers and con-
centrating power in the hands of the democratically elected representa-
tives of the people.29 All units created by the draft constitution had
27 If the adversaries of the draft constitution had been historians, rather than active
politicians in search of a slogan, they would have emphasized the fact that the
constitutional regime which they opposed was quite like that established under
the Constitution of 1793. The 1793 constitution had been voted by the victorious
Montagne after discarding Condorcet's Girondist project. It was never applied,
as it was superseded by the revolutionary regime. However, it established a
regime which placed the maximum power in the hands of a unicameral legisla-
ture elected annually. It gave executive power to an Assembly committee of
twenty-four, which served a two-year term, half its membership being elected
annually. The only check on the Assembly was the people, to whom the laws
were to be referred, the legislature having power to issue decrees only in the
field of security and public order.
The June, 1793, Constitution was the first to be subjected to popular referen-
dum. It received a happier verdict than the draft of May 5, 1946, as 1,801,918
persons approved it and only 17,610 opposed it. However, 100,000 voters sought
to amend it one way or another.
28 A. C., April 9, 1946, p. 1621.
29 In the words of its general reporter, Cot: »If you do not want to close your
eyes to realities you have to face the fact that one ought to talk no more of
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therefore been designed to facilitate administration by a suitable div-

ision of work rather than as constitutional brakes on the functioning of
the sovereign Assembly.
This predominance of the national Assembly, elected by every twenty-
year-old French citizen, included supremacy even over the one other
possible claimant of sovereignty: the people. The theoretical sovereign,
recognized in Article 43 as the people, deposited, according to Article
47, in the legislature every five years all sovereign powers except one:
the amending power, which is divided between the original holder of
sovereignty, the people, and its semi-permanent holder, the Assembly.
Because the new constitutional lawyers had gone through a Marxist
school and were therefore imbued with suspicion of the referendum
and knowledge of its manifold abuses in history, they were more nig-
gardly in its use than the drafters of the Constitution of June, 1793.
No provision for popular initiative was made in the draft constitution.
Even in the case of amending or revising the constitution, the people
were to vote only on a legal document which was to be submitted
by the Assembly after two readings separated by a three-month inter-
val. With the example of Vichy still before them, the drafters of the
constitution included in the amending clauses a formal prohibition of
any action to revise the constitution when metropolitan France was
completely or partially occupied by forces of foreign powers.
The ascendancy of the Assembly was further assured by a system of
water-tight provisions which gave Assembly action maximum indepen-
dence from interference by any other organ of the state.30 Once elected
the Assembly was to meet automatically. The sessions were to be quasi-
continuous. Adjournments during one year could not add up to more
than a total of four months.
During such interruptions, the Assembly controlled the cabinet
through a supervisory committee of its members, one-third of whom
had power to convene the full Assembly.
separation of powers, but of the collaboration of organs charged with different

functions. There are functions, there are organs of government, but there is no
place for different powers under a democratic regime. To the contrary, unity of
power is the rule of democracy and this power belongs to the people and to its
representatives who exercise it.« A. C., April 9, 1946, p. 1622.
30 This attitude has been chided as »sickly fear of the popular representatives« by
the MRP critic Coste-Floret. A. C., April 9, 1946, p. 1638.
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Over the opposition of the Right and the MRP, the draft constitution
continued the system of examination by the Assembly itself into the
validity of the election of its members without intervention of any
outside agency.
The often requested curtailment of the budgetary initiative of the
Assembly was not adopted. Rightist amendments to that purpose were
defeated by an overwhelming majority.31
The Assembly shared with the President of the Council the right to ini-
tiate legislation, yet it alone exercised legislative power and gave final
assent to the international treaties. The draft constitution added, »it can
neither wholly or partly transfer this right [of legislating] to anybody
else«. Viewed in the perspective of the French parliamentary history
of the last decade, this might be interpreted not only as meaning a pro-
hibition of the practice of passing enabling acts, by which France has
been increasingly governed since 1934, but also as excluding transfer
of any rule-making functions to the executive. However, in declining
to accept an amendment which would have established the respective
boundary lines between law and executive order, for convenience the
general reporter himself restricted the field of legislation to the setting
of general rules. The dividing line between general rules and the field
of the executive order was to be drawn by the experience of the Assem-
bly.32 The executive was given no right to take exceptional emergency
measures without the previous authorization of a two-thirds majority
of the Assembly. During such a period, the provisions allowing for the
dissolution of the Assembly were to become inoperative. This indicated
that any emergency rule was to be considered as exercised under strict
Assembly control.
There were two survivals of the attempt to find a compromise between
the Left’s insistence on a sovereign Assembly and the MRP’s fight for
a Parlement including another legislative organ. The first was the Eco-
nomic Council. The Assembly was to submit to this body economic
projects for advisory opinion to be rendered within ten, or if need
be, within two days. If the Council did not act within the stipulated
period, the Assembly could proceed. The Assembly was not required
to heed suggestions. Except for the fact that recourse to the device of
the Economic Council was now mandatory, its whole constitutional
position was essentially the same as that of tire inconsequential Conseil
31 A. C., April 15, 1946, p. 1852.

32 Amendment Giradoux, A. C., April 15, 1946, pp. 1843-1844; Pierre Cot, id., p.
1844.
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National Economique established in 1926 and reorganized by the law of

March 19, 1936.
The second surviving result, the Council of the French Union, was
somewhat more substantial. One of its main functions was to integrate
the overseas territories into the governmental framework of metropoli-
tan France.33 The Council was to be elected every four years, 180 of its
members to be chosen by the general councilors of the metropolitan
departments and 90 by the councilors and territorial assemblies of the
overseas possessions. This law failed when the draft constitution was
rejected.
A semi-parliamentary status was given to the Union Council. Its ses-
sions had some degree of publicity. Criminal prosecution against its
members had to be authorized by the Assembly. Permission was to
be given or refused after the Council had been heard. However, its
political functions did not correspond to the prerogatives granted in an
express attempt to mollify the MRP objections. Projects and bills were
to be referred to the Council by the Assembly or the ministry. It was
to give its opinion of a measure within a month after its reception, but
on urgent bills within the time limit set by Assembly procedure. In
case the Council objected to the bill, the Assembly could override the
objection when it had given the bill another reading. The Council was
given the right itself to ask for transmission to it of projects and bills.
The MRP amendments to give the Council the right to initiate bills and
to allow for the passage of bills vetoed or amended by the Council only
by a two-thirds majority of the Assembly were, however, defeated.34
Having chosen to concentrate total sovereignty in the Assembly, it was
only logical for the drafters of the constitution to restrict the role of
the President of the Republic to a purely decorative one and to tie the
executive branch of the government to the Assembly rather than to the
President. In the pursuit of this aim the Left voted down consistently
all attempts of the MRP and others to enlarge the electoral college by
adding the members of the Council of the French Union to those of
the Assembly.35 The amendments would have given the President a
position much more independent of the Assembly. Whatever the partic-
ular distribution of functions, such a President, especially if his name
were de Gaulle, might easily become a second constitutional power not
governed by the Assembly. These amendments were regarded by the
33 See below Chapter VI, p. 47.

34 A. C, April 15, 1946, p. 1865.
35 Amendments Boisdon, Soustelle, Varenne, A. C., 17 April 1946, p. 1958.
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MRP as necessary conditions precedent to a constitutional compromise

and therefore were to figure again in the deliberations of the second
Constituent Assembly.
The rule as adopted, that a President was to be elected for seven
years by a two-thirds or, if such was not attainable, by a three‐fifths,
majority of the Assembly, was in the tradition of the organic laws of
1875. Whittling down the position of the President may, however, be
considered as a kind of belated sanctioning of the constitutional prac-
tice of the last sixty‐five years. The two most powerful rights which the
organic laws of 1875 had given to the President – the right to dissolve
the Chamber and the right of a suspensive veto against legislation
– had fallen into complete disuse after 1877. The draft constitution
followed a roundabout way, however, in carrying on this tradition.
It did not reproduce the short paragraphs in which the Socialist and
Communist projects defined the essentially decorative and ceremonial
functions of the President. Ever mindful of the danger threatening from
a modem Louis Napoleon, it attempted to circumscribe very closely the
President’s position. But, responsive also to the MRP predilection for
a strong President, it also made some weak gestures in the opposite
direction. The result was not only the »filing clerk president, the post-
man president«, but also »the chief commander president«:36 »postman
president« because he had no decisive voice in the election of the Pres-
ident of the Council, but only communicated to the Assembly a list
of possible candidates; »filing clerk president« because the constitution
gave him the duty of maintaining the Council’s records and of filing
its papers, together with the rights of presiding over the Council of
Ministers. He was to be kept informed of diplomatic conversations and
correspondence. He was to sign and ratify treaties, but he had to sign
within ten days or, in urgent cases, within two days after they had been
transmitted to him by the Assembly. However, the draft constitution
adopted a precautionary measure from the Constitution of 1848 and
ruled that his refusal to sign merely meant that the President of the
Council’s signature could be substituted for his. His messages could
be read in the Assembly only if the President of the Council and the
Assembly consented. Thus the President was in the main restricted to
representative functions. However, by coincidence or intent, the Presi-
dent was left with the disposal of the armed forces, although this power
was not in harmony with the fact that the army appointments as well
36 That is how Herriot nicknamed the presidential creation of the draft constitu-
tion. A. C., April 9, 1946, p. 1643.
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as the important civilian appointments were centralized in the hands

of the President of the Council. The President of the Republic was
assigned a strategic place in the newly created Supreme Judicial Coun-
cil.37 But all in all, according to the draft constitution, the President of
the Fourth Republic was to be shorn of most political functions. He was
to be a symbol rather than a political force. He was kept out of politics
by his assignment to represent the »permanent interests of the French
Union«, a rather curiously worded assignment which even a future
coup d’état President might evoke in his own defense.
The President’s role was overshadowed by the one to be played by
the President of the Council, who, together with the cabinet, was to
exercise the executive power of the French Republic. The President of
the Council was to be picked by the Assembly rather than appointed by
the President as proposed by the opposition.38 He in turn would select
his cabinet, which, like his program, was to be submitted by him to the
Assembly for approval.
Although the President of the Council was to play a prominent role
through his power to name ministers and his unique prerogative to ask
for a vote of confidence, the cabinet was to have a definite influence.
It was to constitute, and often to act as, a collective body. This fact
would become the more important if the French government took the
form of party coalitions rather than a collection of individual politicians
belonging to a ministerial class. The cabinet was to be the center of the
executive organization. A great question concerning its constitutional
status sharply divided the adherents and critics of the draft constitu-
tion. Was the cabinet of the President of the Council to be endowed
with the power of action independent of the Assembly? Were he and
his cabinet to assume the role of an »executive organ of the Republic«,
or were they to become »simple clerks«39 of the Assembly? This last
would give rise to the possibility that the regime might at any time
become one in which power was exercised directly by the committees
of the Assembly.
The dispute therefore inevitably turned on the right of dissolution. If
the President of the Republic in the Council of Ministers could parry a
vote of censure of the Assembly through this authority, the Assembly
would be checkmated.40 By the same token, a President of the Republic
37 See page 32. [384]

38 A. C., April 17, 1946, pp. 1967-70.
39 H. Bouret, A. C., April 17, 1946, p. 1972.
40 Amendment Bouret, A. C., April 17, 1946, p. 1971.
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who might grant or refuse the dissolution to the cabinet was catapulted
from relative oblivion into the decisive rule of arbiter between the
cabinet and Assembly. In this debate, as in many others, the shadow
of the defunct Weimar Republic, whose records many deputies had
closely studied, seemed ever present.41 An Assembly in which majori-
ties were slim and in which the formation of a government might
end in a deadlock any day would fear possible abuse of the right of
dissolution because abuse of this right might kill the Republic rather
than strengthen it.42
The compromise, which the Left was prepared to make in its attempt to
win over the MRP and still preserve the main attributes of a sovereign
Assembly, produced an embryonic right of dissolution. The draft con-
stitution therefore provided that during the first two and a half years
of the Assembly’s existence there was to be no right of dissolution. If
the cabinet was in the minority on a vote of censure (for which either
the President of the Council or the members of the Assembly might
ask and which could be passed on absolute majority of the Assembly
two days after it had been tabled), the cabinet was to fall and the
Assembly was to look for a successor. If the Assembly had been in
office for more than thirty months and if two crises had occurred in
the same year, the cabinet, after having obtained the advice of the
President of the Assembly, might decide on an order of dissolution.
When issued, this was to be signed by the President of the Republic.
Moreover, the Assembly, after two and a half years of existence, was
authorized by the draft constitution to decide on its own dissolution
by action of two-thirds of its membership. Once the Assembly was
dissolved, current affairs were not left in the hands of the old cabinet
until a new Assembly could be elected, but – again a lesson learned
from the Weimar Republic – the President of the Assembly with the
presidents of the parliamentary committees as his cabinet took over
the interim administration. As the draft constitution stood, the provi-
sion for self-dissolution might have easily become more dangerous
to parliamentary authority than the weak and delayed presidential
dissolution which a skillfully maneuvering Assembly majority might
easily have circumvented. Self-dissolution might have worked, on the
one hand, in favor of a strong and self‐confident majority which might
have forced dissolution at a moment propitious to its own interests
in order to re-enforce its power. Yet the device might also have been
41 A. C., April 17, 1946, pp. 1952f. See especially the debate on proportional repre-
sentation, A. C., April 1, 1946, p. 1337, notably Capitant’s arguments.
42 P. Cot, A. C., April 17,1946, p. 1952.
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seized upon by a strong popular movement which wanted to assert its

power over a weak and irresolute Assembly by insistently clamoring
for voluntary self-dissolution. Whatever the merits or shortcomings of
the solutions adopted by the draft constitution, dissolution, the method
of the presidential election, and the advisability of a second deliberative
Assembly remained the central controversial constitutional problems
facing the second Constituent Assembly.
Traditionally, the judiciary has never taken a too important place in
the French governmental set-up. Neither the regular judiciary nor its
mighty and authoritative brother, the Council of State, the purveyor
of administrative justice, has ever exercised the right to determine the
constitutionality of laws. The fact that appointments to the judiciary
and, more important, advancement in rank have been in the hands of
a parliamentary Minister of Justice, together with rather ungenerous
pay scales – the possibility of a strike of judges was once rumored –
has lessened its independence of mind. Moreover, that the same judges
who have been in office and have at least passively, sometimes even
actively, collaborated with the Vichy regime, still hold their jobs – it
would have been difficult to find entirely new ones in view of the
unattractiveness of judicial office in France – has not enhanced their
authority with the population. In order to remedy the situation, a new
Judicial Council was to have been established by the draft constitution.
Judicial appointments and advancement in rank as well as judicial
discipline and the granting of pardons would have been taken out of
the hands of the Ministry of Justice and transferred to this body. This
is one of the few instances where with more or less general consent
the parliamentary sphere of influence, exercised through the Minister
of Justice responsible to the Assembly, was curtailed. Although agree-
ing in principle on taking justice out of politics, the parties have dif-
fered somewhat as to the advisable extent of such action. The draft
constitution provided for a Judicial Council composed of six persons
(chosen by a two-thirds vote of the Assembly) who were not to be
members of the Assembly. In addition it comprised four magistrates
elected by their colleagues and the Minister of Justice. The Council
was to be presided over by the President of the Republic. An MRP
amendment, which proposed adding two high magistrates and two
appointees of the President of the Republic, would have given the judi-
cial appointees predominance, thus elevating the judiciary to the status
of a self-administering corporation.43 But even the acceptance of this
43 Amendment Fonlupt-Esperaber, A. C., April 17, 1946, p. 1975-1976.
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amendment would not have foreshadowed a greater field of activity

for the judiciary nor changed its traditionally secondary place in the
French constitutional set-up. Such a change would have resulted only
from granting the regular judiciary the right to disregard or declare
laws void. Yet even the most vocal advocates of a strict determination
of the constitutionality of legislation have not been willing to assign
such a strategic role to the regular judiciary but have proposed setting
up a special, partly political, partly judicial council.44
Judging from the relative ease and speed with which the articles on
local administration were discussed, the Assembly did not take a very
lively interest in the constitution’s treatment of the issue of self-admin-
istration.45 The deputies knew that whatever the draft constitution pro-
posed, the real distribution of functions among the representatives of
the central government, the départments and the municipalities would
inevitably be made by more detailed legislation and executive orders
worked out under the aegis of a future legislative Assembly. Therefore,
the apparent reversal of the time-honored centralization of maximum
administrative power in the hands of the préfet, who exercised the
administrative tutelage over departments and local communities in the
name of the central administration, should not be taken too seriously.
The principle of administration of départements and municipalities by
locally-elected assemblies and their representatives was adopted over
rather weak opposition.46 The central government’s delegates to the
départements – the draft constitution seemed to exclude the appointment
of delegates to local communities – was to co-ordinate state services
and to see to it that the decisions of the departmental and local author-
ities conformed to law. He was thus a sort of state’s attorney with the
self-administering units. Yet even if future legislation should adhere
strictly to the draft’s concept of democratic self-administration on local
and regional levels and should not use the wide enabling clause of
Article 114 to restore the préfet to his traditional role as the executive
power in the département, the practical scope of the constitutional inno-
vation would still be in doubt. The ever-increasing number of local
administrative activities necessarily handled directly by representatives
of the central authorities, together with the inevitable financial depen-
dence of the local and regional organizations on the good will of the
central authorities, would be likely to affect the future of French local
44 Amendment Mutter, A. C., April 18, 1946, p. 2005.

45 A. C., April 16, 1946, pp. 1914-1923; April 18, 1946, pp. 2004-2005.
46 M. Violette, A. C., April 16, 1946, pp. 1920-1922; A. C., April 18, 1946, p. 2005.
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self-government more forcefully than the generous intentions of the

fathers of the draft constitution.
Chapter V Towards a new Bill of Rights
Protagonists and antagonists of a bill of rights have exchanged their

roles in the last 150 years. In 1789 it was the extreme Right – for
example, Secretary of the Navy Malouet and Cesar-Guillaume de La
Luzerne, who was later to become Cardinal de La Luzerne – who did
not want a bill of rights in a constitution because its exact legal charac-
ter would be difficult to determine.47 Today the Rightists cannot give
praise enough to the 1789 Bill of Rights, which in their eyes embodies
everything for which they are now fighting.
The extreme Left, however, now exhibits a distinct coolness to the
working out of a new bill of rights. This is most strikingly evident from
the fact that the Communist constitutional project contained none. The
CP did not feel that the tripartite government of France of 1946 was the
bearer of an historic message which, as in 1789, it must communicate
not only to the French people but also to the world at large.48 At the
moment they considered that their task was to form a prosaic compro-
mise, and the insertion of a number of constitutionally guaranteed
rights, whatever their historical foundation or social merit, might be
used only to check those forces which embody and execute the national
will. The Right and the Center objected to this opportunist attitude
which considered the constitution as a temporary shelter and the only
thing of importance, the speed with which it could be built.
The Socialists took yet another position. Although a number of left
wing Socialists theorized on the specifically middle class character of
the 1789 Bill, the main feature of the official Socialist project was an
attempt to harmonize the classical text with the postulates of a post-
Fascist social democracy. This Socialist conception shaped the Bill of
Rights which, with few insignificant changes, was eventually written
47 Archives Parlamentaires, VIII, p. 322.

48 Pierre Hervé, »Faut-il une declaration des droits«, Humanité, February 18, 1946.
See also Hervé, »Oui ou non«, Action, April 12, 1946. J. Duclos, A. C., March 12,
1946, p. 674. But see also the parallel independent judgment of R. Aaron – F.
Clairens, Les Français devant la constitution, p. 122.
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into the constitution.49 The Right, and especially the Radical Socialists
with Edouard Herriot as their chief speaker,50 attempted to have the
1789 Bill inserted verbatim into the constitution with necessary changes
added as a kind of postscript, but these efforts proved of no avail.
Three classical political doctrines were subjected to especially vehement
attack and they deserve closer consideration. They are the freedom of
the press, the right to give private instruction, and the position given
property rights under the constitution.
The French press as it has emerged from the war has little in common
with that of the pre-war epoch. The newspapers which had more or
less openly collaborated with the Germans stopped with the German
defeat. The more notorious collaborationist editors were prosecuted for
intelligence with the enemy; the others had to change their profession.
The premises of almost all Leftist papers and of many other papers
had been seized during the Vichy regime and turned over to collabora-
tionists. After liberation a reverse process took place. The premises and
the equipment of the collaborationists were taken over by members
of the Resistance groups and by newspapers of party organizations for-
bidden under the Vichy regime. The establishment of new newspapers
was contingent upon permission from the government. This arrange-
ment was made both to prevent collaborationist proprietors and editors
from regaining influence and also to secure equitable distribution of
scarce newsprint.
The entire Left and the MRP have been determined not to allow
the rebirth of a press which would have either to sell its editorials
and news columns to the highest bidder or become totally subordi-
nated to some other commercial enterprise because normal advertis-
ing could never ensure their financial, and therefore, political inde-
pendence. However, no magic formula has yet been found to realize
the new political ideal and to guarantee the press complete freedom
from administrative interference. The requirement of an administration
authorization to establish a newspaper was vehemently attacked both
by the Rightists and the Radical Socialists because their press, on
49 Compare the official report of the constitutional committee on the Bill of Rights
made by the committee’s reporter, G. Zaksas. March 2, 1946, A. C., p. 605, and
ibid., March 12, 1946, p. 675.
50 A. C., March 8, 1946, p. 636.
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account of the greater number of collaborationists in their ranks, had

suffered a partial eclipse in the early post-liberation period.51
It was against this background that the question of the form in which
the clause on the freedom of press was to appear in the bill of rights
was discussed. The committee proposal assured the right to publish or
disseminate any opinion in any way subject to two prohibitions: first, a
ban on libelous writing, and, second, a ban on writing which violated
rights guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. The Right attacked the second
restriction as a device perpetuating a system of political control over
the content of newspapers and proposed to replace it with criminal
penalties to be inflicted on perpetrators of abuses.52 However, experi-
ence with a Fascist and foreign‐financed press carried more weight
with the three big parties than the fear of political control, especially
as the existing system was to disappear in the near future. Even if
the second Constituent Assembly should abandon attempts formally to
co-ordinate the freedom of the press with the purposes of the Bill of
Rights, it stands to reason that the new freedom of the press will be
more critically watched, lest it develop into the old license.
The second issue involved the so-called free schools or, more explicitly,
the right of religious denominations to establish a private school sys-
tem. This is only a part of the larger question of state-church relations.
The general problem has found its historic solution in the so-called
neutrality of the state towards all beliefs and sects guaranteed, as
Article 13 of the draft expresses it, »by the separation of state and
Church«. The Church and its chief political spokesman, the MRP, made
an attempt to regularize and make permanent the special status of the
Church in the three formerly German departments of Alsace Lorraine.
They were met and defeated by the Left’s inevitable rejoinder that there
could be only one law governing state-church relations throughout
France.53 In other respects the Church has not found the official separa-
tionist doctrine very harsh, because in practice it is the concrete political
orientation of the government of the day which determines its content
and application. For example, General de Gaulle’s first official act on
the day of the liberation of Paris was his solemn visit to Notre Dame.
While accepting the general theory of separation, the Church made a
more resolute attempt to give the present status of the »free
51 The Assembly spent a whole day over Rightist and Radical Socialist interpella-
tions of the press regulation at that time. A. C., March 13, 1946, pp. 704-738.
52 A. C., March 14, 1946, p. 771.
53 A. C., March 14, 1946, p. 769.
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schools« constitutional sanction. This was essential in order to forestall

any subsequent attempts of a left wing majority to abrogate their status
and force the children of practicing Catholics to frequent lay schools.
Constitutional precedents were at best dubious. They were to be found
in only two former constitutions, those of 1795 and 1830, neither of
which was popular with the Left. However, so far as primary schools
were concerned, they had had legal status since the enactment law of
October 13, 1886. The Catholic case was also not advanced by the fact
that the Catholic private schools had received subsidies from the Pétain
regime. The MRP was prepared to concede the supremacy of the state
in educational matters, including not only the right to designate lay
schools as the general state school system, but also to regulate the con-
ditions under which private schools were to function. It insisted only
on a constitutional guarantee of the right of parents to have their chil-
dren instructed wherever they pleased and on the right of individual
teachers to open schools of their own after due examination and licens-
ing.54 The Left, however, proved unwilling to make any compromises.
It was supported by the Radical Socialists, who are traditionally anti-
clerical. Pierre Cot55 upheld the theory that instruction was a social
function, the organization of which was, under Art. 25, a duty of the
state.
Enough guarantees were thought to have been given through insertion
of the provision that education and instruction were not to be bound
by official theory but to be administered with the respect for liberty.
The present »compromise«, as Pierre Cot called the legal status granted
the so-called free schools by the law of 1886, was to be maintained for
the present. The MRP argued that the schools would lose their class
character if the state again granted subsidies to indigent but deserving
students. Marcel Cachin56 referred to the additional privileges which
the free schools had secured under the Vichy regime and which the
Catholic Church sought to maintain and retorted: »We don’t want to
close your schools, but we have also no intention of paying for them.«57
Thus, the MRP’s attempt to include privileges for these schools in the
Bill of Rights has provisionally been defeated. The price paid for this
victory of the traditional doctrine, which had once carried the Radical
Socialist party to predominance, was rather high, as the outcome of the
54 A. C., March, 1946, pp. 775-780, and March 15, 1946, pp. 808-829.
55 Ibid., p. 824.
56 Ibid., p. 819.
57 Ibid., p. 819.
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referendum of May 5th has proven. It caused the Catholic clergy to

campaign actively against the draft constitution.
The third issue concerned the definition of property rights. It involves
some extensive ideological fights in which historical parallels taken
somewhat out of their contexts caused the Rightist parties to take the
part of the Girondists58 and the Left to play the Montagnards of 1793.59
The discussion, strange to say, scarcely involved the one major constitu-
tional innovation which for generations to come will leave its imprint
on the social structures of France and which is essentially a property
problem. The debate on property rights must be examined against the
background of nationalization. There was no question as to the fate of
those enterprises which the draft somewhat loosely defines as de facto
monopolies or enterprises having acquired the character of a »national
public service«. Their »return to the nation«60 had become one of the
vital points in the program proposed by the National Resistance Coun-
cil's charter as early as March, 1944 and had been as such adopted by
the three major parties. At the time when the Assembly was discussing
its new Bill of Rights, after the de Gaulle cabinet and its dilatory tactics
were out of the way, nationalization was going on at full speed. The
Bank of France and the Bank of Algiers, the four largest deposit banks,
the coal mines, the public utilities, and the greater part of the insurance
system had been nationalized before the Assembly adjourned. In fact,
for this very purpose, the Assembly even extended its authority six
days beyond the seven month limit.61 During the individual debates
on the principle of nationalization the MRP did not raise any objection
but, in the interest of the share and bond-holders, concentrated its legis-
lative endeavors almost exclusively on the improvement of the various
indemnification features. During the short debate on the principle of
nationalization which should be inserted in the bill of rights, the MRP
could have been the only group able to challenge the propositions
58 Girondistes, also called Federalists, is a name applied to a group of deputies

of the Legislative Assembly, 1791-1792, and especially of the Convention, who
originally came from the Gironde area; later on, noticeably since Lamartine’s
Histoire des Girondins, extended to all deputies forming the Right Wing of the
Convention and desiring the reduction of Paris’s political power to a size pro-
portionate to its numerical strength.
59 Montagnards, the Left Wing of the Convention; the name was taken from the
seating arrangements in the Convention.
60 »Return to the nation of the principal means of production, of monopolies
which are the fruit of common labor, of the sources of energy and mineral
wealth, of the insurance companies and banks.«.
61 The National Assembly terminated its activities on April 27, 1946.
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seriously. However, it made only a weak attempt to bring its pluralis-

tic philosophy into play, proposing a somewhat vague formula which
would have left undecided the kind of collective entities to which the
monopolies removed from private ownership should be transferred.
It was the definition and guarantee of property rights, rather than the
fate and disposal of the big corporate structures which became a point
of dispute among the various factions. The Communist, and still more
positively the Socialist, constitutional projects62 had restricted the guar-
anteed right of property to the normal fruits of personal labor and the
household goods and tools belonging to a person, family or commu-
nity. It was this restricted area of property which was to be granted
the traditional protection in cases of expropriation for the benefit of an
enterprise useful to the public.
This somewhat novel interpretation of Locke’s labor theory of property
was immediately seized upon by the enemies of the Left as the basis for
a whispering campaign, especially in rural districts, accusing the Social-
ists and Communists of having the sinister intention of abolishing the
institution of property and, at the same time, the right of inheritance.
Thereupon the Left retreated and had the constitutional committee
adopt a formula which was nothing more than a verbatim copy of
Robespierre’s definition inserted in the Montagne draft bill of rights in
April, 1793.63
However, this formula behind which the Left fortified itself in 1946 was
not free from ambiguity. It was dashed off by Robespierre at a time
when he was making a great effort to prove the insufficiency of the
Gironde draft with its repetition of the property formula of 1789. While
stressing the character of property as a social, not a metaphysical, insti-
tution, he at the same time derided those who wanted to abolish it.64
Generally speaking, he tried to play down the problem of ownership
as an institution and to concentrate his attacks on objectionable meth-
ods of getting rich, like hoarding and speculation. Robespierre's whole
move was of a tactical nature and did not involve any frontal attack on
the institution of property. This may be seen from his later acquiescence
62 Article 39 of the Socialist project and Article 42 of the Communist project.

63 A. C., March 22, 1946, pp. 956-58.
64 Robespierre, Oeuvres (Paris, 1840), Vol. III, p. 351 (speech of April 24, 1793): »We
do not need a revolution to show the world that extreme inequality of fortune
is a source of many evils and crimes. But at the same time we are none the less
firmly convinced that social equality is utopian.«.
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in the insertion of the old traditional 1789 formula in the constitution

adopted by the victorious Montagne on June 24, 1793.
The MRP, again the only possible serious challenger, was not so sure
about the motives of Robespierre’s successors in 1946. The Left was
following in general his tactics of assailing the abuses of the monop-
olists rather than discussing property as an institution. Some Leftist
orators were less cryptic in spelling out their unconventional ideas
and spoke even of having »constitutional legality on the side of the
revolution«.65 Therefore the MRP proposed to the Left to add some
concepts from the spiritual heritage of Leo XIII to the Robespierrean
text. It suggested the addition of the postulate that everybody should
be able to acquire property by work and by economy. The Left saw no
objections to adding some piece of Rerum Novarum to its text, if such a
move would induce the MRP to vote for the property provisions. This
would also help to dispel the rumor that the Left wanted to destroy the
very institution of property. But, in addition, the MRP bluntly asked for
an official interpretation of the famous Robespierrean phrase defining
property as the inalienable right to use, enjoy, and dispose of the goods
guaranteed everybody by the law. The question was posed whether the
guarantee by the law meant a guarantee of one’s worldly possessions
acquired »in conformity with existing law«, as the Rightists tried in
vain to have it formulated, or whether it meant the opposite – the
right of the legislator to change without notice the classes of property
enjoying a guarantee. The reporter of the commission, Zaksas, was
stronger in the rhetorical elaboration of principles than in the invention
of ingenious legal formulas for hiding underlying dissentions and con-
sequently almost muffed his job of giving enough satisfaction to the
MRP so that it would vote the text, yet at the same time making it
apparent that the clause did not contain a hard and fast guarantee of
the status quo. In the end, the MRP voted for the Robespierrean text
enriched by its piece of Rerum Novarum and only sixty-one of the Right
stuck with the simon-pure doctrine of 1789. The fight between the
adherents of unconditional property protection like that of 1789 and the
somewhat ambiguous Robespierrean formula was ended provisionally
by a compromise. But only the concrete development of French social
institutions in the years to come will spell out the final version.
With the exception of these three doctrines, the substance of the Bill
of Rights did not give rise to much dissension. In fact, the Communist
reticence might have furnished an additional reason to insert into the
65 Discussion of March 21, 1946, A. C., pp. 961-964.
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new constitution the present form of the Bill for all those who want to
believe that a reconciliation of the personal freedoms and liberties of
1789 with the promised land of a better society is possible. In a sense,
the very political existence of the Socialist Party and the MRP would be
in jeopardy if they should fail to convince their voters that a synthesis
of the old and the new rights is practicable. Only experience will tell
whether this belief, the very raison d’être of these democratic, non-revo-
lutionary mass parties, is hypocritical as some profess to believe.66
The thirty-nine articles of the Bill of Rights formed the first part of the
draft as in the Constitutions of 1793, 1795, and 1848.67 In guaranteeing
these rights to all French men and women, the preamble of the draft
took care to remind the French people of this act of historical continu-
ity.
The Bill fell into two separate parts, that dealing with the individual
liberties and that setting forth social and economic rights. The provi-
sions on individual liberties were modelled closely, if not always after
the wording, at least most decidedly after the connotations of the tradi-
tional bill of rights. There were, however, some important innovations,
such as the complete equality guaranteed to women (Article 2) and the
special safeguards to protect the liberty of colonial populations (Article
12). Sometimes a new bent was given to an old doctrine; thus, Article
10 juxtaposes the old doctrine according to which punishment must be
adapted to the seriousness of the crime with the more recent doctrine of
re-education as the purpose of punishment.
The social and economic rights occasionally also contained old vintage;
the justification of taxes (Article 37) is one instance. Yet even where
remnants of the old terminology still survive, the connotations of the
phrases have been completely changed by the different contexts in
which they are set. The essence of the second part of the Bill of Rights
was new, at least so far as France was concerned. It opened with the
affirmation of society’s duty to further the full development of human
personality. This implies a number of closely correlated guarantees
relating to hygiene and medical standards, family and child welfare,
educational opportunities, the right to work and to leisure, wage stan-
dards, and social security in the broadest sense of the word (Articles
66 A. Aron, op. cit., p. 124.

67 The place given to the Bill in the constitutional framework approximates most
closely that of the Constitution of 1848, which also fully integrated the Bill with
the constitution, whereas in the two other cases it forms merely a preamble to
the constitution.
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22-29). This program was complemented by the guarantees of freedom

for trade union activities, the right to strike (Articles 30-32), and the
acknowledgment of the workers’ right to participate in some aspects
of management. To this core of the social bill were added the property
guarantees already discussed (Articles 35-36), society’s duty to make
good the losses caused by natural disaster (Article 34), the justification
for taxation, including the principle of proportionality and of exemp-
tions for dependents (Article 37), and sanctions against all discrimina-
tory and exploiting practices (Article 38).
Opinions on the implications of the second part of the bill have varied.
Rightist opinion has emphasized its »plannist« character, asserting that
it pushes society towards collectivism.68 The President of the Socialist
parliamentary group opined that the bill did not side directly with the
one or the other social system but merely opened the door for future
Socialist legislation.69
May one, therefore, assume that this Bill of Rights was only an
improved edition of the Bill of Rights of the Weimar constitution,
which represented nothing and admitted everything? The declaration
contained no definite bias toward a specific set of institutions. The
emphasis of its eighteen articles was unmistakably on the prime impor-
tance of human welfare. On the different facets of this it had a number
of more or less well-coordinated ideas. This consideration overrode all
other concerns. The Bill’s hints of the road to be taken to reach this
goal were rather vague. It recognized in a negative fashion that a hard
and fast guarantee of property would hinder the attainment of this
aim. Yet, rather than devise new institutions, it was content to make
sure that the remnants of the old would not stand in the way. In a
positive sense, it seemed to imply that the furtherance of trade union
activities and the strict prohibition of discrimination and exploitation
were necessary steps. Yet it left the elaboration of social devices to the
future legislator. At the same time, it explicitly enjoined him to take
all necessary positive action to attain the goal, thus closing the way
for a return to a system of economic liberalism. It would, therefore,
be wrong to characterize the Bill as a blanket legitimation of any and
all policies. It was rather a one-way ticket to a known destination – a
democratic society free of want – with the means of transportation yet
to be furnished.
68 Bruyneel, A. C., March 7, 1946, p. 608.

69 Depreux, A. C., April 10 and 19, 1946, pp. 1676, 2050.
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In an attempt to define the legal significance of this document, the

following categories might be distinguished. The Bill contained, first,
a small number of declarations which might be legally enforceable
immediately without intervention of another rule-making body. They
were found most often in the part dealing with the traditional liberties,
and they concerned the traditional judicial guarantees – the right of
petition and of public meetings (Articles 9, 10, 15, 16). Into this category
fell also the right to belong to trade unions affirmed in Article 30 of
the Bill of Social Rights. This Article made constitutional the state of
affairs existing since 1884 and did away with the last vestiges of the Loi
Chapelier of 1791.
There were, secondly, a greater number of Articles which neither
expressly or implicitly limited the application of the principle they
enunciated by providing for further specific legal regulation. Explicit
restrictions were contained in the provisions, among others, on search
and violation of the secrecy of correspondence (Article 16), admission
of foreigners to professions and private employment (Article 18), the
right to strike (Article 32), and the protection of property rights (Arti-
cles 35 and 36). Implicit restrictions were contained in those provisions
which made the exercise of a constitutional freedom dependent on the
non-violation of another right equally guaranteed by the constitution,
thus foreseeing further regulation to draw the respective boundary
lines. The freedom of the press and the freedom of association (Articles
14 and 17), which were made contingent on the protection of the very
aims laid down in the Bill of Rights, also belong in this category.
However, a great number of the principles enunciated in the Bill of
Rights were neither applicable nor enforceable without implementa-
tion. They were simply guideposts for future legislators. Into this cat-
egory fell the famous right of asylum (Article 6), which was taken
over from the Constitution of June, 1792 and which was guaranteed
to anybody persecuted in violation of the rights laid down in the very
Bill. Taken literally, this provision would have made France the most
over-crowded country on the earth, and it would, incidentally, have
foiled the energetic attempts of the French authorities to inaugurate a
scientific and well thought-out policy of immigration. Above all, the
first Articles of the social and economic rights (Articles 22-29) should
be named here. In this class also belong the important Article 31, which
gave the workers the right to participate through their delegates in a
collective settlement of working conditions and in the conduct of fac-
tory affairs. To a large extent this Article only made constitutional the
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new legislation which had been initiated by the Popular Front in 1936
and continued by the decree of February 22, 1945. However, the Article
was more interesting for what is omitted than for what it included. The
original text as proposed by the commission spoke of participation in
the conduct of factory affairs as well as in the functions of management.
A last-minute change omitted the mention of management.70 Was this
due to a concession by the left wing parties, or to some feeling that
economic democracy carried out through participation of the workers
and their organizations in management might not always produce the
efficiency demanded in nationalized industry?
The fathers of the draft bill several times put to themselves the question
of the exact legal character of the document. Desiring to combat the
traditional skepticism which saw in the Bill of Rights only a pronounce-
ment of high-sounding moral principles, they stressed the fact that
their draft, if accepted, should have the character of a »veritable legal
document«.71 They even excused part of its cumbersomeness by plead-
ing the necessity of defining points rather than of merely proclaiming
vague generalizations. Guy Mollet, the president of the constitutional
committee, held that the bill was incorporated into the constitution
so that the different Articles could be interpreted by the lawyers and
legislators.72 This intention of the commission naturally did not hinder
members of the same majority groups from denying its legally binding
character if a minority should take advantage of its principles to suit
their own purposes.73
Whatever these various interpretations, the question of enforcement
remained a weak spot, even though the constitution took care at least
to specify that the Bill would not be totally inoperative even in a legally
proclaimed state of emergency. Freedom of movement, the right of
public assembly, the secrecy of correspondence, freedom of speech and
publication might be suspended in such a case for repeated periods of
six months – but not the judicial guarantees against arrest (Article 19).
This vagueness concerning possible enforcement was skillfully used by
the Center and the Right to advocate a body invested with authority
to determine constitutionality. The MRP presented an amendment ask-
ing for the setting up of a constitutional committee elected by every
incoming Assembly from outside its own ranks and presided over by
70 A. C., April 19, 1946, p. 2046.

71 Cf. L. Zaksas, loc. cit.
72 A. C., March 8, 1946, p. 646.
73 Cf. the discussion on the electoral law, A. C., April 1, 1946, pp. 1328-1329.
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the President of the Republic. On the initiative either of the President

or of one-third of the Assembly, this committee could be directed to
rule on the constitutionality of any bill. The signing of the bill would
be postponed by the President of the Republic for this purpose.74 Given
the all-embracing character of the Bill of Rights, this amendment was
probably the most explosive one possible and the last one to which
the Left would ever have been able to agree. Through a back door this
amendment would have reintroduced the theory of the separation of
powers which the Bill of Rights had purposely omitted. In reality its
acceptance would have amounted to transferring ultimate legislative
decisions to the President acting together with a kind of constitutional
Senate. This was an institution which twice in the constitutional history
of the last 150 years – under the Napoleonic Constitution of Decem-
ber 13, 1799 (Articles 15-24) and under his nephew’s Constitution of
January 14, 1852 (Articles 19-32) – had proved to be the pacemaker
and companion of dictatorial aspirations rather than the defender of
constitutional liberties. If the Left was unwilling to submit its political
and social program to any other control than the one exercised by
the voters, it was, again following the precepts of 1793, agreeable to
giving explicit recognition of the people’s right to decide whether their
representatives had stuck to their contract: the right of resistance was
revived (Article 22). The draft constitution did not take cognizance of
Condorcet’s attempt to constitutionalize this right in the Gironde draft
of 1793, but kept simply to the Montagne formula of June 1793. To
be sure, Article 35 of the Montagne constitution, patting the Paris insur-
gents of 1792 on the back and justifying their patriotic revolt against
the treacherous king, has to be read again in the light of its Article 27,
which provided that »whoever usurps the sovereignty of the people
shall be instantly put to death by free men«. The framers of the 1946
draft, living in a more polite society, did not care for the latter phrase.
Did they have greater doubts whether their interpretation of the rights
and liberties was the only legitimate and just one, or was it only that
they trusted the ingrained political wisdom of their people to know
by themselves that there is no rebellion against constituted authorities,
whatever its moral and legal justifications, which does not incur a
heavy risk?75
74 For the amendment, see A. C., April 18, 1946, p. 2005.

75 See the debate on this amendment, A. C., April 18, 1946, pp. 2014-19, and espe-
cially the arguments against the adoption of the amendment drawn by Pierre
Cot from the history of the Supreme Court of the United States.
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Chapter VI The Empire and the Draft Constitution
The draft constitution completely revamps the relations of metropolitan

France to its overseas territories. It starts out with the intention of
opening a new chapter in French colonial history, an attempt which is
the more important because almost all its major provisions have been
written with the assent of all French political groups.
At the outset two theses – the federal and the unitarian – were dis-
cussed in regard to the future relationship of metropolitan France to
its overseas territories.76 The first would have amounted to turning
France into a federation of completely free and equal commonwealths;
the second would have crowned the existing assimilative tendencies of
French administration by giving each inhabitant of the overseas territo-
ries exactly the same status as the inhabitants of metropolitan France.
Both solutions had to face the same difficulty – the existence in the
empire of a great number of totally different civilizations with varying
levels of technological development. This consideration excluded the
granting of an identical political and administrative system to all the
French overseas territories.77 At the same time the divergence between
the cultural and technological development between mother country
and overseas territories would have confuted the implication in the
term federation of its very meaning of a substantial equality existing
among all members of the union. The draft constitution, therefore, tried
to work out a compromise, although there was a decided inclination
to emphasize the strongly assimilatory, and thus to some degree unitar-
ian, tendencies.78
In taking such a course the Assembly drew the logical conclusion from
war-time experiences which demonstrated the enhanced strategic and
economic importance of overseas possessions for the future of France.
76 See the report of L. Sedar Senghor, Senegal native deputy and member of the
Constitutional Committee, in A. C., April 11, 1946, pp. 1713-1715.
77 The term overseas France refers to all French territories outside the ninety
metropolitan departments. It includes (a) the three Algerian departments; (b)
the four new departments formed from the pre-French Revolution colonies:
Guadeloupe, Martinique, Reunion, and Guyana; (c) the protectorates of
Morocco and Tunisia; (d) St. Pierre and Miquelon, French West Africa, French
Equatorial Africa, French Somaliland, Madagascar, French India and French
Oceania; (e) Indo-China; (f) the mandates of Togo and Cameroons. (a) and
(b) are responsible administratively to the Ministry of Interior, (b) only as of
January 1, 1947, (c) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, (d), (e) and (f) to the
Ministry of Overseas Territories.
78 Viard, A. C., April 11, 1946, p. 1717.
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At the same time the Assembly carried out the promises and recom-
mendations which had been made by the February, 1944, Brazzaville
Conference of French colonial administrators and political leaders.79
After March 1944 a number of decrees had enlarged the rights of the
overseas populations. The most significant of these was the election
ordinance of August 22, 1945.80 All of them led up to the draft constitu-
tion, which confirms and amplifies the new policy.
The draft constitution is wholly consistent on one point: its endeavor
to make sure that all the inhabitants of French territories, whatever else
their status, should enjoy all the rights and privileges of the new Bill
of Rights. Whatever improvements this Bill promises the French popu-
lation were, therefore, applicable equally to the metropolitan and to
the overseas population. Some of these rights are of special importance
to the majority of the overseas population. In decreeing that penalties
are personal, Article 10 thus formally abolishes the custom of assessing
collective fines against native villages. The rule providing for identity
of criminal jurisdiction within the limits of the same territory (Article
12) drew the logical conclusion from the Brazzaville recommendation
that penal legislation cannot be based upon native customs and tradi-
tions.81 Therefore it prohibited the existence of different criminal codes
for Europeans and natives. Forced labor, hitherto still in existence in
many localities, was explicitly forbidden in Article 38. Other articles,
like those concerning the prohibition of discrimination in employment,
the equality of material and moral situations, and the assurance of fair
remunerations according to quality and quantity of work (Article 18,
26, 28); were too indefinitely phrased to allow for direct application and
would probably not have helped the natives to realize their desire to
get pay equal to that of the Europeans for equal work. These rights
were expressly acknowledged as pertaining to all inhabitants without
regard to whether some of them are by law entitled to a personal
status Article 45). The draft constitution thus avoided the former costly
mistakes in the treatment of the Arabian population in Algiers, which
made the attainment of French citizenship dependent on the surrender
of their personal status.
Though the applicability of the Bill of Rights to all inhabitants of
the French overseas territories was expressly guaranteed by the draft
79 Text of the Brazzaville Declaration has been reprinted in Free France, special
issue No. 2.
81 Brazzaville declaration, p. 11.
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constitution, the citizenship status of the overseas population, on the

other hand, remained somewhat equivocal. Article 44 purposely left the
open question whether they should be French citizens or citizens of
the French Union. This created the legal basis for establishing special
electoral and administrative requirements unlike those of Metropolitan
France.82
Whatever the difference in electoral organization, all members of the
Union were, however, to be represented both in the French Parliament
and in the Council of the French Union. On the other hand, the gov-
ernment was to be represented in the various overseas territories by a
resident Undersecretary appointed by the Council of Ministers. These
residents were responsible to the Assembly rather than to the higher
echelons in the Overseas Ministry.83
The representatives of the overseas territories in the Assembly, in 1936
numbering twenty deputies, were increased to fifty‐nine for the first,
and also the second, Constituent Assembly.84 The number had been
increased to eighty-nine under the electoral laws of April 13th and
26th,85 which, however, remained in abeyance due to the rejection of
the draft constitution.
This increase in the number of deputies was no more important than
the provision for the future compiling of joint lists of French citizens
and native non-citizens everywhere except in Algiers. However, the
number of natives who were to be allowed to vote amounted to only
a fraction of the inhabitants, as the law established thirteen different
categories under which the right to vote can be claimed. All these cat-
egories were established with a view to the possible assimilative effects
of certain activities.
The extension of native influence, effected by the increase in the num-
ber of overseas deputies, and the establishment of unified electoral
colleges were at that time the only controversial points in the overseas
constitutional program. The Rightists, and to a lesser extent the Cen-
ter, have observed that in the first Constituent Assembly the native
82 See A. C, April 11, 1946, p. 1714.

83 None of the new electoral and administrative devices could be introduced into
Tunisia and Morocco as both are formally not French territories. Attempts to
have a small number of deputies elected by the Frenchmen and Moslem Algeri-
ans living in these protectorates had to be abandoned because of the protest of
the native authorities. A. C., April 11, 1946, pp. 1722-23.
85 Journal Officiel, 1946, pp. 3130, 3538.
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deputies joined the ranks of the Leftist parties almost exclusively, since
from these they could expect more sympathy towards their political
and economic aspirations.86 If the representation of overseas natives
is increased still further, it might easily upset in favor of the Left the
delicate balance of metropolitan French political forces. Therefore, the
time-honored slogan regarding the correlation between taxation and
representation was invoked anew in order to bring out the injustice
of having overseas deputies vote on specifically metropolitan issues.87
However, on account of the positive propaganda effect which the new
election law had already had in the overseas territories, it seemed
rather questionable to what extent the Assembly would be able to
decrease the generous colonial representation voted by its predecessor.
The composition of the Council of the French Union called for 270
members, 180 to be elected by the General Councils of the departments
(including 12 from Algiers and a small number from the West Indies)
and 90 elected by the colonial Assemblies.
From the point of view of the overseas territories, the development of
colonial self-administration through the local assemblies might have
been even more important than the right to participate in the sessions
of the Palais Bourbon and to have a powerful voice in the Council of
the French Union. These assemblies, some of which have already begun
to function, were to administer matters of local interest. They were to
have been composed of representatives elected by universal suffrage
by Europeans and natives through one and the same electoral system.
They were to have the power to vote the budget and apportion expen-
ditures. Of course, the effectiveness of this new departure would have
depended entirely on the relationship between the local assemblies and
the resident Undersecretary to whom the draft constitution gave the
right to supervise the application of laws and to co-ordinate and con-
trol the functioning of administrative services. In discussing the new
regime, the Socialist Minister of Overseas Territories, Marius Moutet,
86 The pattern of the October 1945 election together with the respective attitudes
toward the new electoral law have also dominated the oversea participation in
the May 2nd referendum. Colonies with a majority of eligible Negro citizens
have overwhelmingly voted in the affirmative; colonies with a majority of
French citizens have returned heavy »no« majorities, mainly as an expression of
their protest against the proposed single electoral college and the establishment
of colonial assemblies resting on equal suffrage of white and colored.
87 See the speech of the former de Gaullist Minister of Colonies and later Minister
of Finance, Pleven, in A. C. of April 11, 1946, p. 1720, and Le Monde (Jacques
Guerif) of April 26, 1946, p. 5, »Le Problème Constitutionel et le Pouvoir Cen-
tral«.
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has spoken of »well-directed and well-advised assemblies«, thus indi-

cating the continued hold which the French administration expects to
exercise on the deliberations of the assemblies.88 Only the future can
tell whether the colonial elite, educated and trained to a great extent in
Paris, would be able to fill any such new institutions with real life, or
whether they would simply become tools in the hands of the French
administration.
Generally speaking, it is difficult to assess the effect the new constitu-
tional provisions would have had on future French colonial policies.
There is not much doubt that the reforms would have been well
received by the majority of the political spokesmen of the Negro pop-
ulation in French Equatorial Africa. The extension, and acceleration
of the policy of assimilation together with the generous increase in
political power would surely have attracted great numbers of the edu-
cated Negroes and tied them strongly to the French institutional set-up.
The same may be said of the West Indies, which welcomed the fact
that they were to hold the full status of a French département. But
the effect of the new set-up on the strongly nationalist movement in
Madagascar and, still more important, on Algerian nationalism would
have been at best problematic. In Algiers a not inconsiderable number
of the Arab minority, which had been given the right to vote, boycotted
the October, 1945, elections and those of June, 1946. Moreover, in the
latter elections the native vote in Algiers, which in October, 1945, had
gone to native representatives collaborating with the French left wing
parties, went overwhelmingly (eleven out of thirteen seats) to the more
nationalist Amis du Manifeste, who had come out with lists of their own
at the last moment. The policy of assimilation and close participation in
French affairs might have evoked their interest ten years ago when the
Violette reform program, with its provision for granting citizenship to
all Moslems, foundered because of the opposition of French colons and
officials. Now, faced with a substantially weaker France and in contact
with Pan-Arab forces in the Near East and especially after the ferocious
repression of the May, 1945, riots, the Moslem population found the
attractiveness of the new offer small. Moreover, the French colons
form a second strong nucleus of resistance against the constitutional
program. Though a unified electoral college for Algiers had not been
established, their influence and representation would have decreased,
with the result that they would eventually have been outvoted by the
majority of Algerian deputies both in Paris and in the local assemblies
88 A. C., March 25, 1946, p. 1037.
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that are replacing the old financial delegations over which they have a
predominant influence. The only Algier elements which took a positive
stand towards the new set-up were the Left Wing French working class
groups and the minor officials in the Algerian towns. To a lesser degree
it was also approved by the moderate Moslem elements, especially the
office holders, who would have tried to work through the new assem-
blies for the Arab cause and a program of social and economic reform.
Whether the full support of the first group and the conditional and
temporary approval of the second would have been enough to allow
the new regime to be successful is an open question.
Chapter VII The Referendum and the Elections of June 2, 1946
The election campaigns of the various French parties varied in the

direction and intensity with which they were presented. That of the
Left supported the draft constitution but was rather restrained. It
admitted the shortcomings of the document, but declared that they
were less important than the necessity of terminating the constitutional
hiatus, which had been in existence for almost two years. On the other
hand, almost from the beginning, the Center and the Right directed
their attacks against the Communist Party, rather than against the draft
constitution. According to them, that document was only a kind of con-
venient stepping stone to the establishment of a CP dictatorship. The
propaganda of the Center and Right was implemented by the equivocal
and lukewarm attitude of the Socialist leaders, who had refused the
CP invitation to join in supporting the draft constitution. It was further
aided by the fact that the overwhelming majority of Catholic clergymen
had more or less openly come out against the draft constitution, and
urged the population to make use of their right to vote in an effort to
repulse the dangers threatening Catholic education and traditions.
The result of the referendum of June 2, 1946, constitutes the first case
of a constitution refused popular ratification. More important, however,
is the fact that it demonstrates how evenly opinion was divided. In
all French territory, 10,584,000 votes were cast for its rejection and
9,454,000 for its acceptance. In other words, 52.9 percent of the voters
opposed its acceptance and 47.1 percent wanted its acceptance.
As compared with the elections of October, 1945, these results indi-
cate a slight loss of voting strength in the Left. Two factors explain
this. Between 300,000 and 400,000 voters who, in October, 1945, had
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voted either the straight Socialist ticket or the combined Socialist-UDSR

ticket, had followed the lead of the UDSR deputies and voted against
the draft constitution. The efforts of the Catholic clergy in mobilizing
the politically lethargic voters had led to an increase in registration
among groups almost exclusively opposed to the draft.
The defections from the Left were especially numerous in the great
urban areas like Paris, in the industrial North and in Marseilles and in
Bordeaux. The chief areas in which the Left continued its gains were
in a number of western and eastern départements, in which it had been
traditionally weak and in which the clerical support of the enemies
of the draft constitution might have secured the voting support of the
traditionally anti-clerical middle class voters.
Because the negative result of the referendum was generally regarded
as a Communist rather than a Socialist defeat, the Socialists thus con-
ducted their campaign for the elections for the Second Constituent
Assembly primarily against the Communists. They sought by this
means to win back the Socialist voters who had deserted the party
in the referendum. Consequently, their campaign was highlighted by
Interior Minister Le Troquer’s violent attack on Maurice Thorez, whose
flight to Moscow in 1939 he denounced as desertion. Because of the
results of their overconfidence in the referendum campaign and their
premature clamor for the lion’s share in political power, the Commu-
nists reversed their tactics. Interpreting the defeat of the draft constitu-
tion as a reactionary victory, they then advanced the argument that all
democratic forces must rally against the impending reactionary attack.
Generally speaking, although kept alive in the campaign for the Sec-
ond Constituent Assembly, the constitutional issue played a distinctly
secondary role. The personal records of the candidates in the period
1938-1945 became one of the major issues of the campaign. This was
true particularly because a number of former political leaders, such
as former Prime Ministers Edouard Daladier and Paul Reynaud and
former Minister of Agriculture Georges Monnet, were trying to stage a
political comeback.
The election results do not seem to indicate that these personal issues
were overshadowed by the American loan, whose successful conclu-
sion was reported shortly before election day. In fact, the loan seems
to have played little part in the determination of the voters’ preference.
The Socialist Party, whose leaders had been most closely connected
with the negotiations, received a distinct rebuff from the voters.
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In other respects, the proportion of 53 : 47 between the Center-Right

