Morillo, Leo Adrian B.

2008-78252
G.R. No. 119398 July 2, 1999 EDUARDO M. COJUANGCO JR., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, THE PHILIPPINE CHARITY SWEEPSTAKES OFFICE and FERNANDO O. CARRASCOSO JR., respondents. PANGANIBAN, J.: To hold public officers personally liable for moral and exemplary damages and for attorney's fees for acts done in the performance of official functions, the plaintiff must prove that these officers exhibited acts characterized by evident bad faith, malice, or gross negligence. But even if their acts had not been so tainted, public officers may still be held liable for nominal damages if they had violated the plaintiff's constitutional rights. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. RTC: PCSO and Chairman: no authority to withhold the subject racehorse winnings of petitioner, since no writ of sequestration therefor had been issued by the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG). Carrascoso had acted in bad faith amounting to the persecution and harassment of petitioner and his family. It thus ordered the PCSO and Carrascoso to pay in solidum petitioner's claimed winnings plus interests. It further ordered Carrascoso to pay moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees and costs of suit. herein petitioner is a known businessman-sportsman owning several racehorses which he entered in the sweepstakes races. Several of his horses won the races [Herein petitioner] sent letters of demand to the defendants [herein private respondents] for the collection of the prizes due him. Respondent: prizes are being withheld on advice of PCGG Commissioner PCGG advised resp to pay prizes.

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In reversing the trial court's finding of bad faith on the part of Carrascoso. the Court of Appeals held that the former PCSO chairman was merely carrying out the instruction of the PCGG in regard to the prize winnings of petitioner. It noted that, at the time, the scope of the sequestration of the properties of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos and his cronies was not well-defined. Respondent Court explained: 9 IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the judgment appealed from is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one entered DISMISSING this case. No pronouncement as to costs. ISSUES: a. b. c. Whether the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction over the appeal of respondent Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO); Whether the appeal of respondent Carrascoso, Jr. should have been dismissed for his failure to file an appeal brief; Whether the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to review and reverse the judgment on a cause of action which was not appealed from by the respondents; Whether the award for damages against respondent Carrascoso, Jr. is warranted by evidence and the law.12

d.

SC: The petition is partly meritorious. POINT 1. THE REPRESENTATION OF THE OGCC ON BEHALF OF THE PCSO AND MR. CARRASCOSO IS PURSUANT TO ITS BASIC FUNCTION TO "ACT AS THE PRINCIPAL LAW OFFICE OF ALL GOVERNMENT-OWNED OR CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS, THEIR SUBSIDIARIES, OTHER CORPORATE OFFSPRINGS AND GOVERNMENT ACQUIRED ASSET CORPORATIONS AND . . . [TO] EXERCISE CONTROL AND SUPERVISION OVER ALL LEGAL DEPARTMENTS OR DIVISIONS MAINTAINED SEPARATELY AND SUCH POWERS AND FUNCTIONS AS ARE NOW OR MAY HEREAFTER BE PROVIDED BY LAW." 13 THE OGCC WAS THEREFORE DUTY-BOUND TO DEFEND THE PCSO BECAUSE THE LATTER, UNDER ITS CHARTER, 14 IS A GOVERNMENT-OWNED CORPORATION. THE GOVERNMENT COUNSEL'S REPRESENTATION EXTENDS TO THE CONCERNED GOVERNMENT FUNCTIONARY'S OFFICERS WHEN THE ISSUE INVOLVES THE LATTER'S OFFICIAL ACTS OR DUTIES. WHAT IS IMPORTANT IS THAT RESPONDENT CARRASCOSO FILED HIS NOTICE OF APPEAL ON TIME AND THAT HIS COUNSEL BEFORE THE LOWER COURT,

CA:

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WHO WAS PRESUMED TO HAVE CONTINUED REPRESENTING HIM ON APPEAL, 19 HAD FILED AN APPEAL BRIEF ON HIS BEHALF. POINT 2. BAD FAITH DOES NOT SIMPLY CONNOTE BAD JUDGMENT OR SIMPLE NEGLIGENCE. IT IMPORTS A DISHONEST PURPOSE OR SOME MORAL OBLIQUITY AND CONSCIOUS DOING OF A WRONG, A BREACH OF A KNOWN DUTY DUE TO SOME MOTIVE OR INTEREST OR ILL WILL THAT PARTAKES OF THE NATURE OF FRAUD. 28 WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THE ABOVE JUDICIALLY SETTLED NATURE OF BAD FAITH CHARACTERIZED THE QUESTIONED ACTS OF RESPONDENT CARRASCOSO. ON THE CONTRARY, WE BELIEVE THAT THERE IS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE ON RECORD TO SUPPORT RESPONDENT COURT'S CONCLUSION THAT HE DID NOT ACT IN BAD FAITH. POINT 3. THE EXTANT RULE IS THAT A PUBLIC OFFICER SHALL NOT BE LIABLE BY WAY OF MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES FOR ACTS DONE IN THE PERFORMANCE OF OFFICIAL DUTIES, UNLESS THERE IS A CLEAR SHOWING OF BAD FAITH, MALICE OR GROSS NEGLIGENCE. 32ATTORNEY'S FEES AND EXPENSES OF LITIGATION CANNOT BE IMPOSED EITHER, IN THE ABSENCE OF A CLEAR SHOWING OF ANY OF THE GROUNDS PROVIDED THEREFOR UNDER THE CIVIL CODE. 33 THE TRIAL COURT'S AWARD OF THESE KINDS OF DAMAGES MUST PERFORCE BE DELETED, AS RULED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS. POINT 4. NEVERTHELESS, THIS COURT AGREES WITH THE PETITIONER AND THE TRIAL THAT RESPONDENT CARRASCOSO MAY STILL BE HELD LIABLE UNDER ARTICLE 32 OF THE CIVIL CODE, WHICH PROVIDES. UNDER THE AFORECITED ARTICLE, IT IS NOT NECESSARY THAT THE PUBLIC OFFICER ACTED WITH MALICE OR BAD FAITH. 36 TO BE LIABLE, IT IS ENOUGH THAT THERE WAS A VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF PETITIONER, EVEN ON THE PRETEXT OF JUSTIFIABLE MOTIVES OR GOOD FAITH IN THE PERFORMANCE OF ONE'S DUTIES. 37 WE HOLD THAT PETITIONER'S RIGHT TO THE USE OF HIS PROPERTY WAS UNDULY IMPEDED. WHILE RESPONDENT CARRASCOSO MAY HAVE RELIED UPON THE PCGG'S INSTRUCTIONS, HE COULD HAVE FURTHER SOUGHT THE SPECIFIC LEGAL BASIS THEREFOR. A LITTLE EXERCISE OF PRUDENCE WOULD HAVE DISCLOSED THAT THERE WAS NO WRIT ISSUED SPECIFICALLY FOR THE SEQUESTRATION OF THE RACEHORSE WINNINGS OF PETITIONER. THERE WAS APPARENTLY NO RECORD OF ANY SUCH WRIT COVERING HIS RACEHORSES EITHER. THE ISSUANCE OF A SEQUESTRATION ORDER

