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Pakistan Failed State

By Shiv Sastry

Dedicated to the memory of my cousin, late Wg Cdr. Kukke Suresh, VrC


The reason for writing this book is explained in the first chapter. Once I had collected the reference material it took me only three months to write the book. It then took me two years to refine and release the book as a freely downloadable e-book.

I must take this opportunity to thank members of the forum at for their invaluable and selfless help in digging up material that served as references for this book.

Furthermore I wish to thank the dozen or so people who helped me proof read the book and came up with useful suggestions. Prominent among these are ramana, acharya, kgoan and sudhir.

Shiv January 20, 2007


Licence is hereby granted to make as many copies of this book as needed, and for the book to be distributed to anyone free of charge on condition that no modifications are made and no profit is made from the sharing of this work.


1 Why Pakistan?

Page 03

2 The People of Pakistan

Page 06

3 Education

Page 09

4 Industries and Economy of Pakistan

Page 14

5 Pakistani Psyche and General Observations

Page 17

6 Women and Minorities of Pakistan

Page 24

7 Partition and the Two-Nation Theory

Page 27

8 Islam and Pakistan

Page 30

9 Attitudes Toward India and Indians

Page 35

10 The Pakistani Army

Page 37

11 Kashmir, Plebiscite, Wars and Genocide

Page 43

12 Provinces and Assorted Fragments

Page 48

13 Pakistan, Jihad and Terrorism

Page 50

14 The Government and Criminal Activity

Page 54

15 Pakistan - Failed state

Page 59

Appendix 1

Page 63

Appendix 2

Page 64

Appendix 3

Page 66

Appendix 4

Page 68

Sources and Reference Material

Page 70


Why write about Pakistan?


Pakistan is a huge, populous and diverse nation that has the curious distinction of having been suddenly born in 1947, and it has been an aggressive and implacable neighbor of India.

Most Indians do not understand Pakistan or Pakistanis. Many tend to look at the similarities and remark, “Pakistanis are just like us”. That may appear true but it is important to understand that Pakistanis do not feel like Indians and do not like to say “Indians are just like us”. In fact Pakistanis have spent all those decades since independence trying to show how Pakistan is not like India. And in the intervening years Pakistan, Pakistani institutions and Pakistanis have developed certain unique and recognizable defining features. While these features have been noted time and again by innumerable people in a large number of books, newspaper reports and magazines, no effort been made to collect this information and put it all together between the covers of a single book.

More that anything else, this book can be considered a Review of the literature on Pakistan. In the field of medical research, a Review of the literature is often used to collect and collate information about a disease from various sources. Such a review collects up all the available information about a given disease from all the medical papers available on the subject and consolidates the information in one document. That document then serves as a comprehensive reference point for information about the subject.

This book is a collection and review of what has been written about Pakistan in various sources over many years. It

is a summary of the experiences and descriptions of many people who have reported or written about Pakistan.

The book carries many direct quotes from various authors and these quotes are in italics, while the sources from which the quotes have been taken are listed in the reference section at the end of the book.

There are a few things that Indian readers should keep in mind while reading this book.

First, referring to Pakistan does not mean that we are obliquely referring to Indian Muslims. Indians often become embarrassed or angry in discussions about Pakistan and Pakistanis. Indians who talk about Pakistan or Islam are often considered to be opponents of secularism and tolerance, and are sometimes called saffron sympathizers. For this reason Pakistan and Islamic extremism emanating from Pakistan have almost been taboo subjects in India, not to be discussed by secular non-Muslim Indians, lest they should hurt the sentiments of Muslims in India. An automatic and needless mental connection is made between the subject of Pakistan and the Muslims of India. This

is both unfortunate and unfair to Indian Muslims. Today, Indian Muslims are quite different from Pakistanis, and it is

an insult to Indian Muslims to refer to them as being associated with Pakistan.

Vir Sanghvi, the managing editor of the Hindustan Times has written about this (1):

At a sub-conscious level, some Indians make the simplistic assumption that because (nearly) all pakistanis are Muslims, so all Muslims must be Pakistanis in their hearts. This is an obvious logical fallacy and it is also deeply insulting to all Indian Muslims - including Zaheer Khan and Irfan Pathan who are setting out for Pakistan, determined to keep the Indian flag flying on the cricket field, to say nothing of the thousands of Muslims who have died fighting Pakistan.

It requires a deliberate act of mental re-orientation for non-Muslims in India to learn to talk about Pakistanis without equating them with Indian Muslims. This vestigial thought process remains in many Indian minds like a dark cloud,

a hangover from partition, and that is unfortunate. Pakistan is Pakistan, a separate nation, and Pakistanis are

Pakistanis, not Indians. Pakistanis are no longer Indians. Indians are Indians, not Pakistanis. Muslims in India are not Pakistanis, they are Indians. Confusion and misunderstanding in Indian attitudes more than five decades after independence are certainly a factor in the Indian inability to develop a coherent Pakistan policy.

Another point to note is that no discussion or description of Pakistan can even begin to be meaningful without considering the role that Islam plays on the mind of the Pakistani. Here again, we must remember that when we

speak of Pakistan and Islam we are not referring to Indian Muslims and the vastly different way in which Islam has evolved in India since independence. One of the purposes of this book is to show precisely what has been done with Islam in Pakistan. The situation and attitudes of Muslims in India are no longer comparable to those in Pakistan. There are many assumptions and misconceptions that need to be reviewed, and these will become clear

in subsequent chapters.


As the Indian economy forges ahead there is an increasing constituency of Indians who feel that Pakistan is a small problem that can be ignored, and call for an avoidance of what seems to be an Indian obsession with Pakistan. But Pakistan cannot be ignored by India for many reasons.

The events of independence and partition had a deep effect on the Indian psyche. The appearance of the new nation Pakistan as a neighbor, with people who were brothers and compatriots until very recently created a complex conflict, a love-hate relationship that affected Indian society. With Pakistani leaders attempting to speak for the Muslims in India, many non-Muslim Indians got polarized mainly into two groups, neither of whom were able to look upon Indian Muslims as they should have been looked at, as Indians like everyone else. One group of Indians began to view their Muslim compatriots with hostility as recessed Pakistanis who were always seen cheering for Pakistan in cricket matches. Another group of Indians took the opposite viewpoint that Indian Muslims, unless treated in an especially favorable and kind manner, would somehow feel upset enough to want to side with Pakistan. Pakistan has thus had a great impact on Hindu-Muslim relations in India, and has put a great strain on the ancient Indian tradition of tolerance and pluralism.

Apart from the deep mental scar that partition left on the Indian psyche, the importance of Pakistan lies in its extreme hostility to India. In the first 55 years after independence, the Indian armed forces have had to fight wars on eight occasions (2). In five of those wars armed forces from Pakistan have been the adversary that Indian civilians and Indian soldiers have had to face. Four of these conflicts are discussed in chapter 11, and the fifth engagement with Pakistan still continues at the time of writing, with the infiltration of armed terrorists from Pakistan into India as part of a low grade war to bleed India (chapter 12). From 1965, the Indian armed forces and paramilitary have had to expand to keep pace with the massive build up and continuing assaults from Pakistan.

Indians cannot afford to forget the lessons that can be learned from events like the India-China conflict of 1962, or the naive policy of appeasement of Adolf Hitler followed by British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain. Unilateral pacifism displayed by one nation state when another nation shows every sign of being ready for war is a policy that begs for defeat and disaster. No matter how well intentioned and peaceable a nation state may be, the presence of a belligerent neighbor is a signal that military strength must be adequate to meet any aggressive intent, and if necessary take the battle into the aggressor’s territory. But this build up must not come in the way of urgently needed development and modernization. A policy of ignoring Pakistan’s military intent and might would be a formula for a disaster of unimaginable proportions, while a policy that puts too much emphasis on hurriedly delivering a total military defeat on Pakistan could divert too large a proportion of meager resources towards a war machine. That is one of the mistakes that Pakistani leaders committed, and India would do well to learn from that.

By studying what Pakistan has done, or has not done since independence, Indians have a lot to learn. It is still possible for Indians to make the mistakes Pakistanis have made. Pakistan has made a whole tapestry of errors that Indians can choose to repeat or avoid. Overconfidence, underestimation of problems and hurdles, blindness to the impact of religious discrimination, discrimination against minorities and mal-distribution of wealth, ignoring corruption, a population explosion and social inequity, and attempting to play great power games in the absence of a matching military-industrial-economic capability are some of the mistakes that Pakistan has made, mistakes that India could still make.

Finally, every attempt has been made in this work to avoid direct comparisons between India and Pakistan, except where it is unavoidable. There is a very important reason for that, and it requires elaboration. Although both India and Pakistan started off as having been part of one nation in the pre-Independence era, the two entities cannot really be compared. India is four times larger than Pakistan in land area and currently has a population that is over seven times the size of Pakistan’s population. This means that all numbers and figures relating to India are automatically bigger than those of Pakistan.

To illustrate why a direct comparison between India and Pakistan can be misleading we need to use an analogy:

Imagine India to be a box with 100 eggs in it, but 30 of those eggs are broken. Imagine Pakistan to be a smaller box with 10 eggs in it, and 5 of those eggs are broken. A direct comparison will show that the India box has 30 broken eggs, and the Pakistan box has only 5 broken eggs, and it would seem that the India box is in a far worse shape, with many more broken eggs. But what is hidden from this comparison, is that the India box has 70 intact eggs while the Pakistan box has only 5 intact eggs.

Direct comparisons of numbers regarding Pakistan and India are misleading because of the difference in size, but Pakistani leaders have persistently tried to hide problems within Pakistan such as poverty and illiteracy by saying that India has more problems than Pakistan. All references to Pakistani problems are referred to by Pakistani spokespersons as South Asian problems, South Asian poverty, South Asian hunger, and South Asian illiteracy. All that this does is to hide the magnitude of the problems in Pakistan, and hide the chronic mismanagement of Pakistan.

India and Pakistan do share many of the same problems, but a comparison of the real figures between India and Pakistan shows that Pakistan is not doing well, and is falling behind, even though the number of people who are


poor in Pakistan, and the number of people requiring education in Pakistan are far smaller than the number in India.

Pakistan’s task should have been easier, but Pakistan is failing even to achieve a smaller task. For every child that Pakistan educates, India has to educate seven children in order to “match Pakistan”. But India is not merely matching Pakistan, it has moved ahead in literacy and is racing ahead in other parameters. A direct comparison of numbers will not reveal this and such direct comparisons are useful only to hide Pakistan’s increasing problems.

And while these figures get worse, a quick comparison of the Pakistani armed forces and the Indian armed forces is illustrative of what the two countries have been doing since Independence. With India having a population that is seven times as big as that of Pakistan, the Indian army should have been at least three or four times the size of the Pakistan army. But that is not the case; the Indian army is less than one and a half times as big as the Pakistani army. That is because, since independence India has spent relatively more on development and less on defense while Pakistan has spent almost everything on arms and very little on development.

Pakistan of course was amply aided by other nations, but these details will be discussed later. In this book we will examine the state that Pakistan has got itself into and deal with how it got into its current crisis. In 2007 Pakistan is not in an enviable state. Anyone who has wished for anything bad to happen to Pakistan is likely to find great joy in the condition that Pakistan has reached.



Pakistan is currently estimated to have between 160 and 170 million people. Pakistan's internal turmoil prevented a routine census from taking place in 1991, but it was finally conducted in 1998. Pakistan's population is currently thought to be increasing at the rate of between 2.1% and 2.8% per year. Nobody knows exactly, but even at the lower estimate 8000 children are being born every day in Pakistan, or one Pakistani is born every 10 seconds. Some estimates say that Pakistan's population will double to over 300 million, by the year 2050.

The Pakistani paper the Jang reported in September 2003 (3):

Pakistan’s population will swell to 349 million by year 2050, making it the fourth most populated country in the world

The report goes on to say:

The population growth has caused an eight-time increase in the unemployment

population living in abject poverty, 54 million people do not have access to safe drinking water

illiterates. The population explosion has led to the shortage of educational facilities, health services, housing units, food, living space, arable land and clean water


almost one third of the

53.5 million are

The vast majority of Pakistanis are villagers, living in rural areas. The "average Pakistani" is poor and uneducated. According to some estimates, 70% of the population of Pakistan is uneducated, and education among women is very low since few women are allowed to acquire an education in a society that believes the women should not be seen in public places, mixing with strangers.

These facts may seem surprising considering the smartly dressed, well spoken Pakistani men and women that one may see on television. But that is another curious hidden fact about Pakistan.

The "smartly dressed, well spoken Pakistani men and women that one may see on television" form a small, wealthy elite group that have been described by the expression "Rich, Anglophone, Pakistani Elite". As the description suggests, they are rich, they speak English and they form the elite, the cream of Pakistani society. They actually

form a very small minority, numbering perhaps 25,000 in all. Most of the wealth, land and industries of Pakistan are said to be concentrated among about 43 top families of Pakistan, who, along with top army officers, form the cream




an editorial in the Indian Express that appeared on January 28th 2002, VP Dutt wrote:

Another fundamental flaw is the very narrow social base of the ruling elite. Pakistan is ruled by four interest groups

or their coalition: military, bureaucracy, the feudal lords and the industrial barons. Making up the nucleus of these

four interest groups, it is believed, are a dozen corps commanders, nearly 2,000 landlords owning more than half the cultivable land, a cadre of nearly 1,000 officers and less than 50 industrial families. It is they who own Pakistan and rule in the name of the people.

A report in the Jang (5) on Dec 5th 2003 says:

Top 20 per cent of the population has 50 per cent of national income, while the bottom 20 per cent has only 6 percent,

The Rich Anglophone Pakistani Elite have a great influence on the image of Pakistan abroad. The elite of Pakistan come from rich, feudal landowning families as well as from the armed forces. They drive the Pajeros and the Mercedes-Benz cars of Pakistan, and they own much of the land, with some feudal lords owning over 20,000 acres

of land in a Pakistan that is full of impoverished people. Their children go to the best schools in Pakistan, and often

study abroad in the best institutions of the US and UK, such as Harvard, Oxford and Cambridge.

On October 2nd 2001, the New York Times carried a report about Pakistan:

In the cities, the turn of a street corner can seem to be time travel between centuries. Wide boulevards clogged

with expensive cars become narrow lanes where shrouded women carry jugs of water on their heads. About percent of all Pakistanis reside in rural areas. Most are sharecroppers, eking out subsistence. In some areas,

feudal families still hold sway, making private laws and operating private jails. While the wealthy send their children

to college in America or Britain, many of the poor are deprived of even an elementary education. The literacy rate is

below 40 percent. A fifth of Pakistan’s government schools are “ghosts,” with buildings but no students or teachers


A third curious anomaly of Pakistan is the almost complete absence of a “middle class”. The middle class in

Pakistan have been estimated as being about 10 to 12 million in total (6, 7) forming about 8% of the population. The contrast with India now is stunning with estimates of the middle class in India forming about 25 to 30% of the population. A large middle class is an indicator of the development of a society from the traditional feudal pattern into a more modern society. The old feudal structure of society which Pakistan still retains, consists of a small, very rich elite governing a large mass of poor people. A large middle class is an essential component of a ‘modern’ state and its absence marks a feudal state.


large middle class creates a society in which people have the economic clout to break the economic stranglehold


a rich elite and ensure that their rights are looked after. A report by Pakistani researcher Masooda Bano carried


the News International Pakistan on 31 st August 2001 said:

Pakistan’s middle class is shrinking while India’s middle class is growing. More and more people in Pakistan are slipping in to poverty. This is a dangerous trend as the middle class is the backbone for any progressive society. On top of that the rising of the fundamentalist groups in Pakistan is a fact, which the nation cannot keep denying anymore.

Nine out of ten Pakistanis are poor and uneducated. Less than one out of ten belongs to the middle class and a very small number are extremely rich. Fitting in perfectly well with these facts are other items of information about the life of Pakistanis. The whole of Pakistan has only about 400,000 cars. Pakistan has only 3 million TV sets, for a population of 145 million. (8, 9)

We can thus define the “average Pakistani”. The average Pakistani is an illiterate and poor Muslim. Being a Muslim

is important to the Pakistani citizen because it brings a semblance of order to his otherwise miserable and

unenviable existence.

Religion also helps to define the psyche of the Pakistani, which is dealt with in chapter 5. Paradoxically, religion also helps in the survival of the rich, tyrannical and corrupt leaders of Pakistan. Islam teaches its followers to accept their lives as being preordained by God, and, as a result of this belief, the poor and deprived Pakistani does not question or complain about his miserable life. This stoic acceptance has allowed the rapacious elite and the resource-swallowing army of Pakistan to carry on with their atrociously rich lifestyles and blatant corruption for decades, without having to be answerable to an angry or demanding population.


The Three Faces of Pakistan Top Left: Army rulers on manicured lawns and beautiful surroundings

The Three Faces of Pakistan

Top Left: Army rulers on manicured lawns and beautiful surroundings

Top Right: Abject poverty and brutal police subjugation

Bottom: Crowds celebrating the “Islamic Atom Bomb”


Chapter 3


Through the 1950s and 1960s, Pakistan was believed to be a leading light among developing nations, and the unquestioned technological leader among “Islamic nations”

A closer look at the facts suggests that this was only an impression created by the fortuitous alliance between the

suave, English speaking Pakistani elite and the post world war superpower, the United States of America, and the world’s most powerful media apparatus that came with the US.

Development and technology require education. Most people who take education for granted tend to forget the highly organized and civilized system that needs to be set up for an underdeveloped nation to build up a group of educated citizens who can serve as the pioneers of development.

For example, imagine a small town or village that needs a school. A building is required, with electricity for light bulbs. Teachers are needed and for this the teacher himself must be educated - a separate education system must exist to have a supply of teachers. The people of the village or town need to understand the value of sending their children to be educated in school as opposed to keeping them at home for help in the fields or other work.

The low literacy rate in Pakistan is an indicator of the facts that these fundamental investments have been ignored or sidelined for decades. The precise manner in which lack of education and a runaway increase in population affects a country needs to be understood by leaders in power. But it appears that a series of Pakistani leaders have never really understood how the twin facts of population explosion and lack of education feed upon each other leading to the population-illiteracy cycle getting worse at a faster and faster rate as time passes, making it increasingly difficult to catch up.

A report on reforming education in Pakistan on NBC said (10):

Two years ago, the Pakistani government tried to estimate how many schools it would take to handle the 8 million kids of primary age not in class now. “The numbers that came up is 8,500 primary schools. That’s the kind of numbers we needed two years earlier. They can become 10,000 in 2004, maybe more,” said Zubaida Jalal, Pakistan’s minister for education.

In the 20th century, rapid advances in the development and application of vaccination of people against killer

diseases like smallpox and diphtheria led to a significant reduction in the number of children dying from these diseases. Effective means were developed to reduce complications and deaths during pregnancy and childbirth, and simple treatments were devised to save lives in cases of deadly killer diarrheas. Until these developments occurred, populations in many countries remained relatively stable, because the number of people dying was approximately equal to the number of babies being born. But once these scientific changes affected human society, populations began to rise rapidly. The UNFPA has recognized this and says in a report on Pakistan:

The major contributing factor to population growth has been the sustained gap between low mortality and high fertility levels for the last three decades or so. As a result, Pakistan has today a very young population structure, with 43 per cent below the age of 15 and 63 per cent below the age of 25.

Populations grow by what is called “geometric progression”. That means that if a population of 1 million people doubles to 2 million in ten years, it will double to 4 million in a further ten years, and then become 8 million in ten more years and so on. In fifty years, a population of 1 million can increase to 32 million. If the original 1 million people lived in a poor, developing country that is barely able to feed and provide employment for 1 million people, it will have to look after 32 million people just fifty years later. Unless a great deal of money and effort is put into planning for population growth such as food production, healthcare and education, a rapid rise in population typically leads to more hunger, more poverty, more diseases from malnutrition and more unemployment. That means more people who are unhappy and have reason to be angry.

This is exactly what is happening in Pakistan (11, 12). The population has increased by 50 million people in the last 15 years and the number of poor has doubled.

All these extra people have to have food and opportunities for employment, and they need to be educated regarding the importance of birth control and family planning, since that is essential for slowing down the population explosion.


Unfortunately Pakistan’s leaders have never put in the required amount of money and effort into education of the Pakistani masses. Generations of Pakistanis have been born into poverty and deprivation without the knowledge or the means to slow down population growth or earn a living though a modern job from a modernizing economy.

A report in the San Francisco Chronicle (13) in Oct 2002 on the state of education in Pakistan states:

According to government statistics for this year, the literacy rate is 49 percent overall, 61.3 for men and 36.8 for


Index. A government study commissioned last year demonstrated a clear cause-and- effect relationship between the lack of basic education and increasing poverty.

putting Pakistan among the 20 least literate countries, according to World Bank’s World Development

A study of education in Pakistan reveals many reasons to be concerned, and few reasons to be happy.

The state of education in Pakistan was described by Raymond Bonner in the New York Times on 31st March 2002:

Pakistan’s literacy rate ranks below that of countries like Haiti, Rwanda and Sudan, according to the most recent

United Nations Development Program report

education, compared with $2 billion for the military.

Pakistan’s most recent budget sets aside $107 million for

Madrassa education in Pakistan:

Over large areas of Pakistan, the lack of schools was made up to some extent by madrassas or Islamic schools. Madrassas exist in all nations with a Muslim population, but what is taught in a madrassa can vary significantly depending on the country and government. The madrassas of Pakistan have played a prominent role in making Pakistan the unstable, recessed theocratic state that it is today. Columnist ABS Jafri wrote in the Dawn (14):


Sindh province we have more than a quarter of a million students in the religious Madaris. In Karachi alone

there are well over 226,000 children in these religious seminaries middle schools. Compare this with 869 Madaris in Karachi alone.

In the whole of the province there are only 1,500

Nadeem Iqbal, writing for the Asia Times reported (15):

Currently there are some one million to 1.7 million students enrolled in madrassas in Pakistan, most of them between the ages of five to 18 and from poor families.

According to Dr. Tariq Rahman, Professor of Linguistics and South Asian Studies, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad, Pakistan had only 137 madrassas in 1947. Dr. Rahman writes of Pakistani madrassas (16):

In 1950 there were 210 of them while in 1971 they increased to 563. Nowadays there are at least 7000 of them.

After the 1971 war of liberation of Bangladesh, the process of making Pakistanis more Islamic, the so called Islamization of Pakistan was given impetus. It was initiated by Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, and the Pakistani General Zia ul Haq who removed Bhutto in a coup and later hanged him, accelerated the process. The exact number of madrassas cannot be known because of the lack of registration or census.

Analyst Alexei Alexiev writes (17):

While no official nation-wide study of these madrassas exists, estimates of their overall number range between 10,000 and 20,000; unregistered seminaries may add another 10,000 to the total. As for the number of students, here the estimate ranges from a conservative half-million to over 2 million. (By comparison, some 1.9 million Pakistani children reportedly attended primary schools in 2002.)

In 1979, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, and this gave the US an opportunity to utilize its Cold War alliance with Pakistan to battle the Soviet invasion. The US pumped in large amounts of money and arms into Pakistan, much of it channeled via Saudi Arabia. The Saudi connection enabled the setting up of a vast number of madrassas in Pakistan. Because of the great poverty and lack of schools in Pakistan, madrassas were a natural attraction for the average Pakistani, as being schools that adhered to Islamic values while feeding and housing students, and taking over the burden of looking after one or more sons from a large, poor and ill-fed Pakistani family.

Pamela Constable, a columnist for the Washington Post wrote on 20th September 2001 (18), just days after the attacks on the World Trade Center in New York:

In recent years, however, a number of religious parties and groups have been rapidly gaining influence throughout

Pakistani society. Based in thousands of mosques and Islamic academies called madrassas, they spread their message in part by offering services, especially low-cost education, that millions of poor Pakistani families cannot


obtain any other way.

The name madrassa merely connotes a school. Aijazz Ahmed wrote about madrassas in the Asia Times (19) in January 2003:

Madrassas were introduced about 300 years ago on the Indian subcontinent by then Muslim monarchs and rulers to produce a bureaucracy capable of running the day-to-day affairs of state, especially in terms of financial and legal issues, according to the wishes and pleasure of the king.

Ahmed continues:

Professor Dr Manzoor, a renowned scholar, writer and researcher, comments that nowadays many madrassas have taken an unfortunate direction. “The new role of the madrassas and [the influence] of religious elements has added nothing but hatred against non-Muslims and different sects of Islam. Although some major schools produced better results and play their role for religious harmony, many inject the poison of extremism, sectarianism and ignorance and have become a source of increasing ignorance and religious intolerance in Pakistani society.”

At the best of times, the normal curriculum in madrassas did not offer a well rounded education that included maths, science and information technology. The subjects were frozen 300 years ago, and included logic, Arabic literature and grammar, and Koranic teachings.

But during the Cold War, the number of madrassas burgeoned rapidly and tens of thousands were set up offering only a narrow interpretation of Islam in which young people were indoctrinated into the concept of a violent jihad against unbelievers, and taught to believe that death on the battlefield fighting against the enemies of Islam such as the Soviet Union would ensure eternal paradise for the Islamic fighters.

The preparation of young men for jihad and death in the battlefield was surely very useful and convenient to provide an endless supply of soldiers to fight in Afghanistan, and such fighters under the name Taliban took over when the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan. But even after this, the madrassas that had supplied all these fanatical men did not close down, and indeed could not be closed down. The curriculum teaching jihad did not change either. Having nowhere else to go, thousands of madrassa trained students in Pakistan collected up, ready for jihad in any part of the world, including Kashmir, Bosnia, Chechnya, the Philippines, Indonesia, Palestine, Iraq and Turkey.

Pamela Constable wrote in the Washington Post:

During the 1980s, some radical Sunni groups in Pakistan sent young men to fight in Afghanistan against Soviet

occupation, and many members of the Taliban graduated from their madrassas. More recently, a Islamic students have been sent to fight against Indian troops in Kashmir.



In addition, Pakistan columnist Khaled Ahmed wrote in the Friday Times in November 21-27, 2003:

What better example than the one found in Pakistan whose private armies interfered in Central Asia and China with public acclaim? Let’s take a look at the Harkat al-Jahad al-Islami, Pakistan’s biggest jihadi militia headquartered in Kandahar before it was scattered by the Americans. The Harkat was one of the militias boasting international linkages. It called itself ‘the second line of defence of all Muslim states’ and was active in Arakan in Burma, and Bangladesh, with well organised seminaries in Karachi, Chechnya, Sinkiang, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. Its fund- raising was largely from Pakistan, but an additional source was its activity of selling weapons to other militias

Schools in Pakistan:

Education in Pakistani schools outside of madrassas is not available to most Pakistanis. But even in the few schools that exist, the curriculum is deeply flawed. The following quotes are taken from an in depth study of what Pakistani school children are being taught in a compilation entitled The Subtle Subversion - The State of Curricula and Textbooks in Pakistan by A.H. Nayyar and Ahmed Salim (20):

Madrassas are not the only institutions breeding hate, intolerance, a distorted world view, etc. The educational material in the government run schools do much more than madrassas. The textbooks tell lies, create hate, incite for jehad and shahadat, and much more.


are now taught that the history of Pakistan starts from the day the first Muslim set foot in India.

History and Pakistan studies textbooks rarely mention the ancient and non-controversial cultures of the Indus valley (Moenjodaro, Harrappa and Kot Diji), and completely bypass the entire Buddhist and Hindu periods of history. They

suddenly jump to the advent of Mohammed bin Qasim in India and treat it as the beginning of history

structuring is to make children regard the Muslim part of the history as the


most significant part.’


From about 1972 onwards, history taught in Pakistan was detached from history as we know it.

Quoting further from the Nayyar and Salim report:

Four themes emerge most strongly

1. Pakistan is for Muslims alone;

2. Islamiat is to be forcibly taught to all the students, whatever their faith, including a compulsory reading of Qur’an;

3. that Ideology of Pakistan is to be internalized as faith, and hate be created against Hindus and India;

4. and students are to be urged to take the path of Jehad and Shahadat (martrydom).

