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Youth as a Force in the Modern World Author(s): Herbert Moller Source: Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. 10, No. 3 (Apr., 1968), pp. 237-260 Published by: Cambridge University Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/177801 . Accessed: 04/04/2011 01:18
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The unprecedented number youngpeople in the worldtodaycan be of isolated one ofthecrucial as reality factors and conditioning political cultural developments. distribution only one demographic Age is variablein the complex social and political of life,but the tremendous of growth world population thetwentieth in has century magnified dynamic its potentialities. To gainperspective,willbe useful briefly it to consider roleof youth the in thelight historical of experience. Throughout centuries, the spontaneous youth have organizations had a continuous existence, a ferment but amongthe young withits subsequent departure cultural political from or tradition be observed can onlyat certain times in certain and geographical areas.As a rule, young peoplebecome conspicuous public inperiods rapid in life of demographic growth. thenumerOf ous historical examples a fewcan be referred in this only to essay. Moreover, in viewof thepredominantly narrative nature historiography its low of and levelof generality, illustrations onlyto suggest these serve plausible agreements between events demographic general of contemporary and history. The Protestant Reformation west-central in Europeprovides example an of one of theoutstanding youth movements history. in Luther himself published Ninety-five the Thesesat theage of34; hewrote three his great Reformation tracts 1520 at theage of 37. In the1520's,Wittenberg in University, which had beenfounded 1502,boasted in probably youngest the faculty in thehistory German of universities, a teaching staff uncommon of brilliance and ideological cohesion. number menyounger A of thanLuther received professorships: Aurogallus appointed theage of 30, Justin was at Jonas and Augustin Schiff 27, Johannes at Hainpoland Melanchthon 21; thelatter at was quickly acknowledged leaderof thephilosophical the faculty though he was younger many his students. than of The younger scholars becameLuther's earliest adherents, whilemostof theolder onescondemned ideas.Someofthem, his together members with of thelocal clergy, Wittenberg weredischarged; left or others heldout as best they coulduntil they died.One, a canonat theSchlosskirche, opposed who

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whenLuther's his to was all ritual innovation, forced change attitude youthhis smashed windows. fulfollowers a of attracted reserve reformers of reputation theWittenberg The growing or readyand able to fillpoststhatfellvacant, indeedany young scholars at for cameto Wittenberg gap. intellectual Sucha manas Agricola, example, effective inthereform movean function 22 andremained he hadfound until the of the ment. yearsof theReformation, number university During early was SinceWittenberg a leaptfrom about1,500to 2,000 and more. students the of gave of inhabitants, influx students it an small town only 2,500regular to of The devotion thesestudents their population.' youthful exceptionally and Carlstadt, Melanchas was shown early 1519,whenLuther, as leaders by "surrounded in thon outfortheLeipzigdisputation twoopenwagons set and Students flocked armed students other supporters".2 two nearly thousand and rejected Thomists the and of to thelectures Melanchthon increasingly universities Leipzig, like Frankfurt in Scotists entrenched theolderGerman These institutions, Basel, and others. Rostock, on the Oder, Greifswald, students and lost their for the firmly opposing Reformation twodecades, first had after 1535 every ofthem one scholarly reputations. Sometime then their tobe reconstituted. acmessage notfind did Luther complained theevangelical that Although to in to the ceptance among old,he wasforced holdthestudents check prevent Melanchagainst Pope andEmperor. them protests going far their too in from students. Someofthem among an to thon, also,fought inclination primitivism of to carried their to and opposition Aristotle scholasticismthepoint rejecting Luther's of all scholarship, advocated innocent simplicitytheApostles. the and to almost et Bucer, al.) were, Wittenberg (Bugenhagen, followers outside early imof a man, with than younger he,whereas, theexception Eck,all hismore of like humanists Erasmus opponents wereolder.Somewell-known portant then ideas of reform, broke with Rotterdam, first at sympathized Luther's 50 was already in 1517 whentheTheseswereprowith him.But Erasmus mulgated.3 and It is imperative distinguish individuals actual precocious between to pubMichelServetus in movements. instance, 1531,theSpaniard For youth of at Erroribus 19 years age.Sixteenth-century De lished famous Trinitatis his viewed a fact movement, which, no of however, experienced trace a youth Spain, and of of relates thedepletion its cohorts late adolescents to quantitatively, and empire through overseas adults emigration theSpanish to through young in by abroad.In Germany, contrast, service and naval, military, government
1 Herbert Schoffler, Reformation Die (Bochum-Langendreer, Poppinghaus, 1936), pp. 33-98; reprint, Wirkungen Reformation der (Frankfurt a.M., Klostermann, 1960), pp. 126-66. 2 George H. Williams,The Radical Reformation (Philadelphia, Westminster Press, 1962), p. 39. 3 Schoffler, Wirkungen, 130-31,141-74. pp.

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theyears immediately preceding Lutheran the there Reformation, existed an in or intellectual proletariat. Priests, particular either impoverished unattached a parish vagrant to preachers, and prophets, demagogues about went haranguing populace. the But among craftsmen younger the too, peopleexvocational perienced protracted and insecurity, manysaw no hope of ever escaping condition a dependent often the and of unemployed journeyman. Tax records someGerman of cities attest a downward to mobility middle-income of groups thelater in fifteenth earlysixteenth or centuries. earlyyearsof The thesixteenth century and brought numerous revolts peasants, local of knights, in citypeople,culminating the greatPeasants'War of 1524-25,which in northern Germany a conflict was actually moreurbanthanrural.4 Theseevents wereconnected a demographic with upturn in beginning the mid-fifteenth the century, reversing downward trend thathad been caused by the Black Death and succeeding epidemics. There were considerable regional differences.England most France In and of between 1470 and 1550, an increasing prosperity served needsof thegrowing the population. Conditionsdiffered, however, northern in Italy, Switzerland, eastern France(Burand area of theold German gundy), theentire where upsurge, the Empire begunslowly after 1450,rosesharply about1500,threatening shakethe to existing socialorder. Demographic information, inadequate with reference to entire countries during period, this nevertheless suggest long-term a growth trend. Research smaller on areas,however, yields morespecific data.On the basisof thenumber houses thousands towns villages a comof in of and in pact regionof central Germany, Koerner foundthatthe construction of dwelling units increased rapidly thesecondquarter thesixteenth in of century, slowed then down consistently a growth of7.1% inthe1520's, from rate 6.8% in the1530's,6.5% in the1540'sto 3.3% in the1590's.Although no for figures thefirst decadesof thesixteenth two century available, are the natural increase thepopulation mostlikely of had reached greatest its momentum sometimebefore year1500. In the 1520's,despite the depression andturmoil, people more were setting homes their than anylater up of own in decade. Thisinformation with assumption large agrees the of cohorts young of adults thefirst in several decadesofthesixteenth century.5 Theyouth movement thefirst ofthesixteenth of half century notlimitwas ed to theLutheran Reformation. Zwingli 32 first at challenged old faith; the Calvinat 26 had the temerity dedicate Institutes the Christian to his of
4 Willy Andreas, Deutschland derReformation vor (Stuttgart, DeutscheVerlags-Anstalt,

1932). Will-Erich Peuckert, Die grosse Wende(Hamburg, Claassen & Goverts,1948). Gunther Franz, Der deutsche Bauernkrieg (Miunchen Berlin,Oldenbourg, & 1933). 5 Fritz Koerner, "Die Bev6lkerungszahl -dichte Mitteleuropa und in zum Beginnder Neuzeit", Forschungen Fortschritte, und XXXIII (1959), Heft 11, pp. 325-31.For other thanGermandemographic data, JosiahC. Russell,Late Ancient and MedievalPopulation (_ Transactions AmericanPhilosophicalSociety,N.S., vol. 48, Part 3) (Philadelphia,AmericanPhilosophical Society,1958), pp. 113-27.