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REQUIRES THE SHOWING OF A PRIMA FACIE CASE AND DUE REGARD FOR THE REQUIREMENTS OF DUE PROCESS. 38 THE WITHHOLDING OF THE PRIZE WINNINGS OF PETITIONER WITHOUT A PROPERLY ISSUED SEQUESTRATION ORDER CLEARLY SPOKE OF A VIOLATION OF HIS PROPERTY RIGHTS WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW. ART. 2221 OF THE CIVIL CODE AUTHORIZES THE AWARD OF NOMINAL DAMAGES TO A PLAINTIFF WHOSE RIGHT HAS BEEN VIOLATED OR INVADED BY THE DEFENDANT, FOR THE PURPOSE OF VINDICATING OR RECOGNIZING THAT RIGHT, NOT FOR INDEMNIFYING THE PLAINTIFF FOR ANY LOSS SUFFERED. 39 THE COURT MAY ALSO AWARD NOMINAL DAMAGES IN EVERY CASE WHERE A PROPERTY RIGHT HAS BEEN INVADED. 40 THE AMOUNT OF SUCH DAMAGES IS ADDRESSED TO THE SOUND DISCRETION OF THE COURT, WITH THE RELEVANT CIRCUMSTANCES TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT. 41 Art. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstruct, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages: xxx xxx xxx (6) The rights against deprivation of property without due process of law; xxx xxx xxx that certain basic rights and liberties are immutable and cannot be sacrificed to the transient needs or imperious demands of the ruling power.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby partially GRANTED. The assailed Decision, as herein clarified, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that Private Respondent Fernando O. Carrascoso Jr. is ORDERED TO PAY petitioner nominal damages in the amount of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000). No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.

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Morillo, Leo Adrian B. 2008-78252 o

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Section 60 of B.P. Blg. 337 (then Local Government Code) with the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG). civil case against petitioner for damages A complaint was likewise filed with the Ombudsman for violation of R.A. No. 3019, otherwise known as the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act." With Sandiganbayan. while in the performance of his administrative and official functions and committing the offense in relation to his office, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and criminally request and receive for his benefit the amount of P4,000.00, for and in consideration of the issuance of a permit to operate an investment business, in favor of one Salvacion Luzana, a person for whom the accused has in fact received and obtained a mayor's permit or license. Administrative case: dismissed Civil case: Compromise agreement Sandiganbayan: convicted ISSUES: (1) Whether or not the decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan exonerating the accused serves as a bar by prior judgment to the decision of the Sandiganbayan; (2) Whether or not there was a violation of the Constitutional right of the accused against double jeopardy; and (3) Whether or not the guilt of the petitioner was proven beyond reasonable doubt. POINT 1. PETITIONER'S THEORY HAS NO LEG TO STAND ON. FIRST, IT MUST BE POINTED OUT THAT RES JUDICATA IS A DOCTRINE OF CIVIL LAW. 7 IT THUS HAS NO BEARING IN THE CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE SANDIGANBAYAN. SECOND, IT IS A BASIC PRINCIPLE OF THE LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS THAT A PUBLIC OFFICIAL OR EMPLOYEE IS UNDER A THREE-FOLD RESPONSIBILITY FOR VIOLATION OF DUTY OR FOR A WRONGFUL ACT OR OMISSION. THIS SIMPLY MEANS THAT A PUBLIC OFFICER MAY BE HELD CIVILLY, CRIMINALLY, AND ADMINISTRATIVELY LIABLE FOR A WRONGFUL DOING.

G.R. No. 123045 November 16, 1999 DEMETRIO R. TECSON, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. QUISUMBING, J.: SANDIGANBAYAN: found guilty of violating Section 3[c] of R.A. No. 3019, penalty of imprisonment of SIX (6) YEARS and ONE (1) MONTH, and perpetual disqualification from public office. No civil indemnity is awarded for the reason that Tecson and Mrs. Salvacion D. Luzana entered into a compromise agreement waiving his/her claims against the other. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. Petitioner was Municipal Mayor of Prosperidad, Agusan del Sur. Private complainant Mrs. Salvacion Luzana is a neighbor of the petitioner. Upon the offer of Tecson, he and Mrs. Luzana agreed to engage in an investment business. Tecson does not appear to have contributed any monetary consideration to the capital. Mayor's Permit in the name of Mrs. Luzana for their business called "LD Assurance Privileges." He asked for a cash advance of P4,000.00 and he would not release the Mayor's Permit unless the cash advance was given him. Mrs. Luzana reluctantly acceded, saying that it was not the due date yet, so he was getting the cash advances on his share. Tecson signed for the cash advance. Mrs. Luzana secured a Business Permit in accordance with the instructions of Tecson. Tecson, Resolution No. 100 was passed revoking the business permit at the instance of the Provincial Director of the Department of Trade and Industry.

6. 7.

Complainant: With the revocation of her business permit, private complainant below filed an administrative with the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Agusan del Sur for case against petitioner, for violation of o Section 3 [c], R.A. No. 3019 and

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This administrative liability is separate and distinct from the penal and civil liabilities. Thus, the dismissal of an administrative case does not necessarily bar the filing of a criminal prosecution for the same or similar acts, which were the subject of the administrative complaint. We conclude, therefore, that the decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Agusan del Sur exonerating petitioner in Administrative Case No. SP 90-01 is no bar to the criminal prosecution before the Sandiganbayan. As to the amicable settlement in Civil Case No. 716 with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 6, of Prosperidad, Agusan del Sur, it is settled that a complaint for misconduct, malfeasance or misfeasance against a public officer or employee cannot just be withdrawn at any time by the complainant.

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c. Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present, or other pecuniary or material benefit, for himself or for another, from any person for whom the public officer, in any manner or capacity, has secured or obtained, or will secure or obtain, any government permit or license in consideration for the help given or to be given, without prejudice to Section thirteen of this Act. The crime charged has four elements, namely: (1) The accused is a public officer; (2) That in any manner or capacity he secured or obtained, or would secure or obtain, for a person any government permit or license; (3) That he directly or indirectly requested or received from said person any gift, present or other pecuniary or material benefit for himself or for another; and (4) That he requested or received the gift, present or other pecuniary or material benefit in consideration for the help given or to be given. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED, and the assailed Decision and Resolution of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 18273 are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED.

POINT 2. Double jeopardy attaches only: (1) upon a valid indictment; (2) before a competent court; (3) after arraignment; (4) when a valid plea has been entered; and (5) when the defendant was acquitted or convicted or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused. 10 None of the foregoing applies to the hearings conducted by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Agusan del Sur in Adm. Case No. SP 90-01. It must be stressed that the said proceedings were not criminal, but administrative in nature. Hence, double jeopardy will not lie. Regarding the second issue, petitioner contends that being tried before the Sandiganbayan violated his constitutional protection against double jeopardy since the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Agusan del Sur had already cleared him of all charges.

POINT 3. As correctly pointed out by the Sandiganbayan, all of the aforementioned elements concur in the instant case. Sec. 3 of R.A. No. 3019 states: In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and hereby declared to be unlawful: xxx xxx xxx

G.R. No. 114683

January 18, 2000

JESUS C. OCAMPO, petitioner, vs. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN and MAXIMO ECLIPSE, respondents.

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BUENA, J.: OMBUDSMAN dismissed petitioner from the service, with forfeiture of benefits and special perpetual disqualification to hold office in the government or any government-owned or controlled corporation, and which denied the motion for reconsideration thereof, respectively. 1. 2. Petitioner is the Training Coordinator of NIACONSULT, INC., a subsidiary of the National Irrigation Administration. NIACONSULT wrote a letter to petitioner demanding the turn-over of the total training fee paid by ADBN which petitioner personally received. Despite receipt of the letter, petitioner failed to remit the said amount prompting NIACONSULT through its president, Maximino Eclipse, to file an administrative case before respondent OMBUDSMAN for serious misconduct and/or fraud or willful breach of trust. Administrative Adjudication Bureau of the respondent OMBUDSMAN, required petitioner to file his counter-affidavit Another order giving petitioner another chance to file his counteraffidavit and controverting evidence. OMBUDSMAN issued the assailed Resolution petitioner moved for reconsideration and to re-open the case claiming that he was denied due process -

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The lack or absence of proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean an absence of any evidence whatsoever for there is another class of evidence. Then too, there is the "substantial evidence" rule in administrative proceedings which merely requires such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.