Associated with the insistence on the Ideology of Pakistan has been an essential component of hate against India

and the Hindus

painted as black as possible.


existence of Pakistan is defined only in relation to Hindus, and hence the Hindus have to be

Curriculum documents ask the following as the specific learning objectives:

The child should be able to understand the Hindu and Muslim differences


has always been an enemy of Islam.


evil designs against Pakistan

The class II Urdu book has a lesson on “Our Country”, the first sentences of which read: Our country is



is an Islamic country. Here Muslims live. Muslims believe in the unity of Allah. They do good

The Class 6 book says: Who am I? I am a Muslim. I am a Pakistani


are a Muslim and your religion is Islam.

A book lists “Acchi baten” (good deeds). Among them: “Good people are those who read the Qur’an and teach the

Qur’an to others” implying that those of another faith cannot be good people.

Other things taught in state school texts:

After the partition of the subcontinent the Hindus and Sikhs started a properly planned campaign of exploiting the


hundreds of thousands of women, children, the old and the young with extreme cruelty and heartlessness.

as a result of which the Hindu and Sikh enemies of mankind killed and dishonoured thousands, nay

And Pakistani children are taught about war as follows:

Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto introduced a full two-year course on ‘Fundamentals of War’ and ‘Defence of Pakistan’ for class XI and XII respectively. In the ‘Fundamentals of War’ themes like objects and causes, conduct, nature, modern weapons, operations, principles ethics, the means short of war and modern Warfare were thoroughly


subject of hate in Pakistani educational material is Hindu and India, reflecting both the perceived

sense of insecurity from an ‘enemy’ country, and an attempt to define one’s national identity in relation to the ‘other’. The first serves the military and the second the political Islamists.

In another article on Pakistani education AH Nayyar wrote (21):

The class 4 text book states: The religion of the Hindus did not teach them good things—Hindus did not respect women

Another book tells the students:

Hindus worship in temples which are very narrow and dark places, where they worship idols. Only one person can enter the temple at a time. In our mosques, on the other hand, all Muslims can say their prayers together.

For another, the Hindus as a monolith were always cunning, scheming, and conspiring to deprive the Muslims of

their due rights

Hindus to erase the Muslim culture and civilization

The Hindus always desired to crush the Muslims as a nation. Several attempts were made by the

If the Hindus had any national aspirations then these were clearly a sign of their prejudices, while if the Muslim kings and invaders plundered Hindu temples then presumably they did so with very noble intentions.

The experience of colonialism is described in a textbook as a British-Hindu conspiracy: The British joined forces with the Hindus to bring harm to the Muslims. Muslims tried in every way to maintain good relations with the British and Hindus, but they did not allow it to be so.


Regarding history as taught to Pakistani children Kamila Hyat wrote in the Jang in August 2003 (22):

the terrible events that led to the breaking away of East Pakistan and the creation of Bangladesh are never mentioned

Members of the generation who grew up after 1971 often have no idea at all of what issues underpinned the civil

war or why it took place. The genocide committed in the territory that now constitutes Bangladesh discussed or even spoken off on passing within the Pakistan of today.

are hardly ever

Pervez Hoodbhoy, a Pakistani scientist writes (23):

At the completion of Class-V, the child should be able to

“Make speeches on Jehad and Shahadat” “Understand Hindu-Muslim differences and the resultant need for Pakistan.” “India’s evil designs against Pakistan.”

Hoodbhoy goes on to say in the same article:

A moronic, incompetent, self-obsessed, corrupt, and ideologically charged education bureaucracy today squarely

blocks Pakistan’s entry into the 21st century.

It is clear from this that it is not only the madrassas that offer a curriculum of hatred to Pakistani children. Even children who study in Pakistani state schools imbibe a curriculum of discrimination and hate.

The real worry in having such a faulty educational system that actively encourages hatred is that millions of Pakistani children are growing up to be adults thinking that India and Indians exist to subjugate Muslims and should

be hated for that. There seems to be no way in which a child in Pakistan can grow up without fearing or hating India

in particular and non-Muslims in general. This mindset cannot be wiped out overnight. The problem is so serious

that the Pakistani government must be engaged and encouraged to change the curriculum in Pakistani schools. It

is surprising that faults in an education system that may have such great an impact on Indian-Pakistani relations in

future are not being addressed at all at the highest governmental level in India.

Meanwhile, in the first sign that a glimmering of realization of the consequences of a curriculum of hate, an acknowledgment of the existence of a biased curriculum and a call for change was made by Pakistani Federal Minister for Education Ms Zobaida Jalal in a statement published in the Pakistan Tribune online in March 2004 (24):

a committee has been constituted to work out recommendations for deletion of material from curricula which is

aimed at fomenting hatred against India adding that the committee will submit its recommendations within a month. Several social organizations have raised objection that hatred is fanned against India through the curricula of educational institutions in Pakistan. Government has set up a committee to look into the matter and send its recommendations within a month

But such change cannot come easily in Pakistan. More than half of Pakistan’s population of nearly 170 million are thirty years old or younger and have been exposed to a hate-India curriculum from childhood. As a result these people are likely to form a strong body of anti-India, anti-Hindu opinion for decades to come. Besides there is strong opposition to change. In a sternly worded reaction to the idea of reform of the hate curriculum, the influential director of the Pakistan Institute of Strategic Studies, Dr. Shireen Mazari accused the authors of the report on Pakistan’s biased school books as being biased and having been written for the handsome payment the authors received (25):

Dr. Mazari, commenting on the Nayyar report said:

…the authors take exception to the fact that the present curriculum documents suggest that children should be able

to understand the Hindu-Muslim differences and the need for the creation of Pakistan. The authors’ warped logic is

that knowing the differences breeds hatred! So one should really do away with inculcating the rationale behind the struggle for Pakistan! Of course, there is no doubt that some of the texts do denigrate the Hindus but this should not be a pretext for not creating an awareness of the differences that led to the creation of Pakistan.

In the same article, Dr. Mazari dismissed criticism of madrassas as having an anti-Islam motive - a time honored

diversion used by the Pakistani elite to deflect criticism (see chapter 8). Dr. Mazari’s words:


In a report about the Pakistani economy, economist Sreedhar states (26):

Pakistan’s economy during the past fifty years can be described as a classic example of a case where artificial

prosperity was maintained by heavy doses of foreign aid and overseas remittances of Pakistanis

availability of goods and services through foreign aid discouraged the development of a large scale indigenous industry. At another level, Pakistan failed to do even the basics of economic development which most of the developing countries have done.


and cheap

More than fifty years after independence, Pakistan remains primarily an agricultural economy. Not a single wrist- watch, scooter or motorcycle has appeared on the international market with a Made in Pakistan label on it. This level of industrial technology in Pakistan is in keeping with the overall picture of Pakistan as a nation in which almost 70% of the people are illiterate.

Goods manufactured in Pakistan are mostly no more complex than bicycles, sports goods such as footballs and

cricket balls, clothes, textiles and agricultural products like sugar. Pakistan has survived for over 50 years giving the impression that it is somehow a powerhouse in its depth and breadth of manufacturing and industrial capacity. That

is far from the truth.

Still, a sophisticated Pakistani public relations machine has managed to build up the idea, at least in the minds of Indians, that Pakistani industry is producing some state of the art high technology goods. It is worth looking at some

of these items and Pakistani claims in some detail. In keeping with the Pakistani psyche of according the highest

importance to the armed forces Pakistani claims of high technology indigenous manufacture have revolved around armament, specifically missiles and Pakistan’s nuclear program.

Pakistani spokespersons never tire of speaking of Pakistan’s indigenous missiles - given names like Hatf, Ghauri and Shaheen. These brave names may perhaps be essential for national pride, but even a cursory search of authoritative sources shows that Pakistan’s Hatf, Ghauri and Shaheen missiles are Chinese M-9 or M-11 missiles, or North Korean No-Dong missiles (27).

The idea is not to downplay the considerable risk that Pakistan’s missiles pose to India and other nations, but to point out the compulsion that Pakistani authorities have to maintain a facade of indigenous production for items that are widely known to be imported. The most likely reason for maintaining this charade of indigenous development of missiles is to obscure the fact that dangerous, nuclear capable missiles are being supplied by countries like China and North Korea to Pakistan ignoring international treaties that forbid such exports.

In a detailed report on Pakistani missiles from NTI - Nuclear Threat Initiative, a private body aimed at studying the

risk of nuclear conflict it was reported that (28):

Pakistan is still dependent on China for specialty materials, guidance systems, and other critical missile


major component parts, as well as the liquid propellants to fuel its missiles


will remain dependent on North Korea for importing complete liquid engines, or at least their

Even more peculiar is Pakistan’s nuclear program. The strong Pakistani insistence that the program is entirely indigenous is contradicted by the facts. A news report about this in a New Zealand news portal reads (29):

The father of Pakistan’s atom bomb, Abdul Qadeer Khan, worked at the Urenco uranium enrichment facility in the Dutch city of Almelo in the 1970s.

After his return to Pakistan he was convicted in absentia of nuclear espionage by an Amsterdam court

acknowledged he did take advantage of his experience of many years of working on similar projects in Europe and his contacts with various manufacturing firms.”



A report from the Netherlands, from which Abdul Qadeer Khan got his designs for Uranium enrichment says Khan

received a MSc degree in metallurgy from Delft in 1967 and later stole nuclear secrets from his Dutch employer,

helping Pakistan develop its first nuclear bomb

detected. Back home in Pakistan, then Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto gave Khan the job of organizing Pakistan’s nuclear program

In 1976, Khan suddenly left Europe before his espionage was

Pakistan can hardly be expected to publicly proclaim that the Father of Pakistan’s nuclear program stole the technology. Experts have argued that it does not matter if Pakistan’s atomic bombs are stolen or made in Pakistan.


They are a serious risk either way. This is true, but it is important to place on record the fact that the designs were stolen and not the result of some prolonged research effort in Pakistan.

The designs that Abdul Qadeer Khan obtained from the URENCO labs were for centrifuges. Centrifuges are devices that are used to rotate something at high speed to separate out heavier from lighter components. For example, a rotating centrifugal dryer in a washing machine is a centrifuge that separates water from clothes and makes wet clothes much more dry. Obtaining centrifuges was necessary for Pakistan to start enriching Uranium. Uranium occurs naturally primarily in two forms, the heavier U238 and lighter U235. The latter, U235 is needed for nuclear bombs but occurs in very small quantities mixed with U238. For this reason Uranium needs to be enriched to get material that contains 90% or more of U235, which can then be used for making a nuclear bomb. Several techniques exist for this and Pakistan chose the route of Uranium enrichment by centrifuges using the technology stolen by Qadeer Khan from the URENCO labs.

But making a nuclear bomb goes far beyond merely enriching Uranium. Making a workable and reliable nuclear bomb requires further technology. Indian analyst K. Subrahmanyam quotes Nobel Laureate Abdus Salam as being skeptical about Pakistani ability to actually produce a working nuclear bomb. Subrahmanyam goes on to indicate similar skepticism of Pakistani ability in Indian scientific circles by saying (30):

Their skepticism was based on their judgment that Pakistan did not have the critical mass of scientific and engineering talent necessary for the project

This is where Pakistan’s role as a Cold War ally of the US and its role in helping China and the US get closer came in handy. China provided Pakistan with the necessary technology to make its nuclear bomb. It is widely reported that China gave to Pakistan the complete design of a nuclear bomb that it had tested in 1964 (31).

One week after the Indian nuclear tests of May 1998, and a one week before the official Pakistani nuclear test an announcement was made at a G8 meeting that Pakistan had tested a nuclear device. It is said that the device failed to detonate. After this there was a flurry of activity when Pakistani officials visited China. The next week, on the 28th of May 1998, Pakistan conducted a nuclear test in Chagai. Some experts believe that the device tested was a ready made device provided to Pakistan by China after the failure of an earlier test. During this period mysterious news reports surfaced that Plutonium was detected in the atmosphere over Chagai in Pakistan (32). Since Pakistani bomb designs were Uranium based ones, there is no way Plutonium could have appeared. If the Plutonium story is true, it lends credence to the theory that Pakistan may actually have tested a ready made Chinese nuclear device.

At the time of writing this, the father of Pakistan’s nuclear program, Abdul Qadeer Khan stands discredited and accused of selling equipment and the plans for Uranium enrichment centrifuges to Libya, Iran and North Korea, in exchange for missiles from North Korea and great personal wealth for himself. It appears that this was done with the knowledge and tacit approval of the military government of Pakistan, and its army chiefs of staff (chapter 13). News reports indicate that Pakistan’s nuclear program was based on a network of clandestine imports from a network of proliferators personally built up by Abdul Qadeer Khan, funded by unlimited financial support from the Pakistani government, as well as from Libya and other sources. It seems clear that Pakistan’s entire nuclear weapons manufacturing program was based on a clandestine black-market of contacts with companies all over the world who produced components that could not be fashioned in Pakistan.

Pakistan does not currently produce any fighter, bomber or civilian aircraft and does not have a noteworthy aerospace research or design team. But in 1981 Pakistan imported the entire assembly line for the manufacture of a 1969 vintage Swedish designed, single engine, two seater trainer aircraft from Sweden. The aircraft, called the Saab Supporter in Sweden is assembled in Pakistan under the name Mushshak. Another trainer aircraft that Pakistan became involved in is a Chinese designed K-8 jet trainer. Current reports indicate that the trainers will be manufactured in China, and not in Pakistan.

Pakistan’s industrial sophistication today is arguably not much higher than that of Britain in the early 20th century, but Pakistan has continuously maintained, possibly for domestic consumption that it is a leader in many technologies. This pretence probably does Pakistan more harm than anyone else. Pakistani leaders, convinced by the exaggerated claims of their own countrymen have allowed their nation to lapse into a state of underdevelopment in which Pakistan is now being compared with the other countries at the bottom of the development ladder, such as Haiti and Rwanda.

On March 31st 2002, a report in the The New York Times stated:

Pakistan’s literacy rate ranks below that of countries like Haiti, Rwanda and Sudan, according to the most recent United Nations Development Program report. Furthermore A UNDP report in 2003 ranked Pakistan a low 138th, in

a list of 174 countries (33).

Pakistan’s labor force is growing at the rate of 2.4% per year, but the number of unemployed people in Pakistan is rising at more than twice that rate - 6% (34). The Pakistan Human Condition report of 2003 says that:

…between 1998-99 and 2000-01, population increased by 6 million people (4.46 per cent), while the population of the poor during the period under review increased by 10 per cent. The report warns that population is shifting from upper poverty bands to lower ones, showing a decline in their welfare level

On February 5th 2003, the San Francisco Chronicle reported:

Pakistan’s powerful military has ruled the country for more than half of the nation’s 56-year history, fully integrating

itself into every facet of the economy and draining state coffers with generous benefit plans for its officers

military officers have siphoned off more than $1.2 billion in the last 10 years to purchase such amenities as land, mansions and luxury cars, according to a recent report by Pakistan’s auditor general.


A large number of reports speak of all the economic problems that Pakistan has (35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40) Some of

these problems, regarding industries and poverty have been listed above. But many other factors contribute to the decrepit state of the Pakistani economy. Aid and loan money has been constantly misused for personal gain by the Pakistani army, army run businesses and private enterprise due to rampant corruption at the highest places. There

is an extremely wealthy class of Pakistani at the top of the economic pyramid and this class includes Army Officers

as well as feudal landowners - some owning as much as 45,000 acres of land. In the Punjab province, one percent of the landowners own 26 percent of the land.

One report (36) says only one million Pakistanis pay tax in a country of over 150 million people. The Karachi Stock Exchange has trading in only about 30 stocks - with over 700 other stocks listed for tax advantages. The Exchange

is run by a handful of crooked brokers and scams are rampant. The same report goes on to say:

Estimates of the size of the country’s black-market economy, which includes everything from underground banking to narcotics to the smuggling of consumer goods, range up to 100% of the so-called formal sector. That ratio “is probably the most severe” of any country in the world, says Muhammad Mansoor Ali, one of Pakistan’s leading economists. “It is essentially a parallel economy.”

The number of such damning reports is enormous, and they help build up a picture of Pakistan as a country of predominantly poor people, whose number is increasing by the year as the population rises. Governing these people is a small elite of wealthy, corrupt and self-serving army officers and feudal lords who literally rule over their subjects like medieval kings. The population is kept busy with jihad, being told that India is forever planning to attack Pakistan and kill all Muslims, while the rulers of Pakistan build up their personal fortunes and protect their lucre with an army whose upper ranks are like a Mughal court, while the lower ranks are the bodyguards to protect the powerful from both external enemies and opponents within Pakistan.



Very few studies exist on the subject of the mind of the Pakistani or the Pakistani psyche. Pakistan has been too low on the priority of sociologists and psychologists, while most Indians, including Indian leaders and strategists have been content with describing Pakistanis as being “Just like us” - i.e. just like Indians.

Pakistanis, like all other people, display the usual range of human behavioral patterns: joy, sorrow, anger, pain and other emotions which are indistinguishable from anyone else on an individual level. But groups of thousands or millions of people anywhere in the world, who live together in nations tend to develop certain unique patterns of behavior based on the stresses, experiences and history of their particular society. Sometimes these unique patterns of behavior are very difficult to recognize, because the behavior is very much like that of anyone else. Even so, it is worth recognizing minor differences because this knowledge has some value in understanding behavior, and in negotiation and reaching agreements.

For example, communication between cultures becomes difficult if negotiators from different cultures cannot understand each others’ behavior. A deep understanding of Japanese culture was required before international agreements could be reached with Japan on the issue of whaling and protection of endangered species of whales. Some cultures, such as Japanese culture have been well studied (41). The important role of saving face and avoiding shame is well recognized, and must be taken into account in negotiation. Another well known example of the consequences of an inability to understand cultural nuances comes from a transcript of a telephone conversation in Arabic between Egyptian President Gamel Abdel Nasser and King Hussein of Jordan when Egyptian forces were being defeated by Israeli forces in 1967. The cultural need to avoid shame forced Nasser to state that his forces were fighting well against their enemy, but King Hussein was unable to understand the nuances by which Nasser hinted that his forces were being defeated. That left Hussein, and Jordan unprepared for their defeat in the war subsequently (42).

There are few studies of unique behavioral patterns among Pakistanis. But such patterns do exist, and their importance must not be underestimated. In his testimony to the United States’ Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in January 2004 (43) Stephen Cohen, speaking on India-Pakistan relations quoted a Pakistani army officer saying how important the question of pride was in Pakistani actions relating to India.

In the words of one Pakistani officer, the army understands it cannot wrest Kashmir from India, but it cannot turn its back on a 55 year struggle. At stake is its pride, and it literally calls the shots

But the subject of a specific and defined Pakistani mind has not gone unnoticed among Indian observers. J. N. Dixit, former Indian foreign secretary has spoken of the psychological hurdles that come in the way of Indian and Pakistani relations. These are listed in a review of his book (44):

Dixit identifies a series of Pakistani traits that refuse to live amicably with India. First, “artificially nurtured memories of Muslim superiority and a subconscious desire to rectify the unfair arrangements of partition”. Second, a certain envy Pakistanis would not acknowledge openly about the failure of their civil society to solidify democratic and tolerant traditions in comparison to an India where khakis and bayonets follow popularly elected representatives. Third, assumption by Pakistan of the role of protector and overseer of the welfare of Indian Muslims, who in the words of Maulana Azad, could be exploited from forces across the border owing to their “socio-political schizophrenia” since partition. Fourth, avenging the military defeat of 1971, which is a formal objective declared in the official oath-taking ceremony of every Pakistani officer-cadet when he graduates. Fifth, irrational faith in the “profound capacity for commitment to jihad amongst the momin”, as was publicly declared by Foreign Minister Gauhar Ayub Khan at a press conference in Delhi. Sixth, confidence that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program is an instrumentality to further geopolitical objectives in Kashmir. Seventh, widespread belief in the Pakistani establishment and media circles that India is getting exhausted in Kashmir and would not be able to hold on to it for long (a presumption of Musharraf in Kargil). Eighth, and most significantly, “the unarticulated ambition and hope that if India broke up, Pakistan will emerge as the strongest and most powerful political entity in South Asia”.

Of course, in 1947 and a few years after that it would have been perfectly valid and accurate to describe Pakistanis as being just like Indians. But after over 50 years of being a separate nation with different threat perceptions, problems and priorities, and with 75 % of present day Pakistanis having been born after 1947, it can easily be observed that there are certain behavioral characteristics that can be called Purely Pakistani There is, in effect a Pakistani psyche or a Pakistani mindset, that is separate from the old Indian identity.

It is useful to be aware of this in dealing with Pakistan as a nation and in predicting Pakistani responses to events. There are certainly some parallels in Pakistani behavior to Arab behavior described by Raphael Patai in his seminal book on The Arab Mind (42). These similarities are striking, and the most likely explanation is the internalization of


Arab culture in Islam, leading to a degree of Arabization of behavior among devoutly Islamic people such as some Pakistanis who have actively sought to reject their earlier Indian culture (see chapter 9).

Certain types of behavior stand out among Pakistanis and are best demonstrated by studying examples of statements and actions by prominent Pakistani leaders and spokespersons. It would be wrong to assume that every Pakistani displays all the characteristics described here. No single characteristic is unique to Pakistanis alone, but careful observations of Pakistani statements and actions show that a sufficiently large proportion of Pakistanis, especially their leadership, display one or more of the following characteristics to make them recognizable as general guidelines to Pakistani psyche. Certain statements and actions are repeated time and again, and a pattern can be seen in the way Pakistanis react to people and events.

Hospitality and generosity:

The characteristic of being extremely hospitable and generous to guests has stood Pakistanis and Pakistan in good stead. No visitor to Pakistan goes away without being touched by this, and this characteristic has been used to good effect by Pakistan over the years.

An article in the American magazine, The Weekly Standard had this to say in its Nov 5th 2001 edition:


attractive character of elite Pakistani officials. Compared with their haughty Indian and chaotic Afghan

neighbors, Pakistani VIPs are often wittier, warmer, and more knowledgeable about the insider gossip of U.S. politics. American diplomats and spooks often have a good deal of fun with their Westernized Pakistani counterparts. As one congressional staffer, who frequently visits south-central Asia, succinctly put it, “I like ‘em; the Indians are jerks.”

A series of Western writers and prominent people have been hosted and feted in Pakistan, and have later served as honorary ambassadors for Pakistan in the Western media.

One prominent example is the famous American pilot, Chuck Yeager, who was a guest of the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) and who later went on to write paeans about the PAF For many years after the PAF was comprehensively defeated in successive wars with India, Yeager’s words of praise of the Pakistan Air Force continued to be quoted, maintaining a reputation for the PAF that extended far beyond its real performance.

Pakistani hospitality has charmed a large number of prominent writers to write positively about Pakistan, and some have gone as far as to make needlessly hostile and malicious references to India in their writings despite strong evidence that their words are misinformed at best, and often just plain wrong. Prominent among people who have written warm words for Pakistan are writers like Brian Cloughley, Eric Margolis and John Fricker.

As recently as June 2002, the Washington Post reported:

It was mid afternoon Tuesday, and Anwar Mahmood, Pakistan’s information secretary, was on the phone discussing with an underling how to keep more than 100 foreign journalists happy for the rest of the week

keeps the reporters satisfied, he figured, it’s worth the $3,000 it will cost his ministry to rent the plane from Pakistan

International Airlines

expedite visas for journalists

buses to carry journalists to the Line of Control

with maps, displays of Indian mortar shells—and tea sandwiches served on trays by white-gloved soldiers. You won’t get such hospitality from the Indian army.




Pakistani government, eager to make its voice heard, has ordered foreign embassies to


times in the past month, the Information Ministry has rented air-conditioned

There they are treated to hour-long military briefings, complete

Honour and Dignity:

The need to maintain honour and dignity is a fundamental pillar in the mind of the Pakistani. It is often more important to maintain honour and avoid shame than anything else. At a rural, tribal level in Pakistan, maintenance of honour often relates to women and doubts about fidelity or adultery. Death, in the form of an honour killing is often the sentence carried out on a woman who is thought to have shamed the family. David Pryce Jones has written (45) that the key to understanding some Islamic societies is to recognize the need for:

…acquisition of honour, pride, dignity, respect, and the converse avoidance of shame, disgrace, and humiliation.

The powerful codes of shame and honour

order to safeguard the family or tribal honour, lying, cheating, and even murder.


identity and conformity of behaviour. Everything is permitted in

But honour and dignity play an equally important role among the richer and apparently liberated Pakistani elite rulers of Pakistan. The need to maintain honour and avoid the perceived national shame of appearing weak in front of India has led to the sacrificing of all developmental effort towards arms purchases to pursue military parity with India. Stephen Cohen’s quote of a Pakistan army officer’s words in this regard has already been alluded to at the beginning of this chapter.


The importance of honour is evident from the words used by US deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage after a meeting with the President of Pakistan, General Musharraf on the 6th of June 2002:(46)

I would note that the conversations we had with President Musharraf made it very clear to me that he wants to do

everything that he can to avoid war nation and the armed forces,

Of course he wants to do this, keeping intact the honour and dignity of the

On 14th March 2003, General Musharraf, military leader of Pakistan said about Pakistan’s nuclear weapons aspirations (47)

“We only want the deterrence capability to preserve our honour and dignity.”

The need to maintain honour and avoid shame by Pakistani military commanders goes to the extent of suppressing any news of a defeat or setback suffered by the military, while insisting that victory was always achieved. A brief study of the way Pakistan’s wars with India have been reported in Pakistan are illustrative of this.

The 1965 war with India started with the infiltration of Pakistani special forces into Kashmir for sabotage and to incite acts of violence. As the conflict evolved war broke out over a wide front and by the time a cease fire was declared both India and Pakistan had captured small areas of each other’s territory. Significantly, Indian forces were well within striking range of the Pakistani city of Lahore, with Indian troops in the towns on the outskirts of Lahore, and Pakistani General Ayub Khan’s plans to take Srinagar were foiled. But the 1965 war has always been portrayed from the Pakistani side as a war in which attacking Indian forces were defeated. The need to maintain honour and dignity is so important to the Pakistani, that any available fact may be either picked up or selectively forgotten in order to save face and maintain the pretence of victory.

In 1971, the triumph of an East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) based political party in an election would have meant that a Bengali, Sheikh Mujibur Rehman would have become Prime Minister of Pakistan. This was disliked by the West Pakistani Punjabi dominated army of Pakistan, who commenced a genocide in East Pakistan. Millions of refugees poured into India to escape this. In a humanitarian move, Indian forces entered East Pakistan and defeated the Pakistani military and a new nation, Bangladesh, was born. More than ninety thousand Pakistani soldiers were taken prisoner of war. The Indian victory, unparalleled since the German Blitzkrieg that overran Poland was described by historian Brigadier Shelford Bidwell (48) as follows:

The operations of 1971 finally dispelled any vain dreams that the ‘sword-arm’ of old India could, despite its numerical inferiority, sweep aside the armies of the effete Hindus and win another battle of Panipat outside the walls of Delhi. Not an Indian brigade had to be moved West. General Jagjit Singh Aurora’s daring concentric attack on East Pakistan went forward uninterrupted and on 16 December he received the surrender of the Pakistani commander in Dacca.

The ignominious defeat of the Pakistan armed forces in 1971 and the formation of Bangladesh almost went unreported in Pakistan. An editorial in the Pakistani newspaper The Jang recalled the 1971 reports in Pakistan


So great was the ignorance and absence of principles in West Pakistan that the government of the day had the temerity to issue a disgraceful statement casually mentioning that “by agreement between local commanders, fighting had ceased in East Pakistan and that Indian troops had entered Dacca.”

Pakistani children are not taught about the 1971 war. Mistakes made by the Pakistan army in the war were never investigated or made public, neither were the failures admitted or analyzed. Some of the defeated Generals in that war even received gallantry awards and honours in later years. The Pakistani need to maintain honour and dignity at the expense of truth is a fault that has done Pakistan no good. It may even be a characteristic that can be used to predict Pakistani behavior or provoke desired responses from Pakistanis, when used in a psy-ops role.