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Religion FrancisI, inviting to reform to him himself his Kingdom of and France. Theodor Beza and Sebastian Franck bothjoinedtheReformation in their twenties. Thosegoing overto theradical of were wing theReformation remarkably young: Hans Denck, expelled from at Nuremberg 25, diedat 27; Louis Haetzer, banished from Augsburg 25, died at 30; Felix Mantz, at leaderoftheZurich radicals 25, was executed 27; ConradGrebel, at at the founder the SwissBrethren, of experienced at conversion 23, died at 28; Melchior Hoffmann becamea Lutheran 27, an Anabaptist 30; Menno at at Simons, ordained priest 28, felt first a at his at dogmatic doubts 29, butlaid down priestly his office at theage of40. only The Reformation period beentreated has hereat somelength order in to emphasize fact the that demographic the factor operates independentlythe of industrial, modem, "anti-imperialist" context. be sure,not all or social To important movements history characterized a youthful in are by leadership and youthful supporters. Neither Catholic the nor Counter-Reformationthe Enlightenment be consideredyouth can a movement this in sense, opposed as to early seventeenth-century puritanism English which apparently can. Therecan be no doubtaboutthe surgeof youthful activism several in Europeancountries roughly last 30 yearsof theeighteenth in the century. Childmortality declined western central in and Europeafter the 1750,while life expectancy older of peopledidnotnoticeably improve.6 a consequence As thenumber young of peopleincreased considerably. the1770'sand 1780's In Francehad a higher proportion late adolescents young of and adults under 30 thanat anytime thereafter.71789,thoseover40 yearsof age constiIn tuted only24 percent theFrench of population, while those between and 20 40 yearsconstituted percent, thoseunder20 madeup 36 percent. 40 and Exposedto theeconomic hardships prevailed that between 1785 and 1794, thenumerous under-employed peopleformed explosive young an population group.Theirpresence contributed decisively therevolutionary to unrest in and country, also to themilitary city and ventures theRevolutionary of and Napoleonic wars.8 Brinton pointed thelarge out number unemployed of young intellectuals: "One is struck studying in Frenchsociety the yearsjust in the preceding Revolution a kindof jam in thestream bright with of young mendescending Paristo write talktheir on and in wayto fortune. Mercier hisTableaude Paristells howevery sunny young day menmight seenon be theQuays, washing drying and their onlyshirts, ruffled lacysymbols and of 9 high socialstatus."
6 D. V. Glass and D. E. C. Eversley, eds., Populationin History(London, Edward Arnold,1965), pp. 404, 447. WilliamL. Langer,"Europe's Initial PopulationExplosion",AmerHist. Rev., LXIX (1963-64),1-17. 7 See Table 3, below. 8 Jacques Godechot,Les revolutions (1770-1799) (Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1963),p. 86. 9 Crane Brinton, The Anatomyof Revolution, Rev. ed. (1952. Reprint, New York, VintageBooks, 1957),p. 66.

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Outside France, of resistance authorities, vagrancy to and unrest, became a majorproblem amongworking class youth;discontent excitability and spreadamong younger the of generation theeducated classes.Nationalistic for time enthusiasm emotional appeared thefirst as a potent theme, originally in France, then, with strong a anti-French in other note, The countries. explosionof revolutionary, warlike, nationalist, anti-imperialist antiand (i.e. French) activity toward endoftheeighteenth in theearly the and nineteenth centuries received socialfuelfrom largeyouth its the cohorts "Europe's of initial population explosion".10 Mostcountries Europeexperienced moreor less rapiddemographic of a growth thecourseof thenineteenth in century, revolutionary and agitators likeMazzini their put faith theactivism theyoung. in of Persons over40 were excluded from Mazzini'sorganization, Young Italy.He wrote:"Place the at young theheadoftheinsurgent masses; do notknow you whatstrength is in latent thoseyoung bands,whatmagicinfluence voicesof theyoung the haveon thecrowd; willfind you them hostofapostles thenewreligion. a for But youth liveson movement, grows greatin enthusiasm faith. and Consecrate with lofty them a mission; inflame them with emulation praise; and spread through ranks word fire, wordofinspiration; their the of the speakto "1 them country, glory, power, great of of of of memories." Mazzinibecame therevered leaderof young who militants, in turn of becametheteachers other national youth movements. In societies undergoing disruptive change, adolescents youngadults and are eminently attracted direct by actionas wellas by ideologies promising perfection a hurry. was said of Garibaldi in It thathe could at anytime gather army young an of volunteers a patriotic for cause.For thedevelopment ofItaly, it however, was decisive tllePiedmontese that government prevented theyoung idealists byMazziniand Garibaldi led In from taking overpower. fact,outside Italyalso, "movement governments", which have becomethe promise theterror thetwentieth and of century, generally were averted the in nineteenth century. Compared Italy, with nineteentlh-century Germany, whose population grew muchmorerapidly, a smaller had shareof impulsive This activism. maybe attributed Germany's to moreforceful industrialization to its socialadand both which of vance, facilitated economic the integrationyoung of people. An important aspectof theGerman development theinternal was migration of young peopleto cities industrial and areasin response increasing opto job
10 Godechot, op. cit. HenriBrunschwig, crisede l'etatprussien la findii XVIIle La a siecle et la gene'se la mentalite' de romantique (Paris,PressesUniversitaires France, de 1947). FritzValjavec,Die Entstehung politischen der Stromungen Deutschland in 17701815 (Munich,Oldenbourg, 1951),pp. 185-86,214-24,235-37,321. 11 Quotedby Frederick Hertz,Nationality History in and Politics(London,Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1944),p. 388.