3.

POINT 2. THE ESSENCE OF DUE PROCESS IS AN OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD. ONE MAY BE HEARD, NOT SOLELY BY VERBAL PRESENTATION BUT ALSO, AND PERHAPS EVEN MANY TIMES MORE CREDITABLY AND PRACTICABLE THAN ORAL ARGUMENT, THROUGH PLEADINGS. IN ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS, MOREOVER, TECHNICAL RULES OF PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE ARE NOT STRICTLY APPLIED; ADMINISTRATIVE DUE PROCESS CANNOT BE FULLY EQUATED TO DUE PROCESS IN ITS STRICT JUDICIAL SENSE. Petitioner has been amply accorded the opportunity to be heard.

4. 5. 6. 7.

Petitioner: While the case is pending, petitioner filed a Manifestation stating that the criminal complaint for estafa and falsification filed against him based on the same facts or incidents which gave rise to the administrative case, was dismissed by the Regional Trial Court. With the dismissal of the criminal case, petitioner manifests that the administrative case can no longer stand on its own and therefore should be dismissed.17 SC: Such manifestation is not well taken. POINT 1. THE DISMISSAL OF THE CRIMINAL CASE WILL NOT FORECLOSE ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION FILED AGAINST PETITIONER OR GIVE HIM A CLEAN BILL OF HEALTH IN ALL RESPECTS. THUS, CONSIDERING THE DIFFERENCE IN THE QUANTUM OF EVIDENCE, AS WELL AS THE PROCEDURE FOLLOWED AND THE SANCTIONS IMPOSED IN CRIMINAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS, THE FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS IN ONE SHOULD NOT NECESSARILY BE BINDING ON THE OTHER.

POINT 3. THE RECORD OF THIS CASE INDISPUTABLY SHOWS THAT PETITIONER IS GUILTY OF DISHONESTY AND CONDUCT PREJUDICIAL TO THE GOVERNMENT WHEN HE FAILED TO REMIT THE PAYMENT OF THE TRAINING PROGRAM CONDUCTED BY NIACONSULT. THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED SUFFICIENTLY ESTABLISHED THAT PETITIONER RECEIVED THE PAYMENTS OF ADBN THROUGH ITS REPRESENTATIVE, GTZ, PHILIPPINES THE AMOUNT OF US $9,600.00 AND THAT HE FAILED TO ACCOUNT THIS AND REMIT THE SAME TO THE CORPORATION. ALL THESE ACTS CONSTITUTE DISHONESTY AND UNTRUSTWORTHINESS. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed Resolutions of the respondent OMBUDSMAN are hereby AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 128096 January 20, 1999 PANFILO M. LACSON, petitioner,

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Morillo, Leo Adrian B. 2008-78252

vs. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SANDIGANBAYAN, OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, MYRNA ABALORA, NENITA ALAP-AP, IMELDA PANCHO MONTERO, and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent. ROMEO M. ACOP AND FRANCISCO G. ZUBIA, JR., petitioner-intervenors. MARTINEZ, J.: 1. 1995, eleven (11) persons believed to be members of the Kuratong Baleleng gang, reportedly an organized crime syndicate where slain by elements of the Anti-Bank Robbery and Intelligence Task Group (ABRITG) headed by Chieff Superintendent Jewel Canson of the Philippine National Police (PNP). - led by petitioners media expose - what actually transpired was a summary execution (or a rub out) and not a shoot-out Ombudsman Aniano Desierto formed a panel of investigators to investigate the incident. This panel later absolved from any criminal liability all the PNP officers and personal allegedly with a finding that the said incident was a legitimate police operation. review board reversed - recommended the indictment for multiple murder against twenty-six (26) respondents, including herein petitioner and intervenors. The recommendation was approved by the Ombudsman all the accused filed separate motions questioning the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, asserting that under the amended informations, the cases fall within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court pursuant to Section 2 (paragraphs a and c) of Republic Act No. 7975.1 a. They contend that the said law limited the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to cases where one or more of the "principal accused" are government officials with Salary Grade (SG) 27 or higher, or PNP officials with the rank of Chief Superintendent (Brigadier General) or higher. The highest ranking principal accused in the amended informations has

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the rank of only a Chief Inspector, and none has the equivalent of at least SG 27. 8. Sandiganbayan ordered the cases transferred to the Quezon City Regional Trial Court 9. (1997) R.A. No. 8249 passed - amend the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan by deleting the word "principal" from the phrase "principal accused" in Section 2 (paragraphs a and c) of R.A. No. 7975. 10. Considering that three of the accused in each of these cases are PNP Chief Superintendents this court Sandiganbayan has competence to take cognizance of these cases. Petitioner now questions the constitutionality of Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249, including Section 7 thereof which provides that the said law "shall apply to all cases pending in any court over which trial has not begun as to the approval hereof." SC: The established rule is that every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality, and to justify its nullification there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative one. 20 The burden of proving the invalidity of the law lies with those who challenge it. That burden, we regret to say, was not convincingly discharged in the present case.

2. 3. 4.

5.

6. 7.

The creation of the Sandiganbayn was mandated in Section 5, Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution, which provides: Sec. 5. The Batasang Pambansa shall create a special court, to be known as Sandiganbayan, which shall have jurisdiction over criminal and civil cases involving graft and corrupt practices and such other offenses committed by public officers and employees including those in governmentowned or controlled corporations, in relation to their office as may be determined by law. The said special court is retained in the new (1987) Constitution under the following provisions in Article XI, Section 4: Sec. 4. The present anti-graft court known as the Sandiganbayan shall continue to function and exercise its jurisdiction as now or hereafter may be provided by law.

AN ACT TO STRENGTHEN THE FUNCTIONAL AND STRUCTURAL ORGANIZATION OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN, AMENDING FOR THAT PURPOSE PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1606, AS AMENDED Page 6 of 17

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Under the latest amendments introduced by Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the following cases: Sec 4. Section 4 of the same decree [P.D. No. 1606, as amended] is hereby further amended to read as follows: Sec. 4. Jurisdiction The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving: a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Titile VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense: (1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade "27" and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including: (a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other provincial department heads; (b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads; (c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher; (d) Philippine Army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank;

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(e) Officers of the Philippines National Police while occupying the position of provincial director and those holding the rank of senior superintendent or higher. (f) City of provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor; (g) Presidents, directors or trustees or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations; (2) Members of Congress or officials thereof classified asGrade "27" and up under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989; (3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution; (4) Chairman and members of the Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution; (5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade "27" or higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989. b. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in Subsection a of this section in relation to their office. c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and connection with Executive Orders Nos. 1,2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.

