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Can the Alliance for Progress Succeed? Author(s): Willard F.

Barber Source: Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 351, The Changing Cold War, (Jan., 1964), pp. 81-91 Published by: Sage Publications, Inc. in association with the American Academy of Political and Social Science Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1035223 Accessed: 05/08/2008 16:35
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Can the Alliance for Progress Succeed?


By WILLARD F. BARBER

fore its proclamation in 1961. Its objectives are admirable, grandiose, and, some of them, contradictory. It is beset by complicated organizationaland administrative problems, some of which can be resolved. It is endangered by a continuous massive flight of capital to safe havens abroad, of about the same magnitude as the inflow of our aid. It faces great odds of opposition from the oligarchical sectors in Latin America. The Latin-American governments have also been slow in makingplans and quick to change the ones made. At the same time, some of them allege that Washington does not allow for great differencesin the various countries and state that it is an error in judgment to leave to the United States the apportionment of financial and economic support. Others object to the requirement that materials must be purchased in the United States and to the post-Cuban motivation of the Alliance. Nevertheless, there is widespread realization throughout the hemisphere that the hour is very late, that population growth is outrunning economic development, and that the power of the United States to influence events is limited. Some of the ruling military juntas do seem to be social-minded, but the upper strata cannot be induced to accept reforms at the pace we deem essential. There is some hope that liberal Catholic leaders, moving from the base of Pope John's Mater et Magistra, may be able to induce centrist groups to co-operate with the democraticleft in a broaderadvance.
Willard F. Barber, Washington, D. C., is now Lecturer on International Affairs, University of Maryland. He has served on the faculty of American University. He was a member of the United States Foreign Service and the Department of State, 1938 to 1961, centering on Latin-American affairs. His posts included Counselor of Embassy in Peru and Colombia, Chief of the Division of Central American and Caribbean Affairs, and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs.
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ABSTRACT: The Alliance for Progress had many origins be-

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NLESS the great majority of people and organized groups and leaders of influence feel themselves involved and committed to [its] goals, the Alliance for Progress will not succeed . .."-Ambassador Lincoln Gordon, in "A New Deal for Latin America: The Alliance for Progress." "The truth is that one cannot see anywhere in Latin America the spirit of enthusiasm that should precede and go along with such a formidable adventure . . ."-Expresident Lleras Camargo, in Report of June 15, 1963 to the Council of the Organization of American States. The Alliance for Progress may suffer less from its enemies than from its friends, as is epitomized in the two statements above. AmbassadorGordon, widely recognized as one of the creators of the Alliance for Progress, and Dr. Alberto Lleras Camargo,twice President of Colombia and former Secretary-General of the Organization of American States (OAS), portray here the deep gulf that lies between desirability and reality. There are divergent opinions as to the present or potential success of the Alliance for Progress. Some of the divergencies undoubtedly arise from wishful thinking, often repeated but undocumented. However, some of the differences stem from a lack of knowledge of the objectives of this hemisphericmovement. President Kennedy, marking the first anniversary of announcing the Alliance on March 13, 1962, said: Those who possess wealth and power in poor nations must accept their own responsibilities. They must lead the fight for those basic reforms which alone can preserve the fabric of their societies. Those who make peaceful revolutionimpossible will make violent revolution inevitable. In The New Leader for October 14, 1963, former Dominican President Juan

Bosch, in an article entitled "Why I Was Overthrown,"wrote:


It is difficult for a citizen of the United States to understand the mentality of the oligarchical sectors of Latin America. Their solidarity and lust for power in order to hold on to privileges that are unknown today in most civilized countries of the world is beyond the comprehension of the average person in the United States.