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portunities, only as inmany not of countriesbecause rural underdeveloped and The as misery hopelessness. discontent well as the enthusiasm the of German class flowed intoa purposeful socialist labor movement. working Middle-class had to youth goodreasons adjustto available vocational prospects;manydid so witha single-mindedness deeplydeplored German by authors a romantic of bent.Aggressive fantasies found fertile fields the in strident nihilism no placeinGerman had increasingly nationalism; nevertheless, society before FirstWorldWar. the The opposite extreme characterized Russia: nineteenth-century economic development laggedfarbehind tremendous the of surge population growth. and Despair violence the among Russian was in peasantry paralleled theupper andmiddle classes "successive by wavesofangry young men"."2 instance, For the three major intellectual leaders "YoungRussia"intheearly of 1860'swere all young. was Chernyshevsky's political activity endedat 34, in 1862,when he wasarrested twoyears and, later, condemned forced to labor. Dobrolyubov diedat 25; Pisarev 28.13 at In thenineteenth century, thenations Europeweregrowing an when on of unprecedented they scale, possessed of larger cohorts adolescents young and adultsthanthoseof today;yettheproportions theseage groups of never loomed large they inthedeveloping as as do countries thepresent; of furthermore, Europe's"population was of explosion" attenuated theavailability by outlets emigration, which for of the especially younger peopleavailedthemselves. Muchoftherestless energy adventuresomeness and ofyouth thus was transferredoverseas to colonies to theUnited and States. The proportion young of people began fallearly thetwentieth to in century in mostnations western of Europe,owing thedecline thefertility to rate in which started had around 1880.Thisprocess, more pronounced theBritish in Isles,France, Belgium, German-speaking Austria, Sweden and thanin Gerand Italy, couldbe regarded a demographic descending many as slope from Russia, Rumania, Bulgaria theeastto Ireland Francein thewest. and in and The Habsburg Monarchy, attempting it did to resist national-revoluas the tionary movements theSerbsand Croats, politically most of was the exposed areaofthis slope.The South-Slavic peoples theHabsburg of Monarchy a had higher rate fertility thandidtheAustro-Germans Hungarians; in the and and great assaulton thecohesion theHabsburg of Empire, which endedin its destruction, teenagers young and adults playeda notable role. Gavrilo Princip, whohad justfinished schoolwhenhe assassinated high Archduke Francis Ferdinand, belonged thecircle young to of intellectuals and schoolstudents high calledYoungBosnia.Although smallgroup conthis of
The phrase is Adam B. Ulam's. See his The Bolsheviks (New York, Macmillan, 1965). 13 E. Lampert, Sons AgainstFathers:Studiesin Russian Radicalismand Revolution (Oxford, Clarendon Press,1965); on youthactivities pp. 85-92,125, 236-42. esp.
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spirators received and weapons technical from Serbian the help BlackHand society, theyactedindependently in the daysimmediately and, before the assassination, refused desist to from their of plan.The assassination theArchduke,in June1914, cannot counted a majorcause butrather the be as as spark that off conflagration; to a considerable set the yet it extent forced the handoftheSerbian and government, tlhereby determined timing conthe and ditions theoutbreak thewar.The YoungBosnians of of the despised Serbian bourgeoisie cooperated the who with Austrians thesakeofmaterial "for gain". Gavrilo is Princip reported havesaid,shortly to before assassination, the that ifhe couldforce entire the business of community Sarajevo intoa matchbox, he would italight.14 prison, set In Princip to thepsychiatrist, Pappensaid Dr. heim: "Ourgeneration mostly was conservative, in thepeopleas a whole but there existed wishfornational the liberation. oldergeneration of a The was different opinion from younger as to howto bring about... The the one it oldergeneration wanted secure to from liberty Austria a legalway;we do in notbelieve suchliberty." in Dedijer writes many that wereinvolved in youths thenational-revolutionary struggle, that"in almost and every family there was a revolt theyounger of generation against older". the Highschoolboys, in particular, highly politicized deeply and dedicated, remained uncorrupted bythelureofmoney, alcohol, love,family, vocational and interests.Y5 The political significancetheYoungBosnians seenin their of is opposition to thecautious policy theSerbian of government theOld Radicalsunder of Pasicandin their planto use violence force to those leaders abandon to their slow-moving policy risk military and a showdown theHabsburgs. this with In they succeeded; after assassination, the many diplomats that governfelt the ment Serbiawouldbe unable maintain of to itself internal against opposition ifitacceded all thedemands theAustrian to of ultimatum thus and permitted Serbian sovereigntybe impaired.16 to After endoftheFirst the World War, political turbulence remained in high eastern Europe where populations both were younger poorer. Germany, and In as in all of Europe,birth ratesdeclined rapidly the 1920's; about 1930 in Germany's population no longer was reproducing itself. However, prothe portion young of adults remained highin Germany a result high very as of ratesof natural increase twenty thirty to yearsearlier. The cohorts 1900 of to 1914,more numerous anyearlier than ones, notbeendecimated the had by war.When they entered labormarket, the between 1918 and 1932,their ranks wereswelled immigrants the cededterritories Alsace-Lorraine, by from of Poznan,PolishUpperSilesia,etc.,and by German nationals from abroad,
VladimirDedijer, The Road to Sarajevo (New York, Simon & Schuster, 1966), p. 207. 15 Ibid., pp. 207-8,222, 262-63. 16 ImanuelGeiss,Juli1914: Die europiische Krise und derAusbruch ErstenWeltdes krieges (Munich,Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag,1965),pp. 25-26 and documents Nos. 56, 67, 100.
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from eastern south-eastern and mostly Europe.Altogether to one and a close half million entered Germany between 1918and 1925.At thesametime, emigration theUnited to States was reduced thequotasystem; by 1930, by and under impact thedepression, ceasedaltogether was replaced the of it and by a reverse movement impoverished of former emigrants to Germany.17 back As a result these of developments labormarket the becameglutted. When thedepression theGerman hit economy, agegroup thze from to45, thecore 20 of theworking force, thelargest German was in history.
TABLE 1
18 AgeGroup 20-45inPercent TotalPopulation Germany of of 1871 1880 1890 1900 1911 1925 1933 1950 1959 35.3 34.9 34.4 35.6 35.9 38.8 41.5 35.8 33.7

the Even during relatively prosperous yearsof theWeimar young Republic, peopleof thelargeyouth cohorts weremarching rallying. and Neverbefore had German youth formed many so organizations, of which each combined comradeship among members intense with hatred opponents.'9 of In the elections 1930, 4,600,000first-time of voters wentto the polls, who mainly young their adult without life either people hadbegun work hope. or Theybrought Hitler first his greatelectoral success.Froma demographic viewpoint economic the depression Germany theworst hit at possible time: employment shrinking was at a timewhentheemployable precisely populationreached postwar its peak.In 1933,theyearHitler the cameto power, influx youth already of had to begun taper The number cohorts off. of born the during FirstWorld War and thepostwar the periodand entering labor market 1932wasso small German after that and politicians population experts weregreatly concerned aboutthefuture thewhite an upturn of race.20 Despite
Eugene M. Kulischer, Europe on the Move: War and PopulationChanges,19171947 (New York, Columbia,1948),pp. 160-88. 18 Walther G. Hoffmann, Das Wachstum deutschen der Wirtschaft der Mittedes seit 19. Jahrhunderts (Berlin, Springer, 1965),p. 177. 19 The politicized youthof the 1920's differed completely fromthe romantic, antiurbanJugendbewegung the pre-war of decade. HelmutSchelsky, Die skeptische Generation(1957; Sonderausgabe: Diederichs,1963), Chap. 4, sectionon Dfisseldorf-Kdln, "Die Generation politischen der Jugend". 20 Kulischer op. cit.,pp. 161, 187. RudolfHeberle,From Democracyto Nazism: A Regional Case Studyof PoliticalParties in Germany(Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University, 1945),p. 123. MarcelDutheil, population La allemande(Paris,Payot,1937), Chaps. II, XV.
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it the ofthebirth under rate reached levelof 1925.The Second Hitler, never thinned theranks theyoung out WorldWar further of adults, and,to the extent thatage composition conditions social life,Germany becomea has of different nation. 1960,60 percent German adolescents to By professed be 30 percent were"interested", only10 percent "politically and indifferent", "politically engaged".21 The mostimportant was thethoughtful liberal and change attitude the of majority the last-named of group.German post-war "the skeptical youth, is in generation", interested vocational and advancement, marriage, a early comfortable pleasurable as Schelsky pointed emotional and has life; attiout, tudesof youngand middle-aged people are less differentiated than today Since when formerly. themid-fifties, prosperity returned Europe, to aggressive anti-social has conduct teen-agers becomea problem all industrialized of in but in countries; nowhere Europehaveteen-age into cliques hardened stable has organizations; nowhere adolescent rebellion generated political postures. In all industrialized the countries Europe, non-alienated setting style of are the oflife. In theUnited States, contrast, by political demonstrations civilrights and projects beganabout1960 and gathered momentum successive each year, as violence increasingly replaced mereverbalprotests. The mostactivecivil rights workers wereunder thirty. thecollege On scene, change the from the to "silent generation" themassrallies truculent aland oratory thesixties, of though byan avant-garde atypical led of students, backed a surprisingly was by large following sympathizers.22yearning "participatory of The for democracy" andthenewmoodofsocialactivism coincided theriseofthemore with numerouscohorts the1940'sand1950'sreaching adolescence college of late and age in the1960's.In actuality, most the vociferous radicalism expresses hopethe lessness a young of counter-elite. sensethefutility their They of aggressive aspirations a prosperous flexible in and society offers that attractive rewards forachievers, tameslargenumbers young of peoplethrough early marriage and parenthood, in timeabsorbseven mostof its alienated and youth, a in minorityanycase. Negroes face a different situation. Livingin a society thatincites all in of its members expectation a highconsumption the of level,theyremain economically depressed. Becausetheir fertility beenhigher all years has for forwhich relevant data are available, Negroes showa higher proportion of adolescents young and adultsthandoes thewhite population. addition, In
WalterJaide,Das Verhdltnis Jugend Politik(Berlin-Spandau, der zur Luchterhand, 1963). 22 JacobR. Fishmanand Frederick Solomon,"Youth and Social Action",and "Youth and Peace: A Psychological Studyof StudentPeace Demonstrators Washington", in Journal Social Issues,XX, No. 4 (Oct. 1964),pp. 1-28,54-73. of
21