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In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to salary Grade "27" or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act 6758, or military and PNP officers mentioned above, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant to their jurisdictions as privided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended. The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final judgments, resolutions or orders of regional trial courts whether in the exercise of their own original jurisdiction or of their appellate jurisdiction as herein provided. The Sandiganbayan shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions of the issuance of the writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, injunctions, and other ancillary writs and processes in aid of its appellate jurisdiction and over petitions of similar nature, including quo warranto, arising or that may arise in cases filed or which may be filed under Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986: Provided, That the jurisdiction over these petitions shall not be exclusive of the Supreme Court. The procedure prescribed in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as well as the implementing rules that the Supreme Court has promulgated and may hereafter promulgate, relative to appeals/petitions for review to the Court of Appeals, shall apply to appeals and petitions for review filed with the Sandiganbayan. In all cases elevated to the Sandiganbayan and from the Sandiganbayan to the Supreme Court, the Office of the Ombudsman, through its special prosecutor, shall represent the People of the Philippines, except in cases filed pursuant to Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14, and 4-A, issued in 1986. In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with the public officers or employee, including those employed in government-owned

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or controlled corporations, they shall be tried jointly with said public officers and employees in the proper courts which shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction over them. Sec. 7 of R.A. No. 8249 states: Sec. 7. Transitory provision This act shall apply to all cases pending in any court over which trial has not begun as of the approval hereof. (Emphasis supplied) POINT 1. A PERUSAL OF THE AFOREQUOTED SECTION 4 OF R.A. 8249 REVEALS THAT TO FALL UNDER THE EXCLUSIVE ORIGINAL JURISDICTION OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN, THE FOLLOWING REQUISITES MUST CONCUR: (1) the offense committed is a violation of (a) R.A. 3019, as amended (the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), (b) R.A. 1379 (the law on illgotten wealth), (c) Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code (the law on bribery), 30 (d) Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14, and 14-A, issued in 1986 (sequestration cases), 31 or (e) other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes; (2) the offender comitting the offenses in items (a), (b), (c) and (e) is a public official or employee 32 holding any of the positions enumerated in paragraph a of Section 4; and (3) the offense committed is in relation to the office. POINT 2. CONSIDERING THAT HEREIN PETITIONER AND INTERVENORS ARE BEING CHARGED WITH MURDER WHICH IS A FELONY PUNISHABLE UNDER TITLE VIII OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE, THE GOVERNING ON THE JURISDICTIONAL OFFENSE IS NOT PARAGRAPH A BUT PARAGRAPH B, SECTION 4 OF R.A. 8249. THIS PARAGRAPH B PERTAINS TO "OTHER OFFENSES OR FELONIES WHETHER SIMPLE OR COMPLEXED WITH OTHER CRIMES COMMITTED BY THE PUBLIC OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES MENTIONED IN SUBSECTION A OF (SECTION 4, R.A. 8249) IN RELATION TO THEIR OFFICE. "THE PHRASE" OTHER OFFENSES OR FELONIES" IS TOO BROAD AS TO INCLUDE THE CRIME OF MURDER, PROVIDED IT WAS COMMITTED IN RELATION TO THE ACCUSED'S OFFICIALS FUNCTIONS. THUS, UNDER SAID PARAGRAPH B, WHAT DETERMINES THE SANDIGANBAYAN'S JURISDICTION IS THE OFFICIAL POSITION OR RANK OF THE OFFENDER THAT IS,

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WHETHER HE IS ONE OF THOSE PUBLIC OFFICERS OR EMPLOYEES ENUMERATED IN PARAGRAPH A OF SECTION 4.

Law on Public Officers Liabilities Resignation

INFORMATION DOES NOT INDICATE THAT THE SAID ACCUSED ARRESTED AND INVESTIGATED THE VICTIM AND THEN KILLED THE LATTER WHILE IN THEIR CUSTODY. THE STRINGENT REQUIREMENT THAT THE CHARGE BE SET FORTH WITH SUCH PARTICULARLY AS WILL REASONABLY INDICATE THE EXACT OFFENSE WHICH THE ACCUSED IS ALLEGED TO HAVE COMMITTED IN RELATION TO HIS OFFICE WAS, SAD TO SAY, NOT SATISFIED. WE BELIEVE THAT THE MERE ALLEGATION IN THE AMENDED INFORMATION THAT THE OFFENSE WAS COMMITTED BY THE ACCUSED PUBLIC OFFICER IN RELATION TO HIS OFFICE IS NOT SUFFICIENT. THAT PHRASE IS MERELY A CONCLUSION BETWEEN OF LAW, NOT A FACTUAL AVERNMENT THAT WOULD SHOW THE CLOSE INTIMACY BETWEEN THE OFFENSE CHARGED AND THE DISCHARGE OF THE ACCUSED'S OFFICIAL DUTIES. AMENDED INFORMATIONS The undersigned Special Prosecution Officer III. Office of the Ombudsman hereby accuses CHIEF INSP. MICHAEL RAY AQUINO, CHIEF INSP. ERWIN T. VILLACORTE, SENIOR INSP. JOSELITO T. ESQUIVEL, INSP. RICARDO G. DANDAN, SPO4 VICENTE P. ARNADO, SPO4 ROBERTO F. LANGCAUON, SPO2 VIRGILIO V. PARAGAS, SPO2 ROLANDO R. JIMENEZ, SPO1 WILFREDO C. CUARTERO, SPO1 ROBERTO O. AGBALOG, SPO1 OSMUNDO B. CARINO, CHIEF SUPT. JEWEL F. CANSON, CHIEF SUPT. ROMEO M. ACOP, CHIEF SUPT. PANFILO M. LACSON, SENIOR SUPT. FRANCISCO G. ZUBIA JR., SUPT. ALMARIO A. HILARIO, CHIEF INSP. CESAR O. MANCAO III, CHIEF INSP. GIL L. MENESES, SENIOR INSP. GLENN DUMLAO, SENIOR INSP. ROLANDO ANDUYAN, INSP. CEASAR TANNAGAN, SPO3 WILLY NUAS, SPO3 CICERO S. BACOLOD, SPO2 NORBERTO LASAGA, PO2 LEONARDO GLORIA, and PO2 ALEJANDRO G. LIWANAG of the crime of Murder as defined and penalize under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code committed as follows That on or about May 18, 1995 in Mariano Marcos Avenue, Quezon City Philippines and within the jurisdiction of his Honorable Court, the accused CHIEF INSP. MICHAEL RAY AQUINO, CHIEF INSP. ERWIN T. VILLACORTE, SENIOR INSP. JOSELITO T. ESQUIVEL, INSP. RICARDO G. DANDAN, SPO4 VICENTE ARNADO, SPO4 ROBERTO F. LANGCAUON, SPO2 VIRGILIO V. PARAGAS, SPO2 ROLANDO R. JIMENEZ, SPO1

We shall now determine whether under the allegations in the Informations, it is the Sandiganbayan or Regional Trial Court which has jurisdictions over the multiple murder case against herein petitioner and entervenors. The remaining question to be resolved then is whether the offense of multiple murder was committed in relation to the office of the accussed PNP officers. POINT 3. AN OFFENSE IS SAID TO HAVE BEEN COMMITTED IN RELATION TO THE OFFICE IF IT (THE OFFENSE) IS "INTIMATELY CONNECTED" WITH THE OFFICE OF THE OFFENDER AND PERPETRATED WHILE HE WAS IN THE PERFORMANCE OF HIS OFFICIAL FUNCTIONS. 65 THIS INTIMATE RELATION BETWEEN THE OFFENSE CHARGED AND THE DISCHARGE OF OFFICIAL DUTIES "MUST BE ALLEGED IN THE INFORMATIONS." 66 As stated earlier, the multiple murder charge against petitioner and intervenors falls under Section 4 [paragraph b] of R.A. 8249. Section 4 requires that the offense charged must be committed by the offender in relation to his office in order for the Sandiganbayan to have jurisdiction over it. 63 This jurisdictional requirement is in accordance with Section 5, Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution which mandated that the Sandiganbayan shall have jurisdiction over criminal cases committed by the public officers and employees, including those in goverment-owned or controlled corporations, "in relation to their office as may be determined by law."