The Kargil conflict of 1999 ended with the rapid withdrawal of Pakistani forces facing rout. By the time the withdrawal started the Indian forces had wiped out almost the entire Northern Light Infantry of the Pakistan army. Nawaz Sharif, who was Prime Minister of Pakistan during this conflict, said in an interview to the Weekly Independent from his place of exile in Saudi Arabia,

when the battle began, the whole Northern Infantry was blown up and 2,700 soldiers were martyred and hundreds

were injured. The death toll exceeds even that of the 1965 and 1971 full-scale wars.

But the only history that is acknowledged by Pakistan is that the Kargil conflict was a great victory for mujahideen who held the Indian army at bay. Pakistanis do not admit the involvement of their armed forces, and yet do not explain how the Pakistan army withdrew from the conflict zone if they were not involved. In doing this, face has been saved and honour retained by the Pakistani army, but it is difficult to imagine how the Pakistani army can


learn critical lessons from a disastrous war if the sole aim of its officer class is the save face and maintain honour and dignity

An explanation exists for the tendency of the Pakistani elite and officer class to protect each other’s honour even after embarrassing or disastrous events. A study of Pakistani society and kinship patterns (50) notes that the household is the primary unit for kinship and the male descendants, (the biradari) are under pressure to maintain a picture of unity, because disunity means dishonour. A quote from the study says:

There is considerable pressure for patrilineal kin to maintain good relations with one another. Biradari members who quarrel will try to resolve their differences before major social occasions so that the patrilineage can present a united front to the village.

It has been observed that Pakistan itself is ruled by a small group of between 22 and 43 families (4). With the entire

ruling apparatus of Pakistan under control of a small group of family units, the family obligations of Pakistani society to avoid shame creates the need for whitewashing military disasters and other mistakes. The deeply Islamic fervor of the average Pakistani comes in handy here as all errors and defeats can be explained away as God’s will - an explanation that most devout Pakistanis will accept without question.

It is possible that the Pakistani need to maintain honour and dignity and somehow appear equal or superior to India was understood and exploited by Indian leaders in 1998, when India conducted a series of nuclear weapon tests, breaking a 24 year self-imposed moratorium.

Even before the 1998 tests Pakistan was widely acknowledged to possess nuclear weapons. Pakistan need not have tested immediately after India’s tests. If Pakistan had not tested, it would have put India in a very tight situation, with international censure and sanctions, while Pakistan could have basked in the sympathy it would surely have got for having an aggressive nuclear neighbor in India.

But the need to save Pakistani honour was too great after the Indian tests. The national sense of shame in being unable to publicly match India was so intense that Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif acknowledged that he would not survive unless he sanctioned nuclear tests by Pakistan. Pakistan did test a nuclear device of its own two weeks after India’s tests and although there is some controversy about the real origin of the device tested by Pakistan, the

test greatly diluted the international attention that India was getting after its tests, and put the spotlight on Pakistan,

a spotlight that has only become brighter after the September 11th 2001 terrorist attacks in the US.

Rhetoric and Hyperbole:

The Pakistani need for the maintenance of honour and avoidance of shame ideally involves and outright military victory. When such victory is not possible or unlikely, the war needs to be continued verbally to avoid shame. Every accusation is made to show that an adversary is cowardly, weak and untruthful, with Pakistanis being courageous, righteous and heading for victory.

Such hyperbole seems to be necessary psychological support for the Pakistani mind, although it often sounds hollow and unconvincing. Only a total victory or a mediator leading to a solution on Pakistani terms can maintain honour enough to allow such hyperbole to die down. David Pryce Jones has described the connection between honour, shame and rhetoric (45):

Honour makes life worth living whereas shame is a living death. Shame and honour involve publicity; success involves bragging, and shame means public humiliation.

Stemming directly from this rhetoric and hyperbole is the decades old campaign of misinformation that Pakistan has maintained about itself, its armed forces, its wars and about India. The degree of misinformation is astonishing, but easy to understand in the light of the deep Pakistani need to maintain honour and avoid shame.

For example, wars are never lost, and any defeats are temporary setbacks. Arms built under licence are always shown as indigenous. Ballistic missiles imported from China and North Korea are repainted and given Pakistani names to be flaunted as missiles designed and manufactured in Pakistan. Indians are always depicted as being conniving and scheming, never as courageous and honourable. The Indian armed forces are always referred to by Pakistan as being weak and dishonourable and always accused of raping and murdering civilians. Indian leaders are often referred to as scheming high caste Brahmins or Banias who are plotting to either dominate or eliminate people of all other religions and social groups.

An example of this tendency can be seen in a two part article on the events of 1971 that appeared in the online edition of the Pakistani paper the Jang as recently as 2004, written by a former Pakistani army officer, Brigadier Anjum (51, 52). In a farcical and fanciful description Brigadier Anjum does not say a word about the 1971 elections in Pakistan that were won by the East Pakistani Awami league party, and denies the well documented genocide of ethnic East Pakistani Bengalis by West Pakistani troops (chapter 11). Anjum’s explanation of why reports of genocide by Pakistani troops are false is as follows:


Senator Edward Kennedy, having a pro-India prejudice

was convinced that Pakistan army had committed genocide in East Pakistan. This was enough to disparage Pakistan Army

addressed a press conference in New Delhi to say that he

Brigadier Anjum makes this record of India's role:

India with a mission in hand to destroy Pakistan was first to demolish its basis.

The Indian intervention to stop the genocide by Pakistani troops is described in the following way:

it was an act of military piracy at the highest level to destroy the professional propriety of soldiers who were on

lawful duty

and vociferously backed by the Soviet Union


interference of Indian army in East Pakistan was a well thought out conspiracy hatched by India

Many sources (53, 54, 55) have documented the surrender of 90,000 Pakistani troops in East Pakistan at the end of the 1971 war. Brigadier Anjum records his version of history as:

The number of combatant soldiers out of the 90.000 so-called prisoners of war was just over forty thousands. The rest of PoWs were civilians and their families, mostly children.

The need to appear superior to and better than India is fundamental for the Pakistani. That is what justifies the formation and existence of Pakistan. Accepting that India and Indians may be in any way better than Pakistan is deeply dishonourable and shameful to the Pakistani. The feeling threatens the very existence of Pakistan and is a feeling that must avoided at all cost.

Disputes and mediation:

Pakistani leaders have initiated war against India mainly when they have assessed India as being weak. On every occasion, the Pakistani assessment of Indian weakness has led to a situation in which Pakistan is faced with military defeat. But to the Pakistani leadership, an offer of peace by any party is considered as a sign of weakness. Courage and a willingness to fight are honourable, and offering peace is a sign of cowardice and an unwillingness to fight.

When faced with a situation in which Pakistan is the weaker party, the need to maintain honour and avoid shame requires that Pakistan must not sue for peace by directly negotiating with India. This calls for the introduction of a mediator or middleman. It is cowardly to call for peace directly, but it is honourable to agree to peace when mediated by a respected third party, which avoids the need for defeat and dishonour. Any concessions that Pakistan is forced to make can be conveniently blamed on the mediating party. The important need here is for Pakistani leaders to appear to be strong and retain their honour in front of their own people. It does not matter if anyone else considers that Pakistan was defeated, weak or dishonoured as long as the Pakistani people see their leaders as having pulled off some kind of victory, and are not seen as having lost their honour to the weaker party India.

This explains the tendency that Pakistani leaders have to call for third party mediation in settling a dispute between India and Pakistan by appealing to the US, the UN, the International community or any other third party rather than facing shame by negotiating for settlement directly with India. In the Kargil conflict, when Pakistani forces were facing rout, the Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif demanded an audience with President Clinton of the US and then ordered withdrawal of the remnants of the Pakistani forces to give the appearance that it was not a clear defeat, but a respected third party’s request from President Clinton of the US that made a triumphant Pakistan pull back from defeating India.

Because talk of peace is considered to be a sign of weakness, it is likely that peace offers from India have been misinterpreted by Pakistani leaders. Indian peace initiatives are seen as a sign of weakness, which must be met with threats and demands for concessions. But an India that appears to be showing weakness by talking about peace mystifies Pakistan by refusing third party mediation. For India, third party mediation is unacceptable in what is essentially a bilateral dispute with Pakistan. This confuses and angers the Pakistani leadership, because on the one hand India appears weak to them by asking for peace, but on the other hand India refuses third party mediation which a weak nation should accept with gratitude to save its own face.

One more factor that must be taken into account in negotiation with Pakistan is that Pakistan may fail to honour prior agreements as it has done with the UN resolutions and the subsequent Simla agreement of 1972 with India. It is possible that Pakistani leaders consider all agreements and treaties as temporary instruments to buy time. When faced with the stark choice of being with America, or against America after the September 11th 2001 terrorist attacks on the US, President General Musharraf explained to his people in a speech in Urdu that his aligning with the US would be a temporary alliance with the devil. In support of this plan General Musharraf used the analogy of


the charter of Madina and the treaty of Hudaibiya signed by the Prophet Mohammad in his September 19th 2001 speech (56).

The Martial Mind:

One of the enduring myths to have come out of Pakistan is that Pakistanis are somehow a martial race - with military tradition in their blood, with the courage and valor that such a military tradition suggests being somehow enshrined in the Pakistani’s genes.

General Ayub Khan who led Pakistan into the 1965 war with India had boasted that One Pakistani soldier is equal

to six Indian soldiers The genesis of this attitude is interesting.

In 1857, soldiers of the British Indian army rose up in a rebellion in what is now known as the first war of Indian Independence. That rebellion was eventually quelled by the British with troops mainly from the Punjab particularly Muslim troops from what is now the Pakistani Punjab, assisted by Pashtun troops. After this event, the British greatly changed the composition of the Indian army forces, by recruiting mainly Muslim Punjabi troops and Pashtun troops from the North Western parts of pre-independence India, which are now part of Pakistan. These troops were

subsequently in the thick of all the campaigns that Imperial Britain was fighting. The British gradually began to refer

to these groups as martial races. Retired Pakistani army Major Agha Humayun Amin wrote about the Pakistani

army feeling of martial superiority (57):

The “Martial Races Theory” in reality was an Imperial gimmick to boost the ego of the cannon fodder. Various

British writers like Philip Mason frankly admitted that the real reason for selective recruitment was political reliability

in crisis situations, which the Punjabis had exhibited during the 1857-58 Bengal Army rebellion.

Pakistan the nation was formed with the belief that its army was, from the beginning, somehow superior by virtue of its being composed of martial races. Maj. Amin goes on to write:

The Pakistani nation had been fed on propaganda about martial superiority of their army

placed entire reliance on the Superior Valour and Martial Qualities of the Pakistani (Punjabi and Pathan Muslim soldier) vis a vis the Hindu Indian soldier, as proved in 1965 war and felt that somehow, in the next war to miracles would occur and the Pakistan Army would do well


Pakistani GHQ

Hard as it may be for a rational thinking person to believe, Pakistani military adventurism has been guided by a firm

belief in the innate racial superiority of the Pakistani soldier and supported by a belief that Pakistan and Pakistanis are somehow performing Allah’s will and that God would therefore be on their side no matter how preposterous or

ill advised the action.

Positive Self-image:

One remarkable feature noticeable among Pakistanis, especially Punjabi Pakistanis is an extremely good and positive self-image of themselves and their people. Their self-esteem is unshakable to the extent that no factor is allowed to get in the way of identifying themselves as superior and excellent.

Hamid Hussain wrote of Pakistani military officers' self-image in Pakistan's defence journal (58):

these military officers also have dangerously self-exaggerated opinion of their capacities both in terms of defense

of the country’s frontiers and their ability as an organized body to fix all problems of the society. Confidence in

one’s abilities, pride and constant struggle to excel professionally are essential elements of a good officer’s corps. The problem starts when these positive traits are stretched to unrealistic limits, which now enter the zone of grandiose ideas and self-righteousness.

A good self-image can be a useful personality attribute if it is not carried to extreme lengths in which all others are

considered inferior. Unfortunately that has occurred among Pakistan’s elite, to the detriment of Pakistan. Former Prime Minister of Pakistan, Benazir Bhutto, herself a Sindhi, recalls having been taught as a child that West Pakistanis are tall, fair-complexioned and eat wheat, while East Pakistanis (Bengalis) are short, dark-complexioned and eat rice. The East Pakistanis were held in contempt by West Pakistanis. Major Amin writes (57):

the generals were convinced that the Bengali was too meek to ever challenge the martial Punjabi or Pathan



Bengalis were despised as non martial by all West Pakistanis.

This contempt with which West Pakistanis viewed their own countrymen contributed to the secession of East Pakistan and the formation of Bangladesh in 1971. In one of the few elections held in Pakistan, the 1971 elections gave a thumping majority to the Awami League, an East Pakistan based political party headed by a Bengali, Sheikh Mujibur Rehman. If the results of these elections had been carried through to their logical conclusion, Mujibur Rehman and his party should have formed the government of Pakistan in Islamabad. But the Punjabi generals of the Pakistani army, who considered themselves superior to the short, dark and non-martial Bengalis could not face


the idea of being ruled by an inferior Bengali as Prime Minister. The results of the election were annulled and martial law was clamped in East Pakistan. A subsequent genocide of over three million East Pakistanis led to the Indian military intervention in East Pakistan, and the liberation of Bangladesh.

If Bengali Muslim East Pakistanis were considered racially inferior by West Pakistanis, it is not surprising to note

that Pakistanis have considered themselves racially superior to the “dark, ugly” Hindustani Indians. This feeling was

a carry over from the pre-Independence days when the British relied on the martial race for their army recruits. Maj. Amin writes:

To Kiplings contemporaries, the taller and fairer a native, the better man he was likely to be

A visible symbol of the contempt with which Indians are taught to be regarded in Pakistan can be seen from some

Pakistani textbooks for small children to learn the Urdu alphabet. The word kafir means unbeliever, but in the Pakistani context it is a derogatory term for a non-Muslim. Children’s alphabet books carry the word kafir as an example of a word that starts with the Urdu equivalent of the letter k. Associated with the word is a picture of a kafir - which is often the picture of a Hindu of a Sikh. Even today, in the 21st century it is possible to visit Pakistani chat- rooms and discussion fora on the Internet to find references to Indians as short, dark, ugly, weak or cowardly.

Stemming from the self-image of the Pakistani is his sense of entitlement. Spokespersons for Pakistan never tire of pointing out that Pakistan is not getting its due. Pakistan is always portrayed as being just, fair and sacrificing, and that India, the US or the world owe Pakistan a lot more that it is getting. At every step, Pakistan is said to have already done, or already given more than necessary and that the onus is on the other party to pay Pakistan back for services rendered and sacrifices made.

Islamic overlay in Pakistani behavior:

The obvious question is “Why would anyone’s religion make his behavior different or peculiar?” It is better to answer the question than ignore it and assume that religion has, or does not have any bearing on behavior.

Arab scholar Raphael Patai, in his seminal work on Arab psyche (42) lists a few characteristics of Arab personality that arise from Islamic beliefs. From the profound application of Islamic beliefs among Pakistanis, it seems that the same characteristics can be seen among Pakistanis, with evidence of the same in their behavior.

One powerful Islamic belief is that of pre-destiny; the belief that all events are predestined or decided beforehand by God and cannot be avoided or changed in any way. Patai quotes this Islamic belief as the requirement that”

Man has no choice but to go through the course of events, which have been written down for him in God’s Book to the smallest detail. Not even in everyday life can a man do anything, either to hasten or otherwise influence events

These beliefs are referred to in the words kismat and naseeb that occur in Urdu, but stem from Arabic and Persian respectively.

The average, poor uneducated Pakistani believes that his life is pre-ordained by Allah to be the way it is, and that he will be rewarded for his piety in an afterlife with an assured place in a well-stocked heaven. The average citizen’s life may be lived in poverty in someone’s service because that is what God has willed for him and attempting to change that would be against the will of God. For this reason, the average Pakistani is unlikely to revolt against his lot in life, or even to try to fight to make it better. He will do what his feudal master, local lord, or religious leader tells him to do, so long as it does not go against his Islamic conscience.

The docility of the average Pakistani in day-to-day life is probably beneficial to the stability of feudal Pakistani society, but does not augur well for development. Development requires effort and change and the belief in pre- destiny rules that conditions and events that the Pakistani experiences in life are ordained by Allah to be as they are and must not be changed or tampered with in any way.

Such beliefs also make the average Pakistani male citizen a prime candidate for motivation into leading a life as an Islamic warrior. Such a life is tempting because it meets all his human and psychological requirements. He is well looked after during the indoctrination and training period, and any subsequent violence he takes part in would ensure for him a respected place in his society as an Islamic warrior, or ensure a place in heaven if he were, as is quite likely, to die in action.

Unless there is a fundamental and deep rooted effort within Pakistan to change the relationship of the Pakistani with his religion, a relationship deliberately cultivated by the Pakistani elite for their own ends, there can be virtually no hope of achieving a sea-change in the internal situation of Pakistan, and the external consequences of that.



With 108 men for every 100 women in Pakistan (59), the women of Pakistan could probably be called a minority, to be counted along with other minorities of Pakistan such as Shia Muslims, Ahmedis, Hindus and Christians.

The state of Pakistani women has a powerful bearing on the condition of Pakistan. For example, two out of three women in Pakistan are uneducated. The importance of this fact lies in that many studies show that poverty, malnutrition and child labor are higher in societies where the women are uneducated.

Pakistani women’s rights activist Ameera Javeria, in an article entitled To be a woman in Pakistan is to ask for a life

of subservience (60) wrote:

Pakistani women continue to be victims of an unjust society rooted in history and tradition. Lack of awareness about their rights and their need for education has added to their predicament. Most Islamic communities are

averse to the idea of giving women social status equal to that of men. That a strong feudal elite still rules the roost

in the vast countryside is a major impediment to enlightenment and democracy, while a powerful clergy rejects all

notions of equality and freedom for women. Those women who rebel by asserting their rightful place in society are punished and considered immoral; many have been the victims of domestic violence, rape, and murder.

Another report (50) on Pakistani society says this about women:

A woman’s life is difficult during the early years of marriage. A young bride has very little status in her husband’s

household; she is subservient to her mother-inlaw and must negotiate relations with her sisters-inlaw

gains status and power as she bears sons. Sons will bring wives for her to supervise and provide for her in her old age. Daughters are a liability, to be given away in an expensive marriage with their virginity intact. Therefore, mothers favor their sons.

A wife

A gender bias toward boys is clear from this description. With girls being a liability to be given away after marriage,

education of girls has a low priority in Pakistan. Among some groups it is believed that education of girls leads to immorality.

The woman of the family is considered fundamental to maintaining the honour of the family group. A woman must be chaste and subservient to the man, and failure to do this can lead to dishonour a crime punishable by death. honour killings in which a father or a brother kill a woman for having dishonoured the family are common in Pakistan.

A report on family violence in Pakistani society (61) says:

(sic)The Male dominant society of Pakistan with strong sense of complete “ Mastery “ feel’s pride to Dictate his terms of Physical and Mental Torture to his Wife, Sister, or Daughter in front of other adult and small members of the family.

Particularly egregious is the Hudood ordinance - a law that is in effect in Pakistan. One of the purposes of the Hudood ordinance is apparently to discourage extramarital sex. An explanation of how this law is applied can be seen in the following quote (62):

Since the passage of the Hudood Ordinance in 1979 under the military government of Zia al Haq, “zina” or

extramarital intercourse, has been considered a crime against the state in Pakistan

and devastating punishments, such as whipping or stoning the individual(s) in question, and explicitly discriminates

against women

resulting in the imprisonment and/or physical punishment of numerous women who have come forward with charges of rape without witnesses. Consequently, many rape victims are deemed criminals in a Pakistani court of law.


law often prescribes cruel


Hudood Ordinance has legally blurred the distinction between rape and extramarital sex,

Pakistan is stuck in a vicious circle in which the elite corner all the resources, leaving little for education of the poor. And among this class the women are the worst off, uneducated and discriminated; and this leads to further poverty and degradation in society. No force in Pakistan seems to have the wisdom, will or power to change this.

Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the founder of Pakistan is said to have had a vision for Pakistan in which people of all religions in Pakistan would co-exist. In his 11th August 1947 speech to the constituent assembly of Pakistan, Jinnah said (63):


You may belong to any religion or caste or creed - that has nothing to do with the business of the state

course of time Hindus would cease to be Hindus and Muslims would cease to be Muslims, not in the religious sense, because that is the personal faith of each individual, but in the political sense as citizens of the state.”

in the

A few months later, in 1948, Jinnah reiterated his vision:

We have many non-Muslims-Hindus, Christians and Parsis

rights and privileges as any other citizens and will play their rightful part in the affairs of Pakistan.”

but they are all Pakistanis. They will enjoy the same

But Jinnah’s vision for Pakistan died with Jinnah. Pakistan’s record in the treatment of its religious minorities is shameful and unapologetic.

In his landmark paper (64), possibly the first scientific statistical analysis of the question of ethnic cleansing in Pakistan, researcher Sridhar notes:


89% of the minorities in West Pakistan were ethnically cleansed, i.e. killed, converted or driven out of the

country. Almost 54% of the minority population ended up as refugees in India, while a very high 35% of the minority population is simply unaccounted for. These are people who were likely killed or converted into Islam.

Population researcher P.H. Reddy has noted that at the time of formation of Pakistan, there were over 20 million non-Muslims in the areas that formed Pakistan mostly Hindus. After the migration of partition, approximately 7 million non-Muslims remained in what is now West Pakistan making up approximately ten per cent of the population of West Pakistan. In the years since independence, Pakistan’s population has more than doubled to nearly 150 million, but only three per cent, or 4.5 million people are non Muslims in modern day Pakistan. About half of that number are Hindus and the other half are Christian.

In simple terms, in 56 years since independence the population of Muslims in Pakistan went up from about 60

million to 145 million, while the population of non-Muslims fell from 7 million to 4.5 million. Hindus formed the largest minority in Pakistan at independence and their number has reduced to around 1.5 million.

In November 2002, the Times of India (65) quoted Noor Naz Agha, a prominent Pakistani lawyer and rights activist as saying:

Minorities are not safe in Pakistan. Recently, several attacks have been made on churches, hospitals, even on human rights organisations. And several people have been killed,”

The treatment of religious minorities in Pakistan leaves a lot to be desired. The problem stems from an attitude that Pakistan is for Sunni Muslims alone, and people of other religions, and even Shia Muslims are to be looked upon with contempt. The discrimination extends to derogatory references to non-Islamic people in school textbooks, as noted in chapter 3.

M.H. Aksari, writing in the Pakistani paper Dawn (66) said,

The former Indian foreign secretary, J.N. Dixit, recalling his days as ambassador in Islamabad says that once when he called on a Pakistani friend, the latter’s six-year old daughter on discovering that Dixit was a Hindu skipped around the table chanting ‘Hindu Kutta’, ‘Hindu Kutta.’

Hindu Kutta means Hindu Dog. But it is not Hindus alone who are discriminated against in Pakistan. Over the years the Pakistan army leadership has encouraged a particularly intolerant Islamic mindset to prevail and thrive in Pakistan. Shia Muslims in Pakistan are subjected to terrorist attacts and discrimination, and the Ahmediya sect

have been declared as non-Muslims in Pakistan for their beliefs. Pakistan is busy changing Islam to suit the needs

of a small elite.

The role of the Pakistani army leaders in this is clear from a report that was carried in the paper Dawn in November 2003 (67).

Ziaul Haq actively encouraged this misguided Islamic fervour


the situation. A foreign diplomat, who happened to be travelling by road from Skardu to Islamabad a couple of days after all this started, told me that he saw houses en-route burning and that the route provided a spectacle of war and destruction.


Haq’s advice led to widespread religious

Many people, mostly Shias, were killed and their houses burnt. The local administration did little to control

There is a movement in Pakistan to have Shias declared non-Muslim. Following a massacre of Shia Muslims in a Pakistani mosque on the Islamic holy day of Moharram in 2004, senior analyst B. Raman wrote about anti-Shia hostility in Pakistan (68):

consisting of Gilgit and the Shia majority areas of Punjab and the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP). They wanted the Shia state to be called the Karakoram Province and remain part of a confederation of Pakistan. The Zia regime crushed the Shia movement ruthlessly. In August 1988, the Pakistan Army inducted a large Sunni tribal force from the NWFP and the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), led by Osama bin Laden, into Gilgit and it massacred hundreds of Shias and crushed their revolt. The hatred of the Shias for Osama bin Laden and his Al Qaeda dates from this period.

Successive governments in Pakistan, mostly military, but civilian as well, have consistently fought and opposed anyone and everyone, foreign nations as well as their own people. The only things that have been preserved intact and untouched in Pakistan are the power and wealth of the elite of the army, a few businessmen and the feudal lords and their allies, the preachers of a narrow brand of Sunni Islam, who are responsible for a rising tide of Islamic fundamentalism.



When Indians and Pakistanis meet, one is struck by their similarity. Indians are fond of saying “Pakistanis are just like us” but one will find that Pakistanis do not tend to say “Indians are just like us”. Being different from Indians is a fundamental requirement that defines the Pakistani.

Before India was partitioned in 1947, some of the Muslim elite in India, who were later to go to Pakistan, considered themselves the descendants of the Mughals who had ruled vast tracts of India. When the British were set to leave India, it was realised by these real or perceived descendants of Mughals that in a democratic India, they would not automatically regain control of the lands they had lost to the British. The demand for a separate nation was a natural extension of this Mughal mindset. This group of individuals formed a migrant nation.

The Weekly Standard reported in October 2001 (69):

Created on August 15, 1947, from the northern, primarily Muslim provinces of British India, Pakistan isn’t really a

nation-state. It is a geographic expression of an ageold Islamic ideal: Muslims should not, if at all possible, live

under non-Muslim rule. Living under the all-mighty British was unpleasant for many

numerous Hindus, whom the Muslim Mogul dynasty had dominated for centuries before the arrival of the English,

was worse. For the English-educated Muslim elite, it was intolerable

Hindu, so a Muslim “Land of the Pure”—the literal meaning of Pakistan—was essential to protect and nurture the faithful.

Living under the far more

Gandhi’s Indian democracy was going to be

MB Naqvi wrote in the Jang of Pakistan (70):

Historically the majority of Muslims, originally lowcaste Hindus, affected a superiority complex, especially in Northern India. They feared being falling down into the vast assimilative sea of Hindudom surrounding them wherein they will be at the bottom of social heap. May be they would be punished for former uppishness and for real or imagined wrongs. That explained their demonstrative adherence to Islam, which is what distinguished them from Hindus. Their religious exhibitionism and a superiority complex led to emphases on differences with Hindus and regarding themselves as rulers’ kith and kin deserving privileges and safeguards—the leitmotif of pre- independence Indian Muslim politics.

Others’ refusal to accept Muslims demands, calculated to preserve imagined privileges, angered them and an adversarial attitude vis-a-vis Hindus developed. Muslims thus demanded weightage - actually equality of treatment with Hindus - reservations and separate electorate. These came from, and strengthened, two traits: first, not to accept democracy’s implications, especially the equality with Hindus. The second was to depend on a ruling or hegemonic power to get them their due.

But Pakistan was not formed merely by people with this Mughal mindset. Another root of partition lay with the defeat of the Turkish Caliphate by the British in 1918. When that occurred, Muslims all over the world, and certainly in pre-independence India attempted to go back to their Islamic roots. One of the consequences was that they discouraged their children from attending secular schools, and encouraged education in Islamic schools, madrassas. The end of the Caliphate was a symbolic blow to Muslims who has grown up to look at the Islamic empire as extending from Arabia in the center to North Africa in the West, Southern Europe to the North and Central Asia, India and South East Asia to the East. The Caliph was the symbolic head of this empire, although he by no means controlled even a fraction of that empire. The word Caliph means deputy in Arabic, and the first Caliph had been appointed by the Prophet Mohammad, and the end of the Caliphate was the end of a long line of Caliphs that extended from antiquity.


concept in Islam speaks of a dar ul Islam, a house of Islam - a house or a group of followers of Islam, and a dar


harb or house of war, consisting of unbelievers - people who were not followers of Islam. Inherent in the concept


dar ul harb was that Islam, and Muslims would always be under threat in the dar ul harb. The concept probably

dates back to the early years of Islam, when there was a central but rapidly expanding Islamic empire, around which were lands with non-Muslims who were at war with the followers of the new religion. For Muslims who could not have their way with separate representation in pre-independence India, staying in India would be tantamount to

living under subjugation in the dar ul harb, a completely unacceptable situation, The demand for a separate state for Muslims only was a logical extension of this thought process.