and Left strength, which had been demonstrated in the referendum,
remained virtually unchanged. In fact, the Socialists may be considered
the losers in the elections. Their tactics in shifting to a pronounced
anti-Communist position did not win back the voters who had deserted
them in the referendum. While the Socialist loss of about 300,000 votes
was spread fairly evenly over the country, the Socialist ticket did not
attract a proportional share of the 680,000 voters who had registered
since October, 1945. These facts are all the more important, because
the Communist Party, which had been driven into a defensive position
by being the center of a general attack, emerged unscathed from the
polls. It maintained its relative strength by winning 140,000 new voters.
Following the referendum pattern, its light losses in the predominantly
urban areas were more than balanced by advances in the agricultural-
industrial areas of some eastern departments and especially in the west.
The greatest victory of the election went, however, to the MRP, which
gained a million votes. More than any other group, the MRP attracted
new voters. Except for Paris, where a great many middle class voters
seemed to have returned to their traditionally Rightist habits, the MRP
seems to have been able to make heavy inroads in some traditionally
Rightist areas, such as the Vendée, Maine and Loire. It seems also
to have drawn some of its strength from Socialist losses. The MRP
owed its success, among other things, to its stand on the constitutional
question. This position convinced the middle class voters who had been
suspicious of the MRP collaboration with the Leftists, that the MRP was
both politically reliable and skillful tactically. The MRP also profited
by the benevolent attitude of the Catholic clergy, which favored the
MRP over dissident Rightist groups. The attitude of the Catholic clergy
reflected the desire of many voters to support the one resolutely anti-
Communist party which had the greatest chance of success. This desire
bore fruit in the shift of Rightist voters to the MRP and in the direct
withdrawal of a number of Rightist lists in various departments.
Neither the Rassemblement des Gauches Republicaines nor the Rightists
has proved able to challenge seriously the position of the MRP. Both
seem at best stationary groupings of secondary importance. Their
local successes are mostly purely personal in nature. Such was the
case of Edouard Herriot in the Rhone, the former Gaullist Minister of
Finance Mendès-France in the Eure, Paul Reynaud in the Nord and
Moro‐Giafferi, the well-known criminal lawyer, in Paris. Except for
the greater number of »elder statesmen« in its ranks and its traditional
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stand on »free schools«, which might however now be easily sacrificed,

the Rassemblement with its heavy contingent of former Radical Socialists
has become essentially a Right of Center group. As it has often joined
forces with the Right, it may be doubtful whether it will be able to
retain the 100,000 to 200,000 votes which it won from the Socialists in
the last elections.
Both the Right and the Rassemblement know that their strength lies
in the personalities of their individual candidates rather than in their
outworn doctrines and decrepit organization. They have therefore con-
sistently tried to interpret the rejection of the draft constitution as con-
stituting a rejection of a system of proportional elections in general and
of the election law voted by the first Constituent Assembly in particu-
lar. Their renewed attempts to discard proportional elections for simple
pluralities in single constituencies is not likely to succeed. Not one of
the three big groups which among them now represent 76% of the total
vote – least of all the MRP – is apt to sponsor any return to a single
member constituency, because the present system has allowed them to
pick up a slightly higher number of seats than their proportion of the
popular vote would indicate. Nor would the Left be inclined to support
the return to single constituencies, because, although it had only 47% of
the popular vote, this system gave it 50% of the metropolitan seats.
There were now 261 Leftist deputies and 261 Center and Rightist
deputies, representing metropolitan French election districts. Although
the Left had lost its majority, the Right and Center combined did not
form a majority. In cases where the Assembly – as its predecessor did
a number of times and noticeably over constitutional issues – would
split into a Right-Center and Left combination of exactly equal strength,
the balance of power would be in the hands of the overseas deputies.
Through the addition of 27 overseas deputies for the Center and Right
and only 22 for the Left, the Right-Center combination would have a
slight edge over the Left. However, this small majority was cancelled
out by the existence of 13 additional native nationalist representatives
– 11 from Algiers and 2 from Madagascar. These native nationalists
actually held the balance between the Right-Center and the Left. While
they would cast their votes with an eye to pure strategic considerations,
their day-to-day tactics would most likely cause them to vote with the
Left. This would give the Left a precarious and uncertain majority in
doubtful cases. These native nationalists, who were hostile or at best
completely indifferent to French interests, became the virtual arbiters
of French politics. The threat of such action could force the conclusion
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of new inter-party agreements. As almost every political group had

stated that it desired to present a new constitution to the electorate
for approval at the latest in the fall of 1946, such an agreement would
of necessity include some compromise on constitutional issues. Such
compromises would have to be acceptable both to the CP as an integral
part of the majority and also to the MRP, the victors in the referendum
campaign.
Such new inter-party agreements would indicate a continuation of a
trend characteristic of recent French governmental affairs. The days
in which ministries were held by individual politicians who, once
installed in office with their personal friends and protégés, became
in effect spokesmen and parliamentary representatives of the various
services, are gone. Ministries are now regarded as political fortresses
to be held and built up by political parties for the purpose of support-
ing and even mobilizing group loyalties. Thus, one group may use
the Labor and Armament Ministry, another the Interior and Overseas
Offices, and the third the disposal of Army and justice matters as bases
for their campaigns. The question of governmental participation has
become less a question of programs and more a fight for redistribution
and maintenance of administrative power. The separation of legislative
and executive power, so prominent in constitutional debates, is now
in the process of yielding to the division of various administrative
agencies among the major parties. In this case the control of a certain
portion of parliamentary seats would only serve to bolster the claim for
administrative domination in various functional fields. Slight changes
in the number of seats might not be tantamount to changes in spheres
of administrative influence. Certainly the continued application of pro-
portional representation will minimize changes in the political strength
of the various parties. Administrative changes might be difficult to exe-
cute as the various organizations – the labor unions supported by CP,
the administrative cadres supported by the Socialists, and the officer
corps which consider the MRP friendly to their interests – might easily
get out of hand when their friends and associates in the ministries were
forced to step aside for new and less sympathetic masters. This would
dislocate the balance of forces which now prevails in French politics.
Viewed against the background of existing French politics, the drafting
of a new constitution thus involved less the acceptance of principles
and theories which one or the other faction had espoused than the
establishment of a very pragmatic set of rules which would facilitate,
and to some extent put a premium on, bargains by the major parties.
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Part II. The Final Phase
Chapter I The New Constitutional Compromise
Scarcely four months after it had been elected, the Second Constituent
Assembly succeeded in producing a new draft constitution. All par-
ties realized that anything might happen in future elections, if the
Constituent Assembly were not able to draft a constitutional frame-
work which was acceptable to all parties. In view of the dire conse-
quences which might ensue from another »negative« de Gaulle victory,
the Communists more than any other group were eager to finish the
constitutional business once and for all. They therefore did not even
take the pains to present a constitutional draft of their own. On the
other hand, at the end of June, the Socialists produced a draft. It was,
on the whole, merely the old draft constitution, revised primarily to
include the changes proposed by Auriol for compromise purposes in
April, 1946, and rejected by both the Communists and MRP.89 The MRP,
whose position had been considerably strengthened by its victory in
both the referendum and the June elections, presented a maximum
program, which went much further than the compromises which they
had been willing to accept in April.90 The Rightist Deputy Bardoux
again presented his own draft, which elaborated on his earlier version
by including a number of new devices designed to reduce the powers
of the Assembly to zero.91
In committee, the pattern of discussion followed that already observed
in the winter debate in the First Assembly’s Constitutional Committee.
The Socialists again held the presidency with André Philip, and the
MRP the position of general reporter with Coste-Floret. They seemed to
have had little difficulty in reaching agreement on most of the essential
points. The troubles began only when the draft was reported out of
committee on August 2nd. Then, the vote reporting it out – 22 votes in
favor of the draft and 20 abstentions, which last included the Commu-
nists – demonstrated that the real fight was only beginning.
The normal difficulties of reaching compromises acceptable to all three
major parties were increased by several factors. The incessant interven-
tion of de Gaulle and his adherents with declarations of principle and
89 The Socialist draft has been printed as Annexe au procès de la séance du 26 juin
1946, II, 23.
90 Annexe, 4 juillet 1946, II, 68.
91 Annexe, 26 juin 1946, II, 35.
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detailed criticisms by de Gaulle himself made at each critical juncture

accounts for the erratic MRP attitude. As much as any other party, the
MRP needed a speedy compromise but it wanted to let no opportunity
escape for increasing its price for compromise and, above all, it wanted
to stay in the General's good graces. At the same time, the Socialists
were embittered by the General’s increasing pressure and so resumed
voting with the Communists rather than with the MRP. Conditions
were not improved by the fact that, whenever it was impossible to
work out a compromise solution, the balance of power lay with a small
group of Algerian Nationalists, which by voting with the Left was able
to cause the defeat of MRP and right-wing propositions. On the other
hand, the Left could not afford to seek the support of this group too
often, because it could not take the risk of again reporting out a Consti-
tution which would provoke the enmity of a united de Gaulle-Right
Wing-MRP front. Thus, when de Gaulle’s last intervention of Septem-
ber 19th raised anew the specter of de Gaulle-led opposition to a draft
considered too Leftist, between the first and second readings, the Com-
munists accepted a number of last-minute MRP demands. This enabled
the MRP to claim that it had won concessions sufficiently important to
warrant acceptance of the new draft. Consequently the new draft was
accepted on September 29th by 440 votes which represented tripartite
strength. The 106 votes against it came from the Radical Socialists, the
UDSR and Right Wing. There were 40 formal abstentions, of which the
Algerian Nationalist group was the most significant.
The Constitution as it emerged from a series of new interparty compro-
mises did not differ radically from its predecessor, which had been
rejected at the polls. It also concentrated the essential powers in the
hands of the popularly elected Assembly.
The price which the MRP had exacted for its agreement was naturally
more considerable than the one for which it had been willing to settle
in the preceding April. The MRP was able to increase this price slightly
between the first and second reading because of General de Gaulle’s
tactics and his sweeping condemnation of the constitutional endeavors
of the Second Constituent Assembly. Even so, from the MRP point of
view, the best that can be said of the Constitution is that it contained a
number of entering wedges through which the power of the Assembly
might be whittled down by a resolute President who cooperated with a
powerful faction in a sharply divided Assembly. The MRP is well aware
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of this fact and die doctrine of the presence of magistratures morales,92

which was developed by Coste-Floret, the MRP general reporter, serves
only to underline the fact that in essence the legal basis for the regime
has not undergone any far-reaching changes. The Council which is
looked upon as an integral part but not an equal partner in Parlia-
ment, the somewhat less ceremonial President, the somewhat more
professionalized Supreme Judicial Council and Constitutional Control
Committee – these »magistratures morales« constitute many hurdles to
be jumped. They have not, however, been so thoroughly integrated as
to be a serious obstacle to a well organized Assembly majority.
The new text abandoned the interesting attempt of the draft to insert a
full‐fledged Bill of Rights as an integral part of the Constitution. Again,
like many of its predecessors, it relegated the Bill of Rights to the status
of a simple preamble. This diminution in constitutional stature was the
outcome of one of the compromises which were intended to grant the
MRP a prestige victory without the Left abandoning in substance any
important political position.93 Because the MRP had made it one of its
most cherished propaganda features, the Left accepted inclusion of a
Bill of Rights but saw to it that the form was such as to rob it of any
far-reaching political significance.
Coupled with the reduction of the Bill of Rights to the status of a
preamble, the limitation of the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Com-
mittee to Titles I to X, excluding the preamble, served the purpose of
the Left, depriving the Constitutional Committee of any opportunity to
legislate substantively in accordance with the principles of the Bill of
Rights. Thus, interest in the Preamble with its vague general principles
and standards for future legislation is considerably diminished.
The thirty-nine articles of the draft were crystalized into fifteen state-
ments of principle. The total equality of women and the promise of
asylum for political refugees remain the only individual rights men-
tioned. In regard to the remainder of the traditional individual rights,
the preamble refers in a general way to the 1789 Bill of Rights. It thus
avoids reopening the controversial issue of general property. It reiter-
ates its stand that every enterprise which has the characteristics of a
national public service or of a monopoly should become property of the
community in its somewhat more extensive enumeration of principles
92 A. C., September 28, 1946, pp. 4232-3. »… constitution des magistratures mora-
les directement inspirées des institutions parlementaires …«.
93 A. C., August 23, 1946, p. 3303.
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of future social action.94 The Left has remained adamant in its refusal
to write into the preamble the famous freedom of instruction principle,
which has been so ardently desired by the Right and MRP. Ironically
enough, the Right and MRP lost the vote on this issue, when the Alge-
rian Nationalists voted against it.
A small consolation prize was, however, won by the MRP in the
see-saw battle of amendments, when it was decide that the preamble
should refer not only to the 1789 Bill of Rights but also »to the funda-
mental principles recognized by the law of the Republic«. This formula
in all its vagueness will afford the Catholics a basis for referring to sev-
eral previous enactments, when they renew their struggle for recogni-
tion of their schools.95 While most of the numerous social promises and
the guarantees for workers’ rights are again spelled out, the paragraphs
referring to the suppression of colonial abuses give way to general def-
initions of the French Union and the relations of Metropolitan France
with overseas territories. Finally, the rights of resistance which were
the concluding article in the draft Bill of Rights are missing from the
preamble.
The MRP won its fight to make the Council of the Republic an integral
part of Parliament with all the immunities and privileges attaching to
such a position. However, in the final analysis, this is less important
than the maintenance of the Assembly's dominance in both the legis-
lative and political fields. It is specifically stated that the Government’s
responsibility runs only to the Assembly. Amendments designed to
reduce the Assembly’s powers over the budget were either voted down
explicitly or passed only in anemic form. The Assembly retained the
full initiative in matters of the budget, with only some self-restrain-
ing provisos as to the introduction during the debate on the budget
of amendments seeking to introduce new items of expenditure. The
Council, as under the April draft constitution, shares in the legislative
process after a fashion. It is permitted to send bills of a non-budgetary
nature to the Assembly, but it cannot force the Assembly to vote on
them. Bills which are passed by the Assembly go to the Council, which
may reject them and return them to the Assembly. In case of such
rejection, the Assembly, if it elects to accept the Council’s modifications,
may do so by an absolute majority of votes. However, the Council
is severely restricted in its capacity to use this power of rejection to
obstruct legislation, by the time controls which have been imposed
94 Corte-Floret, August 20, 1946, p. 3184.

95 See supra., p. 37.
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on it. In case of budgetary matters, the Council cannot spend more

time in its deliberations than the Assembly and, in all other cases, the
Assembly is authorized to prescribe an urgency which reduces the time
for Council deliberation. If the Council fails to act within such time
limits, the bill is to be promulgated.
In the long run, the slender connection with the legislative process may
be less significant in determining the Council’s importance than the fact
that the Council shares with the Assembly the right to amend and to
revise the Constitution, and to elect the President. If the Council should
ever happen to have a composition which differs radically in social
and political views with the majority of the Assembly, it might, acting
in conjunction with a vigorous Assembly minority, use this power as
a stepping stone in the re-establishment of independent executive pow-
ers.
In view of this, the constitutional battle was concentrated on the for-
mula for the composition of the Council. The Left, especially the Com-
munists, wanted to make the Council an exact replica of the Assembly
and the MRP, a representative of local government units. The compro-
mise solution provided for election on local and departmental levels
by »indirect universal suffrage«. This leaves the final decision to the
future legislative majorities, who will have an opportunity at every ses-
sion to translate this standard into practical terms. However, attempts
by future legislators to increase or to decrease the Council’s weight
in presidential elections have been frustrated by the Constitutional pro-
vision fixing the maximum and minimum membership (320 and 250
respectively) in the Council.
After having blasted with such difficulties a trail leading to the for-
mation of an enlarged electoral body for the presidency, the outcome
of the MRP attempts to raise the status of the President is not too
impressive. Under the new Constitution the President is to be elected
by Parliament for a seven-year term. The precise mode of voting has
been left open, because the MRP in the final moments of debate insisted
on the omission of the requirements on public vote.
De Gaulle’s version of the President as the final arbiter who as indepen-
dent representative of the nation holds executive power over and, if
need be, against the parties has not been incorporated into the text.
A certain amount of plastic surgery has been done here and there.
The concept of President-postman and the President‐filing clerk have
been abandoned in favor of a somewhat energized version of the First
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Magistrate as it dominated the political life of the Third Republic. As

he did under the Organic Acts of 1875, the President nominates the
President of the Council who in turn forms a Cabinet after he has
received a vote of confidence in the Assembly. Again as under the
constitutional theories of the Third Republic, he is equipped with a
suspensive veto as to bills approved by the Assembly. This veto can,
however, be overridden by a simple majority vote when the Assembly
reconsiders the measure. The list of officials who are appointed by the
President in the Council of Ministers has been enlarged, in comparison
with the provision of the first draft, by the inclusion of the préfets and
the directors of the central administrative agencies. This gives the Presi-
dent a somewhat enlarged influence in domestic politics. He also has a
negative control over key appointments, because he can refuse to sign
commissions for new nominees. In theory the new version diminishes
rather than enlarges his rights, because the Third Republic reserved to
him all civil and military nominations. The very principle of a selective
check established by the new text may, however, make it easier for the
President to establish some measure of real control over appointments.
The constitutional compromise has given the President the right to
appoint two additional legal members to the Supreme Judicial Council.
As a result the lawyers appointed to this body and the magistrates
chosen by their peers have now equality in numbers with the members
chosen by the Assembly. A second and perhaps less significant change
is that the Constitution has abandoned the deliberate shyness of the
draft and made it a constitutional rule that judges cannot be removed
except for cause. Otherwise the authority of this body over the judiciary
at large remained untouched.
In another crucial field – the right to dissolve the Assembly – the pre-
rogatives of the President were not expanded. As before, the initiative
for such action rests with the Cabinet, not with the President, who
merely signs the decree for dissolution enacted in the Council of Minis-
ters. The scope of the application of the right of dissolution has been
somewhat enlarged, as the two crises which give rise to the right to dis-
solve may now take place within eighteen months of each other rather
than within a year and the absolute ban on dissolution is applied to the
first eighteen months rather than the first two years of the Assembly’s
term of office. This seems as little a fundamental change as the MRP
victory in the matter of the caretaker Cabinet, because the new version
of the Constitution replaces only the President of the Council and the
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Minister of the Interior rather than the whole Cabinet by the President
of the Assembly and another parliamentary appointee.
The device of self-dissolution, the entering wedge for extra-parliamen-
tary pressure, is missing in the new document, a fact which in all
probability will reinforce the position of a coherent Assembly majority.
The party positions in regard to the question of constitutional amend-
ments96 have fluctuated considerably recently in accordance with the
parties’ changing fortunes at the polls and the corresponding changes
in their confidence in their own future. When the second Constitution
was drafted, the Right and Center were still mainly concerned with the
danger that a left-wing victory might, with the help of easy amendment
procedures, make a clean sweep of all the institutional devices which
could assure a survival of middle class influence in French politics.
The amendment procedures in the Constitution reflect therefore the
partial success of the Right and Center to hold and to extend the consti-
tutional guarantees against sweeping and easy changes. They are not
characteristic of their more recent battle cry for immediate and drastic
constitutional revision, which is rather the product of the narrow popu-
lar victory of the new Constitution, which, in turn, foreshadowed rising
political strength of the middle class groups.
It is in this connection that the Council of the Republic and, to some
minor extent, the Constitutional Committee gain importance. The text
retains the stipulation for two readings of an Assembly resolution, both
adopted by absolute majorities as the definition of the prerequisite
for the introduction of a bill aiming at constitutional changes. Yet in
contrast to the elaboration of ordinary bills, in which the Council of the
Republic may at best exercise a delaying influence, any bill providing
for constitutional changes requires the consent of a majority of the
Council before it can be presented to the electorate for approval. As
a kind of face-saving device for the Communists who are averse to
popular participation in the process of amendment, a clause has been
inserted in the new Constitution to the effect that such a referendum
need not take place if the amendments were either adopted by a two-
thirds majority of the Assembly or a three‐fifths majority of both the
Assembly and the Council of the Republic.97 However, an additional
96 The document makes no distinction between amendment of individual provi-

sions and revision of the whole; but see footnote 9 [S. 365].
97 André Philip has suggested that these latter procedures may be reserved
for minor modifications, reserving the referendum for major changes. A. C.,
September 28, 1946, p. 4217.
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guarantee has been introduced in this case to protect the Council of the
Republic, whose existence can be put in jeopardy only with popular, or
the Council’s own, consent.
Compared with the role assigned to the Council of the Republic in the
amending process, that of the Constitutional Committee, which was the
residue of the attempts by the Right and MRP to introduce a constitu-
tional court, is of distinctly minor importance. Originally the Constitu-
tional Committee was thought of as an institution which would pro-
hibit the adoption of bills involving constitutional issues in the form of
simple laws. The scope of its jurisdiction has now been severely limited
in two respects. As already mentioned, the whole field of substantive
legislation touched upon in the Preamble has been explicitly excluded
from its jurisdiction. Its authority is thus confined to governmental and
legislative organization as defined in the Constitution and, perhaps
more important, to the examination of whether the numerous organiza-
tional laws and organic statutes which will be issues by virtue of spe-
cial Constitutional authority – organization of the Council of the
Republic (Art. 6), election laws (Art. 5), and especially almost all organi-
zational laws relating to the French Union – are in conformity with the
text of the Constitution. Secondly, it seems that this Committee98 will
assume jurisdiction only when a conflict arises between the Assembly
and the Council of the Republic on constitutional interpretation. The
right to convoke the Constitutional Committee is given to the President
of the Council of the Republic as agent and representative of the major-
ity in the Council and even to him only on condition that the President
of the Republic join him in the request. If the Committee fails to com-
pose the differences, its duties are not ended but, within five days, or in
urgent cases within two days, it must render an opinion showing
whether the bill in question is compatible with the Constitution, thus
deciding implicitly whether or not it requires the full approval of the
Council of the Republic. If its decision is in the negative, and if the
Assembly insists upon the text, the bill would have to be adopted in
accordance with the rules laid down for the revision of the Constitu-
tion. As matters now stand, the Constitutional Committee, a political
body which is authorized to decide on a restricted number of constitu-
tional differences arising between the two houses of Parliament, is a far
98 Composed of the President of the Republic, the President of the Council of

the Republic, seven members elected by the Assembly from outside its ranks
according to proportional principles, and three members elected by the Council
of the Republic according to the same principles.
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cry from an independent judicial body99 designed as a check against

parliamentary supremacy.100
Chapter II The Battle of the French Union
Immediately after the rejection of the draft Constitution, official assur-

ances were given that the French Union provisions which had been
adopted without opposition in the Assembly and which had not been
disavowed by the electorate would not be made an issue during the
campaign for the redrafting of the Constitution. However, when it
came to the actual process, the French Union clauses gave rise to
more difficulties than any other part of the new document. The gen-
erous French Union principles laid down in the draft had meanwhile
produced a deep malaise among French colonists. They saw French
sovereignty, and thereby their own interests, endangered by the liberal
concessions made to native elements. They therefore brought great
pressure to bear on their Rightist, Radical Socialist and MRP deputies
who had been elected by the still extant separate citizens’ electoral
colleges. Their metropolitan MRP and Right Wing colleagues lent a
more receptive ear to their colonial colleagues’ grievances as they saw
themselves outvoted at almost every turn by the help of the decisive
vote of the Algerian nationalists. This group, Amis du Manifeste, which
was under the leadership of Ferhat Abbas, became the virtual arbiters
in all constitutional issues, as has been pointed out.101 The state of
mind of many Right and Center French deputies is characterized by the
statement made by one of their colleagues, after a defeat caused by the
intervention of the group of independent native deputies: »Ce sont les
Malagaches qui font la loi.«102
The Algerian nationalists, on their part, acting as a solid group in the
Assembly and assisted by the Communist Party, were able to wage a
vigorous fight to obtain a self-governing state within the French Union.
All native deputies gathered together under their leadership. Starting
from the premise accepted in the draft Constitution, that the French
Union was a freely consented to union (Art. 41), the native deputies and
99 See the criticism and amendments proposed by Jacques Bardoux, A. C.,

September 17, 1946, p. 3764.
100 As there is no full‐fledged Bill of Rights, the new document did not need to
touch the problem of the suspension of a number of individual rights.
101 A. C., September 18, 1946, p. 3806.
102 Legendre, A. C., September 11, 1946, p. 3657.
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the Left drafted a set of implementing provisions, pushed them

through the Assembly’s Constitutional Committee and caused their
presentation to the Assembly. They called for a gradually evolving fed-
eral structure, which would eventually culminate in a Constituent
Assembly for the French Union, in which Metropolitan France would
he reduced to equal status with the other territories. The constitutional
status of the individual territories was to be worked out by negotiation
between the local Assemblies and the Parliament in Paris. Each over-
seas territory was to have full freedom to fix its relations with France
either as a free state linked to France by international treaty or as a
completely autonomous unit within the French Union, fully integrated
with France. In the latter instance French citizenship was to be granted.
The draft also lent itself to the interpretation that any territory could, if
it wished, remain entirely outside the French Union – in other words,
dissolve its relations with France entirely.
This plan was totally unacceptable to the Right and the MRP, not only
because of the pressure exerted by colonial interests but also because
of the belief that its adoption would be tantamount to the speedy
disintegration of the French Empire. Bidault threatened his left wing
colleagues with a ministerial crisis, if the French Union clauses were
not entirely rewritten.
For these reasons, an alternative plan was drafted by an inter-ministe-
rial committee. This plan assured continuing French sovereignty. It pro-
vided for special representation for the colonial minorities in all elected
bodies and developed a complicated structure of three federal organs,
which were constructed so as to leave a maximum of real authority
in the Paris administration. As the Left was unwilling to precipitate a
Cabinet crisis on a colonial issue, it gave in and agreed that the French
Union clauses would be sent back to the Constitutional Committee
which would consent to go ahead with the inter-ministerial committee
draft. After a second threat by Bidault to resign, the Committee finally
accepted the slightly modified government draft.
This draft, however, met with the bitter hostility of the native deputies.
They threatened to resign collectively and actually started to remain
away from the Assembly discussion of the French Union clauses.
Finally a last minute compromise was effected through the intervention
of the Minister of Overseas Territories, Marius Moutet. Although by
no means satisfying the native deputies who charged that the promise
unanimously given by the First Assembly to the overseas territories
had been broken, the compromise had the merit that it prevented the
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French Union articles in the Constitution being adopted over the votes
of the native deputies. The Algerian nationalists nevertheless abstained
from taking part in the final vote on the Constitution.103
The provisions which were finally adopted are considerably more
detailed and complex than those written into the April draft of the
Constitution. From a purely formal point of view, they still represent a
mixture of federalist and centralist elements. In substance, the federalist
element is at best a draft on the future; at the worst, simple window-
dressing. No right to secede is recognized. The status of an individual
territory cannot be changed within the framework of the Union without
permission from Paris. Furthermore, the Constitution of the Union as
contained in Title VII of the Constitution is handed the territories by
the metropolitan Constituent Assembly and the basic statutes for the
particular overseas territories will be essentially drawn up by the pat-
tern of the metropolitan laws.
With the metropolitan control thus firmly established, the inter-minis-
terial scheme adopted to date has found it conveniently harmless to
create a considerable number of Union organs. There is a president of
the Union, who is President of the French Republic, and a High Council
of the French Union, in which the French Government and the associ-
ated states participate. This Council has, however, purely consultative
functions. There is also a kind of Parliament for the Union, with mem-
bership divided equally between the metropolitan and overseas areas.
Its competence is only advisory, for the Assembly and the Government,
to both of which it may send resolutions on any overseas matters,
are not bound to accept its decisions and act on them. It would seem
therefore that membership in the Union Assembly, endowed with the
customary parliamentary privileges and immunities, will serve more as
an apprenticeship for native legislators and administrators than experi-
ence in a parliamentary body.
The overseas deputies to the Union Assembly are elected by the local
Assemblies. However, even though endowed by the Constitution with
fairly broad autonomy to carry on their own affairs, these Assemblies
will not have a conspicuous role. This will inevitably be true even if
the central government delegate (the official replacing the more digni-
fied Resident Undersecretary of State) should be animated with the
most liberal ideas on native rights and prerogatives. The new Constitu-
103 In giving reasons for their attitude, Ferhat Abbas called Title VIII the »codifica‐
tion of neo-colonialism«. A. C., September 28, 1946, p. 4230.
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tion specifically reserves to Parliament legislative power over criminal

matters, public liberties, political and administrative organization. The
Paris authorities thus retain full control and will be able to preserve
the status of the French colonists by special voting privileges, both
for the Paris and the local Assemblies. The Moutet compromise has,
however, prevented these special voting privileges from being written
into the Constitution and has thus prevented the natives being reduced
to permanent second class political status.
Each metropolitan Assembly will determine the number of overseas
deputies and the all-important method of their election. This is a crucial
point, in view of the continuing small margin of votes which separates
the Left from the Right. The political fate of metropolitan France will,
in the future as in the past, be decisively influenced by the number and
the method of electing the overseas delegates, and each new Assembly
majority will be able to recast the nature of that influence as it redefines
these two points.
The present election law, written by the Second Constituent Assembly
for the November 1946 elections, set the number of overseas deputies at
75 out of the total 619, almost quadrupling the number for this group in
the Chamber of Deputies of the Third Republic.104 The native demand
for a unified electoral college has been partly satisfied by the Moutet
compromise, although the two colleges have been retained for Equato-
rial Africa, the Cameroons, Madagascar and especially for Algeria. Yet,
except in Algeria, the non-citizens have for the first time elected more
deputies than the citizens.
The ticklish question of representation of French colonists in Tunis
and Morocco is still in abeyance. The Assembly has again adopted a
resolution, which calls for negotiations with the native ruler. According
to the law on the Council of the Republic the Assembly will elect eight
councilors to represent the colonists in associated states and the French
citizens residing abroad.
A further result of the Moutet compromise is the partial clarification of
the citizenship status of the native inhabitants of overseas territories. A
second class type of citizenship has been barred by the Constitution,
even while enlarging on the somewhat less definite assurances of Arti-
cle 44 of the draft Constitution. The Constitution repeats the distinction
between the right of citizenship and the conditions surrounding the
104 Overseas participation in the First Council of the Republic will be still more
substantial: 65 out of 315 seats.
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exercise of those rights, the latter being the subject of special laws. In
effect, citizenship is not treated much differently from the other prob-
lems dealt with in Title VIII of the Constitution. There are a number of
new vistas which may open up for relations between France and the
overseas territories if and when the metropolitan rulers choose. At best,
the Constitution erects a framework, within which future federalist
institutions may perhaps develop. This represents a definite setback to
the political aspirations of the more developed colonial territories.
The Left – and above all the Communists – have shown a pronounced
interest in all devices which advance the cause of colonial self-govern-
ment. The Right has increasingly thrown its weight behind converse
propositions. The relations between France and her overseas territories
will probably be largely determined as a result of the political forces
which preside over the implementation of Title VIII of the Constitution.
Whether, however, the most enlightened practices of self-administra-
tion within the framework of a truly federal system will suffice to
check the growing disaffection in the North African territories is quite
another problem.
Chapter III The Referendum of October 13, 1946, and the Elections of
November 10, 1946
When presented to the electorate in the referendum of October 13, 1946,

the new draft of the Constitution squeezed through by a small majority
of 53.6 per cent. This margin was about the same as that by which the
MRP and the Right had defeated the first draft in the May elections.
The affirmative vote represented only 36.3 per cent of the electorate. It
is significant that a substantial part of the electorate (7,700,000 out of
24,500,000) stayed home.
The shift in MRP voting explains much of the difference in result
between the two referenda and the June elections. It is obvious that
the majority of MRP voters in June did not choose to follow party
recommendations and cast an affirmative ballot. Even if it is assumed
that because of overconfidence, dissatisfaction with the new draft, gen-
eral apathy and similar reasons, the Leftist vote for the new draft was
about a half million smaller than that in the May referendum, the fact
remains that only between half a million and a million MRP voters can
have joined the Left in accepting the draft. The majority of MRP voters
seem rather to have heeded de Gaulle’s instruction to reject the draft
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rather than the recommendations of their party organization. As the

parties which unconditionally rejected the second draft had received
only 4,800,000 votes in the June elections, at least 3,000,000 MRP voters
must have joined them in order to bring the total number of negative
votes up to 7,700,000. The remaining MRP votes probably joined the
ranks of the abstentionists, whose numbers increased 2,800,000 over
that in the May elections.
The overseas returns followed the trends which had become clear in
the first referendum.105 In spite of the more conservative character of
Title VIII in the second draft, the Constitution was rejected in all areas
in which the majority of voters were of French origin. With the excep-
tion of Radical Socialist-dominated Guyana, it was approved wherever
the citizen-voters (only the citizen colleges participated in the vote)
were predominantly native. Even though there were many features
displeasing to them, the natives apparently regarded the second draft
as progress compared with the status quo.
The acceptance of the second draft by such an unimpressive majority
has correspondingly reinforced the position of General de Gaulle. The
General has now made it clear that, should a contest for the actual lead-
ership of the French middle class arise between him and the MRP, his
directives would have a great chance to prevail with the middle class
electorate. He was therefore in a position to come out immediately after
the election with a request for a constitutional revision as a binding
part of the program of every group which wanted his endorsement for
the November Assembly elections.
The MRP accepted, at least in principle, the General’s program for
constitutional reforms and was thereupon readmitted to the ranks of
those who received his blessing for the coming elections. Though this
new investiture served only to sharpen the widening cleavage between
the MRP and the Communists in many respects, political expediency
often drew them together. Before the close of the Second Constituent
Assembly they cooperated to frame an electorate law, which would
retain the advantages which had accrued to the large parties in the last
two elections. The preferential ballot which had allowed the voter to
split his ballot among the several party lists was defeated by a Commu-
nist-MRP combination. The system of proportional representation on
an exclusively departmental basis was retained, much to the disgust of
the smaller parties. As a minor concession to the adherents of a more
105 See pp. 53 ff. [S. 405ff].
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individualistic system of balloting, the October election law allowed the

voter to change the order in which candidates appeared on the one list
to which he was bound.
Whether the voters had really ceased to care about the potentialities of
individual politicians or whether they just did not think it worth their
while to bother with changing the set-up of the one ticket to which they
were committed, only 1.7 per cent of the French voters made use of
the right to change the order of appearance of candidates when they
voted on November 10, 1946. On the other hand, for the first time
since liberation, some of the smaller groups found a more efficient way
to beat the discriminatory features of the election law. They restricted
the areas of interparty competition between the smaller parties. By
putting up candidates only in areas in which they had a good chance,
the Radical Socialists and their affiliated groups were able to win a
substantial increase in the number of seats they held, although their
voting strength shows a decline.
The minor comeback of this traditional group cannot change the main
outcome of the battle of the November elections – the increasing
polarization of French political life into two camps, Communists and
representatives of the middle class (MRP, the Radical Socialists and
the Rightists). The Socialists are rapidly dwindling in political force.
Between October, 1945, and November 1946, they lost over a million
votes. In November election they lost 700,000. As part of these lost
votes went to the Right, the Left consequently incurred a loss, even
while the Communists grew in strength. Within the middle class camp
the MRP kept its position to a great extent, even though it lost a half
million votes, which returned to their former allegiance. By throwing
in its lot with the openly Rightist groups, the MRP contributed to the
shift in the middle class strength from the Left to the Right. In the
Second Constituent Assembly there was an exact equilibrium between
the Right and the Left but in November, 1946, thanks to the continuing
Socialist losses, the Left was slightly weaker than the Right and will
need the support of the increased native overseas representation in
order to re-establish an exact balance of voting strength.106
106 Political fronts in the most important overseas possession, Algiers, show a
considerable stiffening. In the battle for seats in the first electoral college,
the middle class French banded together in one list and were victorious. In
the second college, the already intractable Manifeste delegation under Abbas
refrained from participation and was replaced by the completely intransigent
Massali group. Their number of seats is held down to five only by administra-
tive prohibition in some localities of their local lists. This in turn allows the
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This relative strength of the political parties was not changed by the
election of the delegates to the Council of the Republic which was held
on November 24, 1946.107 Due to the similarity of the bases motivating
the voting procedures, which were used both for the Assembly and the
Council, the Council’s composition is more or less a replica of that of
the Assembly. As, however, the Council includes relatively a greater
number of native overseas delegates, the Left will have a small advan-
tage over the Right.
With the first meeting of the Council of the Republic which was held
on December 26, 1946, according to Article 39, paragraph 2 of the Con-
stitution, the Constitution came into operation, and issue was joined as
to the efficiency of the new Constitution for the necessities of life now
confronting France and the struggle for political power which its very
drafting foreshadowed.
French authorities to have seven cooperative Moslems elected. See Le Monde,

December 20 and 21, 1946.
107 The distribution of seats in the Council was described in Le Monde, December
10, 1946, for metropolitan France and Algiers.
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426
[8.]
The Refugee Problem in Western Germany*
[1949]
I. Introduction
A. Definition and Approach
This paper examines the present effects of the major German popula-
tion shifts during the war and postwar periods. The study is confined
to the three Western Zones1 of Germany. Refugees are herein defined
as those persons who are German by descent or citizenship and who
on September 1, 1939 lived outside the area now constituting occupied
Germany and are now residents of one of the Western Zones. This
definition also includes children who were born to such persons after
September 1, 1939 and who are now residents of Western Germany.
Excluded are all those persons (1) who have shifted their residence
from one zone to another, particularly from the Soviet Zone to Western
Germany, (2) who were evacuated from urban centers to rural areas
within the region now under Allied occupation, or (3) who in 1939
lived outside the area of occupied Germany and are expected to take
up residence in the Western Zones but have not yet done so (e.g.,
prisoners of war not yet released, etc.). Some of the persons defined
as refugees actually never held German citizenship before entering
Western Germany and were German by descent; only these are the
so-called »ethnic Germans«.
The definition of »refugee« as it applies to Germans varies among the
occupation powers. The British, for example, include as refugees those
persons now in Western Germany who came from the Soviet Zone
or from Berlin. It is, therefore, often rather difficult to obtain over-all
statistics, a task which is further complicated by the fact that the last
general census was taken in 1946, while refugees were still entering
Germany in large numbers, and that the results of this census with
respect to refugees have been made public only for the total refugee
count by states or for certain zones and regions only.
* [Als OIR Report No. 4928 am 16. Mai 1949 fertiggestellt. – Zu diesem Text ver-
gleiche in der Einleitung S. 127-129.]
1 Excluding the Saar.
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B. Background
The problem of the German refugees was first dealt with in the Pots-
dam Agreement, which outlined the basis for transfer of the German
population in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary at the end of
the war. This transfer was formalized by the Allied Control Council
(ACC) plan of November 20, 1945, which called for the movement of
3.5 million Germans from Poland, 2.5 million from Czechoslovakia,
500,000 from Hungary, and 150,000 from Austria: at these persons the
US Zone was to receive 2,250,000, the British Zone 150,000, the French
Zone 150,000, and the Soviet Zone 2,750,000. Actually about 3.0 million
persons were received in Western Germany under this plan by January
1, 1947, and about 4.1 million additional Germans outside this plan had
arrived from these areas by the same date. In addition, the number of
refugees was increased by Germans coming from still other countries
and by those who had moved into Germany before the plan went into
effect and who could not return to their former residences. In October
1946 there were about 2.9 million refugees in the US Zone, 3.1 in the
British Zone,.1 in the French Zone, and 3.6 in the Soviet Zone. Recent
tripartite discussions have resulted in a plan by which some 300,000
refugees are to be moved from the British Zone to the French Zone.
By October 1948 the total number of refugees in Western Germany had
risen from the 1946 figure of 6.1 million to 7 million.
In addition to refugees in the above categories, the Western Zones
received by 1948 about 800,000 Germans who had been residents of the
Soviet Zone or of Berlin.
II. The Problem
A. Demographic Aspects
This refugee population in Western Germany in October 1948

amounted to 15 percent of the total population of 46.5 million.2 The
refugees are not distributed evenly throughout Western Germany, the
French Zone and the city states of Hamburg and Bremen having actu-
ally a smaller total population in 1948 than in 1939, while 5,5 million
refugees are concentrated in four states alone, namely Bavaria (1.9 mil-
lion), Lower Saxony (1.7 million), North-Rhine/Westphalia (1.0 million),
2 See Table 1.
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428 [8.] The Refugee Problem in Western Germany [1949]
and Schleswig-Holstein (.9 million). In the French Zone only 1 out of 33

persons is a refugee, while every third person in Schleswig-Holstein
every fourth in Lower Saxony, and every fifth in Bavaria comes from
outside occupied Germany.
This lopsided distribution is further accentuated by the influx of the
refugees into the rural areas because of the destruction of housing
in the cities. Thus, while the refugees constituted 15.0 percent of the
total population of the Bizonal area in October 1946, they averaged
only 6.6 in the cities (Stadtkreise) but 19.5 percent in the rural counties
(Landkreise). Moreover, in seven government districts they constituted
more than one-fourth of the total population of the rural counties.3 This
pattern again varies from county to county: thus in Bavaria, in about
one-third of all rural counties 25 percent or more of the population
were refugees in October 1946.4 A large proportion of the refugee pop-
ulation seems to have settled in villages; for example, in Bavaria 59.2
percent of all refugees in 1946 (as against 42.4 percent of the native
population) lived in communities with a population of less than 2,000.5
From the point of view of age distribution, the younger age groups
are more strongly represented among the refugees than among the
natives.6 In general, the ratio between men and women among refugees
corresponds roughly to that of the remainder of the population,
although the 1946 census showed some slight variations which were
due largely to the then uncompleted removal and settlement of the
refugees.
B. Economic Aspects
The economic situation of the refugee population has been unfavorably

affected by the following factors: (1) loss of the former means of liveli-
hood, (2) resettlement in rural areas far removed from normal concen-
trations of specialized or large-scale employment, and (3) loss of almost
all personal property.
3 Schleswig-Holstein: 35.3 percent; Lüneburg: 30.9 percent; Stade: 29.5 percent;

Braunschweig: 28.4 percent; Hildesheim: 27.5 percent; Hannover: 27.3 percent;
Schwaben: 26.0 percent; Bizone, Statistische Berichte; No. VIII/0/1, February 25,
1948.
4 Bavaria, Statistisches Landesamt, Die Flüchtlinge in Bayern, 1948.
5 Ibid.
6 See Table 2.
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The incidence of unemployment among the refugees has been consis-

tently higher than among the natives. As late as 1948 the former still
furnished about 40 percent of all persons on relief in the British Zone.
Most of those who found work either were laborers or took positions
of lower types than those they had held previously.7 Many had to
change their occupations: thus 16.2 percent of all refugees working in
the US Zone in September 1948 were engaged in work unrelated to
their regular training or experience.
Since refugees occupy more marginal positions in the economy than
natives do, they have suffered more from the general effects of the
currency reform. Thus, in the US Zone between June and September
1948, unemployment rose from 6.4 percent to 12.2 percent among
refugees, while it increased from 3.8 percent to 5.7 percent among the
non-refugee population.
The standard of living achieved by refugees has been inferior to that
of the remainder of the population because of (1) their lower current
incomes and (2) the loss of most of their moveable property and real
estate. Thus, refugees became dependent on housing authorities for
assignment of living quarters and on rationing boards for allocation of
furniture, clothing, etc. According to available statistics, the refugees
live under much more crowded conditions than natives do.8 A large
number of refugees (several hundred thousand) live in refugee camps
under conditions that are still less favorable. Up to June 1948, statistics
for Hesse show that rationing authorities had allotted to every 113th
refugee a wool blanket, to every 102nd a mattress or straw sack, to
every sixth a pair of shoes, to every fourth refugee family a stove, to
every third refugee a piece of furniture, and to every second refugee a
piece of household equipment.9 The currency reform, by reducing the
cash on hand of the total population without affecting its holdings of
other property, hit the refugees more severely than the remainder of
the population, because what remained of the property of refugees was
mostly in the form of cash.
7 See Table 3 and 4.

8 About three refugees per room against two natives per room in Hesse (Frankfur-
ter Rundschau, March 23, 1949).
9 Ibid.
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C. Sociological Aspects
The refugees do not constitute a homogeneous group. They are differ‐

entiated primarily according to their background and origin and can be
classified into the following four main groups:
(1) Former residents of the 1937 German territories east of the Oder-
Neisse line and of Danzig, all of whom were either German or Danzig
citizens and most of whom had been under Prussian rule for many
generations. This group is predominantly Protestant; it has a larger
percentage of rural population than the rest of Germany; and it has
traditionally identified itself with the Prussian state.
(2) The Sudeten Germans, who constituted a German-speaking minor-
ity in Czechoslovakia from 1918 until the Munich Agreement of 1938
transferred their area to Germany. These Germans are ethnologically
closely related to the Bavarians, Saxonians, and Silesians, have among
them a large number of highly specialized craftsmen and are predomi-
nantly Catholic. Although they did not become German citizens until
1938, under Czech rule and even before 1918 they developed a strong
German consciousness.
(3) The »ethnic Germans« (Volksdeutsche), i.e., members of the German
minorities in Eastern and Southeastern Europe (primarily the Baltic
States, Poland, the USSR, and minor groups in Czechoslovakia, Hun-
gary, and Yugoslavia), who had a rather limited political contact with
Germany. Some of them – in Western Poland and Memel – had been
Prussian subjects until 1920, while others had been drawn into the
German orbit during World War II and were admitted to German cit-
izenship or nationality. Some have not been subjects of any German
state since their ancestors left Germany many generations ago.
As a rule, the ethnic Germans are predominantly agricultural, least
indoctrinated among all the refugees10 with German nationalism, prob-
ably have a majority of Protestants, and frequently in matters of lan-
guage, customs, etc., are quite different from native Germans.
(4) The »obnoxious Germans«, who are former German citizens or per-
sons of German origin who have been returned from all over the world
to Germany because they were considered politically undesirable.
10 Germans from the former Prussian territories who acquired Polish citizenship
after World War I did so voluntarily and can therefore be considered less
nationalistic as a group than those who remained German citizens.
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Numerically, Germans from east of the Oder-Neisse line (Group 1) and

Sudeten Germans are the strongest of the four groups. As a result of the
distribution plan adopted by ACC in implementation of the Potsdam
Agreement, the bulk of the former are in the British Zone, while the
latter are mostly in the US Zone.11
As a rule, refugees speak a different dialect, or with a different regional
accent, and have different customs from the native population of West-
ern Germany. This mutual group consciousness has been increased by
the unwillingness of a large percentage of both natives and refugees to
consider the presence of the latter as anything but temporary and to
accept the realities of the situation. This attitude has resulted among
the natives in a mass refusal to accept psychologically any responsi-
bility for the refugee problem and has led to constant discrimination
against refugees by the native population and in particular by Ger-
man officials. Housing officials, specifically, have often discriminated
against refugees and thus aggravated their critical housing situation.12
The land reform did not materially improve their status, as natives
were consistently favored in the allocation of farmland. Only from the
distribution of small gardens did an appreciable number of refugees
benefit.13 Under the traditional German system of licensing enterprises,
refugees received until about a year ago only a fraction of the desired
permits to establish new shops or stores. In North‐Württemberg‐Baden
for every ten native master craftsmen one refugee master craftsmen was
newly licensed between July 1, 1945 and July 30, 1948.14 In Bavaria,
during a similar period while refugees received 23.7 percent, of all
new business permits,15 61.8 percent of all applications were rejected
because there was said to be »no economic necessity« (local need) for
granting them.16 The various government agencies have been very slow
in hiring refugees, and then only as laborers rather than as officials.17
In spite of these handicaps, a certain number of refugees have made
satisfactory adjustments in their new environment, many have inter-
11 See Table 5.
12 OMGUS, Hesse to USPOLAD, Frankfurt, March 11, 1949.
13 Thus, in the US Zone of 38,367 acres distributed to refugees, 18,972 acres were
small gardens given to some 390,000 refugees, while the remainder of the land
went to some 5,000 refugees (DRE/CER Files).
14 Wirtschafts-Zeitung, March 12, 1949.
15 Frankfurter-Rundschau, March 23, 1949.
16 Ibid.
17 See Table 6.
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married with natives, and some have found good positions. But this
process of assimilation is slow.
D. Political Aspects
A number of governmental committees and offices for refugee affairs

have been set up on various levels of the German administration. In
general, on the basis of special German refugee legislation, these agen-
cies have dealt with the most urgent refugee problems, such as direct
relief, but have not attempted a general solution of the problems. It has
become obvious that even the relief problem is too big for the more
hard-pressed Land governments to handle.
Refugees are now fully participating in German political affairs. They
have retained or been given full German citizenship with all its atten‐
dant political rights. This step was at the insistence of Allied Military
Government and in many instances against the wishes of the local
government.
Refugees have formed organizations on a local level which until
recently did not actively participate in politics. Nevertheless, as a group
they have played an important role in postwar German political life.
Various political parties have tried to attract the refugee vote by adopt-
ing a pro-refugee platform or by nominating a large percentage of
refugee candidates. In Schleswig-Holstein, the refugees, by supporting
the Social Democratic Party, have helped establish a labor government
in this formerly agricultural and rather conservative region. Even in
areas where the refugees have had much less apparent success, they
have exercised a profound influence on political life. They have often
generated a highly emotional reaction among the native population,
a reaction that has shifted between two extremes. First of all, it has
often crystallized native sentiment and revived or strengthened old
tribal allegiances among the indigenous population. The neo-Danish
movement in Schleswig and the rise of particularism in Bavaria, for
example, can be traced to the impact of the refugees on the native
populations. On the other hand, it has to a lesser degree reinforced
emotional patterns that are closely related to German nationalism; the
feeling that the refugee problem constitutes Allied responsibility or
guilt, the desire to have these people return to their former homes, the
opportunity to shift the consequences of defeat onto another group – all
these factors have contributed to the rise of neo-nationalism.
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The refugees themselves are for the most part not yet committed to any
particular political philosophy, although their present unsettled state
has produced rather strong attitudes among them. Refugee resentment
is directed first of all against the fact of having been expelled, and the
refugees are still thinking in terms of their »rights« in regard to the
regions from where they came. Thus they have naturally espoused the
basic concepts of revisionism; moreover, they have the emotional com-
plex which is so often at the root of nationalistic sentiment in Germany
– their mixed feelings of self-righteousness and self-pity have centered
on the belief that in expelling the refugees the Allies committed a
great wrong on an innocent population. On the other hand, refugee
sentiment is in general favorable to German centralism and opposes the
various regional movements that have so often placed the refugees in
the position of foreigners and second-class citizens. What is perhaps
most dangerous politically is the economic plight of the refugees,
which makes them vulnerable to the political extremism of both the
Right and the Left, as well as the fact that so many refugees have
been uprooted from their middle class economic foundation and now
constitute a group similar to that which gave the Nazi Party its greatest
support. The situation is full of political dynamite; the refugees not
only nourish resentment against having been moved into Western Ger-
many, but also against the many discriminations they are subjected to
and against the loss of their social status. Moreover, they feel that they
are suffering much more from Germany’s defeat than the remainder of
the population. This latter feeling is particularly strong because so far
no real attempts have been made to equalize the burdens imposed on
the population by the war. Until recently these sentiments have been
bottled up because the refugees have not been allowed to organize
politically. The recent by-elections in Hesse and the refugee camp riot
in Bavaria show, however, only too clearly that the refugees are not
willing to accept their plight meekly but are ripe for political action
even though the course of such action is not yet clear.
III. Possible Solutions
A. General Considerations
The refugee problem in Western Germany is of sufficient magnitude to

warrant a continued active American interest in it. If ignored, it is likely
to cause major disturbances in the social and political structure of West-
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ern Germany and would thus considerably retard Western Germany’s

pacification and integration into the Western orbit.
Any settlement of the refugee problem in Western Germany would
involve as a working principle acceptance of the fact that the refugees
cannot return to their former homes. Individual German communities
and states are not capable of solving the problem alone because the
costs involved are too large for most of the states to bear and because
the ramifications of the problem do not stop on township or state
boundaries; any real solution must be based on an over-all, coordinated
plan for all of Western Germany. However, no plan will be effective
unless it is sufficiently expedited and is free from German bureaucratic
interference; also, it would have to be assured of basic German support,
both native and refugee.
B. Specific Measures
The main objects of any measures taken should be, first of all, eco-
nomic rehabilitation (making capital equipment available for gainful
occupation and supplying housing near such equipment), and, sec-
ondly, psychological rehabilitation (decreasing resentment by insuring
the refugees more equitable treatment and minimizing their isolation).
Shifts of population are not sufficient in themselves but are only a way
of achieving these basic objectives.
1. Redistribution. The refugee population should be distributed much
more evenly than is now it over Western Germany. This would by
no means be a panacea but rather the first step toward a solution of
the problem. Distribution should be guided by economic rather than
by geographic factors. If even the extremes of the present distribution
were corrected – by such means as the recent plan to move 300,000
refugees from the British to the French Zone – a great number of diffi‐
culties could be resolved. Distribution would result in a more equitable
division of housing facilities and of the relief burdens; it would also
speed up and encourage assimilation.
2. Reurbanization. A large percentage of the refugees can be brought
back into a normal economic pattern only by settling in urban areas,
because the number and extent of occupations that can be pursued
profitably in rural areas are limited. Urbanization of the refugees would
mean the development of housing and of industries in unreconstructed
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cities. In many cases industrial development is hampered only because

of the difficulty in finding housing for workers and capital for enter-
prises.
3. Industrialization of Rural Areas. Many refugees, particularly Sudeten
Germans, possess industrial skills which could be used in rural areas.
To exploit such skills, they need not only equipment, tools, and factory
space, but also housing and assistance in resettling in rural areas.
4. Training. A training program for refugees who no longer can be
employed in their former occupation is needed as part of their reha-
bilitation. This program should be integrated with existing training
activities.
5. Land Reform. Except for Schleswig-Holstein and Lower Saxony where
sufficient land is still available, land reform programs, even if energeti-
cally pursued, would not materially aid the rehabilitation of refugees.
6. Equalization of Burdens. A plan for the equalization of burdens (Lasten-
ausgleich) is under consideration in Western Germany as a corollary to
the currency reform. This proposed program would tax all property,
except money, as of the date of the currency reform in order to equalize
the position of those having real estate and goods with that of people
who have lost most of their property. In general, it would benefit the
refugees since it would tax primarily natives and since the money thus
raised would be used for the rehabilitation of those groups, including
the refugees, who sustained heavy losses from the war and who are in
need.
7. Emigration. The refugee problem could be more easily and readily
solved if a certain number of refugees were permitted to emigrate.
Preference should be given first to »ethnic German« farmers and sec-
ondly to Sudeten German farmers. Single women and whole families
should be given preference over single men. As a matter of principle,
an emigration program for refugees could not be put into effect until
the problem of displaced persons has been substantially solved.
8. Financial Aid. Financial aid should be given to refugees for their
economic rehabilitation, including housing. This might be in the form
of German government funds, equalization revenue, or ECA counter-
part funds for the purpose of financing a constructive industrial and
housing program.
9. Administrative Aid. The gross discrimination which has been prac-
ticed by various German authorities against refugees will, if continued,
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interfere seriously with any refugee rehabilitation program. Refugees

should be assured an equitable share of jobs, housing, licensed trades,
etc., as these become available. These goals might be achieved by
the perhaps doubtful expedient of granting preference to refugees for
a limited time,18 by giving them a higher degree of representation
in government offices and on governmental boards, and by passing
emergency legislation protecting them for a limited time against petty
bureaucratic interference. In particular, the whole system of residence
permits should be streamlined. Altogether, a central German agency
with authority to override local native administrative resistance against
the rehabilitation program would be necessary to insure an execution
of the plan.
10. Psychological Rehabilitation. Refugee camps should be dissolved
and refugee families reunited and given a certain amount of privacy,
such as separate kitchens. An adult education program should be
undertaken to speed their assimilation. These and similar measures
would reduce the psychological tensions which now exist among both
refugees and natives.
18 As has been already done in some instances.
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Table 1. DISTRIBUTION OF REFUGEES IN WESTERN GERMANY (Area figures in thousands of square
kilometers; population figures in thousands of persons)
Pop. per sq. km.