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postwar for fertility somewhat rose morerapidly thenon-white population.23 in AlThe increase Negro in youth beenmost has pronounced thebigcities. all who the most oftheAmerican Negroes migrated, during pasthalfcentury, from Deep South thenorthern western the to and cities wereteen-agers and young adults; their average was 20-24. Consequently highfertility age their rate, thenewurban in environment, aggravated economic housing and problems. Although 1960census the reported themajority Negroes that of living in northern western this and cities had beenbornin them, surprisingly enough home-grown urban Negropopulation an average of onlyabout12 had age years.24 youthfulness theAmerican The of for Negropopulation accounts and of muchoftheimpetus vitality thecivilrights On movement. theother hand,it has also led to a growth uncontrolled of the aggressiveness, costing olderand moremoderate leaders their a popularity leading and toward rejection integration possibly, development a separate of and, the of anti-white Negro sub-culture. In non-western nations, outlookfor youngrevolutionaries the appears and brightest where poverty insecurity an underdeveloped changing the of but economy coincides with highproportion adolescents young a of and adults. Thissituation aggravated theaccelerated is by of urbanization thedeveloping which be as countries, must certainly considered a majorsourceof floating discontent activism. and Millions therural of distressed invading cities are the and looking employment, for which too often not available.In Greater is Bombay, according the 1961 census, to about65 percent thepopulation of wereimmigrants. Similar situations other in largeIndiancities result from a corresponding increase therateofrural-urban in migration recent in years. In Asia andLatinAmerica almost migrants urban all to centers young are people between and 35 years age.25 10 of The numerous revolts thathave occurred sincethe SecondWorldWar coincide with accelerated the the population growth. several In countries first wave of revolutionary have already youth been opposed, defeated, reand placedbya younger movement political of activists. instance, For first Egypt's modern of party composed theyouth who rioted 1919 and becamethe in force theWafd in driving were, between 1946 and 1952,reproached the by street young fighters guerrillas, and especially students, themselves who were
23 U.S. Departmentof Health, Education, and Welfare: Public Health Service, NatalityStatistics Analysis:UnitedStates- 1964 (= National Centerfor Health Statistics, Ser. 21, No. 11) (Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office,Feb. 1967), pp. 11-13. "In 1964, the excess of the fertility rate (birthsper 1,000 women 15-44yearsof age) fornon-whites thatof whites over was 42 percent." Ibid., p. 11. 24 C. Horace Hamilton, I "The NegroLeaves theSouth",Demography, (1964), p. 285. 25 Jag Mohan Sehgal,"The Population Distribution GreaterBombay",Asian Ecoin nomicReview,VIII, No. 2 (Feb. 1966),pp. 185-97.CarmenA. Miro, "The Population of Latin America", I Demography, (1964), pp. 19-29.U AungThein,"Some Aspectsof Urban Explosionsin DevelopingCountries", PopulationIndex,XXXII (1966), p. 349.

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military intelligentsia.26 preparing wayforthecoup d'etatof theyoung the activities ofcourse, connected not with are, The keydatesofrevolutionary of a but people, usually anyparticular year-cohorts with decadeormore young of Movement" In "Student thirties. Chinatheso-called led by menin their of and professors, returned 1919 and the 1920's was composed students, the of were between agesof 17 and25, and most whom students abroad, from But mostof whomenthusiastically joinedthe Kuomintang.27 by 1936 the for of meeting had youth, Chiang, Kuomintang lost the support educated was to from warlords the Communists, forced the and increased pressure the that dampened the a buytimefrom Japanese, development effectively the thereafter, ardor More and morewidely, revolutionary of thestudents. the of against foreigners. youth Communists enlisted support middle-class Revolution" of of Cultural the and Whatever origins themeaning the"Great that testifies theenergies can to thisfrightful terroristic campaign 1966-67, teenof be generated of from organization vast numbers unsocialized the agers. has by The recent of history Indonesia also beencharacterized successive In youth. the revolution 1945-46,not onlythe of wavesof revolutionary and Dutchbut also mostof thenative aristocrats their lost positions were the of politicians by thepemudas, "Generation and replaced nationalist by drew activists. pemuda The movement in young revolutionary '45", or young the of menfrom socialbackground, "formed mostimportant the who every and the badan new organizations appearat the local level,the army, to the pemuda organization] It produced majority ... perdjuangan irregular [the the and atrocities those and whoshowed highest bothofthose whocommitted 28 most idealism." self-sacrificing by the coup had been thwarted the Againin 1965-66,after Communist powerfrom the thereupon triedto withdraw political armyand Sukarno werefirst revolt. they had been subdued to After military, collegestudents who they calledon theorganized schoolstudents, high by Sukarno's forces, of that aboutthe downfall Sukarno's responded withan uprising brought In teen-agers went and non-Communist government. this case,Muslim other intothestreets theapproval admiration their with families: young the and of and their parents themselves wouldnothavetaken, peopletookrisks which in thefollowing downCommunists months helped identify hunt they to and
p. J. Vatikiotis, The Egyptian Armyin Politics:Pattern New Nations?(Bloomfor ington, Indiana University Press, 1961),pp. 40, 45-52,79. 27 Tsi C. Wang, The YouthMovement in China (New York, New Republic,1928), pp. 2-3, 160-241.Dr. Hu Shih was bornin 1891 and returned China in 1917 to beto come professor philosophy the NationalUniversity Peking;ibid.,p. 11. John of at of Nationalism China,1927-1937(Stanford, Israel,Student in Cal., University Press,1967). 28 JohnR. W. Smail, Bandungin the Early Revolution, 1945-1946:A Studyin the Social History theIndonesian Revolution of (Ithaca,N.Y., CornellUniversity, Departmentof Asian Studies,1964),p. 156.
2B

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a or reputed Communists. Possibly closetohalf million peoplewere butchered a For bythe young idealists General and Suharto's soldiers.29 over year unithe versity students their and allies,and theassociation highschoolstudents of and continued holdmassdemonstrations to pressforfurther to changes. An Indonesian intellectual, serving them an informal as mentor, explained: "They are very frustrated very and angry. a critical In moment ourhistory, these of passionate, dedicated, immature, politically untutored students have taken over.Now they getting political are their 30 education very quickly."
II

It is generally recognized thepresence a largenumber adolescents that of of and young adults influences socialand political it howaffairs; is revealing, ever, elucidate aspect theage composition statistical to this of by comparisons ofvarious countries different in of stages demographic development. Table 2 presents proportion persons the of aged 15 to 29 per 100 persons ofthetotalolderpopulation selected for The of countries. omission children under15 gives to referred as "the to prominence thepopulation group often who and the young generation", impress modify established society through their and activities. cultural, economic, political The Table showswidely and differing ratios thedeveloped thenowfor countries. in developing While Belgium there three are times many as people over30 than and between and29 years age,inMorocco, Philippines, 15 the of othercountries there over90 adolescents youngadultsforevery are and hundred middle-aged older and persons. many thenow-developing In of coun15 tries, age-group the from to 29 is stillgrowing absolutely well as in as proportion thepopulation 30, sincea much to over larger number children of over15 aremoving into 15 to 29 agebracket. thefigures Senegal up the If for canbe trusted, number children the of under equalsthat theentire 15 of older Unless rise population. or reduce emigration an exceptional inmortality should theyounger population there in several and otlher now-developing countries, peopleaged 15 to 29 willsoon equal or outnumber compatriots their aged 30 andover. A comparison therespective groups Japan of age in andEgypt brings out thecontrast between developed thenow-developing the and countries. While theageratios, defined Table2, differ byonepoint as for only (64.1 vs. 65.1), theproportion young of people Japan decline in will rapidly thenearfuture, in whereas Egypt is rising. in it Tropical Africa particular, in demographically a is nowin theearly late-comer, only phaseof accelerating population growth;
29 30

Tarzie Vittachi, The Fall of Sukarno(London,A. Deutsch,1967). Alfred Friendly, "Indonesian Jr., Youth Seeks New Order", New YorkTimes,Sept, 11, 1966.