Bosch also reported that, during his six months in office, and even prior to
his inauguration in

Dominican military leaders were conspiring against him. In seeking for fiscal year 1964 larger-than-ever funds David E. Bell, Agency for International Development Administrator,held a different view: "The use of military assistance for internal security purposes
is predicated upon the fact that military forces have an essential role as a for military assistance to Latin America,

February

1963,

stabilizing force in these countries." Thus another dilemma is raised. Is our policy, determined at the top-Mr. Bell was explicit in observing that "each internal security program in Latin America is initiated only after a Presidential determination"-of help or hindrance to popularly elected civilian governments? Is it not necessary to consider the whole context of our LatinAmerican policy? Perhaps the Alliance is wrongly identified in the public mind as the total of our Latin-American to examine the objectives of the Alliance with care, to determine both its intrinsic worth and its extrinsic relationships. The Alliance for Progress is extremely broad and wide-ranging,as we shall see, but there are other elements in our policy toward the other American republics, such as our relationship in the United Nations, our obligations under the 1947 Rio Treaty of Reciprocal Aspolicy, whereas it might be, in reality, only a part? Obviously, it is necessary

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sistance, membership in the Organization of American States and its juridical, cultural, peace-making, and antisubversion committees. There are recognition policy and visa policy to be considered which Professor Frank Tannenbaum recently criticized as the "greatest single obstacle to goodwill and friendship." ORIGINS Early modest precursors of the Alliance for Progress that can be identified as part of the Good Neighbor policy include the passage of Public Law 63 in 1938, providing for the loan of federal-governmentemployees to those Latin-American governments requesting their services, administered as an integral function of the State Department's Office of American Republics Affairs. In 1940 the Office of Coordinator of Inter-AmericanAffairs was set up by executive order, to be incorporated as the Institute of Inter-American Affairs in 1942. It embarked on enlarged cultural and student-and-professor exchanges, and created co-operating organizations, called Servicios, which brought direct financial and personnel assistance to ministries of education, health, and agriculture. During the years of the Technical Cooperation Administration (TCA) established by Public Law 535 in June of 1950, the Foreign Operations Administration (FOA) from 1953 to 1955, the International Cooperation Administration (ICA), followed in turn by the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA), and the Agency for International Development (AID), there were varying amounts of appropriations and of self-help by Latin governments. Other legislative or administrative actions in Washington benefited the hemisphere countries, in the form of LendLease, Department of Agriculture cooperation in demonstration projects,

scientific investigations, and foot-andmouth disease control. To this should be added credits and grants from the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, the Export-Import Bank, as well as surplus property sales. By 1958 Latin-American thoughts were crystallized in Brazilian President Kubitschek's proposed "Operation Pan America" for enlarged and comprehensive economic development. This set in motion a meeting of Foreign Ministers in Washington and the creation of a "Special Committee to Study the Formulation of New Measures for Economic Cooperation" (Committee of Twentyone). In August 1959 an Inter-American Development Bank was created, with United States membership authorized by Congress and President Eisenhower. In February of 1960 Presidents Eisenhower and Kubitschek conferred on financing Latin-American development, commodity price stabilization, and social-reform legislation. Later in the year, the Congress approved the President's request for a $600,000,000 contribution to a Social Progress Fund, of which $100,000,000 was earmarked for Chilean earthquake rehabilitation. September 1960 saw the adoption by the Committee of Twenty-one of the Pact of Bogota. It should be noted that during 1960 there came into being the Central American Common Market Agreement and in 1961 the Latin-American Free Trade Association (of South America). Introductory paragraphsof the Act of Bogota stressed that the preservation of democratic institutions required acceleration of social and economic progress, especially measures of self-help in the areas of taxation, land and housing legislation, education, and a Special Fund for Social Development. Additional public and private financing was called for, as well as the preparation of development plans, and the mobilization

