Central Asian Survey (2000), 19(3/4), 451-468

Review Article
Policy options for resolving post-Soviet ethnic conflict
ROBERT M. CUTLER

Managing Conflict in the Former Soviet Union CSIA Studiesin International Security Alexei Arbatov, Abram Chayes, Antonia Handler Chayes and Lara Olson (editors) Cambridge:MIT Press, 1997 Ethnicity, Nationalism and Conflict in and after the Soviet Union: The Mind Aflame Valery Tishkov London: Sage Publications for United Nations ResearchInstitute for Social Development,1997 Thesetwo books are perhapsthe most significant recentworks on the origins and regulation of ethnic conflict in the post-Soviet area, yet there could not be a greatercontrastbetweenthem. Valery Tishkov becamedirector of the Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology in Moscow during Gorbachev'sperestroika era and is a former Minister of Nationalities in Yeltsin's government. This work draws on his inside knowledge of major events as well as on extensive primary researchand an encyc1opaedic knowledge of the literature. It is a brilliant tour de force that makes available to English-readersan extremely wide range of Russian-language ethno-historical and conflict-analytic work. Its length, acute criticism of dominant Western theories and analyses, and lack of a unified methodological approach will probably diminish its appreciation by Western scholars.In the opinion of this reviewer, however, the idiosyncratic combination of thesecharacteristics, married to Tishkov's comprehensive familiarity with the situations, is one of the work's strengths and contributes to its acuity. It is precisely the author's political engagement,combined with his use of personal reminiscences, interviews, notes and conversations,as well as documentsfrom his files as Minister and institute director, which give his work its special
Dr RobertM. Cutler is Fellow, Institute of European and RussianStudies,CarletonUniversity, c/o Station 'H'. Box 518, Montreal,Quebec, CanadaH3G 2L5. ISSN 0263-4937print; 1465-3354 online/OOl3/40451-18 2000 Central Asian Survey e DOl: 10.1 080J0263493002002080 1

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qualities. When deployed by someone like Jack Matlock, these qualities are lauded. A good review should outline the argumentsof the items under review and evaluatethem. With only two books under review here and with both of them of such heft and authority, the summary of their argumentswill necessarilybe extended.Therefore the first section of the review indicates in a more cursory manner how the books are constructed and complement one another. This sectionwill include some details as to the basis for the conclusionsof the book edited by Arbatov, Chayes, Chayes and Olson, which is below denoted the .ACCO' volume. The second section of the review examines in detail the structureand argumentationof Tishkov's monograph.It turns out that the two volumes sharetwo case studies and that their general conclusions are mutually related.Thereforethe third section of this review comparestheir treatmentof the Ingush-Ossetian conflict and of the situation of Slavophones Kazakhstan,and in it comparesalso the volumes' respective policy recommendations. The fourth section of this review evaluates those recommendationson the basis of an examinationof Central Asian conflict situations in the former Soviet area. The fifth section of the review is a summary and conclusion. Overview Tishkov's study is strongly policy-oriented and profoundly critical of Western theories of ethnic conflict, Sovietology and 'post-Sovietology'. Although area specialists should recognize the work's value, several of its characteristics militate against its being extremely well received in the North American social-science community. Tishkov stateshis own criticisms of even dominant theoriesof the genesisof ethnic conflict, as if these criticisms were matters of simple fact: which they are. However, he does not elaborate a synthetic social-scientific framework for testing the theories he criticizes. He is thus neither 'scientific' nor 'systematic'. Over-attentionto these aspectsof his work risks obscuring from view the fact that his propositions are nonethelesswell argued;indeed,his thoroughness and encyclopaedismturn his eclecticism into a virtue. If this work doesnot receive the attention it deserves, that will be