Land & Zone Area 1939 Oct. 1939/4 Oct. Percent- Oct. Oct. Percent- 1939 1948
Popula- 1946a 8 1946 age of 1948a 1948 age of
tion Popula- chang Refuge Refugees Popula- Refuge Refugees
tion e in es tion es
per-
cent
Bavaria 72.2 7,037.6 8,789.7 29.9 1,769.4 20.1 9,141.2 1,883.3 20.6 100.2 125.6
Hesse 21.1 3,478.1 3,995.7 21.1 552.5 13.9 4,214.0 638.0 15.1 164.8 199.7
North-Würt- 15.7 3,217.3 3,607.3 18.5 534.8 14.7 3,811.1 673.1 17.7 204.9 252.4
temberg Baden
Bremen .4 562.9 489.4 -6.7 26.6 5.4 525.4 27.8 5.3 1,394.1 1,313.5
US Zone 107. 14,297.0 16,882.1 23,7 2,883.4 17.1 17,691.7 3,222.2 18.2 133.0 164.8
5
Schleswig-Hol- 15.7 1,589.0 2,592.2 70.7 847.4 32.7 2,712.3 910.3 33.6 101.5 172.8
stein
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Hamburg .7 1,711.9 1,420.9 -12.2 64.9 4.6 1,502.9 75.7 5.0 2,292.8 2,147,0
Lower Saxony 47.2 4,539.5 6,300.1 48.6 1,496.2 23.7 6,745.0 1,729.0 25.6 96.1 142.9

North-Rhine/ 34.1 11,945.1 11,748.4 5.6 721.0 6.1 12,608.8 1,008.4 8.0 350.5 369.8
[8.] The Refugee Problem in Western Germany [1949]
Westphalia
British Zone 97.7 19,786.6 22,061.6 19.1 3,129.6 14.2 23,568.8 3,723.4 15.8 202.5 241.2
Rhineland- 19.9 2,962.1 2,753.6 -4.0 35.2 1.3 2,843.8 65,0b 2.3 148.8 142.9
Palatinate
(South) Baden 10.0 1,217.2 1,190.8 2.4 24.3 2.1 1,245.9 44.0b 3.5 121.7 124.6
Württemberg
437
Pop. per sq. km.
438
Land & Zone Area 1939 Oct. 1939/4 Oct. Percent- Oct. Oct. Percent- 1939 1948
Popula- 1946a 8 1946 age of 1948a 1948 age of
tion Popula- chang Refuge Refugees Popula- Refuge Refugees
tion e in es tion es
per-
cent
Württemberg‐ 10.4 1,076.9 1,108.8 7.2 35.8 3.2 1,153.3 48.0b 4.2 103.4 110.9
Hohenzollern
French Zonec 40.2 5,255.2 5,053.2 -2.3 95.3 1.9 5,243.0 157.0b 3.0 130.7 130.4
Western Zonesc 245. 39,337.7 43,996.8 18.2 6,108.3 13.9 46,503.5 6,961.3 15.0 160.3 189.5
4
a.Population as given by German authorities.
b.Round figures.
c.Excluding the Saar.
Sources: TRIB/P (49) 23: Report to the Military Governors by the Tripartite Working Party on Refugees, March 26, 1949. Restricted;
Vereinigtes Wirtschaftsgebiet, Statistisches Amt. Report No. Vlll/0/1, of February 24, 1949; Frankfurter Rundschau, March 2, 1949:
Wirtschafts-Zeitung, March 2, 1949.
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Table 2. A COMPARISON OF THE AGE GROUPS OF REFUGEES AND OF THE TOTAL POPULATION IN
THE US-UK ZONES OF GERMANY, 1946 (In percentage of total group)
Age Groups US- Zone British Zone
Total Refugees Total Refugees
0 -13 23.0 23.6 23.6 26.0
14 – 19 9.2 9.9 9.0 10.3
20 – 49 43.0 45.2 42.7 43.1
50 – 64 15.8 14.0 16.0 14.1
65 - 9.0 7.3 8.7 6.5
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
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439
Table 3. COMPARISON OF THE DISTRIBUTIONOF REFUGEESIN BAVARIA, BY MAJOR ECONOMIC 440
GROUPS, ACCORDING TO THE 1946 CENSUS
Distribution by percent of employed & Percentage of Refugees to all Persons,
unemployed among
Major Class of Eco- Total Population Refugees Employed Unemployed
nomic Activity
Agriculture and 37.0 26.9 10.6 74.2
forestry
Industry 33.9 41.6 16.2 47.4
Commerce 13.3 10.5 8.8 46.0
Public employment, 12.7 16.3 19.1 36.6
professionals, etc.
Domestic services 3.1 4.7 24.5 47.1
100.0 100.0
Source: Bavaria, Statistisches Landesamt, Die Flüchtlinge in Bayern, 1948.
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Table 4. COMPARISON OF THE ECONOMIC POSITIONOF REFUGEESAND OF THE REMAINDER OF THE
POPULATIONIN BAVARIA, 1946
Type of Position Percentage of Refugees Percentage of Remainder of Popula-
tion
Independent 5.3 21.2
Family helpers 1.2 25.2
Independent positions 93.5 53.0
Of these:
a.Officials 1.6 2.6
b.Employees 12.5 12.4
c.Laborers 79.4 38.0
100.0 100.0
Source: Bavaria, Statistisches Landesamt, Die Flüchtlinge in Bayern, 1948.
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Table 5. DISTRIBUTION OF REFUGEES BY COUNTRY OF ORIGIN AND BY ZONE, 1946a (In thousands)
Zone From East of Oder- From Poland From Czechoslova- From Other Coun-
Neisse kia tries

United States 755 112 1,474 542
British 2,482 219 78 351
French 32 7 7 49
a.Figures are not absolute calculated.
441
Table 6. REFUGEES IN HESSE PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT, 1948 (In percent of total public employees) 442
Type of Position State and Local Offices Railway Postal, Telephone, and
Telegraph
Officials 8.2 8.9 3.3
In honorary positions 5.7 8.0 2.0
Employees 14.3 3.3 19.8
Laborers 11.6 10.8 10.2
Source: Frankfurter Rundschau, March 23, 1949
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443
[9.]
Communist Strength in the Trade-Union
Organizations of Western Europe*1
[1950]
Abstract
Communist support in the trade unions of Western Europe is currently

at its lowest level since the end of the war. This decline has been general
in all of the countries discussed here,2 but most pronounced in the
Low-Countries and Scandinavia. In the latter areas the Communists are
not a threat to the firm control exercised over the bulk of organized
labor by the non-Communist trade union leaders. In France and Italy,
however, the largest unions remain in Communist hands. Not only are
the Communists strong in these areas, but their position is favored
by the diversity and disunity of the opposing unions. Nevertheless,
the existence and size of the latter have constituted major obstacles to
Communist domination of the trade-union movement.
Politically the Communist decline has been more pronounced than
in the trade unions. Correlation of Communist trade union support
and electoral strength is not possible in all countries, but generally
speaking, and as would be expected, pro-Communist sentiment is more
pronounced among organized labor than the voting public.
1. France
The extent to which the Communist grip on organized labor in France

has been loosened is indicated by the decline in membership of the
Communist-controlled CGT (Confédération Générale du Travail) from
approximately 5.5 million members in 1946 to fewer than 2,5 million
at present. Nevertheless, the CGT remains by far the strongest labor
* [Als OIR Report No. 5213 am 20. März 1950 für das Department of State fertigge-
stellt. – Zu diesem Text vergleiche in der Einleitung S. 119-121.]
1 A forthcoming OIR report (OIR-5217, Current Strength and Prospects of Western
European Communists) will give an over-all estimate of Communist strength.
2 France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, and Iceland.
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845290027
444 [9.] Communist Strength in Western Europe [1950]
organization, for the total number of workers enrolled in the half-dozen

non-Communist national unions combined is less than 2 million.
Of the non-Communist labor organizations, the Catholic liberal CFTC
(Confédération Française des Travailleurs Chrétiens), with 700,000
members, is the largest single union. The Socialist-inclined CGT-FO
(Force Ouvrière) ranks second in numerical importance, with between
500,000 and 700,000 workers. Autonomous and Trotskyite unions do
not represent more than 20,000 workers, although their strategic impor-
tance has sometimes proved disproportionate to their size. On the
Extreme Right of the French labor movement, the CGSI (Confédération
Générale des Syndicats Indépendents) claims 200,000 members, but a
more accurate figure would probably be nearer 150,000.
There is no available or valid yardstick by which to measure Commu-
nist shrinkage in the popular vote since 1946 in France, since different
electoral systems were used in the three subsequent elections, and in
at least one of them a different electorate was consulted. Nor is the
Communist Party’s parliamentary strength of 181 seats, or 29 percent
of the total, in the National Assembly comparable to the present Com-
munist trade-union strength. The Assembly was elected in November
1946, and the CGT today is only the Communist-dominated remnant
of the principal French labor organization after the Socialist Force
Ouvrière split away from it in December 1947. In brief, the Commu-
nist parliamentary representation is under one-third of the National
Assembly; the Communist-led CGT constitutes more than one-half of
all organized labor.
While it is tempting to see an analogy between the 5.5 million popular
vote for the Communist Party in France in November 1946 and the
membership figure of 5.5 million in the CGT of the same year, even this
analogy is only a coincidence of figures, since the Socialist membership
in the CGT in that year was still a considerable part of its total.
2. Italy
A majority of Italian organized labor remains in the grip of the Com-

munists, who dominate Italy’s largest trade union organization, the
Italian General Confederation of Labor (CGIL). Communist influence
in the labor movement as a whole has been considerably weakened
over the past two years, however. Until 1948, the CGIL, which was
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[9.] Communist Strength in Western Europe [1950] 445
originally formed in 1944 by Communists, Socialists, and Christian

Democrats, constituted the sole nationwide trade-union organization in
Italy, and consequently exercised virtually exclusive control over the
country’s unionized workers. At the first national congress of the CGIL
in 1947, the Communists emerged in a clearly dominant position, a
vantage point which they have been able to maintain since. However,
Communist control over Italian unions is today far from complete. As
the result of withdrawals from the CGIL in 1948 and 1949 of the Chris-
tian Democrats, the Right Wing and Autonomous Socialists, and the
Republicans, several anti-Communist trade-union organizations were
formed and have increasingly challenged the Communist position in
the labor movement. In addition, many other workers have failed to
maintain their CGIL affiliation. Consequently, the claimed membership
of the CGIL has declined from over 6.5 million in 1947 to about 5.2
million today.
The present position of the CGIL, compared to the non-Communist
groups, is indicated by the following table:
Trade-Union Orga- Claimed Membership Estimated

nization
Actual Membership
Italian General Con- 5,211,421 3,500,000
federation of Labor
(CGIL)
Free Italian General 1,340,000 Over 1,000,000
Confederation of
Labor (LCGIL)
Italian Federation of 450,000 150,000-300,000
Labor (FIL)
Italian Union of Labor (being organized) 50,000-100,000 (poten-
(NIL) tial)
Independent unions Not known Several hundred thou-
sand
Communists still control a number of the most important individual

trade unions, especially in heavy industry, including the metallurgical
and engineering fields. The leadership of the strategic Railroad Workers
Union, which comprises about 80 percent of all rail employees, is also
under Communist domination.
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On a geographic basis the Communists and the unions which they

control are strongest in the northern industrial regions of Piedmont,
Lombardy, and Liguria, and in the farming areas of the Po Valley and
Tuscany where the CGIL agricultural workers’ union has recruited a
large share of its more than one million members.
Within the CGIL itself, the Communists hold a majority of the seats on
both the Directorate and the Executive Committee, reflecting their hold
on the rank and file. Communist claims of membership in the CGIL are
obviously exaggerated, however, at the most recent CGIL congress in
October 1949, a membership of over 5 million was claimed, but only
3,6 million dues-paying members were represented by the delegates.
Of these 2.5 million (70 percent) belonged to the Communist »Trade
Union Unity« faction, compared to 800,000 (22 percent) adhering to
the fellow-traveller Left-Wing Socialist element and 300,000 (8 percent)
representing other groups. Actual Communist party membership in the
CGIL is unknown, but it is obvious that not even all members of the
Communist »unity« faction belong to the party, which has an estimated
total strength of less than 2 million.
The current potentialities for strengthening the anti-Communist forces
in the Italian labor movement are highlighted by the negotiations now
in progress for the merger of the Catholic-led LCGIL and the Right-
Wing Socialists and Republican FIL. However, the prospects for full
unification of non-Communist labor are limited both by dissension
within the FIL, arising in part from anti-clerical elements within it, and
by the recent formation of the Italian Union of Labor from FIL and
autonomous elements opposed to union with the LCGIL.
Although the Communists continue to dominate the greater part of
the Italian trade union movement, less than half of the 15 million or
more workers in Italy regarded as potential trade-union members are
organized. Even within the CGIL, moreover, many non-Communist
workers maintain their membership purely for reasons of self-interest.
This is one reason why the Communist and Left-Wing Socialist Parties
combined polled only 31 percent of the votes in Italy’s last national
election (April 1948). Correlation of Communist trade union strength
and Communist political support is not possible, however, because the
use of a joint electoral list by these two parties in 1948 prevents accurate
calculation of the purely Communist vote.
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3. Belgium
Communist strength and influence in the Belgian labor movement is

currently at its lowest level since the liberation. The Communists retain
some numerical strength within the Fédération Générale du Travail
de Belgique (FGTB), which remains firmly in Socialists hands, and
dominate the separate Communist stoneworkers’ and miners’ unions;
however, the Communist Party’s control of its own labor militants gen-
erally is so precarious as to reduce its effectiveness even within the
Communist unions.
Current estimates of union membership in Belgium are:
FGTB Socialist controlled 550,000

Confédération des Catholic 503,000
Syndicats Chrétiens
(CSC)
Confédération Géné- Liberal 40,000
rale des Syndicats
Libérals (CGSL)
Confédération des Communist 10,000-12,000
Syndicats Uniques
(SU’s)
Communist strength within the Liberal and Catholic Unions is

regarded as negligible even by Communist Party loaders. Within the
FGTB Communists and Communist sympathizers are estimated to total
7 percent of the membership. The total for the entire labor movement,
including the FGTB and the Communist dominated SU is 5 percent, or
roughly 50,000. Not all of these can be considered as party members,
however, but rather as the size of the labor group composed of Com-
munists and their sympathizers. Moreover, not all of these are suscepti-
ble to direct Communist manipulation in that the greatest number is
within the Socialist-dominated FGTB.
This estimate of 5 percent for Communist trade-union strength com-
pares favorably with the party’s standing with the electorate, as indi-
cated in the following table of election returns for June 26, 1949, and
would appear to indicate that the party draws considerable support
from outside the trade unions.
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Party Votes Percent of Total

Communists 376,876 7.5
Socialists 1,496,890 29.8
Catholics 2,187,310 43.5
Liberals 766,655 15.2
Others 198,567 4.0
The purely Communist Federation of SU’s was formed in January 1950

following the expulsion of its two constituent unions from the FGTB of
stoneworkers and miners with 8,000 and 3,000-4,000 members respec-
tively. This Confederation, in addition to being isolated from non-Com-
munist labor, is not recognized by the government in the presentation
of candidates for the important elections for joint union-management
work councils. It is also weakened by serious dissension between Com-
munist labor leaders, particularly the chief of the stoneworkers’ union,
and party officials.
Aside from these two unions Communist labor strength is centered
in the Socialist-dominated FGTB. Other than a few seats in the Feder-
ation’s National Committee, the Communists hold no key positions,
however. All Communists have been ousted from the governing
Bureau and the Secretariat, and have no controlling power in any
regional office or national union in the FGTB.
Within certain FGTB affiliates the Communist retain some support. Of
these, the Confédération Générale des Services Publiques (CGSP), has
the highest degree of Communist penetration, with 25 percent of its
members considered to be Communists or fellow-travellers in 1949.
Only one member of the six-man secretariat is a Communist, however,
and Socialist views have dominated. Among the individual unions in
this confederation, Communist strength appears to be greatest in the
Gas and Electricity Workers Union, and to a lesser extent in the postal
workers’ and provincial and communal workers’ unions.
On a regional basis, Communist strength in the FGTB, but outside
the CGSP, is centered in local unions scattered through the »Commu-
nist belt«, which stretches from Mons to Verviers, and in Brussels
and Antwerp. Union locals in these areas subject to Communist influ‐
ence, although not in all instances under Communist domination,
include those for metallurgists, tramwaymen, white collar, book and
paper workers, and dockers. Communist support among the dockers
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is weak on a national basis, totaling only a few hundred out of 13,000

under Socialist direction, but achieves significance for being centered in
Antwerp. Throughout Belgium as a whole, however, Communist infil‐
tration has not been successful on the regional and national trade union
level, where the party remains largely impotent. As a result, within the
FGTB, the Communists are generally capable of only harassing action.
In a few isolated instances, where there has been an identity of interests
of all unions, the Communists have been able to leap into a vanguard
position, as in the Antwerp dockers’ strike of March 1949, and Liege
miners’ strike a year later. They do not however, pose a serious threat to
prevailing Socialist and Catholic control of any major sector of the labor
movement.
Apparently in recognition of their meager success in winning over
organized labor, the Communists, through their Secretary General
Edgar Lalmand, declared in February that future efforts will be
directed primarily to labor outside of the established unions. Principal
emphasis will be placed on agitation in individual factories and locali-
ties, in the hope of attracting the support of dissatisfied members of
existing unions, as well as the unemployed, and the mass or unorga-
nized workers who constitute about 50 percent of the Belgian labor
force.
4. Netherlands
The decline of Communist strength in the labor movement in the

Netherlands since 1948 has been substantial, although less spectacu-
lar than in the political field. As indicated below, membership in the
Communist-dominated Unity Trade Union Central (EVC) has suffered
a general reduction while the non-Communist labor organizations
have continued to expand. These unverified membership figures are
believed to have been padded by the EVC through inclusion of young
non-dues-paying members in 1949.
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Organization Membership
1 Jan*, 1946 1 Jan*, 1948 1 Oct., 1949
Nederlands Ver- 242,600 330,900 377,400
bond van Vak-
verenigingen
(NVV), Socialist
Christelijk 94,000 131,600 153,100
Nationaal Vak-
verbond(CNV),
Protestant
Katholiek 182,800 251,500 289,500
Arbeiders
Beweging
(KAB), Catholic
Eeinheidsvak- 162,300 176,900 162,100
central (EVC),
Communist
Unaffiliated 123.300 162.000 161.700
Unions
805,051 1,052,900 1,142,800
In the major fields of industry indicated below, the strongest centers

of the Communist-dominated EVC in 1947 were in construction, metal-
lurgy, and transport. Although exact figures are lacking, it is known
that the EVC has lost heavily since the end of 1947, which marked the
height of its trade-union support.
Membership
EVC NVV CNV KAB Total

Construction 36,458 40,531 14,070 41,351 133,277
Textiles 10,990 11,484 6,238 17,777 49,876
Metallurgy 28,705 55,648 14,387 33,912 134,201
Food Processing 15,438 22,639 9,742 19,485 67,304
Transport and 21,230 27,879 3,935 9,077 62,789
Seamen
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A comparison of EVC strength in Amsterdam and Rotterdam at its

height in 1947 indicates the following:
Membership
EVC NVV CNV KAB

Amsterdam 86,804 29,674 6,403 9,789
Rotterdam 21,731 36,793 8,603 7,237
Generally throughout the Netherlands, EVC membership has declined

since 1948 not only in the rural areas and in the Catholic southern part
of the country but also in the urban industrial cities of Amsterdam
and Rotterdam. A recent broadcast by the chairman of the Central
Transport Union, an NVV affiliate, gives the membership of the EVC
as »hardly 80,00« in the whole country. Although exact figures on Com-
munist trade union strength are not available, it is known that a major-
ity of the dockers and longshoremen in Rotterdam are members of the
Socialist NVV and the Catholic KAB. It is estimated that the strength
of the Communist-dominated EVC in Rotterdam had declined from
21,731, including 1,500 dockers in 1947, to 9,000 dues-paying members
by March 1948. At the latter date a split in the Rotterdam branch of
EVC resulted in the formation of the independent leftist Onafhandelijk
Verbond van Bedrijfsorganisaties (OVB), which carried with it about
half of the EVC membership (4,000). About 300 of the dissidents went
over to the Socialist NVV. Repeated failure of EVC strikes, and employ-
ment of the organization by the Communists for political purposes,
have led to a further loss of support. In January 1950, the ANBZ, or
Seamen’s Union of the EVC, was tom by the resignation of its leaders in
protest against Communist control at the top, and a new non-Commu-
nist organization was proposed.
Amsterdam remains the center of Communist power, and it is there
and in Rotterdam that the Communists have been staging their
main »peace« rallies and demonstrations.
On the political front the Communist reverses have been somewhat
more spectacular, as indicated in the following table. The forthcoming
provincial elections in 1950 are expected to register a further decline.
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Party Strength:
1947 1950
Estimated Party membership 50,000 33,000
Paid subscribers to CPN daily 400,000 110,000
Electoral Strength:
Municipal Coun- Percent CPNSeats Total

cil elections:
Total Vote Seats
Date
July 26, 1946 16.35% 214 1,828
July 15 and 22, 10.56% 112 1,860
1949
Parliamentary elections for 100 seats in Second Chamber:
Date Total Vote CPN Vote Percent of CPN Seats

Total Vote
May 17, 1946 4,760,711 502,963 10.60 % 10
July 17, 1948 4,933,735 381,953 7.74 % 8
Barring a major economic crisis and a critical state of unemployment,

the Communists are not expected to improve their position among
Dutch workers. Communist attempts at infiltration of the three well-
organized non-Communist labor organizations have not succeeded; the
Communist-sponsored »neutral« action committees designed to appeal
to the workers on questions of wages, prices and rents have failed to
win Socialist and Protestant and Catholic Confessional labor support.
Numerous Communist members have been forced out of the NVV,
while a vigorous Socialist and Confessional information campaign has
warned workers against Communist propaganda. MDAP and NAT are
strongly supported by the non-Communist unions, and these as well
as the leftist OVB have announced their intention to unload MDAP
shipments.
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5. Sweden
Sweden’s trade-union movement remains firmly within the hands of

the Social Democrats, who control the 45 national member unions as
well as all seats on the executive and general council of the National
Confederation of Trade Unions. In December 1948 the latter had a
membership of 1,238,562, which represented nearly 100 percent of
the workers in industry and 60 percent of those in agriculture. It is
estimated that Communists currently control less than 5 percent of
the approximately 9,000 locals in the Confederation. This represents a
marked reduction from postwar high in 1946 when an estimated 11
percent of the locals (including some of the largest and most strategic)
and 25 percent of the adult membership of the Confederation were
Communist supporters. The latter numbered approximately 220,000 or
roughly 60 percent of the total Communist vote cast in the municipal
elections of that year. Communists have practically no influence among
white collar workers organized in the Central Organization of Salaried
Employees or in other independent unions.
The current Communist position in the trade-union movement cannot
be correctly judged merely from the number of locals remaining in
Communist hands. The Social Democrats have recaptured many of the
largest Communist-dominated unions by only narrow margins; strong
Communist minorities remain in the rank and file of several locals,
particularly in those for metal, electrical, engineering, mining, railroad,
sawmill, and municipal and commercial trade workers. Communists
still control most of the shipyard workshop clubs in Göteborg, the large
building workers local in Stockholm, the chairmanship of the Norrbot-
ten district of the railroad union and 11 of its 26 locals, many of the
mining unions in Norrbotten Province, a number of the largest locals of
the textile and sugar refining workers, several locals of the Manual and
Factory Workers’ Union, etc.
The decline in Communist strength and influence in the unions has
been less pronounced than in the political field, however. At the last
parliamentary elections held in September 1948, roughly 12 percent of
the trade unionists voted for the Communist Party compared with only
6.3 percent of the electorate at large. For its 244,812 votes the party
received 8 out of a total of 230 seats in the Second Chamber; in the
150-member First Chamber the Communists have only 3 seats.
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6. Norway
The Norwegian National Federation of Labor, its component national

unions, and the vast majority of the union locals are loyal to the pro-
Western Labor Party. None of the executive councils of the 39 national
unions and none of the district councils are under Communist control.
A study of the political affiliations of the officers of the national unions
as of November 1948 showed that out of a total of 614 officers only 98,
or 16 percent, were Communists, a loss of more than 50 percent since
the close of 1947 and a decline that has continued to the present. At the
national congress of the Federation in May 1949, only 30 delegates of
300 were considered unreliable from the Labor Party point of view, but
not all of these were Communists. The largest vote that the latter could
muster for their proposals was 16.
As of December 1949, roughly 6 to 7 percent of the approximately
4,500 trade union locals in the Federation were estimated to be Com-
munist-controlled. Within certain locals where the Communists retain
significant minority support, however, they also wield considerable
influence. Although figures on Communist membership in the trade
unions are not available, Communist strength is known to be concen-
trated in Oslo, the adjacent Skienfjord industrial district, Bergen, and
Kirkenes. Within industry it is particularly strong in the building
trades, certain sections of the chemical and mining industries, and in
isolated instances in waterfront transport. Communist influence has
been effectively reduced in the paper and forestry, the iron and metal
workers’ and the seamen’s unions. Communists dominate the dockers
locals in Bergen and Trondheim, and also a small dockworkers’ local
in Oslo. They apparently have lost control recently of the Oslo Stone,
Earth and Cement Workers’ Union.
The decline of Communist strength in the Norwegian trade-union
movement has been furthered by a deterioration in Communist politi-
cal strength, but it has not registered the spectacular losses suffered
by the party in the national elections of October 1949, which reduced
the Communist electoral support from 11.9 to 5.8 percent of the total
votes, and its parliamentary representation to zero. The prestige of the
party both with the unions and the public was further weakened by the
severe schism among the leadership at the end of October 1949, shortly
after the party’s electoral defeat.
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7. Denmark
The labor movement of Denmark, like that in Norway and Sweden,

is dominated and controlled by the Social Democrats, with the Com-
munists numbering considerably less than 10 percent of the member-
ship of the unions affiliated with the Danish Confederation of Trade
Unions. The latter has a strength of 623,000 members and includes
approximately 95 percent of all organized labor in Denmark. Commu-
nist influence generally is continually decreasing in the face of a vigor-
ous campaign carried on since 1948 by the Social Democrats to oust
the Communists from their remaining positions of control. Within the
independent unions Communist infiltration has been insignificant.
Communist strength is centered almost exclusively in Copenhagen,
with only isolated instances of Communist influence in some of the
larger workshops of the provincial cities. Out of the 208 locals in the
Copenhagen federation, with a total of 225,284 members in May 1949,
there were Communist chairmen in 33 locals with a combined member-
ship of 53,000. Only 17 locals covering 29,000 workers had Communist
majorities in the leadership, however, or less than 5 percent of the total
number of workers in the entire Confederation.
The significance of the Communist element in Copenhagen lies more
in its areas of concentration in the locals than in the total of its mem-
bers. Those of strategic importance include locals for municipal fire
fighters, dockworkers, and marine firemen, two for the railroad work-
ers, and one for the shipyard workers. Communists also dominate the
Copenhagen branch of the typographers’ union. Communist cells exist
in most industries and trades, and Communist influence generally is
strong in the building, and metal industries, as well as in communica-
tions, transport, and in unskilled labor.
Politically the decline of Communist strength has been even more rapid
and pronounced than in the trade-union movement. Thus the share
of the total vote polled by the Communists in the 1947 parliamentary
elections was 6.7 percent as compared with 12.5 percent in 1945. Par-
liamentary strength as a result was cut by half to a total of 9 out of
149 seats in the Lower House and one out of 76 in the Upper House.
Returns from the municipal election of March 1950 reflected continuing
Communist losses.
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8. Iceland
Communists hold a more entrenched position within the trade unions

of Iceland than in any of the other three Scandinavian countries.
Although the Federation of Icelandic Labor Unions, with 30,000 mem-
bers, has been dominated by the Social Democrats since November
1948, membership is divided roughly among this group, the Conserva-
tives, and the Communists. The latter remain in control of certain of
the Federation’s affiliated unions. Of these the most important is the
Dagsbrun, the union of unskilled laborers in Reykjavik, which is the
largest in the country, with 2,800 full time and 1,200 part time workers.
The significance of Communist control of this union is accentuated by
the fact that within its ranks are the stevedores and other workers on
whom the country depends for the unloading of vital imports. The
dominant position of this union in Reykjavik has given the Commu-
nists control of the Central Committee of the Reykjavik Labor Unions.
In addition, the Communists also dominate Idja, a union of factory
workers in Reykjavik and the third largest union in the country, as
well as a number of smaller unions for unskilled workers. Communists
are generally strong in the fishing industry, particularly in the herring
fishing center of Siglufjordur, but the seamen’s unions are Social Demo-
cratic.
Division of trade-union loyalties mainly among the Social Democrats,
Communists, and Conservatives in the past has facilitated the extension
of Communist influence among the workers. Communists and Conser-
vatives, for example, at different times have combined to check the
power of the Social Democrats. Communist political strength within
the country has likewise, suffered no appreciable diminution during
the postwar period. During the national parliamentary elections both
in 1946 and 1949 Communist percentage (19.5 percent) of the total vote
remained unaltered, although in 1949 the party lost one of its 10 seats
in the parliament. In the municipal elections of January 1950, however,
there were some indications of a Communist decline.
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457
[10.]
The State of East Germany 1949 – 1950*
[1950]
Abstract
East Germany is now being transformed into a Soviet satellite state. In

the social and economic fields the transformation is proceeding accord-
ing to schedule and thus will furnish the necessary prerequisite for any
planned acceleration of the process of political transformation.
This transformation is characterized by the rise of an all-powerful
party-state bureaucracy, the dispossession of the most important pri-
vate owners of the means of production, and the gradual disappear-
ance of an independent middle class. The middle class is being con-
verted into the status of a direct or indirect agent of the official
bureaucracy, which is concentrating economic control in its own hands.
Political life is being increasingly monopolized by the Socialist Unity
Party (SED), the National Front, and the mass organizations. The radius
of activity left to the semi-genuine middle-class parties that are still
tolerated is becoming more and more circumscribed. The centralized
state machine is supported by a powerful police.
Popular support of the government rests primarily on the younger gen-
eration. Workers and older people maintain a critical aloofness toward
the regime. There is little evidence, however, of an organized opposi-
tion.
The more existence at the East German State hinders the definitive
organization of the West German state. It allows the SED, in its
National Front propaganda, to exploit both nationalist feelings and the
desire among wide circles of West German for trade with the East. Even
a reunited, free Germany would be affected by the social transforma-
tion in the East, thus possibly leading to major changes in the social
aspects of an all-German, western-oriented regime.
The propaganda advantage, however, is not exclusively on the Com-
munist side. The presence of the Western Allies in Berlin keeps open
* [Als OIR Report No. 5230 am 24. Mai 1950 für das Department of State fertigge-
stellt. – Zu diesem Text vergleiche in der Einleitung S. 109-113.]
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458 [10.] The State of East Germany 1949 – 1950 [1950]
the means of contact with the West and thus allows the Eastern pop-
ulation to compare its existence with that in Western Germany. The
knowledge that the decision on the future of Germany is to a large
extent beyond German control has encouraged a resigned and passive
attitude; nevertheless, the vast majority of the people in Eastern Ger-
many would gladly accept integration into a free Germany if it could be
accomplished peacefully. Integration into a Soviet-dominated, united
Germany, on the other hand, would be accepted with resignation and
bitterness by all except SED party circles and a handful of rightists.
Introduction:
Major Differences Between Eastern and Western Germany
In the immediate postwar years many of the basic facts of life have
been similar all over Germany, hunger, physical destruction, housing
shortages, and the fact of foreign occupation. However, important
differences became evident as time passed. The differences were not
restricted only to living standards, important as these were at first.
The Western Allies, though imposing various restrictions, refrained
from introducing a whole new set of economic, social and political
institutions. What slowly emerged in Western Germany was a blend of
revived Weimar patterns and survivals of the Nazi period, along with
recommendations and orders from the three occupying powers with
their frequently varying administrative policies. This whole political
and social structure developed into a gradual return to a free economy,
with the retention and to some extent a conscious rebuilding of tradi-
tional patterns of property relationships. There is no general govern-
ment control of production, investment, or prices. Restrictive arrange-
ments, in so far as they exist, are the result of private agreements, not
public action. What stresses and strains have developed have generally
been due to the fact that this system, though speedily restoring Western
Germany’s productive machinery, has continued and deepened existing
and war-produced social inequalities.
The path of East Germany has been altogether different. From the
outset the Soviet occupation authorities made it clear that they would
not maintain a neutral attitude toward all postwar political and social
groups. Relying on their political friends, they immediately began to
revamp all institutions according to Soviet patterns. In as far as devi-
ations from this policy occurred, they were due to the initial preoccu-
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845290027
pation with war booty and reparations and, to a much lesser degree,
to the desire to keep some outward conformity with the fiction of a
uniform ACC administration all over Germany.
I. Structure of East German Society
While Eastern Germany has been under Communist control since May
1945, it is not yet a full‐fledged satellite state. At the end of the war,
uncertainty over the political future of Germany as a whole led to a
certain ambiguity in the policy of the occupation power, which has only
gradually and never completely been corrected during the subsequent
years.
The USSR acted on the principle that the denazification and demilita-
rization of Germany required the destruction of the social and econo-
mic institutions which had given rise to the Nazi system. Consequently,
the first measures of the occupation policy aimed at a fundamental
change in the very class structure of German society, nationalization
of key industries and redistribution of the land eliminated the old
ruling groups as well as their economic basis. However, they were
not immediately replaced by a new political power. While the econo-
mic reforms introduced by the occupation authorities made for a semi-
socialist »People’s Democracy« after the satellite pattern, the political
form of this society was held in abeyance. The chief reasons for this
hesitation were the still fluctuating state of East-West relations, Soviet
interest in a joint Four Power administration of Germany, and hostility
against Soviet occupation policies on the part of the large majority of
the German population. Even today the political form of East Germany
is still provisional: The government is not based on elections which
would give it ostensibly representative character (such elections are
promised for October 1950). However, with the deterioration of East-
West relations, the transformation of Eastern Germany into a satellite
Communist-controlled state has been stepped up, retarded only by
Soviet propaganda for an all-German solution which would take West-
ern Germany out of the Western camp, by lack of a sufficiently strong,
and reliable political elite, important loopholes in the system of controls
(for example, some choice between submission and flight to Western
Germany), official and popular interest in East-West trade, and the
presence of the Western powers in Berlin. But while such factors delay
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the political consolidation of the state into a full »People’s Democracy«,

they hardly affect the social transformation of Eastern Germany.
The first and decisive instrument of this transformation is the all-
powerful new bureaucracy, which has taken over direction of political,
economic and, to an increasing degree, cultural affairs. During the
early stages of the regime the efficacy of the bureaucracy as a whole
inevitably suffered from the confusion of authority between Soviet and
German officials, and the lack of clear-cut delimitation of responsibility
among the various state and party organs. However, most of these
short-comings have now been overcome. With the establishment of the
Provisional Government in Berlin, the relationship between Soviet and
indigenous authorities is taking more and more the form of interested
cooperation.
In personnel terms, the leading state offices are occupied by absolutely
reliable functionaries of the Socialist Unity Party (SED), with only a
minor decorative share reserved for collaborators from the other par-
ties. In contrast, highly qualified technical jobs as well as a certain
percentage of professional jobs, are given to non-Communists from
the managerial and professional classes, whose cooperation is the
more eagerly sought as long as there is no other available technical
knowledge. In a large number of jobs such as judges and administra-
tors, however, the former middle class professionals are rapidly being
replaced by SED graduates from the new, specially established schools.
Concomitant with this rise of a new bureaucracy goes the general pro-
cess of transition from independent economic existence to an employee
relationship or other forms of dependence within official or semiofficial
institutions. It has been effectively aided by the rapid pauperization of
former middle class elements through inflation, expropriation, nation-
alization, and, in the case of the Eastern refugees, loss of their former
means of livelihood. The process also extends to those classes of the
population who retain a seemingly independent economic existence.
Thus the agrarian reform of 1945, by breaking up and distributing the
large estates, has created about 250,000 new peasant proprietors hold-
ing an average of 7.7 hectares of land. However, those new peasants,
who have no equipment and scarcely any housing, were initially com-
pletely dependent on the support of the lower administrative authori-
ties in order to survive. Subsequently, Machine Stations after the USSR
pattern, provided them with the needed equipment but also created
a new form of dependence and political supervision. Production and
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marketing are controlled by the agricultural plan, which determines the

farmers share in the national income.
In the field of industry and commerce, nationalization has increasingly
narrowed down the field of independent enterprise. Private business
activity per se is not prohibited; in the consumers’ goods industry and
in parts of the distribution apparatus it is still predominant. Likewise,
independent artisans and repair shops of all kinds still exist. However,
with sources of raw material and imports and exports under state regu-
lation, and with retail sales of consumers goods increasingly taken over
by the official state (HO) stores, private business retains only auxiliary
functions and becomes in many cases a subcontractor for state-owned
enterprises. Its activities are easily controllable through any number
if technical devices as well as through direct »popular« pressure, exer-
cised via the trade unions, which in the remaining private sector main-
tain their original function of protecting the interests of the workers
against the employers.
Hand in hand with the integration of the population into the economic
machinery of the new state goes the official indoctrination drive in
Eastern Germany. Its main success up to now has been in the cultural
field rather than in the political field proper, where the prevalence of
official slogans may give a somewhat exaggerated idea of the degree
of political uniformity already reached. The apparent similarity of the
methods used with those of National Socialism, plus the physical pres-
ence of the Western powers in Germany, still rob political propaganda
of much of its efficacy. The efforts of the SED in the cultural field, how-
ever, have been much more successful. Negatively speaking, the regime
has had the advantage, that the Catholic Church, one of the strongest
world-wide organizations actively hostile to its cultural policies, is of
only minor importance in predominantly Protestant Eastern Germany.
The Protestant Church, for reasons inherent in its structure and history,
did not object strenuously to being eliminated as a socio-political factor
and being increasingly restricted to strictly religious activities. Only
recently did increasing SED pressure for church support of National
Front policies force the Protestant Church to join the Catholics in defi‐
ance of governmental policies.
The regime which has attracted the support of a number of out-stand-
ing contemporary German writers, has taken infinite pains to identify
itself as closely as possible with Germany’s cultural heritage, it has
effectively popularized culture within the framework of its own inter-
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ests, and to some extent has been successful in diverting the people’s
attention from their miserable standard of living.
At the same time, the regime has made an intensive effort to impress
upon German youth the opportunities granted to them under the new
regime. A great number of the promises contained in the New Youth
Law of February 1950 can be considered as rainchecks. Yet there are
many indications, that the younger generation, with only the memories
of the declining days of the Third Reich to serve as a comparison, are
more willing than any other group to accept the new pattern of society,
they often view the Communist state as the unquestioned framework of
a society in which they have a personal stake. Integration of the older
groups, particularly among the working class, has proved to be far
more difficult. The factory, in spite of the replacement of works councils
by SED-controlled trade union factory groups, still allows for some
social solidarity. Outwardly at least the regime is doing somewhat bet-
ter with the middle class and the intelligentsia, often these classes are
prepared to conform more willingly when some show of compulsion
provides them with a justification for complying if the tables should
turn again.
The problem of refugees, which looms so heavily in Western Germany,
is somewhat less acute in Eastern Germany. Integration into a society,
which itself is undergoing rapid transformation, is achieved with less
friction and rivalry, since hardship is locked upon as a general feature
of the new society rather than as individual misfortune.
While the popular basis of the regime is thus rather narrow, active
opposition is likewise restricted to small circles. Most dangerous from
the regime’s viewpoint is the continued contact which the Eastern
Bureau of the Social Democratic Party is able to maintain with its loyal
followers inside Eastern Germany. But while these contacts encourage
many people to hold out against the regime, they rarely lead to open
opposition. Local outbursts of dissatisfaction, which do occur occasion-
ally, are spontaneous demonstrations caused by specific conditions
rather than forms of organized opposition.
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II. The Political Structure
A. The Government
The establishment of the East German Republic in October 1949 was

accompanied by a change in the methods of Soviet control. Soviet
military government was ended and the functions of the Soviet Mili-
tary Administration (SMA) were contracted and transferred to the new
Soviet Control Commission (SCC). Eastern Germany was nominally
recognized as an independent state, capable of international intercourse
with sovereign states, and every effort has been made since to maintain
this appearance. Thus Soviet legislation for East Germany ceased. In
actuality, Soviet control is not limited to the formal authority exercised
by the SCC over the East German Government on the highest level, but
in specific cases extends directly to certain other levels. For example,
some sections of the East German police are under the direct control of
Soviet officers.
The East German Republic has adopted an ostensibly democratic con-
stitution, containing a bill of rights and providing for an executive
branch with a President, a Prime Minister, and a full‐fledged cabinet,
a bicameral legislature, and a judicial establishment. However, the par-
liamentary set-up is for the most part make believe. The provisional
People’s Chamber which adopted the constitution did not originate
from, popular elections, but derived its authority from a single-list
referendum in May 1949. It is not a deliberative assembly but merely
an instrument to register acts drawn up by the administrative office in
conjunction with the SED Politbüro. The Chamber of States, composed
of representatives elected by the various state diets, can only initiate
and delay legislation but not reject it, and is thus chiefly decorative.
The judiciary, through the abolition of the principle of immovability
and through the filling of more and more judicial jobs from the ranks
of special SED schools rather than from university graduates, has lost
the character of an independent institution and has become an organ
for the translation of the will of the executive into the practice of daily
existence.
The administrative control of the East German state is concentrated
in the cabinet. Although outwardly patterned after the Western parlia-
mentary system, the cabinet is in actuality and substance the former
German Central Administration of the Soviet Zone under a new label.
The actual control of the cabinet lies in the hands of the Prime Minister
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or his deputy. In addition to the regular ministries, a number of spe-

cial offices and commissions are attached to the highest administrative
level, among them the Central Commission for State Control, the Secu-
rity Ministry, the Propaganda Office and two highly centralized police
headquarters.
The government has at its disposal a police apparatus which it has
developed over a number of years. The regular police is centralized
under the command of Kurt Fischer, while a large paramilitary force
of some 50,000 men has been developed under Wilhelm Zaisser. The
latter force seems to be designed primarily for internal purposes in
spite of its military trappings. In addition, there is a centralized political
police, probably attached to the Security Ministry. These three services
are under the direct »guidance« of Soviet administrators.
Thus administratively the East German Government embodies typical
dictatorial institutions, and the dominant party, the SED, maintains
power through its control of top government posts.
Through the Two-Year Plan the control exercised by the central govern-
ment extends into every aspect of the administration, including not
only economic planning but also such fields as education. Government
controls are reinforced and supplemented by special agencies on the
central as well as local level. A permanent State Central Commission,
appointed by the state government at the recommendation of the cen-
tral authorities, functions in each state independent of regular adminis-
trative channels with the cooperation of local organizations and other
Communist-dominated political organizations. These commissions not
only check on the execution of central policy in the field, but also have
the task of breaking down bureaucratic resistance and of combatting
subversive activities.
Local and state governments have been effectively weakened by the
workings of a central budgetary control system which stripped them
of all financial independence, including control of salaries, budgets,
municipally owned enterprises, etc. The formal and informal channels
through which orders are passed down from above have to a large
extent been covert, but have functioned since 1945 completely overrid-
ing all so-called states’ rights and local self-government.
The state governments, although equipped with responsible ministers,
parliaments, state courts, and other attributes of autonomous rule, are
hardly more than the rational agents of the central government, partic-
ularly in the field of internal administration. On the local level, the East-
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ern Republic has maintained outwardly the German pattern of country

and town administration, while actually making local authorities sub-
ject to orders from higher officials. Although certain regional offices
are less closely integrated with the central government than others
(those that still operate under the label of a state government retain
a certain measure of independence), there is no parallel between »fed-
eral« and »state« administration. The central government is nominally
composed of »states« but it is not a federal government in the true
sense.
The position of Eastern Berlin is anomalous: while serving as the capital
of the East German State, it is not formally part of it.
B. Parties and Mass Organizations
1. The Socialist Unity Party (SED). With a membership last reported

as 1.8 million, the Communist-controlled SED is organized at all lev-
els from small shop and local groups through the district and provin-
cial organizations to a highly centralized structure for the entire state
Party directives are implemented by a large, highly reliable corps of
functionaries. Although popular control is ostensibly exercised through
party congresses, real influence lies with the full-time party secretaries
on all levels. The SED Control Committee is organized along the lines
of the Soviet Communist Party, with Political, Organizational, Propa-
ganda and Agitation Bureaus, etc. As with the Soviet Party, real power
lies in the Politbüro. The SED Central Secretariat also controls the West-
ern German Communist Party (KPD).
Leadership within the SED corps of functionaries is exercised by a
small group of Moscow-trained Communist veterans and by old-time
German Communists who remained in Germany during the Hitler
regime. The number of former Social Democrats, who joined the SED
ranks at a result of the forced merger of the two parties in 1946,
and who are still vested with responsible SED functions has been
decreasing steadily. There is heavy emphasis on filling party jobs with
young »activists« who joined the party ranks after the war. This empha-
sis is evident from the fact that of the present SED membership only 17
percent belonged to the Social Democratic or Communist Parties prior
to 1933. The social composition of the party membership for Berlin, as
given by SED sources, is as follows: workers, 38 percent; employees,
30 percent; artisans and merchants 6.7 percent; housewives, pension-
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ers, etc., 19 percent; technicians, 1.9 percent; teachers, 1 percent; and

students, professional workers, etc., 2.5 percent. These figures indicate
the degree to which the SED has become a »state party« rather than a
workers’ party.
The program of the SED is typical of that of a Communist Party dur-
ing the first phase of the transformation of the state into a »People’s
Democracy«. While the nationalized sector is becoming the controlling
element in the entire economy, private enterprise in small business and
trade is still maintained. There is no genuine collectivization of agricul-
ture. Fulfillment of the Two-Year Plan is the chief immediate objective
of domestic policy. Otherwise, the progress is essentially that of the
National Front (see below).
2. The National Front. The National Front has become the catch-all orga-
nization for political activities emanating from Eastern Germany which
are designed to appeal to a non-Communist public all over Germany.
While the National Front in Western Germany is only loosely organized
in local and regional committees and is without power and without
much popular support, it has been made into an effective political
institution in Eastern Germany. There, the committees of the People’s
Congress on central, regional, and local levels were transformed into
a system of National Front Committees in February 1950. Likewise
the »bloc policy«, which binds all licensed parties to support the major
SED policies, is now being effected under the banner of the National
Front. The latest development in this National Front policy has been
to force on all bloc parties to accept a single list for the October 1950
elections. The program of the National Front demands acceptance of
German-Soviet friendship as a cornerstone for an all-German foreign
policy. A unified democratic Germany is to be created through the fight
against all forms of Western domination, whether they rest on special
obligations deriving from the occupation or on Germany’s »exploitation
by Western capitalism«. The progress demands repeal of the Occupa-
tion Statue; denunciation of the Petersberg agreement, and of disman-
tling; dissolution of the West German Republic; conclusion of a peace
treaty with all of Germany and withdrawal of occupation troops. The
eventual »liberation« of Germany is confidently predicted as the conse-
quence of the successful effectuation of National Front policies.
The Communist regime relies for the implementation of its policies on
the regional level on its National Front Committees. These committees
are elected on the lowest level (i.e., village, section of city, enterprise),
in town or shop meetings, in labor unions, and in democratic mass
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organizations. The local committees, in turn, elect county delegates to

elect county committees, which in turn elect state delegates to elect
state committees. Through the participation of the so-called mass orga-
nizations and through this system of indirect elections, Communist
control of these committees is fully assured.
The National Front Committees, although not formally part of the pub-
lic administration, have the right and duty to inject themselves into the
economic, administrative, and legislative life of the Eastern Zone on all
levels, in order to cut red tape, expedite and supervise the execution
of the economic program, initiate reform, investigate public complaints,
and eliminate corruption, sabotage, and inefficiency.
3. The »Democratic Mass Organizations«. Communist control in Eastern
Germany is reinforced not only by the SED and the National Front
Committees but also by the Communist-front mass organizations. The
principal organization are the Free German Youth (FDJ), the Free Ger-
man Trade Union League (FDGB), the Soviet-German Friendship Soci-
ety, the Cultural League (Kulturbund), the Democratic Women’s Organi-
zation, and the Association for Mutual Peasants’ Aid (VdgB).
These organizations serve two purposes; (1) to mobilize, indoctrinate,
and direct various social and occupational groups outside the SED by
organizing them on the basis of their specific interests and functions;
(2) to increase SED strength by giving these groups an ostensibly inde-
pendent vote and voice. This latter function is well illustrated by the
role these mass organizations play in the People’s Chamber, the lower
house of the East German Government. In this body the Communist
and non-Communist parties are equal in voting strength. However,
since the mass organizations are also given representation, the SED
has a decisive 75-vote majority. In the state legislatures, where the mid-
dle-class parties (Christian Democratic Union and Liberal Democratic
Party) have almost 48 percent of the seats, these mass organizations
throw the balance in the favor of the SED, and recently some of their
delegates have openly joined the SED blocs.
The Free German Trade Union League (FDGB) the official Eastern Zone
trade union, which now has over 4 million members, is a highly cen-
tralized organization in which the individual affiliated unions have
almost no independence. Its leadership is closely interlocked with the
SED party leadership. The FDGB has retained only a few genuine
trade union functions and these in the sector of the economy that is
not yet nationalized. Otherwise, it has become an agency of the state.
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Although the unions negotiate collective agreements with the adminis-

tration, labor policy is determined by the administration in conjunction
with the SED. The FDGB’s main job is that of propagandizing and
implementing this labor policy. The unions thus are predominantly
concerned with the drive for increased productivity and for higher
quality of output, and with selling to the workers »the system of effi‐
ciency wages«, »socialist competition«, etc. In the individual factories
the trade unions are now active through their shop committees elected
by the trade union members but firmly dominated by the union offices.
These shop committees have replaced the more independent works
councils, which were abolished in the autumn of 1948. Workers’ code-
termination, prominently features in the 1950 Labor Law, is restricted to
the private sector of the economy; in contrast, the authority of manage-
ment is firmly established in the public sector.
In the field of agriculture, emphasis has recently shifted from the
Mutual Peasants' Aid Association (VdgB), an organization of local farm
cooperatives, to the Machine Tractor Stations, a rapidly expending
branch of the Agricultural Administration, an the focus for Communist
controls in the countryside.
The Free German Youth organization (FDJ) is one of the largest and
most effective of the mass organizations, numbering about 1,133,000
members. The FDJ has a complete monopoly on all sports and social
activities, and membership in the organization is rapidly becoming a
prerequisite for access to administrative and public careers.
4. The Non-Communist Parties. There are currently four middle-class
parties in Eastern Germany; the Christian Democratic Union (CDU),
the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), the National Democratic Party
(NDP), and the Democratic Peasants’ Party (DBD). The first two were
formed at the time of the Nazi collapse, as part of the political pattern
which emerged throughout Germany at that time. The NDP and DBD
were founded on Soviet orders in the late spring of 1946 in order to
attract popular support to the regime and to split the support of the
LDP and CDU.
The Soviet authorities had three reasons for maintaining the semi-inde-
pendent middle class CDU and LDP: (1) to maintain the semblance of
a possible basis for an all-German government; (2) to keep the idea
of the class struggle before the eyes of the Soviet Zone population by
identifying and recognizing the existing »bourgeois elements«; (3) to
provide a means of contact with Western Germany.
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Since the establishment of the East German Government, the sphere

of political maneuver permitted to the »bourgeois« parties has been
sharply curtailed, and their ranks have been continuously purged of
independent elements. Indications point to their further consolidation
along the lines of the »popular democratic« pattern, with the middle-
class parties becoming mere ancillaries of the Communist apparatus
of state control. CDU membership, according to latest figures (1948),
is approximately 208,000. In the last elections (1946) the party polled
2,379,975 votes, or 24.3 percent of the total. No membership figures on
the LDP are available, but in the 1946 elections the party got 2,410,146
votes, or 24.6 percent of the total vote cast. Membership in either party
still gives middle class elements who did not join the SED some access
to administrative jobs.
The National Democratic and the Democratic Peasants’ Parties were
organized in 1948 by trusted Communists on orders from the Soviet
Military Administration in order to mobilize the support of conserva-
tive farm groups and former officers and Nazis. However, despite the
large funds, ample office space, newsprint, equipment, etc., placed at
their disposal, the parties have succeeded only in forming extensive
regional organizations without attracting any sizeable membership.
Control of middle class elements has been achieved without any
notable contribution on the part of these parties. Both parties have been
accepted into governmental elective and administrative positions as
well as into the »democratic bloc«. Dissatisfaction has been expressed
in Soviet quarters over their performance.
III. Impact of the East German State on Western Germany
The very existence of the Eastern German state lends an essentially

provisional character to the Western German Republic. No matter how
firm the democratic constitutional basis of the Western Republic may
be, or how hostile toward the USSR its government may be, national
efforts for the reunification of Germany and therefore for integration
with Eastern Germany will continue. The »revisionist« tendencies of
these efforts must inevitably weaken the structure of the Western state
far more than that of the Eastern state, where such tendencies can be
forcibly eliminated. This makes for a basic instability, which is aggra-
vated by the fact that reunification, desired by the vast majority of the
German population, would involve a fundamental change in the econo-
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mic structure of Western Germany. The socialist economy of the Eastern

state cannot be reconciled with the free economy of the Western state
within one and the same national framework. One would have to give
way to the other. Although the majority of the German people would
not accept the Communist regime in the East as the price for national
unity, they would probably support the inclusion of a large »social-
ist sector« into the West German economy. If Germany’s reunification
should ever come about through free democratic processes, the all-Ger-
man government (in which the Social Democrats would probably be
the strongest party) might be expected to introduce strong government
controls and large-scale nationalization. The social transformation of
Eastern Germany is therefore likely also to affect Western Germany
even if the Communist regime there should be destroyed.
Apart from those long-range prospects, the Eastern state is affecting
Western Germany by counteracting its Western orientation. The chief
instruments of this policy are (1) exploitation of the economic interests
in the Eastern markets, and (2) exploitation of nationalist sentiment
against the division of Germany, the Ruhr authority, and the Saar set-
tlement. Although practically all German groups advocate increased
East-West trade, pressure for economic rapprochement with the East is
apparently heaviest among the steel industry and the agrarian elements
behind the Farmers’ Union. Eastern German spokesmen were quick to
utilize these trends, for example, by contrasting the dismantlings of the
Reichswerke in the West with the advantages they would derive from
selling pig iron to the East Zone, and by playing up Chinese orders for
steel rails.
The economic counteraction against Western orientation is skill-fully
supplemented by political counteraction, especially through the
National Front. The propaganda appeal to the widespread desire for
national unification has selected those targets which are most likely
to win support from non-Communist groups ranging from the Social
Democratic rank and file to the extreme right. These targets include
the Ruhr authority, the Saar settlement, the dismantlings, the failure
of denazification and Allied veto of socialization proposals and the
codetermination provisions of the works council laws.
The few organized groups in Western Germany which have made
rapprochement with the East their explicit business combine economic
and political interests. Their most vociferous spokesmen are: Joseph
Müller, Bavarian Deputy Minister President, who has proposed an
East-West Coordinating Committee to carry on business relations with
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the East; Rudolf Nadolny, old-time conservative diplomat who con-

siders friendly relations with the USSR vital for Germany’s national
interests; and, less important, Ulrich Noack, who promotes the idea of
German »neutrality«. Although at present without such influence, these
groups work in line with strong tradition in German politics.
IV. Prospects of the Regime
The prospects of the East German regime must be evaluated in terms

different from those applicable to the Soviet satellites. In the latter, the
Communist regime will be able to maintain itself in power as long as
its police and administrative apparatus are intact and as long as it can
guarantee the functioning of society on a tolerable existence level, its
power will increase with its ability to raise the standard of living. In
Eastern Germany these conditions are not sufficient to guarantee the
stability of the regime because Eastern Germany is »open« toward the
West, and ample opportunities exist for communication and compari-
son. Therefore, a better functioning society in Western Germany will
be a very real attraction and a constant threat to the regime. Moreover,
the hope for the reunification of Germany, which is so strongly played
up by Soviet officials and the Communist administration intensifies
this attention to the West and the expectation that Communist control
over Eastern Germany will be eliminated. The very hesitation of Soviet
policy to »close« Eastern Germany to the West introduces a element
of instability that could be remedied only by transforming Eastern Ger-
many into a full satellite. Even then, however, the continued existence
of a Western-occupied part of Berlin would work against the successful
completion of such transformation.
In view of the orientation of the Eastern German state on a solution of
the all-German problem, the question must be asked as to the weight of
the Eastern German state in the all-German balance if a solution should
be found. Will the present structure of state and society disappear alto-
gether, or to what degree and extent will it be retained if the German
people themselves can decide freely on the solution of the all-German
problem? If the assets of the Eastern German regime are defined as
those achievements which are likely to be endorsed by a large part
of the population, they would include the abolition of the power of
the Junkers, the nationalization of key industries, considerable measure
of public control ever the economy, a thorough school reform, and
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full employment. These institutions have probably taken roots in the