YOUTH AS A FORCE IN THE MODERN WORLD TABLE 2

249

Ratios of 15-29 Year Groupto 100 Persons30 Years and Over, and Supporting Data in Thousands*
Year 1963 1963 1965 1964 1962 1965 1964 1960 1960 1961 1960 1961 1960 1961 1963 1965 1961 1960 1960 1962 1963 1957 1965
1960 1960

Country Belgium Sweden & England Wales France Italy U.S.A. Japan U.A.R. = Egypt Syria India Turkey Pakistan Senegal Indonesia Ceylon Venezuela Peru Ghana Brazil Kenya Morocco Tanzania Philippines
Mexico Dominican Rep.

Ratio 34.1 36.6 36.7 38.0 43.9 45.4 64.1 65.1 73.7 73.8 73.9 74.4 75.4 76.5 79.4 82.1 84.0 85.3 85.4 90.3 90.3 92.8 96.3
85.7 88.9

Population

Total

30 Years
and over

15-29 Years

Under
15

9,290 7,604 47,763 48,411 50,946 194,583 97,186 25,984 4,565 438,775 27,755 90,283 3,110 96,319 10,625 8,722 9,907 6,727 70,119 8,636 12,665 8,663 32,345
34,923 3,047

5,279 4,386 26,956 26,378 26,720 92,631 43,635 9,011 1,413 149,006 9,390 28,726 1,020 31,603 3,515 2,615 3,053 2,013 21,676
10,484 850

1,799 1,605 9,902 10,026 11,730 42,043 27,961 5,864 1,041 109,750 6,938 21,378 769 24,172 2,790 2,147 2,563 1,717 18,512 2,212 3,254 2,399 8,453
8,987 756

2,212 1,613 10,905 12,008 12,496 59,909 25,590 11,110 2,111 180,019 11,427 40,179 1,789 40,544 4,320 3,960 4,290 2,997 29,931 3,976 5,806 3,679 15,112
15,452 1,441

2,449 3,605 2,585 8,780

* XVII (1965), Section6. ComputedfromUnitedNations,DemographicYearbook, Data of Indonesiabased on a 1% sample of censusreturns.

in decades.3' it willhavea very of adults thecoming largecontingent young as theage ratio, be ForMainland China, agestructure only estimated; the can age over80. The corresponding ratioofthe defined Table 2, is probably for around a 1961, Soviet like of Union, that theU.S.A.,had reached lowpoint cohorts 53 probably between and 54.32 At thattimethe 16 to 19 year-old weresmallowing thebirth deficit during SecondWorldWar. Since the to has cohorts moved the15 to 29 year-group theratio have into and then, larger probably up. gone to The age structure beenfrequently in investigatedregard thedependhas entpopulation, children peopleover65 years age. In theunderi.e. and of for where children under15 account 36 to 48 percent developed countries, is of thepopulation, modernization and capitalformation henceeconomic
31 AnsleyJ. Coale, "Estimates Fertility of and Mortality TropicalAfrica", in Popula32

tionIndex,XXXII (1966), pp. 173-81. UnitedNations,DemographicYearbook,17thissue, 1965.

250

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MOLLER

The population. high a retarded theneedto support largeunproductive by least it, load by child-dependency borne thosecountries able to afford often for cause becomes unrecognized ofdiscontent thepeopleandoffrustration an of accomplishwhosevisions national forpolitical leadersand intellectuals be cannot realized. ment cases an unusually of large- contingent a However, large and in many and restlessness instability addsto thepotential and adults adolescents young a proportion that larger is in these This societies. situation causedbythefact Especially century. the did ofchildren reach 15 than so before present now age in spectacularly Asia, rateshave declined sinceWorldWar II, mortality a in belief, decline thedeath Contrary common to Africa, LatinAmerica. and in increases; the of ratedoes notmeanthat number old peoplesubstantially onlyfor2 to 4 people65 yearsand up account underdeveloped countries aboveall the A rateinvolves of percent thepopulation. decline thedeath of of numbers greater benefit improvements survival children, sincehealth of of young peoplethanold.Evenas lateas the1940's,45 percent thepopulaof in reaching 15.33The reduction themortality age tionofIndiadiedbefore by and children, youngadultsconstitutes far the mostimportant infants, the of As modernization. a result thisprocess proaspectof demographic shrinks.34 portion olderpeopleactually of a implies disproportionately The survival a greater of number children of time, only though fora limited in large population the15 to 29 age bracket, tendsto age the cohorts entire structure the sincewith agingof thelarger however, mustbe confactors, shape.Two additional revert its former to is at of year-cohortstheage offertilitylikely First, arrival larger the sidered. rate the even of increase number children, though fertility rethe to further mains of presence a larger parents of because the of number potential constant, surgeof births thissecondary Thus,after years, 15 thanin previous years. adults. willagainswelltheage group adolescents young and of if rate in as to Second, thefertility begins decline, it is nowdoing several relative and adults of the underdeveloped countries, number adolescents young to 15 will to theentire but will increase, after years begin population at first in will decrease. however, be moderate thenexttwenty Declinesin fertility, of dissemination birth we eventhough can expecta steady yearsor more, nowhave very and control information. Asia, Africa, LatinAmerica Since rapidly; evenif and will the of young populations, number families increase of fertility thesepopulations families the becomesmaller, aggregate average of willremain for development Japan decades. The demographic high several conthe favorable under most serves an example what be expected as can of
33 D. Gosh,Pressure Population of and EconomicEfficiency India (IndianCouncil in of WorldAffairs, 1947). 34 AnsleyJ. Coale, "How a Population Ages or GrowsYounger",in Population:The VitalRevolution, R. Freedman(Chicago,AldinePublishing ed. Co., 1964), Ch. 3.

YOUTH AS A FORCE IN THE MODERN WORLD

251

ditions. Japan's birth declined approximately in thetwenty rate by 50% years following World II; yet population intwodecades War its grew from million 73 to 100 million, theratio adolescents young and of and adults persons to over 29, though constantly declining,still is high. Furthermore, respect age distribution theentire with to for world population, proportion adolescents young the of and adults fail cannot to increase, becausetheunderdeveloped growing are faster thanthedeveloped nations. According a United to Nations forecast madein 1966,theformer comprised 67 percent theglobalpopulation 1960 butwillamount 76 percent of in to by theyear2000. Variousconsiderations, therefore, to theconclusion lead that young peoplerepresent unusually an large proportion theworld of population present willcontinue do so fortheremainder thetwenat and to of tieth century. Sincethe"young nations" now goingthrough earlystagesof demothe graphic modernization collected reliable have no historical census dataon age composition, since and many thedataon agegroups of recorded theDemoin graphicYearbooks oftheUnited Nations either are patently erroneous at or leastsuspect, willbe instructivetabulate it to historical series age ratios of for somenations EuropeandAmerica which of for gooddataare available. Europe experienced "population its explosion" thelatter oftheeighin part teenth nineteenth and centuries. However, despite demographic this expansion, Table 3 shows in Europe 15 to 29 age group no time that the at to amounted 80 percent theolder of population; fact, Sweden, in in France, Germany, and Hungary, as far for backas records it never go, reached even70 percent. The reasons thelower ratios Europearevaried. for age of in First, France as wellas in certain other regions Europe, of farmers other and commoners are known havelimited number their to the of progeny early theeighas as teenth century. Second, improvementhealth, in hygiene, nutrition and came onlyslowly Europein contrast the rapidapplication modern in to of biochemical and otherscientific knowledge the now-developing in countries. the Third, opportunities emigration for available Europeans to attracted predominantly young people.For instance, suddendropof the ratiofor the Greeceafter census 1890 is attributable massive the of to of emigration the a young. Finally, newmovement limit to families beganto makeitself felt between years 1850 and 1880in western central the of and Europe.With the coming thesmallfamily of ideal,theproportion adolescents young of and adults theolderpopulation to dropped one country in after another. Greece, together other with Balkancountries Russiaforwhich age and no data are available, showeda higher proportion adolescents young of and adultsthandid western northern and Europe,excepting British the Isles. Great Britain Russiareported highest ofnatural and the rates increase among thenations Europeduring nineteenth of the century; Ireland, and prior the to great famine 1845-46,anticipated of someof themostunfortunate charac-

252

HERBERT MOLLER TABLE 3

SeriesofRatio of Youlth Historical 15-29 to 100 Persons30 Years * and Over,forSelectedCountries
Year 1750 Sweden [France 62.9
64.9 Great_

Ger-

Hungary }Greece

U.S.A.