because it is not 'comparable' to works by Western specialistsand does not fall within a Westernmajor researchparadigm. This does not make it any less comprehensive and knowledgeable work. During the Soviet period, Westernspecialistson a Soviet-area affairs strongly discountedtestimony even by Soviet-trainedspecialists-and especially by Soviet-trained specialists-and participants in Soviet policy issues. The reception that Tishkov's book receives will be a good indicator of whether and to what degree this parochialism may have changed. The ACCO volume is a collection of essays by Russian and American scholars that succeeds in making available to English-readers a moderate Russianperspectiveon selectedcasesof ethnic conflict and in establishing the difficulties in promoting the deeperinvolvement by internationalorganizationsin their resolution.However, the ACCO book is oddly structuredand marredby the

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absence an overall controlling hand as well as by certain organizational and of presentational shortcomingsthat limit its value. After a relatively thin introductory Part One, Part Two presentssix casestudies:in Russia (North Ossetiaand Ingushetia),in Ukraine (the Crimea), in Moldova (the Transdniesterregion), in Latvia (the Siavophone question), in Kazakhstan (the Slavophone question again) and in Georgia (Abkhazia and South Ossetia).The casestudies are each written by a specialist from the Policy Analysis Section of the Council of the RussianFederation(the upper house of Parliament).Chayes and Chayes make clear from the outset that these case studies 'do not aim for complete scholarly objectivity' but rather for presentationof 'a moderateRussianperspective' (p 3). Arbatov arguesthat 'imbalance and even bias' (p 20) are warranted in pursuit of presentingperspectivesnot widely available in the West. As counterpoint, a commentaryby a young American scholar, usually a Harvard or MIT graduate student,complementseach case study. The collection of six casestudiesis idiosyncratic.Three are by a single author, Edward Ozhiganov.who by himself accountsfor over half of Russian-authored case-study page count, three-sevenths the total Russian-authored of page count and over one-third of the whole book. Moreover, the graduate-student commentaries on Ozhiganov uniformly draw attention to his consistent myopia, his minimization of the role of outside forces in the developmentof the conflicts, his derogationof international organizations in search of their resolution and his rathertransparent sympathies(for Moscow while againstthe Crimean movement and Kyiv, for the Transdniestrians while against Chisinau, for the southern Ossetes and Abhaz while against Tbilisi). While Ozhiganov's chapters provide background and some detail for these casestudies,like the rest of the ACCO book they are marred by a deficient and inconsistentscholarly apparatus.This is the result of a lack of co-ordination of the division of labour among the editorial team, for which no one is individually responsible. However, it is justified and possible,without appearingchurlish, to call attentionto suchrepresentative lapsesas the transliteration,within ten pages, of the nameof Nezavisimaiagazeta's military observervariously as Felgengauer and Felgenhauer 414, n. 2, and p 424. n. 11); the consistentmisspelling of the (p nameof the Presidentof Kazakhstanas Nazerbaevthroughoutthe text, notesand index; or the location of the 'Sinthizian-Uighur [sic] autonomous region in northeastern China [emphasis added], which lies on the eastern border of Kazakhstan'(p 294, n. 29). With the exception of a few of the graduate-student commentaries, cited works and article titles are given in English translation, all complicating the identification of the originals. To give but two examples: although items published in Sukhumi are clearly not Abkhaz (else they should have been published in 'Sukhum'), whether they are in Georgian or Russian is unclear; and the language of items published in Vladikavkaz by a university press whose name is also given in English can only be guessed.Also it is increasinglystandardbibliographic practice to cite physical locations where rare or ephemeralitems such as these are conserved.Finally, the case studies and Ozhiganov's in particular, are marked by an over-relianceon Itar-Tass reports.