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of domestic capital and personnel resources.1 In March 1961 President Kennedy announced the Alliance at a White House ceremony keynoting that "our unfulfilled task is to demonstrate . . . that economic progress and social justice can best be achieved . . . within a framework of democratic institutions." In August a Special Meeting of the Inter-American Economic and Social Council (IA Ecosoc) issued, without Cuba's signature, the Declaration to the Peoples of America and the Charter of Punta del Este, based almost wholly on the concepts set out in the Pact of Bogota. The Declaration and the Charter are hortatory, progressive, comprehensive, and idealistic. They are also grandiose, optimistic, expensive to implement, and susceptible of differing interpretations. The Declaration aims at stronger democratic institutions "to assure that all share fully" in housing, health, tax and fiscal reforms, stimulation of private enterprise, of employment, and of economic integration. Other goals are to "wipe out" illiteracy, to find a "quick and lasting solution" for commodity export prices, to punish tax evasion severely, to prepare national economic development programs, and to "redistribute national income to those who are most in need while promoting savings and investment." The Charterlists specific objectives of 2.5 per cent per capita annual growth, agricultural diversification, land reform, industrialization, to provide water and
1 In view of the history of both Republican and Democratic efforts in inter-American relations, the partisanship of Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., is notable in his statement at the Ditchley Park Conference in England in March 1963: "The Alliance for Progress marks the first creative initiative in hemisphere policy since the Good Neighbor Policy of Franklin Roosevelt." In Canning House Bulletin, April 1963, p. 9.

sewers to 70 per cent of the urbanpopulation, to reduce child mortality rates by one half, "to maintain stable price levels, avoiding inflation or deflation," and to increase low-cost housing. The necessity for self-help and long-term development programs, with accompanying organizations and procedures, are set forth with recommendations for wider use of regional common-market groups and active participation of the private economic sector.
OBJECTIVES

A scanning of official statements on the Alliance's objectives is useful. Some of them are disturbing. Secretary Rusk has stressed "stability of governments and the requirement for self-help." Assistant Secretary Edwin M. Martin identified five objectives: political development toward greater stability and wisdom, institutional change, social development, economic development, and changes in individual attitudes. Of the latter, he hoped for more pragmatic and less doctrinaire approaches, a quicker reaction to time factors, a greater sense of responsibility, attention to science, a willingness to work, and the necessity for team spirit. At the same time, he cited the fast population increase as a formidable obstacle.2 The objectives of the Alliance for Progress were cited by administration leaders in the fall of 1963, at the time of the coups in the Dominican Republic and Honduras, stressing its "framework of democratic institutions" aspect. Senator Young, speaking of the Dominican change, said: 3 We have sponsoredthe Alliancefor Progress for the welfare of the freedom-loving and to people of the WesternHemisphere
2 Address to Los Angeles World Affairs Council, September 20, 1963, in State Department Press Release No. 482. 3 Congressional Record, September 30, 1963, p. 17392.

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acceleratethe progressof our sister Latin AmericanRepublicsof Centraland South America. Are we respondingto the demands of the times if we fail to remove these Fascist usurpersby persuasion,or hy force, if necessary? Senator Gruening simultaneously urged that a destroyer intercept President Bosch to return him under United States protection to the Dominican Republic. "If we do not do this, we might as well forget the Alliance for Progress and our hopes of seeing it gradually develop under free and democraticregimes in Latin America."4 To some Senators, the Alliance includes overthrowing or reinstating specific individuals in political office. Another ambiguity inherent in assessing the Alliance's stated purposes arises out of a pronouncement made by Special Assistant Schlesinger:5 Whatwe are tryingto do throughthe Alliance for Progress is not only to help Latin Americajoin the 20th Century,but also to make her a full member of the Atlantic Community. The imperativesof history, geographyand culture have long since made the Latin Americanstates potentialmembersof the Atlanticpolity. It would undoubtedly come as a traumatic shock to a number of South American governments to learn of this purpose of the Alliance.
OBSTACLES

The faltering start of the Alliance can be traced to delays and changes in the appointments of the chief United States officials involved. During the first eighteen months of the Kennedy Administration, three men acted as Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs; there were four changes of Deputy Assistant Secretary; three men served as representatives to the OAS;
4 Congressional Record, September 30, 1963, pp. 17391, 17393. 5 Canning House Bulletin, April 1963, p. 10.