POINT 4. APPLYING THESE LEGAL PRINCIPLES AND DOCTRINES TO THE PRESENT CASE, WE FIND THE AMENDED INFORMATIONS FOR MURDER AGAINST HEREIN PETITIONER AND INTERVENORS WANTING OF SPECIFIC FACTUAL AVERMENTS TO SHOW THE INTIMATE RELATION/CONNECTION BETWEEN THE OFFENSE CHARGED AND THE DISCHARGE OF OFFICIAL FUNCTION OF THE OFFENDERS. WHILE THE ABOVE-QUOTED INFORMATION STATES THAT THE ABOVENAMED PRINCIPAL ACCUSED COMMITTED THE CRIME OF MURDER "IN RELATION TO THIER PUBLIC OFFICE, THERE IS, HOWEVER, NO SPECIFIC ALLEGATION OF FACTS THAT THE SHOOTING OF THE VICTIM BY THE SAID PRINCIPAL ACCUSED WAS INTIMATELY RELATED TO THE DISCHARGE OF THEIR OFFICIAL DUTIES AS POLICE OFFICERS. LIKEWISE, THE AMENDED

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Morillo, Leo Adrian B. 2008-78252

WILFREDO C. CUARTERO, SPO1 ROBERTO O. AGBALOG, and SPO1 OSMUNDO B. CARINO, all taking advantage of their public and official positions as officers and members of the Philippine National Police and committing the acts herein alleged in relation to their public office, conspiring with intent to kill and using firearms with treachery evident premeditation and taking advantage of their superior strenghts did then and there willfully unlawfully and feloniously shoot JOEL AMORA, thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal wounds which caused his instantaneous death to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the said victim. That accused CHIEF SUPT. JEWEL F. CANSON, CHIEF SUPT. ROMOE M. ACOP, CHIEF SUPT. PANFILO M. LACSON, SENIOR SUPT. FRANCISCO G. ZUBIAM JR., SUPT. ALMARIO A. HILARIO, CHIEF INSP. CESAR O. MANCAO II, CHIEF INSP. GIL L. MENESES, SENIOR INSP. GLENN DUMLAO, SENIOR INSP. ROLANDO ANDUYAN, INSP. CEASAR TANNAGAN, SPO3 WILLY NUAS, SPO3 CICERO S. BACOLOD, PO2 ALEJANDRO G. LIWANAG committing the acts in relation to office as officers and members of the Philippine National Police are charged herein as accessories after-the-fact for concealing the crime herein above alleged by among others falsely representing that there where no arrest made during the read conducted by the accused herein at Superville Subdivision, Paranaque, Metro Manila on or about the early dawn of May 18, 1995. CONTRARY LAW. It is alleged therein that the said accessories concelead "the crime herein-above alleged by, among others, falsely representing that there were no arrests made during the raid conducted by the accused herein at Superville Subdivision, Paranaque Metro Manila, on or about the early dawn of May 18, 1995." The sudden mention of the "arrests made during the raid conducted by the accused" surprises the reader. There is no indication in the amended information that the victim was one of those arrested by the accused during the "raid." Worse, the raid and arrests were allegedly conducted "at Superville Subdivision, Paranaque, Metro Manila" but, as alleged in the immediately preceding paragraph of the amended information, the shooting of the victim by the principal accused occurred in Mariano Marcos Avenue, Quezon City." How the raid, arrests and shooting happened in the two places far away from each other is puzzling. Again, while there is the

Law on Public Officers Liabilities Resignation

allegation in the amended information that the said accessories committed the offense "in relation to office as officers and members of the (PNP)," we, however, do not see the intimate connection between the offense charged and the accused's official functions, which, as earlier discussed, is an essential element in determining the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Leroy S. Brown City Mayor of Basilan City, as such, has organized groups of police patrol and civilian commandoes consisting of regular policeman and . . . special policemen appointed and provided by him with pistols and higher power guns and then established a camp . . . at Tipo-tipo which is under his command . . . supervision and control where his co-defendants were stationed entertained criminal complaints and conducted the corresponding investigations as well as assumed the authority to arrest and detain person without due process of law and without bringing them to the proper court, and that in line with this set-up established by said Mayor of Basilan City as such, and acting upon his orders his co-defendants arrested and maltreated Awalin Tebag who denied in consequence thereof. the phrase committed in relation to public office "does not appear in the information, which only signifies that the said phrase is not what determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. What is controlling is the specific factual allegations in the information that would indicate the close intimacy between the discharge of the accused's official duties and the commission of the offense charged, in order to qualify the crime as having been committed in relation to public office.

WHEREFORE, the constitutionality of Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 is hereby sustained. The Addendum to the March 5, 1997 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan is REVERSED. The Sandiganbayan is hereby directed to transfer Criminal Cases Nos. 23047 to 23057 (for multiple murder) to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City which has exclusive original jurisdiction over the said cases.1wphi1.nt SO ORDERED.

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G.R. No. 78957 June 28, 1988 MARIO D. ORTIZ, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondents. FERNAN, J.: this petition is basically one for a writ of mandamus aimed at compelling both the COMELEC and the COA to approve his claim for retirement benefits. ISSUE: whether or not a constitutional official whose "courtesy resignation" was accepted by the President of the Philippines during the effectivity of the Freedom Constitution may be entitled to retirement benefits under Republic Act No. 1568.2 1. 2. 3. Petitioner was appointed Commissioner of [COMELEC] for a term expiring May 17, 1992." He took his oath of office on July 30, 1985. On March 5, 1986, courtesy resignation to Aquino. Pres. Proclamation. Section 3 of Freedom Constitution: SEC. 3. Any public officer or employee separated from the service as a result of the reorganization effected under this Proclamation shall, if entitled under the laws then in force, receive the retirement and other benefits accruing thereunder. 4. 5. 6. President had "accepted, with regrets, their respective resignations, effective immediately." Petitioner submitted to new COMELEC Chairmen respective applications for retirement. To justify their petitions for retirement and their requests for payment of retirement benefits, invoked Republic Act No. l568 as amended by Republic Act No. 3595 and re-enacted by Republic Act No. 6118, specifically the following provision:

Law on Public Officers Liabilities Resignation

SECTION 1. When the Auditor General or the Chairman or any Member of the Commission on Elections retires from the service for having completed his term of office or by reason of his incapacity to discharge the duties of his office, or dies while in the service, or resigns at any time after reaching the age of sixty years but before the expiration of his term of office, he or his heirs shall be paid in lump sum his salary for one year, not exceeding five years, for every year of service based upon the last annual salary that he was receiving at the time of retirement incapacity, death or resignation, as the case may be: Provided, That in case of resignation, he has rendered not less than twenty years of service in the government; And provided, further, That he shall receive an annuity payable monthly during the residue of his natural life equivalent to the amount of monthly salary he was receiving on the date of retirement, incapacity or resignation. 7. COMELEC revoked denied the applications for retirement of Commissioners.

Petitioner Ortiz moved for the reconsideration of said resolution, he did not resign but simply placed his position at the disposal of the President; that he had in fact completed his term as Commissioner by the "change in the term of [his] office and eventual replacement," Article 1186 of the Civil Code which states that "the condition [with regard to an obligation] shall be deemed fulfilled when the obligor voluntarily prevents its fulfillment." He invoked the aforequoted provisions of Proclamation No. 3 and cited the cases of former Chief Justice Ramon C. Aquino and Associate Justice Hermogenes Concepcion, Jr. who were allowed to retire by this Court and receive retirement benefits.