The Friday Times had this to say (71):

Allama Iqbal, the poet who composed the popular Indian patriotic song Saare Jahaan se achcha, Hindustan hamara later paradoxically endorsed the need for a separate nation for Muslims (72):

Allama Iqbal asserted that there is only one nation opposed to the Muslim Umma, and that is the nation of non- Muslims! In other words, the world is divided into two camps, the Muslims and Non-Muslims.

Another key player in the call for Pakistan was Maulana Maududi, the ideological founder of Pakistan (73):

(The) Pakistan Movement was based on the theory that Muslims are entirely separate people from Hindus in every


Ali Jinnah, the movement, in less than a decade gave birth to Pakistan The man who is most credited as an intellectual force behind the two-nation theory and a front against united Indian nationalism is Maulana Abul Ala Maududi.

This theory is popularly known as two-nation theory. Under the leadership of Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad

A third factor that contributed to the formation of Pakistan was the political power aspiration of Mohammad Ali

Jinnah who saw in the formation of the new nation of Pakistan a ready made constituency of Muslims, in addition to power and glory for himself and the new nation.

The result, as eloquently documented by Rajiv Malhotra, was (74):

Without any concrete ‘dispute’ between Hindus and Muslims, the logic that prevailed was that Muslims require segregation of political and social life in order to be in compliance with the demands of sharia. The Two-Nation Theory was a manifestation of the doctrine of darul-islam versus dar-ul-harb.

With Islam, and Islamic reasons being the basis for the formation of Pakistan, Pakistanis have, right from the beginning, been taught to regard themselves as Muslims first and foremost, and as opposed to being citizens of the nation, Pakistan. Pakistan was supposed to be a homeland for Muslims of India and its formation was pushed through by the groups who wanted it, over the wishes of other groups, including some such as the Jamaat-i-Islami who did not favor the formation of Pakistan.

Not much thought was put into whether a state based on religion alone would be able to survive. With Jinnah as leader the heady success of nation formation in 1947 was enough. Pakistan had come into existence. It was Islamic. It was not Indian. It was a victory of Islam over the British and the Hindus. The fact of being Pakistani brought with it a liberal dose of pride, satisfaction, honour and dignity. For the new Pakistanis India was a land of kafirs, unbelievers. It was a land of superstition, discrimination, hunger and poverty. A nation in decline. Pakistan would not be like India. Pakistan would be progressive, strong and Islamic. And Pakistan would claim to represent the Muslims who had stayed behind in India. Pakistan would represent Islam itself it would be a leading light of Islam in the world. It was the first Islamic state to be created in the modern era ab initio.

Although the purpose of this book is to present a study of Pakistan after partition, it would not be out of place to mention briefly the civilizational effect that partition had on India. When studied over centuries, civilizations can

often be seen to behave like live beings. In civilizational terms, the splitting up of British India into modern India and Pakistan can be compared to an act of auto-amputation. This is a condition in which a live human body spontaneously discards and casts off a dead or diseased part, such as a toe or a fingertip so that the body itself can survive and not be affected by the disease that damaged the toe or finger. For India partition was akin to that -


civilizational auto-amputation.


one convulsive act, the people of the Indian subcontinent agreed to place all the people who wanted to live and

work in a united India in one place, and and all the people who did not wish to live and work in India were placed in Pakistan.

Strange as it may sound, this tumultuous self-mutilating act was a profoundly democratic one, in which those who

wanted to opt out of India were allowed to opt out, and those who wanted to stay, stayed. The actual act of partition was accompanied by horrifying suffering and death, but after five decades the memories of the pain are beginning


fade; more than two-thirds of the population of India having been after 1947, after the painful events of partition.


is easier for these younger Indians to see that for India, partition was not so much an act of separation of all

Hindus from all Muslims, but it merely segregated a sub-group of Indians who did not want to co-exist with other Indians. The vast majority of Indians rooted for India and worked for India.

Pakistanis did not see things that way. They saw themselves as Muslims, and Pakistani leaders assumed that the Muslims remaining in India would automatically rise up and revolt, and that India would fragment and break. They were wrong. The initial fragmentation and breaking that occurred at partition, continued in Pakistan, with the formation of Bangladesh. Pakistan had filled itself with people whose intent was less to live and work in harmony, and more to live away from some group or the other.


It was only after the formation of Pakistan that all the assumptions made about Islam as a unifying concept began to break down. There were contradictions at every turn. The 15 million mohajirs who migrated to Pakistan from India were not welcomed. But they were educated and held all the important bureaucratic posts. The mohajirs found that their survival in Pakistan would be made easier by creating and maintaining an India scare - a phobia against the scheming Hindu who was out to subjugate or kill all Muslims. The mohajirs, the Muslim elite of India who had migrated to Pakistan were in an ideal position to concoct any stories they wished about the bestial Hindus they had left behind.

Apart from the mohajirs was the other half of Pakistan, East Pakistan, with its people, the Bengalis. The fact that East Pakistani Bengalis were Muslim did not help to stop the West Pakistani disdain for the short, dark, fish and rice-eating Bengali, as opposed to the tall, fair, wheat eating Pakistani Punjabi. The possibility of democracy in Pakistan brought with it the threat of a short, dark, rice-eating Bengali becoming Prime Minister of Pakistan. That would have been totally unacceptable to the Pakistani Punjabi. Punjabis made up 90% of the Pakistani army, and the army had no intention of seeing its Punjabi dominance being subordinate to the inferior Bengali.

This complex web of factors kept Pakistanis from uniting with each other but the Islam argument was used for unity. Any threat, and any setback to Pakistan, even when caused by internal politics and mismanagement was blamed on India. India and Indians were continuously and bitterly accused of being anti-Pakistan and anti-Muslim. It was drummed into ordinary Pakistanis that they must be good Muslims, and while Pakistanis struggled to meet the standards set for them, the ruling elite lived as they pleased.

In his book, Among the Believers (75), Nobel Prize winning author V.S. Naipaul describes travels through Pakistan, and records interviews with a diverse group of Pakistanis. A repeated observation that comes out is that the ordinary Pakistani citizen is under pressure to be a good Muslim. The Pakistani citizen is judged by whether he is a good Muslim or not. Every act or event in Pakistan has to be seen through the prism of whether it is Islamic or not. One of the problems that crops up from this is the definition of “Who is a good Muslim?”. Naipaul says:

To be a devout Muslim was always to have distinctive things to do; it was to be guided constantly by rules; it was to live in a fever of the faith and always to be aware of the distinctiveness of the faith.

And Pakistanis believed that this was all that was needed. It was only necessary for everyone to be a good Muslim, and everything else would look after itself. After all Islam had given them a nation. It would now provide for that nation.



In the end, it could perhaps be said that Islam was too big for Pakistan to keep as its private domain. Pakistan was unable to grab and hold Islam as though Islam and Pakistan were one and the same.

To be sure, Pakistani leaders, for decades behaved as though Pakistan was Islam and Islam was Pakistan. Even before independence, Jinnah, the founder of Pakistan had called the flag of his political party, the Muslim League as the Flag of Islam and had said you cannot separate the Muslim League from Islam. (76). A very popular slogan in Pakistan was, “Pakistan ka matlab kya, La ilaha illallah”. The slogan combines a few words taken from the the Islamic call to prayer La ilaha illallah - meaning there is no God but God and attaches those words to Pakistan to make the meaning What does Pakistan mean there is no God but God - implying that Pakistan and Islam are one and the same.

But this charade could only last a few years before the fallacies began to show.

It is endlessly and erroneously repeated that Pakistan was formed for the Muslims of the Indian subcontinent. This is a shameful piece of fiction that needs to be set right. Pakistan was formed for some, and not all Muslims of the Indian subcontinent.

Demographer P.H. Reddy noted in the Times of India on 8th April 2003 (77):

According to the 1941 census, out of a total of 435 districts in undivided India, there were 76 in which more than 50 per cent of the people were Muslims. Based on this demographic fact, the Sir Cyril Radcliffe’s Boundary Commission allotted these 76 districts to Pakistan. The 76 Muslim-majority districts were grouped together in two clusters. One cluster was in north-west India and the other in north-east India. Western Pakistan comprised the north-west part of the sub-continent and Eastern Pakistan comprised eastern part of Bengal and one district in



1951, Muslims numbered 3.54 crore, making up 9.9 per cent of the total population of India.

Over the centuries Islam reached a balance with the cultures of the people who adopted Islam. Arab culture had existed in Arabia for centuries before Islam was born, and Arab culture adopted and internalized Islam, which was born in Arabia. Egyptians live in peace with their past, and do not seek to deny the ancient, pre-Islamic Egyptian civilization of Pharaohs who built the Pyramids. An entire literature and culture of Islam developed in Persia, using the Persian language. Islam spread peacefully into Indonesia and was absorbed and rationalized by the local culture.

Similarly Islam developed and flowered in India with its own unique literature, arts and architecture produced by an intermingling of two rich cultures. The formation of Pakistan sought to deny this vibrant entity. Jinnah exploited a cleavage in Indian society to proclaim:

Hindus and Muslims belong to two different religious philosophies, social customs, literature”, “to two different

civilizations”, that they “derive their inspiration from different sources of history”

heroes and different episodes.” “We wish our people”, he declared, “to develop to the fullest our spiritual, cultural, economic, social and political life in a way that we think best and in consonance with our own ideals and according to the genius of our people.”

(with) different epics, different

Perhaps Jinnah did not mean to strip Pakistan of the rich culture that Islam had developed in its centuries of interaction in India (78).

But the leaders of the new Pakistan who took over after Jinnah died in 1948, certainly felt that Pakistan should be stripped of all its connections with India. In an experimental and unparalleled act of ignorance, Pakistan was deliberately set on the path of being an orphan, culture-less nation. Pakistan was not Arabic; it was not Egyptian or Persian; it was not Indonesian, but it was definitely not going to be Indian any more. The India connection had to be stripped clean, leaving Pakistan purely Islamic. Islamic, for Muslims alone, free from India or any Indian roots. Indian culture had to be actively cleaned out of the minds of millions of Pakistani citizens - a culture of centuries was to be washed clean, and nobody had any idea of what would replace the void. The only thing people knew was that Pakistanis would have to be Islamic, and good Muslims.

The formation of Pakistan was considered a great victory. But there were inconsistencies and contradictions right from the beginning and the confusion has remained to this day.

Was Pakistan a nation for Muslims only? But why did Jinnah say:



have many non-Muslims - Hindus, Christians, and Parsis - but they are all Pakistanis. They will enjoy the same

rights and privileges as any other citizens

your mosques or to any other places of worship in this State of Pakistan

would cease to be Hindus and Muslims would cease to be Muslims

You are free; you are free to go to your temples, you are free to go to



will find that in course of time Hindus

Was Pakistan a nation for all Muslims of the Indian subcontinent? If so, Pakistan had failed at birth, as the majority of Muslims chose to remain in India.

Was Pakistan the leader of all Islamic nations, an example for Islamic nations to follow as the leader of the ummah,

a modern day Caliphate? But if that was the case Pakistan should not have had any boundaries. That is indeed what some Pakistani Islamists believe:

Muslims all over the world must realize that nationalism is kufr, and that the modern nation-states are a creation of that period in history when Muslims were defeated and dominated by kufr. (79) (kufr refers to unbelievers i.e. People who are not Islamic.)

Pakistani leaders, in their confusion as to what Pakistan was and what it should do, ended up trying to make Pakistan take all the routes that it could possibly take simultaneously. And like a man whose arms and legs are being pulled apart by horses moving in different directions, parts of Pakistan, and social and ethnic groups of Pakistan have all headed in different directions, resulting in the chaos that Pakistan is today.

Pakistani leaders claimed that they, and Pakistan, were purely Islamic, and represented Islam. Islam was and still

remains the ultimate excuse, the lever that is used in Pakistan to justify anything. For Pakistan, Islam has served as

a tool to be used when convenient, to get aid, or to deflect blame or to accuse an adversary of misdeeds. As long

as Pakistani leaders hid behind the Islam excuse for their actions, nobody could question them. After all, Pakistan was Islamic, and therefore anything that Pakistan did, from waging wars, avoiding elections, genocide, corruption could not be criticized by anyone. Any criticism of Pakistan was criticism of Islam. If Pakistan obtained military and economic aid from the US, it was because Islam was naturally anticommunist. India did not dare question Pakistani claims no matter how preposterous or obscene they were, because Pakistan was Islamic. Opposing Pakistan was anti-Islamic.

And in this manner, instead of consolidating and unifying the new state of Pakistan, its leaders set about using Islam to divert attention to India, and to meddle with Indian territory and Indian Muslims. India was the source of all problems; the enemy of Pakistan, and therefore the enemy of Islam. The India problem had to be solved, and that took priority over everything else in Pakistan, be it development, democracy or common sense. The threat from India became the common denominator for all Pakistani actions, for postponing elections and for postponing development of Pakistan indefinitely. And conveniently, aid and funds poured into Pakistan in the early years as part of US aid to Pakistan as a cold war ally. As long as the money kept coming in, there was no pressure to change policy. India could be fought and opposed, the people of Pakistan could be kept busy, and elections postponed. Money and the economy were not a problem. Allah (God), who had given Pakistan to the faithful, was providing funds and arms via the US. India would be defeated. Pakistan could do no wrong.

But as repeated Pakistani assaults against India failed, Islam could not fail. Pakistanis had failed the faith. They were not Islamic enough they had to strive to be better Muslims. They had to starve, sacrifice and allow their army to get stronger, so that Islam could be upheld against India, the number one threat to Pakistan, and therefore to Islam. No method was ruled out, no sacrifice could be too great in opposing India, because opposing India meant devotion to Islamic ideals. Muslims in Kashmir, and later all the Muslims in India would be rescued from Hindu tyranny by Pakistan.

Islam gradually became the tool, the prop, used in Pakistan to make every opinion or move. The Islam card was

used by everybody in Pakistan to suit their own purpose. The Pakistani elite, migrants from India, holding all the important government posts, saw their positions threatened by the prospect of elections which would unseat them

in favor of locals. Elections were a threat that had to be postponed or canceled and an imaginary threat to Islam

was invoked. In his essay on the role of the power structure in Pakistan (80), Mohammad Waseem wrote:

Muslim migrants from East Punjab and further East in India shaped the psyche of the new nation along feelings of

insecurity at the hands of India, commitment to Islamic ideology and the need to unite against all odds





the prospects of their exit from power in the event of elections.

A report in Pakistan’s Friday Times (81) carried this scathing message on the role of the migrant elite in using


On Feb 21, 1952 the historic Bengali language movement erupted spontaneously all over East Bengal

a major potential challenge. Foolishly our ruling elite, instead of going some way to meet Bengali demands, thought

they could isolate the Bengali nationalists by raising religious slogans of Islamic ideology and Islamic identity to counter Bengali anger.




The army of Pakistan was initially subservient to the government. After 1971 Zia-ul-Haq started a campaign of Islamization of the Pakistani army, and strengthened the process of Islamization of Pakistan started by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, whom Zia had deposed in a coup. Rajiv Malhotra wrote (74):

Islamic texts are being introduced into Pakistani military training. Middle ranking officers must take courses and examinations on Islam. There are even serious attempts under way to define an Islamic military doctrine, as distinct from the international military doctrines, so as to fight in accordance with the Koran.

And as Islam was stirred into the mindset of the Pakistani army, the army started seeing Islam in more and more of its actions. Columnist Hamid Husain has this to say about Islamization of the Pakistan army (58):

Brigadier Gulzar Ahmad explaining the role of celestial powers to lessen his troop casualties in 1965 war stated,

‘There was a hidden hand deflecting the rounds’

conference reprimanded the ambassadors for not relying on the intercession of Providence while analyzing Pakistan’s Afghan policy. Another compelling reason to be very cautious about overuse of religion is to avoid seeping of sectarian tendencies into the armed forces.


Mahmud Ahmad during Pakistani ambassador’s

Finally, for the mullahs (Islamic scholars) of Pakistan, anything less than an Islamic state in Pakistan was a threat. Only in an Islamic state could mullahs be influential and prominent. Pluralism or Western-style democracy was incompatible with the mullah’s world view, and they supported every measure to make Islam the basis of the existence of all Pakistanis. M. A. Hussain wrote (82):

Imam, Mozin, Mo-alim, Maulavi, etc

power and have tremendous scope for employment. It explains why even those Ulamas and Maulavis (like Moulana Maudoodi), who had opposed Jinnah, went to Pakistan as they saw no role in India for themselves.


a vested interest in establishing an Islamic state where they are locus of

With everyone in Pakistan, the people, the bureaucracy and government, the army and the mullahs seemingly being in agreement with each other on the question of the Islamic status of Pakistan, there really should have been no problem. Everything should have fallen in place, and gone without a hitch.

But that did not happen. Every group in Pakistan needed Islam only for their narrow self interest. The idea of an Islamic state seemed noble enough, but making it reality was easier said than done.

The Ideal Islamic state existed at the time of the Prophet Mohammad. The desire for an ideal Islamic state has been described as follows (83):

The quest for it reflects the desire to model Muslim politics on the original Islamic community in Medina, which remains to this day the blueprint for a genuinely Islamic society. No Muslim polity has measured up to the

combination of piety and social justice achieved by the Medinese community polity remains an ideal.


trying to replicate the Medinese

When the Prophet Mohammad died in AD 632, he left behind a tradition, but there were no written guidelines on how a state should be run. In the absence of such guidelines, Islamic people often ended up being controlled by the nearest strongman. The men who controlled the sword, controlled the ulema (scholars) and the people.

Tamara Sonn, a Professor of religious studies, wrote (84):

(The Prophet) Muhammad’s prophetic mantle was not inherited by his successors, and he did not leave behind a

specific political system or designate a successor

personally pious and to behave according to the guidance left by the Prophet, but there were no formal criteria for determining the community’s leadership or judging its legitimacy.


general, the Prophet’s successors were expected to be

Succession of leadership among Islamic people has been a bone of contention ever since that time. And Pakistan is no exception.

In a report on the relationship of the mullahs and the military in Pakistan by the International Crisis Group, (a non- profit multinational organization committed to resolving conflict) the introduction carries the following quote (85):

The Muslim state in India was a theocracy

holy law of the Qu’raan and no sultan could clearly divorce religion from politics. But in practice the Muslim sultan of India was a perfect autocrat and his word was law. The real source of the sultan’s authority was military strength,

and this was understood and acquiesced in


theory the sultan’s authority in religious matters was limited by the


the soldiers, the poets and the ulema of the age.

The precedent of the strongman - the military ruler taking absolute control over Islamic people had already existed in Mughal India, and was implemented and perpetuated in Pakistan. The Pakistan army was invited to take power, liked it, and held on to power. Other forces in Pakistan who wanted power and influence, such as the politicians,


bureaucrats and the ulema used the army, or reached some accommodation with the army. And it was all done in the name of Islam.

Anything that Pakistan did was done in the name of Islam. It was done, Pakistani leaders claimed, to uphold Islam and represent Islam. It was to be assumed by all who were watching that Pakistan itself was the embodiment of Islam. After all Pakistan was formed for Islam. Criticism of Pakistan was criticism of Islam. Pakistani leaders were always right, always Islamic and they compelled their people to be more and more Islamic.

Gradually the non-Muslim minorities of Pakistan were squeezed out (chapter 6) They had no role in Islamic Pakistan. East Pakistanis their minds poisoned by India according to some West Pakistani commentators, revolted, seceded and formed Bangladesh (chapter 11). This blow to Pakistan was explained on the basis of Pakistan not being Islamic enough. More and more Islamic laws had to be passed and implemented. The sharia, zakat, and the Hudood ordinance were brought in. Islamic fervor, it was implied, would solve all of Pakistan’s problems, and put and end to the people’s misery.

The effort to make Pakistan purely Islamic has been described by V.S Naipaul in his book “Among the believers”


This Islamic state couldn’t simply be decreed; it had to be invented, and in that invention faith was of little help. Faith, at the moment, could only supply the simple negatives that answered emotional needs: no alcohol, no feminine immodesty, no interest in the banks. But soon in Pakistan these negatives were to be added to: no political parties, no parliament, no dissent, no law courts. So existing institutions were deemed to be un-Islamic and undermined or undone; the faith was asserted because only the faith seemed to be whole; and in the vacuum only the army could rule.

However, the army, the rulers and influential people of Pakistan did not have to be all that Islamic. Pure Islam was for the hoi-polloi, the serfs and underlings. The elite stayed rich, and the army became richer, and their modern, liberal lifestyle conveyed the impression of a progressive society to Western aid givers. Pakistan’s alliance with the U.S., ensured that foreign aid poured in and the economy of the wealthy in Pakistan boomed. The rich got money, the army got weapons, while the poor of Pakistan got madrassas (Islamic schools) to ensure that they became more Islamic.

The mullahs of Pakistan were doubly happy. The burgeoning of madrassas and ensured that they would have jobs and influence. They took charge of the madrassas with gusto and preached with fervor. They preached jihad, Jihad against the enemies of Islam. In order to be good Muslims, Pakistanis were urged to do jihad - not the internal, self correcting jihad of the Koran, but the external violence of the Generals and their games of military domination. More and more Pakistanis were needed to fight Pakistan’s wars. Men were needed to fight India. Men were needed to fight the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. The army brass, getting richer, needed men to do their fighting, and the mullahs, secure and happy in their newly funded madrassas, ensured the delivery of any number of men to fight for Pakistan, for Islam.

Each Islamic jihadi, brought up with fervor in a madrassa, was ready to die for a cause, ready to embrace and accept the guaranteed benefits of dying in jihad in an afterlife to be enjoyed in a well-stocked heaven.

And as these men prepared for and died fighting for the cause that they had been told was Islamic - the people who trained them and sent them to die the army and the mullahs, got fatter, and more powerful.

This glorious scene became Pakistan’s version of Islam. Rich generals doing office jobs while men from the poor classes with little to live for were trained, indoctrinated and prepared for death; their families accepting that the death of their son would bring glory and honour. The Islam of Pakistan’s mullahs, in league with lazy Generals, aiding the Generals’ wars, preaching an Islam that would keep the mullahs comfortable in this life, while their wards and students were encouraged to seek the pleasures of an afterlife, obtainable only by violence and death.

As the institutions of Pakistan failed in this unique and unorthodox concept of a nation, the faith Islam, grew stronger.

In a remarkably prescient passage Naipaul observes (75),

The state withered, but faith didn’t. Failure only led back to the faith. The state had been founded as a homeland for Muslims. If the state failed it wasn’t because the dream was flawed, or the faith flawed; it could only be because men had failed the faith. And in that quest of the Islamic absolute the society of believers, where every action was

instinct with worship men lost sight of the political origins of their state

Pakistan: it was founded as the land of the pure; it was to be the first truly Islamic state since the days of the Prophet and his close companions


claims began to be made for


The average Pakistani citizen was coerced or co-opted by putting Islam first. Pakistan, it was stressed, was created by Muslims for Muslims. Every Pakistani had to strive to be a good Muslim. To be Pakistani was to be a good Muslim. Muslim clerics, the mullahs and the ulema were necessarily allowed to exercise spiritual control over the Pakistani masses to ensure that Pakistan remained adequately and properly Islamic in all arenas. It was drummed in that this was necessary because India was always there to swallow up Pakistan. India had been held in check only by God and the Pakistani army, which presented itself as the savior, ‘the army of Islam,’ upholding the faith and protecting Pakistan. Co-opting the Pakistani citizen under the Islam banner eminently served the interests of the rich and corrupt elite of Pakistan in maintaining their grip and preserving their business and territorial interests. And the Pakistani state died. In his characteristically astute manner V.S, Naipaul concludes (75):

Step by step, out of its Islamic striving, Pakistan had undone the rule of law it had inherited from the British, and replaced it with nothing



Career diplomat-turned-politician Mani Shankar Aiyer served as India’s first Consul General in Karachi, and he has published his collected writings on Pakistan in a book entitled Pakistan Papers (86). Aiyer says that the best definition for Pakistani is “One who is not Indian”. Pakistanis define their identity as being non-Indian, and go on further to define themselves as pure Muslims.

Pakistan itself means “Land of the Pure” and Pakistani identity has been sought to be defined on the basis that Pakistan is a land of pure Muslims. In their effort to ensure that Pakistanis are not Indian, Pakistani authorities have done everything in their power to discourage any Pakistani from displaying cultural traits that are seen as Indian in character, and encouraged the replacement of that culture by an invented Islamic culture. This experiment is unique in the world. No other nation has attempted to so totally reject its existing culture while retaining only the faith or religion.

In his book, Among the Believers, (75) Naipaul quotes the words of a man describing Pakistan.

I will tell you the story of this country in two sentences. In the first quarter of this century the Hindus of India decided that everything that was wrong had to do with foreigners and foreign influence. Then in the second quarter, the Muslims of India woke up. They had a double hate. They hated the foreigners and they hated the Hindus. So the country of Pakistan was built on hate and nothing else.

The predominant Pakistani attitude toward India is hatred. The birth, and survival of Pakistan required the rejection of all that was Indian. But Mani Shankar Aiyer has recognised a gradual change of attitudes to India among Pakistanis. Up until 1971 it was hate and contempt, but after 1971, Pakistani attitudes have changed to hate and fear. Aiyer writes (86):


but the most blind Pakistani today looks back on what happened to his country in 1971 at the hands of India as

a great defeat; till 1971 he looked back on what happened

as a great victory.

Aiyer continues:

From 1947 to 1971 the general belief (in Pakistan) was:

‘hans hans ke liya tha Pakistan, (We got Pakistan with a triumphant smile) lad lad ke lengey Hindustan’ (We fill fight and take Hindustan)

Myths about a single Muslim soldier being the equal of four, or ten or whatever number of Kafirs was widely believed; it was put about and accepted implicitly that in a matter of days, perhaps hours, the flag of Islam would be imparted on the ramparts of the Red Fort.

Columnist Hamid Hussain describes the Pakistani army officer corps’ attitude toward Indians prior to the 1965 war


The general despise (sic) of Hindus and doubting their capacity of able (sic) to give a good fight was almost universal

Over the years, India struggled but improved; while Pakistan split up and tottered. And hatred of India grew. Dislike and distrust of India became an industry in Pakistan. Like life itself, which evolved from simple one-celled organisms into a multitude of life forms, huge Banyan trees, fragrant flowers, tigers, elephants, insects and men, hatred of India was nurtured to evolve, grow and metamorphose into a multitude of reasons and justifications.

Pakistanis evolved a plethora of reasons to hate India. The act of partition at independence left Pakistanis with a small moth-eaten nation. This was a source of resentment to many elite Pakistanis who had left everything in India to be in Pakistan. For these people nothing would be better than exacting revenge for their lost lives. It was worth defeating India for this reason alone. For others, India was a hateful nation of people who caused the trauma of partition. Hatred and mistrust of India was the reason for the creation of Pakistan. Pakistan existed because Muslims would be suppressed in India, and opposition to India was the reason for Pakistan’s birth. India was the enemy, to be fought, defeated and brought to its knees.

Hatred for India and Indians has been made into a national purpose, a national obsession in Pakistan, with active hatred being taught in Pakistani schools as described in Chapter 3.


In an article written for Pinnacle magazine (87), Brig. Raychaudhuri sums up Pakistani attitudes to India:

This shattering of the psychological indoctrination, based on assumed religious superiority, makes it difficult for the Pakistanis to accept the reality of India’s intrinsic superiority in size and economy. The fact that in 1965 and also in Kargil it was the Moslems of India who alerted the country is too insulting to believe. The cup of Pakistani hatred brims over and India, in the Pakistani mindset, is the cause of their nation(‘s) deprivations

Pakistanis were poor because of Indian aggression. Pakistan could not develop because of India. Furthermore, hatred of India was needed as the justification for the wealth of the Pakistan army, and for the health of army businesses surviving on state handouts. India had to be hated to keep Pakistanis in line, to make them more Islamic, to make them good Muslims. Pakistanis had to be good Muslims to survive; they had to give up Indianness, because India was there to subjugate or kill all Muslims, just like India was accused of killing or raping 30,000 or 70,000 or whatever number of people in Kashmir. And as India grew stronger, hatred and fear of India had to grow stronger, and Islamic fervor had to be increased to oppose India.