political life of Eastern Germany which are deep enough to prevent the
return to the pre-1933 system even if the present Communist regime is
removed.
The population at large, on the other hand, would expect a reunified
democratic Germany to bring them a drastic amelioration of their living
standards through extension of US credits to Eastern Germany and
abandonment of their forced renunciation of the Eastern territories. On
the institutional level they would expect speedy demise of the SED
party and administrative machine with all its satellite organizations,
the restoration of personal freedom and of a liberal regime for vol-
untary associations as well as freedom of opinion, and generally the
return to more spontaneous forms of personal and collective expression
as against the uniform patterns of action imposed by the Communists.
There is little doubt that the overwhelming majority of the German
people would gladly support a reunited, Western-oriented Germany.
The opposite solution – German unification under Eastern auspices –
has few supporters outside the ranks of the Communists. The majority
of Eastern Germans would loathe it; even though it would bring Ger-
man unity, it would make the data of liberation from the Communist
yoke much more remote. The only exception of this general sentiment
applies to certain right-wing circles, which would be prepared to accept
German unity even under Soviet auspices. These elements believe that
in the long run Germany would come out as the stronger partner in any
USSR-German alliance and would thus not only be able to throw off the
Communist mortgage on the German social fabric, but even profit by
the independence of action toward the West gained by such an alliance.
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473
[11.]
The Status of Labor in East Germany, 1951*
[1951]
Abstract
A system of organizing, directing and compensating East German labor

force has been instituted to maximize the productivity of the workers.
The postwar changes in labor policies and institutions are designed to
achieve this purpose.
After 1945 the East German authorities abolished, one by one, the insti-
tutional safeguards of the rights of labor. Since the workers »own« the
plants, the »exploitation of man by man« has, theoretically, ceased. The
interests of the workers are, therefore, said to be identical with those of
management, and failure to cooperate enthusiastically with the greater
productivity drive is attributed to the influence of capitalism, which
must be eradicated from the new »progressive« order.
The role of the labor administration, traditionally the protector of
labor’s position, has been increasingly whittled down in order not to
endanger the all-important productivity goals. Except in the private
sector of industry, comprising about 35 percent of the economy, the role
of the trade unions has also been altered. Instead of acting to protest the
economic and social rights of the workers against management, they
are being increasingly employed to control and organize the workers
for production purposes. In the private sector unions are still permitted
to conduct traditional activities, though even there certain restraints are
felt.
The collective contract has become a means of »propagandiz-
ing« and »organizing« the workers to fulfill the work plan. It no longer
sets wage levels and working conditions. The new plant »collective
contracts«, which have now been introduced in addition to the normal
industry contracts, specify »self-imposed« work obligations for individ-
ual workers. These new obligations have been strongly opposed by the
workers, and in some instances open resistance has resulted.
* [Als Intelligence Report No. 5460 am 17. Oktober 1951 für das Department of
State fertiggestellt. Zu diesem Text vergleiche in der Einleitung S. 113f.]
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474 [11.] The Status of Labor in East Germany, 1951 [1951]
The wage structure has been considerably revised in the interest of

productivity. Piece work and increased performance rates have been
introduced as progressive aspects of the »democratic« economic order,
and new wage gradations have been created. Employees are encour-
aged to compete with each other to set higher production record. »Rate-
breaking« is rewarded, and the fixed wage sum for each plant during
a given plan period necessitates deducting the »activist« bonuses1 from
the wages paid to the rest of the plant.
Administration of social services and allocation of the labor supply
have been revised to out down absenteeism and to channel the labor
force into priority industries.
The strongest form of labor compulsion is employed in the East Ger-
man uranium mines. Recruited by false promises, threats, and open
force, the miners work in conditions of slavery. Unable to resign, sub-
jected to hazardous working conditions with impossibly high norms
and housed in overcrowded barracks, the uranium miners constitute
the most oppressed element of the East German labor force.
The program of drawing women into the labor force presents work
obligations in the guise of »progressive« and »democratic« measures.
The campaign advocating equal status for women and men is designed
to enlist female workers in industry. However, if propaganda measures
do not sufficiently increase the labor force, the necessity of supplement-
ing the family income is relied upon to send women to the factories.
East German labor policies designed to meet increasing productivity
goals have encountered unwilling obedience rather than enthusiastic
collaboration. Those never-ending attempts to tighten psychological,
social and administrative controls are indicative of widespread unwill-
ingness on the part of the workers to accept the labor program of the
present regime.
I. Introduction
Since 1945 the Communist dominated Socialist Union Party (SED) has
progressively strengthened its position in Eastern Germany. Its policies
are purportedly directed toward the construction of a socialist society,
1 Activists by maintaining increasingly high levels of productivity serve as pacers

for the rest of the labor force. On October 13, 1951, 150,000 activists were honored
by the state.
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which at some future date will transform itself into a Communist soci-
ety. The SED authorities repeatedly assert that the changes already
effected in the social and economic structure of East Germany have,
in large part, abolished »the exploitation of man by man«. The work-
ers now supposedly »own« the plants in which they work and soci-
ety is ostensibly organized to serve their best interests. Consequently,
increased productivity does not benefit an exploiting »ruler class«, but
is rather in the interests of the workers themselves. By assuming an
ever-increasing work burden, the labor force is told that it is hastening
the advent of »a previously unheard of prosperity for the working
class«. This goal apparently justifies to the East German regime the
ruthless exploitation of the workers and the complete subordination of
their needs and interests to the requirements of the state.
Besides this ultimate goal, there is a more immediate and practical
requirement of strengthening the industrial position of the Soviet
Union and its European satellites. It has long been a Soviet aim to
obtain access to the production of the Ruhr. As a result of the devel-
oping East-West struggle, this aim has, at least temporarily, been frus-
trated. The Soviet Union has, therefore, been forced to utilize to the
fullest possible extent the industrial production of Eastern Germany.
Smaller in area and population than the West German Federal Repub-
lic, poor in natural resources, with an inadequate skilled labor supply
and an extremely unfavorable population distribution, the German
Democratic Republic is undergoing increasing industrialization to over-
come its economic weaknesses. Thus the East German labor force is
prevailed upon to work longer and more intensively to make up for
its deficiencies in numbers and other production factors. It is to those
goals that East German labor policy has been increasingly harnessed.
II. Functions of the Trade Unions
With more than 5,000,000 members, the Free German Trade Union
Federation (FDGB) is the largest mass organization in East Germany,
but successful control of the workers is rendered difficult by the nature
of its tasks and the recalcitrance of its members. From the time it was
established in 1945, the FDGB has sought to embrace the entire East
German labor force, and has refused to limit itself to the traditional
trade union task of protecting the economic and social interests of the
workers. In accordance with SED requirements, the major objectives of
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the FDGB have been, to increase the output of the worker and, through
organized discussion and psychological propaganda control his general
attitudes.
Throughout the initial phase of the occupation, FDGB operations facil-
itated the Soviet dismantling policy as well as the deduction of repara-
tions from current output. In the face of worker resentment over the
long-term prospect of lowered living standard resulting from Soviet
demands, the FDGB’s task was to ensure continued on-the-job perfor-
mance. After this initial period, official objectives shifted from disman-
tling and reparations to obtaining maximum productivity at the lowest
possible costs, again utilizing the FDGB.
These productivity drives not with bitter resentment and resistance on
the part of the workers and would have failed except for the framework
of rigidly centralized Communist control over the unions. This central-
ization permitted SED functionaries to retain the services of a numbers
of former Social Democrats and Christian Democrats, some of them in
the higher echelons of union command without risking any relaxation
in over-all Communist control. In the beginning seeming disregard of
party affiliations gained support for the Communist program of weld-
ing German labor into one organization.
Gradually, however, the personnel in the neutralized union apparatus
became interchangeable with higher officials of the SED and the East
German state administration. These groups were primarily responsible
for implementing FDGB policy and overcoming difficulties arising in
the 18 industrial unions as well as within the individual shops. Com-
munist accusations that saboteurs and »enemies« (sometimes former
Social Democrats) were permitted to occupy offices in the union admin-
istration may have been true to some extent. However, the chief diffi‐
culties arose over the incompatibility between demands for increased
productivity and the protection of the workers’ well-being. This conflict
has been a persistent feature of post-1945 labor conditions in Eastern
Germany and in 1948 led to the abolition of the traditional works
councils (Betriebsräte), which the FDGB proved unable to control. The
trade union shop executives (Betriebsgewerkschaftsleitung, BGL), elected
at least in theory by the individual shops, were set up in their place,
and have also been unable to overcome this conflict.
It is this basic contradiction between the productivity drive and the
workers’ interests which lies at the heart of the acrimonious top-level
criticism directed against unsatisfactory work of the industrial unions
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and the shop union executives. SED head Walter Ulbricht, at the third
FDGB congress in September 1950, indicated that the lack of trust
between industrial and shop union leadership and the rank and file
of union members constituted one of the decisive shortcomings of the
trade union system, a point also recently stressed by FDGB chairman
Herbert Warnke.
On the union and shop level, FDGB officials are often called
upon to defend extremely unpopular policies of the SED regions.
This »defense« often takes the form of a mechanical repetition of the
official slogans, combined with only nominal compliance with the new
policies. Moreover, their ability to protect the interests of the workers
has been reduced almost to the vanishing point through the increas-
ingly unfavorable position of industrial unions and shop executives in
relation to management in publicly owned enterprises.
The labor law of April 19, 1950 makes management responsible for
meeting production quotas and for observing regulations governing
insurance and wages. The shop executive’s functions, designated as
co-determination, in reality are extremely narrowly defined. It collab-
orates in the »just« distribution of the director’s funds in conjunction
with management. To enforce legal regulations, union leadership may
set into operation the apparatus of the »people’s control«, a board of
specially chosen people to investigate irregularities within the adminis-
tration. In actual practice the »people’s control« becomes active only to
the extent that the SED regime or the FDGB top command considers it
expedient to focus underlying resentment on some particular action of
management.
A candid discussion between management, the unions, and the work-
ers is not provided for, and there is even less active participation of
labor in the management functions of public enterprises. Mass meet-
ings convoked by the shop union executive have either degenerated
into spiritless »command performances« attended by listless and bored
workers, or they have tended to become vehicles for the airing of real
grievances by the labor force. The first response failed to show the
desired degree of enthusiasm for the »progressive« policies of Stalin’s
East German disciples. The second was even worse, for giving the
workers an opportunity to openly criticize basic official policies would
weaken the authority of the whole SED-FDGB combine.
Therefore, as mass meetings have proved to be an unreliable propa-
ganda medium, an alternative has recently been sought in organizing
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sections of 20 to 40 workers for discussion purposes. Political, econo-

mic, and cultural propaganda is disseminated by »trade union organiz-
ers«. In cooperation with the foremen, these organizers are authorized
to enforce »correct« attitudes and behavior through disciplinary mea-
sures, and in this way the FDGB extends its control over the individual
workers. At the same time, some outward form of democratic organi-
zation is maintained, since the »organizer«, like the shop executive, is
supposedly elected by the members of his union.2 While it is not very
probable that the relationship between the »organizer« and the small
group entrusted to his care will overcome the basic lack of confidence
of union members in their officers, the device might be useful in tight-
ening union controls over the actions and utterances of the rank and file
members.
Insurance funds previously administered by semi-independent public
law corporations under the supervision of the Ministry of Labor were
transferred to the FDGB in May 1951. This transfer was accompanied
by a Communist smear campaign blaming the former insurance admin-
istration for the short-comings of the system. Dissatisfaction is thus
directed away from official policy makers to the victims of policy
changes. This transfer of funds considerably widens the authority and
jurisdiction of the FDGB, which will administer the system through
a central management council. The transfer also aims to increase the
workers’ dependence on the unions and make the unions appear as the
protagonists of the workers interests. But it is hardly possible that it
will improve relations with the workers.
The very concept of Soviet Zone social insurance – an exclusively self-
supporting organization with no other financial resources other than its
receipts – militates against a harmonious relationship between the insu-
rance administration and the insured worker should the premiums of
the fiscal year fail to cover insurance payments. Moreover, the control
of insurance funds is employed as an additional means of increasing
production by making the amount of the insurance benefits dependent
on importance to the economy of the individual’s work.3
2 Harry Krebs, »Einiges über innergewerkschaftliche Demokratie«, Die Arbeit,

Nr. 7, July 1951. After emphasizing that the FDGB charter requires election of all
functionaries, the article criticizes sharply plants in which functionaries have
assumed office, apparently without being elected by the workers.
3 In one of their propaganda drives to prove the need for the social insurance
reform, the FDGB unwittingly portrayed the callousness of officials entrusted
with the administration of the social insurance. A case was described in which a
worker complained to a social insurance official about the delay in payment of
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III. Functions of the Trade Unions in Private Industry
Discontent among FDGB members stems chiefly from the subordina-

tion of workers’ rights to the demands for increased productivity, a
condition which the unions have neither the desire nor the ability to
change. However, there still exists a private sector of industry compris-
ing approximately 35 percent of the East German economy, where cen-
tralized control of the unions is not so rigid.
In this sector, union functionaries have not attempted to introduce
labor »reforms«, such as shock brigades, socialist competition, perfor-
mance wages, and »activist« methods of increasing output, already
effected in the public enterprises. Also, the extent of managerial control
over the workers is not as great as in state-owned enterprises. On
the contrary, the 1950 basic labor law empowers the shop executive
to act within the rights of co-determination and information, giving
him access to company records. Collective contracts, establishing these
rights of the shop executive, are drawn up between private manage-
ment and the industrial unions. In practice, however vigorous exercise
of these prerogatives by a competent and class-conscious shop execu-
tive gives the FDGB and SED valuable information concerning the
business practices of private employers, further enabling the regime
to limit the independence of private industry. The July 1951 Chemnitz
Conference of the FDGB highlighted the duties of the shop executive.
In addition to »safeguarding« the workers interests, he must exercise
watchdog functions and must be constantly alert to ensure fulfillment
by the entrepreneur of conditions subcontracted from publicly-owned
enterprises. He must also guard against unjustified price-raising and
tax evasions.4
The relatively small percentage of hard-core SED members5 and the
reluctance of shop executives in privately owned enterprises to comply
with FDGB policies moderates the effect of trade union regulations on
private industry.
a social insurance pension. The worker asked how the official would feel if his
widow were treated in a similar fashion. The official replied that he would, in
such a case, arise from his grave and give his widow a kick if she depended upon
a social insurance pension rather than seeking productive work. Tribüne, Berlin,
July 17 – 19, 1951.
4 Walter Möbius, »Die Stellung der privatkapitalistischen Betriebe in unserer anti-
faschistisch-demokratischen Ordnung«, Die Arbeit, Nr. 7, July 1951.
5 In the privately owned sector of the economy the percentage of SED members in
the BGL’s is less than 30 percent, in contrast to the publicly owned sector, where
SED members comprise 60 percent.
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Faced with a doubtful future, shop executives in private enterprises

realize that the imposition of additional difficulties upon management
will hasten the breakdown of these industries. Demands of shop exec-
utives in private plants have been extremely moderate in comparison
with those of industrial unions, and consideration of existing price
ceilings, rigorously enforced in the case of private industry, has limi-
ted requests for higher wages. Both union officials and members of
unions in private enterprise often tend to side with their employers
rather than with the FDGB-SED bureaucracy. Consequently, the FDGB
has condemned the absence of »progressive« ideology among workers
employed by private entrepreneurs, their noticeable lack of class-con-
sciousness, and their loyalty to their employer.6
IV. New Concept of the Collective Contract
German labor law before 1933 designated as a collective contract an

agreement on wages and working conditions arrived as by free bar-
gaining between unions and employers’ associations. With the banning
of employers’ associations and the rapid transformation of private
enterprises into state-owned concerns or Soviet AG’s, wages were
increasingly determined by administrative regulations. Collective con-
tracts are now formally drawn up between the various industrial min-
istries and the industrial unions. In the remaining private sector of
industry the revamped chambers of commerce and of industry became
the bargaining partner of the trade unions. With the exception of this
private sector, however, the so-called collective contract has little sim-
ilarity with the wage agreements of free societies. Instead of a free
agreement on wages, the collective contract has become a means for
securing fulfillment of the economic plan. The total amount of wages
is now set by the respective ministries in charge of specific production
tasks as part of the over-all economic plan. Changes in these total wage
sums cannot be made until modifications of the economic plan are
elaborated in conformity with new production schedules.
6 Walter Möbius, »Die Stellung der privatkapitalistischen Betriebe in unser anti-

faschistisch-demokratischen Ordnung«, Die Arbeit, Nr. 7, July 1951. This article
contains the following interesting statement: »Naturally the cooperation with
capitalists in the National Front of democratic Germany does not mean that the
class antagonisms between the workers in the privately-owned plants and the
entrepreneurs will be given up.... In the privately-owned plants there is no Com-
munity of interests and there cannot be any.«.
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In reality this term collective contract is a misnomer. The document is

used to publicize the specific union obligations to work toward the pro-
duction goals laid down by the ministries. Consequently, the provisions
of the contract do not contain any wage norms, but determine specific
percentages in production, productivity increases and cost decreases
which the industrial unions promise to meet. However, collective con-
tracts still specify reciprocal duties for both partners.
As a matter of form the addressee of the obligation owed to the indus-
trial ministries is the trade unions. However, their duties enumerated
in the collective contract are chiefly administrative, such as preparation
of industrial plans and support for the individual management in the
carrying through of organizational production schedules.
With regard to employment and dismissal regulations, the sample con-
tract does not contain any protection of workers’ rights whatsoever
hiring is left exclusively to the management and dismissals are made in
accordance with existing legal rules. While omitting protective clauses
for workers’ rights, the collective contract grants management exten-
sive rights to revise the performance wage standards.
In addition to the collective contract, which makes the trade unions
auxiliary to management and to the industrial ministries in carrying
out increased production drives, the new labor law calls for a second
contract between the trade-union shop group, representing the workers
in a given enterprise, and the management. This contract is used on
the assumption that the worker will more willingly accept the refined
piece rate and performance system if his representatives on the plant
level agree, ostensibly at least, to accept responsibility for fulfillment on
that level of production schedules which the unions have signed on the
industry level. With its detailed specifications of the work duties and
obligations for each section of the plant labor force even designating
workers by name, this contract, like the collective contract, is an instru-
ment exerting pressure for the utmost productivity on the labor force.
In this way evasion of responsibility and failure to obtain maximum
output at minimum production costs are greatly decreased.
The system of »self-imposed obligations« (Selbstverpflichtungen) gives
the worker the impression that he is being constantly observed by the
state. Writing these obligations into plant collective contracts aims to
make the personal in each plant aware of the duties of specific workers,
thereby exercising group pressure on the individual for the fulfillment
of his obligations. The worker is given the impression that in addition
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to the state, the plant leadership, and the trade union officials, the
entire plant labor force is »watching him«.
In addition to specifying the workers’ duties under the productivity
plans, this contract attempts to define the social obligations of the plant
to the workers. Provisions for sport and cultural activities, as well as
homes for the aged, etc., are contained in the plant collective contract.
This systematization of labor according to Soviet patterns has reduced
the propaganda effect of the plant collective contract. As with most
other policies whose implementation is necessary for the attainment
of Soviet goals, social pressure is disguised by a huge campaign to
promote social progress. However, to judge from the workers’ reaction,
the campaign of selling this system and making the workers participate
in its implementation is running into difficulties. While the workers are
powerless to resist increased speed-up and exploitation, the attempt to
associate the shop-union groups and the individual workers with the
system is making only slow headway.
Despite strong pressure from the SED, the workers have not shown a
positive reaction to the new plant contracts. Their attitude reveals indif-
ferent resignation to another act of SED compulsion. Union shop execu-
tives also regard the new plan as a disagreeable measure to be imposed
upon the workers, and their failure to arouse worker enthusiasm for
the new contracts has led to severe censure from SED representatives.7
In addition to indifferent resignation on the part of the workers, there
have been sporadic outbreaks of open resistance to the introduction of
the new contracts.8 Resentment has been directed chiefly against the
system of »voluntarily undertaken duties« which makes the individual
worker directly responsible for meeting production quotas.
7 This attitude is revealed in an article in the East German newspaper. Sächsische

Zeitung of August 28, 1951, which strongly condemned the circumstances sur-
rounding the adoption of the plant collective contract in the VEB Dampfhammer‐
werk Brand-Erbisdorf. The contract was discussed while a large part of the labor
force was attending the World Youth Festival in Berlin. Only 35 workers were
present at its signing.
8 On August 16 four miners employed by the Wismuth AG unranium concern at
Saalfeld were arrested following their protest against the new plant collective
contract. This action provoked riots, participated in by as many as 3,000 miners,
resulting in the death of a People’s Police sergeant, the serious injury of eight
other People’s Policemen, and the less serious injury of twenty others. On August
29 clashes took place at the Strassfurt salt miners between People’s Police and
workers following the unanimous rejection by the workers of the new plant
collective contract.
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V. The Wage Structure
Under the East-German wage structure wide divergences exist in the

pay scale of the labor force. The system stimulates a sort of »free enter-
prise« competition among the workers to attain maximum productivity
and thereby supplement their wages. The pseudo-liberal character of
this rivalry is not changed by calling it »socialist competition«. Wage
standardization, hourly rates, or a sense of worker solidarity are not
allowed to block the development of a system in which the worker
must comply with the increased productivity plan of the East-German
authorities in order to earn even a subsistence wage.
An East-German ordinance of August 17, 1950 on payment of workers
in the »People’s Owned and Assimilated Industries« divides the work-
ers in nearly all important branches of industry into eight wage groups.
Workers are divided according to the difficulty of the work they per-
form, the amount of their responsibility, and their training and skills.
In order to attract labor to vital industries, the East-German regime
has fixed wages on a priority scale. The highest wages are paid for
coal mining, metallurgy, machine and automobile production, while
the lowest are paid in the light consumers’ goods industries. In those
industries at the top of the wage scale, the strength and energy requi-
site for satisfactory job performance are normally found only among
the younger age groups. Contrary to Western practice, women are
employed in these industries, though their chances of attaining a pro-
duction level which would place them in the higher wage groups are
very slight.
Actual practice reveals the deceptive nature of official campaigns to
abolish wage discriminations based on sex and age. Since payment
depends upon the quantity and quality of the work performed, with
special rewards given to workers in the heavy industries, the age and
sex of the worker, as well as his skills and training, affect the size of
his wages. In comparison with the wage structure of enterprises in
democratic nations, the controlled wages of East Germany are based on
a greater number of gradations.
Of great importance to the East German Government is the establish-
ment of industry wage-group catalogues (Industrie Lohngruppen Kata-
loge), specifying the type of work performed in a particular wage
group, as well as the training and skills which qualify the worker for
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that group.9 Purportedly these catalogs assure the worker full wages
and provide for more efficient placement to utilize his full capabilities.
Divisions are established between workers who receive time wages
and these who receive performance wages for meeting a specific work
norm, the piece rates being uniformly higher than the time wages paid
to workers in the same income group. Recognizing labor’s traditional
dislike of piece rates, the SED has launched a campaign to convince the
worker that he is no longer exploited and must therefore change his
attitude toward piece rates. By 1955 the East German regime plans to
have 66 percent of the labor force paid on a performance wage basis.10
Wage determination also differ for workers paid on a performance
basis within the same industry. Performance wages determined on an
hourly basis are paid in full only when the worker has completed the
work norm set for the hour. It is impossible to estimate what percentage
of the workers fulfill the norm and receive the posted wage, what per-
centage exceed it and receive additional bonuses, and what percentage
fall to fulfill the norm and receive less than the posted wages. However,
the relatively high level of the work norms makes it difficult for more
than a small proportion of the workers to exceed them and accounts
for frequent failures to meet the more among older and less skilled
workers.11
»Technically justified work norms«, representing the maximum output
of a given number of men and machines in a given period of time with
the minimum expenditure of raw materials, fuel and power, and the
least deterioration of plant equipment, are periodically revised by the
East German Government. Three months before the end of every »plan
year« these norms are checked to determine their conformity with
existing production conditions, enabling the »norm bureaus« to deter-
mine whether an increase in the basis quota is possible.
The industrial ministries employ »shock brigades« in performance
exhibitions to provide the basis for a revaluation of the »technically
justified work norm«. The output of those brigades, working short
9 Karl Lucke, »Über den Leistungslohn in den Berliner Betrieben«, Die Arbeit,
Nr. 5, May 1961. In this article the author criticizes severely what he considers to
be the insufficient introduction of the performance wage system in the East
Berlin plants and attributes to this fact the lower worker productivity in these
establishments.
10 Ibid.
11 »Die Entlohnung der Arbeit in der Sowjetischen Besatzungszone«, Europa
Archiv, March 20, 1951.
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hours under optimum conditions, determines the rate to be maintained

by the other workers throughout their entire shift.
The official encouragement given to »norm-boosting« in the interest
of greater productivity is calculated to divide the workers. When a
particular worker, by more efficient use of time, equipment, raw mate-
rials, and fuel, succeeds in establishing a higher work norm, this norm
becomes binding upon his co-workers. They are then paid according to
the new schedules established by their »Activist« colleagues, while he
continues for a four-month period to draw performance wages based
on the old rate. However, the allotment for workers in a particular plant
is fixed in advance for the plan period. When certain workers succeed
in raising their wages, the wages of all the other workers must fall
since a pay increase for one worker leaves that much less to be divided
among the others. Should the wages withheld from workers failing to
meet the norm be insufficient to cover overproduction bonuses, work-
ers who fulfill their norms may suffer wage cuts. The wages of foremen
also fluctuate according to output.
Wages may also be reduced when, through no fault of the worker, tech-
nical difficulties, such as a lack of raw materials or failure of electricity,
stop production. Under such condition the worker can only claim 90
percent of a wage based on lower time rates. East German spokesmen
consider this percentage too high, and one official stated that failure to
draw the attention of the management to factors possibly leading to a
work stoppage makes the workers responsible for the shutdown.
Continual jacking of the basic work norm to higher levels makes it
extremely difficult for workers to meet the quota and permits only a
few workers to exceed the norm. The wage structure of the Commu-
nist »merit system« applies the inducement principle of the old »car-
rot on a stick«, which remains forever out of reach. Attempts by the
East German worker to supplement his pay through over fulfillment
bonuses simply increase the work he must do to receive the basic per-
formance wage. While the East German worker recognizes the falseness
of the promise of »great rewards for great accomplishments«, he is
compelled by political, economic, and social pressure to conform to the
pattern set by this system.
Since exact wage statistics for Eastern Germany are not available, it
is possible only to approximate the difference between the wage lev-
els and the comparative purchasing power of Eastern and Western
Germany. Although wage for such groups of the East German labor
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force as the »activists« are higher than those for most labor groups in
Western Germany, the wage standard in Eastern Germany is lower than
in Western Germany. Wages for both skilled and unskilled work in
Eastern Germany are considerably lower than those for the correspond-
ing work in Western Germany.
Since the East Mark is lower than the West Mark in purchasing power,
the real income of the East German worker is approximately one third
that of the West German. The cost of a subsistence living standard is
approximately the same in both parts of the country but unrationed
goods sold at high prices in the State-operated HO (Handelsorganisation)
stores, in spite of a series of price reductions, cost the East German
worker still considerably more, sometimes three times as much as
goods cost in West Germany. While the unskilled worker earning DM
(East) 200 a month would have 83 percent of the purchasing power
of his West German opposite, the skilled worker earning DM (East)
300 a month would have a corresponding purchasing power of only
67 percent, since the purchasing power of the East Mark decreases in
direct proportion to its expenditure on non-rationed goods.
VI. Labor Administration
Recent measures by the East German Government have sharply

reduced the functions of the Ministry of Labor. Most of its duties
have been distributed among the various ministries for industrial pro-
duction, the State Secretariat for Vocational Training, the local admin-
istrations, and to some extent the FDGB. This reduction is not primar-
ily an attempt to delegate the authority of a centralized bureaucracy
to specialized units for the purpose of safeguarding and improving
labor standards. Instead, it emphasizes the increasing subordination of
labor’s interests to the productivity drive. Three areas of direct control
have been removed from the Labor Ministry: determination of wages
and labor conditions, administration of social insurance, and labor allo-
cation.
The basic labor law of April 19, 195012 gave jurisdiction over wage and
labor conditions to the Ministry of Planning and the various industrial
12 »Gesetz der Arbeit zur Förderung und Pflege der Arbeitskräfte, zur Steigerung
der Arbeitsproduktivität und zur weiteren Verbesserung der materialen und
kulturellen Lage der Arbeiter und Angestellten« (Labor Law for the securing
and maintance of the labor force, for the increase of labor productivity and the
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ministries. Authority to establish labor standards and wage indexes

and to initiate industrial research has been given to the industrial min-
istries, with the Ministry of Labor in a review position.
Social insurance, which had been administered by semi-independent
public law corporations under the supervision and direction of the
Ministry of Labor, was placed under the jurisdiction of the FDGB in
May 1951.
The transfer of authority in the field of labor allocation is still being
effected. Hitherto, one of the main functions of the Labor Ministry has
been to supervise the labor exchange offices located in every county of
Eastern Germany. September 1, 1951, the exchanges were dissolved and
their functions divided between new labor departments set up in the
local governmental administrations and the State Secretariat for Voca-
tional Training. The Secretariat is responsible for all matters affecting
the training and placing of new workers and apprentices. The scope
of its authority will be increased by the creation of vocational training
departments in the land and local governments. These departments
will distribute manpower, assist nationalized plants in recruiting labor,
and register those seeking employment or receiving unemployment
benefits. On the surface this arrangement might allow labor adminis-
tration to place the welfare of the individual workers ahead of the
production goals of the East German Government. In a society where
community pressure could be brought to bear upon administrators
drawn from local trade unions and municipal or county councils, this
would be the case.
In Eastern Germany, however, the strict subordination of all local
offices to the central government makes a decentralized labor admin-
istration merely a more flexible tool for the implementation of its pol-
icies. If, for example, the worker must have his application for sick
leave insurance confirmed by a social insurance administrator who is
at the same time a member of the plant trade union, a closer check of
excessive or unjustified sick leave is possible, and absenteeism is thus
decreased. Decentralized administration of labor allocation has a simi-
lar purpose. As the SED-controlled city and county labor offices have
closer contact than the central government with the local labor force,
responsibility for allocation of the workers will be sharply defined and
the possibilities for deviation correspondingly reduced.
further improvement of the material and cultural situation of the workers and
apprentices), Gesetzblatt der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, Nr. 4, April 19,
1950, p. 349.
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Transfer of these powers may be a further step toward abolishing the

Ministry of Labor, which would be in accordance with Soviet practice.
Symbolic of its decline is the lack of publicity given to Labor Minister
Roman Chwalek13 who is eclipsed by Herbert Warnke, first chairman of
the FDGB.14
VII. Labor Allocation
The East German Government recently initiated policies to realize the

maximum use of labor for the successful implementation of its Five-
Year Plan. These policies are embodied in a legislative ordinance of
July 12, defining the duties of the Labor Administration.15 Announcing
the new system, Labor Minister Chwalek declared that the manpower
shortage was now as acute as had been the lack of tools and machines
immediately after the war. The new arrangements are intended to uti-
lize more fully the potential manpower to Eastern Germany and to add
890,000 workers to the labor force by 1955.
Included in the new plans is a provision to revise the system of com-
pulsory registration for employment. Formerly compulsory registration
applied to men aged 18 to 60 and women from 18 to 45. New men from
14 to 65 and women from 15 to 50 are obliged to register. Exception
is made for shopkeepers, independent artisans and relatives working
with them, members of the professional classes, and students. Women
with children under sixteen, self-supporting women with two or more
children under fifteen, and women nursing invalids whose need for
constant care is certified by a German hospital are also excused, but
all others in these age groups must register. Since the SED authorities
plan to add 890,000 workers to the labor force by 1955, extra-legal
13 After being denoted in 1949 from president of the FDGB, Berlin, to chairman of
the Railway Workers’ Union, Chwalek was appointed Minister of Labor in the
autumn of 1950.
14 The original Labor administration was the Deutsche Verwaltung für Arbeit und
Sozialfürsorge (German Administration for Labor and Social Security). At the
beginning of 1948 it was changed to the Hauptverwaltung für Arbeit und Sozi-
alfürsorge (Main Administration for Labor and Social Security). In November
1948, the name was again changed to the Ministerium für Arbeit und Gesundheit
(Ministry for Labor and Health), which in November 1950 was split up into the
Ministerium für Arbeit (Ministry of Labor), and the Ministerium für Gesundheits-
wesen (Ministry of Health).
15 »Verordnung über die Aufgaben der Arbeitsverwaltung und die Lenkung der
Arbeitskräfte in der DDR« (Ordiance Concerning the Duties of the Labor Admi-
nistration and the Directing of the Labor Force), DDR Gesetzblatt, July 18, 1951.
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compulsions such as propaganda on equal status of men and women

may exert pressure on women now exempt from registration.
Registration is made at the new local labor offices. Under this new
system the industrial ministries and nationalized industries will be able
to fill their manpower needs by direct recruiting rather than by hiring
through an intermediary such as the labor exchanges. Individual facto-
ries are responsible for personnel actions and are required to inform the
labor offices when an employee has been hired. The labor offices will
assist workers to find jobs for which they are best suited. They will also
maintain a continuous check on the factories in their district to ensure
employment of the number of women and younger workers specified
in the plan.
The labor record book entitling the holder to apply for a job commen-
surate with his training and ability is an important feature of the new
system. In the book are entered the applicant’s work experience, his
wage group, general capacities, and promotion record.
The new system will facilitate the diversion of manpower to priority
industries such as steel, coal and uranium mining, and shipbuilding.
To avoid confusion and inefficiency, manpower priorities are to be
established by the State Manning Commission. The extent to which
this will facilitate allocation of manpower can be determined only after
the system has been in operation for some time.
VIII. The Uranium Mines
The harshest form of labor control in the Soviet Zone is in the ura-
nium mining industry. Some 300,000 workers employed by Wismuth
AG, the Soviet-owned and directed corporation established to mine
the uranium deposits of central Germany, live and work in conditions
of human slavery.16 This corporation employs all available means to
recruit and control its labor force. It is not subject to East German law
and possesses extra-territorial status which, in effect, makes it a colonial
enclave of the Soviet Union. Although it operates for the benefit of
16 Excellent studies on Wismuth AG are »Der Uranbergbau der Sovjetzone«, Vor-

stand der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands, 1950: »Background Notes of
the Activities of Wismuth AG« and »The Latest Developments in East German
Uranium Mines«, British Information Service, Berlin, 1950.
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the USSR, the bulk of the operating costs is borne by the East German
economy.
Since 1946 uranium mining operations have been under way in the
Erzgebirge, the Vogtland, the Görlitz district, the Thüringer Wald,
and the Harz area. At first an attempt was made to meet manpower
demands by employing volunteer workers, but when the number of
volunteers proved insufficient, workers were sent to the mines under
compulsion.
Labor is recruited with the help of the SED, the FDGB, and the Com-
munist-controlled FDJ (Free German Youth). These organizations par-
ticipate in drives to enlist recruits through promises of high wages and
special rations, and through appeals to advance the cause of the »World
Peace Camp«. When such drives fail to obtain the necessary workers,
a variety of ingenious schemes are used to force reluctant workers into
the mines.
Output quotas for uranium miners are placed with the local labor
offices, and the methods employed to fill these quotas are not subject
to close examination. In some cases ration cards are withdrawn from
workers who refuse to »volunteer«, and young workers are told that
to be employed in the occupation of their choice, they must first serve
a »tour of duty« in the uranium mines. Workers refusing employment
in the mines have in some instances even been imprisoned. Possibly
the most subtle of all methods of coercion is the creation of artificial
unemployment in the mining areas. Workers seeking jobs are then
informed by the local labor office that the only available positions are in
the uranium mines.
Working conditions are extremely primitive in the mines, and the
health of the labor force is seriously endangered by silicosis, skin dis-
eases, and respiratory ailments. Cave-ins, accidental explosions, and
falling rocks, add to the occupational hazards. From these dangerous
working conditions the workers go to extremely unpleasant living
arrangements, primitive and overcrowded barracks being the usual
type of quarters.
While the opportunity exists to earn wages which by East German
standards are very high, in actual practice the bad working conditions,
high work norms, and health hazards make it impossible for all but a
small proportion of the miners to earn a compensatory wage. In many
cases the miners receive no more than other unskilled laborers.
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Under such conditions, stringent measures are required to prevent

mass desertions. The mining areas and their approaches are constantly
patrolled by elements of the Soviet and the East German security
forces. In place of the customary East German identification passes,
special Wismuth passes have been issued, making deserters from the
mines easily detested. In addition, the entire East German police sys-
tem has been alerted to watch for deserters.
IX. The Role of Women in the Labor Force
The shortage of skilled labor in the Soviet Zone is one of the most
important obstacles facing East German production plans. The low
birth rate during World War I, and the heavy casualties of World War
II have depleted the most productive age groups of the male popula-
tion. According to the 1950 East German census, for every four women
aged 14 to 50 there were only three men.
Provisions of the Five-Year Plan for the addition of 890,000 workers to
the labor force are to be met chiefly by the induction of women into
industrial work. It is estimated that women will constitute 700,000 of
the 890,000 additional workers to be drawn into industry by 1955. This
will increase the proportion of women in the total labor force from 37 to
42 percent. By contrast, in the Federal Republic women account for 30
percent of the total labor force and are excluded by statute from work
considered unsuitable or dangerous to their health.
The East German regime employs persuasion and force to contract
women for industry. A set number of industrial apprenticeships have
been reserved for women, and an attempt is being made to convince
East German women that they are capable of more than family and
household duties. By advocating »equal status«, the regime hopes to
get more women to accept fulltime factory jobs. At the same time, eco-
nomic conditions in Eastern Germany make it necessary for the wives
of lower-paid workers to help support the family.
Legislation has been enacted for the provision of nurseries and kinder-
gartens in the vicinity of the most important industrial plants17 which,
17 »Sonderbeilage zur Zeitschrift«, Arbeit und Sozialfürsorge, Nr. 8, 1951, contains a

model collective contract which is to serve as the basis for collective contracts in
the state industries. One clause specifies the use of plant funds for the erection
of kindergartens.
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it is hoped, will reduce the opposition of married women to working

outside the home. Working women who maintain a home for their
families are also promised one free day a month, but this day off is
given only to those who had no absence during the previous month.
The number of women in industry by the end of 1950 did not indicate
an enthusiastic response to government propaganda. During the post-
war period from October 1946 to July 1950, the total number of wage-
earning women in the Soviet Zone dropped from 2,292,000 to 2,150,000
and the proportion of women to wage-earners fell from 41.9 percent
to 36.4 percent. At the same time the number of women employed
in family businesses declined from 877,000 to 527,000.18 In large part
this decline may be attributed to their return to household duties after
the soldiers and prisoners of war had come home. Plans for attracting
women workers to industry were 65 percent fulfilled in 1949, with
similar results in 1950.
The priority given to heavy industry may have been another factor mil-
itating against the induction of women in the labor force. At present the
SED regime plans to continue the preferential development of heavy
industries and at the same time increase the use of women through
a twofold policy. Women are to replace men in fields not requiring spe-
cial strength or endurance such as light industry and thereby free men
for employment in heavy industry. A simultaneous attempt is being
made to add to the number of women employed in heavy industries.
Women are employed in increasing numbers for jobs in mining, iron
and steel works, sawmills and load construction. The extent to which
women work at night and underground has necessitated legislation
providing that pregnant women and nursing mothers may not be so
employed. The demands of these strenuous occupations, combined
with the pressure for increased production, have taken their toll on
the health of many women.
It is still too early to estimate the extent to which the plan to put
women in industry will succeed, for the program is confronted with
deep-rooted resistance. The labor decree of July 12, 1951, excuses from
compulsory employment registration women with children under 16, a
group comprising a large part of the female population with the great-
est labor capacity. If the East German authorities, without resorting to
arbitrary measures, put more women in industry, they will have to rely
18 »Die Bedeutung der Frauenarbeit in der sowjetischen Besatzungszone«, Deut-

sches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Nr. 9, March 2, 1951.
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on the efficacy of indirect compulsion. This may lead to changes in

the wage-price ratio, compelling hitherto unemployed women to enter
industry. However, if the pressure of low wages and high prices, com-
bined with »equal status« propaganda, fails to counter the widespread
opposition to this program, it is difficult to see how the goal of adding
700,000 women to the labor force by 1955 can be attained without
further resort to compulsory measures.
X. Conclusion
If success or failure of the East German labor policy were exclusively

measured by the rise in industrial output or the open defiance of SED
policies, the present regime would probably have reason to be fairly
satisfied. Production is increasing, and though quality of output does
not compare with that of Western Germany, within the satellite orbit it
is relatively good. Even though recent aspects of the intensified produc-
tivity drive have not been particularly successful and have on occasion
even met with open defiance, by and large the East German worker
does his stint. But whatever collaboration SED policies elicit from the
East German worker comes largely from the necessity to conform in
order to survive. Spontaneity, willingness to make sacrifices, in short,
all manifestation which would permit the administration to alleviate
the repressive character of its labor policies and rely on voluntary
collaboration, are conspicuously absent. To the contrary, the regime is
constantly driven to multiply compulsory incentive devices and contin-
ually to invent new supervisory and espionage methods.
The question arises whether the cumulative effect of the Hitler regime,
the war, and SED rule has been able to destroy the bond of sympathy
between members of the same shop and made the worker distrustful
of his associates, bent on furthering only his family’s and his own
welfare. If this were true, the SED, having failed in its attempts to
win the worker for the cause, would at least have eliminated him
as a potential danger. The very behavior of the SED agencies, their
never-ending attempts to tighten psychological and social controls over
the worker, belies such conclusion. While competitive production and
the repetition of propaganda motifs may have some effect on younger
workers, the older workers, though reluctantly complying with official
demands, scarcely seen resigned to accepting the regime as permanent.
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494
[12.]
Prospects for the Development of Control
Measures Against the Communist Parties of
Western Europe*
[1951]
Problem
To estimate the prospects for developing stronger and more effective

control measures directed against the Communist parties and Commu-
nist organizations of Western Europe and to analyze the problems con-
nected with the development of these controls.
Conclusions
1. Western European governments have taken only very limited action

against Communist parties and organizations since the end of World
War II; such action has been directed primarily against espionage
and sabotage, but Communists still hold positions in government, the
police and armed forces, and in sensitive private employment such as
teaching and information services. The Communist parties of France
and Italy are major political groups in their respective countries and
control mass trade union organizations.
2. Though less so than in the immediate post-war years, the present
attitude of Europe towards Communists is one of toleration; though
many — especially on the right — would like to see the Communist
party and its front organizations eliminated, the majority are opposed
to such action in principle and apparently fear that repressive measures
to suppress Communists might »get out of hand«.
3. The present balance of political forces in the various West European
nations has some influence in preventing the adoption of repressive
measures against Communists, but shifts in the UK (a Conservative
government), in France (orientation towards the Gaullists), or Italy
State fertiggestellt. Zu diesem Text vergleiche in der Einleitung S. 121-124.]
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[12.] Control Measures Against the Communist Parties of Western Europe [1951] 495
(right trends within the Christian Democratic cabinet) might well lead
to a more favorable political climate for such action. Anti-Communist
measures are likely, however, to continue on only a limited basis
in Western Europe (except, perhaps, Western Germany), unless there
are‐significant growths in Communist strength, extensive Communist
provocation, or the development of a feeling of national emergency.
4. Measures for increased controlling Communist activities would fall
into three broad categories: those designed to »hamper and hinder«,
but not to actually dissolve, the party; those legally dissolving the
party, forbidding its overt activities; and reducing it to an underground
operation; and those aimed at physically eradicating Communists and
their works.
a. Measures of the first category — »hamper and hinder« — would do
just that and would reduce the party’s influence, but in such countries
as France and Italy the party would continue to be a major political
force.
b. Dissolution of the Communist party would not have far-reaching
effects save in France and Italy, and in these countries the immediate
results would be to significantly reduce the party’s capabilities. In the
long run, the party might be able to recoup some of its lost ground,
especially in Socialist political organizations and trade unions, even to
the extent of taking over these groups.
c. The regaining of this ground by the Communists would lead to addi-
tional debate over introducing measures of the third category — those
involving police-state methods to physically eradicate the party and
its membership. There is little likelihood, under presently foreseeable
circumstances, of such a course being entered upon by any democratic
government in Western Europe; such a course would lead to the elimi-
nation of basic democratic institutions where adopted.
Discussion
I. Background
Western Europe today is an area in which Communism exists as an

openly organized political force in all countries save Ireland, Portugal,
and Spain. The Communist political parties of Western Europe vary
greatly in strength and influence; some are small and weak, others
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496 [12.] Control Measures Against the Communist Parties of Western Europe [1951]
the largest single political organism in their state. Some control the
organized workers of their countries, some do not. Whatever their
strength, their presence is felt everywhere in Western Europe and in
every country of the area measures have been urged to control their
activities and their influence.1
Insofar as such measures have been already adopted by the var-
ious Western European governments they have been primarily
directed toward the strengthening of internal security regulations.
Additional »home defense« and security forces have been established
in several countries, notably France, Italy, Belgium, and the Nether-
lands, for the purpose of coping with Communist insurrections or »fifth
column« activities in the event of war. Likewise some Communists
have been removed from key positions in the governmental adminis-
trations of many countries, an action designed to reduce espionage
capabilities as well as the general strength of the Communist appara-
tus. Direct measures against the organizational strength of the Commu-
nist parties include, (1) the dissolution of the Communist youth and
women’s movements and limited press control (Western Germany);
(2) the reduction of Communist representation in national and local
government through the revision of electoral laws (France and Italy);
(3) the expulsion of sizeable groups of foreign Communists (France)
and (4) the forcing of various international Communist organizations to
remove their headquarters from the country (France generally; UK with
respect to scheduled Sheffield »Peace Congress« removed to Warsaw).
The anti-Communist measures that have been adopted in the Western
European countries probably have contributed to some reduction of
Communist espionage and sabotage capabilities. Generally, however,
they have not led to any significant diminution of the mass following
of the Communist parties nor have they impeded to any great extent
to the normal political functioning of the Communist apparatus. The
fall of Communist party membership and vote‐getting capacity in most
Western European countries appears to bear no relationship to the very
limited measures taken against Communists and their organizations
in the past few years. Thus, in France and Italy Communist electoral
strength has largely been maintained. Communist domination of the
trade unions has continued unimpeded and no measures have been
taken to reduce the effectiveness of the party leadership, its financial
support, or its propaganda agencies. Moreover, in most of the Western
1 Iceland and Finland have been excluded from this general consideration of Wes-
tern Europe.
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European countries, Communists continue to hold positions in the

national and local administrations, in the police forces, and within
junior officer ranks of the national defense forces. In France, Commu-
nists remain in even such strategic government services as the Atomic
Energy Commission.
II. Factors Conditioning the Adaption of Anti-Communist Measures
Governmental action to curb Communist strength in Western Europe

is conditioned by several factors, the most important of which are
(1) the strength, influence, and capabilities of the Communist parties
in the various countries; (2) the sources of Communist strength and
capabilities; (3) prevailing governmental and popular attitudes toward
the Communists; and (4) the political balance in the various countries
concerned.
A. Communist Strength, Influence, and Capabilities
From the point of view of the maintenance of internal political stability,

public order, and security, the strength and influence of the Communist
parties pose a serious problem only for France and Italy. In the UK and
the smaller Western European democracies (Switzerland, the Scandina-
vian and Benelux countries) Communist strength and capabilities are
relatively insignificant, while in Western-Germany and Austria they are
of greater concern because these countries by their position are more
exposed to Soviet pressures, rather than because of the size or potential
of the local Communist parties.
The Italian Communist Party (PCI), with some 1,600,000 members, is
the largest Communist party in Western Europe. In alliance with Pietro
Nenni’s fellow-travelling Socialist Party (PSI) it appears to have the
support of roughly one-third of the Italian electorate. According to cur-
rent intelligence the PCI also has a well-organized clandestine paramili-
tary apparatus estimated at 75,000 in strength. The French Communist
Party (PCF), with an estimated 600,000 members, is the largest single
party in France, having secured approximately one-quarter (26.5 per-
cent) of the total vote in the June, 1951 national elections. The PCF
likewise possesses an efficiently organized clandestine paramilitary
organization estimated at perhaps 60,000 members.
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Both the PCI and the PCF control the dominant trade-union federations
in their countries, the CGIL and the CGT respectively, and through this
control and their well-organized front organizations and propaganda
services, exert a strong influence on public attitudes toward political,
economic, and social issues. Neither party, however, has any prospect
of coming to power in the foreseeable future through the regularly
established constitutional processes or through insurrectionary action.
Their capabilities, in time of peace, relate chiefly to their potential for
(a) sabotaging national defense efforts, especially through their strong
position in industry and the transportation system; (b) maximizing
discontent by outbidding any government with respect to pressing
political, economic, and social problems; and (c) confusing the public
on basic issues confronting their countries.
In the UK and the smaller Western European democracies (Switzerland
and the Scandinavian and Benelux states), the Communists form only
minor political groupings with memberships varying from twenty to
forty thousand (less, of course, in Luxembourg) and polling, in the
most recent elections, four to seven percent of the popular vote —
much less in the case of the UK. In these countries, the Communists
have no paramilitary organizations and exert little influence in the
trade unions or on public opinion. The Communist parties in Western
Germany and Austria have somewhat larger memberships than else-
where in Western Europe but their strength at the polls is no greater,
nor is their influence among the trade unions or the general public any
greater.
B. Sources of Communist Strength
The strong position of the Communist parties, as it is reflected in Italy

and France, is based primarily on the existence of widespread discon-
tent among labor and lower middle classes arising from a complex
of long-run economic, social, and political ills – ills exploited by an
efficiently organized and skillfully-led Communist party organization.
Communist Party tactics contribute to the spread of this discontent
and the mass support which it receives in turn enhances the strength
of the party organization. The removal of the »discontent« factor in
France and Italy, under present political and economic conditions, can
be effected only gradually if at all. Government action already taken
recognizes implicitly, at least, that the immediate reduction of the Com-
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munist Party’s power must be sought in weakening its organizational

aspects, namely, (1) its strong and able leadership; (2) its representa-
tion in the national and local legislatures and administrations, social
security administrations, and labor-management councils, etc.; (3) the
financial support and prestige that it derives from such representation;
(4) its control of the dominant trade-union federations; and (5) its well-
organized and efficient propaganda services and front organizations.
C. Attitude Toward the Communist Parties
The possibility of adoption and implementation of governmental pro-

grams for control measures against the Communists depends to a con-
siderable extent on prevailing popular attitudes toward the Communist
parties. Most non-Communist opinion is cognizant of the role of the
Communist parties as agents of Soviet policy and as »fifth columns« in
the event of war. There is considerable opinion in conservative circles
and even isolated sentiment in the ranks of Socialist and Labor groups
for the suppression of the Communist parties. At the present time,
however, the generally prevailing attitude toward the Communists
is one of toleration. This attitude stems primarily from (a) the deep-
rooted conviction that, except in grave national emergencies, politi-
cal toleration of even non-democratic, foreign-supported, anti-national
groups, is an essential feature of the democratic system; (b) a sort
of »detached« view of the Communist parties that comes from years
of first‐hand experience with its varying fortunes and tactics; (c) the
influence of the Socialist parties, especially in France, Italy, Belgium,
and to a lesser extent, Western Germany which view the Communist
parties as »working class« movements and consider strong measures
taken against them as directed against labor; and (d) liberal and non-
Communist left opinion that harsh measures against the Communists
could only strengthen the right and might lead to dictatorship and to
similar measures directed against themselves. These were the factors
underlying the viewpoint of the majority in Australia in voting down
on September 22nd a constitutional proposal to give the government
power to dissolve the Communist Party.
In the UK and the smaller Western European democracies, the incon-
sequential size and influence of the Communist parties also tends to
create an attitude opposed to further repressive measures. On the other
hand, in France if not in Italy, there is a strong feeling that Communist
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strength which has no prospect of taking over the country, will grad-
ually decline either as economic and social conditions improve or as
the party’s failure to secure tangible satisfaction of existing grievances
causes its mass following to drop away. Further aggressive action by
the Soviet Union against the free world, however, would incline most
of the Western European democracies to place additional curbs on their
domestic Communist parties.
D. Political Balance
The UK, the Scandinavian countries, Switzerland, and the Netherlands

have strong governments controlled by single party majorities or rela-
tively cohesive coalitions that would enable them to take additional
measures against the Communist parties without difficulty. In France,
and to a lesser extent, Belgium, the governments are more precariously
situated and have been compelled to adopt varying degrees of caution
in dealing with the Communists. In France, the »third force« coalitions
have never been able to come to grips with the problem primarily
because of the Socialists whose support is necessary for any middle-of-
the-road government. In Belgium the Christian Social (Catholic) gov-
ernment of Premier Joseph Pholien holds only a slim majority and is so
bitterly opposed by both the Socialists and Liberals that it must exercise
considerable restraint in its anti-Communist measures. While the Chris-
tian Democratic government in Italy has a majority in parliament and
is much more favorably situated than the weak coalition governments
of France, divisions within the Party, losses in electoral strength, and
the desire to avoid the complete alienation of the democratic Socialist
group have caused the government to hesitate before taking strong
measures against the Communists, though this hesitancy has tended
to disappear in recent months. The evidence of continued Communist
electoral strength has given rightist elements in the government a
strong talking-point for control measures against the Party.
E. Likely Future Course of Action
Under present domestic and international conditions a continuation of

the present policies of very limited measures against Communists is
the most likely course for the countries of Western Europe except West-
ern Germany and Italy. In West Germany, there is strong pressure for
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anti- Communist measures stemming from the dislike of the Germans

for anything Russian. In Italy popular fear of growth in Communist
strength may well lead to stronger control measures. In that country
the De Gasperi government has already proposed to parliament new
measures respecting libel, the loyalty of civil servants, and trade union
activities.
In the UK and in the smaller democracies present measures are gener-
ally regarded as sufficient to contain the domestic Communist threat
and the governments of these countries would be reluctant to take fur-
ther anti-Communist action. France, given a continuation of her present
difficult parliamentary situation, is likely to continue her present policy
without basic alteration. In each of these cases, however, possibilities
for change exist. Exercise of influence by the United States, a shift to the
right in France — perhaps the formation of a Gaullist or Gaullist-ori-
ented government in that country, — a victory by the Conservatives
in the forthcoming British general election — these might portend
stronger measures for control of Communism. In all countries signifi‐
cant growths of Communist strength, extensive Communist provoca-
tion through sabotage, street fighting, or similar activities, and the
developing of a feeling of national emergency — these would almost
certainly lead to stronger anti-Communist measures.
III. Possible Control Measures
In case of war with the Soviet Union, it is assumed any Western Euro-
pean state involved in hostilities would proceed at once to dissolve
the Communist party and take action against its leaders and its organi-
zations. Within conditions of peace, however, measures to control Com-
munists and their work may be considered as falling into three general
categories: (a) those designed to »hamper and hinder«, but not to dis-
solve, the Communist party and its affiliated organizations; (b) those
designed to legally dissolve the Communist party, to forbid its overt
activities, and to reduce it to an underground operation without legal
status, and (c) those designed to physically eradicate Communists and
their organization. Naturally these groups of measures tend to overlap,
but most proposals for Communist control may be conveniently placed
in one or another of these categories.
In the first of these categories would be measures designed to weaken
the leadership of the party and its satellite groups, to eliminate their
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influence in national and local governments, to end their control of

trade unions, and to harass the operation of their propaganda and front
organizations. Such measures might include: (1) the strengthening of
laws against sabotage and defeatist propaganda and against libel and
slander, holding party leaders responsible for such acts; (2) strong revi-
sions of electoral laws, chiefly in France and Italy, to reduce Communist
parliamentary strength; (3) the establishment of a complete list of orga-
nizations Communist-dominated or infiltrated on the basis of which
Communists could be barred from government jobs and from sensitive
private employment (teaching, press and radio, scientific research and
the like); (4) the revision of laws governing social security administra-
tions and labor-management councils to give supremacy to non-Com-
munist unions; (5) strengthening of laws governing strikes in such a
way as to outlaw political work slowdowns or stoppages and provide
for a cooling‐off period in labor disputes; (6) stricter regulations gov-
erning the press in order to prevent the dissemination of obviously
distorted and treasonable news reports; (7) stricter police regulations
relative to official permission for the holding of demonstrations and
mass meetings.
Measures of this sort directed to minimizing Communist strength
and capabilities would have considerable effect, especially amongst
peripheral groups and individuals. Fear for personal economic security
amongst fellow-travelers and »hangers-on«, together with the party’s
own preoccupation with adapting its operations to new conditions and
even with simple survival would combine to reduce significantly the
influence of Communist organizations. However, the party and its front
organizations would continue to exist and in those countries in which
they presently possess their strongest influence — France and Italy —
these measures would have minimal effect. Party membership would
continue to run into many hundreds of thousands, electoral strength
would be substantial, and influence in trade unions would be signifi‐
cant.
Given these circumstances it is likely that pressures would develop
in France and Italy for the official dissolution of the party and its affil‐
iated organizations, with penalties of imprisonment or fine imposed
for party membership or activity. While it is unlikely that any present
Western European government with the possible exception of that at
Bonn would feel it necessary to suppress its domestic Communist
party, war or extreme Communist provocation might change the view-
points of many. Suppression of the Communist party is now new in
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democratic Europe — the Lapua movement in Finland in the thirties,

the French suppression of the party in 1939 – 1940, the Swiss wartime
dissolution of extremist organizations — all these are evidences of will-
ingness, under certain conditions, to move solidly against the Commu-
nist party and its fellow-travelers.
IV. Consequence of the Dissolution of Communist Parties

in Western Europe
In the UK, Western Germany, and the smaller democracies of Western

Europe, the outlawing of the Communist party would not involve any
far-reaching political adjustment nor would it endanger the traditional
democratic bases of these countries. The seats currently held by the
Communists in the legislatures of most of these countries could be
left vacant until the next election, or, in the event that a new general
election were held, the shift in former Communist votes to other groups
would not create a major alteration in the political balance in these
countries.
It is difficult to estimate the change that would be brought about in the
political balance in France and Italy by the dissolution of the Commu-
nist party.
Suppression of the Communist party and of its front groups and affil‐
iated organizations in France and Italy would undoubtedly weaken
the party’s hold on many of its present supporters. Though the hard-
core Communists would remain loyal, and though many not of this
category would remain convinced that the party was right in its line
and would consider themselves as Communists, party work would
pass through a period of shock and disorder. Inability to hold public
meetings, publish, speak, and agitate would seriously and significantly
limit the party’s capacity to maximize public discontent. In time, as
the party perfected its underground organization and especially as it
found ways to circumvent police regulation and developed methods
for infiltrating non-Stalinist political and trade-union organizations,
it would regain some of its lost ground. Given the opportunities for
maneuver that would exist in France and Italy after dissolution, it is
highly unlikely that suppression would lead the Communist parties or
their front organizations into an open insurrectionary movement. Such
a move, moreover, would be taken only at the command of the Kremlin
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and probably only at a time when the USSR had determined to take
military action against Western Europe.
In any event, there is little doubt that the first move of the Communists
would be to try to re-establish themselves under a different name.
This course of action was followed in France in 1939 and in Canada,
where the Communist party, once suppressed, has become the Labor-
Progressive party of today. In Italy, the former Communists would
undoubtedly join the fellow-travelling Nenni Socialist organization. In
such instances, the government would have to go forward to dissolve
any and all Stalinist »new« groups as well as those proscribed in the
first suppression.
The Communists would then presumably join the genuinely non-Com-
munist Socialist parties. Should this democratic Left, especially the
Social Democrats, be able to find new strength and new will, it is
possible they might set up broad-based Socialist and worker parties
comparable to those in the UK and Western Germany; this is unlikely
however. In both France and Italy, the suppressed Communists would
be more numerous than the Socialists and the greater likelihood would
be that the Communists would take over the democratic Socialist par-
ties, posing to the French and Italian governments the problem of fur-
ther suppressive moves, this time against the subverted but previously
anti-Communist Socialist parties. At best, the present Socialist leader-
ship and rank‐and‐file in Italy or France would be able to do little more
than keep their present strength (perhaps slightly increased) — and
that by rigorously excluding the elements which might enable them
to build a worker party, but which, were they admitted, would soon
destroy the character of the democratic Socialist parties themselves.
Under these circumstances, the political spectrum in France and Italy
would be one from the right (of extreme right if Fascist and neo-Fascist
groups were not simultaneously banned) to the democratic Socialist
left, with a vacant space on the far left. In elections, the Communist
voter, without candidates of his own, might well support Socialists in
the hope of building up anti-rearmament groups and personalities of
the Bevanite type within the Socialist parties. Should this maneuver
develop, the struggle within the Socialist parties would become fierce.
As indicated above, if the Communists attained some success in this
struggle, strong appeals would be made to the government to dissolve
the new left Socialists on the grounds of neo-Stalinism.
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V. Pressure for Physical Eradication of the Communist Parties
As the Communist apparatus regained a measure of its influence in

France and Italy, pressure would undoubtedly develop from the right
— and especially the extreme right — for even more vigorous mea-
sures against the party than would be associated with its legal disso-
lution. The effectiveness and efficiency of control measures would be
much questioned and a demand would be made for »tougher« enforce-
ment of dissolution decrees, stronger penalties against those continuing
allegedly Communist activity, and the like. While there would be con-
siderable debate on those questions, it is highly unlikely that complete
elimination of the Communists would be undertaken as a policy by
any government that wished to remain democratic. Such a program
would involve the establishment of a Gestapo-MVD system and the
emergence of state controls of a Fascio-Communist type. If the »hamper
and hinder« and »legal« suppression measures were to be completely
ineffective, the debate over such further stops might become important.
For the immediate future, however, the issue of control of Communist
parties in Western Europe appears to be limited to the first two of
the three possible categories of control mechanisms — »hamper and
hinder« and »legal« suppression.
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506
[13.]
The Current Status of the Socialist Unity Party
(SED) in Eastern Germany*
[1952]
Abstract
In 1951 the SED conducted an exhaustive investigation of the personal

and political records of its entire membership. The most tangible result
was a reduction in the size of the party by perhaps as much as 22
percent. Those affected most directly were probably former Socialists
and old-time Communists.
A distinctive feature of the purge was the apparent immunity of the
top leadership. Nor have any trials of the Rajk and Kostov type been
held. The chief reason for this is probably the Communist desire to
avoid, at least for the present, practices which would be interpreted in
West Germany as dramatic evidence of East Germany’s conversion into
a People’s Democracy, in all but name.
The SED’s own analysis of its investigation shows that the party orga-
nization is beset with shortcomings endemic in any mass Communist
party holding governmental power. Of still greater importance in the
long run is the apparent lack of substantial roots among the population.
This is especially true of the working class, among which the SED has
been unable to increase its already limited influence. Thus administra-
tive devices were employed to keep worker representation at a constant
level. Another basic liability is the SED’s subservience to Moscow.
Party leaders propose to overcome these difficulties by a greater dif-
fusion of Communist doctrine and by selling the USSR to the East
Germans. Despite the party’s weaknesses, the elimination strengthened
the inner coherence of the SED and consequently its capabilities as an
instrument of Soviet policy.
* [Als Intelligence Report No. 5727 am 16. Januar 1952 für das Department of State
fertiggestellt.– Zu diesem Text vergleiche in der Einleitung S. 114-116.]
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[13.] Status of the Socialist Unity Party in Eastern Germany [1952] 507
Report
I. Introduction
Beginning in January 1951 the SED conducted an exhaustive investiga-

tion of its entire membership. This task was accomplished by some
6,000 special commissions who operated at all administrative levels
of the party, interrogating regular members as well as candidates (pro-
bationers) on such matters as their political past, understanding of
the SED’s program, participation in its activities, and knowledge of
Communist theory. In addition, the commissions were charged with
determining the future status of all members. On the basis of their
investigations, and subject to review at a higher level, the commissions
were empowered to; (1) confirm membership in the party and pro-
mote candidates who had served the necessary waiting time to regular
membership; (2) demote regular members to candidature, and extend
a candidate’s waiting time; (3) cancel the membership of those »who
show themselves unable to understand and to further the work of the
party« but otherwise qualify as »honest citizens«, and (4) expel from
the party »alien, hostile, morally corrupt, and careerist elements«.1
The SED Central Committee (CC) met in the middle of March to review
the progress of the investigation to date, and adopted a resolution
which dealt almost wholly with the shortcomings and deficiencies of
the investigating commissions.2
The commissions were charged with a strong tendency to forgive and
forget the political records of members who had not always subscribed
to a pro-Moscow orientation of German Communism, or who had after
1933 joined the Nazi party and had rejoined the Communist ranks after
1945. In addition the CC sharply criticized certain disciplinary actions
which the commissions had taken against workers on the grounds of
insufficient knowledge of Communist theory; it ordered that such cases
be reviewed.
After the investigation had been completed the CC met again, from
October 18 to 20, to appraise the results and to delineate the tasks now
1 Neues Deutschland (official organ of the SED), November 15, 1950.