Respondents: petitioner's "voluntary resignation" prevented the completion of his term of office, and, therefore, having rendered only sixteen years of service to the government, he is not entitled to retirement benefits.

2 AN

ACT TO PROVIDE LIFE PENSION TO THE AUDITOR GENERAL AND THE CHAIRMAN OR ANY MEMBER OF THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS.

SC: for petitioner

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POINT 1. PETITIONER'S SEPARATION FROM GOVERNMENT SERVICE AS A RESULT OF THE REORGANIZATION ORDAINED BY THE THEN NASCENT AQUINO GOVERNMENT MAY NOT BE CONSIDERED A RESIGNATION WITHIN THE CONTEMPLATION OF THE LAW. RESIGNATION IS DEFINED AS THE ACT OF GIVING UP OR THE ACT OF AN OFFICER BY WHICH HE DECLINES HIS OFFICE AND RENOUNCES THE FURTHER RIGHT TO USE IT. TO CONSTITUTE A COMPLETE AND OPERATIVE ACT OF RESIGNATION, THE OFFICER OR EMPLOYEE MUST SHOW A CLEAR INTENTION TO RELINQUISH OR SURRENDER HIS POSITION ACCOMPANIED BY THE ACT OF RELINQUISHMENT. RESIGNATION IMPLIES AN EXPRESSION OF THE INCUMBENT IN SOME FORM, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, OF THE INTENTION TO SURRENDER, RENOUNCE AND RELINQUISH THE OFFICE, AND ITS ACCEPTANCE BY COMPETENT AND LAWFUL AUTHORITY. FROM THE FOREGOING IT IS EVIDENT THAT PETITIONER'S "RESIGNATION" LACKS THE ELEMENT OF CLEAR INTENTION TO SURRENDER HIS POSITION. WE CANNOT PRESUME SUCH INTENTION FROM HIS STATEMENT IN HIS LETTER OF MARCH 5, 1986 THAT HE WAS PLACING HIS POSITION AT THE DISPOSAL OF THE PRESIDENT. HE DID NOT CATEGORICALLY STATE THEREIN THAT HE WAS UNCONDITIONALLY GIVING UP HIS POSITION. It should be remembered that said letter was actually a response to Proclamation No. 1 which President Aquino issued on February 25,1986 when she called on all appointive public officials to tender their "courtesy resignation" as a "first step to restore confidence in public administration. Verily, a "courtesy resignation" can lot properly be interpreted as resignation in the legal sense for it is not necessarily a reflection of a public official's intention to surrender his position. Rather, it manifests his submission to the will of the political authority and the appointing power.

Law on Public Officers Liabilities Resignation

POINT 3. As he is deemed to have completed his term of office, petitioner should be considered retired from the service. And, in the absence of proof that he has been found guilty of malfeasance or misfeasance in office or that there is a pending administrative case against him, petitioner is entitled to a life pension under Republic Act No. 1568 as amended and reenacted by Republic Act No. 6118. He is, therefore, protected by the mantle of the Freedom Constitution specifically Article III, Section 3 thereof which was in effect when he was replaced by the appointment and qualification of a new Commissioner.

On the respondents' assertion that the retirement law is clear and hence, there is no room for its interpretation, We reiterate the basic principle that, being remedial in character, a statute creating pensions should be liberally construed and administered in favor of the persons intended to be benefited thereby. 19 This is as it should be because the liberal approach aims to achieve the humanitarian purposes of the law in order that the efficiency, security, and well-being of government employees may be enhanced. 20 WHEREFORE, respondent Commission on Elections denial of petitioner's application for retirement benefits is hereby reversed and set aside. The Commission on Audit and other public offices concerned are directed to facilitate the processing and payment of petitioner's retirement benefits.

POINT 2. THE CURTAILMENT OF HIS TERM NOT BEING ATTRIBUTABLE TO ANY VOLUNTARY ACT ON THE PART OF THE PETITIONER, EQUITY AND JUSTICE DEMAND THAT HE SHOULD BE DEEMED TO HAVE COMPLETED HIS TERM ALBEIT MUCH AHEAD OF THE DATE STATED IN HIS APPOINTMENT PAPER. Petitioner's case should be placed in the same category as that of an official holding a primarily confidential position whose tenure ends upon his superior's loss of confidence in him. His cessation from the service entails no removal but an expiration of his term.

G.R. No. 146710-15

March 2, 2001

JOSEPH E. ESTRADA, petitioner, vs. ANIANO DESIERTO, in his capacity as Ombudsman, RAMON GONZALES, VOLUNTEERS AGAINST CRIME AND CORRUPTION, GRAFT FREE PHILIPPINES FOUNDATION, INC., LEONARD DE VERA, DENNIS FUNA, ROMEO CAPULONG and ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR., respondent.

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---------------------------------------G.R. No. 146738 March 2, 2001 9. 10. 11.

Law on Public Officers Liabilities Resignation

Recognition of respondent Arroyo's government by foreign governments swiftly followed. The House then passed Resolution No. 175 "expressing the full support of the House of Representatives to the administration respondent signed into law the Solid Waste Management Act.40 A few days later, she also signed into law the Political Advertising ban and Fair Election Practices Act. the Senate passed Resolution No. 83 declaring that the impeachment court is functus officio and has been terminated. Her presidency is accepted by majorities in all social classes

JOSEPH E. ESTRADA, petitioner, vs. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, respondent. PUNO, J.: On the line in the cases at bar is the office of the President. Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada alleges that he is the President on leave while respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo claims she is the President. 1. Both petitioner and the respondent were to serve a six-year term commencing on June 30, 1998.

12. 13.

Several cases previously filed against him in the Office of the Ombudsman were set in motion. bribery and graft and corruption; plunder, forfeiture, graft and corruption, bribery, perjury, serious misconduct, violation of the Code of Conduct for Government Employees, etc; malversation of public funds, illegal use of public funds and property, plunder, etc.; for bribery, plunder, indirect bribery, violation of PD 1602, PD 1829, PD 46, and RA 7080;

Incidents: 2. 3. Rallies for the resignation of the petitioner exploded in various parts of the country. Negotiation between parties. Then, news broke out that Chief Justice Davide would administer the oath to respondent Arroyo at high noon at the EDSA Shrine. At about 12:00 noon, Chief Justice Davide administered the oath to respondent Arroyo as President of the Philippines. At twelve o'clock noon today, Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo took her oath as President of the Republic of the Philippines. While along with many other legal minds of our country, I have strong and serious doubts about the legality and constitutionality of her proclamation as President, I do not wish to be a factor that will prevent the restoration of unity and order in our civil society. By virtue of the provisions of Section 11, Article VII of the Constitution, Estrada declaration that I am unable to exercise the powers and duties of my office. By operation of law and the Constitution, the Vice-President shall be the Acting President. court Resolve unanimously to confirm the authority given by the twelve (12) members of the Court then present to the Chief Justice on January 20, 2001 to administer the oath of office of Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Philippines, at noon of January 20, 2001.

A special panel of investigators was forthwith created by the respondent Ombudsman to investigate the charges against the petitioner. 14. petitioner filed with this Court GR No. 146710-15, a petition for prohibition. It sought to enjoin the respondent Ombudsman from "conducting any further proceedings until after the term of petitioner as President is over and only if legally warranted." 15. Thru another counsel, petitioner, on February 6, filed GR No. 146738 for Quo Warranto. He prayed for judgment "confirming petitioner to be the lawful and incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his office, and declaring respondent to have taken her oath as and to be holding the Office of the President, only in an acting capacity pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution." ISSUES:

4. 5. 6.