As recently as December 2003, a retired Colonel of the Pakistan Army wrote the following accusations against India (88):

There is a long list of other hostile Indian actions against Pakistan, some of which are:

Indian usurpation of Jammu and Kashmir, the continued occupation of that state against the will of its people, and the merciless killing of thousands of innocent Kashmiris by the Indian occupation forces;

Constant efforts to destabilize Pakistan through its agents, who are always at work to create disgruntlement in Pakistan’s smaller provinces;

Conducting terrorist activities in various parts of Pakistan to exploit ethnic and religious differences;

Developing Pakistan-specific nuclear and conventional arsenal, thus forcing this country to enter into a suicidal arms race with the consequent irreparable damage to its economy;

Keep bullying Pakistan by concentrating Indian armed forces on its borders and on the Line of Control in Kashmir on trumped up grounds, having previously imposed three wars on Pakistan.

Expecting an enemy with such a criminal record to change its heart overnight and become friendly toward us is nothing but inanity.

And while some Pakistanis have reacted to India with this degree of hatred and suspicion, others try to urge Pakistan to virtually move out of the Indian subcontinent into Central Asia or even the Middle East. Ahmad Quraish wrote in the Pakistani paper the Nation (89):


following steps are necessary:


Political: Pakistan’s




Pakistan’s inclusion in South Asia and play up

Pakistan’s role in Central and West Asia.


Cultural: Islamabad’s cultural cooperation with West Asian and Central Asian countries must be revitalized.

Changing the name of Pakistan’s national monetary unit

by adopting either the Riyal or the Dinar

instead of the Rupee, which has exclusive Indian connotations.

Educational: The other major facets of Pakistan’s identity - the Arab, Persian, Turkic and Central Asian - must be emphasized in our schoolbooks. If this requires drafting new books on Pakistan studies, so be it, and these must be compulsory reading for Pakistani students

It is both ludicrous and sad to see Pakistani loathing for India covering the full spectrum - from the perigee of wanting to occupy and subjugate parts of India, to the apogee of wiping out memories of India, even denying Pakistan’s links with India and claiming imagined links with Central and West Asia. And all this while Indian children are taught to recognize Pakistanis as just like us.



The word Army for the Pakistan army is a pitifully inadequate description for an organization that does vastly more, and has diversified into more ventures than most armies in the world could dream of doing. Calling the Pakistan army by that name is akin to describing a 30-course meal as a light snack. There is almost no activity in Pakistan that the army is not involved in doing, and there is no group in Pakistan or among Pakistan’s neighbors that the Pakistani army has not fought, antagonized or disagreed with. But yet, the Pakistani army leads a charmed existence, being admired by most of Pakistan, although that has begun to change recently.

Time and time again, and from many sources, one can find people who have made the quote: Pakistan is not a nation with an army; it is an army with a nation

Of course, the Pakistani army started off as a regular army, with soldiers, guns, generals, tanks and valor. But its tentacles have spread into politics, power, industry, business, religion, terrorism, fighting by proxy, crime, greed, deception, lucre and self preservation. How the Pakistani army changed from a regular army into this Hydra- headed monster has an interesting history.

It has been noted in an earlier chapter (Chapter 5) that due to historic reasons dating from the 1857 war of Indian independence, the British increasingly recruited people from the Northwest of undivided India, which included a large number of Punjabi Muslims from the area that was to later become Pakistan. Because of their loyalty and docility under British leadership, these troops began to be known as hailing from a martial race (57). Thus the Pakistani army was dominated by Punjabis, who began to see themselves as being of a superior martial race.

Apart from the predominance of Muslim Punjabis in the Pakistani army, several other unique observations can be made about the Pakistani province of Punjab (West Punjab) at the time of independence and partition (80).

Punjab was the most populous province of Pakistan.

Pakistani Punjab was militarized because of the large number of Punjabis in the military,

As part of the settlement of retired army personnel, vast tracts of land in West Punjab had been awarded to them.

70% of the voters in Pakistani Punjab had some connection with the military

Punjab itself was partitioned so a lot of army personnel had relatives or friends in Punjab who were affected by the events of partition.

Pakistani army units from Punjab were tasked with the protection of civilians in the post-partition violence, so the personnel in these army units served both as protectors of the civilians as well as sufferers as their villages or families were affected during partition.

Punjabi units were also utilized in Pakistan’s unsuccessful attack to wrest Kashmir from India in 1947.

For these reasons, the military in Pakistan was not merely the military, but had political clout as well as political opinions, especially a deep hatred for India. The military also actually owned a lot of land because of the policy of settling retired soldiers by gifting land. The Punjabi dominated army also considered itself a martial race with superior fighting and leadership qualities compared to the East Bengalis (East Pakistanis) who were considered effeminate, and the Hindu Indians. The army, having been tasked to protect Pakistanis during partition began to consider itself as the protector and savior of Islam. All these tendencies were present or had set in shortly after independence in 1947.

But there was an additional factor that led to the induction of the Pakistani army into the role of absolute rulers of Pakistan.

The areas that constituted West Pakistan were largely rural, and apart from the Punjabi dominated Army, there were not many educated local people to make up the bureaucrats, legal experts, engineers and technocrats that were required in the government of the new Pakistan. These posts were filled by the educated elite migrants from British India, largely mohajirs and Punjabis. These people suddenly had a nation to lead, a new nation, Pakistan - one of the biggest countries on earth. It was a victory for them, and for Islam. They were not about to fritter away


that victory by allowing power to pass into the hands of the more numerous uneducated locals in democratic elections, in the same way as they would later refuse to hand over power, and the rule of Pakistan to a Bengali party from faraway East Pakistan. After all, the reason these migrants had left India was precisely because they feared democracy attenuating their privileges.

Democracy was inconvenient for the ruling elite of Pakistan. It was also inconvenient for the feudal lords in Pakistan, who stood to lose their lands and influence. And democracy also brought with it the danger that the more

numerous Bengalis, considered an inferior race, might actually end up ruling all of Pakistan. Besides these facts, the migrant elite faced some resistance from the locals in West Pakistan, who had to give up space and resources

to the migrants from India.

The ruling elite of Pakistan therefore had a deep vested interest in not handing power to the people of Pakistan. And what better way to do that than to declare a threat to Pakistan, and to Islam itself, from their huge neighbor India. Elections were constantly postponed and the civilian authority used the Army to stay in power until the first bloodless military coup of 1958. And although that was the first year that the Pakistani army officially came into power, the army nevertheless had shared power with the elite in Pakistan for nearly a decade before that.


report from the International Crisis Group (53) has this to say:


the first decade of Independence, Pakistan was nominally a parliamentary democracy but civil bureaucrats ruled

the state with the military as junior partner. No elections were held Minister and used it liberally. (Governor-General Iskander) Mirza


President had power to dismiss the Prime in league with Army Chief, general


Mohammad Ayub Khan. Dispensing even with the pretence of democracy, Ayub ousted Mirza and imposed martial law in October 1958

The military coup by Gen Ayub Khan was a watershed of sorts as it marked the first step by the Pakistani military to gain and retain control of Pakistan. In the period from 1958 to 1971 the Pakistan Army gradually consolidated its hold on power in Pakistan, and stopped being a junior partner to the civil bureaucracy in government. It seems

virtually certain that no single individual in the Pakistani army could have been a strongman without the connivance and cooperation of the Punjabi and feudal lord dominated military brass of the Pakistani army. The Pakistani army

is like a close-knit fraternity, a family or brotherhood, a biradari, that protects its own from harm and disrepute, while

ensuring that its interests, be they power, finances or honour are not harmed. It is a cooperative system, rather than power handed down from a single supremo.

Pakistani security analyst Ayesha Siddiqa-Agha writes (90):

It is important to note that Pakistan’s armed forces especially the army operates like a fraternity. In this

environment, severe punishments to individuals or extraordinary treatment of a similar nature are viewed as undermining the morale of the institution. Sidelining undesirable individuals or rewarding others discreetly is, thus, a preferred choice.

Ayub exercised total control of Pakistan before, during and after 1965 when he launched and lost a war with India. The Army replaced Ayub Khan when it was sensed that popular opposition to Ayub Khan would harm the Army’s interests, and General Yahya Khan, who oversaw the splitting away of East Pakistan and the formation of Bangladesh after the worst defeat that the Pakistani armed forces have ever faced replaced him.

The International Crisis Group’s paper on democracy in Pakistan (53) refers to the Pakistani Army’s role in this period as follows:

Fearing that its defeat would translate into popular demands for accountability, the (army) high command

transferred power to Zulfikar Ali Bhutto

to East Pakistan. Despite 93,000 prisoners of war in India, its infrastructure in the West was untouched. Military

leaders quickly recouped losses and closed ranks against perceived civilian threats to their personal and institutional interests


military’s defeat in the 1971 war with India had, however, been limited

It is clear that even as early as 1971 the Pakistan Army had enough of a vested interest in retaining power in

Pakistan to pretend to hand over power to a civilian government in order to maintain the reputation and interests of the Pakistan army from public scrutiny and accountability. In fact a damning report on the actions and defeat of the Pakistani army in the 1971 war, the Hamoodur Rehman report was never made public until a copy was obtained and published by the Times of India.

All military governments in Pakistan, including the one currently headed by General Musharraf have grabbed power

to save Pakistan and bring in a sound democratic system. But the Pakistani army has always grabbed power from

elected governments or prevented democracy from actually being established, and have prevented all attempts to check the finances or power of the military in any way.


It is informative to look at the perquisites, businesses and non-military interests of the Pakistan army that are so keenly protected and preserved.

The army ensures that its officer class live in great style and luxury. A report in the Washington Post in 2002 (91) described army life in the following words:

The officer class in Pakistan has always had a strong sense of entitlement stemming from its dominant role in

defending the country and in running it

County and Golf Club, a sparkling new facility with lush fairways, a two-story driving range and a gracious stone clubhouse overlooking an inlet of the Arabian Sea. Active-duty military personnel can join the club for an initiation fee of $16, compared with $9,166 for civilians, according to the club’s fee schedule

One of the fanciest clubs in Karachi is the Defense Housing Authority

The same paper goes on to say:

the military also rewards its senior officers by allowing them to purchase agricultural and urban land from the

army’s vast inventory of real estate at prices far below market value

for example, is the blandly named Army Housing Scheme II

community protected by paramilitary troops, the development consists of spacious, Mediterranean-style villas grouped around a playground and an elaborately landscaped Japanese-style garden. Nearby are clothing boutiques, jewelry stores, restaurants and a yoga studio


of Pakistan’s most coveted addresses,


the upscale Karachi suburb of Clifton. A gated

Describing the decrepit and run-down state of most schools in Pakistan, the Washington Post goes on to compare that with a Pakistani army run school:

Geared toward preparation for the competitive O Level exams required by British universities, the handsome school

is an educational showpiece whose computer, physics and biology labs would not seem out of place in an

American suburb

There are an enormous number of news media reports of the money and businesses that the Pakistani army controls.

The Independent of London described the contrast between a Pakistani army establishment and the rest of Pakistan (92):

Outside in the street, Afghan refugees and Pakistan’s urban poor root through garbage tips and crowd on to soot- pumping buses to work in sweatshops and brick factories. Inside, behind the ancient, newly painted cannons and battalion flags, rose bushes surround welltended lawns and officers’ messes decorated with polished brass fittings. No rubbish litters this perfect world of discipline. Why should anyone living here want a return to corrupt democracy?

A report in the online edition of the Pakistani newspaper Dawn said (93):

The perks don’t end here: military personnel are entitled to a 50 per cent discount on air and rail fares as well as cinema tickets. Their children have a quota at most public universities, and serving and retired officers are routinely inducted into civilian jobs.

The Pakistan Weekly reported (94):


relation to country’s per capita income Pakistani senior military officers are one of the best paid in the world. No

other career, with equivalent academic qualifications and so little productivity produces comparable personal affluence as that of the officer cadre of the Pak military

Where does the money for all this come from? A report in the Daily Times of Pakistan in August 2002 says:

All countries have armies, but in Pakistan the army has a country. Defense expenditures consume between one third and one-half of the national budget. In recent decades, senior military officers have been transformed into powerful landlords through grants of choice agricultural lands and real estate. Retired officers head many, if not most, public corporations. This garrison economy is increasingly unsustainable, as Pakistan’s poor multiply and the economy falters.

Part of the army’s wealth is from the extremely high defense budget that Pakistan has maintained for decades, at the expense of all other expenditure and all other groups in Pakistan. The excuse for the high defense expenditure has been the external threat from India, but the army ensures great personal wealth for its serving and retired personnel especially those of the higher ranks, and those seen as cooperative people who toe the line.

The News International, Pakistan reported on Sunday September 09, 2001:


As a % of GDP, from among the poorest of countries

Pakistan, at 4.4% of GDP, spends the highest on defense.

Shaheen Sehbai wrote in the Weekly Independent in 2002 (95),

For decades almost 35 to 40 per cent of Pakistan’s revenues have been going into un-audited and no questions- asked defence budget.

For this report and other reports on the activities of the Pakistani army, Shaheen Sehbai, former editor of the English language daily the News was threatened by the army and forced to flee Pakistan and live in exile (96).

The high defence budget is not the only source of income for the luxury loving Pakistani army. It also controls a huge business empire. In her study of the Pakistan military’s economic activities, security analyst Dr. Ayesha- Siddiqa Agha describes why the businesses were started in the first place (90).


military’s business empire in Pakistan was created to guarantee welfare of retired and serving personnel. It

was a pattern inherited from the pre-independence days.

The Pakistani army’s business enterprises were started for the welfare of retired personnel. Initially only the army had its businesses, with a small quota for the Air Force and Navy. Later these two branches started off their own businesses, and the vast enterprise has grown to gargantuan proportions. They are not necessarily profitable, but they survive on government subsidies and grants; competition is scared off by military threats, and the senior employees make fat salary packets, safe from accountability and questions.

The four key armed-forces run business organizations in Pakistan are The Fauji Foundation, the Army Welfare Trust, the Shaheen Foundation and the Bahria Foundation.

The Fauji Foundation’s businesses include sugar mills, cereal and corn, Natural gas, plastics, fertilizer, cement, power and education and healthcare. The Fauji foundation’s assets have grown from Pakistani Rs. 152 million in 1970, to 9,800 million according to Dr. Siddiqa-Agha, and employs 6 to 7 thousand military personnel, mostly in middle and upper management positions.

The Army Welfare Trust has 26 projects including farms, stud farms, fish farms, rice and sugar mills, cement factories, pharmaceuticals, shoes, wool, hosiery, travel agencies, aviation, commercial complexes, banking, insurance and security with many bearing the name Aksari. Aksari aviation was set up merely to accommodate retired army helicopter pilots who could not get a job in the private sector.

Not to be outdone, the Pakistan air force established the Shaheen foundation which is now involved in air transportation, cargo, airport services, pay TV, FM radio, insurance, knitwear and commercial complexes.

That left Pakistan’s smallest force, the navy, to start its own venture, the Bahria Foundation in 1981. The Bahria Foundation deals in commercial complexes, trading, construction, a travel agency, paints, deep sea fishing, dredging, ship breaking, salvage and even a university.

There is no nation in the world whose armed forces are involved in as many non-military business ventures as the Pakistan armed forces. Banking, insurance, commercial complexes and radio stations are ventures that do not obviously appear to be an essential part of the armed forces of any nation and would not be justifiable in any other nation on earth. But they are normal and routine for the Pakistani armed forces. Like a core business that has diversified, the Pakistani armed forces have diversified into fields well outside the mandate of an armed force.

Dr. Farrukh Saleem, a freelance Pakistani columnist wrote in the Pakistani daily Jang (97):

Fauji Cereal has been part of my daily breakfast for as long as I can remember. The only wrapping that Fauji Cereal ever uses comes from Fauji Poly Propylene Products. During my days at the village, milk use to come from the nearby Okara Military Farms, the 17,000-acre dairy, meat and grain-producing project. The only sugar that I ever liked was either from the four Fauji Sugar Mills or Army Welfare Sugar Mills. Not too long ago, my wife wanted to build a house. I didn’t want to be anywhere but in one of the six Askari Housing Schemes. The only cement I will use is Fauji Cement. I wish I was right next to Fauji Kabirwala Power Company because I hate the power that Wapda comes out with. The paint for my house must come from no one but Bahria Paints. Fauji also owns and operates Fauji Corn Complex, FONGAS, Fauji Fertilizer Company, Fauji Jordan Company, Fauji Oil Terminal Company Project and Mari Gas Company.

The army also operates what is called the National Logistic Cell (NLC) which is a trucking and transportation giant in Pakistan, employing thousands of serving and retired army personnel. The web page of the NLC describes its army connection euphemistically…

discipline. (98)

With the military in government, and the defence ministry manned by retired military officers, the military run businesses of Pakistan are above all accountability.

In her study of the Army’s businesses, Dr. Ayesha Siddiqa-Agha makes a scathing indictment (90):

The top management of the armed forces jealously guard their interests. Over the years the interests have

narrowed down from the greater benefit of the institution to the personal welfare of the generals. A feature peculiar

to a number of cases is, the ventures were started not based on any feasibility study but on the whims of the top

management to accommodate certain high ranking officers.

The businesses run by the Pakistani armed forces are marked by inefficiency, corruption and self-interest, and are preserved by intimidation that scares away competitors or people who try to question their activities. Corruption in running these businesses has been noted by Siddiqa-Agha and others (96):

“When you dig into them, you find out they are inefficient, and there is evidence of corruption,” Siddiqa-Agha said. “There is also evidence of corruption linked to monopolization of government contracts.

In another report in August 2002, the South Asia Tribune reported (99):

a list of over 100 armed forces men who allotted to themselves at least 400 or more acres of prime land in

Bahawalpur, heart of Punjab, “to defend it from the enemy,” at the throw away rate of Rs 380 per acre (US Dollars

Six & 50 cents). The list is only of one District. Such lists exist all over Punjab and Sindh where a new breed of

landlords has already been created through similar allotments

explains why no serious effort has been made by the military to introduce land reforms in the country, which could cure many political and social imbalances in the Pakistani society.


conversion of generals into landlords also

An online report in the Crescent International revealed a list of Pakistani billionaires and millionaires with accounts

in Swiss banks. Nearly half the billionaires were from the army or close relatives of senior army personnel.

With this degree of money, wealth and power, the Pakistan army’s main problem shifts away from the defense of Pakistan to the defense of their own wealth and power. Which wealthy army general living in the lap of luxury would want to give up his good life for the hardship and travails of war? Besides, the risk to this life is not so much from an attack by India, but by anger and opposition to the corrupt and wealthy army from the desperately poor people of Pakistan, a staggering 85% of whom live on less than US $2 per day (100).

Increasingly under pressure within Pakistan for their greed the Pakistani army has used Islam and the external

threat from India to retain their power and wealth. The people must be more Islamic, because the sacrifice of jihad

is required to fight India. Poverty and destitution in Pakistan are because India is trying to attack Pakistan and kill

Muslims. This Islamization of Pakistan and the Pakistani army accelerated after the 1971 defeat of the Pakistani army by India in the war of liberation of Bangladesh.

Pakistani journalist Najam Sethi noted in an article in the Friday Times of Pakistan (101):

Since the late 1970s, the Pakistan army has maintained a mutually profitable relationship with Islamic elements in the country. The Islamicists have offered two critical inputs to the military: they have provided armed manpower for the military’s security agendas in the neighborhood, as in Afghanistan since 1979 and in India since 1989. And they have been ever ready to join hands with the military to undermine popularly elected and mainstream civilian governments inimical to the military’s corporate view of Pakistan’s interests in one way or another.

A report in the Washington Times recognized this (102):

The Pakistani army, the center of anti-Indian sentiment, rallied radical Islamic forces to the cause. Pakistan is a poor country, and recruitment to the army benefits the poor who are inclined to Islamic fundamentalism. In fact, the hundreds of Islamic seminaries have become breeding grounds for terrorism and centers for the recruitment of junior officers to the Pakistan army. Thus, the army has become a harbinger for Islamic ideological orientations.

Another report in the Asia Times in 2003 (103) reveals the depth to which the Pakistan army’s fighting forces have become intertwined with Islamic jihadi’s.

The jihadi outfits

war. However, in the course of the 1989 uprising in Kashmir, these jihadis played so vital a role that they outdid the army, so in the 1990s it was decided that they would act as a front-line force in any India-Pakistan war. First-hand observations by this correspondent in Azad Kashmir camps confirm that the jihadi outfits are in fact paramilitary troops. Each unit has a commander who reports to an army officer. Each jihadi commander is given funds and the brief to devise a strategy for his unit’s combat operations. The commanders have lap top computers in which they


was to develop a paramilitary force that would assist the Pakistan army in the event of


store their data, from which they generate summaries of their operations for their military officers.

The Pakistan army has, over the course of the last few decades, subcontracted its fighting to the jihadis. Former Indian Intelligence analyst B. Raman was quoted in the online portal Rediff (104):

Pakistan has two armies

itself, with a total strength of about 200,000.

a regular army of around 500,000. But there is an Army of Islam, so-called by Pakistan

As the Pakistani army generals consolidated their financial and business empires, they gradually subcontracted the actual fighting to Islamist irregular forces. During the Kargil conflict of 1999, Pakistan refused to admit that any of their forces were involved in the fighting, saying that Kashmiri mujahideen were doing the fighting. But as Pakistani soldiers bodies began appearing in Pakistan the truth leaked out. Pakistani troops withdrew in the face of defeat, but not before the Pakistani Northern Light Infantry was virtually wiped out. The latter fact was confirmed in an interview with deposed Former Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in an interview at his place of exile in Saudi Arabia (105).

Finally, information regarding the Pakistani army would be incomplete without mention of the criminal activities and genocide that they have been involved in:

G. Parthasarathy, former Indian High Commissioner to Pakistan wrote (106):

The Pakistan army is today the largest investor in the Karachi Stock Exchange, controls the largest network of elite public schools, owns the largest construction company and the largest transportation company the National Logistics Cell— that has the dubious distinction of not only transporting weapons for the ISI and the CIA, but also heroin from Peshawar for export from Karachi.

In another article, Parthasarathy outlines the role of the Pakistani army in genocides and the killing of its own people (107):

The Pakistan army has killed more of its own citizens in the past three decades than any other armed force, except the Khmer Rouge led by the genocidal Pol Pot. Documented evidence of the numbers of Pakistani citizens killed following the carnage by the Pakistan army in Bangladesh (1971), Baluchistan (1972-1974), rural Sind (1983 onwards) and the urban centres of Sind against the MQM (in the 1990s), confirms this fact.

In conclusion, it may be said that the Pakistani army retained a great degree of respect among the people of Pakistan from the time of independence. Based on this the army repeatedly took power in Pakistan with the promise of setting things right, promising to bring back democracy and to fight and defeat the number one enemy, India. But the army did none of these things. It started unwinnable wars, and built up a huge business empire for its senior officers and sycophants while the actual fighting was given over to jehadis fired up with Islamic zeal. This Islamic zeal has gradually entered the ranks of the Pakistani army. A large number of men in the lower ranks of the Pakistani army now have fundamentalist Islamic leanings, and these lower ranks will be senior officers with the passage of time. In late 2003, Indian Intelligence analyst B. Raman was quoted in a report (108):


or three of the 10 corps commanders are seen as Islamicists. B. Raman, RAW’s former Pakistan expert, says

only one of the 30 officers of lieutenant-general rank and above is definitely a jehadi.

The Pakistani army has set itself on the course of a serious split. On the one hand are the rich and corrupt generals, with their businesses and lands. On the other hand are the Islamists, who are indoctrinated on the exclusivity and superiority of their brand of religion. In short the Pakistani army has people who are serving two masters, the army commanders on the one hand and Allah on the other. One of these masters will lose out, and it is unlikely that the followers of God as the supreme army commander will give up without a fight. With the Pakistani army being the only viable institution that seems to be represented almost all over Pakistan, it is difficult to imagine what could be in store for Pakistan other than serious instability when differences begin to show up between the Islamists and the corrupt mafia of the Pakistani army.



It is beyond the scope of this book to enter into a detailed military discussion of the wars that Pakistan has fought with India. Much has been written on this subject and many references are available, including some excellent online references complete with photographs, documents and video clips on the Internet (109, 110, 111).

But a brief description of the background and outcome of the wars that have been fought give an insight into how Pakistani leaders have viewed the world around them and their relationship with India.

The 1947-48 war:

The first conflict started in 1947, shortly after independence and the formation of Pakistan. The exact circumstances under which this war started is generally lost in a maze of rhetoric, myth and misinformation, and needs to be described.

Demographer PH Reddy pointed out in an article in the newspaper The Deccan Herald on January 25th 2002 that the basis of division of British India into India and Pakistan was Sir Cyril Radciffe’s Boundary Commission which had been tasked with demarcating the districts in India that had a Muslim majority of more than 75% which were to be allotted to Pakistan. The commission found 76 out of 435 districts with such a majority, in two clusters that were to form West and East Pakistan. It is interesting to note that, Kashmir was not one of them.

Pre-independence India (British India) consisted of present day India, Pakistan and Bangladesh. Within this area were also about 600 states that were not directly ruled by Britain, but were Princely States with kings or rulers of their own. When it was decided that British India was to be split up into India and Pakistan and given independence, the 600 Princely States were given the option of joining either India or Pakistan by signing a document called the Instrument of Accession. The Instrument of Accession was a legal document saying that a state ruled by a Prince or King had acceded - or agreed to join India or Pakistan.

The dominion of Kashmir was one such Princely State that was ruled by a King (Maharaja Hari Singh) who had to make the decision of joining India or Pakistan. This King had not made up his mind about signing the Instrument of Accession at the time of Indian independence on 15th August 1947. He was hoping to retain his kingdom, and he therefore requested both India and Pakistan to sign a treaty called a standstill agreement to maintain supplies and postal services to his landlocked state while he made up his mind. India wanted to formalize this agreement with a representative of the King. Pakistani leaders suspected that this was a ploy by India to make the Maharaja of Kashmir accede to India, and hastily commenced an invasion of Kashmir to take over the Kingdom before the Maharaja made up his mind (112).

In a tradition that was to be repeated in 1965 and 1999, the Pakistani army sent in irregular non-army forces as well as army personnel in civilian attire at the forefront of the invasion of Kashmir. Faced with this invasion from Pakistan, the Maharaja of Kashmir signed the instrument of accession to India and requested assistance from the Indian Armed forces in protecting his people who were being subjected to rape and pillage by the invading Pakistani forces.

The letter of accession to India written by the Maharaja of Kashmir (113) is as chilling as it is telling. The entire text of the letter is reproduced in Appendix 1, but an excerpt follows:

The Dominion of India desired further discussion with representatives of my Government

standstill agreement with the Pakistan Government, the Government permitted a steady and increasing strangulation of supplies like food, salt and petrol to my State.

Though we have got a

Afridis, soldiers in plain clothes, and desperadoes with modern weapons have been allowed to infiltrate into the


power house, which supplies electric current to the whole of Srinagar and which has been burnt. The number of

women who have been kidnapped and raped makes my heart bleed. The wild forces thus let loose on the State are

marching on with the aim of capturing Srinagar

the knowledge of the Provincial Government of the North-West Frontier Province and the Government of Pakistan.


has become difficult to stop the wanton destruction of life and property and the looting of the Mahura

armed with up-to-date weapons, cannot possibly be done without

After the accession of Jammu and Kashmir to India, the Indian armed forces started their process of evicting the invading Pakistani marauders in a war that continued till an official UN sponsored cease fire was declared in 1949, at a time when Pakistani forces still occupied about one third of Kashmir in the North West.