2 Neues Deutschland, April 20, 1951.
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508 [13.] Status of the Socialist Unity Party in Eastern Germany [1952]
confronting the party. The published accounts of this meeting throw

considerable light on the present status of the SED.3
II. Status of the SED
Size. Party leaders have not revealed the total membership of the SED
but they have, perhaps inadvertently, furnished information which can
be used to arrive at an estimate.4 On the basis of this information,
the SED had about 1,372,000 regular members and candidates as of
November 1, 1951, when the recruitment of new members, which had
been in abeyance since November 15, 1950, was resumed. As of April 1,
1950 the party claimed a total membership of 1,750,000.
This reduction in size came about through outright expulsions from
the party, cancellations of membership without prejudice, and vol-
untary resignations. The intelligence service in Eastern Germany of
the West German Social Democratic Party – the so-called Ostbüro of
the SPD – reported that Matern had told the CC that only 60,000
members had been expelled during the investigation.5 This statement
was not reported in the SED press. It is not clear from the Ostbüro
whether »expulsion« is used in the strict sense of the SED definition or
in the general sense of elimination from the party, which would include
cancellation of membership without prejudice. The CC has stated
openly, however, that an unspecified number of members, unwilling
to submit to investigation, had resigned from the party.
Assuming the reliability of the Ostbüro’s information with regard to
the figure of 60,000, it appears that during the past year perhaps as
3 The basic documents on the meeting, as reported in Neues Deutschland, are:

extracts from Politbüro member Hermann Matern’s »Report on the Results of
the Investigation of Party Members and Candidates,« October 28, 1951; a CC
resolution entitled »The Results and Lessons of the Investigation of the Party
Members and Candidates and the Tasks Emerging Therefrom«, October 30, 1951;
extracts from Politbüro member Fred Oelssner’s report »The Ideological Tasks of
the Party,« October 31, 1951; and a CC resolution entitled »The Most Important
Ideological Tasks of the Party«, November 15, 1951.
4 In the course of the investigation many members publicly promised to carry
out some specific task, such as studying the classics of Communism or working
extra shifts at the factory. In reporting on this development, Matern told the CC:
»32.4 percent of the regular members and 51 percent of the candidates assumed
voluntary obligations.« Subsequently the CC stated in its resolution: »During
the investigation 406,662 regular party members and 59,631 candidates assumed
voluntary obligations.«.
5 Neuer Vorwärts (official organ of the SPD), November 16, 1951.
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many as 300,000 more SED members either had their membership »can-
celled« or resigned.
Apparently this group consists chiefly of workers. In part, this would
derive from the fact that workers comprise the single largest segment
in the SED. Moreover, in referring to those members who had refused
to submit to investigation, the CC singled out workers for special men-
tion. In all probability the group includes a large number of those
Socialists and old-time Communists, who in the first post-war flush of
enthusiasm for Socialist-Communist cooperation agreed to the merger
establishing the SED in 1946, but have since then become disillusioned
by the progressive elimination of Socialist influence in the SED and
the party’s subservience to Moscow. As a result, these individuals with-
drew from participation in the party’s affairs, even to the point of dis-
continuing their dues. According to the Ostbüro 70 percent of those SED
members who were Communists before 1933 have either been expelled
or have resigned.
Social Composition. The inability of the SED to enhance, or even main-
tain, its influence among the working class is further illustrated by
the CC’s remarks on the social composition of the party. Despite the
efforts of party leaders to increase the extent of worker representation,
the situation is still considered desirable for membership, such as the
peasantry (which in mid-1950 stood at 10 percent), has diminished still
further. The only category whose representation has grown is that of
salaried employees.
To compensate for the loss of worker representation because of pro-
motions to administrative positions in government and industry, and
consequent reclassification as salaried employees, the percentage of
workers among the regular membership was kept constant by the
administrative device of transferring a disproportionate number of
workers from candidate to regular membership status. As a further
safeguard »to insure the leading role of the working class«, the recruit-
ment of new members has been restricted to industrial and agricultural
workers, technicians, and scientists.
Aside from the inadequate representation of workers in the party, SED
leaders have complained that workers and peasants are being subjected
to discriminatory treatment. As evidence for this they cited the fact that
during the investigation the ratio of expulsions to cancellations was
higher among workers and peasants than among salaried employees.
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The chief reason for this was the unreasonably high standards which
the investigation commissions applied to workers, resulting, for exam-
ple, in the expulsion of some workers because they were insufficiently
versed in Communist theory. At the same time, the commissions were
hoodwinked by those members – probably party bureaucrats for the
most part – who in response to stock questions merely parroted the
party line. Although this situation was said to have changed after the
CC had sharply called attention to it in March, the tendency of party
functionaries to identify themselves with the interests of the salaried
employees rather than with those of the workers nevertheless persists.
Further evidence of the secondary influence of the working class is
Matern’s complaint that very few teachers in the party schools are of
working class origin.
Problems of Leadership. Although the purge reduced the membership of
the SED by perhaps as much as 22 percent, the top leadership appears
so far to be immune. During its first month the investigation was high-
lighted by the public »confessions« of three top SED members: Gerhard
Eisler, East German propaganda chief; Max Seydewitz, Minister Presi-
dent of Land Saxony; and Robert Siewert, Vice Premier and Minister of
Interior of Land Saxony-Anhalt. All three stated that they had engaged,
both within and outside the pre-1933 German Communist Party, in
activities which had militated against a pro-Moscow orientation of the
party and had thus reduced its effectiveness. The miscreants were care-
ful to point out, however, that they had long ago seen the error of their
ways. Moreover, the three »confessions« were unique in that during
the entire period of the investigation they were the only ones reported
by the SED press. This fact, combined with the continuance in office
of Eisler, Seydewitz, and Siewert, suggests that the primary purpose
of their »confessions« was to induce other members to do likewise in
order to uncover currently incriminating information.
Nor have any purge trials so far been reported. While the lack of
such trials does not preclude their future appearance, the chief reason
for their absence may be that the Communists do not yet consider
the psychological climate auspicious among the population at large,
and probably desire to avoid practices which would be interpreted
in West Germany as dramatic evidence that East Germany had been
transformed in all but name into a People’s Democracy.
In 1950, for example, Willi Kreikemeyer, former chief of the East Ger-
man railroads and long-standing SED official, was arrested in the
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Soviet Zone. A West German source has recently published informa-

tion which strongly suggests that he was secretly murdered in an East
German prison. If in fact he was killed it is noteworthy that the East
German authorities did not hold even a mock trial.
The much-vaunted »inner party democracy« of the SED is to all intents
and purposes a dead lotter. Those party officials who are elective, by
the terms of the party statute, are simply selected by fellow officials.
Moreover, even these theoretically elective officials do not provide the
real leadership of the party, which is carried on by officials appointed to
conduct the party’s day to day business.
At the intermediate county (Kreis) level the party leadership is particu-
larly weak. Moreover, party functionaries are loath to make way for
promising younger elements. Although the investigation uncovered a
wealth of new talent in the party, insufficient use has been made of it.
Functionaries adopt a dictatorial manner and neglect the human factor.
On the other hand, party members have been reprimanded by the CC
for being unduly subservient to higher officials. In this general connec-
tion the SED is currently urging wider application of »criticism and
self-criticism« not only by party members but also by the population at
large. Workers especially are being encouraged to air their grievances
publicly concerning the shortcomings of their superiors.
»Social Democratism«. One of the chief preoccupations of party leaders
is the fight within the party against the »remnants of Social Democra-
tism«, which is said to be particularly strong in the trade unions. The
importance which the SED attaches to the elimination of this phenome-
non is indicated by the fact that it was not only mentioned in the recent
CC meeting, but was thoroughly covered in a Politbüro resolution on
November 27, 1951.6
In general »Social Democratism« manifests itself in a refusal to accept
the inequities and inequalities of the new social structure. Specific
aspects of this refusal are unwillingness to recognize that some indus-
trial employees – particularly the »technical intelligentsia« – are enti-
tled to receive special perquisites, and opposition to the practice of
granting bonuses and setting up differential wage scales.7 Ironically,
6 »Improvement of the Work of the Trade Unions by Their Leadership and Mem-
bers of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany«, Neues Deutschland, November 29,
1951.
7 For a detailed treatment of the labor policies and practices of the East German
regime, see OIR-5460, The Status of Labor in Eastern Germany, October 17, 1951.
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the Communists claim that it is precisely these practices by employers

before World War I which were instrumental in disrupting the unity
and effectiveness of German Socialism. These are described as capitalist
devices to establish among the workers a special group which, in order
to maintain its privileged status, had to make common cause with
capital rather than labor.
Additional evidence of adherence to »old habits« is the tendency of
trade union functionaries in the state-controlled enterprises to concern
themselves with specific economic interests of the workers, such as
food and housing, without regard for the interrelationship of these
problems with larger, overall considerations.
The cure for these alleged evils, the Politbüro has recommended,
is wider diffusion of Soviet methods, and persuading the workers
that »because of the splitting of Germany… a series of additional exer-
tions must be undertaken«.
Attitudes. Among the chief questions which members were asked
during the investigation were those designed to reveal attitudes toward
the USSR, the Oder-Neisse line, and the East German unity campaign.
Anti-Soviet sentiment still exists within the SED, though repeatedly
only in individual cases. The Oder-Neisse line is given »formal« recog-
nition, but its significance is minimized on the ground that frontiers
between friendly states are of little practical importance.
The East German unity campaign meets with widespread skepticism
among party members. »Many« members feel that unity can come only
through war. Also, the Stalinist thesis of »just and unjust wars« is not
properly understood. There are still »pacifistic tendencies« which mani-
fest themselves in the rejection even of »wars of liberation«.
External Activities. The SED claims to be particularly influential in the
state and Soviet-controlled enterprises. In private industry, however,
exactly the opposite is true. Non-SED managers frequently exert influ‐
ence even among party members.
In the field of public administration there is a widespread political-con-
sciousness among party members. Actual leadership is often in the
hands of members who occupy an important administrative post but
are not leaders in the party organization.
With regard to the work of the party in the mass organizations, Matern
told the CC: »The work of the party organizations in the apparatuses of
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the mass organizations is being completely neglected.« Party meetings

are held only at irregular intervals and then only to rubber-stamp party
resolutions handed down from above. This is particularly true in the
Free German Trade Union. With remarkable candor one party official
was reported to have explained the failure to hold meetings on the
ground that the members didn’t show up anyway.
In their relations with other parties in the Soviet Zone party members
often overlook the fact that officially Eastern Germany is a multi-party
state. In the formulation of joint governmental policies with representa-
tives of non-Communist parties they often pay little, if any, attention to
the views of these parties.
In Berlin SED members are making very little effort to establish »unity
of action« with members of the SPD in the Western sectors of the city,
on the ground that they are unable to deal effectively with the argu-
ments of the Socialists.
Future Tasks. Many of the above defects, according to party leaders,
stem from inadequate understanding of Marxism-Leninism, as inter-
preted by Stalin, and inability to apply this doctrine to contemporary
problems. The principal effort of the party within its own ranks will
be directed, therefore, toward raising the »ideological level« of its mem-
bership.
Among the population as a whole, a similar effort will be conducted to
diffuse a greater knowledge of Communist doctrine and to present the
USSR in the most favorable light.
In an attempt to offset the liability of Soviet tutelage, which is bound
to increase still further as the SED steps up its efforts to sell the USSR
to the East Germans, the party will give increased emphasis to the
promotion of German cultural nationalism. The development of »a real,
democratic, national consciousness« among the East Germans, Oelssner
indicated in his report to the CC, is one of the most important tasks
confronting the SED. He went on to point out that in large part this
means nothing less than the entire rewriting of German history – with
due emphasis, of course, on the role of those representatives of the
working class who have been enshrined in the Communist pantheon.
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III. Conclusion
Apathy and indifference, lack of initiative of party leaders on the inter-

mediate levels, insufficient political consciousness, unwillingness of
functionaries to relinquish their prerogatives, widespread place-seek-
ing, continuing difficulties with »Social Democratism« both inside and
outside the party, lack of understanding for the policies and actions of
the top leadership – these seem to be the major weaknesses of the SED.
In part they are endemic in any mass Communist party holding gov-
ernmental power. Beyond this, they result from the SED’s continuing
efforts to derive support from the East German working class which
continues, though passively, to oppose the application of Soviet labor
practices and policies. Another basic consideration is the SED’s status
as an instrument of Soviet policy in Germany. So long as those con-
ditions prevail, it seems unlikely that any amount of indoctrination
will significantly reduce the shortcomings of which the party leaders
complain.
Perhaps of still greater importance in the long run is the fact that the
SED still appears to lack substantial roots among the population, which
continues to identify itself with the West despite Communist efforts to
convince the Germans that their salvation lies in the East. The eradica-
tion of this state of mind is the largest, and from the party viewpoint,
most important task to which the SED is now addressing itself.
It is uncertain to what extent outward protestations of loyalty by mem-
bers of a mass Communist party reflect inner conviction. However, the
elimination of openly lukewarm or deliberately ambiguous elements,
which probably applies in the main to disillusioned Socialists and
Communists unsympathetic to the Stalinist orientation of the SED,
has undoubtedly strengthened the inner cohesion of the party. Conse-
quently, Moscow can now rely to an increased extent on the SED for the
execution of Soviet policy in Germany.
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515
[14.]
Communist Influence in Sensitive Positions in
Western Europe*
[1952]
Abstract
Communist influence in sensitive positions in Western Europe has been

greatly reduced during the postwar period and a further decline in this
influence has taken place since OIR produced a report on this subject
in July 1951.1 Although the methods used by the Western Europe gov-
ernments in removing Communists from public offices, security, and
trade union posts have varied, like the results achieved, from country
to country, the efforts made along this line have been generally energic
and effective. However, in the fields of heavy industry and transporta-
tion there remain certain important centers of Communist trade union
strength, particularly in Italy and France.
Although the Communists are represented in the parliaments of nearly
all the Western European countries, they do not by virtue of this fact
alone have access to positions of influence. In fact, it is only in Iceland
that Communists continue to occupy a rather large number of positions
in the government services, primarily in the fields of education, radio
and aviation. In France and Italy where, as in Iceland, the Communists
constitute large political parties, the governments and parliaments have
devised techniques for excluding Communists from positions of par-
liamentary leadership and for reducing Communist representation in
local governmental bodies. The French and Italian governments also
maintain close scrutiny of the armed forces, police, civil service, and
nationalized industries with a view to reassigning suspected Commu-
nists and dismissing those who engage in specific anti-national actions.
The Benelux countries have likewise taken aggressive measures against
the Communists with the result that Communists have either been
excluded from various local and national governmental posts or their
influence has been circumvented. In Western Germany the Commu-
* [Als Intelligence Report No. 5511 R am 6. Mai 1952 für das Department of State
fertiggestellt. – Zu diesem Text vergleiche in der Einleitung S. 124-126.]
1 OIR Report No. 5511.
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516 [14.] Communist Influence in Sensitive Positions in Western Europe [1952]
nists have no influence in sensitive positions. The same is true of Aus-

tria, except that a few Communist police officials in the Eastern zone
of the country have remained in office on Soviet orders and despite
efforts by the Austrian government to remove them. In the UK, where
the Communist Party is one of the smallest in Western Europe, and
throughout all the Scandinavian countries except Iceland, Communists
still occupy some civil service posts, but government policy seeks to
prevent them from working on security matters.
In the trade unions the task of reducing Communist influence has been
and continues to be more difficult. In spite, however, of the hold which
the Communist unions still have on a number of sensitive areas of
the Western European economy, the decline of Communist influence
has also been pronounced in the labor field. Communist trade unions
pose the greatest problems in Italy and France, where the Communists,
through their control of the largest labor organizations, dominate the
workers in heavy industry and exercise only somewhat less powerful
influence over maritime and transport workers. However, less than half
of all Italian and French workers are currently enrolled in labor unions,
and that segment of organized labor which adheres to Communist con-
trolled unions is both smaller and less responsive to Communist direc-
tion than it was a few years ago. In Iceland Communists control the
largest union, that for unskilled workers, as well as a number of smaller
unions, but they have lost control of the central labor federation. In the
UK the Trade Union Congress has conducted an effective campaign to
oust Communists from key positions in various unions, and today no
union is under exclusive Communist control. In the remaining Western
European countries the Communists exercise no control over major
trade unions and merely exercise leadership in small and isolated
unions or in local units of non-Communist national federations.
Report
I. FRANCE
Although the Communists remain a powerful force in France, their

strength has greatly decreased since the early post-war years, and the
past year has seen the further decline of their influence. The most
important elements in the French Communists strength continue to
be the control of the largest French labor union, the Confédération
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[14.] Communist Influence in Sensitive Positions in Western Europe [1952] 517
générale du travail (CGT) and the large Communist vote at the polls.
However, in spite of their large popular vote, the Communists repre-
sentation in the National Assembly has been out nearly in half during
the past year, and their role has been increasingly restricted to that of
an intransigent and often isolated opposition. In their attempts at mass
agitation the Communist have been curbed by the increasing reluc-
tance of workers to participate Communist-led political strikes and
by widespread public opposition to Communist-sponsored demonstra-
tions. In the past year, no mass demonstration has successfully defied
police interdiction. Communists continue to hold some positions in
key nationalized industries and in the public administration, but gov-
ernment action throughout 1951 has diminished both the number and
influence of known Communists in important public posts. The circu-
lation figures of the Communist press also show a marked decline in
Communist influence; the major Party organs now have only approxi-
mately one-fourth the circulation they had in 1946.
A. Communist Influence in the Government
1. No Communist has belonged to the Cabinet since May 1947.

2. In the elections of June 17, 1951 for the National Assembly, the
Communist Party polled 4,926,500 votes (25.7 percent) of a total of
18,000,000 – equivalent to a 2.9 percent decline in popular support since
1946. However, the Communists remained the strongest single political
party in terms of the total number of votes received. Nevertheless,
the revised electoral law reduced their representation in the National
Assembly from 180 deputies to 97. Although the officers and committee
members are chosen in such a way as to reflect the political composi-
tion of the Assembly Communist influence has been nullified by dele-
gating power to a subcommittee on which no Communists serve.
3. The most effective Communist threat to governmental stability rests
in the solid parliamentary block of 97 opposition votes. Whenever the
Gaullists and Socialists join the Communists in opposition to the right
center government, the combined vote is sufficient to overthrow the
government.
4. The pattern of losses of Communist representation is repeated in
local and regional governments. In the cantonal elections of October 7
and 14, 1951, while the Communists captured the largest percentage
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845290027
of vote cast (an increase of 0.4 percent over 1949) their representation
on departmental councils declined from 176 to 78, out of a total of
1,500 seats. Of 466,209 seats on municipal councils, Communists hold
about 30,500 and claim approximately 2,000 mayors out of 37,930. Gov-
ernment policy is to remove or suspend from office any Communist
mayors who use their positions to openly aid pro-Communist activities.
B. Labor
Although the Communists retain a dominant influence in the field of

trade unionism, their strength in this area has also been declining. In
the past year the Communist-dominated CGT, despite its position as
the largest and strongest union, was unable to maintain any major
strike without support from non-Communist unions. Nor have the
Communists been able in the past year to persuade the mass of workers
to follow them in protest strikes of a political nature, as proved in the
failure of the general strike attempt on February 12, 1952. The CGT
remains indisputably the most dynamic force in French labor, but its
efforts to absorb the free trade unions have failed. However, CGT’s
continuing efforts to secure unity of action meet with limited success
at the plant level and the threat exists that local cooperation might
snowball into a national labor front if the precarious economic position
of the French worker seriously deteriorates.
Communist influence in key sectors of French industry is still a prob-
lem, but is being reduced by the continuing anti-Communist action
of the government. In two former strongholds, atomic energy and
the national aircraft industries, Communists have been removed from
posts of responsibility. However, Communists still hold positions of
influence in the Social Security and Health administrations and in the
nationalized coal mines. In the latter, Communists are a minority in the
directing bodies. In Air France Communist infiltration still exists among
the pilots, operations and maintenance staffs, and possibly within the
directorate. In the vital public utilities of gas, electricity and railroad,
Communists no longer present a serious risk. However, Communists
continue to control individual important centers of transportation and
the Communist-controlled CGT is the strongest union in mining, met-
allurgy and other branches of heavy industry. In these areas they can
and do call nuisance strikes, and Communist sabotage constitutes a
potential hazard.
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C. Defense and Internal Security
Communists have been largely weeded out of the armed forces and
police. Of the relatively few Communist officers in the Army, Navy, Air
Forces almost all are of junior rank. No Communist senior office occu-
pies a post of command. In line with government policy to eliminate
Communists from influential posts, an Army general was retired in the
year for appearing in a Communist-front demonstration.
The police force still has some Communists in its ranks, but they have
been relegated to non-security assignments. The reliability and effec‐
tiveness of the police have been amply demonstrated in the past year
in every instance where the Communists tried to hold a public demon-
stration in defiance of a government interdiction, they were foiled by
prompt and decisive police action.
II. ITALY
Although the Italian Communist Party is the largest Communist orga-

nization in Western Europe and the largest political party in Italy, its
membership has declined during the past four years. According to
the most recent Italian Communist claims the Party has a membership
of over 2.1 million persons, while the party’s youth organization has
enrolled some 460,000 young people. The current number of adult
members claimed by the party represents a drop of 10 percent from the
record strength 2,330,000 claimed in early 1948. Its present estimated
size, however, is probably no more than 1.7 million, compared to an
estimated peak strength of 2.0 million in 1947 – 1948, and its genuinely
active party members probably do not exceed 500,000.
Italian Communist electoral strength has apparently increased by slight
margin within the past few years. In the local elections held in May and
June the Communists and their allies, the Left-Wing (Nenni) Socialists
and the so-called »Independent Leftists«, polled almost 37 percent of
the vote, compared to slightly less than 35 percent won in the same
areas by a similar combination in the national elections of 1948.
Yet, despite its continued strength at the polls, the overall political
influence of the Communist Party in Italy today is substantially less
than it was in the immediate postwar period. No Communists or
Nenni Socialists have been included in the Government since May
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1947. Although these two parties constitute, with their 179 seats, a large
opposition in Parliament, they are definitely in a minority compared to
the Christian Democrats, who have 301 seats. The Communist Party is
represented in the committees of both houses of Parliament in propor-
tion to its legislative strength. However, there are no Communists in
executive posts, in the national administration, and few if any known
party members in the upper and intermediate levels of the civil service.
A few Communists may be found in the lower levels of the government
bureaucracy.
In the field of local government, the 1951 municipal elections drastically
reduced the number of Communists and Nenni Socialists on communal
councils. Despite their strong popular vote, the electoral system worked
to the disadvantage of these parties, ousting them from control of a
number of important cities, such as Genoa, Florence, Turin and Venice.
Nevertheless, they retained control of Bologna, Leghorn and several
other major localities.
The electoral strength of the Communists and their Socialist allies is
attributable to the fact that these parties serve as the most important
vehicle of the large »protest« vote against existing conditions in Italy
and against the present government. For the most part this electoral
support has not represented a vote for Communist ideology or for
Soviet foreign policy. In fact, it is in popularizing its ideological dog-
mas and in supporting the Soviet Union that the Italian Communist
Party has been most clearly unsuccessful. Moreover, while the Italian
Communists have made an appeal to wide sections of the population,
their conciliatory strategy has failed to persuade democratic elements
to cooperate with them upon major issues of national policy, espe-
cially questions of foreign relations. For, despite the basic attractive‐
ness of »anti-war« propaganda to many of the Italian people, the left-
wing »peace« campaign has made few inroads into non-Communist
political groups.
Communist efforts to infiltrate the national armed forces have been
largely unsuccessful. In general the administration and leadership of
the armed forces has been traditionally conservative and strongly anti-
Communist. Since 1947 many party members have been weeded out
of these services by the vigorous efforts of the Ministry of Defense.
Similarly, Italy’s internal security organizations – the Carabinieri and
the Public Security police force – have not offered favorable fields for
Communist exploitation.
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Communist influence in the labor movement has been challenged and

somewhat diminished, but is still formidable. As has been the case
since 1947, Communists dominate the country’s largest trade union
organization, the Italian General Confederation of Labor (CGIL). At
present it has an estimated dues-paying membership of between 3.5
and 4.0 million workers, although the latest claim was 5.0 million. This
may be compared to the CGIL’s peak postwar membership, claimed
in 1947, of 6.5 million. Affiliated with the CGIL and controlled by
Communists are a number of the major Italian unions, especially in
heavy industry, and including the strategic Railroad Workers Union.
Since 1948, however, the CGIL has lost the monopoly position in Italian
labor it had possessed up to that time, and during the past year the
democratic, non-Communist trade union federations have been offer‐
ing increasingly effective competition to it. It has also been weakened
by losses of members both to these unions and to the ranks of the
unorganized. Finally, in recent years the CGIL has become less effective
as an instrument of Communist political strategy.
III. UNITED KINGDOM
The British Communist Party is one of the smallest and most ineffec‐
tive of the Communist parties in Western Europe. In December 1951,
its membership amounted to about 35,000; it had no representation
in Parliament and little in local government. The Communist-spon-
sored »peace« campaign had largely failed in Britain, as had Commu-
nist attempts to discredit and disrupt the current rearmament program
of the government. Despite the austerity of post-World War II condi-
tions in Britain and some increase in class tensions, the British Commu-
nists have been unable to shake the basic stability that characterizes
British government and society.
Although Communist influence in a few British trade unions is still a
possible threat to industrial efficiency and output, the potential danger
is small and it is decreasing. A few British Communists are believed to
have infiltrated the civil services, but Government policy prevents them
from working on vital security matters. There are no reports indicating
infiltration of the police or armed services.
Domination of the British trade unions has always been a primary
British Communist objective, but the effort to achieve this aim has
passed the peak of its effectiveness and no union is under exclu-
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sive Communist control. Within the past four years the Trade Union
Congress has conducted an effective campaign to oust Communist
from key positions in various unions. The Labor Party has followed
a similar course in local party organizations. Communists still retain
posts as shop stewards and foreman in certain heavy industries, and
some leadership in unions for dockers, electrical trades, fire brigades,
foundry workers, engineering workers, mine workers, and civil service
clerical workers. Even in these unions, however, members of the rank
and file are fully alert to Communist efforts to influence them and to
foment strikes for purely Communist political purposes. While certain
workers respond to Communist leadership on issues closely affecting
grievances ever questions of pay, workers’ committees, and cost of
living problems, the Communist Party’s ability to foment strikes of
significant dimensions is steadily diminishing.
After the government policy of permitting no Communist or Fascist
to work on vital security matters was announced in March 1948, 86
alleged Communists were investigated. Five of these have resigned, 19
were reinstated, 7 were dismissed (including one Fascist), one retired,
32 were transferred to non-secret departmental work, and 22 cases were
awaiting action. These figures do not indicate extensive Communist
infiltration in vital security areas. Communists are not barred from
non-secret government work. Some estimates, which are of uncertain
reliability have placed the number of Communists on the public payroll
as high as 10 to 14 thousand. The Civil Service Clerical Association, a
recognized trade union for clerical civil servants, has been Communist-
led, although recently the union ousted 8 Communist branch leaders.
Communists were in leading positions in the Post Office Engineering
Union until defeated in 1948. The Institution of Professional Civil Ser-
vants has long followed the Communist line. The British Association
of Scientific Workers, which included scientists from the civil service,
was once Communist-led but its membership now appears alert to this
danger, and Communist leadership has been substantially reduced.
The most serious cases of Soviet-inspired espionage concern the use
of British Communists who were key government scientists in the
wartime development of the atomic bomb. The only known spies are
Allan Nunn May, British-born, who was arrested in 1945 and is now
serving a 10-year sentence; Klaus Fuchs, German-born, arrested in 1950
and now imprisoned for 14 years; and Bruno Pontecorvo, Italian-born,
who served with the Anglo-Canadian atomic energy team in Montreal
and at Harwell. Pontecorvo fled the country with his family to some
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point behind the Iron Curtain in September 1950. These cases aroused
alarm and criticism of the government’s security precautions, which
the government has since tightened to prevent further leakages of vital
information. The possible damage to the security of the United King-
dom resulting from the May-Fuchs-Pontecorvo espionage activities is
conceded to be of major importance.
IV. WESTERN GERMANY
The Communist Party in Western Germany is not important, at present,

by reason of its numerical strength or any parliamentary or trade union
influence, but because it serves as an instrument of Soviet Zone’s Com-
munist organization. Although the West German Communist made
slight election gains in several localities last year, they remain a polit-
ically negligible factor. Under the new parliamentary regulations its
fourteen Bundestag representatives have lost the status of a parliamen-
tary group and consequently are ineligible for committee representa-
tion and cannot initiate legislation.
Communist influence in the federal or state administrations and in
the police is also of minor importance. The already weak Communist
position among organized labor has deteriorated further as a result of
a series of severe Communist setbacks in shop council elections, within
the past year.
Despite strong Communist efforts, Communist influence among such
groups as veterans, refugees, and students remains small. The party
appears to be most successful among pacifist and neutralist organiza-
tions.
V. AUSTRIA
Never before of any consequence in Austrian politics, the Communist

grew organizationally stronger during their illegal period under the
Austrian and German totalitarian regimes, and profited by postwar
conditions to win parliamentary representation for the first time in
1945. Since then, however, the Communists have not succeeded in
gaining further political support. The Party commands only five per-
cent of the popular vote and only four deputies in Parliament who,
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together with one left-wing Socialist, form the Left Block.2 In the Trade
Unions the Communists constitute a small minority (between 10 and
15 percent); they have no controlling influence over any one union.
In October 1950 Communist officials were ousted from the tripartitely
organized Trade Union Federation because they had supported the
Communist-inspired general strike attempt.
The only sensitive positions occupied by Communists are in the police
force in the Eastern Zone of Austria. Because of objections by the
Soviet occupation authorities, the Austrian government made only
slow progress in its efforts to remove Communists from important
posts. The few remaining police officials who are Communists might
disobey government orders in the event of internal disturbances; the
rest of the force will probably prove reliable unless Soviet forces inter-
vene openly. The police in the Western zones is completely reliable.
VI. BENELUX
In the Benelux countries the Communists have suffered a sharp decline

in strength since the early post-war period. Although Communists still
sit in the parliaments of the three countries, as well as in a number of
local governing bodies, they are in no position to affect the formulation
of national policy. They have either been excluded from such important
parliamentary committees as foreign affairs or defense or their influ‐
ence has been circumvented. Where Communists have secured election
to local government, steps have been taken – particularly in the Nether-
lands – to deprive them of any positions of power. The municipal
council of Amsterdam, for example, has removed Communists from
the Board of Aldermen and the Netherlands government took over
the functions of the municipality of Finsterwolde when it came under
Communist control. Recently the Dutch Government established a list
of organizations in which civil servants were forbidden to participate,
including the Communist party, the Communist trade unions and sev-
eral front organizations.
Individual Communists probably remain scattered through the
national and local bureaucracy of the three countries, but none are
known to be in vital or influential positions. In Belgium, where the
Communists achieved their greatest penetration into the civil service
2 Since 1947 there has been no Communist in the Government.
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under the left-wing governments from 1945 – 1947, the government in

February 1951 decreed that all subversives were to be removed from
government service. None of the military or police forces of the three
countries is known to have been infiltrated to any significant degree by
the Communists and none of these organizations has Communists in its
upper command levels. This is equally true for the fields of education
and government-owned communications.
The only significant areas of Communist strength in all three countries
are to be found in the trade unions. In no instance, however, are the
Communists a determining factor in the national labor movement,
which remains firmly in the hands of Socialist, Protestant, or Catholic
leaders. In the Netherlands, the Communists have their own union,
known as the EVC, whose membership probably does not exceed
70,000, and is dwindling. It is largely concentrated among the Ams-
terdam municipal, harbor, metal and construction workers. The EVC
is seriously handicapped because it is not recognized by the national
government as a bona fide union, and consequently is restricted in the
scope of its activities. Similar conditions prevail in the Belgium trade
union movement. A few small Communist unions exist, and in other
instances, as among the communications, public service and certain
white collar workers, the Communists have achieved some degree of
infiltration and control. In Luxembourg, Communist strength is cen-
tered in the trade unions of the principal industrial activities such as
iron and steel and mining. The great majority of the Luxembourg work-
ers belong to strongly anti-Communist unions.
VII. SCANDINAVIA
Communist electoral strength in Denmark, Norway and Sweden has

declined in roughly 50 percent in the postwar period. Losses in party
membership and in parliamentary representation have been even more
pronounced. Iceland continues to be somewhat of an exception; the
Communists have the third largest party in the country and retain
considerable strength in the trade union movement. In all countries
some governmental and private measures have been taken to remove
Communists from sensitive positions. In Norway there are no Commu-
nists in parliament. In the parliaments of the other three Scandinavian
countries the Communists either have been excluded from participa-
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tion in such important committees as those dealing with foreign affairs,

or their presence has been circumvented.
Despite these anti-Communist measures, all of which have been taken
within the framework of respect for the individuals’ constitutional
rights there are believed to be some Communists still scattered through
the executive branches of the government as well as in the lower
ranks of the police and military services, including the Home Guard.
None of these, however, is known to hold a position of influence.
The arrest in Sweden of six persons, of whom two were confessed
Communist espionage-agents, over the past six months does not call
into question the thoroughness with which Communists have been
removed from important administrative and policy-making positions
in Sweden. However, it does raise some doubts as to the government’s
effectiveness in preventing Communist penetration of sensitive areas. A
few known Communist workers continue to be employed in sensitive
positions in Sweden but demands for their removal have been intensi-
fied as a consequence of the arrest of the Communist espionage agents.
Powers of the security police also have been strengthened.
No similar arrests for espionage activities have been made in the other
three Scandinavian countries, all of which are members of NATO and
therefore presumably of equal or greater interest to the Soviet Union
than Sweden. It may be assumed, however, that greater vigilance
will be exercised by these countries’ security services as a result of
the Swedish experience. Iceland because of its small police force and
absence of a military establishment, is probably least well equipped to
deal with Communist espionage. The Communists, moreover, by virtue
of their participation in the cabinet until February 1947, managed to
place a number of their supporters in the government service, particu-
larly in the fields of broadcasting, education and aviation. While the
government is alert to their presence and desires their removal, it has
undertaken no vigorous steps to this end, being hampered by the very
considerable protection afforded to the employees under present civil
service regulations.
On the local levels of government in Scandinavia a few Communists
also continue to hold elected office. Some are elected directly from pro-
Communist areas; others have won seats through temporary electoral
combinations with other parties. Similarly, a few Communists have
been selected to serve on civil defense and other boards and commit-
tees, particularly in Sweden. In these positions, however, they are well
known both to the community and to the authorities.
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There are no national labor unions which are controlled by the Com-
munists in Sweden, Denmark and Norway. Communist strength in the
trade unions movement has declined appreciably since the postwar
period; only a few locals still remain under Communist direction. A
few of these are strategically placed, such as in the metal industries, the
building trade, and among some docker and shipyard workers. None
of them, however, is sufficiently powerful to exert a significant influ‐
ence on trade union policy.
In Iceland the Communists occupy a better entrenched position in the
trade union movement. They lost control of the national federation in
1948 but continue to dominate Iceland’s largest single union, that for
the unskilled workers, which includes the dockworkers and a number
of others. However, the national position of the Communists in Iceland
is appreciably weaker than in 1947, when they were eliminated from
the government. They have failed, for example, to prevent or interfere
with Iceland’s participation in NATO, the return of American troops
to the Keflavik airfield, or the government’s continued pro-Western
course.
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Estimates of Communist Strength in Western European Countries
528
Country Voting Strength (per- Party Membership (In thou- Votes in Main Legislative Body Circulation of Leading
centage of total vote sands) (As fractions of body’s total mem- Party Newspapers (In
polled) bership) thousands)
1946 Most 1946 Most Recent 1946 Most Recent 1946 Most Recent
Recent Satisfactory
Estimate
France 23.2 25.7 850 600 1,200 346
a b c a
Italy 34.8 36.9 2,300 1700 330 340
181 621 97 627
UK 0.4 0.07 48 20 0 121 65

219 556 180 574
W. Germany 7.9 5.7 300 130 – 20

2 640
Austria 5.4 5.08 90 80 200 150

6 104 15 402
Belgium 12.7 4.7 100 35 none under 30

4 165 5 165
available
23 202 7 212
Netherlands 11.4 7.7 50 33 400 115

d d
Denmark 12.5 4.6 60 16 35 21
10 100 8 100
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845290027
Norway 11.9 5.8 35 9 d 0 40 20
18 149 7 149
Iceland 20 20.0 1 1 7.5 5

11 150

Sweden 11.2 4.9 60 27 25 20
10 52 9 52
a. Includes vote of parties allied with Communists.
15 230 8 230
b. The figures used here are for the Communist-led electoral alliance in those areas voting in the local elections, May-June 1951. The first column
gives the results of the 1948 Italian elections, and the second column indicates the results of the 1951 local balloting, in those areas.
c. Party claims, January 1948.
[14.] Communist Influence in Sensitive Positions in Western Europe [1952]
d. 1945 elections.
529
[15.]
Implications of Chancellor Adenauer’s Removal
from the German Political Scene*
[1952]
Abstract
If Chancellor Konrad Adenauer were to die before the Bundestag elec-

tions in June 1953, it would be necessary to form a new cabinet, but
his death would not lead to any decisive changes in the basic political
alignments nor in the policies of the Federal Republic of Germany.
The CDU-led interim government would be likely to carry out Ade-
nauer’s promises to ratify and implement EDC and would be strong
enough to force its coalition partners to espouse the same policies.
Although Adenauer’s death would inevitably result in a certain amount
of maneuvering on the part of the coalition members, the present part-
nership between the CDU and the moderate rightist elements is likely
to continue until the elections. Dr. Heinrich Brentano, the CDU faction
leader, will probably be selected as Adenauer’s successor in the party
and the government. Bundestag President Hermann Ehlers is also a
possible candidate because, as a Protestant and a lay functionary of
the Evangelical Church, he might help keep allegiance of Protestants
who voted for the CDU in 1949. However, if the French seriously delay
or refuse ratification, Adenauer’s death would have the effect of precip-
itating new elections, as no coalition partner would like to be associated
with the failures of the previous regime.
Report
The death of Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, before the Bundestag elec-

tions in June 1953, would necessitate the formation of a new cabinet but
would not lead to any decisive changes in the basic political alignments
or in the policies of the Federal Republic of Germany. Article 69-2 of
the Bonn Constitution states that the office tenure of the present cabi-
State fertiggestellt. – Zu diesem Text vergleiche in der Einleitung S. 129f.]
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845290027
530 [15.] Adenauer’s Removal from the German Political Scene [1952]
net members would be terminated in this event and a new chancellor

elected, according to procedures prescribed in Article 63. In the interim
period, the Adenauer cabinet, under the leadership of Vice Chancellor
Blücher, would be limited to administering current affairs.
Although there is an outside chance that the German Party (DP) might
bolt the coalition in the event of Adenauer’s death, the present partner-
ship between the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and the moderate
rightist elements (the Free Democratic Party and the German Party) is
likely to continue until the elections. Replacement of Adenauer would
inevitably result in a certain amount of maneuvering on the part of the
coalition partners in an attempt to improve their positions in the forth-
coming election campaign. But the temptation to improve the coalition
in order to regain individual initiative would probably be checked
by consideration of the profits to be drawn from association with the
record of the Chancellor who regained German sovereignty and the
probable effects of a rupture of the coalition on the formation of the
cabinet after the elections.
Without Adenauer’s authoritative leadership to keep them in line,
elements within the Free Democratic Party (FDP) and the DP would
undoubtedly favor breaking off from the coalition in order to increase
their appeal for the extreme right. With the SRP now removed as a
likely nucleus for the rightist extremists, the FDP and the DP have a
chance of incorporating within their clientele the bulk of the electorate
which is to the right of their coalition partner. Even if the FDP and
the DP succeeded in amalgamating all the electorate to the right of
the CDU and, in addition, gained a substantial number of the CDU’s
more conservative and Protestant adherents, however, they would not
be in a position by 1953 to assume, unilaterally, the reins of govern-
ment. The hard core of voters who would always adhere to either a
moderate »Socialist« party or a moderate »Christian« party appears to
comprise a safe majority of the West German electorate. Therefore,
unless the FDP is willing to renounce participation in policy making on
the federal level for some time to come, it will be obliged to collaborate
with the CDU before the election so as not to render impossible all
chances for a post-June coalition.
Such considerations may not be as compelling for the DP. It would gain
more in proportion to its present strength from an all-out appeal to
the radical right. The DP might decide that it could afford to renounce
participation in the government for the present in return for a chance
to build up its electoral strength and assume strategic importance in
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[15.] Adenauer’s Removal from the German Political Scene [1952] 531
some of the northwest German Länder. If the DP withdraws from the

coalition, however, necessary legislative support for the interim govern-
ment could probably be had from the ranks of the Bavarian Party and
some assorted independent deputies.
Consequently, in the event of Adenauer’s death, it is probable that
the FDP, and very possible that the DP, would confine themselves to
applying pressure on the CDU in order to give the appearance of a
more »nationally conscious« leadership. In return for remaining in the
coalition, the FDP is likely to demand that one of its leaders be elevated
to the post of foreign minister and, possibly, that Secretary of State
Hallstein resign as he is considered too pro-Western. Such changes
might allow the FDP, and possibly the DP, to remain in the coalition
and to support the essentials of Adenauer’s foreign policy, while at the
same time appealing to the rightist elements as having been instrumen-
tal in obtaining important concessions, if not from the Western allies, at
least from the CDU.
An alternative »grand coalition« of the CDU and the principal opposi-
tion party, the Social Democratic Party (SPD), is highly unlikely before
the 1953 elections. The SPD appears determined to test the validity of
the late Dr. Kurt Schumacher’s hypothesis that, by espousing a nation-
alist-oriented foreign policy and a strong anti-CDU domestic position,
the SPD can pick up enough votes outside its traditional working class
areas of strength to enable it to break through the 35 percent electoral
limit to which it has been restricted by the social and denominational
structure of West German society. This tactic, if successful, would allow
the SPD to assume power in the federal government without the coop-
eration of the CDU.
The leadership of an interim cabinet would almost automatically be
assumed by the CDU. Adenauer’s successor in the party and the gov-
ernment would most probably be the CDU faction leader, Dr. Heinrich
von Brentano, who has been among the strongest supporters of integra-
tion with the West. The principal spokesman for a more active reunifi‐
cation policy. Federal Minister for all-German affairs Jakob Kaiser, has
become more cautious lately and moreover he has little chance of suc-
ceeding Adenauer either as party leader or as Chancellor. No serious
opposition to Brentano’s leadership or to the continuation of present
policies is likely to come from other CDU party leaders, such as Kurt
Kiessinger, Franz Josef Wurmerling or Robert Tillmanns. None of the
CDU cabinet ministers or Land Minister Presidents appear desirous or
capable of assuming leadership or of changing basic party policies.
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532 [15.] Adenauer’s Removal from the German Political Scene [1952]
A possible rival to von Brentano is Bundestag President Hermann Ehlers

whose decision to receive the East German delegation has been inter-
preted as a bid for a more flexible type of leadership than has been
provided by Adenauer. He might be chosen party leader and chancel-
lor in an attempt to recoup the deteriorating electoral fortunes of the
CDU. If Ehlers should become party leader, as a Protestant and a lay
functionary of the Evangelical Church, he might have a better chance
of regaining for the CDU a large part of the Protestant voters whom
the party has lost since 1949. The CDU leaders might estimate that their
Catholic adherents would support the party in any eventuality, while
the Protestant followers, who have proved less reliable in post-1949
Land elections, would require special consideration in order to retain
their allegiance.
Under the leadership of either von Brentano or Ehlers, the CDU would
adhere to its present foreign policy, although, because of desire for
greater policy flexibility and because of the absence of the strong-willed
leadership of Adenauer, some outward signs of doubt and hesitance
might become apparent. A CDU-led government would be likely to
carry out Adenauer’s promises to ratify and implement EDC and
would be strong enough to force its coalition partners to espouse the
same policies. According to present plans, the only implementation of
EDC commitments between the entrance into effect of the EDC treaty
and the June elections will be the passage of legislation to set up and
regulate voluntary training cadres. As this program will probably not
cause any decisive political conflict, even some cooling off of CDU zeal
for the implementation of EDC would be of little consequence.
The CDU-led interim government might attempt to give the impression
of pursuing a more »nationally conscious« policy, especially in the Saar
issue, and might also take some propaganda initiative in regard to
German reunification. There is little possibility of revising the govern-
ment’s policies on these two issues, however, as Adenauer has already
strengthened his stand on the Saar question and propaganda activity
is limited by the fact that West Germany and the Western powers are
officially in accord on reunification.
If the French fall to ratify EDC, or attempt to delay indefinitely or
cripple the agreement, the political situation in Germany would be
drastically changed. While this fact would be true under Adenauer’s
leadership, the political reaction would be more immediate in the event
of his death. In the light of French intransigence, the demise of the
Chancellor or who had espoused European unification might be con-
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[15.] Adenauer’s Removal from the German Political Scene [1952] 533
sidered as a blessing in disguise by all the coalition partners. The CDU

would find it easier to abandon their »discredited« attempts to establish
Franco-German amity as the cornerstone of European unity. The FDP
and the DP might welcome the opportunity to disassociate themselves
from the CDU as the party mainly responsible for the Chancellor’s
policy. Under these circumstances, a new coalition composed of those
parties in the present government would be almost out of the question.
As no candidate for the chancellorship might obtain the necessary
majority and any new CDU chancellor might only have minority sup-
port, the Bundespräsident might decide to dissolve the Bundestag, thus
necessitating new elections before June 1953. This action would be
approved by all parties because the new situation arising from French
refusal to ratify would necessitate reconsideration of German foreign
policy. Regardless of whether or not the minority government managed
to stay in power until the June elections, it is certain that the Germans
would demand those benefits agreed to in the contractual agreements
which they have not already received on the grounds that they should
not be penalized for French failure to act on EDC.
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534
[16.]
Higher Education in East Germany*
[1952]
Abstract
The rapid Sovietization of higher education in Eastern Germany, which

was initiated in February 1951 with the establishment of a State Secre-
tariat of Higher Education, promises to become an important factor
in widening the gap between East and West Germany. Under the pres-
sure of a rigid system of supervision which severely limits academic
initiative and precludes independent research, teaching and research
personnel have emigrated westward in large numbers. East German
research centers must fit their activities to the requirements of the Five
Year Plan. The indoctrination of the student body and the elimination
of dissident elements has been achieved through the agency of the mass
organizations, which participate in decisions on admissions procedure,
student subsidies, and programs of study. The rise of a new techni-
cal and intellectual elite committed to the doctrines of the state has
been fostered through the imposition of a restrictive admissions policy
which discriminates against the children of upper and middle class
families, and through large-scale subsidies to students from worker and
peasant backgrounds.
The net effect of these measures has been to lower drastically the intel-
lectual level of the student body, which from the government viewpoint
has the advantage of facilitating conformity. While members of the old
generation may conceal their beliefs under outward compliance, the
system of ideological control is designed to produce unquestioning
acceptance of the Communist indoctrination program among East Ger-
man youth.
* [Als Intelligence Report No. 5715 am 30. Januar 1952 für das Department of State
fertiggestellt. – Zu diesem Text vergleiche in der Einleitung S. 116-118.]
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Report
From the initial period of the occupation, East German authorities have
sought to build an educational structure based on Communist ideology.
The Central Administration for Education, established in September
1945, used the Soviet system of education for a blueprint but was
forced to shelve some of its more drastic proposals for reform, in
order to deal first with the problem of keeping the universities in
operation. In the field of higher education, state planners desiring to
equate immediate with long range goals would have liked to dismiss
all non-Communist professors and replace them by SED members of
unquestioned loyalty. Introduction of a Marxist-Leninist curriculum
could then have been accelerated and student discipline more rigidly
enforced. However, the acute teacher shortage, together with a desire to
preserve intellectual contacts with West Germany, which were endan-
gered by rapid institutional and doctrinal changes, made it necessary to
retain professors who were unwilling to espouse Communism. These
facts, together with student opposition during the early occupation,
forced East German authorities to postpone full-scale reform until they
could work with Communist-trained instructors and a more receptive
student body.
The major reforms of this initial period established the groundwork for
the current education program of the East German regime. Men trained
in Marxist-Leninist ideology gradually replaced those of their older
colleagues who had been forced to resign or seek refuge in Western
Germany. Through a system of selection established by the state, the
composition of the student body was altered so as to exclude groups of
potential opposition. No longer faced with emergency problems such
as existed in 1945, the East German regime by early 1951 was ready
to initiate a large-scale program of Sovietization in the East German
universities.
To carry out this program, a Secretariat of Higher Education was estab-
lished in February 1951. Under the direction of Gerhard Harig, it is
proceeding with a uniform revision of curricula throughout the univer-
sities and colleges of Eastern Germany. To this primary objective has
been added the policy of directing students into science and technology
and increasing the contribution of professors and students alike to the
Five Year Plan.
The implementing legislation issued by the Secretariat is remodeling
the very structure of the East German universities. These reforms have
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536 [16.] Higher Education in East Germany [1952]
stripped institutes of higher education of their traditional autonomy,

particularly as regards the scope of university administration and fac-
ulty initiative.
1. State Control of University Administration
The increasing centralization of education under the East German gov-

ernment has sharply limited the independence of the university presi-
dent (rector). East German practice has discarded the traditional right
of the faculty to choose the president, which is still exercised in Western
Germany. Instead, he is appointed by the State Secretariat for Higher
Education and is responsible for carrying out Secretariat instructions.
These directives, which regulate the educational and administrative
practices of the university, are designed to standardize university pro-
grams throughout the GDR so as to permit no deviation from the
officially prescribed plans.
The president is assisted in his supervisory duties by four deans (pro-
rectors) also appointed by the State Secretariat.1 They are responsible
for (a) graduate student affairs; (b) general student problems, course
programming, and vocational training; (c) correspondence courses and
research activities, and (d) basic courses in social science, Russian litera-
ture and German.
The deans have very little freedom of discretion, since they must follow
detailed instructions from the Secretariat and report all action taken
to the central bureaucracy. The few old-timers who have been allowed
to remain are compliant having no desire to oppose the educational
program of the government. All of them can be relied upon to enforce
the ever-increasing number of controls imposed on both professors and
students.
2. State Control of Professors and Instructors
Not only do the state authorities manipulate the president and deans,
but they also determine the activities of the professors and instructors.
Every decision of the faculty is closely scrutinized and controlled in
1 Gesetzblatt der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik (afterwards referred to as Gbl.),

No. 62, May 28, 1951, p. 491.
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order to ensure conformity of university programs with official doc-

trines and policies.
a. Appointments. In contrast to traditional German practice which per-
mits the university to submit a list of three nominees to the government
for each professional vacancy, the East German Secretariat for Higher
Education has sole authority both to nominate and appoint professors.
Moreover, it reviews the president’s decisions concerning the appoint-
ment and dismissal of assistant instructors, especially in the case of
assistants in the social sciences.
b. Hours and Wages. In organizing and directing the activities of profes-
sors and instructors, the State Secretariat for Higher Education employs
methods similar to those which govern industrial workers throughout
the GDR. Wages and hours are regulated through special gradations
fixed by the state.2 Upon appointment each faculty member must sign a
contract accepting certain duties, which place him in a specific wage
category. Full professors, assistant professors and instructors must
undertake 10 hours per week of lectures, seminars and related research,
while instructors in Worker and Peasant Faculties are required to teach
20 hours per week.
Wage gradations range from Class 2, including provisional instructors
at Worker and Peasant Institutes and assistants, at a monthly wage of
675 to 875 East Marks, to Class 10, which covers professors holding a
chair, who receive a monthly wage of 1,600 to 2,000 East Marks. A full
professor receives 1,400 to 1,700 East Marks per month, an assistant
professor 1,200 to 1,400 marks. Graduate students who lecture in the
science departments and commissioned lecturers are paid by the hours,
their stipend ranging from 10 to 45 East Marks.
Close supervision of the faculty member’s private life makes it virtu-
ally impossible to supplement these wages except through government
projects. The opportunity for private work during summer vacations
is severely limited by the now 10-month academic year. Individual
activities are further restricted by the requirement that the duration and
purpose of any absence exceeding three days – even those occurring
in vacation period – be recorded by the university administration and
filed with the State Secretariat.3
2 Gbl., No. 85, July 12, 1951, pp. 677-681.