7.

8.

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Assuming that the petitions present a justiciable controversy, whether petitioner Estrada is a President on leave while respondent Arroyo is an Acting President. Whether conviction in the impeachment proceedings is a condition precedent for the criminal prosecution of petitioner Estrada. In the negative and on the assumption that petitioner is still President, whether he is immune from criminal prosecution. Whether the prosecution of petitioner Estrada should be enjoined on the ground of prejudicial publicity.

Law on Public Officers Liabilities Resignation

The issue brings under the microscope the meaning of section 8, Article VII of the Constitution which provides: "Sec. 8. In case of death, permanent disability, removal from office or resignation of the President, the Vice President shall become the President to serve the unexpired term. In case of death, permanent disability, removal from office, or resignation of both the President and Vice President, the President of the Senate or, in case of his inability, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, shall then act as President until the President or Vice President shall have been elected and qualified. POINT 2. Resignation is not a high level legal abstraction. It is a factual question and its elements are beyond quibble: there must be an intent to resign and the intent must be coupled by acts of relinquishment. not governed by any formal requirement as to form. It can be implied. As long as the resignation is clear, it must be given legal effect.

POINT 1. THE GOVERNMENT OF RESPONDENT ARROYO IS NOT REVOLUTIONARY IN CHARACTER. THE OATH THAT SHE TOOK AT THE EDSA SHRINE IS THE OATH UNDER THE 1987 CONSTITUTION.64 IN HER OATH, SHE CATEGORICALLY SWORE TO PRESERVE AND DEFEND THE 1987 CONSTITUTION. INDEED, SHE HAS STRESSED THAT SHE IS DISCHARGING THE POWERS OF THE PRESIDENCY UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION. IN FINE, THE LEGAL DISTINCTION BETWEEN EDSA PEOPLE POWER I EDSA PEOPLE POWER II IS CLEAR. EDSA I involves the exercise of the people power of revolution which overthrew the whole government. EDSA II is an exercise of people power of freedom of speech and freedom of assembly to petition the government for redress of grievances which only affected the office of the President. EDSA I is extra constitutional and the legitimacy of the new government that resulted from it cannot be the subject of judicial review, but EDSA II is intra constitutional and the resignation of the sitting President that it caused and the succession of the Vice President as President are subject to judicial review. EDSA I presented a political question; EDSA II involves legal questions. Needless to state, the cases at bar pose legal and not political questions. not the petitioner

POINT 3. IN THE CASES AT BAR, THE FACTS SHOW THAT PETITIONER DID NOT WRITE ANY FORMAL LETTER OF RESIGNATION BEFORE HE EVACUATED MALACAANG PALACE IN THE AFTERNOON OF JANUARY 20, 2001 AFTER THE OATH-TAKING OF RESPONDENT ARROYO. CONSEQUENTLY, WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER RESIGNED HAS TO BE DETERMINED FROM HIS ACT AND OMISSIONS BEFORE, DURING AND AFTER JANUARY 20, 2001 OR BY THE TOTALITY OF PRIOR, CONTEMPORANEOUS AND POSTERIOR FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE BEARING A MATERIAL RELEVANCE ON THE ISSUE. USING THIS TOTALITY TEST, WE HOLD THAT PETITIONER RESIGNED AS PRESIDENT. The proposal for a snap election for president in May where he would not be a candidate is an indicium that petitioner had intended to give up the presidency even at that time. Significantly, the petitioner expressed no objection to the suggestion for a graceful and dignified exit but said he would never leave the country.

Whether or Resigned as President

The issue then is whether the petitioner resigned as President or should be considered resigned as of January 20, 2001 when respondent took her oath as the 14th President of the Public.

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This is proof that petitioner had reconciled himself to the reality that he had to resign. His mind was already concerned with the five-day grace period he could stay in the palace. It was a matter of time. the problem was already about a peaceful and orderly transfer of power. The resignation of the petitioner was implied. Again, this is high grade evidence that the petitioner has resigned. The intent to resign is clear when he said "x x x Ayoko na masyado nang masakit." "Ayoko na" are words of resignation. The second round of negotiation cements the reading that the petitioner has resigned. It will be noted that during this second round of negotiation, the resignation of the petitioner was again treated as a given fact. The only unsettled points at that time were the measures to be undertaken by the parties during and after the transition period. In sum, we hold that the resignation of the petitioner cannot be doubted. It was confirmed by his leaving Malacaang. In the press release containing his final statement, (1) he acknowledged the oathtaking of the respondent as President of the Republic albeit with reservation about its legality; (2) he emphasized he was leaving the Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of our nation. He did not say he was leaving the Palace due to any kind inability and that he was going to reassume the presidency as soon as the disability disappears: (3) he expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them. Without doubt, he was referring to the past opportunity given him to serve the people as President (4) he assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come ahead in the same service of our country. Petitioner's reference is to a future challenge after occupying the office of the president which he has given up; and (5) he called on his supporters to join him in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity.

Law on Public Officers Liabilities Resignation

operation of law and the Constitution, the Vice President shall be the Acting president. POINT 5. A READING OF THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF RA NO. 3019 WILL HARDLY PROVIDE ANY COMFORT TO THE PETITIONER. RA NO. 3019 ORIGINATED FORM SENATE BILL NO. 293. THE ORIGINAL DRAFT OF THE BILL, WHEN IT WAS SUBMITTED TO THE SENATE, DID NOT CONTAIN A PROVISION SIMILAR TO SECTION 12 OF THE LAW AS IT NOW STANDS. BE THAT AS IT MAY, THE INTENT OF THE LAW OUGHT TO BE OBVIOUS. IT IS TO PREVENT THE ACT OF RESIGNATION OR RETIREMENT FROM BEING USED BY A PUBLIC OFFICIAL AS A PROTECTIVE SHIELD TO STOP THE INVESTIGATION OF A PENDING CRIMINAL OR ADMINISTRATIVE CASE AGAINST HIM AND TO PREVENT HIS PROSECUTION UNDER THE ANTI-GRAFT LAW OR PROSECUTION FOR BRIBERY UNDER THE REVISED PENAL CODE. SECTION 12 OF RA NO. 3019 CANNOT THEREFORE BE INVOKED BY THE PETITIONER FOR IT CONTEMPLATES OF CASES WHOSE INVESTIGATION OR PROSECUTION DO NOT SUFFER FROM ANY INSUPERABLE LEGAL OBSTACLE LIKE THE IMMUNITY FROM SUIT OF A SITTING PRESIDENT. After petitioner contended that as a matter of fact he did not resign, he also argues that he could not resign as a matter of law. He relies on section 12 of RA No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-graft and Corrupt Practices Act, which allegedly prohibits his resignation,: "Sec. 12. No public officer shall be allowed to resign or retire pending an investigation, criminals or administrative, or pending a prosecution against him, for any offense under this Act or under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on bribery." POINT 6. WE HOLD OTHERWISE. THE EXACT NATURE OF AN IMPEACHMENT PROCEEDING IS DEBATABLE. BUT EVEN ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT IT IS AN ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDING, IT CAN NOT BE CONSIDERED PENDING AT THE TIME PETITIONER RESIGNED BECAUSE THE PROCESS ALREADY BROKE DOWN. THERE WAS, IN EFFECT, NO IMPEACHMENT CASE PENDING AGAINST PETITIONER WHEN HE RESIGNED.