three were Administratorsof AID, Mr. Teodoro Moscoso being named Assistant Administratorin November 1961. The basic economic situation has been widely discussed and does not require review here. The statistics on concentration of wealth and land ownership, lack of trade between Latin-American countries, and the need for capital to provide infrastructure have been published repeatedly, as have the number of low-cost houses completed and the miles of roads constructed under the aegis of the Alliance. Increasing attention has been given to recent changes in the United States investment pattern and the price levels of Latin-American exports. In 1962 new United States capital investment in Latin America was exceeded by the outflow. During 1961 the unit value of all exports from Latin America remained below their 1957 levels. The flight of Latin-Americancapital to foreign havens has an insidious and continuing effect. Some estimates of Latin-Americanholdings abroad run to twenty billion dollars, an amount equal to the proposed external aid for a decade under the Alliance. There is the problem of military expenditures, demands for pay increases and for additional equipment of an escalating technical sophistication, now estimated as taking approximately a billion and a half dollars per year from Latin-American budgets. While there may not be much immediate hope for increased United States private investments going into Latin America, in view of unstable governments and a fear of nationalization measures, there is reason to expect enlargedeconomic and commercialbenefits accruing from the two regional trading associations. Devices to bring back expatriated capital have not had the full consideration which the seriousness of the problem deserves. Indicative of the broader context of United States relations with Latin

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America, of which the Alliance is a part, are serious administrative obstacles to which Mr. Moscoso, as United States Coordinator, must pay heed. He operates within AID, with the collaboration of the State Department, is helped by the Pan American Union, and works through the InterAmerican Development Bank and its Social Progress Fund. There are also constant arrangementsto be made with the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the International Development Agency, and the relevant agencies of the United Nations. There is also the thicket of Washington bureaucracy to penetrate, such as the Departments of Defense, Commerce,Treasury, and Agriculture, as well as the Export-Import Bank, Food for Peace, Peace Corps, and other agencies that bring their assets-and their own procedural requirements-to bear upon the tasks of the Alliance. The 1963 reports to the Council of the OAS by former Presidents Kubitschek and Lleras Camargowere intended to improve and speed up the operations of the Alliance and at the same time to broaden Latin-Americanparticipation and sense of responsibility. One of the suggestions was the creation of an InterAmerican Development Committee with a principal duty to help determine standards for loans and grants and the distribution of Alliance assets. It remains to be seen how soon the OAS can take action on the KubitschekCamargo recommendations. Some delays may ensue, both in legislation and administration,before changes are made in the admittedly cumbersome implementing machinery now in use. The specific recommendationsfor changes in internal United States procedures by Kubitschek may create annoyance in Washington rather than easy acceptance. Dr. Lleras Camargo's valid criticisms of Latin-American slowness in

preparing national plans and frequently changing a plan's focus and direction may not produce cheers from his compatriots. New heads of the World Bank and of the International Monetary Fund are aiming at more flexible procedures and wider ranges for their credit facilities. It is clear that some time and much detailed work is ahead before these changes will be reflected in projects-in-being or in an appreciation of the improvements by the Latin-American masses.
LATIN-AMERICAN CRITICISMS

At the end of 1962 the hemisphere's finance ministers met in Mexico to evaluate the progress of the Alliance. They observed that it had been handicapped in its first year by several political upheavals, Castro's propaganda and subversion efforts, and the Cuba missile crisis. The ministers noted that a coffee price agreement had been signed in keeping with engagements to work on commodity problems. Considered as obstacles for the Alliance to overcome rather than criticismsof its accomplishments were the lack of trained human resources, slow national budgeting (admittedly because of a lack of whole-hearted commitment), the scarcity of sound projects needing financing, the political objections to structural changes, and the continued need for balance of payments and budget support. The former president of Uruguay, Sr. Victor Haedo, is one of many who has expressed the view that "the creators of the Alliance err in thinking that the different countries of the Hemisphere have identical problems" and that, due to that mistake and slow and bureaucratic procedures, the Alliance was a "frustrated illusion." 6 In El Salvador,where income-tax pro6 Jornal do Brasil, July 14, 1963, interview, p. 1.