3 Gbl., No. 105, August 27, 1951, p. 812.
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The professor is also restricted in his counseling opportunities. Legal,

industrial management, and engineering consultants have little scope
for their specialties outside of state-directed enterprises. Government
control of publishing houses, moreover, checks the diffusion of private
research. While the professor is prevented from engaging in indepen-
dent work, he is encouraged to supplement his basic salary through
work initiated by the East German government. This pressure is great-
est in the fields of science and technology.
Both monetary and honorary inducements are offered for extra work
on state projects, including the possibility of improved living condi-
tions and better opportunities for educating one’s children. Bonuses
are paid for participation in state education projects, such as text-
book preparation and the popularization of research based on Soviet
theories. Premiums are awarded for helping to reorganize curricula
along »progressive« lines and for outstanding presentations of Soviet
discoveries, especially those demonstrating Soviet supremacy in the
natural sciences. To secure the maximum contribution along these
lines, »individual« contracts have been introduced.
c. Individual Contracts. Like the individual contract for industrial work-
ers, the academic contract specifies for the holder certain privileges and
obligations designed to direct his work toward state educational goals.4
The contract, which is proposed as an honorary distinction, gives the
holder a high priority in the use of such research material as USSR
publications and other literature from the Soviet orbit and guarantees
premiums as well as honorary recognition for outstanding work.
In return the professor agrees to engage in designated research and
teaching duties, which involve placing »all his knowledge, experience
and strength at the disposal of the university«. Included in the contract
are special research projects which the individual agrees to undertake
under state direction. On leaving the university he must submit all data
pertaining to his work. Finally he must agree to help revise methods of
education and draw up study programs according to Soviet pattern.
d. Pensions and Retirement Allowances. Another powerful lever to secure
compliance with the educational goals of the East German state is the
system of pensions and retirement allowances.5 Effective at the age of
65 for men and 60 for women, the pension varies in amount according
to the individual’s cooperation with state objectives. The pensioner is
4 Gbl., No. 105, August 27, 1951, pp. 814-815.

5 Gbl., No. 85, July 12, 1951, pp. 678-679.
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guaranteed a minimum allowance of 60 percent of his group wage

rate previous to retirement, but may raise this to 80 percent by out-
standing work along state educational lines. However length of tenure
may vary also according to the individual’s assistance in furthering
official policies. The retirement age specifications need not be strictly
observed and a professor may be retained beyond the age limit if he
is especially needed for the state education program. On the other
hand, retirement may be ordered before age 65, should the individual
be considered, »incapable of further activity«.6 The general terms of
this proviso indicate that retirement decisions are not based solely on
physical condition, thus providing a means to oust recalcitrant persons.
The effectiveness of these controls, designed as a whole to break down
individual resistance to the state program, depends to a large extent on
the degree of centralization within the educational system. Secretariat
control over university administration in matters of appointments,
salaries and pensions provides a direct method of securing submission
from each member of the university faculty. By this pressure the indi-
vidual must surrender his initiative to state direction and is reduced
to a mechanical component of the educational system. Both incentive
and penalty systems and ultimately the threat of economic insecurity
enable the East German regime to force these human components into a
pattern of activity which will serve its immediate and long-range goals.
3. State Control of Research Activities
Central control of research activities is enforced largely through a reg-

istration system and the granting or withholding of subsidies.7 Each
research center in the GDR is required to register with the Central
Bureau of Research and Technology, at which time it must submit a list
of its personnel with a record of their previous activities. The Bureau
then decides what centers shall be permitted to operate, and assigns
specific research tasks to departments within the various universities
and to such specialized institutes as the German Academy of Sciences,
the German Academy of Agriculture and the German Academy of
Construction.
The specific requirements of the Five Year Plan relating to research and
experimental activities are designed primarily to improve agricultural
6 Ibid.
7 Gbl., No. 22, February 15, 1951, p. 115.
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and industrial techniques. Agricultural research is directed toward

the development of cultivation methods based on the theories of
Mitschurin and Lysenko, as well as toward greater farm mechanization.
Industrial goals call for the development of new methods of mining
and ore refining as well as refined steel and special alloys. Funds have
also been earmarked for research on magnetic materials, heat-resistant
steel and a continuous pouring process. To increase industrial output,
research centers are asked to improve machines and machine tools as
well as measuring and testing devices. Most of the projects approved
for state subsidy are designed to make an immediate contribution to
the goals of the Five Year Plan. Since funds are withheld from those
projects which do not make a definite contribution to the Five Year
Plan, much exploratory work must be discontinued.
These projects are specified in detail and assigned to technical experts
through individual contracts, thereby increasing the responsibility of
every scientist and technician within each center. Since most institutes
and laboratories are dependent for their operating funds on state
grants, their members must cooperate with the state‐specified goals in
order to continue to function.
4. State Control of Students
a. Admissions. Student opposition to the ideological controls imposed

by the East German government has been dealt with severely. One of
the most drastic methods of squelching resistance has been exercised
through the control over admissions. Quotas determined by the Secre-
tariat of Higher Education discriminate against middle class groups,
where much of the opposition originated, in favor of active supporters
of the regime. By this means, children of professional and civil service
workers, who constituted the majority of the prewar student body, have
been reduced to as little as 9 percent of the present-day university
enrollment.
The exclusion of professional and civil service groups by the quota
system has made possible a considerable increase in the number of
workers and farmers entering the universities. This group now has
highest priority, with a quota minimum of 40 percent. By 1947 workers
and peasants already constituted 65 percent of the student body at the
Martin-Luther University in Halle. The pedagogical institutes in partic-
ular are urged to draw more than 50 percent of their enrollment from
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845290027
worker and peasant groups. Every possible attempt is made to raise the
worker and peasant quota and the admissions committees give special
preference to those students interested in the natural sciences, encour-
aging worker and peasant candidates to enter institutes of technology
and medical schools.
Children of professional families who are cooperating with the East
German government rank second in preference, and existing discrimi-
nation has been modified to admit more students from such groups.
Participation in rebuilding activities and outstanding scientific apti-
tudes also help to qualify the candidate for admission.
In addition to the quotas imposed by the State Secretariat, control
through mass organizations tightens the process of selection. Candi-
dates must be endorsed by the FDJ and FDGB and members of those
organizations sit on the reviewing committee which determines the
admissions. On the basis of the prospective student’s political record,
plus FDJ-FDGB recommendations, the Committee favors those appli-
cants who are considered to be »activists« or have distinguished them-
selves in FDJ vocational competitions and »peace« drives. The effect is
to virtually exclude from the universities those who are not members of
the mass youth organizations.
b. Government Aid Program. The revised system of admissions draws
heavily on candidates who cannot count on financial support from
their families. To enable these students to attend the universities, cost-
of-living allowances are provided by the state.8 Plans for 1951 to train
additional engineers, teachers, doctors and farmers, provided 25,400
basic stipends for higher education, covering more than 90 percent
of the total university enrollment.9 The distribution of cost-of-living
allowances is determined by the State Secretariat and the industrial
ministries and a Stipend Control Commission supervises awards. The
fact that 90 percent of the student body are stipend holders demon-
strates the changing concept of scholarships. Instead of being issued
on basis of merit, scholarships are available to students upon assign-
ment to state-controlled schools. Thus the student is virtually a govern-
ment employee and must follow the training program prescribed by
the state. The stipends are awarded primarily in such preferred areas
of study as science and technology and pedagogy, thus discouraging
8 Gbl., No. 115, September 20, 1951, pp. 868-870.

9 Gbl., No. 35, March 14, 1951, p. 197.
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enrollment in theology and the humanities. Those who enter theologi-

cal schools are not eligible for government stipends.
Attempts have been made to draw up stringent classifications which
will limit this new group of stipend holders to bona fide workers
and peasants and members of the technical intelligentsia. Worker and
farmer groups receive first claim to the basic stipends, under a state
directive to increase their enrollment from 7,500 to 12,000 by 1955. To
qualify for stipends, applicants must prove that they or their parents
have been employed as »workers« since 1942. Peasants must not own
more than 15 hectares of land and must have worked their holdings
without outside help.10
FDJ representatives of both student body and faculty sit on the Stipend
Control Commissions, thus reinforcing the influence exercised by the
FDJ-FDGB in the Admissions Committees. The basic stipends are paid
in monthly installments of 180 East Marks. Bonuses of 40 marks for
a »good« examination and 80 for an »excellent« examination are given.
To encourage married students to raise families while continuing their
studies, the state provides monthly allotments of 40 East Marks for the
first child and 30 marks for each additional child.
In addition to these basic stipends there are a number of special grants
designed to encourage the more promising students and to direct their
studies toward fields considered most vital from the viewpoint of the
regime. For example, Wilhelm Pieck scholarships of 300 East Marks
a month have been established.11 Only workers and peasants may
apply for these scholarships, which are distributed on a percentage
basis among candidates for trade schools, universities and Worker and
Peasant Faculties.
Study of the natural sciences is encouraged by monthly allotments
ranging from 200 marks for undergraduates, to 500 marks for scientific
assistants. Students at government schools of administration receive
monthly grants of 200 marks and at the German Academy of Adminis-
tration (DVA) are given room and board with special provision for their
dependents.
c. FDJ Student Controls. Membership in the FDJ, while ostensibly vol-
untary, is necessary if the student desires to remain in the university.
To demonstrate his progressive attitude and hence his suitability for
10 Gbl., No. 122, October 10, 1951, p. 917.

11 Gbl., No. 5, January 3, 1951, p. 23.
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university training the student must participate actively in FDJ or other

mass organization programs. Failure to support either the FDJ or one
of the other mass organizations usually causes the student to lose his
stipend and may even result in his expulsion from the university.
FDJ control of the student councils has been secured by elimination
of all dissenters. Moreover, students outspoken in their opposition are
accused as saboteurs, and a number have actually received prison sen-
tences. Some have mysteriously disappeared and many more, fearing
kidnapping or other coercion, have been forced to flee.12 Some opposi-
tion to the FDJ still exists in the Medical Schools, but obviously there
can be no resistance in the Worker and Peasant Faculties and the Social
Science Institutes, where screening of admissions is rigid enough to bar
those elements not deemed loyal to the regime.
Thought control has been further achieved through the organization of
compulsory study groups. These study groups, led by SED-approved
students, were originally designed to relate Marxist-Leninist theories
to the work of each student-member and to inculcate the proper atti‐
tude toward such principles of Western civilization as Objectivism,
Cosmopolitanism and Formalism. Various study problems are consid-
ered under the direction of professors and instructors approved by
the SED, and basic questions for the term work were distributed to
members of the group. Typical questions called for proof that the rise
of Marxism was a philosophical revolution or that the history of all
societies demonstrated the postulate of the class struggle. Some of these
study groups, however, instead of docilely reciting, formed centers
of opposition to the Marxist-Leninist views presented by their faculty
directors.
To stifle this dissidence, the study groups have been reorganized as
seminars of not more than 25 students under the supervision of reliable
SED professors and instructors. Like the industrial discussion groups,
the seminars function collectively to interpret and work out assign-
ments according to state-approved doctrine. The FDJ student leader
works with the seminar instructor to achieve the desired discipline of
study and thought, and if difficulties arise, reports offenders to the
pro-rector of student affairs.
12 Deutsche Universitätszeitung, Göttingen, regularly lists the names of students

and professors who have suffered from persecution in Eastern Germany, with
special mention of those whose fate remains unknown.
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Seminar leaders emphasize the Communist approach to scientific

research and experimental activities and endeavor to make the students
accept Marxian postulates. During his university career the student
remains within the same seminar group, which thus serves as a ready
channel for FDJ influence.
Students are also organized into culture »brigades« where new books
and movies are discussed. Even the short intervals between lectures
are utilized by FDJ »agitation« groups to discuss Marxist-Leninist prin-
ciples.
d. Examinations. Compulsory examinations are held at the end of
each semester to review the student’s progress in comprehending and
accepting official doctrines. Examinations in social science and Russian
are conducted by members of the SED and FDJ, who are primarily
concerned with the student’s political attitudes and the extent of his
participation in mass organizations. Non‐attendance at study groups
or inadequate interpretation of Marxist-Leninist theories are sufficient
causes for failure. The oral examinations are given to groups of not
more than 5 students. They last about 30 minutes and test the students’
political orientation. The written section gives the student a choice of
one of several themes, which he must develop in terms of Marxist-
Leninist ideology.
In addition to the formal examinations, the student is judged on the
basis of opinions which he may have expressed in group discussions,
as well as his participation in FDJ activities. Questionable political lean-
ings are enough to bar a student from the examinations or lead to his
expulsion from the university.
e. Vocational Guidance Commissions. These commissions are established
for the purpose of advising students in choosing a career and in seek-
ing employment, and are dominated, like the Admissions Committee
and the Stipend Control Commission, by the FDJ and FDGB.13
The state not only grants permission to study and prescribes the cur-
riculum, but it also determines how this training shall be applied to
serve the purposes of the regime.
The unsatisfied demands of government and industry for new employ-
ees have resulted in increased pressure on the universities to train
administrators conversant with Communist ideology, as well as quali-
fied engineers, chemists and physicists. Before graduation each student
13 Gbl., No. 100, August 15, 1951, p. 786.
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is interviewed by the Commission to determine his qualifications for

employment in government administration, public industry, or mass
organizations. Aptitude testing has been eliminated. East German voca-
tional guidance officers are required to direct as many students as
possible into scientific and engineering fields. Students who face the
Commission still undecided on a career are channeled into state-con-
trolled industry.
5. Establishment of Special Institutes
The government’s reorganization of higher education has resulted in

the closing or consolidation of many faculties. This action was to a large
extent necessitated by the difficulty of replacing professors who had
fled to the West or who had been forced to resign. At the same time,
this consolidation enables the central government to exercise greater
supervision and control over the study programs of each center.
Of the old universities few have been allowed to retain their depart-
ments intact, with the largest inroads taking place in the humanities
and faculties of law. Only the universities of Leipzig and Berlin have
been permitted to function on anything like their prewar scale, a con-
cession which has proved valuable for propaganda.14
In place of the discontinued faculties of law and philosophy, special
institutes have been established to prepare students for government
service and at the same time ensure uniform political indoctrination.
These institutes are staffed largely by government officials; students of
outstanding ability are also assigned teaching duties.
The most important of the special institutes is the Academy of Admin-
istration at Forst Zinna, where experienced officials are prepared for
positions of greater responsibility in government and industry.15 The
academy serves as an intensive indoctrination center, where Marxist-
Leninist theories are related to the practice of law and economics.
The program stresses Marxist doctrines concerning the development of
14 Hochschul-Informationen, Verband Deutscher Studentenschaften, May 1951, p. 5.

15 Although no particular academic requirements are specified, the applicant
should have attended a Land administrative school or an FDGB school and have
held an administrative position in the central government or the Länder. See
Hochschul-Informationen, Verband Deutscher Studentenschaften, Berlin, April
1951, pp. 2-6.
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human society, the political economy of capitalism and socialism, and

Russo-German relations.
In the field of economics, the Institute for Planned Economy pro-
vides an 8-semester indoctrination in Marxist-Leninist theories to train
economists and statisticians for government assignment.16 Courses in
the history and planning of the collective industries as well as in philos-
ophy and statistics are required of all students. Opened in 1950 with
185 students, the Institute plans to increase its enrollment by 1955 to
1,300.
Professional education of legal officers has been transferred increas-
ingly to special schools, the most important of which is the Central Law
School at Babelsberg. The regular training program of the Central Law
School is designed to fill the demand for state attorneys and judges
trained in Communist ideology.17 At Babelsberg worker and peasant
groups constitute of the student body. Each class of 200 students under-
goes a 2-year course in which legal training is secondary to an intensive
drilling in the Leninist-Stalinist version of the social sciences.
By establishing these special institutes and discontinuing many tradi-
tional chairs within the universities, the East German government has
succeeded in more closely approximating the Soviet system proper,
with its dogmatic intolerance of every doctrine except the Russian ver-
sion of Marxism.
6. Curricular Revisions
a. Humanities. Curricular revision has strengthened the fields of natural

science and social science at the expense of the humanities. Within the
humanities the study of Russian has been encouraged. Russian is urged
on German youth as the key to understanding progressive science and
each student must attain a fluency sufficient to read the periodicals
and technical literature in his field. All »peace-loving« students are also
urged to study Russian in order that they may gain understanding of
the real USSR.
Instruction in German literature as well as written and spoken German
employs texts selected to conform with Marxist-Leninist analyses of
society. Even Goethe is made to conform, and classic traditions of Ger-
16 Statistische Praxis, Deutscher Zentralverlag, Berlin, March 1950, p. 36.

17 Neue Justiz, Deutscher Zentralverlag, Berlin, June 1950, pp. 183-185.
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man literature are related to Communist doctrines. These classes are

permitted only on a reduced scale, and must relate their material to the
ideological principles of the state.
b. Natural Sciences. Far from being untouched by propaganda efforts,
the natural sciences are utilized to prove the »progressive« nature of
Soviet discoveries and to celebrate Soviet scientists. At every oppor-
tunity Soviet theories are stressed. Students are everywhere urged
to concentrate on the natural sciences, and are assured immediate
employment in industrial laboratories upon graduation. While at the
university, the student must spend part of his time gaining practical
experience, thereby helping to fill the needs of the state for scientists
and technicians.
In addition, to its lack of trained scientists’ engineers, the East German
state suffers from a serious shortage of doctors, caused by the numer-
ous emigrations to Western Germany. To overcome this deficiency an
accelerated program has been introduced in the medical schools. Basic
courses in physics, chemistry and biology have either been shortened
or omitted altogether, on the assumption that the student sufficiently
mastered these subjects during his secondary school training. After
a brief period of theoretical training, during which little opportunity
exists to study Western medical science or gain insight into other than
Soviet-sponsored methods, students are assigned directly to the clinics.
c. Social Sciences. The most rigidly controlled of curricular reorganiza-
tions is taking place in the social sciences. Social science institutes have
been established within the various universities with separate depart-
ments for; (a) the foundation of Marxist-Leninist thought, (b) dialectic
and historical materialism and (c) basic studies in political economy.18
Training in the fundamentals of Marxist-Leninist ideology is required
of all first‐ and second-year students. It examines the impact of Marx
and Engels on »scientific« socialism, culminating in the development of
socialism in the USSR.19 Communist Party doctrines are related to the
development of the German labor movement, with careful exploitation
of post-1924 events such as Stalin’s aid to the German workers, the
economic crisis of 1929 – 1933 and the KPD struggle against fascism.
The Soviet victory over fascism in World War II and the post-war strug-
gle of the German working class for unity form the state-prescribed
conclusion to the study of Marxist-Leninist fundamentals.
18 Gbl., No. 94, August 4, 1951, p. 727.

19 Neue Justiz, Deutscher Zentralverlag, Berlin, September 1951, pp. 408-413.
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Subsequent lectures in dialectic and historical materialism train their

sights on Western institutions. In this survey, the class struggle and
the increasing importance of the proletariat are related to the Western
institutions. Further discussion demonstrates that the proletariat must
struggle to overcome contemporary social and political obstacles such
as the menace of Western Idealism, Objectivism, and Social Democracy.
Instruction in political economy, following the program of dialectical
materialism, employs the doctrines of Lenin and Stalin in the analysis
of contemporary problems of capitalism, socialism and the GDR econ-
omy. The basic principles and production methods of capitalism are
contrasted with the planned economy of the Soviet Union and its satel-
lite countries in order to demonstrate the advanced form of democracy
which is possible under the Soviet system. Moreover, to economics
is given the arduous task of proving the real measure of increasing
misery under capitalist conditions.20 State planning, exemplified by the
GDR economic system, is extensively discussed to present the relentless
Sovietization of East Germany in a favorable light.
To reinforce this program, a close surveillance is maintained over all
publications in the social science field. While technical and scientific
journals may be procured from the West, only those publications are
approved which promote »scientific development and the democratic
culture of Eastern Germany,« which severely limits the importation of
literature from countries except China, the USSR, and the satellites.21
One reading room stocked with a wide variety of Western literature has
been opened in the Soviet Sector of Berlin, but the reader must sign
for each publication he requests. The risk of being blacklisted certainly
prevents full use of this reading room’s facilities. Elsewhere the dearth
of Western publications outside of scientific and technical fields is com-
plete.
20 Jürgen Kuczynski, the most important East German economic historian, has
recently been reprimanded for not having performed this job satisfactorily
in his seven volumes on the conditions of the European and U.S. working
classes. »Geschichte der Lage der Arbeiter in der kapitalistischen Welt«, Einheit,
Zentralkomitee der Sozialistischen Einheitspartei Deutschlands, November 1951, pp.
1491-1504.
21 »Der Bezug wissenschaftlicher Literatur aus dem Ausland«, Buchhandel, Verlag
des Börsenvereines der Deutschen Buchhändler, Leipzig, December 22, 1951,
pp. 686-689.
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Conclusion
The rapidly progressing Sovietization of higher education in East Ger-

many may well become a major factor in the ever-widening split
between East and West Germany. While East Germany’s integration
into the Western intellectual community, which was interrupted during
the Hitler era, is again proceeding rapidly, East German higher learning
is perforce adopting Russian standards and procedures. In this whole-
sale process of adaptation the native tradition of German Marxism is
fast retreating before the ready-made Russian cultural overlay. To some
extent this process of adaptation is facilitated by the emigration to the
West of students, and especially of teaching and research personnel,
with unorthodox backgrounds. While this exodus has left serious gaps
in the East German universities, it has, on the other hand, facilitated
the process of adopting new methods and concepts. The radical shift
in student recruitment policy works in the same direction. In West
Germany the continuity of the intellectual tradition not only has been
preserved, but has perhaps been overemphasized, since the bulk of the
student body continues to be drawn from families with academic (29
percent) or civil service (40 percent) backgrounds. With the exception of
loyal followers of the regime, the old upper and middle classes in East
Germany are being increasingly excluded from higher learning. While
this procedure inevitably results in drastically lowering intellectual
standards, it has the advantage from the viewpoint of the government
of greater ease in the indoctrination of the student body.
Moreover, the economic assistance made almost universally available
to those students selected for training minimizes the difficulties often
inherent in student existence and in the pursuit of professional careers.
These circumstances should hasten the rise of a new intellectual and
technical elite committed to the doctrines of the new state.
While the practical and organizational preconditions for the mass pro-
duction of the new intellectual elite are fairly well established, the
regime has apparently discarded the expectation that this elite could
function as a spiritual bridge to West Germany. To be sure, the govern-
ment is still going through the motions of emphasizing the existence of
a common intellectual tradition. It still publishes bibliographies of all
German publications and allows a number of historical and scientific
works unrelated to SED doctrine to be published. Up to the present
it has still permitted theological students to frequent West Berlin semi-
nars and yet be ordained in East Germany. But the very nature of the
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task of forming a completely reliable cadre of professional people, both

administrative and academic, militates against their ability to play the
role of cultural missionaries to West Germany.
To what extent the East Germans themselves are able to escape the
consequences of this intellectual Sovietization remains a matter of con-
jecture. The continuing attraction of the churches for large numbers of
people and the pent-up demand for classical literature testify to the
renewal of the phenomenon of the inner emigration, well known from
the experience of the Third Reich. But this very comparison reveals
the limited possibilities for such a withdrawal under the much more
stringent conditions of a Communist regime. Anyone who becomes
active in the administrative, intellectual and to a lesser extent the pro-
fessional cadres of the new state will have to adopt its language and
profess its principles. While this may be largely a protective screen in
the case of the older generation, the educational reorganization which
has been described above is designed to convert any merely mechani-
cal obedience into a system of fool-proof convictions and self-evident,
quite uncritical attitudes.
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551
[17.]
Probable Course of German Constitutional
Court Crisis*
[1952]
Abstract
The Adenauer government has little chance of obtaining a clear cut,

legality of passing the Bonn and EDC treaties with a simple parliamen-
tary majority. By attempting to put the case in the hands of the second
division of the court, which is deemed more favorable to the govern-
ment than the first division or the plenary court, the administration has
endangered its reputation and that of the court without insuring the
government an eventual favorable decision on its case. Even the resig-
nation of court members in sufficient numbers to hamstring the court
will not necessarily guarantee ratification. President Heuss, under the
impact of the Constitutional Court crisis, might refuse to promulgate
the treaties adopted by simple majorities in both houses. Moreover, the
opposition would not be willing to recognize the validity of the treaties
enacted under such auspices.
Report
The Adenauer government has little chance of obtaining a clear cut,

legality of passing the Bonn treaties with a simple parliamentary major-
ity.
A. The Jurisdiction of the Court
To some extent the present impasse has its origin in the complicated
division of jurisdiction within the court, as it has been established by
* [Als Intelligence Report No. 6130 am elften Dezember 1952 für das State Depart-
ment fertiggestellt. – Zu diesem Text vergleiche in der Einleitung S. 130-132.]
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552 [17.] Probable Course of German Constitutional Court Crisis [1952]
the Constitutional Court Law (CCL). Judges are not nominated to the
court as a whole, but to one of the two court divisions by a two-thirds
majority in the Federal Council and the Selection Committee of the
Federal Diet (Paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 of CCL). At the same time, the
law contains a complicated enumeration of the types of cases which
should be decided by each of the two divisions. In general, the first
section decides the problems dealing with the compatibility of specific
Land or federal legislation with the Bonn Basic Law, whereas the second
division decides on controversies between the various highest organs
of both the federation and the Länder (Paragraph 14 of CCL). But the
fathers of the law have admitted themselves that this scheme of distri-
bution is a difficult one and liable to further clarification, especially
by the practices of the court (Stenographische Berichte des Bundestags,
January 18, 1951, page 4222).
Under the law, the plenary court was given the power to solve jurisdic-
tional conflicts and conflicts of legal interpretation arising between the
divisions, as well as to render opinions as distinct from binding deci-
sions (Paragraphs 6 and 9 of CCL). The plenary court faced with the
request for an advisory opinion and knowing that an additional case
on the same question was already pending before the second division
and another case is expected by the first division after the treaties have
been passed by both houses, tried to enlarge on its procedural rights
and render a binding decision instead of an advisory opinion, thus
obviating the possibility and the necessity of additional decisions by
the separate divisions.
B. Problems of Procedure
The German Government’s withdrawal of its request for an opinion

by the CCL on the constitutionality of the Bonn and EDC treaties has
ended, for the present, any possibility that the court as a whole, would
be entitled to rule on this problem. The government’s demand for a
declaratory judgement on the constitutional law as it applies to the
treaty is still before the second division of the court, however.1 The gov-
ernment chose this procedure when it realized that the majority of the
judges intended their opinion to be binding on all requests which are
1 It is unclear whether the government had also asked the second division to give
an authentic interpretation of the constitutional provision pertaining to the rights
of the Federal Council in regard to the ratification of such treaties.
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[17.] Probable Course of German Constitutional Court Crisis [1952] 553
now before or could come before individual sections of the court, and,
moreover, that this opinion has a good chance of being unfavorable
to the government. On the other hand, it hoped that the second div-
ision might hand down a favorable declaratory judgement, interpreting
the respective constitutional provisions applicable to the treaties which
would be accepted later on as binding by the first division.
So far, the second senate has not ruled whether the request for a
declaratory judgement would be admissible under the provisions of
Article 93-1 of the Basic Law and of Article 13.5 of the CCL. Such
admissibility, however, is doubtful. To make it admissible, the second
division would have to rule that there now exists an actual legal contro-
versy between the highest constitutional bodies on the interpretation
of the constitution. Both the language chosen by the reporter on the
constitutional law bill when it was discussed in the Federal Diet2 as
well as the various legal writings of the most prominent lawyer now
sitting in the second division of the court, Dr. E. Friesenhahn,3 empha-
size the point that without such a legal controversy any demand for a
declaratory judgement is not admissible. Speeches of SPD member of
the Federal Diet, Arndt, attacking the constitutionality of the treaties,
on which the government seems to base its claim that a legal contro-
versy exists, can scarcely be considered as constituting either an action
or an omission violating the Basic Law. According to Article 64.2 of the
CCL such a specific violation would be the only basis for the request for
a declaratory judgement.
Even if the second division wanted to assume jurisdiction, it might
be prevented from doing so by the existence of some doubts on juris-
diction according to Article 16.3 of the CCL. On July 30, when the
SPD demand for an injunction and a declaratory judgement as to the
constitutionality of the treaties was thrown out by the first section as
premature, the first section declared that it could only take cognizance
of the case after the treaties had been passed by both houses. This
language may be interpreted to mean that it is not clear which section
of the court has jurisdiction, in which case the question of jurisdiction
would be decided by the plenary court.
At any rate, even if the second senate could assume jurisdiction on
its own or be assigned jurisdiction by the plenary court, it could only
render a theoretical interpretation of the constitution as it relates to the
2 112 Sitzung, January 18, 1951, p. 4222.

3 Handbuch des Deutschen Staatsrechts, 1932, vol. II, p. 534, and »Über Begriff und
Arten der Rechtsprechung«, Festschrift für Richard Thoma, Tübingen 1950, p. 60.
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554 [17.] Probable Course of German Constitutional Court Crisis [1952]
treaties. It could not decide which specific provisions of the treaties

would be constitutional or unconstitutional. The job of examining the
specific provisions of the treaties in regard to their constitutionality
would be incumbent on the first division of the court, according to
Article 13.6 in conjunction with Article 14.1 of the CCL, if and when
one third of the Federal Diet, after the final adoption of the bill by
the two houses, brings its case to the Constitutional Court.4 If, in the
meantime, the second division had rendered a declaratory judgement
conflicting with the views of the first division, a new plenary decision
would have to be given (Article 16.1 of the CCL).
C. Political Implications
It is not clear what position the first or second division or the plenary
court will take on these issues. Opinions by highly respected German
constitutional lawyers on the problem involved vary widely. Moreover,
attacks have been directed against the constitutionality not only of
the general agreement, but also of numerous provisions contained in
the individual conventions. Therefore, even if the general agreement
should stand the scrutiny of the court, any number of the more detailed
provisions of the various conventions might be declared unconstitu-
tional.
Even if the second division takes or is granted jurisdiction and hands
down a favorable judgement, the government could not rest easy as
long as there exists an acute danger that the first division or the plenary
court will refuse to go along with the interpretations of the second
division. As to the time element involved, the decision by the first
division or the plenary court could not be expected until four to six
weeks after the one third Federal Diet minority, under SPD leadership,
has brought its own suit against the treaties.
In view of this complicated legal situation and the deepening cleavage
between the court and the government, caused by the government’s
withdrawal of the petition for plenary opinion, the Chancellor might
hope that the Constitutional Court will be put out of action temporarily
4 The decision of July 30, 1952 of the first division specifically ruled that the
minority case would be acceptable before the President promulgates the treaties
passed by both houses in order to exclude the possibility of a conflict between the
binding force of international treaties and the possible unconstitutionality of the
treaties from the viewpoint of domestic law.
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[17.] Probable Course of German Constitutional Court Crisis [1952] 555
by the resignation of at least four judges. They might resign out of

dissatisfaction over the handling of the controversy or they may be
persuaded to resign by government promises to provide them with
equivalent jobs or one’s that would be more secure in view of a possible
court reorganization. The quorum for each division, according to Arti-
cle 15.2 of the CCL, is nine out of 12 members and nine members of
each division have to be present in plenary court in order to reach a
decision, (Paragraph 16.2 of CCL).
If four judges resigned from any one section of the court, the plenary
court or the section from which they resigned could not be reactivated
until new judges had been nominated by the Federal Diet and the
Federal Council and appointed by the president. Such selection could
be held up endlessly by the government parties.
Resignations, whether submitted voluntarily by the judges or engi-
neered by the Chancellor, might easily backfire. The treaties, after
having been adopted by both the Federal Diet and the Federal Coun-
cil, would have to be submitted to President Heuss for promulgation
according to Article 82.1 of the Basic Law. The president has to pro-
mulgate them if they have been enacted according the provisions of
the Basic Law. The overwhelming majority of German constitutional
lawyers, as well as the already quoted decision of July 30, 1952 by
the first division, recognize that the president has the right to decide
independently whether a bill has been enacted in conformity with the
Basic Law. In order to help him in making this decision, the president
has been given the right to demand opinions from the Constitutional
Court (Article 97.2 of the CCL). If the Constitutional Court had been
put out of commission by the resignation of the judges over the con-
stitutionality of the treaties, the president might decide to withhold
his signature in the face of deeply divided public opinion. Moreover,
even if President Heuss signs, the opposition would not be willing to
recognize the validity of the treaties enacted under such auspices.
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556
[18.]
The West German Election Campaign*
[1953]
Abstract
The results of the West German federal election on September 6 will

probably make possible but not guarantee the continuation of an
Adenauer-led center-moderate right government. This coalition may
require the support of certain additional right-wing groups in order to
assure a comfortable parliamentary majority. One of the many factors
affecting the formation of the cabinet is the size of the main opposi-
tion group (Social Democratic Party-SPD) which probably become the
largest faction. Communist representation is likely to be eliminated,
and neutralist and radical rightist groups will have little, if any, role in
the new Bundestag.
It now appears likely that the campaign will encompass many issues
rather than concentrating on the foreign policy record of the Adenauer
government. The SPD opposition, although continuing to appeal to
non-labor voters primarily on the issue of rearmament and reunifi‐
cation, is now emphasizing domestic social-economic problems. The
Christian Democratic Union-Christian Social Union (CDU-CSU) is uti-
lizing the personality of Adenauer as its principal asset in the contest.
The Free Democratic Party (FDP) and German Party (DP), while joining
with the CDU in defending the overall domestic and foreign policy of
the coalition, are stressing issues calculated to appeal to rightist voters.
I. Introduction1
On September 6, the West German electorate will choose a federal

Parliament (Bundestag) for a four year term. The balance of political
forces within this new assembly will determine German state policy
on a number of international issues of vital importance to the Western
* [Als Intelligence Report No. 6378 am 13. August 1953 für das Department of
State fertiggestellt. – Zu diesem Text vergleiche in der Einleitung S. 132-134.]
1 For additional background of German political parties and voting trends see IR
5712, »German Election Trends Since 1952«, May 2, 1952, restricted.
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powers: the fate of rearmament under EDC or some alternative system;

political integration of Western Europe, German reunification and its
relationship to the first two issues, and Germany’s role in the East-West
conflict.
The most immediate problem is whether the parties comprising the
Adenauer coalition can maintain a safe parliamentary majority by
themselves or in a coalition with smaller groups. The formation of
such a coalition would be interpreted as a considerable success for
US policy in Europe. Therefore, the relative voting strength of the
main opposition party (Social Democratic Party-SPD) and the present
coalition parties (Christian Democratic Union-CDU, Free Democratic
Party-FDP, and German Party-DP) is of major importance in the short
run. In the long run, the composition of the various segments of the
non-leftist vote ‒ Adenauer’s CDU, the moderately rightist FDP, the
catch-all All-German Bloc (BHE), the outright nationalist DP, and the
radical or extremist splinter groups of the right ‒ may be of greater
significance. The more the relationship between moderate and rightist
elements is modified in favor of the rightists, the more difficult it is
likely to be for any middle class government to conduct a moderate,
western oriented policy.
II. Impact of Election Law on Party Tactics
The election law promulgated on July 162 has so far influenced the
election campaign in two ways. Since the law virtually guarantees all
major groups, and those minor groups with strong regional support, a
number of seats in the Bundestag at least proportional to the number of
votes cast for them, the incentive to join forces in presenting programs
and candidates has not been strong except among some of the smaller
parties. Recognizing that the advantage of presenting common candi-
dates would be at best psychological, without any direct electoral bene-
fits, the parties supporting the Adenauer government have combined
forces in a very few localities and mostly for special local reasons. So
far, the middle class parties have only agreed to run joint candidates in
individual districts in Hamburg and in some districts of Lower Saxony
and Schleswig-Holstein. In most cases, all major political groups ‒ the
CDU-Christian Social Union (CSU), the SPD, the FDP, the DP, and the
2 For a description of election procedures see IR 6333, »Probable Effects of the New
German Election Law«, July 1, 1953, restricted.
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558 [18.] The West German Election Campaign [1953]
BHE will compete electorally in the member districts and on the Land
reserve list throughout the federal area.
Most smaller groups have tried to form coalition alliances because of
the provision in the electoral law requiring a party to obtain either
five percent of the federal vote or capture one district seat in order
to participate in the distribution of seats on the Land list. The Bavaria
Party (BP) is likely to capture enough individual seats in lower and
upper Bavaria to enable it to survive without entering into an alliance.
The Center Party (ZB) has little chance of carrying any single district
and its percentage of the federal valid vote will almost certainly fall
short of the five percent minimum. It has therefore attempted to work
out election arrangements with the CDU, the SPD, and most recently
the BP. So far none of these negotiations seem to have had any positive
results. The Center’s main competitor for the vote of Catholic artisans,
peasants, and working class people in North Rhine-Westphalia the
CDU, seems determined to destroy this party as an independent group.
The same difficulties beset the neutralists. The best organized of these
groups and the one with the most attractive leadership, Heinemann’s
All-German People’s Party (GVP), could not find a partner with stature
and lacked sufficient campaign funds. As a result, it reluctantly joined
forces with the Communist-controlled German Association for Free-
dom, Unity, and Peace of former Reichschancellor Dr. Josef Wirth. So
far, the merger has done little to alleviate the precarious electoral pos-
ition of the Heinemann group.
The GVP is handicapped by the fact that it has virtually no major
interest in domestic politics and concentrates almost exclusively on the
espousal of a neutralist foreign policy. While it is unlikely that five
percent of the German voters will put neutralism before all other con-
siderations; the party has outside chance of obtaining representation. It
might secure representation through a well-known candidate running
on its ticket in an individual district, or the Communists might in the
last stages of the campaign ask their voters to cast one of their two
votes, namely the one on the regional list, for the Heinemann group.
Open Communist support would lessen the appeal of the GVP for
many middle class supporters of neutralism.
The Communists might prefer assisting the Heinemann group to an
open contest for direct Communist Party (KPD) representation, since
no party wants to join forces with them and alone the KPD would have
little chance of winning five percent of the vote. Their one opportunity
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to win a district seat, by concentrating Communist absentee ballots in

the Remscheid district, was frustrated by a stringent executive decree of
the Ministry of Interior requiring justification for each absentee ballot
requested. Moreover, it would be to the advantage of the Communists
to be able to point to a fairly substantial neutralist vote and to have
non-Communist spokesmen for neutralism in the new Bundestag.
The position of the extreme right is probably the most difficult to
assess. The Socialist Reich Party (SRP), which was the most likely
rallying point for all rightist elements, was banned in October 1952,
and the group that had the best chance of succeeding the SRP, the
German Community (DG), was outlawed in every Land except Bavaria
and Baden‐Wuerttemberg.
One of the provisions in the election law which would have militated
strongly against rightist attempts to participate in the election, namely
the requirement of five hundred signatures under the election peti-
tions in each individual district, has been thrown out by the Constitu-
tional Court. While this action facilitates political agitation by extremist
groups even in the absence of enough active local sponsors, it also
encourages proliferation of competing candidates on lists. To date,
there are at least three rightist combinations that want to present can-
didates in some of the Laender and in some instances in the same elec-
tion districts. The most important, the new National Rally, composed
of over 60 splinter groups including the German Rally of August
Hausleiter, the German Bloc of Karl Meissner and the German Social
Movement of Karl Priester, has announced that it will enter candidates
in all election districts. Its claim to rightist leadership, however, is con-
tested by the German Reich Party of Adolf von Thadden, who has
secured prominent former Nazis such as Dr. Werner Naumann as can-
didates.
In addition, the former head of the now defunct Economic Reconstruc-
tion Party, Alfred Loritz, has reportedly joined with several leaders of
the banned SRP to establish the German Reconstruction Community.
Unless there is a last-minute merger of the ultra-rightists, their chances
of obtaining more than a handful of seats are poor for purely technical
reasons. Even if they win a number of seats in individual election dis-
tricts, their inability to present a single united list in the majority of the
Laender will prevent them from fully utilizing the electoral advantages
which would otherwise accrue to them under the provisions of the
election law. The existence of several competing ultra-rightist groups
will prevent them from obtaining more than a token representation,
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even in Lower Saxony where they are expected to have the largest
following.
III. The Election Campaign
A. Candidates and Supporting Interest Groups
All major parties follow a pattern of utilizing their most popular figures
as top candidates, sometimes in several areas and regardless of whether
they intend to serve as deputies. Thus, Chancellor Adenauer is slated
to head the CDU lists in at least five Laender. Hesse Minister President
Zinn for the SPD and Wuerttemberg‐Baden Minister President Rein-
hold Maier for the FDP will head their respective Land lists. SPD leader
Ollenhauer will run in Schumacher’s old district, Hannover-Sued. The
DP, in a special effort to set up candidates likely to appeal to the rightist
segment of the electorate, has placed Hitler’s old Foreign Office inter-
preter, Paul Schmidt, second on its Land list in Bavaria.
In many instances veterans and military experts have been nominated.
The CDU will have ex-Admiral Heye and ex-General Geyer von
Schweppenburg and Stumpf as candidates, while the FDP has chosen
former General Hasso von Manteuffel. Several highly decorated officers
of lesser rank will head the SPD lists, among them ex-Captain Gerhard
Eschmann, who will run against the FDP’s rising young deputy and
contact man for veterans groups, ex-Major Erich Mende.
In addition, the SPD has made it a policy to place in strategic spots on
its lists as many chairmen of industrial unions and top functionaries
of the German Trade Union Organization as it was able to recruit.
Therefore, in spite of the absence of DGB Chairman Walter Freitag from
the next Bundestag, the unions will have full representation within the
SPD party faction. Outspoken neutralists have disappeared from the
lists of the middle class parties, although some of them may run on the
Heinemann ticket.
The various interest groups are lending moral and financial support to
the parties which they have traditionally supported. While the trade
unions continue to pay lip service to political neutrality, their demands,
criticism, and supporting actions leave little doubt in the voters’ minds
that they are on the side of the SPD. Still less doubt is possible in
regard to the preferences of industrial groups. They support the CDU,
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the FDP, the DP, and to some extent the BHE. While some difficulties
seem to have arisen in securing funds from enterprises which have
statutory union representation on their boards and management, the
total industrial campaign funds prorated among the non-Socialist par-
ties is larger than the funds of the SPD. Campaign funds seem ample
for the KPD, but it is not yet clear whether this money will be available
to Heinemann’s party. On the whole, the ultra-rightists appear to be
operating on a shoestring.
The important »middle class bloc«, representing the economic interests
of farmers, craftsmen, retailers, and real estate men, has more or less
endorsed the middle class parties of the present coalition. SPD attempts
to persuade these groups to adopt a somewhat more neutral attitude
seem to have failed. The SPD has been equally unsuccessful in its
attempts to pacify the official representatives of the veterans’ organiza-
tions. The veterans’ organizations, however, are not recommending any
middle class or rightist parties to the voters.
The refugee party, the BHE, is running for the first time in a federal
election. Its effort to attract the maximum number of refugee votes is
somewhat counterbalanced by the fact that all other parties continue to
present spokesmen of refugee interests in advantageous spots on their
lists. Since officials of refugee organizations and the leading personnel
of the BHE are often one and the same, however, the latter enjoys a
distinct advantage over the other parties among the refugee voters,
especially among those who have not been fully integrated into the
West German economy.
The official electoral neutrality of the churches has so far been only
partly maintained. The Catholic Church appears to be squarely behind
the CDU-CSU, a fact which has led to sharp criticism not only by the
SPD but also by such predominantly Catholic rivals of the CDU-CSU as
the ZP and the BP. The position of the Protestant Church is much less
unified. It makes an effort to keep out of the election campaign as much
as possible, but such well-known Protestant leaders as Bundestag Chair-
man and foremost CDU representative Hermann Ehlers and Bishop
Niemöller, who is strongly opposed to Adenauer’s foreign policy, try to
draw the Protestant Church into opposing camps.
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B. The Course of the Campaign
Although the campaign is still in its early stages, it is already apparent

that it will differ significantly from the Bundestag contest of August
1949. At that time the Allies were still generally viewed by the Ger-
man public as the main source of political power. The people were
less concerned with political developments, the refugees had a limited
political selection, and rightists were more or less excluded from active
campaigning both by design and by circumstances. Interest at that time
tended to focus largely on the question, whether and to what extent a
planned economy would prevail in the immediate future.
Political interest in the 1953 election will be more intense, but also more
diversified. The population is well aware that, except for the external
trappings of the occupation, West Germany’s freedom of decision is as
great as that of any free European nation. It is conscious of the fact
that the next German government will be capable of making major
decisions in foreign as well as in domestic affairs. But there is no evi-
dence to indicate that the majority of German voters think their choice
should hinge on the issue of the future course of German foreign policy.
Adenauer’s original intention of transforming the election contest into
a form of plebiscite, with the coalition under his leadership ranging
itself behind his record in the last four years, has undergone a number
of modifications. Because the other European signatory powers have
delayed ratification and because the constitutionality of the treaties is
still to be examined by the Karlsruhe court, EDC, although ratified
by the Germans, has not been consummated. Moreover, Stalin’s death,
the change in Soviet tactics, Churchill’s initiative, and the East German
uprisings have opened so many new vistas that the Chancellor cannot
rely as heavily as he would have liked to on the assertion that there
exists no alternative to his policy of West German rearmament and inte-
gration into Western Europe. At the same time, the SPD has not been
able to present a clear-cut alternative to the Adenauer policy. In view
of the last Soviet note, it seems unlikely that the USSR will make new
proposals which the SPD could utilize to develop a sharply defined
foreign policy of its own. These factors will tend to prevent foreign
policy from becoming the overriding issue of the campaign.
Such a development doubtless has advantages for the administration
as well. It makes it possible to play down the closely related and
still controversial rearmament issue. It may also take the sting out of
charges that the Adenauer government represents US rather than Ger-
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man interests and will prevent this issue from becoming a focal point
for both right and left wing criticism. On the other hand, the fact that
the foreign policy issue is not clear-cut reinforces the effects of the pro-
portional representation system, thereby giving the campaign a more
diffuse character. On the whole, the government would have profited
substantially by concentration on the foreign policy issue. As of now
the election contest threatens to become a projection of everybody’s
hopes and fears.
While maintaining a common position on foreign policy and in support
of a liberal economy, each of the coalition parties is conducting its
campaign to play up the specific issues which it estimates will yield
a maximum electoral advantage. For the CDU-CSU, this issue is the
personality and successes of the Federal Chancellor, Dr. Konrad Ade-
nauer. The development of positions on particular social or economic
questions has been subordinated to the over-all presentation of the
Chancellor as the architect and statesman responsible for the economic
recovery of Germany and for its reinstatement as an important world
power. He is lauded as the talented leader whose political skill has
brought such favorable results during the past four years and who can
be trusted to make the right decisions for Germany on the difficult
issues which lie ahead.
The FDP and DP have concentrated on attacking the role of the SPD
and of organized labor in German political life in an effort to establish
a record as the most uncompromising defenders of middle class inter-
ests against the encroachment of SPD and organized labor interests.
These two parties compete with each other, and also with the CDU,
in demanding an end to the »defamation« of German soldiers and the
release of »war criminals«. In southwest Germany, the FDP and CDU
are relying heavily on the denominational issue, the former to attract
the Protestants and the latter to gain the vote of the Catholic middle
class.
The BHE, with its present freedom from political ties, is taking every
opportunity to press future German claims in its energetic drive for
refugee and generally rightist votes. Its chairman, Waldemar Kraft,
took sharp issue with the tendency of certain CDU and FDP spokesmen
to present the goal of German foreign policy as the restoration of a
unified state within the 1937 frontiers, Kraft asserted that such an objec-
tive is meaningless because it ignores obvious areas previously settled
by Germany such as the Sudetenland, Danzig, Memel and the Polish
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Corridor, and it conceives of organizing East-Central Europe according

to an outmoded and ineffective nation-state pattern.
The SPD campaign seems to have undergone some significant shifts
and retrenchments. Officially the party is still attempting to break
through the 33 percent ceiling of its predominantly working class fol-
lowing by appealing to the economic interests and patriotic feelings
of all middle class elements not identified with big business. But in
view of the persistently hostile reception accorded its spokesmen lately
in gatherings of small business, artisans, veterans, and even refugee
groups, the emphasis of the SPD campaign is shifting perceptibly. Its
propaganda seems to be more and more calculated to solidify and
extend its hold over its traditional supporters: the working classes,
pensioners, and other recipients of public funds.
The SPD is not pushing its socialization plans too far into the fore-
ground for fear that these might evoke the specter of a controlled
economy and bring a repetition of 1949 voting patterns. Therefore, it
tries to put across its message by emphasizing the social inequities
which it attributes to the economic and social policies of the present
government. It promises definite improvements in the living standards
of workers and other lower income groups. In addition, party and, to a
greater extent, trade union propaganda, are playing on popular fear of
a revived German militarism. This propaganda is conveyed primarily
by innuendo and does not directly connect government policy with
such a development.
The Communists have scrupulously refrained from attacking the Social
Democrats in the present campaign, although these courteous tactics
are not reciprocated. The present Communist campaign is calculated to
exploit anti-rearmament and anti-Western sentiment at all costs, and in
this respect, it is the government, rather than the SPD, which appears as
the archenemy.
V. Election Trends
A. Participation
With a total electorate of approximately 33,000,000 and voter participa-

tion calculated at the 1949 level of 78.5 percent, the total vote would
approximate 26,000,000. But if the voters develop an interest as intense
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as that shown in some Weimar Reichstag elections, participation might

run two to three percent higher. Moreover, the invalid vote, which
stood at the unusually high level of three percent in 1949, might be cut
in half now that there are fewer restrictions on parties and almost every
voter is assured of the opportunity to vote for a candidate of his choice.
Thus the total valid vote might be between 26,000,000 and 26,500,000.
Of this total, approximately 3,460,000 will be newly eligible voters, who
have never before gone to the polls. These consist of about 2,940,000
young voters, including about 100,000 refugees from the East Zone, and
some 525,000 older people from East Germany and East Berlin who
have settled in the Federal Republic since 1949. Even if a smaller than
average percentage of younger voters participate, approximately eight
percent of the vote will be cast by persons who have not previously
participated in West German politics, and among them the young vot-
ers, rather than the fugitives from the East, will play the decisive role.
B. Effects of Splinter Groups
If none of the numerous splinter groups ‒ KPD, GVP, Center, and vari-
ous ultra-rightist elements ‒ succeed in obtaining any representation,
seats equivalent to 2,000,000 to 3,000,000 votes might be allocated to
other parties, roughly according to their proportional strength. Since
the SPD is not likely to gather more than one-third of the total vote,
any sizeable allocation of votes forfeited by splinter parties would work
to the relative disadvantage of the SPD. Conversely, the greater the
representation obtained by these groups ‒ which, regardless of their
over-all political orientation, are all opposed to the present government
coalition ‒ the smaller the margin between the parties of the center and
moderate right and the SPD.
C. Probable Outcome
The old center-right Adenauer coalition is likely to win enough votes

to form a coalition either by itself or by the addition of the BHE and
perhaps the BP. This will hold true even in the unlikely event that all
or most of the splinter parties ‒ neutralists, communists, ZP, ultra-right-
ists ‒ receive full representation in proportion to their strength. The
Adenauer coalition will probably control a sufficient working majority
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short of the two-thirds majority necessary to pass constitutional amend-

ments. That such a combination is possible, however, does not neces-
sarily mean that it will come into being. Many practical problems will
affect the formation of the cabinet, among them the relative parliamen-
tary strength of the CDU in relation both to the moderate right and the
SPD, the extent to which the alternative coalition partners are willing to
compromise both as to personnel and policies of the new government,
the judgment of the Karlsruhe court on the constitutionality of EDC,
and the international situation at that time.
As between the middle-of-the-road and moderate-rightist parties ‒
CDU, CSU, FDP, DP, BP, BHE ‒ the following pattern appears likely.
The prestige of Adenauer and the certainty of winning a substantial
number of votes from the BP militate in favor of the CDU-CSU. A num-
ber of factors indicate, however, that it will do well to maintain its 1949
percentage of the total vote. These factors are: the loss of certain refugee
elements to the BHE, some Protestant middle class elements to the FDP
and to the rightists, and some catholic labor elements to the SPD. The
FDP and the DP, on the other hand, can be expected to improve their
electoral positions somewhat, despite severe internal dissension and, in
the case of the DP, organizational handicaps. The BHE will probably
obtain one-third to one-half of the refugee vote, bringing its strength to
six to eight percent of the total vote. All things considered, the balance
within the middle-of-the-road camp should shift somewhat to the right,
but the CDU will retain its strategic central position allowing it to enter
a coalition either to the right or the left.
Between the moderate-rightists and the ultra-rightists, the former is
likely to have a greater appeal to the marginal rightist voter than the
latter. The ultra-rightists are poorly organized compared with the FDP
and the DP and the number of people currently dissatisfied with the
regime to the point of rejecting it entirely is still comparatively small.
Many rightist-oriented voters might favor the FDP or DP on the ground
that they are giving only conditional and temporary support to the
policies of the Adenauer government.
The line dividing the CDU-CSU and the SPD will shift but little. The
SPD is likely to gain the support of certain Catholic labor elements and
middle class voters opposed to rearmament. It can also be expected
to attract more than its proportional share of the young voters as it
has in the past. It will retain and perhaps increase its hold on the
non-Catholic labor vote, to the disadvantage of the KPD. Even though
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the SPD probably will nose out the CDU-CSU as the strongest party, it
is not likely to obtain more than one-third of all valid votes cast.
Addendum to Intelligence Report 6378 CF August 13, 1953
The Soviet note of August 16 will have little effect upon the election
campaign in West Germany. Each of the two major contestants, the
government and the Social Democratic Party, can use some part of
the note to bolster their own arguments. The Social Democratic Party
can point to the Soviet statement that military alliances with the West
and unification are mutually exclusive. In its defense, the government
can argue that the Soviet position on unification procedures remains
virtually unchanged since 1952 and that the USSR still insists upon
the full‐fledged participation of the East German Government in such
proceedings. Moreover, the government can draw some comfort from
the fact that the note is very vague and confused about the nature of
the preparatory steps for the peace conference. As it does not call for an
immediate meeting, no action is required prior to the election.
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568
[19.]
Austria Attempts Independent Foreign Policy*
[1953]
Abstract
Prompted by Soviet relaxation of occupation controls, and by what is

viewed as a propitious international situation, Austria has adopted a
new Eastern policy with the avowed purpose of inducing the USSR to
grant Austria a treaty. There are indications that the Austrians would
be willing to accept a neutralized position, provided allowance is made
for adequate security forces, and would agree to an expansion of East-
West trade.
The direct approach to Moscow was to some extent prompted by
domestic considerations, the leadership of the conservative People’s
Party, which lost in the last two elections, is anxious to gain a foreign
policy success and is also sensitive to the demand for expanded Eastern
trade emanating from the party’s business wing.
The Austrians, probably estimate that they have little to lose by trying
a new approach. They are confident of their ability to deal with the
Soviets after the termination of the occupation and hopeful that the
West would underwrite economic liabilities which might arise from a
settlement based on the present treaty terms.
I. Austrian Reactions to Recent Soviet Moves
In early June the Soviet occupation authorities in Austria initiated a

series of alleviatory measures with the removal of controls on the traffic
of goods and persons between the Eastern and Western zones and the
promise to release some 600 Austrian military and civilian internees. In
successive moves they have nominated a civilian high commissioner,
assumed the expenditures for the maintenance of their occupation
troops in Austria, abolished unilateral censorship, and agreed to the
abolition of quadripartite censorship of postal and wire communica-
* [Als Intelligence Report No. 6403 am 31. August 1953 für das Department of
State fertiggestellt. – Zu diesem Text vergleiche in der Einleitung S. 139-142.]
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tions. These moves involve a change of policy on matters where the