The United Nations resolution on Kashmir (Appendix 2) called for a withdrawal of military forces within five months from the date of the resolution, 14th March 1950, after which a plebiscite, (meaning a vote, or a referendum) could be held to poll the people of the state of Kashmir on the issue.

History has shown that Pakistani forces have not withdrawn from the portions of Kashmir that they occupied even 600 months, or 50 years after the UN resolution was passed. In the meantime, a portion of Kashmir that Pakistani forces occupied was gifted away to China it appears that no plebiscite of the people of Kashmir was required for giving away a part of the state to China.

Pakistan’s failure to get Kashmir on their terms, and the failure to bend the terms of the now defunct UN resolution to suit Pakistan has been the basis for all further attempts by Pakistan to take Kashmir by force, deception, subversion or diplomacy.

The Pakistan-India war of 1965:

The early 1960s were great years for Pakistan. Under military rule, Pakistan allied itself with the United States of America in the cold war against the Soviet Union. The US in the 1960s had just emerged from the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, when Soviet nuclear missiles were placed in Cuba right under the nose of the US. The US was also fighting communist forces in Vietnam, and communism was considered the most serious threat by the US. Any ally was welcomed as long as he declared that he was opposed to communism.

Pakistan’s alliance with the US allowed a great deal of aid money to flow into Pakistan, as well as the most sophisticated arms that were available. These included state-of-the-art supersonic F-104 Starfighter aircraft, armed with Sidewinder air to air missiles. Pakistan could do no wrong, and was lauded as a progressive leader among developing nations. The economy was booming, held afloat by aid dollars.

India on the other hand was smarting from a military defeat in the hands of the Chinese in the 1962 war, after having naively trusted China to do good. Indian forces in 1962 fought valiantly but valor is no substitute for planning and equipment in a war that the Indian Army had not been given the funds or strategy to prepare for.

Pakistan’s military leader felt that the 1960s offered him a chance to invade and take over Kashmir from India. In the heady 1960s, Pakistanis, starting from their military supremo Ayub Khan, genuinely believed that one Pakistani soldier equals six Indian soldiers (68), and that the Muslims of India were waiting to rise up in revolt and join Pakistan. Pakistani leaders were wrong on both counts. Columnist Hamid Hussain quotes from a letter written by Ayub Khan, the military dictator of Pakistan (58):

General Ayub Khan in his letter to C-in-C General Muhammad Musa stated, as a general rule Hindu morale would not stand more than a couple of hard blows delivered at the right time and place.

Through August 1965 Pakistani forces in civilian clothes were infiltrated into Kashmir as part of Operation Gibralter (sic). The plan was to conduct acts of sabotage and create mayhem after which a radio broadcast was to be made saying that Kashmir had been taken over by revolutionary liberation forces, who would ask for international assistance, mainly from Pakistan, against India. In the event, the infiltration of Pakistani forces was not welcomed with the pro-Pakistan rebellion of Indians in Kashmir that the Pakistanis had expected. The planned broadcast did not take place, though leaflets were distributed.

At this stage, on September 1st 1965 Pakistan launched Operation Grand Slam, a massive armor attack on India, beating back Indian defences. The attackers were planning to take the town of Akhnoor, en route to the taking of Srinagar, the capital of Jammu and Kashmir. In order to relieve the intense Pakistani pressure in Kashmir, India opened a second front by attacking Pakistan across the border in Punjab, and advancing toward the Pakistani city of Lahore.

By the time a cease fire was declared on 23rd September 1965, Gen. Ayub Khan’s plan of annexing Kashmir had been foiled. India ended the war holding about 1,100 square kilometers of Pakistani territory in the Poonch and Lahore regions, with Indian troops occupying the Pakistani town of Barki in the Lahore sector. Pakistan occupied about 490 square kilometers of Indian territory in the Akhnoor region. The cease fire was formalized with the Tashkent declaration of January 10th 1966 (Appendix 3)

The 1971 war of liberation of Bangladesh:

The 1971 war was one of the most shameful episodes in the history of Pakistan. At the time of writing of this, the instability that Pakistan displays more than three decades after the 1971 war is indicative of the deeply dysfunctional internal forces that have kept Pakistan in turmoil since then.

The lessons and punishment suffered by Pakistan should really have been an eye-opener for any responsible and patriotic forces in Pakistan, but no such awakening has occurred. Pakistan appears to be repeating the same mistakes again and again.


West Pakistanis always considered their East Pakistani Bengali compatriots as somehow inferior and weak. But East Pakistan had a population greater than that of West Pakistan, which meant that true democracy in Pakistan could pave the way for an East Pakistani Bengali to become leader of Pakistan. That was unacceptable to the ruling elite of West Pakistan as well as the Pakistani army. Elections were somehow postponed or avoided until 1971, when General Yahya Khan, the incumbent military dictator of Pakistan allowed an election to be held, gambling that no party would get an overall majority.

He was wrong. An East Pakistani party, the Awami league, headed by Sheikh Mujibur Rehman won a landslide victory and should have formed the government of all of Pakistan, East and West. The Pakistani army could not countenance this, and martial law was clamped in East Pakistan, followed by a genocide of East Pakistani Bengalis. This was the beginning of the Pakistani army’s darkest and most shameful phase to date. The killing of Bengalis, who were all Muslims and fellow Pakistanis was shocking and brutal.

One description, by Prof. Rafiqul Islam of Dhaka University reads(114):

Just after midnight on the night of 25th March, the Pakistani Army began their attack on the Student Halls and Staff

Quarters of the University

attack from near the pond in front and the police barracks behind it

and barbarity that was perpetrated on the Dhaka University area, especially Iqbal Hall, Jagannath Hall, and adjoining residential areas, for a period of 36 hours from the night of the 25th till the 26th night. What transpired around Iqbal Hall, I saw with my own eyes. Raging infernos everywhere; the slum was burning, the cars parked around the residences were burning. The heaped bodies of the dead from the slum were also set on fire near the Nilkhet rail gate petrol pump. The sound of shells bursting and guns firing, the smoke and fire, the smell of gun- powder and the stench of the burning corpses all transformed the area into a fiery hell.


after midnight Iqbal Hall came under a barrage of heavy mortar and machine-gun


don’t have the words to express the bestiality

The genocide by the Pakistani army in East Pakistan was the worst seen after the holocaust of Jews by the Nazis

in the second World War. One online source (115) has a collection of references to this and the descriptions are


R.J. Rummel likewise writes that “the Pakistan army [sought] out those especially likely to join the resistance— young boys. Sweeps were conducted of young men who were never seen again. Bodies of youths would be found

in fields, floating down rivers, or near army camps.

Bangladesh is a nation criss-crossed by rivers, and the Pakistan army tended to line up men along river-banks at night and shoot them, allowing their bodies to float down-river (115)

They were in batches of six or eight, and in the light of a powerful electric arc lamp, they were easy targets, black against the silvery water. The executioners stood on the pier, shooting down at the compact bunches of prisoners wading in the water. There were screams in the hot night air, and then silence. The prisoners fell on their sides and their bodies lapped against the shore. Then a new bunch of prisoners was brought out, and the process was repeated. In the morning the village boatmen hauled the bodies into midstream and the ropes binding the bodies were cut so that each body drifted separately downstream. (Payne, Massacre [Macmillan, 1973], p. 55.)

Descriptions of rape and killing of Hindus abound and over over 3 million people were killed over a 267 day period an average of one murder committed every 8 seconds by Pakistani army personnel for nearly 9 months.

The killings in East Pakistan led to a massive influx of refugees into India. More than 10 million people were accommodated in refugee camps in India, putting a great strain on resources, while Bengali resistance fighters sought Indian help. Unable to stand by and watch the horrific events in East Pakistan, the Indian Prime Minister Mrs. Indira Gandhi ordered the Indian Armed forces into East Pakistan on the humanitarian mission of stopping the killing. A two-front war broke out when the Pakistani Air Force commenced hostilities in the West with air raids on Indian targets on December 3rd 1971. In a whirlwind war the Indian armed forces overran East Pakistan, comprehensively defeating the Pakistani army, taking 93,000 prisoners of war. At the end of this action, the new nation of Bangladesh was born out of the ravaged remains of East Pakistan. The army of the martial races of Pakistan had capitulated and surrendered a nation of 144,000 square kilometers along with 93,000 of its men in a mere 16 days.

Military historian Brig. Shelford Bidwell summarized the military action as follows (48):

A close study of this campaign will edify military students for a long time to come. Bengal, now Bangladesh (literally

Land of Bengal), is an eminently defensible country cut up by rivers five miles wide and obstructed by marshes. The Indian plan was a masterly combination of airborne, guerrilla and conventional forces, based on complete mobility and the bypassing of all centres of resistance. The advance was not held up for bridging operations; troops and guns were ferried over the rivers by helicopter, and ‘supply and transport’ was by air, boat, canoe or country cart as suitable. An astonishing momentum was maintained from start to finish - it was a Blitzkrieg without tanks.


The 1999 Kargil conflict:

It was a while before anyone realized that a war had erupted between India and Pakistan in 1999, albeit a war limited in area. For the third time since independence, the Pakistan army had sent soldiers disguised as civilians into Indian territory, and tried to deny any involvement with the conflict.

One of the major disadvantages of a state trying to deny involvement in a war is that neither escalation nor pullout are possible without admitting involvement or conceding that the earlier denial of involvement was a lie in the first place. This ultimately has a great bearing on credibility and international standing. Pakistan seems to have gleaned more shame than honour from this action.

Pakistani soldiers in civilian garb occupied and fortified themselves within Indian territory in the heights of the mountains in the Kargil region of Kashmir. These soldiers were then in an advantageous position to defend their positions and to direct accurate artillery fire to cut off a major Indian highway and Indian army supply route.

While the entry of these Pakistani forces had gone undetected, the war started after their discovery, when Indian forces began the process of evicting the Pakistanis from their positions within India. Using the overwhelming firepower at the disposal of the Indian army and air force, mountain bunkers and supply depots occupied by Pakistani forces were systematically destroyed. Pakistan denied any involvement in the war until coffins of their soldiers started turning up at their hometowns in Pakistan, accompanied by Indian media coverage of captured Pakistani army identity papers and weapons. The war ended when the last few surviving Pakistani soldiers were pulled out in a humiliating retreat that Pakistan conducted under the fig-leaf of American mediation - the retreat being announced after a visit by Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to meet US President Clinton. By the time the last abandoned Pakistani soldiers’ corpses had been buried by the Indian army, Pakistan’s Northern Light Infantry had been all but wiped out in a war that Pakistan denied till the last moment (105).

The Kargil conflict is very difficult to explain from the Pakistani viewpoint. Why did Pakistan do it? And having done it, why was it done so half-heartedly? If they wanted to be involved in the conflict, why did they deny involvement? If they did not want to be identified as being involved, why did they admit to involvement later? What was it that Pakistani leaders hoped would be achieved by this action?

While there are more questions than answers, any answers that fit the known facts suggest a frightening disconnect between perception and reality among the seniormost leaders of Pakistan, and an equally frightening lack of communication and cooperation between the leaders themselves. Small organizations, let alone nations cannot function if leaders display a disconnect between their actions and reality.

What could have been Pakistan’s motive and ultimate objective in sending army troops dressed in mufti to fortify themselves and occupy positions above 15,000 feet high on mountains just within the Indian border? One explanation is that they sought to salami slice into Indian territory by surreptitiously occupying unguarded Indian territory. But did they not expect Indian retaliation when they were discovered? Were they so worried about the possibility of discovery that they refused to allow their men to wear uniforms? But that was futile, since they could not prevent their men from carrying identification papers in their personal effects.

Another theory, the more commonly quoted one, is that the men on the mountains were there to help cut off the Srinagar-Leh highway, after which a Pakistani attack would have isolated and encircled Indian positions in the Siachen glacier region. If that was the case, why was Pakistan so concerned about keeping the identity of its men secret, and pretending not to be involved? Why did the Pakistani military not plan a counter-offensive to blunt or stop India from relentlessly clearing the heights as it did?

The logic defies explanation, and some of the explanations are ludicrous enough to be unbelievable. It has been said that after Pakistan’s nuclear tests in 1998, Pakistani military leaders believed India to be very afraid of Pakistan. Furthermore, it was believed that the morale of the Indian armed forces was at breaking point and that Indian soldiers would be ready to run away from battle at the slightest threat. In the 1965 war, India had taken Pakistani pressure off Kashmir by opening a second front in Punjab. It appears that Pakistani generals believed that India would be afraid to repeat that in 1999 because they feared nuclear retaliation from Pakistan. And within Kashmir it was expected that the Indian army would capitulate and run away.

In February 1999, at about the time when Pakistani army men were secretly taking up their positions in the mountains near Kargil, senior Pakistani General Javid Nasir wrote in the prestigious Pakistani Defence Journal


This statement by a senior Pakistani army general eerily echoes the assessment made by Pakistani dictator Ayub Khan 34 years earlier when he stated that Indian morale would break after a couple of hard blows. As indicated in the description of the Pakistani mind in chapter 5, such assessments are more indicative of the psychological state of the Pakistani army officer, with a self-image amounting to delusions of grandeur rather than objective and rational military judgment. It is interesting to note that the large and powerful army of Pakistan has cultivated a leadership that somehow believes that the Indian military will be a pushover in battle. Such an attitude can be termed as nothing short of suicidal, as events have shown.

After the Kargil conflict, Gen. Ved Prakash Malik, the Indian Chief of Army Staff who oversaw the defeat of Pakistani forces in the Kargil conflict wrote about Gen Javid Nasir’s article and misperception within the Pakistani army’s high command that led them to attempt the Kargil misadventure (117):

This was not only a gross underestimation of a possible adversary but also a poor assessment and misperception. Some other assumptions and misperceptions which led to the Pakistani offensive operation in Kargil were:

1. Nuclear umbrella allows offensive action without risk.

2. International community would intervene or stop the war at an early stage.

3. The coalition government in India, weak and indecisive, will either over-react or under-react.

4. India is militarily weak and unprepared.

5. Indian frustration will lead to escalation, putting the onus of escalation on India.

6. Military operation under the garb of Mujahideen would focus attention on Kashmir and Pakistan would be able to claim this as a victory.

Assumptions regarding enemy weakness and fear can only be termed as high hopes unless they are balanced out by other, less rosy scenarios. But it does not appear that the Pakistani army had planned for anything but easy and cheap victory in Kargil. That is a disquieting thought. If Pakistani Generals persist in thinking of war and easy victories against India, the chance of Pakistan viewing India with any sanity or objectivity can also be dismissed as high hopes.



The word “provinces” calls to the mind the idea of a nation that has been divided into smaller blocks for administrative reasons. Each province is one part that contributes to the whole.

In the case of Pakistan this idea is misleading – Pakistan’s provinces belong to the Pakistani state in name only, with vast swathes of Pakistan falling outside the bounds of any control. Indeed more than half the land area of Pakistan is outside the control of the Pakistan government. Much of this area is sparsely populated, but the peoples in such areas have either declared independence, or are seeking separation from Pakistan. The state of Pakistan can be compared to a shattered cookie within an intact wrapper – each fragment is separate, but held together forcibly by the wrapper. The “wrapper” that holds the Pakistan state together is the Pakistan army, which has regularly massacred people within those provinces in an effort to maintain control.

In 2006 Amnesty International published a report (159) about human rights violations in the tribal areas of Pakistan. An excerpt from the report says:

In “

of the person, to freedom from arbitrary arrest and detention, to freedom from torture, other ill-treatment and enforced disappearance, and to legal remedies and reparations.”

the “war on terror”, Pakistan has violated a wide array of human rights, including the right to life, to the security

Pakistan has four provinces, Punjab, Sindh, Balochistan and the Northwest Frontier Province. The map below depicts the provinces of Pakistan.

Province. The map below depicts the provinces of Pakistan. Punjab, Sindh and the Northwest frontier provinces

Punjab, Sindh and the Northwest frontier provinces (N.W.F.P.) form the “core provinces” of Pakistan. These were the provinces that voted to be part of Pakistan from the outset. These provinces form less than half the land area of Pakistan, but are home to over 80% of Pakistan’s population, which, in the absence of any reliable recent census is estimated to be between 160 and 170 million in 2006.

Punjab is by far the dominant province, with Punjabis comprising over 50% of Pakistan’s total population, and contributing over 60% of the personnel in the Pakistan armed forces. The fact that most of the population and economic activity of Pakistan occurs in these three provinces can be seen in the photograph below, which shows a


map of Pakistan super-imposed on a satellite photograph of the Indian subcontinent at night. Almost all of Pakistan is dark, except for a strip close to the Indian border representing the provinces of Punjab, Sindh and N.W.F.P., which show lights and population activity.

and N.W.F.P., which show lights and population activity. BALOCHISTAN: Balochistan is the largest province of

BALOCHISTAN: Balochistan is the largest province of Pakistan, comprising 42% of the land area, but it has a population of only about 7 million – or just over 4% of Pakistan’s population. Balochistan became part of Pakistan after it was forcibly annexed by the Pakistani army after Pakistan was created in 1947.

Balochistan is rich in natural resources, including natural gas and minerals. The people of Balochistan have long fought for independence of their land from Pakistani rule, and more recently for a fair share of the proceeds from the natural resources being exploited in Baluchistan.

In return, the Pakistan army and successive governments have shown that they want the natural resources more than they want the people of Balochistan. Despite a long struggle the sparse population of Balochistan cannot match the firepower of the Pakstani army. A series of massacres of Balochi tribals have occurred with the use of deadly force, including helicopter gun ships. This has resulted in the death in 2006 of a prominent and respected Balochi leader and a fierce opponent of Pakistani occupation, Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti.

F.A.T.A. The F.A.T.A. – or Federally Administered Tribal Areas is a euphemism for a completely lawless area that does not come under Pakistani control at all. It is a strip of land on the Northwest border of Pakistan with Afghanistan populated by tribes, of whom less than 2% live in urban areas. They do not recognize Pakistan’s border with Afghanistan and the area is home to a thriving arms industry in which clones of almost any type of small arms are made in small workshops (139).

The Pakistan army actually entered the F.A.T.A. for the first time in its history in 2002 on the pretext of helping the US in its war on terror. In 2006 the same army made an ignominious retreat from the area after suffering hundreds of casualties, signing a peace deal with the Taliban who control an area of the F.A.T.A. called Waziristan (see map on page 136). The “peace deal” (160) made by the Pakistani Army with people who are supposed to be Pakistani citizens guarantees that the Pakistani army will never return to Waziristan and a return of confiscated weapons, as well as the payment of reparations for damage. This has been described as a defacto acceptance of an independent “Islamic Emirate of Waziristan” – ruled by the Taliban, in an area that serves as a safe harbor for the Al Qaeda and other assorted Islamist militia personnel.



When it was declared by the US Treasury department that two thirds of all terrorist groups had a link with Pakistan, the statement came as sweet music to the ears Indians who have been fighting terrorism from Pakistan for over a decade (118).

About two-thirds of all designated terrorist groups in the world have a Pakistani connection, according to the U.S. Treasury Department.

The statement was a vindication of long-standing Indian concerns. Since 1989, India had been ploughing a lonely furrow in the diplomatic capitals of the world calling attention to Pakistan’s role in terrorism. The terrorist attacks of September 11th 2001 in the US, in which aircraft were hijacked and crashed into the twin towers of the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in Washington were a wake-up call to the somnolent and blinkered intelligence communities of the West about the deep changes taking place in Pakistan.

A charming tale for children is told in an animated film called “The Sorcerer’s Apprentice” featuring Walt Disney’s

cartoon character Mickey Mouse. The sorcerer (magician) is Mickey himself and has the task of drawing water from

a well to fill a tub. Being too lazy to do the job himself, the sorcerer uses his magic powers to make a broom grow hands and legs to draw water to fill the tub. As Mickey relaxes and falls asleep the Sorcerer’s Apprentice, the magic broom, working tirelessly, transfers enough water to cause a flood and does not stop. A panicky Mickey wakes up and chops the magic broom into small pieces but each piece then becomes a new apprentice that carries water and the flooding starts to get out of control.

Pakistan and jihad are like the story of the Sorcerer’s Apprentice. The Pakistani army tried to use jihad to do it’s work but jihad, and terrorism associated with jihad now has a life of its own and may be getting out of control of the Pakistani army.

Jessica Stern, an expert on terrorism wrote (119):

Pakistani militant groups are killing civilians and engaging in terrorism in Indian-held Kashmir under the guise of holy war. The government in Islamabad supports these militants and their religious schools as cheap ways to fight India and educate Pakistan’s youth. But this policy is creating a culture of violence that exacerbates internal sectarianism and destabilizes the region. Without change, this monster threatens to devour Pakistani society.

Islamic scholars, especially from Pakistan, have repeatedly tried to point out that jihad is not terrorism. It is stated that jihad is an internal struggle and not external violence. But this assertion goes against the facts on the ground. Terrorism and senseless violence are being routinely committed in the name of jihad. In the Pakistani context, terrorism and jihad are one and the same. In his study of jihadi groups in Pakistan, Ehsan Ansari says of jihad


various Islamic groups have been interpreting it to mean ‘holy war’ against everything the perceive as being ‘non


An interview with a leading Pakistani expert on jihad, Arif Jamal, was published by the Asia Times online. Jamal has this to say about jihad (121):

The main objective of jihad even today is to defeat the infidels and establish Islamic states all over the world.

One of the ideological founding fathers of Pakistan, Maulana Maududi, placed a great emphasis on jihad, (120) so Pakistanis are not strangers to the concept of jihad. And with jihad being defined as holy war to defeat infidels,

acts of terrorism are considered normal and par for the course by a large number of Pakistanis. The extent to which the system to promote violent jihad against non-Muslims has spread in Pakistan may be gauged from the following


Terrorism expert Jessica Stern writes (119):

Only about 4,350 of the estimated 40,000 to 50,000 madrasahs in Pakistan have registered with the government Madrasahs are the supply line for jihad

A report from the US council of Foreign Relations said:

than 650,000 students. Pakistani officials estimate that 10 to 15 percent of the madrasas in Pakistan promote extremist ideologies.

The New York Times reported on May 27, 2002:

there are as many as 500,000 members of jihadi - Muslim holy war organizations - in Pakistan, including many thousands committed to the cause of forcing India out of the sector of Kashmir that it controls.

Jihad became a driving force in Pakistan under General Zia ul Haq in the 1980s.

Quoting Jessica Stern (119):

Pakistani dictator General Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq promoted the madrasahs as a way to garner the religious parties’ support for his rule and to recruit troops for the anti-Soviet war in Afghanistan.

This is supported by a report in the Asia Times (122):

The jihadi outfits were in fact a part of the ISI’s operations and the brainchild of late dictator General Zia ul-Haq and General Akhtar Abdul Rehman. The purpose was to develop a para-military force that would assist the Pakistan army in the event of war.

Jihad in Pakistan received a lot of funding from the US and Saudi Arabia. Stern reports that Pakistan received US $ 3.5 billion from these countries in the 1985 to 1989 period. Jihad became an important business in Pakistan, with funds coming in from diverse sources such as Libya, Iraq, Iran and other Gulf states. Along with the money came guns and drugs, mainly heroin, to fund the US backed war against Soviet troops in Afghanistan. With US arms, Saudi funds and Jihad recruits from Pakistan, the Soviet Union was put under sufficient military pressure to withdraw from Afghanistan, paving the way for the Pakistan sponsored Taliban to form a government in Afghanistan.

Tariq Ali wrote in The Independent of the UK (123):

religious fundamentalism is the legacy of a previous military dictator, General Zia-ul-Haq

89), a network of madrassahs (religious boarding schools), funded by the Saudi regime, were created

madrassahs produced a crop of 225,000 fanatics ready to kill and die for their faith when asked to do so by their

religious leaders. Dispatched across the border by the Pakistan Army, they were hurled into battle

creed is an ultra-sectarian strain, inspired by the Wahhabi sect that rules Saudi Arabia

however, have captured Kabul on their own Army

his rule (1977-







Taliban could not,


were armed and commanded by “volunteers” from the Pakistan

For the Pakistani army, control of Afghanistan with its puppet, the Taliban government was a double blessing. The forces of jihad provided a huge supply of trained and experienced soldiers to fight India in a low cost war. The Pakistani army could describe the jihadi-terrorists as freedom fighters and deny any link with them, while Pakistan claimed to provide only moral and diplomatic support to them.

Meanwhile Afghanistan itself was seen by Pakistan as strategic depth - that is, if India ever attacked Pakistan, Pakistani forces and leaders could withdraw into Afghanistan and continue to fight. Afghanistan also served as a safe place to continue to train jihadis to fight Pakistan’s war against India.

RAND, a US based non-profit organization that helps policy and decision making, carried the following passage in

a commentary (124):

Sponsoring militancy in Kashmir is regarded as a relatively cheap and effective way of offsetting existing power

symmetries (essentially through the philosophy of a ‘war of a thousand cuts’) while simultaneously

Pakistan has sufficient strategic depth to undertake a protracted conventional war on the subcontinent, should this ever become necessary.

ensuring that

A report in the New York Times (27th May 2002) describes how the jihadis from Afghanistan were applied against


drawing on the 80,000 fighters whom Pakistan had trained and armed to fight the Soviet forces in


of the Kashmir from India. “We have fought three wars with India and have not won even one of them,” said an

expert on the country’s jihad movements. “The success of the jihadi strategy in Afghanistan compelled the generals

to try it on India, too. The Kashmir jihadis are our cannon fodder because they are willing to die for their cause in a

way that no paid soldiers would.”


military and intelligence services struck upon the idea of employing jihadis to wrest control


And even today as Pakistani jihadis continue to be used as cannon fodder against India, the recruitment has to go on. Jihad is advertised in Pakistan as a career path to follow. Shahid Nadeem wrote in the Daily Times of Pakistan


The moment we left Fortress Abbottabad, it was jehadi territory. Wall chalking after wall chalking advertised jehadi outfits and announced recruitment for jehadi fighters. Just a few kilometers from the Havelian cantonment, there are slogans such as Jehad is the shortest route to Paradise and Contact us for commando Jehadi training. Walls between Havelian and Haripur are full of jehadi slogans and adverts

Pervez Hoodbhoy, a Pakistani scientist and columnist wrote (126):

Islam, Pakistan, Jihad became emblazoned on banners at Pakistani army recruitment centers, created; this was to be an army not just for Pakistan, but for the greater glory of Islam.

A new ethos was

Jihad has been made attractive and financially rewarding. The rewards of waging jihad include the following, among more worldly rewards (127):

The mujahideen were assured of entering Paradise before the first drop of their blood fell to earth. The Holy Scriptures of Islam also say that houris [beautiful virgins of the Koranic Paradise] come down to Earth to take the spirit of the mujahid who is about to die before the first drop of his blood falls to earth. The martyrs are promised 72 houris in Paradise. These houris are more beautiful than all the beauties of the world combined.

There are salary and pension rules in place as well. A RAND report quotes Indian Intelligence estimates of the budget of the Pakistani agency responsible for training and coordinating jihad-terrorist action in India the so called Inter Services Intelligence or I.S.I. (124):

annual ISI expenditure to the main militant organisations runs to between US$125 and $250 million a year. These funds are used to cover salaries for fighters (which run from 5,000 to 10,000 rupees a month), support to next of kin, cash incentives for high-risk operations and retainers for guides, porters and informers.

Appendix 4 reproduces an article carried in the online paper Mid-Day listing details of incentives and salaries offered to terrorists from Pakistan. The article is revealing in the extent to which Pakistan has been organizing and funding terrorists who have long been said to receive only moral and diplomatic support from Pakistan.

With jihad and terrorism being Pakistan’s main industry, the effect on India has been murderous.

A paper published by the South Asia Analysis Group (SAAG) carries examples of newspaper headlines resulting from terrorist acts sponsored by Pakistan in India (128). A few samples are quoted below:

“Suspected Islamic militants axed to death six members of a shepherd’s family overnight. The attackers killed four women and two children, the officer said.”

“Militants slit the throats of two women, shot dead another person and set off two explosions damaging a bridge “

“Terrorists have slit the throats of two of the four policemen abducted after the attack on a police post in Udhampur on Sunday.