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posals of the army-dominated regime were attacked by citizens' committees as leading the country towards communism, the defense minister replied that the government'sprogram was based on "malnutrition, high infant mortality, bare feet, semi-naked bodies, filthy tenements, exhausting working hours, and the wages of hunger."7 Ecuador's military junta that came to power in the summer of 1963 publicly proclaimed its policy to be based on the Alliance. The president of the junta, General Castro Jijon, declared that, if the problem of commodity prices could be overcome, "Latin America could begin the fundamental transformationwhich is required and which is written in the
Charter."
8

Former President Lleras Camargo of Colombia, in his thoughtful and constructive way, cites the great population increase as a basic consideration. He believes that a distorted view that the Alliance was merely another phase of the policy of the United States caused Latin governments and publics to feel absolved from doing their share. An error in procedure was to leave to the United States the judgment "as to how and when and to whom support would be apportioned."9 He also states that "the Alliance cannot be a means for obtaining external funds to cover budget or balance-of-payment deficits." 10 The ColombianMinister of War, Gen. Ruiz Novoa (commander of the Colombian battalion in Korea), thinks that the Alliance "is a programof which we must avail ourselves, despite its limitations . . . in the Latin American community it is sabotaged by those who
7 The New York Times, October 15, 1961. 8 Reported in El Comercio of Lima, August 14, 1963. 9 "The Alliance for Progress: Aims, Distortions, Obstacles," Foreign Affairs, October 1963, p. 25 ff. 10Dr. Lleras Camargo's Report to the Council of the OAS, June 15, 1963, p. 14.

make use of the necessity of following the purely capitalistic system as a pretext for defending their ancestral privileges." 11 The cochairman of the Colombia Liberal party, Dr. J. C. Turbay, in a conversationwith the writerpraised the Alliance for averting a worse decline in the Colombian economy caused by falling coffee prices. Others report that, under President Valencia, the Colombian planning agency has suffered loss of prestige and personnel, although it was originally part of the Colombian "showcase" of the Alliance. President Belaunde of Peru, who seeks funds from Washington to carry out his administration's aims, has stated that the Alliance shows more concern for the protection of capital than for aiding people and that "after two years the Alliance for Progress was losing the fight to under-development,misery, and ignorance."12 Belaunde encountered strong opposition to his drastic agrarian reform bill. The conservative El Comercio of Lima viewed the difficulties of the Alliance as arising out of lack of appreciation by the United States of the magnitude of the problems and opposition in Peru of powerful privileged groups, concluding that "our immediate need is to start true planning. If this is done, the Alliance can have a certain success." 13 Peruvian Foreign Minister Schwalb Lopez told the General Assembly of the United Nations that the Alliance should divest itself of excessive red tape and proposed an international institute of regional credit.14 These comments are both typical and notable. The unusual act of requesting analysis and recommendationsfrom Presidents Lleras and Kubitschek indi11 Address to First Latin American Congress of Radio Schools, Bogoti, September 16, 1963. 12 The New York Times, August 18, 1963. 13 El Comercio of Lima, August 15, 1963. 14The New York Times, September 25, 1963.

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cates the gravity with which the OAS viewed future prospects. The Argentine Minister of Economy, Sr. Martinez de Hoz, complained about the required purchase of materials in the United States with aid funds and was critical of the expectation that there must be long-range planning and investments, especially inasmuch as United States officials in Buenos Aires were overridden by officials in Washington: "What is good for the U. S. is not adequate for Latin America."15 Juan Bosch, while still president, complained in similar vein that "Alliance assistance means merchandise from the U. S., rather than needed dollars, and this type of assistance makes planning difficult and erratic."16 President Illia of Argentina, whose election campaign included promises to cancel petroleum contracts and rejection of controls by the International Monetary Fund, before his election contemplated the Alliance as a source of funds for hydroelectric and housing projects, technical aid for agriculture and public health, and reconstruction of railroads and rollingstock replacement. With Chilean elections scheduled for the end of 1963, it is not surprising that statements by political leaders might be inconclusive,even inconsistent. Edwardo Frei, the Christian Democratic presidential candidate, described the Alliance
in Chile as "inoperative," not accom-

per capita. Subsequently, Frei's proposed agrarian reforms, he said, would be paid in part by bonds, guaranteed by a credit coming from the Alliance.18 This informal request-in-advance for Alliance funds appears to be emerging as a new aspect of election campaigns: there have been variations of it in Ecuador, Peru, and Argentina. A long-time friend of the United States, former President Figueres of Costa Rica gave utterance to the phrase "It is one minute to midnight in Latin America." He also has remarked that "The Alliance is ten years too late .... We need a true crusade. But the spirit of Latin America is too depressed."19 Ex-President Kubitschek of Brazil is
harsh:
20