Soviets have previously taken an adamant stand. They do not represent
material concessions on the part of the USSR, although the relinquish-
ment of about 160,000,000 Schillings ($ 6,000,000) annually in occupa-
tion cost payments is a minor financial sacrifice for the Soviet adminis-
tration in Austria which is chronically short of the native currency.
Taken in their entirety, the Soviet moves have dispelled the feeling of
apathy on occupation issues prevalent among Austrians during the last
few years. They have also stimulated a lively discussion in the press
concerning the probability of a treaty and have created an atmosphere
of cautious anticipation, less so in the Soviet zone than in the rest of the
country.
Some Austrians see a correlation between their own and the Korean
problem. They point to the sudden stiffening of the Soviets on the
Austrian treaty question in late 1949 and early 1950, a period during
which preparations for the Korean War must have been planned in
Moscow. To them it follows logically that with the achievement of a
Korean armistice, the Austrian problem might again be taken up by the
powers and even brought to a successful conclusion. Others consider
the Soviet gestures to be motivated primarily by a desire to influence
Western European opinion in general, and West German opinion on the
eve of general elections, in particular.
II. The New Eastern Policy
Whatever the motivation ascribed to the Kremlin, the Austrian Govern-

ment, under the leadership of Chancellor Julius Raab and Foreign Mini-
ster Karl Gruber, has embarked upon a new Eastern policy in order
to make the most of what to them is a propitious situation. Through
direct bilateral negotiations they are attempting to prove Soviet inten-
tions, perhaps in the hope that the Soviets could be induced to grant
Austria a treaty in return for an offer to reorient the country’s foreign
policy. Since the Soviets showed tangible evidence of their softer pol-
icy towards Austria during, and seemingly as a result of, these nego-
tiations, the Austrians are fortified in their belief that this is a more
fruitful course than leaving the initiative entirely in the hands of the
Western powers. They think that by clever manipulation they may be
able to turn East-West sparring to Austria’s advantage.
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570 [19.] Austria Attempts Independent Foreign Policy [1953]
For this reason, Russia’s conciliatory gestures are emphasized although

they fall only within the confines of occupation policy while unpromis-
ing Soviet moves, such as the inadequate references to the Austrian
problem in the latest Soviet notes, are glossed over by Austrian offi‐
cials. In addition, the government is taking painstaking care not to give
the Soviets the slightest cause for offense. For example, the film »Man
on a Tightrope« was barred by Austrian authorities who feared that the
Soviets might object to it.
How far the government is prepared to go in limiting the country’s
future political and economic freedom is difficult to estimate. A mem-
orandum to the USSR on June 30, 1953 and statements by leading
Austrian politicians strongly suggest that it is willing to agree, for the
post treaty period, to some kind of military neutrality and to make
concessions on the question of East-West trade. This agreement might
entail a pledge not to join any Western defensive arrangements, but
it is unlikely that the Austrians would accept a status of completely
disarmed neutrality. Nor is there any indication that the Soviets would
insist on reducing the military force of 53,000 which Austria is to be
permitted under the long treaty for internal security requirements.
As far as the future economic orientation is concerned, the Austrians
probably consider controls on East-West trade no longer worth main-
taining in view of the greatly diminished US aid. Yielding to real or
fabricated pressures from the business wing of the People’s Party, the
government is likely to conclude trade agreements with bloc countries
which are more liberal than any signed in the past. On the other
hand, the Austrians are unlikely to forge membership in such economic
organizations as the European Payments Union, of which traditionally
neutral countries, like Switzerland, are also members.
Austrians readiness to make concessions to the USSR is based on the
assumption that Soviet intentions can be truly probed only by offering
some inducements to conclude a treaty, the political and military situa-
tion of the USSR having obviously not deteriorated to such an extent as
to force their withdrawal from Austria on the basis of the abbreviated
treaty.
The Austrians have emphasized that the ultimate form (i.e. long or
short treaty or evacuation protocol) of the treaty itself, as well as
the method of negotiation, is immaterial. As to substance, public dis-
cussions has centered on Article 35, dealing with the German assets
problem. In the light of the vast financial benefits which the Soviets
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have derived from these assets during the occupation it is argued that
this article must be renegotiated in Austria’s favor. On the other hand,
the Austrians have gone far towards committing themselves to a settle‐
ment along the lines of the long treaty and, if conclusion of the treaty
depended upon acceptance of Article 35, they probably would assume
the economic obligations contained therein.
The new approach to the USSR also reflects Austrian confidence that
they can handle their own relations with the Soviets, although it is
admitted that the existence of quasi-extraterritorial concessions on Aus-
trian soil may give rise to a number of delicate problems. The Austrians
minimize the danger of future Soviet or satellite invasion by arguing
that the Soviets are not likely to incur a grave risk of war by overtly
endangering the independence of a country only recently evacuated.
Concerning internal security, the Austrians are confident they can con-
trol the small subversive potential of the native Communist party.
They are perhaps less sanguine about their economic future, particu-
larly if heavily mortgaged by the German assets settlement. Pressure
for a greater volume of trade with the East are clearly discernible and
may be adopted to increase if a slackening of Austria’s exports should
follow in the wake of an East-West settlement.
III. Internal Factors Prompting New Policy
One of the most important elements in the new Austrian approach is

its inner political aspect. The Foreign Office is controlled by the People’s
Party which has suffered serious losses in the last two elections. It
desperately needs to increase its prestige with the voters and to prove
the resourcefulness of the two-year-old Raab-Maleta leadership to the
party’s rank and file. Within the People’s Party, the initiative for a soft
policy, coming from the Foreign Ministry, received its strongest backing
from the business wing, while spokesmen of the farm wing had to be
brought in line by Chancellor Raab’s warning to cease stepping on the
tail of the Russian bear.
The readiness of the People's Party to embark upon a more dynamic
foreign policy make it impossible for the Socialists, who are more gen-
uinely skeptical as to ultimate Soviet intentions, to remain inactive.
They at first derided Chancellor Raab’s expressions of warm apprecia-
tion and even gratitude for minor Soviet concessions as eating humble
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572 [19.] Austria Attempts Independent Foreign Policy [1953]
pie, questioned Soviet objectives, and stressed that these concessions

were granted by the Western powers years ago. But the Socialists must
have concluded that no advantages could be gained by this kind of
opposition as they are now participating fully in the new approach,
although their emphasis is on revision of the long draft treaty rather
than on a treaty at almost any price. This tactic will enable them to
share in the fruits of any future concessions, to evade some of the
responsibility if an economically burdensome settlement should be
arrived at, and to blame the People’s Party Chancellor and Foreign
Minister in case of failure.
The right-wing opposition Independent Party (VdU) has struck out in
three directions all at once; it has warned the government against the
danger of being taken in by the Soviets, but to be on the safe side, it
has demanded that the treaty settlement must not in any way Austria’s
sovereignty, which is tantamount to demanding revision of Article 35.
Finally, the Independents have urged the government to divorce the
problem of the treaty from that of evacuation and to press for a with-
drawal of occupation troops if the new policy has yielded no tangible
results after three months.
The Communist press continues highly critical of the government,
much more so than the official Soviet press. The coalition is constantly
lambasted for its alleged failure to come to terms with the USSR and
to answer the Soviet question on the withdrawal of the abbreviated
treaty in a satisfactory fashion. The party’s line may be explained by
their ignorance of Soviet objectives, or they may be trying to furnish the
USSR with an excuse for not granting a treaty.
IV. Estimate of the New Policy
In pursuing their new Eastern policy, the Austrians have deliberately

proceeded without consulting the Western powers. Realizing that the
West is, for political and propagandistic reasons, unable to flout pol-
icies the Austrians themselves developed to attain important national
aspirations, they have practically committed the West to an unquali-
fied support of their policies. Moreover, they may rationalize that the
West would be extremely reluctant to apply its already very limited
economic leverage against Austria. The new policy affords them an
opportunity to find out to what extent the US is prepared to under-
write Austria’s economic future. Austrian policy makers are, therefore,
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risking little in their actions. If the new approach succeeds, they can
claim credit for having brought about a detente in the cold war. If it
fails, the Western powers, in view of their strategic commitments in
Central Europe, are [alleged] to be unwilling and unable to castigate
the Austrians for their [mediation]?
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574
[20.]
The West German Bundestag Elections of 1953*
[1953]
Abstract
The decisive factor in the 1953 Bundestag elections was the expansion
of the West German electorate by about 4,000,000 voters, bringing the
total vote to approximately 28,400,000. Largely through obtaining the
lion’s share of this increase, the Christian Democratic Union/Christian
Social Union (CDU/CSU) emerged by far as the strongest party, with an
absolute majority of one in the 244 seat Bundestag. It virtually elimina-
ted the minor Catholic parties and dwarfed its middle class Protestant
allies, the Free Democratic Party (FDP) and the German Party (DP),
obtaining 12,400,000 votes to their combined total of 3,500,000. The
major portion of its gains occurred in Protestant areas, or as a result of
election arrangements with the minor Catholic parties. Its vote remai-
ned relatively stable in predominantly Catholic regions where it had
previously established itself as the only party appealing to Catholic.
The Social Democratic Party (SPD), with 7,970,000, will not be able to
challenge the supremacy of the CDU.
Prominent in the success of the CDU/CSU were Chancellor Adenauer’s
personality and prestige as head of the government in a period of rapid
recovery, which made him – rather than the CDU as such – a rallying
point for the entire West German middle class. In many regions voters
split their ballots to give the Chancellor a vote of confidence. Like
the FDP and DP, the refugee party, the All-German Bloc (BHE), was
hard-hit by the tendency to vote for Adenauer, losing ground among
the refugee voters throughout the Federal Republic, even though its
vote totaled 1,600,000 and it moved into fourth place in the Bundestag
with 27 seats.
Although remaining the second largest party, the SPD found no effec‐
tive method of expanding its electorate outside labor’s ranks, failing
either to penetrate the middle class or to draw large blocs of supporters
from other parties with the exception of the Communist Party (KPD),
* [Als Intelligence Report No. 6426 am sechsten Oktober 1953 für das Department
of State fertiggestellt. – Zu diesem Text vergleiche in der Einleitung S. 134-137.]
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from whom it obtained an estimated 50 percent of its total gain of

1,000,000 voters since 1949. The SPD’s chief weakness is the relative
inflexibility of its vote, which places it at a disadvantage when voters
participation increases. It did not even capture its proportional quota of
young voters in the large pool of new participants.
The only non-socialist party campaigning on a clear opposition pro-
gram, the neutralist party of Gustav Heinemann (All-German People’s
Party, GVP), failed to pose a serious challenge, obtaining only 318,000
votes. The various ultra-rightist splinter groups, like the Communists,
did not win a single Bundestag seat, as large numbers of former rightist
voters demonstrated their satisfaction with present conditions by swit-
ching to the CDU.
In view of the CDU’s landslide victory and the apparent relegation of
the SPD to the role of permanent opposition as a result of its failure,
the question arises whether Germany is on the way to developing a
one and one half-party system (i.e. a permanent majority party versus a
permanent minority party) to replace its traditional multiparty system.
The probabilities seem to favor the revival of the multiparty pattern.
With the specter of a socialist government fading and potential conflicts
within the CDU enhanced by its expansion into a middle class catch-all,
centrifugal tendencies may be expected to arise. Whether or not future
patterns remain dominated by an aggrandized CDU or relapse into
the pre-1953 picture, however, both the CDU and SPD will continue
to be strong enough and clear enough in their loyalty to democratic
government to insure the stability of future German regimes.
I. Introduction
The story of the Bundestag elections of 1953 is first and foremost the
story of the new voters. About 4,000,000 more voters participated in
the 1953 election, bringing the total participation to 28,400,000.1 The
great majority, or about 3,000,000, of these were responsible for the bulk
of the 5,000,000 new voters cast for Chancellor Adenauer’s Christian
1 The difference of 4,000,000 votes is composed of an estimated 2,300,000 young

persons eligible to vote for the first time in 1953, plus 450,000 votes representing
the net increases in refugee voters in West Germany since 1949, plus a net gain
of 2,200,000 eligibles [sic] not previously participating. Taking into consideration
the replacement of slightly less than a million participants deceased since 1949,
4,900,000 new participants cast ballots in the 1953 election.
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576 [20.] The West German Bundestag Elections of 1953 [1953]
Democratic Union (CDU). The reminder of this vote came through

shifts from the smaller Catholic parties (the Bavarian Party and the
Center Party) which were all but eliminated yielding 800,000 to 900,000
new CDU/CSU votes, plus between 1,100,000 and 1,200,000 from voters
who had previously supported right-of-center parties or from refugee
voters.
With this stupendous victory, the CDU has dwarfed all other middle
class and right-of-center parties. It won 12,400,000 voters as opposed
to 3,500,000 for the Free Democratic Party (FDP) and German Party
(DP) combined, or to 5,100,000 voters if the dwindling refugee party is
included. As for the various ultra-rightist parties, they could not muster
even half a million voters. The only group which remains as a major
political competitor of the CDU is the Social Democratic Party (SPD).
Although the SPD gained a million votes since 1949, approaching the
8,000,000 mark it has suffered through its inability to attract enough
new voters or to swell its ranks by drawing blocs of voters from other
parties (with the exception of the Communist camp). If one assumes
that a considerable percentage of the 750,000 voters lost by the Commu-
nists since 1949 represented shifts to the SPD, the latter has fallen short
of attracting even its own proportional share of new voters. As a party
which can always count on a certain number of loyal supporters but
which shows little ability to expand into other social strata, the SPD has
suffered from the same circumstances which created the conditions for
the overwhelming CDU victory: the increase in voter participation from
78.5 to 86.2 percent.
Two closely related questions therefore arise. Why did 45 percent of
the German electorate concentrate its vote on the CDU, and secondly,
what likelihood is there, and under what conditions, that the CDU can
transform this personal victory by its leader into a more permanent
allegiance to the party? There is little doubt that a majority of new
voters for the CDU cast their ballot for the chancellor rather than for the
party organization. In some regions like Hesse, this conclusion derives
from the fact that a considerable number of votes were split between
local FDP candidates on the district ballot and the CDU Land lists
headed by Chancellor Adenauer on the second ballot.
This show of confidence in Adenauer’s leadership stems primarily from
the voter’s satisfaction with Germany’s astounding economic, social
and political recovery. Judging from the limited amount of informa-
tion available on vote distribution among the various social strata,
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commercial, rural, and artisan proprietors, managerial elements, a con-

siderable segment of the white collar group, and a minority of the
manual workers remain solidly in the Adenauer column. The majority
of pensioners, refugees, and many people eking out a marginal exis-
tence outside the working classes were also sufficiently satisfied with
present conditions to support the CDU/CSU. Even former rightists and
ultra-rightists voted the CDU ticket in great numbers, attesting to their
satisfaction with present conditions.
Adenauer’s unequivocal stand for German rearmament, if only within
the European framework, may also have made it easier for former
rightist and ultra-rightist voters to switch their allegiance. There is no
evidence to show that the voter was swayed by the foreign policy
debate. If anything he probably felt pride in Germany’s newly regained
importance and a sense of security because his government’s policy had
aligned his country with the one power which in his estimate could
provide the maximum protection in the future.
Ordinarily one associates high voter participation with intense voter
interest; however, political apathy in Germany has been considerable. It
has expressed itself by a lack of sustained interest in party politics and
by low participation in pre-election activities. As an explanation for the
unusually large turnout of voters, the thesis may be advanced that Ade-
nauer symbolized the established regime and that identification with
this regime may have been psychologically attractive in the absence of
specific grievances. It may also be argued that the foreign policy debate,
even if it made only incomplete sense to the voter, impressed him with
Germany’s, and indirectly his own, key role in future development.
This may have been an additional reason to translate his satisfaction
into active participation. If the general trend of these explanations is
accepted, it would once more underline the vital part of Adenauer and
his government in the election victory and the rather secondary part
played by the party organization.
II. Extent of Voter Participation
The participation percentage of 86.2 was not only 7.7 percent higher
than in the previous Bundestag election, but exceeded all participation
levels in the elections for state legislatures held between 1949 and
1953; it compares favorably with elections during the Weimar period,
except the last (of March 1933). It was highest in Lower Saxony and
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Schleswig-Holstein – 88.6 and 88.2 percent, respectively – and lowest

in Baden‐Württemberg and Bremen, with 82 and 78.8 percent, respec-
tively. Increased participation alone accounted for 2,200,000 new votes
in 1953; an equal number is represented by those who reached voting
age since 1949, while another 450,000 votes represent the net increase
owing to migrations since 1949. Thus about one in six voters went to
the polls for the first time in 1953. In many districts the actual increase
was relatively greater because of population shifts involved in migra-
tions from the refugee-swollen rural areas of Bavaria, Lower Saxony,
and Schleswig-Holstein into urban and suburban areas of southern and
southwestern Germany.
III. Number of Invalid Votes
A total of 926,497 ballots were invalidated, thus maintaining the rather

high level of invalid votes – 3.1 percent of the total in 1949, 3.4 and
3.2 percent, respectively, for the first and second ballots in 1953. The
regional distribution of invalid ballots is indicated in the following
tabulation, given in percentages of the total valid votes:
State 1949 1953

First Second
Baden‐Württem‐ … 2.9 3.3
berg
Bavaria 2.6 3.6 3.6
Bremen 2.3 2.2 3.3
Hamburg 2.3 3.5 2.3
Hesse 5.3 3.7 4.3
Lower Saxony 2.2 3.7 2.8
North Rhine- 2.7 3.1 2.9
Westphalia
Rhineland- 5.4 4.9 3.5
Palatinate
Schleswig-Hol- 2.3 2.7 2.9
stein
National Aver- 3.1 3.4 3.2
age
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This deviation from the Weimar pattern, where the invalid vote oscil-
lated between 1 and 1.5 percent, may be ascribed partly to the lowering
of education levels, in the latest instance aggravated by the intricacies
of a system involving two ballots. But to some extent the persistence
of a high invalid vote average is due to the existence of a rightist
protest vote. This becomes especially clear in regions where invalid
votes exceed the average, as in Hesse, Rhineland-Palatinate, and Lower
Saxony – especially in the latter state, where about six districts (all for-
mer strongholds of the outlawed Socialist Reich Party, SRP) accounted
for the disproportion between the state’s invalid vote level and the
national average. In most of these areas, the neo-Nazi German Reich
Party (DRP) presented no individual candidates but entered a Land list;
correspondingly, invalid vote totals decreased sharply from the first
to the second ballot. In Hesse, on the contrary, the ultra-rightist vote
was represented largely in terms of invalid ballots, the level increasing
sharply from the first to the second ballot in six selected districts with a
heavy invalid vote.
IV. The Two Ballot System
In general the voters took only moderate advantage of the opportunity

to split their vote. About 150,000 voters in Hesse and Baden‐Württem‐
berg, mainly in Protestant districts, employed this device to support the
FDP district candidate while giving their second ballot to the CDU state
list. In the Württemberg region, at least, this procedure may have been
in part a protest against the policies of party leader Reinhold Maier
who led the FDP Land list. In the case of the SPD, which consistently
won fewer votes on its Land lists than for its district candidates – the
total differential amounting to some 170,000 votes – the explanation
seems to lie in distrust of the SPD party organization rather than in any
recognizable preference for another party.
Very few voters chose to support an independent candidate on the first
ballot, thus forfeiting (by the terms of the election law) any opportunity
to cast a second, or party list, ballot. The one incumbent independent
deputy, Richard Freudenberg, was soundly trounced by his CDU rival
in the Mannheim-Land district.
Where the three middle class parties (CDU, FDP, and DP) entered elec-
tion alliances, assigning various districts to one candidate representing
all three, the voters generally honored these agreements, thus winning
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three additional seats for these parties in Hamburg and Schleswig-Hol-

stein over and above their Land list quotas. On the other hand, the
election arrangement between the Center Party and the CDU, though
instrumental in saving the former party two of its ten seats in the
1949 Bundestag, apparently only furthered the transfer of support to the
CDU, thus pointing to the total elimination of the Center Party.
Viewed as a whole, the election system has worked out rather well.
It has excluded splinter groups from representation and given the
strongest party, the CDU/CSU, a certain advantage over the other
groups; with 45.2 percent of the vote, it acquired an absolute majority
of one seat in the Bundestag, thus insuring a high degree of governmen-
tal stability. Since the SPD reaped comparable advantages from the
election system which had been worked out under its influence in
Hesse and Hamburg, and since it benefited, though to a lesser extent,
from the greater weight automatically given to the established parties,
it has little reason to complain of the operation of the electoral system.
As for the FDP, which had originally sponsored the 1953 electoral law,
it suffered to a relatively high degree from the actual operation of
the system, as the result of shifting votes from the first to the second
ballots. Nor is the proportion of the total vote obtained by the unrep-
resented groups (6.7 percent) so high, or the disproportion between
the number of votes needed to seat a deputy for the various parties
so great, as to deprive the Bundestag of its representative character, as
shown in the following tabulations:
Party Bundestag Seats Votes per Seat

1949 1953 1949 1953
CDU/CSU 139 244 52,932 51,069
SPD 131 151 52,918 53,111
FDP/DVP 52 48 54,832 54,812
DP 17 15 55,299 61,034
BHE … 27 … 59,886
ZP 10 2 54,382 72,447
Nationwide 59,711 56,706
Average
a.Not licensed independently in 1949.
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It may be added that from the viewpoint of political stability, the sys-
tem is likely to produce better results than the straight plurality system,
with a preferential weight for certain party-combinations, embodied in
the initial administration draft of an election law. Such a system would
have left the SPD with about 50 seats, the rest going to the government
parties, and would thus have dangerously distorted the relative weight
of the individual parties while adding hardly anything to governmental
stability.
The over-all picture of party strength in the 1949 and 1953 elections is
indicated in Table 1.
Table 1. COMPARATIVE STRENGTH OF THE WEST GERMAN PAR-
TIES 1949 – 1953
(In terms of relative gain or loss)
Party Total Vote Percent of Percent of Total Vote Percent of Shift
Shift
1949 1953a 1949 – 1953 1949 1953 1949 – 1953
CDU/CSU 7,359,084 12,459,705 +69.3 31.0 45.2 +45.5
SPD 6,934,975 7,971,068 +15.0 29.2 28.8 -1.0
FDP 2,829,920 2,632,787 -7.0 11.9 9.5 -20.1
BHE …b 1,618,569 … … 5.9 …
DP 939,934 914,507 -2.7 4.0 3.3 -17.5
KPD 1,361,706 609,821 -55.2 5.7 2.2 -61.4
BP 986,478 465,552 -52.8 4.2 1.7 -59.5
ZP 727,505 217,078 -70.2 3.1 0.8 -74.2
DRP (Nau- …b 297,219 … … 1.1 …
mann)c
DRP/DKPc 429,031 …b … 1.8 … …
b
GVP … 318,877 … … 1.2 …
Other 1,481,875 115,665 -92.3 6.2 0.3 -95.2
Total 23,732,396 27,620,848
a.Based on preliminary figures; all vote totals for 1953 in this and subsequent tables represent
second ballot (party list) figures.
b.Did not participate.
c.The DRP was allied in 1949 with the splinter German Conservative Party (DKP); the 1953 DRP
is largely a new group.
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V. Probabilities of a Two-Party System
In spite of the CDU’s stupendous gains, the chances for the develop-
ment of a two-party system in West Germany are slender. This would
be true even if a combination of fortuitous circumstances allowed the
CDU to maintain its dominant position within the non-Socialist camp.
A long period of CDU predominance would simply raise the prospect
of a one and one half-party system, since the SPD in its present state
has little hope of developing sufficient strength and popular appeal to
function as an opposition able and ready to turn into a majority. Its
social basis is too narrow, its outlook too provincial, and its appeal to
the German electorate too limited for such a role.
The SPD’s own estimate of its situation, which has strongly influenced
its strategy and tactics, has been and still is geared toward presiding
over a coalition government rather than forming a government major-
ity of its own. The latter possibility is considered almost always in
relation to a larger development, upon which the SPD has built its
greatest hopes of an altered political picture, namely, German reunifica‐
tion. In the view of the SPD, the return of East Germany would give,
the party its main chance to recast the German social system. Although
it is doubtful that the mood of the »returning« population would cor-
respond to SPD-hopes, this expectation largely determines the party’s
position in the field of international policy.
The CDU’s chances of consolidating its present power via the one and
one half-party system apparently depend more on Germany’s future
social and economic development than on the party’s ability to make
good its promise to strive valiantly toward reunification. In the event
of continuing prosperity, it may be expected that the remoteness of
unification will not be held too much against the government, espe-
cially if the latter should succeed in carrying integration to its logical
conclusion, thus opening new vistas for German energy and imagina-
tion otherwise fixed on the unity problem. As the new CDU faction
will embrace representatives of the most varied interests, decisions on
domestic issues will have to be arrived at through a series of compro-
mises within the party. Therefore, to some extent, the center of attention
shifts to the internal structure and composition of the CDU, rather than
to the antics of its weak coalition partners, or to the opposition, which
more and more represents only one interest group, namely organized
labor. Forging ahead in its foreign policy, plus satisfactory group com-
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promises within the party, would therefore seem to be the key to unity
and cohesion within the CDU.
At the same time, the SPD’s known inability to develop a prospective
majority hints strongly at a probable revival of the traditional multi-
party system. With the specter of a socialist government fading, its
propaganda value as a cement for non-socialist elements diminishes.
While the CDU has either obliterated the remaining middle class par-
ties or forced them into the position of satellites, this success has been
made possible – Adenauer’s personality apart – by the comparative
insignificance of remaining points of difference between the CDU and
other West German parties. The denominational school issue in the
case of the FDP, the particularistic interests of the Bavaria Party, tradi-
tional nationalism among the refugee and conservative elements, were
simply not strong enough to command consideration by the voters as a
worthwhile alternative to the greater middle class appeal of the CDU.
Moreover, the CDU was able by means of a judicious selection of candi-
dates to give each element the impression that its social and economic
interests would be well represented in the CDU’s parliamentary group.
If this analysis is correct, the return from the one and one half-party
system to the multiparty system would presuppose: (1) an increasing
differentiation of interests within the catch-all CDU or (2) the develop-
ment of sufficient opposition to the Chancellor’s foreign policy to pro-
vide a rallying ground for non-satellite rightist elements. The first situ-
ation could develop from a failure to maintain the spectacular rate of
economic progress demonstrated between 1949 and 1952, thus increas-
ing the likelihood of cleavages among economic interest groups. In this
event the economic support so far given freely to the Chancellor and
his party by all but the trade union groups might go elsewhere.
The progressive difficulty of realizing foreign policy aims could lead to
the second situation. Liberation from Allied supervision, the restoration
of German sovereignty to the Federal Republic in all but name, the
feeling of having swiftly gained the position of coveted ally rather than
outcast from the family of nations, have been translated into prestige
for Adenauer and his CDU – partly because of the Chancellor’s skill
and sheer perseverance, partly as a natural consequence of the fact
that his party presided over Germany’s affairs in this crucial period.
Especially as concerns the major foreign policy issue of the future,
German reunification, further progress will be both more difficult and
more limited in scope. While a failure to obtain German unity might
not seriously affect the fortunes of either the government or the CDU
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in the next few years, it may well be a strong enough factor to create a
new, non-socialist, nationalist opposition party, thus marking the return
to a multiparty system. Whether West Germany emerges with a one
and one half-party system or returns to a multiparty system, however,
the CDU and the SPD will remain strong enough and clear enough in
their loyalty to democratic government to insure the stability of future
German regimes.
VI. The Middle Class Parties
A. The Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU)
New voters cast their ballots predominantly for Chancellor Adenauer’s

party fairly uniformly throughout the Federal Republic. The increase
in CDU voting strength over its 1949 showing varied widely from one
state to another, ranging from 6.3 percent in Rhineland-Palatinate to
100 percent in Lower Saxony; this provides a reliable index of the pres-
ence or absence of non-socialist voters prepared to shift allegiance from
their former parties to the CDU (Table 2). As a rule, the percentage of
CDU increase was moderate in predominantly Catholic regions like the
Mosel valley or southern Württemberg, where the absence of any com-
peting Catholic party had already resulted in bringing CDU strength
to its saturation point. The proportion of increase was uniformly much
higher in regions where smaller Catholic parties, like the Bavaria Party
(BP) and to a lesser extent the Center Party (ZP), sustained direct losses
to the CDU/CSU.
The most spectacular gains were registered in the Protestant north.
The CDU made deep new inroads into the formerly rightist and ultra-
rightist clientele of the other class parties, except in Schleswig-Holstein
where it has been established since 1950 as the greater middle class
party. This latter development contradicted any expectation that the
CDU would lose heavily in these Protestant areas and thus relapse into
something akin to the Center Party of the Weimar Republic. In effect,
political and economic considerations have overshadowed any purely
denominational conflicts and endowed the CDU with the character of a
conservative mass party.
Although no middle class rival of the CDU, the BHE included, was
immune to CDU/CSU inroads, the hardest-hit areas were the bailiwicks
of nativist groups like the Bavaria Party and, in Lower Saxony and
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Schleswig-Holstein, the German Party (DP); also included in this cate-

gory are the ultra-rightist elements who enjoyed a brief flurry of suc-
cess in the Lower Saxony state elections of 1951. The decline of nativist
sentiment, which had developed as a defense mechanism against the
refugee influx, was accompanied by a similar though less spectacular
reduction of refugee solidarity, as expressed in the vote for the refugee
party. In each case it was the CDU which reaped the benefit of changing
loyalties (Table 3). The story of the lesser non-socialist parties is there-
fore largely a matter of their obliteration, sharp decline, or development
as a satellite of the CDU/CSU.
B. The Bavaria Party (BP) and Center Party (ZP)
These minor Catholic parties have paid a heavy price in their attempt to
forestall obliteration by coming to terms with their powerful competi-
tors. Both had suffered heavy losses in the Diet elections between 1949
and 1953, reducing their combined vote to 1,350,000; in 1953 this figure
declined to only 680,000. Apparently the voters felt that these parties, in
their struggle to obtain representation, had already sacrificed too much
of their identity, so that it would merely be simplifying matters to vote
directly for the CDU or CSU. The Bavaria Party was unable to win a
plurality in any district where its candidates competed with the CSU;
its only successful candidates were elected under the CSU label and
with CSU support. Consequently the party was unable to translate its
465,000 votes into parliamentary representation.
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Table 2. PERCENTAGE GAIN OR LOSS OF CDU/CSU and FDP/DVP VOTE, 1949 – 1953
586
CDU/CSU FDP/DVP
1949 Bun- Interim a 1949 Bun- a Shift from
1953 Bun- Shift from Shift from Interim 1953 Bun- Shift from
destag Diet destag 1949 Interim destag Diet destag 1949 Interim
Baden-Würt- 39.6 36.0 52.4 +32.3 +45.5 17.6 18.0 12.7 -27.8 -29.4
temberg
Bavaria 29.2 27.4 47.9 +64.4 +74.8 8.5 7.1 6.2 -27.1 -12.7
Bremen 16.9 9.1 24.4 +44.4 +168.1 12.9 11.8 7.0 -45.7 -40.7
Hamburg 19.8 34.4b 36.7 +85.6 …e 15.8 …e 10.3 -34.8 …e
c
Hesse 21.3 18.8 33.2 +55.9 +76.6 28.1 31.8 19.7 -29.9 …e
d e
Lower Sax- 17.6 23.7 35.2 +100.0 … 7.5 8.4 6.9 -8.0 -17.9
ony
North Rhine- 36.9 36.9 48.9 +32.5 +32.5 8.6 12.1 8.5 -1.2 -29.8
Westphalia
Rhineland- 39.1 39.2 52.1 +6.3 +32.9 15.8 16.7 12.1 -23.4 -27.5
Palatinate
Schleswig- 36.7 19.7 47.1 +28.3 +137.7 7.4 7.1 4.5 -39.2 -36.6
Holstein
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a. Interim elections for state legislature were held between 1949 and 1953 as follows: Baden‐Württemberg, 1952; Bavaria, 1950; Bremen,
1951; Hamburg, 1949; Hesse, 1950; Lower Saxony, 1951; North Rhine-Westphalia, 1950; Rhineland-Palatinate, 1951; Schleswig-Holstein,
1950.
b. Represents combined votes of CDU and FDP.

c. Represents combined vote of FDP and BHE.
d. Represents combined vote of CDU and DP.
[20.] The West German Bundestag Elections of 1953 [1953]
e. Not possible to calculate because of election coalitions.

Table 3. DECLINE OF NATIVIST AND REFUGEE VOTE IN WEST

GERMANY, 1950 – 1953a
Region Party Year
1950 1953
Schleswig CDU 74,884 121,927
SSW 66,615 40,786
BHE 71,493 35,120
Upper Bavariab CSU 171,786 352,863
BP 175,378 124,626
BHE 105,188 71,357
Lower Bavaria- CSU 287,005 500,708
Upper Palatinatec
BP 224,330 106,545
BHE 138,299 83,664
a.Figures from 1949 election are not used because the BHE did not
participate.
b.Does not include urban area of Munich or the Ingolstadt district.
Available figures for the latter area erroneous.
c.Does not include urban area of Regensburg.
Although the Center Party escaped a similar fate by virtue of its elec-
toral with the CDU, securing one direct seat and another from its party
list, as a party it suffered as grievous a defeat as the BP. In North Rhine-
Westphalia – the only state where it was permitted to enter candidates,
by the terms of its agreement with the CDU – it lost more than half its
1950 vote, declining to somewhat more than 200,000 voters.
C. The Free Democratic Party (FDP)
The FDP has managed to avoid major losses, but the general oblitera-
tion of denominational lines robbed the party of any chance of serving
as a catch-all for the Protestant vote. While retaining the bulk of its
supporters, it did not succeed in attracting its proportionate share
of new voters end thus suffered an over-all decline, except in North
Rhine-Westphalia, Rhineland-Palatinate, and Lower Saxony. It can be
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considered a major party only in Hesse, Rhineland-Palatinate, Baden‐

Württemberg, and the city-states of Bremen and Hamburg, attracting
more than 10 percent of the vote in these areas. Although its percent-
age of losses in the various regions seems not too closely related to
the intensity of its internal disputes, FDP voters more than those of
any other party cast split ballots, thus clearly favoring individual candi-
dates over the party organization. Even in cases where an FDP deputy
won a district plurality unassisted by an electoral alliance among the
government parties, the voters tended to transfer their second-ballot
preference to the CDU, so that no district pluralities at all were regis-
tered for the FDP on the second ballot. Thus FDP voters indicated that
their preference for national leadership lay with Adenauer rather than
with their own party.
D. The German Party (DP)
Although the DP lost only about 25,000 of its 1949 total of 940,000
votes and won 15 seats in the Bundestag, it was greatly reduced in areas
of northern Germany where it had been a strong competitor of the
CDU for the native Protestant, non-labor vote. Since 1949, it has lost
nearly one-third of its former supporters to the CDU in these areas.
Although this gap has temporarily been filled by a trickle of rightist
and ultra-rightist Protestant voters throughout the country, the total did
not reach 100,000 in any state, not even in the most populous state of
the Federal Republic, North Rhine-Westphalia, where the DP organiza-
tion had disintegrated early in 1953.
VII. Prospects of The All-German Bloc (BHE)
The 1953 election has fairly well settled the fate of one of the politi-
cal newcomers, the All-German Bloc (BHE). In spite of the fact that
it obtained 1,600,000 voters and entered the Bundestag as the fourth
largest group with 27 seats, its pattern of decline is clear-out and will
probably lead to its elimination in the next Bundestag elections. Its
average of 6.6 percent of the total vote in Diet elections since 1950
has been reduced to an average of 5.9 percent. In the districts where
refugee concentration is largest – Lower Saxony, Schleswig-Holstein,
and Bavaria – it managed to obtain approximately 40 percent of the
refugee vote. But even in these areas, where refugee cohesion is still
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firm and economic opportunities scarce, the BHE’s share of the total
refugee vote has appreciably declined.
Elsewhere in the Federal Republic, in areas where refugee density
is lower and economic and social integration has made substantial
progress, the vote cast for the refugee party (expressed as a percentage
of the total refugee vote) varies from a low of 22.5 in North Rhine-West-
phalia to 36.0 in Baden‐Württemberg (Table 4). Only in Schleswig-Hol-
stein and Lower Saxony, where it commands about 10-12 percent of the
total vote, can it hope to remain much more than a splinter element.
In southern Germany, with about 5-6 percent of the vote, it seems
certain to remain limited to the role of a minor element, barely able
to meet requirements for representation. In the most populous state,
North Rhine-Westphalia, its 2.7 percent of the vote can be written off as
negligible.
VIII. Failure of The Neutralist All-German People’s Party (GVP)
The only non-socialist party running on a clearly defined opposition

program, the neutralist All-German People’s Party (GVP) of Gustav
Heinemann, failed entirely to qualify as a serious competitor to the
CDU. The vote obtained by this party amounted to only 318,000 and
apparently was drawn largely from the non-Communist left, at least
in the urban areas of the Rhine-Ruhr valleys, where it replaced the
German variant of a social credit party, and in the northern city-states.
As could have been assumed from the political antecedents of some
of its candidates, the GVP drew perhaps 10-15 percent of its total vote
from the Communist electorate. In all, its showing was spotty from one
region to another; in urban areas, it averaged one to one and a half
percent, falling below one percent in many rural regions. Its maximum
strength (two to three percent) was demonstrated in the south German
cities, especially Frankfurt, and also in the Protestant city of Wuppertal
in North Rhine-Westphalia.
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Table 4. DEVELOPMENT OF THE REFUGEE VOTE IN WEST GER-

MANY
BHE Vote Percentage

State Percentage of Diet (1950 – 1952) Bundestag (1953)
Refugees in
Population
1950 – 1953 Percent Percent of Percent of Percent of
1952 of Total Refugee Total Refugee
Vote Vote
Baden‐ 14 15 6.2 44.3 5.4 36.0
Würt-
tem-
berg
Bavaria 21 21 12.3 58.6 8.2 39.0
Bre- 9 11 5.6 62.2 3.3 30.0
men
Ham- 6 9 …a … 2.5 27.8
burg
Hesse 16 17 …a … 6.4 37.6
Lower 27 26 14.9 55.2 10.7 41.2
Saxony
North 10 12 …a … 2.7 22.5
Rhine-
West-
phalia
Rhinel 6 8 1.9 31.7 1.5 22.5
and-
Palati-
nate
Schles 33 30 23.4 70.9 11.6 38.7
wig-
Hol-
stein
a.BHE not participating.
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IX. The Social Democratic Party (SPD)
The SPD’s election performance must be measured by the yardstick

of its own reasonable expectations. Beyond holding on to its estab-
lished following and counting on somewhat more than its quota of the
expending electorate, SPD policy had been keyed to attract a sufficient
segment of the lower middle class and white collar vote to bring its
over-all share of the vote to about 35 percent, and at worst, to the 32-33
percent necessary to insure the SPD a veto power over any legislation
which might be construed as requiring constitutional amendment. The
SPD failed to realize any of the expectations, even though it gained a
million new votes; because of the total expansion of the electorate, its
share of the total vote actually declined by 0.4 percent from the 1949
level.
To the extent that it drew voters who had previously supported other
parties, these came not from SPD-courted middle class voters but in
large part from the 700,000-odd deserting the Communists, as is illus-
trated by the large number of districts where SPD gains dovetailed pre-
cisely with KPD losses. With similar shifts taking place in urban areas
throughout West Germany, it seems reasonable to attribute roughly
500,000 votes, or two-thirds of Communist losses, to shifts to the SPD
(Table 5). This pool of votes represents about 50 percent of the SPD’s
additional million votes since 1949.
It therefore becomes evident that the SPD fell far short of its expected
proportion of young voters, and attracted virtually none of those who
had abstained from voting in 1949 or in interim Diet elections.2 The
close correlation between SPD gains in the interim Diet elections and
lower participation levels was corroborated by the party’s poor show-
ing in the 1953 election, which brought out record participation level,
thus pointing to the relative inflexibility of the SPD vote as one of its
severest handicaps (Table 6).
2 Assuming that the SPD drew only a negligible share of the vote cast by eligibles
[sic] formerly abstaining, its net gain of one million votes would be made up
roughly as follows:
a. 500,000 ex-KPD votes.
b. At a conservative estimate, about one fourth of the net refugee increase since
1949, or roughly 100,000.
c. At a maximum, 400,000 votes remain as the SPD share of the 2,300,000 young
voters eligible for the first time – or only about 15 percent, as compared to its
proportional quota of about 30 percent.
(This estimate is provisional, based on information so far available which is
expected to be borne out by fuller data.)
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The SPD fared worst in rural areas and smaller urban concentrations
throughout the Federal Republic. In these areas it either lost votes out-
right, remained static, or merely absorbed Communist defectors with-
out securing its quota of the expanding electorate. It did much better
in the large urban centers, where it not only profited directly from con-
siderable Communist losses3 but shared to a certain extent in the new
vote pool, largely through the support of young voters and possibly of
migrant elements who had flocked into the cities during the preceding
year. Those cases where the SPD gains, after deducting its ex-KPD
increment, amounted to its proportional share of the expending elec-
torate were rare, however. The SPD found the going very difficult and
possibilities of expansion limited even in predominantly laboring class
districts in Hamburg, the Ruhr, and the south German cities. Bremen,
where the party did fairly well, is the one exception to this rule.
The reasons for differences in SPD voting patterns between countryside
and city are likely to be found both in the prevailing local attitudes and
in the lack of strength and aggressiveness of SPD and trade union orga-
nizations in rural areas. There is a possibility that dominant organiza-
tions like the peasant associations, or the church in Catholic regions,
represented a generally accepted pattern of thinking, which the SPD
party units were neither willing nor able to resist. The inability of the
party organizations to provide acceptable political or cultural alterna-
tives becomes more obvious in times of prosperity, when special effort
is required to challenge the prevailing social-political pattern. These
factors are not as important in larger urban concentrations, where there
is less uniformity in political and social patterns and where both the
SDP and the trade union federation (DGB) have sufficient support and
vigor to challenge conservative forces.
3 It is interesting that the SPD fared very badly in Bavaria’s urban centers, where
KPD losses were relatively light – especially in Munich, where the KPD actually
regained some of the support lost since 1949.
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Table 5. PERCENTAGE GAIN OR LOSS OF SPD AND KPD VOTE, 1949 – 1953
State SPD KPD
1949a Interimb 1953a Shift from Shift from 1949a Interimb 1953a Shift from Shift from
1949 Interim 1949 Interim
Baden-Würt- 23.9 28.0 23.0 -3.8 -14.3 6.4 2.3 2.2 -65.6 -4.3
temberg
Bavaria 22.8 28.0 23.3 +2.2 -16.8 4.1 1.9 1.6 -61.0 -15.8
Bremen 34.4 39.1 38.0 +10.5 -2.8 6.7 6.4 3.7 -44.8 -42.2
Hamburg 39.6 42.8 38.0 -4.4 -9.3 8.5 7.4 3.8 -55.3 -48.6
Hesse 32.1 44.4 33.7 +4.7 -24.1 6.7 4.7 2.9 -56.7 -34.0
Lower Saxony 33.4 33.7 30.0 -10.2 -11.0 3.1 1.8 1.1 -64.5 -38.9
North Rhine- 31.4 32.3 31.9 +1.6 -1.2 7.6 5.5 2.9 -61.8 -47.3
Westphalia
Rhineland- 28.6 34.0 27.2 -4.9 -20.0 6.2 4.3 2.3 -62.9 -46.5
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Palatinate
Schleswig- 29.6 27.5 26.5 -10.5 -3.6 3.1 2.2 1.2 -61.3 -45.5
Holstein

NOTE Gains and losses are expressed as proportions of the parties’ percentage of the total vote.
[20.] The West German Bundestag Elections of 1953 [1953]
a. Bundestag.
b. Diet.
593
Table 6. RELATIONSHIP OF PARTICIPATION LEVELS TO SPD VOTE,

1949 – 1953
State Year Percent of SPD Vote (in Percent of

Participation thousands) Total Vote
Baden-Würt- 1949 69.8 650 23.9
temberg
1952 64.1 765 28.0
1953 82.0 825 23.0
Bavaria 1949 81.1 1075 22.7
1950 80.0 1300 28.0
1953 86.1 1185 23.3
Bremen 1949 82.0 105 34.4
1951 83.1 130 39.1
1953 86.5 165 38.8
Hamburg Bundestag 1949 81.9 360 39.6
Diet 1949 69.4 340 42.8
1953 86.8 400 38.0
Hesse 1949 77.3 685 32.1
1950 64.9 820 44.4
1953 86.7 860 33.7
Lower Saxony 1949 78.0 1125 33.4
1951 75.8 1123 33.7
1953 89.0 1135 30.0
North Rhine- 1949 79.6 1110 31.4
Westphalia
1950 72.3 2000 32.3
1953 86..0 2550 31.9
Rhineland- 1949 79.6 410 28.6
Palatinate
1951 74.8 490 34.0
1953 86.1 480 27.2
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State Year Percent of SPD Vote (in Percent of

Participation thousands) Total Vote
Schleswig-Hol- 1949 82.7 410 29.6
stein
1950 78.2 360 27.5
1953 88.7 358 26.5
National Aver- 1949 78.8 6935 29.2
age
Interim 73.0 7328 32.8
1953 86.2 7940 28.8
X. The Communist Party (KPD)
The Communist Party has continued its uninterrupted decline, its per-
centage of loss since 1949 varying from 65.6 in Baden‐Württemberg to
44.0 in Bremen. Its decline had been sharpest since the various Diet
elections in Hamburg (42 percent) and North Rhine-Westphalia (48
percent); in the latter area of greatest Communist concentration, the
party’s vote dropped to one quarter of a million, amounting to about
2.9 percent of the statewide total. The party’s losses have been less
precipitous in Baden‐Württemberg and Bavaria, with a decrease of 14.3
and 15.8 percent, respectively, of its vote in the Diet elections in those
states.
In general, the pattern of deterioration is closely related to the KPD’s
showing at the interim state elections, falling most sharply in the area’s
where it had maintained itself previously and revealing relative stabil-
ity where interim elections had already demonstrated its strength to
be reduced to the hard core. The city of Munich was virtually alone in
showing a partial KPD comeback, since 1950 in this case, but its 1953
total of 20,000 votes is still a far cry from the 38,000 it obtained there in
1949.
Even among the outspokenly working class elements in the Ruhr val-
ley, the Communist Party has been reduced to a very minor role, as
compared with the SPD; Essen, for example, showed 14,000 KPD as
against 146,000 SPD voters, and Duisburg 10,000 as against 98,000. In
its erstwhile stronghold of Solingen-Remscheid, the KPD got 19,800
votes compared to 48,000 for the SPD and the picture is similar in
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other former areas of Communist strength (Stuttgart, 14,000 to 93,000;

Mannheim, 10,000 to 54,000; Hamburg, 40,000 to 403,000). Although
a backlog of embittered strikes provided a favorable atmosphere for
Communist influence in Bremen, the KPD failed to hold its own as it
had in the 1951 city council elections; with a net loss of 4,500 voters in
the city, its share of the total dropped from 6.4 percent in 1951 to 3.9
percent establishing a ratio of nearly seven to one of SPD over KPD
votes. The rate of renewed losses since the interim elections for state
legislatures has been fairly uniform for rural and urban, Catholic and
Protestant districts. With an over-all ratio between SPD and KPD vote
of 13 to 1, the latter party has reached a new low in its competition for
electoral strength with the major working class party.
XI. The Ultra-Rightist Defeat
Conspicuous among the election results was the failure of the ultra-
rightist parties to obtain an appreciable share of the vote. Altogether
these parties netted less than half the 800,000-odd votes which similar
groups had received in the 1949 – 1952 Diet elections. Ultra-rightist
strength also declined from its 1949 level, and this in spite of the fact
that about 100,000 persons who had been disenfranchised as Nazis at
that time were able to cast votes in 1953.
The ultra-rightist vote declined sharply throughout the Federal Repub-
lic, with particularly marked deterioration in North Rhine-Westphalia,
where the radical rightist parties were wiped out. As before, the north-
ern and eastern districts of Lower Saxony and some #(Franconian?)#
districts in northern Bavaria showed the highest concentration of right-
ist voters; however in these areas of greatest concentration, the vote
of these groups averaged only four to five percent of the total in the
individual election districts, and in no instance did an ultra-rightist
party obtain as much as 10 percent of the valid second-ballot votes.4
For the time being, rightist extremism is an insignificant factor in Ger-
man politics. Even if one-third to one-half of the invalid vote were
counted with the rightist vote total, thus making popular sympathy
rather than effective organization the criterion, the total would hardly
4 These percentages are based on Bundestag election districts totals. The percentage
was higher in a number of countries, forming administrative subdivisions within
the election districts. For example, in the countries of Alzey and Oppenheim in
Rhineland-Palatinate, the DRP obtained as much as 13.4 percent of the valid vote.
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have exceeded 750,000. (Table 7 illustrates the ultra-rightist decline in

two selected districts of Lower Saxony).
Table 7. DECLINE OF ULTRA-RIGHTIST VOTE IN TWO SELECTED
DISTRICTS
Party Stade-Bremervördec Lüneburg-Dannenbergc

1949 Bun- 1951 Diet 1953 1949 1951 1953
destag Bun- Bun- Diet Bun-
destag destag destag
CDU 10,510 30,868a 21,875 14,469 22,344a 31,940
SPD 44,714 29,008 30,271 29,111 21,278 22,991
FDP 4,095 4,638 3,544 6,889 3,688 4,893
DP 45,698 …a 40,512 29,018 …a 19,632
BHE …b 13,433 14,422 …b 16,353 15,889
KPD 1,911 1,030 707 3,520 1,553 955
ZP 481 586 …b 424 513 …b
GVP …b …b 696 …b …b …b
RSF 2,451 …b …b 285 …b …b
SRP …b 26,055 …b …b 22,175 …b
DRP …b …b 2,947 …b 6,822 …b
(Nau-
mann)
DRP/DK 3,179 3,067 …b 4,096 1,903 …b
P
DSP …b 797 …b …b 1,127 …b
Unaffili‐ … b … b … b 4,104 …b …b
ated
Total 113,039 108,482 114,974 91,916 90,934 103,531
NOTE Votes of ultra-rightist parties are underlined.
a. Only CDU total listed for CDU-DP electoral alliance 1951.
b. Not participating.
c. These two districts in Lower Saxony had the greatest concentration of
ultra-rightist voters in the interim elections.
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599
Abkürzungen
A. C. Reports of the Assembleé Consul-

tativ
Abb. Abbildung
ADGB Allgemeiner Deutscher Gewerk-
schaftsbund
AFL-CIO American Federation of Labor and
Congress of Industrial Organiza-
tions
APSA American Political Science Associ-
ation
Arch. F. öff. R. N.F. Archiv für öffentliches Recht,
Neue Fassung
Bde. Bände
BBB Bayerischer Bauernbund
BGB Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch
BHE Bund der Heimatvertriebenen und
Entrechteten
BP Bayernpartei
BV Verfassung des Freistaates Bayern
BVerfGE Entscheidungen des Bundesverfas-
sungsgerichts
BVG Bundesverfassungsgesetz
BVP Bayerische Volkspartei
CAD Civil Affairs Division
CARE Cooperative for Assistance and
Relief Everywhere
CCS Combined Chiefs of Staff
CDU Christlich Demokratische Union
Deutschlands
CEDA Confederacion Espaniola de
Derechos Autonomos
CES Central European Section
Cf. confer / vergleiche
CGD Christliche Gewerkschaftsbewe-
gung Deutschlands
CGT Confédération générale du travail
CIA Central Intelligence Agency
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600 Abkürzungen
CIAA Coordinator of Inter-American

Affairs
CID Central Information Division
COI Coordinator of Information
Comm. Community
Cong. Congress
CP Communist Party
CSC Coal-Steel Community
CSU Christlich Soziale Union
DAG Deutsche Angestelltengewerk-
schaft
DBP Demokratische Bauernpartei
Deutschlands
DDR Deutsche Demokratische Republik
Dept. Department
ders./dies. Derselbe/dieselben
DGB Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund
DHfP Deutsche Hochschule für Politik
DJZ Deutsche Juristen-Zeitung
DM Deutsche Mark
DNVP Deutschnationale Volkspartei
DP Deutsche Partei
DRW Division of Research for Western
Europe
DSI Division of Special Information
Dr. des. Doktor designatus
DVP Deutsche Volkspartei
e.g. exempli gratia [lat. zum Beispiel]
éd. Edition [Französisch]
EDC European Defense Community
EMNID Erforschung der öffentlichen Mei-
nung, Marktforschung, Nachrich-
ten, Informationen, Dienstleistun-
gen
esp. Especially
Et seq. und folgende
EVG Europäische Verteidigungsgemein-
schaft
f. folgende
FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation
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Abkürzungen 601
FCC Federal Communications Commis-

sion
FDGB Freier Deutscher Gewerkschafts-
bund
FDJ Freie Deutsche Jugend
FDP Freie Demokratische Partei
FEA Foreign Economic Administration
FIS Foreign Information Service
ff. fortfolgende
FLN Front de libération nationale
(Nationale Befreiungsfront, Alge-
rien)
FM Force Manual
G-2 Intelligence‐Staff der United States
Army
GG Grundgesetz
G.M. Gewerkschaftliche Monatshefte
GESTAPO Geheime Staatspolizei
GI Galvanized Iron (umgangssprach-
lich für amerikanische Soldaten)
GVG Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz
GVP Gesamtdeutsche Volkspartei
HbdDStR Handbuch des Deutschen Staats-
rechts
IAC Intelligence Advisory Committee
Ibid. Ebenda
ICFTU International Confederation of
Free Trade Unions
Interpol International Criminal Police
Organization
IRIS Interim Research and Intelligence
Service
ISK Internationaler Sozialistischer
Kampfbund
JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff
Jg. Jahrgang
JW Juristische Wochenschrift
KAB Katholische Arbeiterbewegung
KPD Kommunistische Partei Deutsch-
lands
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602 Abkürzungen
MIT Massachusetts Institute of Techno-

logy
M.P. Member of Parliament
MRP Mouvement républicain populaire
[»Volksrepublikaner«]
MUR Unified Movement of Reconstruc-
tion
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organiza-
tion
NIA National Intelligence Agency
NDP Nationaldemokratische Partei
Deutschlands
NEP New Economic Policy [Neue
Ökonomische Politik]
No. Number
Nos. Numbers
NR National Right
NSDAP Nationalsozialistische Deutsche
Arbeiterpartei
o. J. ohne Jahr
OCIIA Office of the Coordinator of Inter-
American Affairs
OCL Office of Intelligence Coordination
and Liaison
OFD Office of Financial and Develop-
ment Policy
OIR Office of Intelligence Research
OMGUS Office of Military Government for
Germany US
ONI Office of Naval Intelligence
ORI Office of Research and Intelligence
ORO Operations Research Office
Op. cit. opere citato (im angegebenen
Werk)
OSS Office of Strategic Services
OWI Office of War Information
ÖVP Österreichische Volkspartei
par. paragraph
PCF Parti communiste français
PSC Parti Social Chretien (eine katholi-
sche Partei Belgiens)
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Abkürzungen 603
PVS Politische Vierteljahresschrift