POINT 4. TO SAY THE LEAST, THE ABOVE LETTER IS WRAPPED IN MYSTERY.91 THE PLEADINGS FILED BY THE PETITIONER IN THE CASES AT BAR DID NOT DISCUSS, MAY EVEN INTIMATE, THE CIRCUMSTANCES THAT LED TO ITS PREPARATION. It is, however, urged that the petitioner did not resign but only took a temporary leave o By virtue of the provisions of Section II, Article VII of the Constitution, I am hereby transmitting this declaration that I am unable to exercise the powers and duties of my office. By

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Petitioner contends that the impeachment proceeding is an administrative investigation that, under section 12 of RA 3019, bars him from resigning.

Law on Public Officers Liabilities Resignation

Whenever a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet transmit to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice-President shall immediately assume the powers and duties of the office as Acting President. Thereafter, when the President transmits to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration that no inability exists, he shall reassume the powers and duties of his office. Meanwhile, should a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet transmit within five days to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Congress shall decide the issue. For that purpose, the Congress shall convene, if it is not in session, within forty-eight hours, in accordance with its rules and without need of call. If the Congress, within ten days after receipt of the last written declaration, or, if not in session, within twelve days after it is required to assemble, determines by a two-thirds vote of both Houses, voting separately, that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice-President shall act as President; otherwise, the President shall continue exercising the powers and duties of his office." 1. Petitioner, on January 20, 2001, sent the above letter claiming inability to the Senate President and Speaker of the House; Unaware of the letter, respondent Arroyo took her oath of office as President on January 20, 2001 at about 12:30 p.m.; Despite receipt of the letter, the House of Representatives passed on January 24, 2001 House Resolution No. 175;96

Whether or not the petitioner Is only temporarily unable to Act as President. POINT 7. WHAT LEAPS TO THE EYE FROM THESE IRREFUTABLE FACTS IS THAT BOTH HOUSES OF CONGRESS HAVE RECOGNIZED RESPONDENT ARROYO AS THE PRESIDENT. IMPLICITLY CLEAR IN THAT RECOGNITION IS THE PREMISE THAT THE INABILITY OF PETITIONER ESTRADA. IS NO LONGER TEMPORARY. CONGRESS HAS CLEARLY REJECTED PETITIONER'S CLAIM OF INABILITY. CLEARLY, THE COURT CANNOT PASS UPON PETITIONER'S CLAIM OF INABILITY TO DISCHARGE THE POWER AND DUTIES OF THE PRESIDENCY. THE QUESTION IS POLITICAL IN NATURE AND ADDRESSED SOLELY TO CONGRESS BY CONSTITUTIONAL FIAT. IT IS A POLITICAL ISSUE, WHICH CANNOT BE DECIDED BY THIS COURT WITHOUT TRANSGRESSING THE PRINCIPLE OF SEPARATION OF POWERS. IN FINE, EVEN IF THE PETITIONER CAN PROVE THAT HE DID NOT RESIGN, STILL, HE CANNOT SUCCESSFULLY CLAIM THAT HE IS A PRESIDENT ON LEAVE ON THE GROUND THAT HE IS MERELY UNABLE TO GOVERN TEMPORARILY. THAT CLAIM HAS BEEN LAID TO REST BY CONGRESS AND THE DECISION THAT RESPONDENT ARROYO IS THE DE JURE, PRESIDENT MADE BY A CO-EQUAL BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT CANNOT BE REVIEWED BY THIS COURT. that "Congress has the ultimate authority under the Constitution to determine whether the President is incapable of performing his functions in the manner provided for in section 11 of article VII."95 This contention is the centerpiece of petitioner's stance that he is a President on leave and respondent Arroyo is only an Acting President. "SEC. 11. Whenever the President transmits to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration that he is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, and until he transmits to them a written declaration to the contrary, such powers and duties shall be discharged by the VicePresident as Acting President.

2.

3.

Whether or not the petitioner enjoys immunity from suit. We shall now rule on the contentions of petitioner in the light of this history. We reject his argument that he cannot be prosecuted for the reason that he must first be convicted in the impeachment proceedings.

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Morillo, Leo Adrian B. 2008-78252

The impeachment trial of petitioner Estrada was aborted by the walkout of the prosecutors and by the events that led to his loss of the presidency. The plea if granted, would put a perpetual bar against his prosecution. Such a submission has nothing to commend itself for it will place him in a better situation than a non-sitting President who has not been subjected to impeachment proceedings and yet can be the object of a criminal prosecution. To be sure, the debates in the Constitutional Commission make it clear that when impeachment proceedings have become moot due to the resignation of the President, the proper criminal and civil cases may already be filed against him, viz: This is in accord with our ruling In Re: Saturnino Bermudez111 that 'incumbent Presidents are immune from suit or from being brought to court during the period of their incumbency and tenure" but not beyond. We now come to the scope of immunity that can be claimed by petitioner as a non-sitting President. The cases filed against petitioner Estrada are criminal in character. They involve plunder, bribery and graft and corruption. By no stretch of the imagination can these crimes, especially plunder which carries the death penalty, be covered by the alleged mantle of immunity of a nonsitting president. Whether or not the prosecution of petitioner Estrada should be enjoined due to prejudicial publicity Petitioner also contends that the respondent Ombudsman should be stopped from conducting the investigation of the cases filed against him due to the barrage of prejudicial publicity on his guilt. He submits that the respondent Ombudsman has developed bias and is all set file the criminal cases violation of his right to due process. There are two (2) principal legal and philosophical schools of thought on how to deal with the rain of unrestrained publicity during the investigation and trial of high profile cases.125 The British approach the problem with the presumption that publicity will prejudice a jury. Thus, English courts readily stay and stop criminal trials when the right of an accused to fair trial suffers a threat.126 The American approach is different. US courts assume a skeptical approach about the potential effect of pervasive publicity on the right of an accused to a fair trial. They have developed different strains of tests to resolve this issue, i.e., substantial; probability of irreparable harm, strong likelihood, clear and present danger, etc.

Law on Public Officers Liabilities Resignation

Be that as it may, we recognize that pervasive and prejudicial publicity under certain circumstances can deprive an accused of his due process right to fair trial. Thus, in Martelino, et al. vs. Alejandro, et al., we held that to warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity there must be allegation and proof that the judges have been unduly influenced, not simply that they might be, by the barrage of publicity. Applying the above ruling, we hold that there is not enough evidence to warrant this Court to enjoin the preliminary investigation of the petitioner by the respondent Ombudsman. Again, we hold that the evidence proffered by the petitioner is insubstantial. The accuracy of the news reports referred to by the petitioner cannot be the subject of judicial notice by this Court especially in light of the denials of the respondent Ombudsman as to his alleged prejudice and the presumption of good faith and regularity in the performance of official duty to which he is entitled. Nor can we adopt the theory of derivative prejudice of petitioner, i.e., that the prejudice of respondent Ombudsman flows to his subordinates. In truth, our Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, give investigation prosecutors the independence to make their own findings and recommendations albeit they are reviewable by their superiors.134 They can be reversed but they can not be compelled cases which they believe deserve dismissal. In other words, investigating prosecutors should not be treated like unthinking slot machines. Moreover, if the respondent Ombudsman resolves to file the cases against the petitioner and the latter believes that the findings of probable cause against him is the result of bias, he still has the remedy of assailing it before the proper court. IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petitions of Joseph Ejercito Estrada challenging the respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as the de jure 14th President of the Republic are DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.

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