Unfortunately,the manner in which the Alliance was launchedpermitted the impression that the Alliance is a political initiative purely United States in origin, aimed at restoring U. S. prestige in a hemispherethreatened by ideological infiltration. He calls for Latinizing the Alliance, at the decision level. At the same time, it is Senator Mansfield's position that, "in the absence of a clear-cut initiative on the part of Brazil to come to grips with its deeper difficulties, the best course for this nation is one of avoiding deep
commitments."
21

plishing what it was intended to do or even raising the hopes of Chile's poor 17
-this despite United States expendi-

THE ROLE OF THE CHURCH

tures in Chile during the fiscal year 1962 of some $136,400,000, or $17.50
15 El Mercurio of Santiago, Chile, August 13, 1963. 16 The New York Times, September 18, 1963. The interview was given in Mexico. The reader will note that, whatever the motive, several of the critical statements were published in newspapers outside the speaker's own country. 17 The New York Times, April 17, 1963.

Progressivechurchmenin Latin America were greatly encouraged by Pope


El Siglo of Santiago, August 13, 1963. 19 Statement at Conference on Tensions in the Western Hemisphere, held at Salvador, Brazil, reported in The Washington Post, August 9, 1962. 20 His report to Council of the OAS, June 15, 1963, pp. 25-26. 21 "Brazil and U. S. Policies," report of Senator Mansfield to the Foreign Relations Committee of the United States Senate, February 1962.
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John's 1961 encyclical Mater et Magistra advocating social reform and many other policies found in the Alliance. Antonio Cardinal Caggiano of Buenos Aires stated that the church "would join in the common effort of the Alliance for Progress."22 Other prelates, without citing the Alliance, identified themselves with its programs. Chilean bishops asked for wide institutional changes, adding that "it is anti-Christian to keep assets unproductive or to remove them abroad." Paul CardinalSilva Henriquez of Santiago, after conferring with Pope John, started in 1961 a pilot project of selling church lands on credit to farm familiesand co-operatives.23The bishops of Ecuador went further in declaring that unfruitful or badly cultivated land "must be expropriated and transferred to persons capable of making it productive." In 1963 the Peruvian bishops declared it urgent to speed up social changes, concluding that "aid from abroad-plans, loans, teams and machinery-will be of little use if the will to work is remiss." The archbishop of San Salvador headed a membership list of a credit co-operative. The bishop of Goias in Brazil founded the Catholic Agrarian Front, and in 1963 a Brazilian pastoral letter called for expropriation of rural properties to be paid by bond issues. The archbishop of Rio de Janeiro, Dom Helder Camara, cited as an obstacle "the egotism of many rich people, their blindness, a more serious and urgent problem than communism itself." 24
CONCLUSIONS

Timetables in the Charter such as 2.5 per cent per capita economic growth per year and the assurance by 1970 of a
22 National Catholic Welfare Conference News Service, November 26, 1961. 23Newspaper Los Principios of Cordoba, Argentina, August 8, 1963. 24 The New York Times, August 15, 1963.

minimum access to six years of education to all school children are unattainable. Redistributing wealth and emphasizing social-welfare projects, while simultaneously developing agriculture and industrialization swiftly, and at the same time increasing savings and investment, are contradictory. These conflicts should be resolved if it is expected to achieve marked progress in one direction or the other. A concentration on fewer objectives is in order.25 Latin-American societies and power elites that may be unwilling to accept radical measures could be persuaded to acquiesce in more moderate ones, step by step. It is not possible to eradicate four hundred years of political and economic colonialism, nor the continent's habits and practices, within a decade. Much more use could be made of the model proposals in Pope John's encyclical Mater et Magistra of 1961, which has been passed on to the Catholics of Latin America in pastoral letters. If Catholic groups and parties would serve as the catalyst of centrist parties with the democratic left, a new era of accomplishment could be envisaged. In some South American countries, the military show indications of more social consciousness and willingness to engage in civic action in literacy and other training programs for recruits. Such changes should be encouraged and made the base for further progress, bringing this category of inter-American relationships closer to the Alliance, rather than leaving them outside its purview. On the other hand, the labormanagement objectives of the Alliance, greater than the standards thus far attained in the United States, are more idealistic than realistic. It does not appear to contribute to long-range goals
25 Grants or "bailouts" to cover governmental budgetary or balance-of-payments deficits have been given to several governments in recent years.