R&A Research and Analysis (Branch)
RAND Corporation Research Memoran-
dum
RGBl. Reichsgesetzblatt
sec. Section
SED Sozialistische Einheitspartei
Deutschlands
Sen. Senate
sess. Session
SFIO Section française de l'Internatio-
nale ouvrière (Französische Sek-
tion der Arbeiter-Internationale)
SHAEF Supreme Headquarters, Allied
Expeditionary Force
SIS Secret Intelligence Service
SPD Sozialdemokratische Partei
Deutschlands
SPÖ / SPOe Sozialdemokratische Partei Öster-
reichs
SRP Sozialistische Reichspartei
StGB Strafgesetzbuch
StPO Strafprozessordnung
TUC Trades Union Congress
UDSR Union of Democratic and Socialist
Resistance
U.S.S.R / UdSSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
[Union der Vereinigten Sowjetre-
publiken]
UCLA University of California, Los Ange-
les
USGCC US Group Control Council
USMC United States Marine Corps
UDSR Union of Democratic and Socialist
Resistance
UNR Union pour la Nouvelle Républi-
que
USA United States of America
vgl. vergleiche
Vol. Volume
Vols. Volumes
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604 Abkürzungen
WAV Wirtschaftliche Aufbau‐Vereini‐

gung
WWI Wirtschaftswissenschaftliches
Institut der Gewerkschaften
WWI World War One (Erster Weltkrieg)
WWII World War Two (Zweiter Welt-
krieg)
Z Zentrumspartei
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605
Otto Kirchheimers Schriften im amerikanischen

Nachrichtendienst
Hier verzeichnet sind nur die Schriften, die Kirchheimer für verschie-
dene Geheimdienstorganisationen in den USA verfasst hat und für die
wir in den National Archives in Maryland konkrete Nachweise für
Kirchheimers Autorschaft finden konnten. Eine umfassende Bibliogra-
fie der unter seinem Namen publizierten Schriften findet sich in Band
5 dieser Edition. Die Nachweise für seine »geheimen« Schriften finden
sich in den »textual records« und sind per Fußnote verzeichnet. Dabei
handelt es sich im Wesentlichen um zwei verschiedene Übersichten aus
den Jahren 1943/44 und 1953, die die Tätigkeiten der Mitarbeiter doku-
mentieren. Es muss zur Zeit des Bestehens von R&A im OSS und »R«
im State Department durchgehend solche Listen gegeben haben. Sie
sind aber nicht überliefert. Teilweise konnten wir einzelne Nachweise
in Briefen, die zwischen den verschiedenen Abteilungen verschickt
wurden, finden.
Zuständig für die Verteilung der Reports innerhalb der US-amerika-
nischen Sicherheitsarchitektur mit ihren vielen verschiedenen Mitglie-
dern waren das »Office of Libraries and Intelligence Acquisition«
und die »Acquisistion and Distribution Division«. Deren Akten hätten
sicher Klarheit gebracht, aber, wie mir [HH] eine besonders freundliche
Mitarbeiterin der National Archives in Maryland bei meinem letzten
Besuch 2019 mitgeteilte, sind die dortigen Akten nicht archiviert wor-
den.
In den Nachlässen von Otto Kirchheimer und John Herz finden
sich ebenfalls selbst erstellte Tätigkeitsberichte, die jedoch offenkun‐
dige Überschneidungen und Fehlerzuordnungen enthalten. Texte, die
gemeinsam verfasst wurden, werden beispielsweise als individuelle
Studien präsentiert. Die in der Einleitung beschriebenen Produktions-
bedingungen in den Forschungsabteilungen lassen die Vorstellung
eines »souveränen« Autors oder Autorenkollektivs bezweifeln.
Darüber hinaus gibt es eine äußerst umfangreiche Sammlung von Intel-
ligence Reports auf Microfiche unter der Signatur M1221 und einen
dazugehörigen »Card Index« – einen Zettelkasten. Dieser besteht aus
zahllosen Karteikarten, die jedoch ebenfalls keine Autorennachweise
enthalten. Auch die numerischen Bezeichnungen passen nicht immer
zusammen: Neben marginalen sprachlichen Verschiebungen, die wahr-
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845290027
606 Otto Kirchheimers Schriften im amerikanischen Nachrichtendienst
scheinlich während der Erstellung der Reports entstanden, liegen auch

explizite Fehlzuordnungen vor: So habe ich etwa unter der Nummer
1572 das Intelligence Brief »Possible Delay in the German Ratification
of the European Defence Community« erwartet, aber den Intelligence
Report »The Japanese Aircraft Position« erhalten. Diese Bestände eig-
nen sich sehr gut, um thematisch nach Studien der Abteilung zu
suchen, aber weniger, um sie zu identifizieren. Deshalb haben wir
davon abgesehen, die zahlreichen möglichen Kandidaten aus diesem
Zettelkasten hier mit aufzunehmen.
Es ist mit Sicherheit davon auszugehen, dass Kirchheimer ein Vielfa-
ches der hier verzeichneten Reports produziert hat, aber handfeste
Nachweise dazu fehlen heute leider.
Intelligence Estimates
German Rearmament1
The Course of opposition in West Germany2
National Intelligence Estimates
Long Range Prospects for Western Europe3
Intelligence Surveys
NIS 5 – Section 534
1 Siehe: Division of Research for Western Europe, Scheduled Projects for February
– June 1954, in: Folder VI 1951, CIA – General, Box 68, Lot 58D528 Intelligence
Bureau, Office of the Director 1950-59, Record Group 59: Central Files of the
Department of State. National Archives at Maryland. Kirchheimer wird dort
explizit als Hauptautor genannt.
2 Siehe: Ebenda.
3 Siehe: Division of Research for Western Europe, GER scheduled Program for six
Months, August 1 – December 31, 1953 (excluding NIS), in: Folder Provisional
Programm August 1 to Dec. 31. 1953, Lot 58D528 Intelligence Bureau, Office
of the Director 1950-59, Record Group 59: Central Files of the Department of
State. National Archives at Maryland. Kirchheimer wird dort als einziger Autor
genannt.
4 Siehe: Division of Research for Western Europe, Scheduled Projects for February
– June 1954, in: Folder VI 1951, CIA – General, Box 68, Lot 58D528 Intelligence
Bureau, Office of the Director 1950-59, Record Group 59: Central Files of the
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845290027
Otto Kirchheimers Schriften im amerikanischen Nachrichtendienst 607
Intelligence Reports
IR-6498 – The Future of the Austrian Coalition5

IR-6177 – Trends in German Foreign Policy6
IR-5900 – Political and Economic Developments in East Germany7
IR-6378 – West German Pre-Election Survey8
IR – The West German Bundestag Elections of 1953: Analysis and Interpreta-
tion9
IR – The New West German Government: Its Composition and Politics10
Civil Affairs Guides
1655.3 – Civil Affairs Guide for Germany: Regional Sub-Division to be used by

MG (zusammen mit Franz Neumann, John Herz und Gordon Stewart)11
1655.8 – Adaptation of Penal Law12
1655.11 – Adaptation of the Consitution of the Courts and their Composition
(zusammen mit John Herz)13
Department of State. National Archives at Maryland. Kirchheimer wird dort

explizit als Hauptautor genannt.
5 Siehe: Ebenda.
6 Siehe: Division of Research for Western Europe, GER scheduled Program for six
Months, August 1 – December 31, 1953 (excluding NIS), in: Folder Provisional
Programm August 1 to Dec. 31. 1953, Lot 58D528 Intelligence Bureau, Office of
the Director 1950-59, Record Group 59: Central Files of the Department of State.
National Archives at Maryland. Kirchheimer wird dort explizit als Hauptautor
genannt.
7 Siehe: Ebenda.
8 Siehe: Ebenda.
9 Siehe: Ebenda.
10 Siehe: Ebenda.
11 Interoffice Memo vom 10. Dezember 1943, Research and Analysis Branch,
OSS, in: Folder Central European Section, Box 1, Entry 60, Record Group 226:
Records of the Office of Strategic Services. National Archives at Maryland.
12 Findet sich in einer Übersicht von Projekten, bei denen OSS und FEA zusam-
menarbeiteten. In: Folder Guides to the Abrogation of Nazi Laws, Entry 44:
CA-Guides, Box 2, Record Group 226: Records of the Office of Strategic Services.
National Archives at Maryland. Zur Zusammenarbeit zwischen OSS und FEA
siehe auch Kapitel vier der Einleitung zu diesem Band.
13 Interoffice Memo vom 18. Januar 1944, Research and Analysis Branch, OSS, in:
Folder Central European Section, Box 1, Entry 60, Record Group 226: Records of
the Office of Strategic Services. National Archives at Maryland. Auf dem Doku-
ment wird weiter vermerkt: »This is the Civil Affairs Guide – No. X E«. Der
Report trägt später auch den Namen »MG and General Principles of Adminis-
tration«. Siehe dafür die Übersicht von Projekten, bei denen OSS und FEA
zusammenarbeiteten. In: Folder Guides to the Abrogation of Nazi Laws, Entry
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608 Otto Kirchheimers Schriften im amerikanischen Nachrichtendienst
1655.12 – German Central Administration and Civil Service14

1655.13 – Adjustment of the National Level of German Administration to the
Needs of MG15
1655.23 – American MG and the Jewish Problem (zusammen mit Edgar John-
son, Franz Neumann und Herbert Marcuse)16
44: CA-Guides, Box 2, Record Group 226: Records of the Office of Strategic Ser-
vices. National Archives at Maryland.
14 Brief R.A. Winnacker an Hajo Holborn, Division Review Committee vom 2. Mai
1944. In: Folder FEA Claerance, Entry 44, CA-Guides, Box 1, Record Group 226:
Records of the Office of Strategic Services. National Archives at Maryland.
15 Übersicht von Projekten, bei denen OSS und FEA zusammenarbeiteten. In:
Folder Guides to the Abrogation of Nazi Laws, Entry 44: CA-Guides, Box 2,
Record Group 226: Records of the Office of Strategic Services. National Archives
at Maryland.
16 Siehe: Interoffice Memo vom 18. Januar 1944, Research and Analysis Branch,
OSS, in: Folder Central European Section, Box 1, Entry 60, Record Group 226:
Records of the Office of Strategic Services. National Archives at Maryland. Auf
dem Dokument wird weiter vermerkt: »This is the Civil Affairs Guide – No.
XVI C«
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609
Personenregister
Abbas, Ferhat 418, 420, 424, Daladier, Edouard 406

Adenauer, Konrad 126, 129-131, de Gaulle, Charles 97, 99, 102f,
133-138, 529-533, 551, 556f, 359-366, 368, 371, 377, 383, 390,
560-563, 565f, 574-577, 583f, 588 392, 410f, 414, 422f
Acheson, Dean 64, 71f de La Luzerne, Cesar-Guillaume 388
Altstötter, Josef 267 de Menthon, François 376, 378
Anderson, Eugene 20, 23f, 47, 96 Denais, Joseph 376
Armstrong, Sinclair 20 Deutsch, Harold 23
Arndt, Adolf 553 Donovan, William J. 12-18, 23, 64-71,
Auriol, Vincent 378, 410, 77
Doriot, Jacques 368
Bardoux, Jacques 376, 410, 418 Dorn, Walter 24, 28
Baxter III, James P. 14, 20 Doumergue, Gaston 376
Best, Werner 290 Duclos, Jacques 377
Bidault, Georges 419
Biddle, Francis 68 Eastmann, S. Mack 103
Bissell, Clayton 67 Ebermayer, Ludwig 259
Blücher, Franz 530 Ehlers, Hermann 129, 529, 532, 561
Blum, Léon 369, 374 Ehmke, Horst 127
Breithaupt, Franz 254 Ehrmann, Henry W. 103
Brentano, Heinrich von 129, 529, Eisenhower, Dwight D. 26, 34, 46,
531, 532 140
Brettle, Emil 267 Eisler, Gerhard 510
Briand, Aristide 368 Engels, Friedrich 547
Brinton, Crane 48, 51 Eschmann, Gerhard 560
Bruyneel, Robert 376, 396 Evans, Allan 77, 83
Buchstein, Hubertus 119, 139, 144
Bumke, Erwin 41, 250, 267 Fina, Tom 76
Byrnes, James F. 71-73 Fischer, Kurt 464
Fitzgibbon, Russell H. 103
Cachin, Marcel 391 Fonlupt-Espéraber, Jacques 376
Capitant, René 376, 385 Forsthoff, Ernst 44
Churchill, Winston 31, 562 Fraenkel, Ernst 90
Chwalek, Roman 488 Frank, Hans 41
Cohn, Ernst J. 46-48, 51 Freisler, Roland 41, 253, 265, 267,
Condorcet, Marie Jean Antoine 277, 288, 295
Nicolas Caritat 379, 399 Freitag, Walter 560
Conti, Leonardo 62 Freudenberg, Richard 579
Coste-Floret, Paul 376, 380, 410, 412 Friedrich, Sophie 143
Cot, Pierre 99, 377-380, 391, 399 Friesenhahn, Ernst 553
Froissarts, Jean 368
Fuchs, Klaus 522f
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845290027
610 Personenregister
Funk, Walther 228 Klemm, Herbert 266

Klingsporn, Lisa 143f
Gebh, Sara 144 Knox, Frank 12
Geyr von Schweppenburg, Leo 560 Kostov, Trajčo 506
Gilbert, Felix 20, 23 Kraft, Waldemar 563
Goethe, Johann Wolfgang von 117, Krautheimer, Richard 20
546 Kreikemeyer, Willi 510
Göring, Hermann 228 Kriege, Walter 267
Gooch, Robert Kent 103 Krieger, Leonard 24
Gürtner, Franz 41, 265 Krohn, Steffi 143
Gruber, Karl 569
Lalmand, Edgar 449
Hallstein, Walter 531 Lammers, Hans Heinrich 228
Harig, Gerhard 535 Langer, Walter Charles 15
Hausleiter, August 559 Langer, William L. 10, 20, 22-24, 65
Heinemann, Gustav 135, 558, 560, Langfeldt, Moritz 143f
561, 575, 589 Lautz, Ernst 267, 324
Hermens, Ferdinand A. 90 Laval, Pierre 368
Herriot, Edouard 383, 389, 407 Le Troquer, André 406
Hervé, Pierre 376 Leo XIII 394
Herz, John 20, 23, 48, 53, 54, 73, 605, Lenin, Wladimir Iljitsch 548
607 Liszt, Franz von 274
Heuss, Theodor 551, 555 Locke, John 393
Heye, Hellmuth 560 Loewenstein, Karl 47
Hilldring, John H. 25, 27, 34, 46, 47 Loritz, Alfred 559
Himmler, Heinrich 228, 254, 300 Lyssenko, Trofim Denissowitsch 540
Hitler, Adolf 15, 17, 20, 26, 40, 41,
57, 198, 228, 246, 253, 262, 263, 265, Maier, Reinhold 560, 579
560 Manteuffel, Hasso von 560
Hoegner, Wilhelm 95 Marcuse, Herbert 20, 23, 75, 608
Hofmann, Konstantin 143 Marie, André 376
Holborn, Hajo 20, 23, 27, 28, 32, 34, Marquardt-Bigman, Petra 38
36, 37, 38, 47 Marsh, John B. 46
Hoover, J. Edgar 17, 68 Marshall, George C. 27, 34, 74
Hüber, Franz 312 Marx, Karl 547
Hughes, Henry Stuart 20f, 24, 72, Marx, Rudolf 267
75f, 88, 125 Matern, Hermann 508, 510, 512
May, Allan Nunn 522f
Jeanneney, Jules 364 McCarthy, Joseph 121
Joël, Curt 265 McCloy, John J. 27, 32
Johnson, Edgar 20, 608 Meissner, Karl 559
Mende, Erich 560
Kaiser, Jakob 531 Mettgenberg, Wolfgang 266
Keitel, Wilhelm 228 Meyerhoff, Hans 20
Kent, Sherman 20, 53 Meyerhoff, Jonas, 143
Klauer, Georg 267 Millerand, Alexandre 368
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845290027
Personenregister 611
Millikan, Max 77 Reynaud, Paul 406f

Mitschurin, Iwan Wladimirowitsch Roberts, Henry 20, 23
540 Robespierre, Maximilien de 393f
Mollet, Guy 376, 398 Roosevelt, Franklin D. 12, 15, 17, 25,
Monnet, Georges 364, 406 28, 30f, 68f
Montague, Ludwell Lee 16 Roosevelt, Kermit 18
Moro‐Giafferi, Vincent de 407 Rosenman, Samuel Irving 70
Morrison, Phoebe 357 Rothenberger, Curt 246, 248, 263,
Moutet, Marius 403, 419 265f
Muller, George 79 Rousseau, Jean-Jacques 379
Müller, Joseph 470 Rüthers, Bernd 45
Müller, Tobias 144 Russell, Francis H. 74
Murray, Henry A. 15
Sartori, Giovanni 90
Nadolny, Rudolf 471 Scammon, Richard M. 78
Napoleon, Louis 383 Schäfer, Ernst 266
Naumann, Werner 559, 581, 597 Schäfer, Leopold 266
Nenni, Pietro 497 Schleck, Robert W. 79
Neumann, Franz L. 11, 20, 23, 32, Schlegelberger, Franz 41, 265
38f, 45, 47f, 51, 53f, 75, 90, 96, 130, Schlesinger, Arthur M. 10, 21
607, 608 Schmidt, Paul Otto 560
Neumann, Hilde 119 Schmitt, Carl 44, 277
Neumann, Robert G. 31 Schneller, Otto 267
Niemöller, Martin 561 Schoch, Magdalene 52-54
Nietzsche, Friedrich 277 Schorske, Carl 20, 24, 47
Noack, Ulrich 471 Schumacher, Kurt 531, 560
Noguères, Louis 377 Seydewitz, Max 510
Sherwood, Robert 13
Oelßner, Fred 508, 513 Siebert, Hannes 143
Ollenhauer, Erich 560 Siewert, Robert 510
Oppenheimer, Fritz E. 46f Smend, Rudolf 76
Smith, H. Bowen 52
Palandt, Otto 267 Smith, Harold 63, 69f, 77
Panuch, J. Anthony 77 Snyder, John W. 70
Pétain, Philippe 364 Stalin, Josef 16, 132f, 140, 477, 513,
Phillip, André 371, 376 547f, 562
Pholien, Joseph 500 Steinäcker, Walter von 267
Pieck, Wilhelm 542 Stephenson William S. 12
Pontecorvo, Bruno 522f Sterling, Wallace 77
Priester, Karl 559 Stern, Fritz 23
Sternberger, Dolf 90
Quassowski, Leo 267 Stettinius, Edward Jr. 65
Stimson, Henry L. 17, 27, 31
Raab, Julius 140, 569, 571
Rajk, László 506 Teitgen, Henry 367
Rathenau, Walther 319 Thadden, Adolf von 559
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845290027
612 Personenregister
Thierack, Otto Georg 253, 262f, 265f Vollmer, Günter 266

Thomson, David 103
Tillmanns, Robert 531 Wagner, Gerhard 62
Thorez, Maurice 363, 372, 406 Warnke, Herbert 477, 488
Trezise, Philip 82 Weigert, Oscar 20
Truman, Harry S. 65, 67, 69-71, 73, Wildenmann, Rudolf 90
75, 77 Wurmerling, Franz Josef 531
Ulbricht, Walter 477 Vansittart, Robert Gilbert 39

Ulio, James Alexander 26
Zaisser, Wilhelm 464
Viard, Paul 376 Zaksas, Gilbert 389, 394
Viviani, René 368 Zinn, Georg-August 560
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845290027
613
Sachregister
Abrüstung 227, 236 Besatzungszonen 104, 129, 227, 230,

Abtreibung 58, 201, 220, 224 356
“African camps” 364 Amerikanische 93, 95, 107, 351,
Akademie für Deutsches Recht 45, 352-356, 427, 429, 431
265, 266, 277, 297 Britische 94, 352, 354-356, 427, 429,
Akademie für Staats- und Rechts- 431, 437
wissenschaft der DDR 546 Französische 127, 352, 354f, 427,
Alliierte 19, 26, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 36, 428, 434,
37, 47, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 58, 59, 60, Sowjetische 96, 104, 107-109, 341,
66, 88, 89, 128, 129, 156, 158, 159, 343-345, 349, 352f, 355f, 426f,
188, 212, 217, 230, 236, 359, 360, 463, 467f, 470, 478f, 491f, 511,
433, 562 513, 523, 565, 568f
Allied Control Council (AAC) 427 Westliche 8, 89, 92, 107-109, 127,
Amnestie 43f, 57, 59, 173f, 184f, 197, 350, 355, 426, 437-442, 568
210-214, 216f, 283- 286, 291f, 298, Betriebsrat 448, 462, 468, 470, 476
304 Betriebsgewerkschaftsleitung (BGL)
Antifaschismus 26, 36, 52-54, 107f, 476f, 479f, 482
157, 350, 353, 355 Bill of Rights 100, 375-399, 401, 412f,
Arbeiterbewegung 50, 120, 144, 418, 463
444-447, 449-451, 455, 525, 547 Bureau of the Budget 16, 65, 6
Arbeiter- und Bauernfakultät 537, Bürgerliches Recht (BGB, Privat-
541-543 recht, Zivilrecht) 39, 44f, 155, 172,
Arbeitslosigkeit 128, 240, 257, 429, 173, 246, 255, 267, 312-314
440, 452, 487, 490 Catch-all Organisation 7, 9, 82, 94,
Arier 49, 161, 164, 175, 182, 256, 317 111f, 137-139, 466, 557, 575, 583,
arithmetical justice 366 587
Asyl 127, 397, 412 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
Auflösungsrecht (parlamentarisch) 17, 66, 80, 83, 85
348, 384, 385, 415 Central Intelligence Group (CIG) 73
Ausbeutung 113, 235, 396, 466, 470, Civil Affairs Division (CAD) 25, 26,
473, 475, 482, 484, 520 27
Ausnahmezustand 398 Comité national français (CNF) 360,
Autoritarismus 41, 44, 49, 88-90, 95, 365
99, 103, 105-107, 276f, 308, 340, Conseil National Economique 382
342, 346f, 354, 376, 530 Constituent Assembly 93, 351, 353,
Beamte 61, 63, 107, 171, 189, 226, 359-362, 365, 369, 376, 378, 383,
232-235, 258, 264, 307f, 312, 501, 386, 390, 402, 406, 408, 410f,
522, 524 419-421, 423f
Constitutional theory 357-425
Coordinator of Information (COI)
12-19
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845290027
614 Sachregister
Council of Ministers 372, 383, 384, Emigration 8, 435, 547, 549, 550,
402, 415 Innere 118, 550
Council of the French Union (Union Enteignung 100, 255, 260, 308, 393,
Council) 373, 378, 382, 402f 460
Demilitarisierung 30, 32, 459 Entnazifizierung 30, 36, 37, 42, 46-48,
Demokratie 35, 54, 89, 104, 105f, 50, 52, 54f, 57, 59, 61, 63, 92, 94-96,
123, 129, 136, 139, 340f, 343f, 104, 108, 112, 157f, 171, 215
346-349, 353, 379, 380 Erbrecht 45, 172, 259, 393
direkte 372 Erzgebirge 327, 490
ökonomische 398 Eugenik 50, 55, 158
parlamentarische 91, 346 eugenische Gesetzgebung 170, 182
präsidentielle 91, 99, 346, 354 Faschismus 28f, 48, 156f, 169, 319,
repräsentative 379 390, 504, 522, 547
Volksdemokratie 459, 460, 466, 506 Flüchtlinge 127-129, 134f, 426-442,
Demokratischer Frauenbund 460, 462, 523, 561-566, 574-578,
Deutschlands 467 583, 585, 587- 591
Deutsche Arbeitsfront 50 Föderalismus 89f, 105, 108, 341, 343,
Diktatur 67, 99, 109, 379, 405, 464, 353, 419f, 422, 465
499, 511 Foreign Information Service (FIS)
Dritte Internationale 264 13f, 16f
Drittes Reich 40, 42, 44, 118, 158, 163, Forschung 14f, 20f, 23, 41, 62,
187f, 191, 193-195, 197f, 203, 206, 72, 116, 144, 266, 487, 502, 534,
229, 233, 250-252, 255, 257, 261, 536-540, 543, 549
268, 269, 270f, 273, 276, 278, 281, Fraktion 99, 341, 393, 409, 411, 446,
283, 289f, 292, 294-296, 313, 550 529, 531, 556, 560, 582
Dritte Republik 97, 359, 362, 365, Freie Deutsche Jugend (FDJ) 111,
371, 415, 421 117, 467f, 490, 541-544
Economic Council 381, 382 Freier Deutscher Gewerkschafts-
Eigentum 27, 51, 92, 100, 102, 106, bund (FDGB) 117, 467f, 475, 513,
128, 180, 212, 246, 255, 274, 288, 541f, 544
314f, 392, 394, 396, 412, 428f, 435, Freiheit
458 Bewegungsfreiheit 398
Eigentumsrecht 27, 33, 48, 92, 100, Glaubensfreiheit 157
308, 349, 351, 389, 392f, 397 individuelle 165, 180, 182, 360, 395
Einkammersystem 373-375, 379 Meinungsfreiheit 92, 166, 157, 348,
Electoral College 382, 402-404, 418, 472
421, 424 Pressefreiheit 100, 157, 167, 389f,
Elektorat 130, 135, 352, 367, 369, 371, 397
409, 416, 418, 422f, 444, 447, 453, Vereinigungsfreiheit 50, 92, 166,
497, 530, 556, 560, 564, 574, 576, 348, 397
582, 589, 591f Versammlungsfreiheit 50, 157, 166,
Elite 37, 38, 47, 49, 61, 95, 97, 118, 348
161, 404, 459, 534, 549 French Committee of National Libe-
ration 359, 364
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845290027
Sachregister 615
Front national de l'indépendance de Reichswirtschaftsgericht 251, 311,

la France 359, 430 320
Front populaire 398 Reichsverwaltungsgericht 311
Führer 44, 62, 207, 223, 230, 237, 238, Sondergericht 40, 158f, 163, 179,
244, 250, 257, 261, 265, 270, 292, 196, 219, 222, 239, 252, 289, 292f,
304, 309, 311, 322, 353, 355, 363, 295f
370, 373, 401, 405f, 443, 448, 451, SS-Gericht 163f, 195, 216, 254, 281,
501f, 506, 508, 509, 511-514, 522, 282
525, 529, 531f, 543, 559-561, 563, Hauptamt SS-Gericht 254
576, 579 Strafgericht 158, 163, 170, 184, 195,
Führerprinzip 45, 50, 195, 296, 319 199, 204f, 207-210, 218f, 223, 248,
Fünf Jahres Plan 488, 491, 534, 535, 276, 295-297, 304
539, 540 Verfassungsgericht 92, 130, 417
Gaullisten 97f, 360f, 366, 376f, 403, Verwaltungsgericht 39, 44, 251,
407, 494, 501, 517 304-312
Gefangene, politische 173f, 210f Volksgerichtshof 40, 159, 163, 179,
Gefängnis 302, 325-338, 511 193, 195, 221, 239, 253, 267, 281,
Gegner, politischer 28, 114, 156-158, 290, 293, 294, 296
163f, 173, 187, 211, 217, 345 Gerichtsprozess 173, 183f, 191-195,
Geheime Staatspolizei (Gestapo) 68, 205-207, 211, 214, 217, 221, 248,
70, 253, 304, 505 253, 259f, 264, 274, 278f, 290f,
Geisteswissenschaften 542, 545f 293-299, 302, 323
General Labor Confederation 367 Reichstagsbrandprozess 253, 261
Gemeinwille 98, 373 Säuberungsprozess 510
Gericht Schauprozess 506, 511
Berufungsgericht 247, 252, 265, Gesellschaft für Deutsch-Sowjetische
272, 290, 296, 307, 322 Freundschaft 467
Bundesverfassungsgericht 126, Gesetz 155-182, 183-200, 203-208,
130-132, 551-555, 559, 562, 566 213, 216f, 219-224, 244, 245-339,
Ehrengerichtshof 272 343, 346, 348f, 360f, 364f, 369, 376,
Erbgesundheitsgericht 170, 252 381-383, 386f, 390f, 394, 401-403,
Erbhofgericht 252, 267 408, 413, 417, 420-424, 462, 480,
489, 496, 502, 517, 545, 557, 558f,
Militärgericht 40, 59, 220, 253, 281,
579-581, 607
364
Berufsbeamtengesetz 176, 226, 233,
Militärregierungsgericht 208-210
244, 261, 308
Obergesundheitsgericht 252
Gesetz der Arbeit vom 19. April
Parteigericht 40, 163 1950 468, 470, 477, 479, 481, 486
Polizeigericht 163, 195, 216,
Gesetz über das Bundesverfas-
Reichserbhofgericht 252 sungsgericht 221, 273, 552
Reichsgericht 246, 249-251, 253, Grundgesetz 552f, 555
259f, 267f, 272, 278, 290, 296f, organische Gesetze 383, 415, 417
308, 322f
Reichskriegsgericht 221
Reichsoberhandelsgericht 245
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845290027
616 Sachregister
Strafgesetz 56, 58, 173, 179, 182, 275, 278f, 291, 302, 308, 396, 460,
220-223, 266, 273f, 276f, 283, 288, 466, 472f, 522, 548
607 demokratische 30, 35, 37, 495
Gesetzgebung, sozialistische 396 diktatorische 110, 157, 464
Gewaltenteilung 99, 229, 294, 371, französische 359, 377, 393f, 396,
378, 379f, 399, 409 399, 404, 417
Gewerkschaft 30, 35, 61, 111, 113, juristische 49, 157, 160, 292, 463
115, 118-120, 121f, 124-126, 139, nationalsozialistische 167, 311
166, 234f, 242, 365, 367-369, 377, ökonomische 110, 458, 459,
396f, 443-456, 461f, 466-468, 470, politische 466
473-482, 494-505, 511f, 515-528,
rechtliche 256, 393, 394
560f, 564, 583, 592
Regierungsinstitutionen 186
Girondisten 379, 392
soziale 110, 256, 393f, 458, 459
Gleichberechtigung von Frauen
Interessengruppe 66, 133, 560f, 583
(equality of women) 395, 412
Interim Research and Intelligence
Gouin cabinet 371
Service (IRIS) 71, 82
»gouvernement conventionel« 378
Jeunesse Ouvrière Catholique 367
Große Koalition 531
Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) 15, 18, 21,
Grundrechte, individuelle 99, 185,
23, 32, 66
192, 307, 309, 314, 348, 412, 418,
Juden 26, 49, 51, 56, 62, 100, 161f,
526
173, 176f, 211, 257, 265, 269, 270,
Haager Konvention (Hague Conven-
314, 316f
tion, Hague) 156, 186
Jury d'honneur 364
Haftstrafe 161, 191, 210, 214, 275,
Justiz, Judikative 39-42, 45-47, 49f,
276, 279, 281, 282, 283, 284, 288,
52, 55, 56, 59, 63, 98, 100, 119, 158,
293, 296, 298, 302, 303, 364, 502,
171-174, 245-339, 386f, 415, 463
543
politische 127, 132
Handelsorganisation (HO) 461, 486
Justizminister 68
Holocaust 56
Kapitalismus 466, 473, 545, 548
Ideologie 77, 370
Monopolkapitalismus, totalitärer
autoritäre 276
11, 37, 45, 46, 60
kommunistische 121, 520, 535, 544,
Kirche 39, 61, 100, 167f, 181, 236, 242,
546
390, 550, 561
Marxistisch-Leninistische 535, 544,
evangelische 181, 529, 532
547
katholische 166, 168, 314, 366, 391,
nationalsozialistische 49, 156, 158,
461, 561, 592
160, 181, 225, 230, 234, 236, 244,
277 protestantische166, 168, 181, 461,
561
sowjetische 117
Klassen, soziale 57, 138, 235, 384,
Indoktrination 117, 461, 514, 534,
391, 459, 475, 584
545, 546, 549
Arbeiterklasse/Proletariat 113, 118,
Inflation 40, 259, 274, 460
138f, 259, 352, 363, 366f, 405, 462,
Institutionen 27, 34f, 38, 44, 62f, 65,
475, 498f, 506, 509f, 513f, 531,
85, 96, 100, 106, 156, 165, 170, 175,
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845290027
Sachregister 617
534, 547f, 558, 564, 577, 592, 595, Bundesrepublik Deutschland (BRD)
596 8f, 55, 81, 93, 123f, 126-138, 475,
Bourgeoisie/Bürgertum 41, 89, 93, 491, 529-533, 551-555, 556-567,
94, 99, 126, 133f, 136, 139, 265, 574-597
468, 469 China 548
Junker 92, 349 Deutschland 8f, 11, 27, 30, 32-34,
Mittelklasse 40, 98, 105, 133-135, 36-39, 41, 46-63, 80, 90-93, 96,
138, 258f, 341f, 345, 349, 351f, 104-109, 115f, 128-130, 135, 156,
354f, 363, 365-368, 388, 406f, 416, 158, 161-163, 168, 172, 176-178,
423f, 433, 457, 460, 462, 467-469, 185, 206, 208, 215, 225-227,
498, 540, 549, 557f, 560f, 563f, 229-231, 236, 243, 245, 250, 269,
566, 574-576, 579, 583, 584, 591 275, 277, 281, 283, 285f, 291, 305,
Oberklasse 258, 352 309, 312, 320, 325, 340-349, 350-356
Unterklasse 256, 258 Baden 272, 437
Klassenbewusstsein 479f Baden‐Württemberg 107, 272, 351,
Klassenkampf 137, 468, 543, 548 354, 431, 437, 559f, 578f, 586,
Kollaborateure 26, 29, 97, 223, 235, 588-590, 593-595
361, 389f, 460 Stuttgart 595
Kollektivvertrag 113, 473, 479-482, Bayern 93f, 107, 249, 272, 286, 333,
491 346, 351, 354, 427f, 431-433, 437,
Kolonie 101, 373, 382, 400-403, 413, 440f, 558-560, 578, 586-588, 590,
419, 420-422 592-594
Kommunisten 9, 68, 77, 88, 97f, 101, München 249, 251, 254, 265, 324,
107-109, 117, 119-126, 132, 135, 333f, 587, 595
140, 200, 219, 340f, 345, 347, 349, Berlin 81, 89, 139, 249, 325, 326,
351-353, 355, 360f, 363, 366-368, 341, 344, 426f, 457, 459f, 465, 482,
378, 443-456, 459, 462, 467-472, 484, 488, 513, 545, 548
494-505, 515-528, 558f, 589 Westberlin 111, 471
Konservatismus 40, 94, 106, 130, 134, Ostberlin 465, 549, 564
138, 258, 260, 303, 345, 349, 352, Brandenburg 249, 326, 344
354, 456, 469, 471, 494, 499, 501, Babelsberg 546
520, 568, 584, 592 Forst Zinna 545
Konzentrationslager 44, 51, 91, 157, Bremen 329, 427, 437, 578, 586,
163, 173, 185, 210f, 280, 304 588, 590, 592-596
Kriegsgefangene 190, 202, 213, 223, Hamburg 276, 298, 329, 427, 437,
227, 426, 492 557f, 580, 586, 588, 590, 592, 593,
Kriegsverbrecher 30, 32, 159, 213, 594, 595
217, 259, 563 Harz 490
Kulturbund 467 Hessen 89, 107, 327, 341, 352,
Länder, Regionen und Städte 354, 429, 431, 433, 437, 560, 576,
Algerien 25, 101, 400, 404f, 421 578-580, 586, 588, 590, 593f
Algiers 359, 401-404, 408, 424f Mecklenburg 344
Belgien 443, 447-449, 496, 499f, 524f,
528
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618 Sachregister
Niedersachsen 427f, 435, 437, 557, Island 125, 443, 456, 496, 515f, 525-
560, 577-579, 584-586, 588-590, 528
593f, 596f Italien 48, 76, 103, 120, 122f, 125, 157,
Nordrhein-Westfalen 427, 437, 443-446, 494-505, 515f, 519-521, 528
558, 578, 586-590, 593-596 Jugoslawien 430
Essen 330, 595 Luxemburg 337, 498, 525
Pfalz 354, 587 Marokko 25, 400, 421
Preußen 39, 55, 228, 230f, 233f, Niederlande 119, 120, 443, 449-452
246, 249, 252, 260, 265, 272f, 276, Norwegen 443, 454f, 525, 527f
284f, 290, 297, 302, 305-307, 309, Österreich 8, 20, 46, 55, 79f, 124,
311, 332f, 342f, 430 139-142, 176, 285, 311f, 427, 497f,
Rheinland 272 516, 523f, 528, 568-573, 607
Rheinland-Pfalz 437, 578f, 584, Wien 79, 311, 325, 336
586, 588, 590, 593f Polen 427, 430, 441
Saar 354, 426, 438, 470, 532 Danzig 563
Sachsen 344, 510 Russland 363, 501, 536, 546, 570f
Erzgebirge 490 Moskau 116, 120, 156, 363, 406,
Görlitz 490 506f, 509f, 514
Leipzig 245, 249, 328, 545 Schweden 443, 453, 455, 525-528
Vogtland 490 Schweiz 79f, 497f, 500, 570
Sachsen-Anhalt 510 Skandinavien 119, 125, 443, 456,
Schleswig-Holstein 435, 437, 557f, 497f, 500, 516, 525-527
580, 586-590, 593f Sowjetunion, Union der Sozialisti-
Thüringen 276, 344, 565 schen Sowjetrepubliken (UdSSR)
Weimar 106f 85, 109-111, 113, 140f, 430, 459f,
Thüringer Wald 490 469, 471, 475, 489-501, 504, 506,
Westphalen 351 512f, 520, 526, 547f, 562, 567-572
Württemberg 272, 584 Tschechoslowakei 427, 430, 441
Ostdeutschland 109-118, 138, Tunesien 400
457-472, 473-493, 506-514, Tunis 421
534-550, 565 Ungarn 427, 430
Dänemark 443, 455, 525, 527f Vereinigte Staaten von Amerika
England 347 (USA) 11f, 14, 19, 30f, 34, 46, 64,
Finnland 496, 503 69, 72, 76, 83, 85, 92, 127, 135, 142,
Frankreich 8, 26, 97f, 101f, 120, 122f, 186, 250, 272, 291, 342f, 346, 358,
125, 130, 283, 346f, 357-425, 443f, 399, 441, 501, 572, 605
494-505, 515-518, 528 Westdeutschland 85f, 111f, 118, 127f,
Paris 406f 136, 426-442, 495-500, 503f, 515,
Überseegebiete, französische 101, 523, 528
373, 382, 400-403, 413, 419, Legalität 44, 131, 291, 309, 359, 394,
420-422 551
Großbritannien 11, 124, 291, 346, Leistungslohn 479, 481, 484f
494, 496-501, 503f, 516, 521-523, Lex Hoefle 192
528 Lex van der Lubbe 43, 58, 278
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845290027
Sachregister 619
Liberalismus 258, 396 Office of Military Government US

Loi Chapelier 397 (OMGUS) 46, 93, 95
Massali group 424 Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) 64
Massenorganisation 110f, 116-118, Office of Research and Intelligence
457, 465-469, 475, 512f, 534, 541, (ORI) 71f
543f Office of War Information (OWI) 17,
Militärregierung (MG) 8f, 27-30, 64, 69, 103,
32-38, 46, 48- 50, 52-59, 63, 93, Ordnung, öffentliche 156, 185, 188,
183-224, 226, 228, 230, 432, 463 198f, 217, 274, 289, 379, 497
Misstrauensvotum 91, 348, 361 öffentlicher Dienst 35, 77, 125, 226,
Ministerium für Staatssicherheit 464 232, 243, 392, 412, 525
Monarchie 259, 260, 346 Opposition 61, 73, 131, 158f, 188,
Monopol 102, 111, 165-167, 371, 372, 212, 234f, 241f, 247, 252, 260, 274,
392f, 412, 468, 521 276, 313, 364, 370, 373, 379, 381,
Montagnards 392 384, 387, 404, 411, 418, 457, 462,
Mord 62, 194, 278, 287 492, 493, 511, 517, 520, 531, 535,
540, 543, 551, 555-557, 572, 575,
Moskauer Deklaration 28, 48, 156f
582-584, 589, 606
Münchner Abkommen 430
Ostbüro der SPD 508, 509
Nation 15, 30, 31, 40, 41, 67, 68, 259,
Palais Bourbon 368, 403
278, 360, 392, 414
Parlamentarismus 89, 92, 95, 98, 99,
National Council of Resistance 360,
106, 110
362
Parteien
National Intelligence Agency (NIA)
66, 73 Belgische
Nationale Front 111f, 457, 461, 466f, Parti Social Chrétien 366
470, 480 Deutsche
Nationalisten, algerische 101, 404, Bayernpartei (BP) 134, 531, 558,
408, 411, 413, 418, 420 566, 576, 583-585, 581, 587, 597
Amis du Manifeste 404, 418 Block der Heimatvertriebenen
Nationalsozialismus 28, 39, 40f, und Entrechteten (BHE) 132,
43-45, 47, 48, 50, 59, 60, 90, 127, 134, 135, 138, 557, 561, 563,
257, 258, 260, 305, 308, 313, 316, 565f, 574, 580f, 584, 586-590,
461 597
Naturwissenschaft 117, 538, 541, 542, Christlich Demokratische Union
546- 548 Deutschlands (CDU) 89, 93,
126, 129f, 132-136, 138f, 351f,
Neo-Nationalismus 432
468f, 529-533, 556-558, 560f,
Notverordnung 48, 187, 193, 292 563, 566f, 574-577, 579-589,
North Atlantic Treaty Organization 597
(NATO) 125, 526, 527 Christlich-Soziale Union (CSU)
Nürnberger Gesetze 58, 62, 161, 164, 93-95, 132, 134, 136, 341, 351,
186, 221 556f, 561, 563, 566f, 574, 576f,
Oder-Neiße Linie 431, 512 580f, 584-587
Office of Intelligence Coordination
and Liaison (OCL) 74, 340
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845290027
620 Sachregister
Demokratische Bauernpartei Zentrumspartei (ZP) 134, 558,

Deutschlands (DBD) 468, 469 561, 565, 580f, 584f, 597
Deutsche Partei (DP) 129f, Französische
132-134, 530f, 533, 556f, 560f, Mouvement républicain popu-
563, 566, 574, 576, 579, 580f, laire (MRP) 98-102, 366-369,
585f, 588, 597 372-378, 380-383, 385f, 389,
Freie Demokratische Partei 390-392, 394f, 398, 407-415,
(FDP) 129f, 132-134, 138, 530f, 417-419, 422-424
533, 556f, 560, 563, 566, 574, Parti communiste français (PCF)
576, 579, 580f, 583, 586-588, 98f, 101, 363, 365-367, 368-370,
597 374f, 377, 388, 393, 405-407,
Gesamtdeutsche Volkspartei 410f, 414, 416, 418, 422-424,
(GVP) 132, 558, 565, 575, 581, 497f, 517f
589, 597 Rassemblement des Gauches
Kommunistische Partei Republicaines 407f
Deutschlands (KPD) 89, 93, Parti républicain, radical et radi-
135, 351, 465, 523, 547, 558, cal-socialiste 365, 367, 391, 424
561, 564-566, 574-576, 581, Parti socialiste (PS) 367, 369f,
591-593, 595f, 597 374, 395, 406
Liberal-Demokratische Partei Italienische
Deutschlands (LDP) 351, 468f Partito Communisto Italiano
National-Demokratische Partei (PCI) 497f, 519-521
Deutschlands (NDPD) 468 Partito Socialista Italiano (PSI)
Nationalsozialistische Deutsche 497
Arbeiterpartei (NSDAP) 49f, Sowjetische
58, 61, 93f, 106, 165, 182, 200, Kommunistische Partei der
207, 221, 257, 260 Sowjetunion (KPdSU) 465
Sozialdemokratische Partei Parteiensystem 91f, 98, 105-107, 112,
Deutschlands (SPD) 93, 95, 135, 137
105, 126, 130-136, 138, 143,
Zweiparteiensystem 90, 136
341, 350, 352-355, 465, 508,
Mehrparteiensystem 136
513, 531, 553-558, 560-566,
574-576, 579-584, 591-597 Petersberger Abkommen 466
Sozialistische Einheitspartei Plebiszit 133, 361, 362, 562
Deutschlands (SED) 96, Pluralismus 98, 373
107-112, 114-116, 118, 124, Politbüro 115, 463, 465, 508, 511f
353, 355f, 457f, 460-469, 472, Potsdamer Abkommen 88, 341f, 427,
474-477, 479f, 482, 484, 487f, 431
490, 492f, 506-514, 535, 543f, Privatschulen 390f
547, 549 Proletariat 118, 548
Sozialistische Reichspartei Propaganda 8, 13f, 19, 25, 100, 111,
Deutschlands (SRP) 129, 530, 114f, 123, 157f, 197, 230, 236, 260,
559, 579, 597 265f, 299, 363, 367, 378, 403, 405,
Südschleswigscher Wählerver- 412, 452, 457, 459, 461, 464f, 470,
band (SSW) 587 474, 476-478, 482, 489, 492f, 496,
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845290027
Sachregister 621
498f, 502, 510, 520, 532, 545, 547, Staatsbürger 44, 49, 79, 156, 161f,
564, 583 174f, 177, 185, 217, 256, 304f, 308,
Rassenhass 161 311, 380, 402f, 418, 421, 423, 430,
Reichswehr 55 433, 507
Schwarze Reichswehr 158, 259 Stalinismus 116, 120, 504, 512, 514,
Régime Conventionel 379 546
Reichstag 40f, 93, 252, 253, 261, 262, Supreme Headquarters Allied Expe-
263, 265, 275, 345, 347, 352, 565 ditionary Force (SHAEF) 29f, 46
Reparation 30, 88, 459, 476, 481 Strafgesetzbuch 179, 182, 189, 200f,
Repräsentation 101, 125, 192f, 204, 220-223, 274
268, 319, 345, 403f, 419, 421, 424, Strafprozessordnung 206, 209, 221,
436, 467, 496, 499, 506, 509, 515, 273, 291, 295
517f, 521, 523, 556, 558, 560f, 565, Subventionen 372, 391, 534, 539,
580, 585, 589 Sudetendeutsche 430f, 435
parlamentarische 374f, 444, 454, Symbole, nationalsozialistische 50,
523, 525, 585 158, 169, 181f
proportionale 344, 346, 354, 365, Terrorismus 44, 188, 199, 200-220,
369, 385, 409, 423, 563 304
Überrepräsentation 319, 345 Todesstrafe 43, 58, 185, 191, 197, 202,
Satellitenstaat 109, 113, 116, 457, 459, 220, 275f, 278f, 287, 289
471, 475, 548, 571 Tribunal 94, 200, 258, 268, 283, 310
Schriftleitergesetz 166, 167, 180, 182 administratives 304-311
Schulsystem 390, 391 Militärtribunal 195, 206
Schutzstaffel (SS) 163f, 195, 207, 216, Militärregierungstribunal 219
222, 230, 238, 253f, 281f Parteitribunal (NSDAP) 254
Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) 11 Verbrechen, politisches 163, 173,
Secret Service Bureau 11 188f, 198, 212-214, 216
Selbstverpflichtung 473, 481 Vereinigung der gegenseitigen Bau-
Sicherheit, öffentliche 168, 226 ernhilfe (VdgB) 467f
Sklaverei 191, 474, 489 Vereinte Nationen 30, 48, 50, 56, 156,
Sowjetisierung 8, 116, 118, 534f, 186, 198, 211, 213
548-550 Verfassungen
Sozialdemokratie 89, 105, 107, 137, Deutschland
259, 388, 548 Bonner Verfassung (Grundge-
Sozialismus 54, 89, 117, 512, 545, 547, setz) 56, 132, 529, 552
548 Weimarer Verfassung 101, 206,
Sozialistischer Wettbewerb 114, 468, 253, 255, 258, 260f, 308, 319,
479, 483 346, 396
Sozialversicherung 175, 241, 306, Frankreich
478, 486f Napoleonische 399
Sozialwissenschaft 117, 256, 536, 537, Verfassung von 1793 (Erste
543f, 546-548 Republik) 393f, 399
Spruchkammer 355
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845290027
622 Sachregister
Verfassung von 1875 (Dritte Währungsreform 429, 435

Republik) 359, 361f, 365, 371, Wehrmacht 49, 55, 178, 179, 221, 222,
383, 415, 421 300
Verrat 59, 164, 173, 188f, 195, 198f, Weimarer Republik 39, 43f, 53, 56,
208, 212, 223, 253, 259f, 265, 278, 90-93, 106, 187, 191, 235, 244, 246,
283, 287 251, 259, 268, 276, 290, 292, 303,
Verstaatlichung 89, 92, 110, 349, 353, 314, 342, 347-349, 351, 385, 584
378, 392, 398, 459-461, 466f, 470f Weltkriege
Vierjahresplan 230, 237, 318 Erster Weltkrieg 12, 40, 259, 269,
Vichy-Regime 25f, 97, 100, 359f, 364, 357, 430, 491, 512
380, 386, 389, 391 Zweiter Weltkrieg 11, 16f, 22, 64f,
Volk 37, 48, 156, 158f, 165f, 169f, 180, 126, 358, 430, 491, 494, 547
186, 188, 198f, 202, 219, 240, 322, Widerstandsrecht 399
340, 359, 362, 372, 375, 380, 388, Wiederbewaffnung 85, 132, 134, 158,
395, 399, 470-472 259, 261, 504, 521, 556f, 562, 564,
Volksentscheid 361f, 365, 369, 566, 577, 606
378-380, 392, 403, 405-408, 410, Wiedervereinigung 132, 136, 137,
416, 422f, 463 469, 470f, 531f, 556, 582f
Volkskammer 110f, 463, 467 Wismut AG 482, 489
Volkskongress 466 Wohlfahrt 62, 163, 224, 226, 237, 238,
Volkspolizei 482 239, 240, 241, 298, 320, 321, 395,
Wahlen 93, 107, 341, 344-346, 348, 396, 487, 493
351, 354, 359f, 362-370, 373, 381, Zensur 19, 168, 236, 568
383, 401, 403-408, 410, 414, 417, Zentralismus 110, 341, 433
421-425, 433, 444, 446-448, 451-456, Zentralkomitee (ZK)
459, 463, 467, 469, 497f, 501, 503f, der Sozialistischen Einheitspartei
517, 519f, 524, 528, 568f, 571 Deutschlands (SED) 507
Bundestagswahl 126, 133, 138, der Gewerkschaften von Reykja-
139, 141, 523, 529-533, 556-567, vik 456
574-597
Zigeuner [sic!] 162, 178
Präsidentschaftswahl 386
Zivilrecht 39, 44f, 155, 172f, 246, 255,
Reichstagswahl 93, 351, 352 267, 312-314
Volkskammerwahl 111, 466 Zulassungskomitee 541f, 544
Wahlsystem 90, 105, 132, 341, 344f, Zweikammersystem 361, 463
346, 365, 580
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845290027

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Herausgegeben von Hubertus Buchstein 6

Hochstein | Schale [Hrsg.]

Herausgegeben von Henning Hochstein und Dr. Frank Schale

Die Deutsche Nationalbibliothek verzeichnet diese Publikation in

Einleitung zu diesem Band 7

[1.] The Abrogation of Nazi Laws in the Early Period of MG

[19.] Austria Attempts Independent Foreign Policy [1953] 568

Otto Kirchheimers Schriften im amerikanischen

Einleitung zu diesem Band

1. Die Research and Analysis Branch im Office of Strategic Services 9

militärischer und ziviler Seite an die Geheimdienstorganisationen her-

1. Die Research and Analysis Branch im Office of Strategic Services

Die Charakteristik des hier versammelten Materials liegt in seinem

ieren, so dass zumindest die jeweiligen Beteiligten an einem Text ermit-

hafte Vertreter der Frankfurter Schule für die Vereinigten Staaten in

2 Das Vorwort zu dieser Broschüre verfasste Roosevelts republikanischer Mari-

the President as Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy« (zitiert

Abb. 1: Organisation des Coordinatorr of Information

Abb. 1: Organisation des Coordinatorr of Information

4 Zur organisatorischen Struktur des COI: vgl. Roosevelt (1976: 29-92).

Geschäften schwarzer Propaganda, also der bewussten Fehlinforma-

5 Zur Radiopropaganda und den internen Zwistigkeiten: Soley (1989: 45-79).

get, a thorough knowledge of the other great powers' capabilities

6 Bereits in seinem an den Präsidenten adressierten Gründungsmemorandum vom

thought it would help us defeat Hitler« (zitiert nach: McDonald 2002:

23. Dezember 1942 umriss die beiden zentralen Funktionen des

Abb. 2: Organisation des OSS

Abb. 2: Organisation des OSS

und Ostasien, denen R&A‐Offiziere zugeordnet werden sollten. Damit

Central Information Division (CID) beauftragt. Mit dieser Abteilung

tiggestellten Analysen, sondern entschied bereits im Voraus, ob die

Abb. 3: Verbreitung geheimdienstlichen Materials im US-amerikanischen

tung und Besatzungspolitik in den Mittelpunkt treten würden (Katz

tischen Politikwissenschaftler« Neumann, dem liberalen Holborn und

chen Einheiten durchsetzen konnte. Ob geheimdienstliche Analysen

2. Die Bedeutung der R&A-Studien für die Civil Affairs Division

Kirchheimer, der in der R&A primär als Experte zum nationalsozialis-

14 Zur CAD: Holborn 1947; Coles/Weinberg 1986; Marquardt-Bigman 1995:

gängern des Vichy-Regimes ergaben: Um nach der Landung in

15 So etwa die bemerkenswerte Einschätzung François Darlans durch Eisen-

Einfluss auf die besatzungspolitischen Entscheidungen des Militärs

ohne jegliche Bindung zur Orientierung der künftigen Besatzungsof‐

its evil influence and emanations shall be utterly destroyed« (zitiert

21 Beispielhaft war für Morgenthau der »Report on Reparation, Restitution, and

Anrainerstaaten bei gleichzeitiger Einsetzung eines US-amerikanischen

22 Memorandum by President Roosevelt to the Secretary of War, Foreign Relations

24 Abgesehen von politischen Gründen und interadministrativen Eifersüchteleien,

framework on its own administration and of its legitimate influence

kung der Gewerkschaften verstand,33 plädierte das War Department

33 United Army-Navy Manual of Government and Civil Affairs (FM 27-5)

in die soziale Struktur einzugreifen. 2) Sie führt dennoch eine umfas-

Sicherstellung der Versorgungslage betraut waren, von deren Verant-

3. Das Civil Affairs Handbook Germany: Legal Affairs

Die Handbücher für zivile Angelegenheiten in Deutschland sollten als

zu nehmen scheint, kommt er immer wieder auf die Auflösung des

ing a certain degree of predictability of decisions, has been definitely

nalsozialisten eingeführten Strafverschärfungen als auch die Erosion

geführten Amnestien belegen. Sie dokumentieren eher die Auswei-

Führer, the control of the civil administration by any kind of judicial

41 Vgl. Rüthers 2017.

4. Vorschläge zur Nachkriegsplanung im besetzten Deutschland

Bevor im Folgenden Kirchheimers (mit)verfasste Studien zum natio-

»For the most part, however, an inverse proportionality existed within

Kirchheimer-Edition