The Community Contribution Requirement in CDD Projects: Evidence from Kyrgyz Republic

Babken V. Babajanian 11 August 2011

The views expressed in this paper are the views of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views or policies of the Asian Development Bank (ADB), or its Board of Governors, or the governments they represent. ADB does not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this paper and accepts no responsibility for any consequence of their use.. The countries listed in this paper do not imply any view on ADBs part as to sovereignty or independent status or necessarily conform to ADBs teminology.

Presentation Overview
CDD Paradigm Community Contribution Component Research Question and Methods Research Findings Participation in Public Consultations Participation in Collective Action Implications Recommendations for Policy and Practice

Community Driven Development (CDD)

De-centralised and participatory projects Provide community groups with resources and decisionmaking responsibility Enable them to pursue their immediate priority needs (e.g. improve local service delivery) Seek to promote empowerment, social inclusion and good governance

Community Contribution
The community contribution (or co-financing) is promoted to: Ensure efficient use of resources, and Improve quality and sustainability of infrastructure The challenge is to ensure the participatory basis of the contribution requirement Little evidence about the relevance and implications of the community contribution component

Research Question and Methods

This research sought to establish the extent to which the CDD model promoted empowered participation of citizens Hypothesis: Citizens were able to influence decisions about the community contribution Main assumption is that participation is purely voluntary and citizens have free choice to negotiate, contest, or opt-out

Village Investment Project

The Village Investment Project in Kyrgyz Republic Fieldwork - 2007-08 16 communities in Chui, Naryn, Issyk-Kyl and Osh 130 in-depth interviews and 18 focus group discussions (involving 54 respondents)

Village Investment Project

World Bank ($30 mln), Japan, Kg, and DFID (20032011) Provides grant funding for local priority needs Coverage all 475 settlements (Aiyl Okmotu) Average MP cost $4,800

Community Contribution in VIP

Mandatory, at least 25% of community grant, incl. 3.75% in cash Required upfront, before the release of funds The participatory aspect of this requirement is meant to be promoted through: Inclusion of community residents in decision-making Reliance on traditional social norms (social solidarity, ashar or public works)

Main Findings
Most micro-projects had a poverty targeting element

Some of the poorest were exempt Higher amounts solicited from better-off All sample communities had extremely poor residents (mostly female) who provided the contribution

Participation in Public Consultations

Principle of representative participation in decisionmaking (consultations) Principle of direct participation in co-financing Residents who do not attend meetings are nevertheless asked to contribute Partial grassroots coverage: 65 residents on average (30-40% of beneficiaries) Difficulty to mobilise during agricultural season Most of the poorest respondents did not attend

Participation in Public Consultations

Many participants did not speak up Local activists more dominant Traditional gender roles: Men - water, irrigation, electricity, and roads Women - schools and health centres Limited ability of many residents to influence decisionmaking during public consultations

Participation in Collective Action

Contribution is mobilised by local leaders Pressure to meet the requirement to receive grant Difficulty to mobilise contribution Pervasive poverty Weakening of traditional institutions due to poverty and migration

Participation in Collective Action

Explanation and persuasion Frequent application of top-down methods Social control (ashar as a social obligation) Threat of penalty (e.g. denial of access to services and citizenship rights) Use of administrative authority

Participation in Collective Action

The ability to negotiate contribution depends on individual bargaining power The poorest have limited ability to protect their rights Single females are especially vulnerable due to: High degree of social pressure Absence of a male figure to negotiate their interests

Implications
Financial cost Extremely poor lived on less than 200 Som ($5) a month Empowerment cost The co-financing requirement often undermined VIPs participatory objectives and did not serve as a vehicle for empowering residents It reinforced traditional gender roles and relations

Recommendations
Strengthen institutional design and operational procedures: Establish formal rules and procedures Redress grievance Criteria for poverty targeting and exemptions

Recommendations
In-depth understanding of existing social and institutional relations: Local social and political hierarchy (e.g., activists/local leaders vs. marginalised residents) Gender roles and relations (e.g., gendered sectoral participation; vulnerability and limited ability of women to negotiate their interests) Shifting boundaries of traditional local institutions

Source: B.V.Babajanian, Problematising the Community Contribution Requirement in Participatory Projects: Evidence from Kyrgyzstan Development in Practice, Vol. 21 (3), 2011