Statistics of deaths of Indians in Kashmir show that over 17,000 civilians have been killed by Pakistani trained terrorists in Jammu and Kashmir from 1990 to 2003.

Over the same period Indian security forces have intercepted and killed 17,000 terrorists who were found committing acts of terrorism or infiltrating into India from Pakistan, along with the staggering recovery of over 27,000 assault rifles and machine guns, and over 59,000 hand grenades, 6 million rounds of ammunition and 34,000 kilograms of explosives (129).

The US army discovered in Vietnam that groups of armed men carrying machine guns and explosives, hiding in jungles in mountainous regions cannot be fought with tanks and attack aircraft. Men have to be met by men in deadly face to face encounters at the end of long vigils or cordon and search operations. The US in Vietnam had the luxury of being able to withdraw from Vietnam, but Indians do not have the option of withdrawing from their own land. Terrorism, with hundreds of thousands of jihadis entering from Pakistan required a robust response, and India met the threat by building a powerful counter-insurgency apparatus, and by starting to fence the India-Pakistan boundary where possible.


As the Indian strategy proved effective, jihadis started getting eliminated in increasing numbers, and the average life-span of a jihadi-terrorist entering India from Pakistan was reduced to weeks or months rather than years (130). One Indian army major is quoted in an interview as saying (131):

Once somebody picks up the gun then his family knows that it is only a matter of days before they hear that he has been killed in an encounter. We put the average lifespan of a terrorist at two-and-half years. Within this period we are bound to eliminate him.

This seems to have had a significant effect on the morale of Pakistan’s army backed jihadi-terrorist apparatus, because the Pakistani government started protesting against the presence of large numbers of Indian counterinsurgency personnel within India, and diplomatic protests grew shriller as Indian security forces chalked up success after success.

In many areas, terrorists from Pakistan were unable to enter India at all or were able to infiltrate through in the smallest numbers. A backlog of violent, trained and indoctrinated terrorists built up in Pakistan, and gradually, these terrorists began to target other nations of the world.

Once again, the only country that tried to alert the world about the global terrorist threat emanating from Pakistan’s jihad factory was India, but Indian information fell on deaf ears, until the September 11th 2001 terrorist attacks on the US. That woke up the intelligence communities of the world with a jolt. Since then terrorist links leading back to Pakistan have been found in countries like Burma, Nepal, Chechnya, Bangladesh, Afghanistan, Yemen, Mongolia, Kuwait, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Russia, Turkey, Latvia, Australia, UK, Canada, Indonesia and the Philippines. (119,132). A detailed study exists in an online portal of the evidence of Pakistani links to terrorism against the US, including links to the September 11th attacks (133).

Pakistan has now become the home base of global terrorism. Terrorism Central would not be an inappropriate name for Pakistan, and it is by no means certain that anybody in Pakistan can control the forces that have been unleashed. The Sorcerer’s Apprentice is out of control. The entire world, and Pakistan itself is being targeted by the Islamist groups spawned and nurtured by the Pakistani army and its intelligence cell, the I.S.I.

In an article on Pakistan-sponsored terrorism, the magazine India Today, referring to the L-e-T (Lashkar-e-Tayeba), a powerful and deadly Pakistan based jihad group, had this to say in its December 2003 edition (132):

There is a terrible price to pay for this facilitation because the same forces that drive jehad in Jammu and Kashmir

drive it in other lands too

dangerous. Not only would they become too large for the ISI to manage but also their strong links with the underworld would create a sort of double whammy.


authorities reckon that groups like the LeT could, in time, become more

This view is echoed by one of India’s premier anti145 terrorism experts, K.P.S. Gill, who warned (134):

There is now mounting evidence of a loss of control as these autonomous religious groups challenge, not only their Army and ISI handlers, but the Government itself.

In an indication of increasing international understanding of how jihad threatens to eat up Pakistan, a report carried by RAND said (124):

it is no longer apparent that the army or ISI exercise complete control over the proxies they have helped to create, some of which are now openly talking about fomenting a fundamentalist revolution in Pakistan itself.

In December 2003, General Pervez Musharraf, President of Pakistan survived two attempts to assassinate him that occurred within days of each other (135, 136). The fact that the route of the motorcade he was travelling in was known to the people who wanted to kill him suggests that someone close to General Musharraf was involved in these attempts. In an interview quoted in the BBC (137), Musharraf blamed the Al Quaeda for attempting to assassinate him. Other reports too have pointed to Islamist forces within Pakistan as being responsible for wanting to replace General Musharraf. Although the first of the two assassination attempts was thought to have been stage managed by Musharraf’s supporters to win greater sympathy for him (138), the second one, a suicide bombing involving multiple bomb laden trucks was a very real indicator of the sort of forces that exist in Pakistan today.

These forces will not be easy to eliminate. Apart from multiple Islamist groups, Pakistan is awash with weapons. There are an estimated 18 million illegal firearms in Pakistan, in addition to 2 million registered ones (139).

Pakistan is home to a Kalashnikov culture with hundreds of firearm manufacturing workshops making weapons, including inexpensive clones of the Kalashnikov AK-47 assault rifle, a reliable weapon of choice for terrorists, being able to spray a high volume of fire at targets. In a coherently functioning nation-state, the government retains coercive power. That means that the government, (the army, in Pakistan’s case) retains the armed power to suppress and control all other groups. But that monopoly over coercive power may have slipped out of the hands of the Pakistani army, into the hands of Islamic fundamentalists in Pakistan.



There is probably no government in the world which does not have one or more people in power who are either themselves criminals or have links to criminals. However, successive Pakistani governments and the army have been unique in actively supporting and participating in international criminal activity as an integral component of the Pakistani economy and foreign policy.

Heroin smuggling and Narco terrorism:

Heroin is a drug that is a derivative of the medically used pain-killer morphine. It is obtained from the Opium Poppy plant. Although heroin itself has medicinal value as a potent pain-killer, it is extremely addictive when administered to normal people. People are said to crave for the drug after experiencing its effects just once. In most countries of the world, heroin is illegal to manufacture or possess because of its dangerous potential to cause addiction. Heroin addicts become so physically dependent on the drug, and crave the drug so much that they are willing to pay very high prices to obtain it, making heroin the star compound of the illegal drug trade.

In October 1994, US Senator Frank Pallone brought to the attention of the US house of representatives a news report in the Washington Post (140): Mr Pallone said:

Mr. Speaker, I rise to bring to the attention of my colleagues a report that appeared in the Washington Post of September 12, 1994, which describes a disturbing link between narcotics and terrorism. The report from Karachi, Pakistan, headlined ‘Heroin Plan by Top Pakistanis Alleged’ quotes Pakistan’s former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif saying that ‘drug deals were to pay for covert operations’ brings to mind other reports not so long ago of Pakistani involvement in using the Bank of Credit and Commerce International [BCCI] to launder drug money that was eventually believed to have been used in financing terrorist groups involved in the New York World Trade Center bombing. The report cites Pakistan’s army chief and head of intelligence agency proposing to then-Prime Minister Sharif ‘a detailed blueprint for selling heroin to pay for the country’s covert military operations in early 1991.

The news report said that three months after Nawaz Sharif became Prime Minister of Pakistan he was approached by the Pakistan army chief of staff, Gen. Aslam Beg and Gen. Asad Durrani, the head of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) with the blueprint for a plan to export heroin to raise money for the Pakistan army’s covert foreign operations a euphemism for Pakistan sponsored terrorism in the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir. Indian analyst, B. Raman writes (141) that money earned through Pakistan’s heroin trade was used to fund Pakistan’s arms purchases, including missiles from North Korea, submarines from France and components for Pakistan’s covert nuclear program. During the late years of Gen. Zia ul Haq’s rule and in the early years of Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, a special cell was set up by Pakistan’s ISI for the use of heroin for covert action, under one Brigadier Imtiaz.

Raman writes:

Pakistan’s illegal heroin economy has kept its legitimate State economy sustained since 1990 and prevented its collapse. It has also enabled it to maintain a high level of arms purchases from abroad and to finance its proxy war against India through the jehadi organisations.

The Indian army’s 15th Corps, which is in the thick of action against terrorists from Pakistan has this to say in an article on Narco-Terrorism on its website (142):

Both the Pakistan Army and the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) agency are known to be extensively involved in narcotics trade. The primary reason for indulging in narcotics trade by these two premier institutions of Pakistan is the need for money to finance covert foreign operations, which the otherwise cash strapped economy of Pak could ill afford to pay for. The nexus between Pak ISI and Pak Army with the drug mafia is a well documented and established fact. Pak trucks are used by the drug mafia for narcotics smuggling. Even during the Afghan crisis Pak trucks and National Logistic Cell (NLC) vehicles transporting arms to Afghan Mujahideen were used for shipping large consignments of drugs from the drug producing areas to Karachi, Islamabad, Rawalpindi and other such city centres, where the drugs were processed, packaged and dispatched towards their destination.

In a one and a half year period from January 1997 to May 1998, the Indian army captured from Pakistani infiltrators about 19 Kilograms of Heroin with a street value of US $ 5 million. Also recovered was 60 Kilograms of Charas - a drug derived from Cannabis (Ganja).


Nuclear Proliferation:

Nuclear weapons, also known as atomic bombs are extremely destructive. They have been used only twice in August 1945 when the Unites States dropped a bomb on each of the Japanese cities Hiroshima and Nagasaki. A single bomb reduced each city to rubble, killing hundreds of thousands of people, causing Japan to surrender within days. That brought the second World War to an end. The destructive potential of nuclear weapons made them attractive to nations as a deterrent - a weapon of terrifying power to scare a potential attacker from waging war for fear of being hit by nuclear weapons. And because of their destructive potential, the technology for manufacturing nuclear weapons remained a closely guarded secret, available to only a handful of nations in the world.

As described in chapter 4, Abdul Qadeer Khan, a Pakistani metallurgist stole the blueprints for making Uranium enrichment centrifuges from a Dutch concern called URENCO that he worked for. Enrichment of Uranium is one of the first steps in making one type of nuclear bomb. Upon his return to Pakistan, Khan was encouraged and funded by the Prime Minister of Pakistan at the time, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto to set up facilities to enrich Uranium manufacture nuclear bombs. Abdul Qadeer Khan became a hero and achieved cult status in Pakistan as the father of Pakistan’s Islamic bomb

In late 2003 and early 2004, it became clear that Pakistani nuclear technology to enrich Uranium had been supplied to North Korea, Libya and Iran, along with actual blueprints of nuclear bomb designs in order to help these nations manufacture atomic bombs. Centrifuges made from the very designs Qadeer Khan had stolen from URENCO were found in Iran, and these centrifuges had radioactive contaminants that unmistakably bore the signature of a Pakistani source. Shipments of centrifuge components to North Korea and Libya were intercepted. Pakistan had obtained funds from Libya in exchange for this technology and North Korea paid for the technology by supplying Pakistan with ballistic missiles capable of carrying nuclear weapons (143).

In early 2004 the world was witness to an incredible drama on Pakistan television in which Abdul Qadeer Khan made a public confession of having sold nuclear weapons technology to other nations entirely on his own, with no knowledge of the Pakistani army or government. This confession was followed by a prompt presidential pardon for Dr. Khan by President and army chief Gen. Musharraf. It would be naive to imagine that successive Pakistani governments and the military were unaware of Khan’s activities.

An article in the online edition of the L.A. Times said (143):

U.S. officials, nuclear experts and a former prime minister of Pakistan expressed doubts Monday about how Khan and a handful of associates could have circumvented the extraordinary controls on the country’s nuclear technology without the military’s blessings.

Benazir Bhutto, who served twice as prime minister before going into exile in the face of corruption charges, said she doubted that the transfers could have taken place without the knowledge of senior military officials.

“It is difficult to accept that the scientists could have violated government policy on their own,” she told the Los Angeles Times. “Those who violated the policy are now hiding behind the scientists.”

On February 4th 2004, the New York Times reported (144):

experts inside and outside the government say it is difficult to believe that Pakistan’s nuclear secrets could have been exported without the knowledge of some in the military and the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence agency, especially since some shipments were made on Pakistani military aircraft.

Four days later, the New York Times carried a report in which it was said (145):

Few of Mr. Bush’s aides believe Pakistan’s story that Dr. Khan operated alone. He has the deepest ties to the military, which oversaw the Khan Research Laboratories, and supplied it with a cargo fleet. Pakistan got missiles from North Korea, investigators believe, in return for uranium enrichment technology. Clearly, the Pakistani government must have known something about how its new missile fleet materialized.

It is virtually certain that the televised drama of Qadeer Khan absolving the army of all responsibility for proliferation while taking all the blame, only to be pardoned by the army is in keeping with the Pakistan army’s time honoured tradition of protecting its self interest and attempting to appear farcically squeaky-clean in the face of contrary evidence.

Airliner hijacking:

The most blatant case of an airliner hijacked with Pakistani army and government complicity is the shameful episode of Indian Airlines Flight number IC 814 that was hijacked in December 2000 by five Pakistani nationals


who boarded the flight in Kathmandu in Nepal. If it had not been for the murder that the hijackers committed and their success in achieving their aim of securing the release of jailed terrorists in India terrorists who were later to enter Pakistan and mastermind further murders and play a role in the suicide attacks of September 11th 2001 in New York, this whole hijacking story could have come out of a B-grade semi-comic motion picture.

The five hijackers actually received their weapons in a diplomatic bag checked in by Pakistani First Secretary in Nepal, Mohammad Arshad Cheema (146). The hijacked aircraft was flown to the UAE, Amritsar and Lahore, and the newlywed husband of a honeymooning couple was murdered by slashing his throat, and his body thrown out of the aircraft while his wife remained on board for the rest of the duration of the hijack. The plane was then flown to Kandahar in Afghanistan, where it came under control of Pakistan’s puppet Taliban government. In a surreal turn of events, the hijackers were provided with new weapons in Kandahar, as reported by a French tourist hostage who survived the ordeal (147).

Indian intelligence agencies who monitored and recorded the communications of the hijackers on the aircraft in Kandahar found them receiving instructions from Lt. Gen. Mohammad Aziz, a Pakistani Corps commander (148). On Aziz’s instructions the hijackers demanded a ransom of nearly one million US dollars, which was to be delivered in cash. When that was decided to be impracticable, the money was deposited in the account of a Pakistani diplomat in Delhi. The hijackers also secured the release of three dangerous Pakistani terrorists in prison in India, including Maulana Masood Azhar the founder of the Pakistan based terrorist group Jaish-e-Mohammad, and Omar Shaikh. The released terrorists disappeared from Kandahar and resurfaced in Pakistan. Omar Shaikh was later implicated in helping to fund the attacks on the World Trade center in New York, and was finally arrested for the murder of the Jewish-American reporter Daniel Pearl.

Pakistan’s record with reference to Indian airliners hijacked to Pakistan has been condemnable. After a 1971 hijack the hijackers were granted asylum in Pakistan, and the aircraft blown up on the ground. After a 1976 hijack, the hijackers were imprisoned for a token one month in Pakistan for entering Pakistan without due documents. In two instances of hijacking in 1981 and 1984, the hijackers were given refuge in Pakistan. And in an unbelievable second hijacking event in 1984, the hijackers received a weapon along with snacks in Lahore (149).

Refuge for Criminals:

Pakistan has positioned itself as an ideal place for any criminal from India to seek, and obtain refuge. India has a list of 20 most wanted criminals who are living in Pakistan.

The following is a list of names of the twenty, and a brief description of their activities (150):

1. Maulana Masood Azhar, leader of Jaish-i-Mohammad, man behind the attack on India’s parliament on December 13, 2001. He is also wanted for an attack on the J&K Assembly on Oct 1, 2001 in which 38 people were killed. He currently lives in and operates from Bahawalpur, Pakistan.

2. Hafiz Mohammad Saeed, co-founder of Lashkar-e-Toiba, also blamed for the attack on parliament in New Delhi. He operates from Muridke town, near Lahore in Pakistan.

3. Dawood Ibrahim, an Indian underworld don, man behind the planning and financing of 13 explosions in Mumbai in 1993 in which almost 300 people died. Ibrahim is wanted in connection with cases of arms supply, counterfeiting, drugs trade, funding alleged criminals, murder and smuggling. He lives in and operates from Karachi, Pakistan.

4. Chhota Shakeel, a key associate of Dawood Ibrahim. Wanted for murder, extortion, kidnapping, blackmail of businessmen and film stars in India. He lives in and operates from Karachi, Pakistan.

5. ”Tiger” Ibrahim Memon, accused of executing the 1993 Mumbai blasts. He is wanted in cases of murder, extortion, kidnapping, terrorism and smuggling arms and explosives in India. He is currently living in Pakistan.

6. Ayub Memon, accused of executing the 1993 Mumbai blasts. He is alleged to have helped his brother Ibrahim Memon carry out the blasts. He is wanted in cases of terrorism and smuggling. He lives in and operates from Karachi, Pakistan.

7. Abdul Razzak, accused of involvement in the Mumbai blasts. He is wanted in cases of terrorism and arms smuggling. He lives in and operates from Karachi, Pakistan.

8. Syed Salahuddin, head of Hizbul Mujahideen, which has claimed responsibility for dozens of attacks on Indian forces in Kashmir, India. He currently lives in and operates from Muzaffarabad, Pakistan.



Ibrahim Athar, an associate of Maulana Azhar Masood and was one of the hijackers of Indian Airlines flight IC-814 from Kathmandu to Delhi in 1999. He is a member of Jaish-i-Mohammad and is wanted for hijacking, kidnapping and murder. He currently lives in and operates from Bahawalpur, Pakistan.

10. Zahoor Ibrahim Mistri, a member of Harkat-ul-Ansar, which later changed its name to Harkat-ul- Mujahideen. He is wanted in connection with the hijacking of IC-814 and in cases of kidnapping and murder. He lives in and operates from Karachi, Pakistan.

11. Shahid Akhtar Sayed, is wanted for the IC-814 hijacking and for kidnapping and murder. He lives in and operates from Karachi, Pakistan.

12. Azhar Yusuf, wanted in the IC-814 hijacking case and in cases of kidnapping and murder. He lives in and operates from Karachi, Pakistan.

13. Abdul Karim, a Kashmiri terrorist blamed for more than 30 bomb blasts in Delhi and parts of northern India in 1996-97. He lives in and operates from Lahore, Pakistan.

14. Ishaq Atta Hussain, an associate of Dawood Ibrahim, is wanted in connection with a conspiracy to kill Indian Deputy Prime Minister and Home Minister L.K. Advani. He lives in and operates from Karachi, Pakistan.

15. Sagir Sabir Ali Shaikh, an associate of Dawood Ibrahim, is also wanted in connection with the conspiracy to kill Advani. He lives in and operates from Karachi, Pakistan.

16. Wadhawan Singh Babbar, chief of Sikh group Babbar Khalsa International, which was involved in an insurgency in East Punjab during the 1980s. He is wanted in over a dozen cases of sedition, murder and in connection with the assassination of East Punjab’s then chief minister Beant Singh. He lives in and operates from Lahore, Pakistan.

17. Ranjit Singh Neeta, chief of Khalistan Zindabad Force. He is wanted in cases of murder, bomb blasts and smuggling of arms in India. He lives in and operates from Lahore, Pakistan.

18. Paramjit Singh Panjwar, leader of the Khalistan Commando Force. He is accused of trying to revive the Sikh insurgency in East Punjab and is wanted in more than a dozen cases of murder, treason, conspiracy and arms smuggling. He lives in and operates from Lahore, Pakistan.

19. Lakhbir Singh Rode, leader of the International Sikh Youth Federation, is wanted in cases of arms smuggling, conspiracy to attack government leaders in Delhi and inciting religious hatred in East Punjab. He lives in and operates from Lahore, Pakistan.

20. Gajinder Singh, leader of Sikh group Dal Khalsa, is accused of hijacking an Indian Airlines plane from Srinagar to Delhi in 1981. He was arrested by Pakistan after he hijacked the plane to Lahore and tried. He lives in and operates from Lahore, Pakistan.

Pakistan admitted the presence of the third man on the list, Dawood Ibrahim in Pakistan in September 2003 after news of a bomb blast in Karachi. Rediff reported (151):

Pakistan has admitted gangster Dawood Ibrahim’s presence in the country, according to a report. The admission came after a bomb blast at a Karachi business centre, the Kawish Crown Plaza, which the inspector general of Sindh police said was “ostensibly owned by Ahmed Jamal but actually belonged to Dawood Ibrahim”, Pakistani journal The Herald said.

Dawood Ibrahim was subsequently designated a global terrorist by the US for his links with Al Quaeda and the Lashkar-e-Tayeba, the Islamist extremist group that was founded by Maulana Masood Azhar, the first man on India’s Most wanted list, one of the prisoners released by India after the 1999 hijacking of an Indian Airlines aircraft to Kandahar in Afghanistan.

Printing and circulation of counterfeit currency:

In January 2000, a staffer from the visa section of the Pakistan embassy in Nepal was arrested in Kathmandu (Nepal) after passing counterfeit Indian currency to Nepalese police in a sting operation. The Pakistani ambassador tried to stop the arrest claiming diplomatic immunity for the staffer but it turned out that he did not have diplomatic immunity.


The Indian Express reported (152):

Officials said the quality of fake notes was “such that it could only be printed in security presses”, in an apparent hint that Pakistan was indulging in massive printing of fake notes to abet its terrorist activities against India.

With Indian currency being valid in Nepal, that country was a natural choice for anti-India activities from Pakistan, which apparently intended to destabilize the Indian economy by flooding India with fake currency. One report (153) quoted the street value of the Pakistan made counterfeit currency in India:

The prevailing price for counterfeit currency in Punjab is Rs 40-60 (83 US cents-$1.25) in exchange for every Pakistani-made Rs 100 note - the range depending on the buyers’ bargaining skills and the volume required. The right contacts can ensure that Pakistani counterfeit currency is available even cheaper.

Another report of the arrest of a man carrying counterfeit currency said (154):

The racket was being remote controlled by Aftab Butki from Dubai in United Arab Emirates (UAE). Butki is a front man of notorious mafia don Dawood Ibrahim and controls the gang for pumping fake currency into India through the porous Indo-Nepal border. Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) of Pakistan has been providing logistical support to the underworld dons for flooding the Indian market with counterfeit currency with the sole aim of creating panic in the Indian market. Joint Commissioner of Police, Crime Branch, U K Katna said, “The counterfeit currency notes were sent for damaging the Indian economy.

The high quality of the counterfeit notes and official sponsorship of this and other criminal activities by Pakistani governmental agencies is a frightening indicator of the chaotic state that Pakistan is in with no expense being spared to prepare for war or jihad against India and very little being spent on development and education within Pakistan.



The credit for coining the name Pakistan probably goes to one Choudhry Rehmat Ali who is said to have thought of the name in 1933 as an acronym containing letters from the names of all the areas which this man thought were representative of the ancestry of his people. Another theory is that the acronym was composed by a group of students in Cambridge in England. It is not clear if Rehmat Ali was one of these students. A passage attributed to him says (155):

“Pakistan” is both a Persian and an Urdu word. It is composed of letters taken from the names of all our homelands - “Indian” and “Asian”. That is, Punjab, Afghania (North West Frontier Province), Kashmir, Iran, Sindh (including Karachi and Kathiawar), Tukharistan, Afghanistan, and Baluchistan. It means the land of the Paks-the spiritually pure and clean. It symbolizes the religions, beliefs and the ethnical stocks of our people; and it stands for all the territorial constituents of our original Fatherland.

The theory that Pakistan is an acronym does not stand up to scrutiny. In the first place, the Pakistan described by the acronym includes Iran and Central Asia (Tukharistan) as part of Pakistan and makes no mention of East Bengal, which was part of Pakistan until it seceded with the creation of Bangladesh. A second curious anomaly is that the name of this nation that is claimed to be derived from Urdu and Persian is composed of letters in the English alphabet with the English letters forming the acronym. Such an acronym is non-existent when the name is written in Urdu. It seems more likely that the acronym theory of the name is a confabulation, a plausible but imagined memory that fills in gaps in what is remembered as to how Pakistan got its name.

Ultimately, the stress on pure Islam and a nation purely for Muslims, that has Urdu as its official language suggests that the real origin of the name Pakistan derives from the Urdu word Paki. The dictionary of Urdu, Classical Hindi and English defines Paki as Purity - with stan meaning country (156).

That stress on purity - or purity with a narrow definition has certainly played a role in Pakistan’s undoing. Purity is a subjective concept, and can only be grasped in relation to something else that is impure. To define purity, one must simultaneously define what is impure, and Pakistanis have spent the years since 1947 years struggling to weed out anything that they consider impure, rather than concentrate on nation building. India, and Indians were impure and were rejected. Minorities and religious groups in Pakistan were impure Hindus, Sikhs, Christians, Ahmediyas and later even Shia Muslims in Pakistan were not pure enough for Pakistan. Further purity was required by fighting wars and making sacrifices. Social imbalance, corruption, poverty and greed were all minor blips in the route to Pakistan’s mythical purity.

Conditions of life for a Pakistani depend on what class of society one belongs to and whether one lives in a rural or urban area. As noted in chapter 2, there are only two main classes of society in Pakistan, the very rich and the very poor and these classes comprise 90% of Pakistan’s population.

There is a very small, very rich class of Pakistani. They are the Rich Anglophone Pakistani Elite, sometimes facetiously referred to by the acronym of that name. The acronym R.A.P.E. is perhaps an apt description of what this class have been doing to Pakistan. They are the feudal lords, who may own thousands of acres of land. They might be rich industrialists and businessmen, or they might be serving or retired army officers.

The lifestyles of these people can be compared to that of the rich and famous anywhere. They live in fabulous mansions, maintained and supported by armies of servants. These are the beautiful people, the handsome men clad in lounge suits or traditional sherwanis, the mascara and lipstick adorned women in designer dresses. No burkha (veil) for these women.

The elite are educated, often in the best schools and universities of the world. They travel, and are familiar with all the major cities that a man of this world should know about New York, London, Paris, Rome, Geneva. They are seen in parties and receptions attended by friends and diplomats, actors and society people. Their photographs appear in glossy magazines and on the Internet. These charmed people are the Pakistanis that we see and hear. Irfan Husain wrote in the Dawn:

An old friend was recently invited to a serving general’s official residence for a small dinner party, and came away hugely impressed by the acres of immaculate lawns, the discreet lighting, the tasteful furnishings and the overall

level of luxury

gathering had apparently been trained at a fivestar hotel


food and refreshments were of the highest quality, and the army staff who served the small

But 90 percent of Pakistanis are rarely seen or heard outside Pakistan. They are the servants, the sweepers, the waiters, the casual laborers and sharecroppers, the goatherds and the cleaners with their wives and their children.


They can be seen on Pakistani streets and in the villages. The men wear crumpled and seemingly unwashed salwar suits. The women, if seen at all, are covered in burqas as expected of women in Islamic Pakistan. The women do not work outside the home and may have four or more children to bring up. More than half these people do not earn enough money for a decent life. Most earn less than the equivalent of US $1 per day. Even those who earn more than that often sink below poverty level at certain times of the year, or in times of illness or drought.

Malnutrition is rampant, as is lack of education. Any education that can be gained, can be gained only from madrassas that often provide food and shelter for its students. That is a welcome source of relief for a very poor family with many children to care for. But girls are not allowed, and girls are not sent to schools either, in the few places where schools exist.

Life is harsh, and many try to find work in the Middle East to earn a living as menial laborers. Others try to migrate to Europe and beyond. The hard life, hunger, poverty and destitution are accepted by some people as the will of Allah that cannot be questioned or mitigated. Others are angry and frustrated at their lot and these people are told by their elite masters that poverty and hardship are because of Indian aggression or some other extraneous factor. Pakistani leaders, being Islamic and who appear forever busy to defend Pakistan, are above blame.