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None of theseobservationsdetractsfrom the principal merit of the ACCO book, which is that it succeedsin its intent to provide more widely in English certain 'moderate' nongovernmentalspecializedRussianperspectives. The main policy argument of the ACCO book is that in the Russian view, internationalorganizationshave not played enoughof a role--or not an effective enoughone-in settling conflicts in the former Soviet area. From the American collaborators,the argument is that the US has no effective policy regarding the participation of international organizationsin conflict resolution in the former Soviet area. Thus Osipova concludes (p 70) that there was no concerted international action at all as regards the Ingush-Ossetianconflict and that the Council of Europe would be the best place to pressurethe Russiangovernment. Yusupovsky suggests(p 264) that the full range of institutions including the OSCE, the Council of Europe and human rights NGOs as well as UNESCO could act as 'mediators in negotiationsbetweenRussia and Latvia on questions connectedwith the future of the Russiancommunity in Latvia and monitor the observationof human and citizenship rights'. According to Barsamov (p 323), 'the CSCE and the United Nations have been the most active and influential organizationsin Kazakhstan[as regardsthe Slavophoneethnolinguistic issues], but the Council of Europe has also made a number of visits'. The remaining three casestudies are those by Ozhiganov. He concludesthat in the Crimea (p 133), the CSCE, European Parliament and United Nations have all 'show[n] their clear support for Kiev's [sic] actions' and that international organizations in general'cannot be relied upon as unbiasedarbiters in promoting the effective resolutionof crisis situations' in the former Soviet area.As for Moldova (p 189), he observesthat the CSCE has played 'a significant part in the negotiations betweenMoldova and Russia on the political status of Transdniesterand the withdrawal of the 14th Army' but calls into questionits approach,which he calls (p 207) 'extremely formal and one-sided'. Finally, he asserts that in South Ossetia, the OSCE was the only organization that produced results but 'inevitably ran into the problem of how to apply international law to the complex issuesinvolved in the conflict while adheringto OSCE principles of national and human rights' (p 370), while in Abkhazia he questions whether the situation would be much different without the UN and OSCE involvement (p 398). Tishkov's accomplishment At this juncture, it is appropriate to outline the contents of the Tishkov book. Subsequently, policy recommendations his will be comparedin detail with those emergingfrom the ACCO volume and the two sets of recommendations will be evaluatedagainst the actual situation on the ground in Central Asia. Tishkov's book is divided into three main parts, plus introduction and conclusion.The first part comprises five chapters: an introduction to ethnicity in the Soviet and post-Soviet context, a history of Soviet 'ethnic engineering', a review of ethno-politics in the former Soviet area as from the early 1990s,an analysis of territorial and 'spatial' (including economicand environmental)issueson power 454

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struggles over ethnic territories, and an analysis of temporal-demographic (particularly cultural and linguistic) origins of conflict. Part Two, 'Case Studies', comprisesalso five chapters: Russiansleaving 'Central Asia and Kazakhstan', the ash conflict, the Ingush-Ossetianconflict, the ChechenWar up to early 1992 and the Chechen war since early 1992. Finally, Part Three, 'Governing Conflicting Ethnicity', comprises three chapters: an inventory and analysis of post-Sovietnationalismsand their types, 'identities in transition' in 'Rossia' (sic and distinct from 'Russia', as explained below), and a lengthy list of 'strategies for ethnic accord' in the post-Soviet states.Add to this a general introduction and a conclusion that accuse scholars in East and West of 'destroying reality through theory', in a manuscript of 200,000 words including 34 tables and 15 figures, with a bibliography listing nearly 500 works cited and one sensesthe impatiencewith which this book will be received in certain Western academic circles. Chapter 1 reviews Western and post-Soviet ethnographic approachesand observesthat the 'primordialist' school is still prevalent in the former Soviet area.Tishkov also reviews the 'ethnos' theory and Gorbachevianinnovations on the Stalinist-Khrushchevistschools of ethnographicalanalysis.He criticizes all theseviewpoints and maintains that ethnicity is a socially constructedmeaning. Indeed,the signal virtue of Tishkov's monographis that he treats ethnicity as a social constructionyet limits himself to the empirical casesat hand, avoiding abstractdiscoursedisconnectedfrom the life and history of the social groups concernedin his empirical studies. As such, although he nowhere cites Karl Deutsch,Tishkov may be regardedas a continuator of him. In Tishkov's hands, this approachrelativizes the meaning of ethnicity, thus making it amenableto policy influence by those who are in a position to affect the deployment, construction,and reconstruction of such meanings and of the power relations amongthe sub-elitesand intellectuals who propagandize ethnic rank-and-file. the Chapter2 is a comprehensivesurvey of the history of Soviet ethnic engineering from the Bolshevik revolution up