1820-21 1830-31 1840-41 1850-51 1860-61 1870-71 1880-81 1890-91 1900-01 1910-11 1920-21 1925 1930-31 1933 1936 1940-41 1946 1950-51 1960 1963 1964 1965

1780 1786 1790-91 1800-01 1810-11

1760 1770 1776

59.8 63.2

63.6 56.6 57.0 61.1

62.8 59.1 69.7 69.5 61.2 58.0 61.3 54.7 57.4 57,3 57.1 54.0 47.6 34.8 33.6 37.9

58.6 56.9 56.3 54.3 54.0 50.3 48.5 48.8 48.5 47.4 44.9 45.5 38.0 37.1 42.5 35.8 38.0

62.9 60.7 57.0 58.1
77.1a 73.8 70.5 69.9 72.5 73.0 72.1 62.5 54.7 51.4 43.4 35.9 33.8 36.9 108.5m 103.7m 101.0 94.7 86.4 84.1 80.9 73.1 73.1 62.9 59.3 52.2 45.4 39.4 45.4

63.6b 64.5 66.7 67.9 65.2 63.7 49.5 42.5e 33.4f 40.4f 39.4f

65.3mc

66.2 67.2 62.6 48.5 50.0d 45.5 39.8

79.4 77.5 78.6 78.5 74.7 63.9 71.8 61.2 65.6 52.1 49.1

a = approximate b = year 1871 c = year 1869 d = year 1949 e = year 1939 f = Federal Republicand W. Berlin m = males only. Frenchand British data for odd-numbered years from 1791 to 1951; all othersfor even-numbered years,unless indicated specifically otherwise.
* Computedfrom Gustav Sundbairg, Bevolkerungsgeschichte Schwedens1750-1900 (Stockholm, Norstedt S,iner, & 1907). Sweden:Statistiska Statistisk &rsbok Centralbyran, for Sverige1950; 1956; 1966. J. Bourgeois-Pichat, "The General Development the of Populationof France since the Eighteenth Century", Populationin History,ed. in D. V. Glass & D. E. C. Eversley(London,E. Arnold,1965), pp. 474-506,App. II. Statistik DeutschenReiches,Vol. 451,2: Volkszahlung: Bevolkerung Germany: des Die des Deutschen Reichesnach den Ergebnissen Volkszihlung der 1933, Heft2: Geschlecht, Alter,und Famnilienstand (Berlin,1936). B. R. Mitchell, Abstract British of Historical Statistics (Cambridge, Eng.,University Press,1962),pp. 12-13.Lajos Thirring, "Magyarin T8rte'neti Demografidja, ed. orszag nepessege 1869-1949 kvzo6tt", Magyarorszdg JozsefKovacsics (Budapest,K6zgazdas'agies Jogi Konyvkiado,1963), pp. 282-83, Table 25. V. G. Valaoras, "A Reconstruction the Demographic of History Modern of

YOUTH AS A FORCE IN THE MODERN WORLD

253

countries: 1841,theratioof the in teristics present-day of underdeveloped 31 and overwas 96.2 to 100.35 Yet apart to of 16 to 30 age group that from was as these exceptional cases,Europe's demographic growth never explosive as thatofmany thenow-developing of countries. The age composition countries as theUnited of such States Argentina and is differentiated that European from of countries themassive by immigration with consequently proportion women ofpredominantly people a of young high The extreme in thechild-bearing period. of youthfulnessthese populations is of increase therefore theresult natural not alone.SincetheFirst World War, has a minor in demographic immigration become relatively factor the experience oftheUnited in and are States, changes theage composition largely conditioned byfluctuationsnatality, and of mortality, themeanage at marriage. Table 4 presents changes theage composition theUnited the in of States since1930 andprojections 1980. to
TABLE 4

Ratios Persons 15-29YearsofAgeto100 Persons YearsandOver of 30 intheU.S.A.,inThousands, * 1930-1980
Year 1930 1940 1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980

11 Ratio
59.3 52.2 50.9 45.4 40.7 39.4 45.4 52.2 56.7 56.0

15-29 Years 32,381 34,019 35,250 34,526 33,696 34,889 42,043 50,061 57,367 61,175

[ 30 Years and over
54,614 65,131 69,202 76,128 82,759 88,648 92,631 95,977 101,142 109,317

* Enumerated populationbased on Statistical Abstractsof the United States and U.N. Demographic Yearbooks. Estimated future population, 1970-1980, the assumpon tionof 400,000 immigrants annum, per based on Statistical Abstract the U.S., 1966, of p. 6, No. 3.

In Table 4, theratios the15 to 29 age group of relative themiddle-aged to and olderpopulation reflect earlier the fluctuations thebirth of ratein the United States. ratio The declined between 1930 and 1960 dueto thedecrease
Greece", Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly, XXXVIII (1960), No. 2, pp. 138-39. U.S. Bureau of the Census,HistoricalStatistics the UnitedStates,Colonial Times of to 1957 (Washington, D.C., 1960), Series A 71-85. Statistical Abstract the United of States,1966. UnitedNations,DemographicYearbooks, 1948-1965. 35 ComputedfromK. H. Connell, The Populationof Ireland 1750-1845 (Oxford, Clarendon Press,1950),p. 192.

254

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the the and of immigration during after FirstWorldWar,as wellas from factor theincrease is decreasing birth of the1920's and 1930's;a third rate health conditions. in thenumber older of peoplebecauseofimproved rate in The American fertility climbed the 1940's, especially following its WarII, reaching peakin 1957. The "babyboom",which World necessischools the1950's,reached in the tated building numerous the of elementary high the and around 1960. Also thealtar. schools, labormarket, thecolleges the the in of mothers With increase thenumber potential during 1960's,plus a further the will increase during 1970's,morechildren be born;thus, after rise 1980 the proportion adolescents youngadultswill doubtless of and the will again.Almost certainly, therefore, United States havea high proporwith tionofyoung peoplebetween and 29 in comparison other 15 Western a countries theremainder thiscentury. of evenwith relatively for However, high fertility theUnited rate, States never will approach high the proportions of teenagers young countries and adults seenin mostunderdeveloped today andinthenear future. in A risein therateoffertility, as occurred theUnited in such States the the on 1940'sandpartofthe1950's,has nearly sameeffect theage structure as has a decline mortality, predominant in of the cause fortheincrease the the number young of peopleinAsia,Africa, LatinAmerica. and Regrettably, lack of reliableand regular censusesin the underdeveloped countries in previous decadesprecludes presentation their a of age ratiosin historical perspective. Certainly, however, mostofthenow-developing in countries the largenumber children, of relative theolder to population, combined the with largeproportion young of adults with their highaggregate fertility potential, willperpetuate several for decades high ratios adolescents young of and adults. III In anycommunity presence a largenumber adolescents young the of of and adults influences temper life;and thegreater proportion young the of the of peoplethegreater likelihood cultural political the of and change. poor "If aging peasants be left misery evenstarvation can to or without serious political 36 the consequences, case is different theyoung with generation."Age composition, be sure,constitutes one determinant thefunctioning to only in of society; therefore itcannot assumed a large be that proportion young of people makesthesameimplications every for nation, evenforevery nor poorand starving nation. Too often, however, direct a and exclusive correlation bethe tween incidence violence ofpoverty taken granted. imof and is for This pression easilycreated theobservation outbursts violence is by that of are
36 NathanKeyfitz, "Age Distribution a Challengeto Development", as Amer.Journal of Sociology, LXX (1964-65), 665. p.

