Peter Singer, Practical Ethics, 1993

Influence R.M. Hare

I. About Ethics

A. Ethics is not
- « stop people from having fun » (1)
- So the first thing to say about ethics is that it is not a set of prohibitions particularly
concerned with sex.

Second, ethics is not an ideal system that is noble in theory but no good in practice. The
reverse of this is closer to the truth: an ethical judgment that is no good in practice must
suffer from a theoretical defect as well, for the whole point of ethical judgments is to guide
practice.
Some people think that ethics is inapplicable to the real world because they regard it as a
system of short and simple rules like 'Do not lie', 'Do not steal', and 'Do not kill'. It is not
surprising that those who hold this view of ethics should also believe that ethics is not suited
to life's complexities. In unusual situations, simple rules conflict; and even when they do not,
following a rule can lead to disaster. It may normally be wrong to lie, but if you were living in
Nazi Germany and the Gestapo came to your door looking for Jews, it would surely be right to
deny the existence of the Jewish family hiding in your attic. (2)

Consequentialists start not with moral rules but with goals. They assess actions by the
extent to which they further these goals. The best-known, though not the only,
consequentialist theory is utilitarianism. The classical utilitarian regards an action as right if it
produces as much or more of an increase in the happiness of all affected by it than any
alternative action, and wrong if it does not.

Third, ethics is not something intelligible only in the context of religion.

The fourth, and last, claim about ethics that I shall deny in this opening chapter is that
ethics is relative or subjective.

Relativity of ethics?

Ethics is not relative to the society one lives in

(Marxism: ruling ideas of each period = ideas of the ruling class, hence morality = relative
to the dominant economic class)
Ex. of slavery : if one society disapproves of slavery and another does, saying that “slavery
is wrong” is a simple fact, not an ethical judgment.
Impossible to convince others of the wrongness (a poll would settle the question)

Subjectivism of ethics?

Ethics can’t be subjective: if I say that I am against torture, I simply say that I disapprove, I
do not make an ethical point, and I cannot account for ethical disagreement: I am against,
you are for = we disagree, but both statements may be true.

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  Ethics is practical, is not about stopping to have fun, is not linked to religion, is not
relative and is not subjective.

 What is ethics then?

B. Ethics is

First we have to show that ethical reasoning is possible.

On what grounds?

How do we judge? How do we live according to ethical standards? How do moral

judgments differ from practical judgments?

Ethical / non ethical

a - difference between right and wrong morally (ethically)
b - difference between moral standards and no moral standards

Someone whom we disagree can still live up to moral standards

But in order to assert those standards, we (and the other) have to justify why X or Y
standard is the right one (a).
Justification for one’s conduct puts individuals in the realm of ethical reasoning (b).

BUT the justification must be of a certain kind.

Are justifications by self interest a sound justifications?
NO. (I killed, lied, stole because it was in my best interest) = not compatible with ethically
defensible principles
They have to be broader, bigger than the individual and its sheer interests.
They must be UNIVERSAL in some sense.

There are many famous formulations of the universality principle.

- love thy neighbour as thyself' Moses / Jesus
- Act only on that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it should
become a universal law.' Kant
- Adam Smith appealed to an imaginary 'impartial spectator’ etc.
- Rawls’ veil of ignorance (in which, while choosing our future society we don’t know what
we will be)

 Ethics has to be somehow universal, and must not express the desires of one particular
group
 this does not mean that an ethical judgment must be universally applicable :
circumstances alter causes

But is universality enough? Many theories are “universal”, some of them quite
incompatible.

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 Singer argues for a utilitarian approach to ethics, though accepting that ethical judgments
must be made from a universal point of view.

How does he proceed:

My interests, my desires, although important, cannot count more than the interests of
others
In making my decisions, I have to look for the best balance of interests / desires of all
affected, including myself
More than pleasure and pain, I want to further the best interests of all concerned.
This is a consequentialist reasoning: we universalize self-interest decision making

II. Equality and its implications

(A consequentialist version of equality principle)

Moral attitudes have changed over the centuries. Some faster than others
Racism for example is universally rejected
All humans are equal = political and ethical orthodoxy.
But what exactly does that mean?

Humans are not equal, and the differences apply to so many characteristics that there
simply is no factual basis upon which to erect a principle of equality.
One must hence look elsewhere.
Humans may differ as individuals, but there is no morally significant difference between
races and sexes
The claim to equality does not rest on the possession of intelligence, moral personality,
rationality or the alike.
Equality is a basic ethical principle, not an assertion of fact.

How do we assess equality?

One basic principle, in the Utilitarian view would be the “equal consideration of
interests”: giving equal moral weight in our moral deliberations to all those affected by our
actions.
“An interest is an interest”, whoever’s interest it may be – and from that point of view,
differences in intelligence, race, gender, beauty, disability are totally irrelevant.
For the only thing that counts are the interests themselves.

Equal consideration of interests

Equal consideration of interests does not imply equality of treatment

We can make this more concrete by considering a particular interest, say the interest we
have in the relief of pain. Then the principle says that the ultimate moral reason for relieving
pain is simply the undesirability of pain as such, and not the un desirability of X's pain, which
might be different from the un desirability of V's pain. Of course, X's pain might be more
undesirable than V's pain because it is more painful, and then the principle of equal

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consideration would give greater weight to the relief of X's pain. Again, even wftere the
pains are equal, other factors might be relevant, especially if others are affected. If there has
been an earthquake we might give priority to the relief of a dpctor's pain so she can treat
other victims. But the

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