through the middle of the Gorbachev period. Chapter 3 covers the disintegration of the Soviet Union from the standpointof national construction, including the failure of the 'new' Union Treaty, through 1992-1993.Tishkov refutesthe 'triumph of nations' catchphrase coined by Helene Carrere d'Encausse to signify the dissolution of the Soviet Union. He correctly points up the role of scholarsand intellectuals in constructing allegoriesof nationalism and illustrates the autonomoussignificance of the strategiesand incentive structures of sub-elites and their individual members. Theseare not necessarilyrelated to the aspirationsof those ethnic groups that they say they represent.Tishkov discussesand comparesthe declarations by leaders in Tatarstan, Bashkiria, Yakutia, Checheno-Ingushetia, Kalmykia and elsewherethroughout the Russian republic in support of this interpretation. Indeed,his emphasison the need to distinguish the individual-level incentive structuresof particular members of sub-elites is a leitmotif of the work applicable to cases of ethnic mobilization beyond the Soviet area. This seems implicitly to be his main justification for asserting(p xi) his own approachto be 455

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'methodologicalindividualism' while in the next breathinsisting that he doesnot subscribe'to one single exclusive concept or cultural theory'. His criticism (p 187) of 'the limited nature of the objectivist methodology' would have to apply also to methodologicalindividualism. It seemshis invocation of methodological individualism is mainly an antidote to the late Soviet version of historical materialism,which denied any autonomy to individual agentsin the explanation of social change.Tishkov owes at least as much to historical sociology and the study of collective social change although, as his next chapter makes clear, he does not entirely subscribeto the 'resources' approachthat typifies the work of CharlesTilly. Like Tilly, however, Tishkov is fundamentally anti-Durkheimian in his approachto studying protest, discontent and violence. Chapter 4 discussesterritories, resourcesand other elements of power, and begins to set the background for the case studies in Part Two of the book. Chapter5 gives example after specific exampleof facile policy-oriented conclusions drawn by Western scholars, often basedon 'their uncritical belief in the misleading results of Soviet census data concerning language behavior and language status' (p 84). As mentioned,Tishkov draws on personalfiles, personal notes,personalconversationsand personal experiencein this work, to produce an evaluation of the situation that arguably no one else could authoritatively offer. In this sense,his argumentis 'nonfalsifiable'. However, it is precisely this sort of knowledge that allows Tishkov to demonstratehow changesrecorded from one Soviet census to the next cannot be regarded as reflecting the true situation (e.g. pp 89-91). This is one place where Tishkov's experiential knowledge of Soviet census procedures and nationality issues in particular cannot be adduced as an argument against the validity of his criticisms of Westernscholars.Throughout this chapter,the shallownessof much of Western social-science scholarship on Central Asia in particular in the Soviet and early post-Sovietperiod comes in for repeatedcriticism. Tishkov is further able to use his intimate and detailed knowledge of the Soviet and post-Soviet situations to renderverdicts on some generalWestern social theories,insofar as they do or do not apply to the Soviet and post-Soviet area. On the basis of serious scholarly work carried out in the Soviet area both before and after 1991, for example,he is able to conclude(p Ill) that 'Samuel Huntington's thesis [about ethnicity and culture] doesnot work for the interpretationof cultural cleavages,at least on the territory of the former USSR'. Of Tishkov's five casestudiesin Part Two, two addressconflicts also covered in the ACCO volume and are therefore discussedfurther below. Chapter 7 analyzesthe Osh conflict. Tishkov begins by criticizing both the frustration-aggression theory and the idea of 'structural violence'. He also fundamentally criticizes from severalstandpointsthe 'Minorities at Risk' project (pp 135-136). His approachin this chapter involves the micro-analysis of ethnic violence as opposedto the study of mass group conflicts. He uses for his data the texts of court rulings. This is especially useful in view of the obligation of social scientiststo use available data even when no comparabledatasetmay exist in other instancesand to construct their researchdesigns in such a manner as to 456

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exploit idiosyncrasies the datasetitself. Tishkov treatsmassethnic violence as of distinct from politically manifested ethnic insurrection, noting that the former 'seemsto build up towardsexplosive but short-lived manifestationsif it does not evolve into planned military actions with establishedfront lines and organized paramilitary or military units' (p 141). Along several criteria, he therefore distinguishes it from mass unrest. He analyzes the sociological background characteristics the perpetratorsand of the victims, and specifiesthe motives of and mechanism of violence, including rumours, 'group think', myth-based solidarity and social paranoia. Since Tishkov is not ignorant of the possible biasesintroducedby an exclusive reliance upon the court texts, he supplements these with intensive attention to the