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if the benefits of economic assistance that the richest of Latin Americancounare to be denied the citizens of a coun- tries feels any real obligation to help try where political office is held tempo- the poorest."26 Domestic reforms come rarily by persons unknown or unpleas- slowly, reminding us of the less than ing to Washington. Such action carries speedy enactments in our own country implications to the Latins of moral ar- in areas such as tax revision, Medicare, rogance and superiority, and it is doubt- or government aids to education. ful that such a consideration should There are obviously limits to what be placed ahead of the basic issues of the United States can do unilaterally, helping peoples and countries develop for it is by no means omnipotent, nor socially and economically within the indeed omniscient. Our governmentwas framework of democratic institutions. unable to dislodge Castro or Duvalier Existing administrative-organizational or to keep Juan Bosch in office. But problems of the Alliance are viewed not our role in the Alliance has been critias permanent obstacles to success but, cized as affording protection to Amerirather, as a necessary part of the struc- can investors and shippers, or as intertures requiring additions and changes. ference with internal affairs, and as exSpecific initiative could be taken to erting pressure by unilateral decisions confer with the Latin-Americangovern- to give or withhold financial assistance. ments regarding measures to stop the The enlistment of other governments' flight of capital and ways to regain the help and the applicationof Latin-Americapital of private Latin owners, esti- can internal resources to the goals of mated to exceed $20 billion, now abroad. the Alliance will have to be substanThere is need to turn away from tially and continuously increased if the cliches and slogans and to think clearly program is to succeed, even with more about the Alliance and the additional limited goals. It has been wisely said issues that go to make up the whole of that government is the art of the posour inter-Americanrelationships. There sible and that compromise need not be are inescapable realities such as mono- a sacrifice of principle but an admisculture economies, fast-increasing popu- sion of fallibility. With 1963 coming to a close, reports lation, inadequate statistics, exploitation of labor, illiteracy, maldistribution of from the second annual review of the land and other resources, gaps in re- Alliance, conducted at Sao Paulo by the sponsible leadership, and lack of reali- IA Ecosoc, created the impression that zation of the need for greater produc- it would be futile to confirm the Chartivity. There is insufficient enthusiasm ter of the Alliance in treaty form, as for the Alliance within political parties, the parliaments would be unwilling to labor unions, and university circles. ratify. An abortive Brazilian proAfter the identification of these prob- posal, pointedly ignoring past United lems and of the heroic measures, in- States help, suggested that the Soviet ternal and external, needed to resolve bloc might participate in the Alliance. them, the full magnitude of the task Latinizing the Alliance was opposed by emerges. Achievements thus far do not Brazil, presumably because of her rekeep up with population growth, much alization that Latins would be less willless raise levels of living. Self-help and ing than United States officials have mutual help are basic to the Charter. been to dedicate large shares of AlliBut Dr. Milton Eisenhower records that 26Milton Eisenhower, The Wine Is Bitter he has "seen little evidence to indicate (New York: Doubleday, 1963), p. 329.

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ance funds to bolstering Brazil's inflationary economy each year. The Sao Paulo meeting adjourned after setting up an additional seven-governmentcommittee but without revising unrealistic goals, streamlining its apparatus, or attacking basic obstacles. Almost simultaneously, Argentine cancellation of for-

eign oil contracts met with a sharp re-

joinder from President Kennedy. While these disturbances persisted in the relations of the three largest countries, the situation of small states-Haiti, Honduras, and the Dominican Republicvis-a-vis Alliance assistance remained highly uncertain.

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