And that has been an integral part of Pakistan’s problem. For more than five decades since independence, Pakistani leaders have sacrificed enormous and fruitless amounts of money, time, human life and effort to somehow equal, match or defeat India. The build up of Pakistani armed forces into a formidable war machine was initially to defeat India and take Kashmir, and later to defend against an India that had no intention of attacking Pakistan. Money and effort that should have gone into building schools, roads and hospitals in Pakistan was spent on building a war machine that could never overwhelm an India that was just too big. Pakistan was halved when Bangladesh seceded, but even then the wasteful expenditure did not stop. The bloated ranks of army retirees had to be accommodated, and businesses were custom made for employing them, and development of the poor was bypassed as usual. Money from any source was poured developing nuclear weapons to deter India. Money was diverted to training Islamist operatives for covert operations against India, and a system of salaries and pensions had to be set up for them, while the stoic Pakistani public, with women and children at the bottom of the pile received little. Even criminal activity aimed against India, gun running or currency counterfeiting swallowed funds that should have gone into schools and healthcare in Pakistan.

In the midst of this, the poor of Pakistan are left with the only succour they can get - Islam. And even that is used against Pakistan’s arch enemy, India. Popular devotion to Islam is channelled to provide an endless supply of men for jihad. Anger is carefully re-directed away from the ruling elite, to be directed at India, Israel, the US or other Western nations, or is internalised as people not being “Islamic” enough. The anger is compounded by what is taught in schools and madrassas following curricula that actively teach hatred and discrimination to impressionable children.

The madrassa is the place where students’ physical hunger is assuaged, but their emotional hunger for explanations about the miserable existence of their families is often met by a call for violent jihad against forces that are blamed for hunger and misery. Every son sent to a madrassa is one mouth less to feed for a poor family, and sending one son to die for jihad brings honour and financial reward to the family.

Girls grow up uneducated, live at home until they come of age, marry and produce children. Boys are preferred in all ways in this male-dominated society. The girl child gets less food and is more likely to die of malnutrition and disease. The ratio of men to women in Pakistan is grossly skewed with many more men than women.

But women hold the key to family honour. A woman’s place is in the home - she is not supposed to be seen outside, either alone, or in the company of a man who is not her husband or father. A woman who breaks rules by exposing herself or by being seen with a non-approved male companion, or a woman who marries against the wishes of her family is considered to be committing a crime by bringing dishonour on the family - an act that is punishable by death.

Pakistani society has both extremes. On the one hand the society has a small minority of wealthy and emancipated people among whom women can get educated and work. The other extreme is the harsh life of a woman living under the burden of strict discriminatory rules. Between these two extremes are a vast mass of Pakistanis who are more or less generally poor; they are generally uneducated, and the level of education for women is invariably less than that of men.

The people are docile, as the British had found them. They do not easily rise up in revolt against tyranny or injustice, but individuals in such a society grow up in conditions that make their minds receptive to indoctrination into a life of terrorism and jihad.

The people need clean drinking water, roads, schools, health care, and access to family planning so that births can be spaced out, giving a mother time to recover and nurse an earlier child before bearing another child. But the money, people and will to provide these things never reach the population. All the money in Pakistan, be it government funds, aid money or export profits is split up and shared by a small percentage of wealthy people at the


top. The Army gets money; the army businesses do well; the businessmen and feudal lords get money, and very little reaches the Pakistani on the ground. The only funding that reaches this level comes from unaccounted and unaccountable sources funding the madrassas that preach an agenda of hatred and jihad.

Pakistan is controlled by an oligarchy of a thousand individuals or so (157) in a few dozen families. This ruling elite is composed of senior army officers, business magnates controlling key businesses such as transport, fuel oil and cement, as well as feudal landowners. For the survival of corrupt business interests in Pakistan the elite must remain in power and not be bothered by rebellion or the uncertainties of democracy. The 140 million mostly poor people of Pakistan are kept in check with the excuse that their faith, Islam, is under threat from India, and other nations. Pakistanis have been told that the army and the ruling elite have protected Pakistan and Islam from these external threats. For aid givers like the US and rich Western nations, the ruling elite of Pakistan behave like moderate, secular and well-intentioned democrats who are keeping Islamic fundamentalism at bay.

Time and again Pakistani leaders change masks depending on whom they are addressing. They appear in Western suits or crisp army uniforms, speaking in English to aid givers and donors. To their deprived population, they appear in traditional Pakistani salwar suits, and speak in Urdu. Western aid givers are told what they want to hear; that the ruling elite are fighting to hold fundamentalist forces at bay and that more aid and lifting of sanctions are essential for the prevention of a Islamic fundamentalist takeover of Pakistan.

In the meantime the ruling clique in Pakistan ensures its own survival. Each member of this elite community knows that too much action in curbing or controlling the vast business empires of their rivals will upset one’s own business interests. Opponents are rarely killed, punished severely or publicly humiliated. They are gently sidelined, along with sops to keep them happy. This mechanism was clearly illustrated after the father of Pakistan’s nuclear bomb Abdul Qadeer Khan made a public confession that he was responsible for the proliferation of nuclear technology (chapter 13). Within a day, he was publicly pardoned by Pakistani President General Musharraf, and allowed to keep all the wealth that he had earned from nuclear proliferation activities. The ruling clique of Pakistan stands to gain from this form of loose cooperation in which all the business interests survive at the expense of the constitution and law, while people are constantly fed with the anti-Muslim India threat.

The threat that is held up is that if the ruling clique goes, Pakistan will sink into an uncontrollable morass of 160 million hankering for an Islamic state. Whether this is likely or not, the US administration and some US think tanks seem to believe this providing the ideal setting for Pakistani rulers to play a double game of pretending to be devoutly Islamic for their people, while appearing moderate to aid givers.

When Pakistani President and Army Chief Pervez Musharraf was given an ultimatum by the US government in September 2001 that he could be With the US or against the US in its war on terror, he made his decision to support the US in a speech (56) that used the time tested Pakistani mask-changing routine to address different groups of people. He spoke in English initially, knowing that this would be understood by viewers in the US, saying words of support to please the US. But in the course of the same speech, he addressed Pakistanis in Urdu and, using Islamic examples, told them that his alliance with the US was akin to a temporary alliance with the devil to deter an immediate threat. This ploy is a fail safe formula that has allowed the survival of the Pakistani oligarchy so far, even as the human condition of the people in Pakistan has gradually deteriorated.

The average poor Pakistani is taught that his misery is because of Indian aggression, or more recently, because of the US’ war on terror. External anti-Islamic forces are always to blame. The powerful and wealthy groups of Pakistan stand to lose their money and lifestyles if funds are diverted to education, health care and development of the poor. As long as the poor can be left to vent their anger against some external foe by joining jihad or accepting their misery as Allah’s will the rich army, elite and feudal leadership of Pakistan will be under no pressure to change.

No power on earth can coax this small group of rich and powerful Pakistanis that wealth in a nation has to be shared and spread around for development of society and the nation as a whole. The rich get richer and the poor get poorer, and the population of the poor is rising rapidly, and their level of education is falling. These people will form a huge mass of uneducated and unemployed people in a few years’ time.

The ruling elite of Pakistan are engaged in a strange experiment in which they seem out of touch with reality. They exist on a different plane from the poor and they do not seem to understand that the burgeoning population of the poor, and the anger that is now being channeled against India or the West can turn inwards. The poor are over 100 million strong now but will be twice that number in a single generation, and they will be jobless, hungry and angry.

Nations like India, China, Russia and Western countries, who have all had to face the violent consequences of trained jihadi fighters from Pakistan are vigorously resisting and neutralizing them. The forces of jihad are unlikely to receive sanctuary or be allowed to survive in these nations in the current geo-political scenario. Faced with such pressure outside Pakistan, thousands of indoctrinated, armed and dangerous young men could well turn inwards at Pakistani rulers, blaming them for their inability to help in the victory of jihad over unbelievers. If Pakistani leaders can show constant military victories, it is likely that their population will at least temporarily continue to be happy at the successes. But when low-tech irregular Islamic militias spawned by the Pakistani army and governments are


unable to achieve victories despite tremendous losses, they are increasingly likely to ask the leaders of Pakistan, the army and the elite why they are being defeated.

From the beginning Pakistanis, rich or poor have had no sense of nationhood, no sense of whom and what they are other than being a group of Muslims who have escaped from India. Every effort at development and good governance has been destroyed by a vested interest, always living in the vain hope that some Western nation, or rich Islamic nation will bail the country out. Democracy was first derailed by the migrant bureaucracy who had moved to Pakistan from India. Later it was the army that stood to lose from democracy. Political parties have been disempowered, and the judiciary lives under the shadow of the army.

The only forces that are gaining strength are those of fundamentalist Islam, the forces that seek to fight India or the US, or even Shias within Pakistan. The two most powerful groups in Pakistan today are the army and Islamic groups, Pakistan is getting to the stage when the Islamic groups have infiltrated into the ranks of the army and appear set to take control of Pakistan. The Islamic groups themselves are divided, and their unity may only last as long as it takes for them to gain control of Pakistan.

None of these powerful groups seems to be interested in development or progress. No group seems set to allow modern education, peace with India, women’s rights or birth control in Pakistan, all essential for progress. The political parties and democratic forces did not do this. The army did not do it and the Islamic groups do not show any intent of fostering a progressive Pakistan. Predictably, they too are careening down the path of more and purer Islam as the answer to Pakistan’s problems. And worse for Pakistan, Islamist groups, with trans-national loyalties, cannot be guaranteed to be interested in the territorial integrity and borders of Pakistan as they exist. And so the disease eating Pakistan from the inside continues. Jessica Stern wrote (119):

Pakistan is a weak state, and government policies are making it weaker still. Its disastrous economy, exacerbated by a series of corrupt leaders, is at the root of many of its problems. Yet despite its poverty, Pakistan is spending hundreds of millions of dollars on weapons instead of schools and public health. Ironically, the government’s “cost- saving” measures are even more troubling. In trying to save money in the short run by using irregulars in Kashmir and relying on madrasahs to educate its youth, Pakistan is pursuing a path that is likely to be disastrous in the long run, allowing a culture of violence to take root.

Pakistan is in an unstable state and there appears to be no leader who can show Pakistan a way out. Too many Pakistanis have been taught that they exist only for Islam and for jihad and these people are now caught between the twin pincers of the global war on terror being conducted by many nations on the one hand, and by the rich and corrupt Pakistani rulers on the other. The long term outlook for Pakistan does not appear encouraging. In a paper on Pakistan, Stephen Cohen wrote (158):

When security, human services, justice, and basic necessities are not provided, states fail.

Pakistan can be compared to a broken biscuit whose pieces are held together by some wrapping paper. The area labeled as Pakistan on maps is called Pakistan, but that area is not wholly under the control of any single government or leadership, as one would expect of a normally functioning nation-state. The first fragment of the biscuit that broke off was Bangladesh, in 1971. There is no guarantee that the other fragments of this dysfunctional state will hold together.

Pakistan is already a nation that is only partially under control of its government which is basically the army. Only 5% of Baluchistan, Pakistan’s largest province, is under Pakistani control. Tribal law rules the sparsely populated land. The Pakistani government has little or no control over the Federally Administered Tribal Areas the so called FATA. Areas of Pakistan’s first city, Karachi, are outside government control.

Gaining control of Pakistan is easier said than done. As indicated in Chapter 12, Pakistan is awash with illegal weapons. The FATA areas are home to hundreds of small arms factories and shops that sell them (151). With 18 million illegal firearms, Pakistanis outside the military and government have enough weapons to equip several armies, and anyone trying to bring heavily armed private militias under control will have to contend with a lot of firepower.

But as the history of nations shows, if the Pakistan government is unable to control its own territory, someone else is likely to step in to fill the vacuum sooner or later. Therein lies the real significance of having large areas in a country that are out of governmental control. The fact that a government can only govern areas that it controls means that areas beyond government rule are ripe for control by some other force or alternate government. These schisms are begging to be exploited. The United States already has a powerful military presence in Pakistan, and perhaps that is an eerie harbinger of yet another civilization set to rule this lawless land.

Pakistan is perhaps fortunate that the nation state of India is not yet as adept and conscious of international hegemonic games and how India can interfere to bring law and order to the fraying edges of Pakistan. But that may


be changing as the lawlessness of Pakistan continues to spill into an increasingly powerful India as terrorism, forcing India to become conscious of its role and responsibility in the region.



Letter from Maharaja Hari Singh to Lord Mountbatten

on the eve of Pak invasion on J&K in 1947

My dear Lord Mountbatten,

I have to inform Your Excellency that a grave emergency has arisen in my State and request the immediate assistance of your Government. As Your Excellency is aware,the State of Jammu and Kashmir has not acceded to either the Dominion of India or Pakistan. Geographically my State is contiguous wit h both of them. Besides, my State has a common boundary with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and with China. In their external relations the Dominion of India and Pakistan cannot ignore this fact. I wanted to take time to decide to which Dominion I should accede or whether it is not in the best interests of both the Dominions and of my State to stand independent, of course with friendly and cordial relations with both. I accordingly approached the Dominions of India and Pakistan to enter into standstill agreement with my State. The Pakistan Government accepted this arrangement. The Dominion of India desired further discussion with representatives of my Government. I could not arrange this in view of the developments indicated below. ln fact the Pakistan Goernment under the standstill agreement is operating the post and telegraph system inside the State. Though we have got a standstill agreement with the Pakistan Government, lhe Govemment permitted a steady and increasing strangulation of supplies like food, salt and petrol to my State.

Afridis, soldiers in plain clothes, and desperadoes with modern weapons have been allowed to infiltrate into the State, at first in the Poonch area, then from Sia1kot and finally in a mass in the area adjoining-Hazara district on the Ramkote side. The result has been that the limited number of troops at the disposal of the State had to 175 be dispersed and thus had to face the enemy at several points simultaneously, so that it has become difficult to stop the wanton destruction of life ad property and the looting of the Mahura power house, which supplies electric current to the whole of Srinagar and which has been burnt. The number of women who have been kidnpped and raped makes my heart bleed. The wild forces thus let loose on the State are marching on with the aim of capturing Srinagar, the summer capital of my government, as a first step to overrunning the whole State.The mass infiltration of tribesman drawn from distant areas of the North-West Frontier Province, coming regularly in motortrucks, using the Manwehra-Mazaffarabad road and fully armed with up-to-date weapons, cannot possibly be done without the knowledge of the Provincial Govemment of the North-West Frontier Province and the Government of Pakistan. Inspite of repeated appeals made by my Government no attempt has been made to check these raiders or to stop them from coming into my State. In fact, both radio and the Press of Pakistan have reported these occurences. The Pakistan radio even put out the story that a provisional government has been set up in Kashmir. The people of my State, both Muslims and non-Muslims, generally have taken no part at all.

With the conditions obtaining at present in my State and the great emergency of the situation as it exists, I have no option but to ask for help from the Indian Dominion. Naturally they cannot send the help asked for by me without my State acceding to the Dominion of India. I have accordingly decided to do so, and I attach the instrument of accession for acceptance by your Government. The other alternative is to leave my state and people to free booters. On this basis no civilised government can exist or be maintained.

This alternative I will never allow to happen so long as I am the ruler of the State and I have life to defend my country. I may also inform your Excellency’s Government that it is my intention at once to set up an interim government and to ask Sheikh Abdullah to carry the responsibilities in this emergency with my Prime Minister.

If my State is to be saved, immediate assistance must be available at Srinagar. Mr. V.P. Menon is fully aware of the gravity of the situation and will explain it to you, if further explanation is needed.

In haste and with kindest regards,

Yours sincerely,

Hari Singh October 26, 1947



Resolution 80 (1950)

Concerning the India-Pakistan question, submitted by the Representatives of Cuba, Norway, United Kingdom and United States and adopted by the Security Council on March 14, 1950.

(Document No. S/1469), dated the 14th March, 1950).

THE SECURITY COUNCIL, Having received and noted the reports of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan establishing its resolutions 39 (1948) of 20 January and 47 (1948) of 21 April 1948.

Having also received and noted the report of General A. G. L. McNaughton on the outcome of his discussions with the representatives of India and Pakistan which were initiated in pursuance of the decision taken by the Security Council on December 17, 1949,

Commending the Governments of India and Pakistan for their statesman like action in reaching the agreements embodied in the United Nations Commission’s resolutions of August 13, 1948 and January 5, 1949 for a cease-fire, for the demilitarisation of the State of Jammu and Kashmir and for the determination of its final disposition in accordance with the will of the people through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite, and commending the parties in particular for their action in partially implementing these Resolutions by

1. The cessation of hostilities effected January 1, 1949,

2. The establishment of a cease-fire line on July 27, 1949, and

3. The agreement that Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz shall be Plebiscite Administrator,

Considering that the resolution of the outstanding difficulties should be based upon the substantial measure of agreement of fundamental principles already reached, and that steps should be taken forthwith for the demilitarisation of the State and for the expeditious determination of its future in accordance with the freely expressed will of the inhabitants,

1. Calls upon the Governments of India and Pakistan to make immediate arrangements, without prejudice to their rights or claims and with due regard to the requirements of law and order, to prepare and execute within a period of five months from the date of this resolution a programme of demilitarization on the basis of the principles of paragraph 2 of General McNaughton proposal or of such modifications of those principles as may be mutually agreed;

2. Decides to appoint a United Nations Representative for the following purposes who shall have authority to perform his functions in such place or places as he may deem appropriate;


to assist in the preparation and to supervise the implementation of the programme of demilitarization referred to above and’ to interpret the agreements reached by the parties for demilitarization;


to place himself at the disposal of the Governments of India and Pakistan and to place before those Governments or the Security Council any suggestions which, in his opinion, are likely to contribute to the expeditious and enduring solution of the dispute which has arisen between the two Governments in regard to the State of Jammu and Kashmir; to exercise all of the powers and responsibilities devolving upon the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan by reason of existing resolutions of the Security Council and by reason of the agreement of the parties embodied in the Resolutions of the United Nations Commission of August 13, 1948 and January 5, 1949; to arrange at the appropriate stage of demilitarization for the assumption by the Plebiscite Administrator of the functions assigned to the latter under agreements made between the parties; to report to the Security Council as he may consider necessary, submitting his conclusions and any recommendations which he may desire to make;

3. Requests the two Governments to take all necessary precautions to ensure that (heir agreements regarding the cease-fire shall continue to be faithfully observed, and “calls upon them to take all possible measures to ensure the creation and maintenance of ‘in atmosphere favourable to the promotion of further negotiations;



Extends its best thanks to the members of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan and to General A. G. L. McNaughton for their arduous and fruitful labours;

5. Agrees that the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan 179 shall be (terminated, and decides that this shall take place one month after both parties have informed the United Nations Representative of their acceptance of the transfer to him the powers and responsibilities of the United Nations Commission referred to in paragraph 2 (c) above.

The Security Council voted on this Resolution on 14-3-50 with the following result:

In favour:

China, Cuba, Ecuador, Egypt, France, Norway, U.K. and U.S.A.




India and Yugoslavia





Tashkent Declaration January 10, 1966

The 1965 armed conflict between India and Pakistan was formally brought to an end by signing this declaration at Tashkent, the capital of the Republic of Uzbekistan in the Soviet Union. Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri and President Ayub Khan signed it on behalf of their respective countries in the presence of the Soviet Premier Alexi Kosygin who mediated between them.

The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan, having met at Tashkent and having discussed the existing relations between India and Pakistan, hereby declare their firm resolve to restore normal and peaceful relations between their countries and to promote understanding and friendly relations between their peoples. They consider the attainment of these objectives of vital importance for the welfare of the 600 million people of India and Pakistan.


The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan agree that both sides will exert all efforts to create good neighborly relations between India and Pakistan in accordance with the United Nations Charter. They reaffirm their obligation under the Charter not to have recourse to force and to settle their disputes through peaceful means. They considered that the interests of peace in their region and particularly in the Indo-Pakistan Sub-Continent and, indeed, the interests of the people so India and Pakistan were not served by the continuance of tension between the two countries. It was against this background that Jammu and Kashmir was discussed, and each of the sides

set forth its respective position.


The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan have agreed that all armed personnel of the two countries shall be withdrawn not later than 24 February, 1966, to the positions they held prior to 5 August, 1965, and both sides all observe the cease-fire terms on the cease-fire line.


The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan have agreed that relations between India and Pakistan shall be based on the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of each other.


The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan have agreed that both sides will discourage any propaganda directed against the other country, and will encourage propaganda which promotes the development of friendly relations between the two countries.


The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan have agreed that the High Commissioner of India to Pakistan and the High Commissioner of Pakistan to India will return to their posts and that the normal functioning of diplomatic missions of both countries will be restored. Both Government shall observe the Vienna Convention of 1961 on Diplomatic Intercourse.


The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan have agreed to consider measures towards the restoration of economic and trade relations, communications, as well as cultural exchanges between India and Pakistan, and to take measures to implement the existing agreements between India and Pakistan.


The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan have agreed that they will give instructions to their respective authorities to carry out the repatriation of the prisoners of war.


The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan have agreed that the two sides will continue the discussion of questions relating to the problems of refugees and eviction/illegal immigrations. They also agreed that both sides will create conditions which will prevent the exodus of people. They further agreed to discuss the return of the property and assets taken over by either side in connection with the conflict.


The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan have agreed that the two sides will continue meetings both at the highest and at other levels on matters of direct concern to both countries. Both sides have recognized


the need to set up joint Indian-Pakistani bodies which will report to their Governments in order to decide what further steps should be taken.

The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan recorded their feelings of deep appreciation and gratitude to the leaders of the Soviet Union, the Soviet Government and personally to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. for their constructive, friendly and noble part in bringing about the present meeting which has resulted in mutually satisfactory results. They also express to the Government and friendly people of Uzbekistan their sincere thankfulness for their overwhelming reception and generous hospitality.

They invite the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR to 183 witness this declaration.



Terrorists earn a peon’s wage By: M K Tayal November 2, 2003

What motivates a young man to take up terrorism, enrol himself at a training camp in Pakistan, infiltrate India, fire at the Army and possibly never return home?

It is a small pay package that equals the wage of a peon or driver. The lure of a mere Rs 3,000 per month ensures that the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) meets its manpower requirements.

However, not every terrorist gets Rs 3,000. Payments relate directly to performance, area of operation, number of casualties the terrorist has inflicted upon Indian security forces, motivation level and other HR criterion.

In short, the ISI maintains dossiers and gives annual marks to its cadres very much like the Pakistan Army does for

its regular employees.

The pay scale is not rigid as it varies depending on the risks one is willing to take and his commitment to the cause. Some of the more ‘enthusiastic’ Kashmiri youth get around Rs 5,000. With the number of years one puts in, the annual increment increases.

A Kashmiri company or battalion gets from Rs 5,000 to Rs 10,000. A district commander gets around Rs 20,000.

Nevertheless, one thing is clear that Kashmiri youth get a raw deal compared to the Pakistani or foreign counterpart. The Kashmiri mujahideen is paid less by the ISI than a Pakistani terrorist.

The rank and file from Pakistan or Afghanistan or any other country gets a starting salary of Rs 5,000 that can go up to Rs 7,000.

Commanders get much more. A commander starts at anything above Rs 25,000. The higher they go, the heftier the pay package and the more discreet it becomes.

Lashkar-e-Taiba’s (LeT) Doda district commander Mohd Shahzad, a 184 Pakistani national, captured by the Army after a fierce encounter in September 2003, said he came to Jammu & Kashmir to be a jehadi and was paid nearly Rs 20,000 per month but that limit was waived off as a special case.

“Money didn’t matter. I could get as much as I wanted,” Shahzad had said. However, he remained silent when asked what was the amount his parents were getting in Pakistan.

But it is sure that the money Shahzad got was for operations in his area and his logistical support. His monthly emoluments were being directly sent to his home in Pakistan.

The main attraction in joining the ISI is the initial offer. A Kashmiri gets Rs two lakh as one-time payment to join. There is a catch. One must go over to Pakistan to get the complete four to five month training and then work his way back into India from the 120 launch pads.

The basic training at the 85 training camps is the same and involves handling small arms (AK-47) and explosives, small unit tactics of raid and ambush and radio communication. The second term involves training of special operations-explosives.

The fidayeens (soldiers on a suicide mission) get highly sophisticated training but their emoluments remain a mystery, since naturally none survive to tell their tale.

“Poor economic conditions in the Valley force some to cross over to Pakistan for their training. The amount is too tempting for anyone to say ‘no’,” explains an official.

There are other factors too at work. Competition and style for instance drive most youth into the realm of the AK-47. “It has become a style. If you don’t have a gun you don’t get good girlfriends and nobody respects you,” a militant said to an army officer serving in the Valley.


Sources also point to the presence of foreign militants who come to the Valley after sessions of intense motivation and psychological drills. LeT’s Shahzad said he came to Jammu & Kashmir (J&K) to fight jehadis as he was told harrowing stories of atrocities being committed on the Muslims in the Valley.

I felt I had to take revenge but now after fighting the army for more than three years I realize the futility of this ‘freedom’ movement,” he said in a heart-to-heart talk.

However, the ISI makes sure that those who help recruit while on the job are not neglected. It rewards handsomely. “If a militant motivates and enrolls another youth, he can make upto Rs 1.5 lakh,” explained a source.

However, initially the ISI made sure the money was delivered to the militant’s parents but as the numbers started dwindling, so did it the commitment.

Though no one complains publicly, there have been reports of parents of the deceased militant not getting a single penny. Realizing this, Kashmiri youths are now averse to taking up the gun while recruitment from Pakistan remains high.



1. Indian Muslims and Pakistan, Vir Sanghvi, Counterpoint, Sunday 7th March 2004,00300001.htm

2. The eight conflicts that the Indian armed forces have been involved in since 1947 are the four conflicts with

Pakistan described in Chapter 11, the long running lowgrade war of cross border terrorism from Pakistan described in Chapter 12; Operation Vijay against the Portuguese occupation of Goa in 1961, the India-China war of 1962, and Operation Pawan, the Indian peacekeeping operations in Northern Sri Lanka in the late 1980s.

3. Pak population will swell to 349m by 2050, Syed Asif Ali and Muddassir Rizvi KARACHI/ISLAMABAD: The Daily

Jang, Pakistan, September 28th 2003, online edition

4. Who Owns Pakistan? Website by Shahid-ur-Rehman

5. Human conditions not improving in Pakistan: report, By Nadeem Malik, The Daily Jang, Pakistan, December 5 th

2003, online edition,

6. National stock-taking, M B Naqvi, The Daily Jang, Pakistan, August 14th 2002, online edition,

7. Op-ed: Our missing middle, by Ravian, The Daily Times,

Pakistan, August 1st 2003, online edition,

8. Television sets per 1000 people - Pakistan has 22 TV sets per 1000 population

9. Pakistan, The Press for Change, Kavita Menon, Special Report According to London's Financial Times, the

combined circulation of Pakistan's entire Englishlanguage press is no more than 150,000 in a population of 134 million.

10. Reforming Pakistan's madrassas, Musharraf determined to change Muslim schools' 'indoctrination', By Tom

Brokaw Anchor, NBC News

11. Donors want poverty trends reversed, By Ihtashamul Haque, The Dawn, Pakistan, November 6th 2003, online


12. - a document published by

the statistics division, Government of Pakistan, page 2.

13. Deplorable schools angering Pakistanis Issue at the top of voters' agenda Juliette Terzieff, Chronicle Foreign

Service, Thursday, October 10, 2002, The San Francisco Chronicle, online edition,

14. What and wherefore of Madaris, A. B. S. Jafri, The Dawn, Pakistan, 20th January 2003, online edition,

15. Medievalism and Pakistan's madrassas, Nadeem Iqbal, The Asia Times online edition, 29 Aug 02

16. The madrassas and the have-nots, Dr Tariq Rahman, Professor of Linguistics and South Asian Studies, Quaidi-

Azam University, Islamabad, The News - Jang : Opinion, Saturday September 08, 2001 - "At the time of the partition there were 137 madrassas.In 1950 there were 210 of them while in 1971 they increased to 563. Nowadays there are at least 7000 of hem. Out of the registered ones - and most are still unregistered - the Barelvis have 1400; the Deobandis 550 and the Ahl-e-Hadith 347. These are the Sunni madrassas"

17. The Pakistani Time Bomb, Alexei Alexiev, Center for Security Policy


18. Pamela Constable, The Washington Post, September 19th 2001, online edition,