YOUTH AS A FORCE IN THE MODERN WORLD

255

in and, neighborhoods internationally, more nationally,disadvantaged frequent, But and countries. sincepoorand crowded in underdeveloped overpopulated of have proportions countries high as neighborhoods wellas underdeveloped in as must people,age composition be considered a majorcoefficient young behavior. of theincidence violent in Negroes the1960'shas been of the For instance, struggle theAmerican Since the SecondWorldWar, by bornealmostexclusively Negroyouth. not terms, especially in poorer absolute havenotbecome Negroes American white against part the cities in thebignorthern where greater ofthestruggle The havebecomeyounger. largeconplace.But Negroes has society taken in the be cannot accounted onlyfactor theexof tingent Negroteen-agers and white gap for that discontent led to riots, thewidening between plosive part. played unemployment an important and and incomes white Negro Negro of stoodout as a factor crucial in of But thepresence youth largenumbers thoseof the with sharply contrasted of the importance: attitudes theyoung themselves to too part, dispirited bring for older who Negroes, were, themost suppresor elections, evento meet to to go outand demonstrate,votein city violence.37 with sionand violence in factor whoseimportance revolutionary is Class antagonism another The to is once is change deflated, attention directed theroleofyouth. widely or are revolutions causedbyclassstruggles are that heldassumption political by years in has with synonymous classstruggles beenchallenged thepastfew the the Revolution, French on research thePuritan historical Revolution, rise upgovernmental morerecent and ofNational Socialism Germany, other in as revolution, itworked Indonesian of unique study theearly Smail's heavals. and wereirrelevant that on thelocal level, himto conclude classfactors led of the between radicalsand the moderates the that"the maindistinction
Indonesian Revolution was one of generations....

it of expression thetimes; movement a wholewas themostcharacteristic as santri kindof background ruraland urban, menof every drewin young and educated illiterate." Muslims] secular, and [devout between was At thenational the level,in Djakarta, revolution a struggle was of elite; thesentiment nationalism but theforeign Dutchand a domestic of and activities thereplacement officials. for notessential therevolutionary in the worked with samevigor the "In thisperiod revolutionary the process did the rural areas,where Dutchand theBritish notappearat all and where the revolution In nationalism such as wasoflittle significance."theIndonesian ever that most decisive were pressure hadbeengrowing factors thepopulation of the century, weakening the the during courseof thetwentieth stronger of the through events thePacificWar,and the traditional powerstructure
37

The pemuda [youth]

Lewis W. Jones,"The New World of Negro Youth", in Problemsof Youth,ed. Muzafer Sherifand CarolynW. Sherif(Chicago, Aldine Publishing Co., 1965), pp. 65-88.

256

HERBERT

MOLLER

the Similarly, the occupation.38 during Japanese stimulated of activism youth of an aim had forits official thereplacement in 1964 revolution Zanzibar of adults eventhough Arab Arabby a Negroelite;buttheriseof young if of important, less well-publiorigin to positions powerwas an equally cizedaspect. of thatthesubversion anyestabappearsto indicate evidence Historical a requires movement by ifnot government, accomplished coupd'etat, lished is such a movement directed thatcuts acrosssocial classes;and whether and force the peopleprovide driving elite, or a against native a foreign young "Most leadership. and the a largeextent, intellectual organizational to often, have in movements the MiddleEast, Asia, and Africa of thenationalistic their who against or people,students, officers rebelled of consisted young youth a has developed specific usually elders.... At the same timethere to movement the thatintensifies nationalistic and consciousness ideology have nations formed of many thenewly 39As a result the 'rejuvenate' country." i.e., whatRobertC. Tuckerhas called "movement-regimes", governments mass and auspices basedon a revolutionary movement.40 under single-party in very rapidly thecoming is population boundto grow Sincetheworld In tremendously. peoplewillincrease of number young the decades, absolute finally until will theolderage groups rise, to their countries proportion many The trend. the will ratesand masslongevity reverse present birth declining vary of cohorts, course, of consequences largeyouth social and economic develit Broadly societies. different among speaking, can be said that greatly educathe can countries copebestwith needforlarger opedandprosperous in and on the tional facilities, effects thelabormarket, changes consumption. of the from advantages a morereadily can Thesesamecountries also profit and flexibility, eduintellectual vigor, physical their from population, young and utilize, can society best stimulate, and A cability. dynamic developed to that originality belongs thoseunder35. A youthful the creative reward accomand of reservoir inventiveness potential a representsgreat population have history beentoopoorin throughout societies most However, plishment. and socialstructure, too in and too resources, rigid monopolistic their capital poof to facilities availthemselves thesehuman educational in limited their The overwhelmtoday. societies ofmost still which holdstrue a tentials, fact and unrecognized goesto waste.Unremains talent of ingmajority human personalities, underdeveloped produce societies underdeveloped fortunately and both intellectually emotionally. in an conditions, increase thenumber of Irrespective socialand economic Young in an involves increase social turbulence. in any society of youth
38

39 S. N. Eisenstadt, of Patterns Youth", Daedalus, Winter1962: Youth: "Archetypal

Smail,op. cit.,pp. 10-13,22-23, 156-57.

p. Changeand Challenge, 36. Amer. Politicsof Movement-Regimes", RobertC. Tucker,"Towardsa Comparative PoliticalScienceRev., LV (June1961), 281-89.
40

YOUTH AS A FORCE IN THE MODERN WORLD

257

and to to inclined takerisks, exposethemselves people are conspicuously in behavior. Discountdisruptive to and others danger, tend engage socially to connation nation, to statistics long-range from variation ingtheconsiderable world 15 malesbetween and 29 in everywheretheWestern firm fact the that than and against property morehomicides morecrimes years age commit of fewer with As commit suicides, thenotable theolder population.41 a rulethey who have decades,collegestudents, and, in recent exception soldiers of of coevals.But theaggressiveratesthantheremainder their higher suicide outis partdirected adults forthemost nessofmaleadolescents young and which one differences represents of themostpronounced wards, finding a The measurable.42 imare and between younger oldermenthiat statistically of the population the is pression lawlessness on theriseamong young that to extent attributed thecontinually be United Statescan to a considerable in proportion youth the of of in as An increase socialunrest a result a high behavior that must also agestructure be assumed on thegrounds psychopathic or brutality, even is specific youth. acts of cruelty, Manywho commit to the as after reach age of25, 30, or they crime young menkeepoutoftrouble 35. Although individual (or the of "age curves" psychopathy "sociopathy") disorder of of all assumea variety shapes, manifestationsthispersonality and to self-assertion pugnacity criminal excessive from "wildoats"behavior, tendenthat with youth. follows primitive It related acts- arepredominantly in to behavior be expected increase anypopulation can ciesandpsychopathic if will with The commensurately itsyouthfulness. increase exceedproportion thehigher or involves riseof illegitimacy larger a rateof natural increase or higher is families both, delinquencydemonstrably sincetherateofjuvenile thanforchildren manysiblings children forthosewith and forillegitimate whoare lessfrequently victims neglect rejection. of or the - in contrast neurotic psychotic states and is with Psychopathyepisodic put felicitously it. as Cleckley and thuswearsa "maskof sanity", Hervey wouldhaveto If did,"society do Psychopaths notact outall thetime. they and They them an early in self-defense. appearto be normal at age destroy 44 episodes." For this even amiablepeople in between their psychopathic
41 For international historical data, Georg von Mayr,Statistik und Gesellschaftslehre, III: Moralstatistik Mohr, 1917), pp. 760-801. Crime in the UnitedStates: (Tilbingen, Uniform CrimeReports the U.S., issuedannually J. E. Hoover,Fed. Bureau of for by Investigation, Department Justice; Tables on "Total Arrests Age". U.S. of see by 42 Louis I. Dublin, Suicide: A Sociologicaland Statistical Study(New York, Ronald, 1963),Chap. 3. For historical international data, G. v. Mayr,op. cit.,pp. 309-15. 43 AlbertD. Biderman in Social Indicators, RaymondBauer (Cambridge, ed. Mass., M.I.T. Press,1966),pp. 122-29,convincingly criticizes thisscore the F.B.I.'s Crime on in the UnitedStatesquoted above. 44 Dr. Milton S. Gurvitz, of Great Neck, New York, to whom I am indebtedfor out and pointing the age-specific episodicnatureof psychopathy. HulseyCason, "The Amer.Jour.of Orthopsychiatry, XVIII (1948), pp. 297Conceptof the Psychopath", 308.