social context in which the violence was perpetrated. Chapters9 and 10 deal with two phasesof the Chechenwar, respectively up to the end of 1991 and as from the beginning of 1992. Tishkov begins chapter 9, as he begins other chapters,with a survey of explanatory models or theories that have been proposed to explain the case at hand: in this instance, the Chechencrisis. He mentions the 'conspiracy theory' (citing a newspaperarticle by Ozhiganovas an example,particularly the oil and money motives) and admits that this economic factor, including its criminal aspect,did play an important role; however, he remains sceptical of this explanation. He cites the interpretation that the conflict was an unsuccessful blitzkrieg by Russia against a self-proclaimed independent Chechnya and traces this near-stereotypeback through the Westernhistoriographic tradition of Islamic studies and Russia,and to Alexander Bennigsenin particular (p 184). According to Tishkov, even the more nuancedWesternanalyses,which emphasizeRussianmilitary violations of mass human rights, failures of leadership and the inability of negotiations to resolvepolitical disputes,have a large debt to that tradition. He further criticizes the 'civilizational-ethnographic romanticism' of the 'clash of civilizations' hypothesis-be this hypothesisof Christian or Islamic origin-and deconstructs it (p 186) into 'a widespread practice in ethnography, whereby a cultural complex is constructed by an outsider-professional,for whom field research~ mainly meanswriting a text with an indoctrinated informant'. By virtue of his personal experience as former Minister of Nationalities in Yeltsin's government, Tishkov is able to give a number of examples of the highly personalizedcharacterof the conflict and how the personalrelationships amongthe principal political figures affected the subsequent courseof events.He is also one of the few social scientiststo remark (e.g. p 188) emphatically and repeatedly-and correctly--on 'the problematic role of the mass media as participantsin the conflict once the professional creators of electronic images and newspapertexts have created a version (or versions) of the conflict in dramatically marketableforms and then return theseversionsto the participants themselves-influencing not only their attitudes but also the behaviour of the participants,at times more strongly than the miHtary orders'. This chaptercontains the most detailed yet concise and relevant summary of the history of the Chechen ethos from its origins up until the 1944
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deportation that I have seen (pp 188-192). The trauma of that deportation is underlinedalong with an analysisof the various statistical sourcesconcerningits magnitude. Analyses of other statistical data (pp 194-198) summarize the evolution of Chechensocial affairs and their political significancein Russiaafter Wodd War II up to the outbreak of the insurrection. The data are not mechanically recited but rather integrated into the overall discursive narrative called 'building Chechenloyalty'. In this way, Tishkov is able convincingly to point to sourcesof underlying social tensionsand conflicts despitethe superficial . inter-ethnic stability apparent on the ground at that time. He recounts the emergenceof Dudaev as the leader of Chechen nationalism and correctly estimatesthat this was 'a milestone in the history of Chechenconflict' (p 200). He also recountsin enlightening detail the intricacies of struggle among various Chechensocial and political formations, during the late 19805and early 1990s, in the context of the Soviet disintegration, the Gorbachev- eltsin competition Y and the transfer to Chechnyaof some weaponsfrom Georgia under Gamsakhurdia. So doing, he also introduces appropriate aspectsof the Ingush national movementand its relations with the Russianrepublic's administrative structure within the USSR including relations with North Ossetia. The second chapter on the Chechen War begins with the end of 1991, by which time 'the "Chechen revolution" was assumingits own active content and developmental logic largely independent Moscow' (p 207). Tishkov examines of divergent explanationsof the formation of new political structuresin the region and the profound economic crisis resulting from the upheavalthere. He correctly emphasizeshow the secessionof the territory brought significant economic benefit to the initiators of independence(and other strata of Chechen society) through evasionof Russianexport rules, particularly for oil. He emphasizes that 'Moscow did not awakento the situation in the Chechenrepublic until the spring of 1994' (p 214) and, analyzing the Khasbulatovfactor in the summer of 1994, concludes(p 218) that this 'played an important role in Yeltsin' s decision to introducearmed forces into Chechnya,although the president's principal reason was to bolster his own declining popularity'. Finally he gives reasons(lack of assimilation,social and economic problems, accelerated modernization,transfer of weaponsfrom the Russian arsenal) why Chechnya becameone of the first actors to implement a radical scenario of sovereignty. In conclusion he lists a whole seriesof factors that the federal regime ignored, might have done, ought to have done and could have done, starting in late 1991. It is hard to disagree with his final conclusion that Yeltsin's self-proclaimed inability even to speak with Dudaev was an idiosyncratic factor that goes a great distance towards explaining the final tragic outcome.