of enlarging proportion the youngerage groupsin recentyears.43

258

HERBERT

MOLLER

of in their among peers theescalation instrumental become often they reason with of relationshipspsychopaths schizoin Research thesymbiotic violence. on light certain and is persons a desideratum maythrow or phrenic paranoiac groups.45 or two between individuals within interactions extraordinary are the though youth maybe in ferment, majority world, In theWestern of the within context the adult and emotionally socially stabilized usually in are adults also involved the countries, But society. in thenow-developing live nations more in adolescents these As a crisis instability.46 consequence, of of and of to attuned thetemper thewholesociety to theaspirations closely a often politically, playing leading Youngpeopleare moreactive oldermen. by dominated the In governments. countries of rolein theoverthrow their take beliefs and mythologies eschatological political mentality theyoung, of in is and reality often perceived, a of on a highdegree importance, political of forces good and irredeemable as of frame thought, opposing Manichean by monopolized completely are groups well-nigh "ideological evil. extreme The are of of and people".The leaders prophets the"Wretched theEarth" young their and tolerance"; projecting of opposedto "themyth liberal passionately of the preach destruction they scene, onto troubles thepolitical owndesperate them.47 as so for cure a world immoral tohavehurt as existing society theonly in are hatred rising themore of It is noteworthy movements consuming that in has while"theend of ideology" arrived thedevelpopulations, youthful of opedcountries theWest. and of of or on Anyjudgment theutility disutility theinfluence theyoung of an consider array problems: must on society ofyouthful movements mass of percentage theyoung What a Whoaretheelites with massappealtoyouth? To alienation? what for Whatare thereasons their is population alienated? changes? certain or to needed effectuate prevent and are extent force terrorism are and are costsofchange, what thecostsofthe What thesocialandhuman quo? Andso on. of preservation thestatus of the can Somegeneral observations be maderegarding methods political youth by havebeenemployed moreor less revolutionary movethat action self-conand frequently more usedmore in are ments thepastandthat being are youth Sinceactivist century. halfof thetwentieth sciously thelatter in own, to power their military in vastly governments superior established facing wouldbe self-destructive. as on them equal terms, in open battle, meeting to attempts disarm for suitable theweak.Thefirst two There remain strategies
45 ErnestM. Gruenberg, in "SociallySharedPsychopathology", Explorations Social in Psychology, Alexander Leighton al. (New York, Basic Books, 1957),pp. 201ed. H. et 29, givessome suggestive ideas on thissubject. 46 Raoul Makarius, La jeunesseintellectuelle dEgypteau lendemain la Deuxieme de GuerreMondiale (Paris and The Hague, Mouton,1960), p. 75. 47 Vladimir C. Nahirny, "Some Observations IdeologicalGroups",Amer.Jour.of on Sociology, LXVII (1961-62), 397-62.On FrantzFanon, the authorof The Wretched pp. of the Earth,Irene L. Gendzier,"FrantzFanon: In Search of Justice", Middle East Jour., Autumn1966,pp. 534-44.

YOUTH AS A FORCE IN THE MODERN WORLD

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the opponent morally a complete by renunciation force, to of subscribing non-violence, allowing helplessmembers be imprisoned, to or tortured, and exposing the themselves abuseby the to martyred, turning other cheek, of This moralcampaign asserting one's injured aims at powerful. rights and eroding conscience thepowerful enlisting the of As publicsupport. a "It contemporary of exponent thisstrategy explains: is up to thecitizenry, in outside to combat with state, the short those of power, engage permanent violent the escalatory revolution, beyond gentility theballot-box, but of to 48 insure justice, freedom well-being." This "permanent and combat" of is course effective against liberal a state. only The secondmethod overcoming powerful insurgent guerrilla the is of or To than warfare. an evengreater extent thefirst method is accessible it almost exclusively theyoung, to sinceguerrilla must fighters endure incredible deprivations discomforts a life permanent of and and danger. Regular governments, civilized find and especially difficult cope with to governments, it extremely determined underground terrorism. instance, For General of Grivas, Cyprus in of fame, explained hisbookthepractice hisexecution whosetask squads, was to stalk their victims the shoot them makeoff, and from rear, after passthegunto a childor young whom British the ing werenotexpected girl to with charge murder.49 The twostrategies seemcontradictory, thosewho subscribe and may to one usually the with sincere in reject other but a horror; whenever history revolt directed was against well-established adversaries, typical youth-ideoloor giessuchas Anabaptism anarchism manifested themselves irenic in and belligerent shapesat thesametime, swinging easilyand suddenly from one extreme theother. to Bothstrategies reject legalmethods parliamentary of procedures, "electoral opium", compromise slowprogress. or Bothaimat the overthrow humiliation the enemy; and of and bothare supported the by chiliastic "thelastshallbe first". hopethat Thepurpose direction young and that people find movements rebellion in of helpsmany overcome insecurity hopelessness a futile to the and of existence. Thefeeling being of ableto copewith hardship danger, enjoyment and the of comradeship, theacceptance their and of peersis basicto a senseofidentity in theyoung. Evenbelonging an anti-social destructive to and movement can havea salutary effect thepersonality on formation a boyor girl, of especially intimes socialdislocation.50 of
Howard Zinn, "The HealthfulUse of Power", Amer. Jour.of Orthopsychiatry, XXXVI (1966),pp. 90-95. 49 Regis Debray, Re'volution dans la revolution? Lutte armee et luttepolitiqueen Ameriquelatine (Paris, FrangoisMaspero, 1967) is an outstanding exposition inof surgentwarfare.George Grivas, General Grivas on Guerrilla Warfare.Trans. by A. A. Pallis (New York, Praeger,1965). 50 On the mentalhealthaspectsof youthmovements, Fishmanand Solomon,"Youth
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and Social Action", loc. cit., pp. 16-20.

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HERBERT

MOLLER

of serious movements"theinis One ofthemost consequences "liberation Basic political culcation hostility children. of in attitudes beliefs and are and in learned the in in formed adolescence, even earlier life.Prejudices resistant later first decadesoflifearehighly to The of two experience. orgies in hatred of in of nowindulged byleaders theyoung various parts theworld the of greatly exceedin scopeand intensity teaching nationalism children to and adults the 150 years in following American French the and revolutions. Thesehatreds remain long-lasting will a of legacy theage ofthe"population explosion". is but Socialchange notengineered youth, it is most manifest youth. in by for is in "The potential change concentratedthecohorts young of adults who are old enough participate to directly themovements in impelled change, by a butnotold enough havebecome to committed an occupation, residence, to 51 a family procreation, a wayof life." The direction socialchange of or of results from totalsituation which young themselves, the in the find including thetypes leaders of with whom they interact thetraditions institutions and and haveinherited. presence a largecontingent young The they of of peoplein a and of population makefora cumulative may process innovation socialand it cultural it growth; maylead to elemental, directionless acting-out behavior; old and maydestroy institutions elevatenew elitesto power;and theunemployed energies theyoung be organized directed totalitarian of may and by of rulers. dynamism itslargeand youthful The populations distinguishes the crowded of history thetwentieth century.
HERBERT MOLLER

Boston University

51 Norman B. Ryder,"The Cohort as a Concept in the Study of Social Change", Amer.Sociol. Rev., XXX (1965), p. 848.

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