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Common case studies and policy recommendations The two books share case studies of Kazakhstan and the Ingush-Ossetian conflict. For the ACCO volume, thesetwo casestudiesare among the strongest essaysin the book, even though the Ingush-Ossetianstudy is better integrated 458

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into Tishkov's work (as a natural lead-in to his discussionof the ChechenWar). In the ACCD volume, Dsipova tends to blame the Russian government for ignorance and short-sightedness,minimizing the effects of third parties or broader social and political structures. However, her conclusion (p 75) that Russiamust developwithin its bordersa nationality policy that 'ensurespeaceful coexistenceand cooperation among its many ethnic groups and enables these groups to satisfy their national cultural needs' complements Tishkov's conclusion about how Russia should pursue a policy concerning Russiansoutside Russiain the former Soviet area.Tishkov's own casestudy of the Ingush-Ossetian conflict bears the phrase 'ethnic cleansing' in the title and gives further examplesof the broader themesof his work as mentioned above. Barsamov's case study of Kazakhstan for the ACCD volume suggests(pp 328-331) several possible scenariosfor the longer-rangedevelopmentof relations betweenKazakhsand Russiansin Kazakhstan:thesemay be grouped into the scenarios considersvery unlikely (three separatetypes of administrativehe territorial change),rather unlikely but not out of the question(civil war between the two ethnic groups, a confederate Kazakhstani-Russian state), unlikely (maintenanceof the status quo, national~ultural autonomy for the Russian population, Russianassimilation), possible (creation of a civil state throughout which the two ethnic groups of equally represented:a once realistic but now unrealized hope), and likely but potentially dangerous (continued Russian emigration).Although this chapterdoes not seekto distinguish different political and social forces within the Kazakh ethnos that may differ among themselves over the proper ethnic policy, it is a very capableexamination of the origin and developmentof ethnic politics in Kazakhstanas a whole. Tishkov deals with the whole of 'Central Asia and Kazakhstan', a phrase inherited from the Soviet vocabulary. He surveys demographicand ethno-cultural data from the entire region: actually the verb 'survey' does not adequately denote the in-depth nature of his analysis. In conclusion Tishkov, rather than tracing scenarios like Barsamov,suggests 134) that Russiaadopt 'a long-term (p and consistentpolicy of supporting and defending ethnic compatriots abroadon a basis of inter-state cooperation within a framework of internationally recognized norms and practices'. In contrast with the ACCD studies, Tishkov here advocatesa pro-active policy on the part of Russia, not necessarilyrelying on existing internationalorganizations.The ACCD casestudy of Russiansin Latvia, as well as the generally positive outcome now observable, lends weight to Tishkkov's conclusion. Each volume also includes three concluding chaptersthat seek to synthesize the respectivework and presentpolicy-relevant conclusions.Arbatov's chapter in the ACCD volume reachesprincipally the sameconclusionsas the aggregate of casestudies,but without apparentlydrawing on them. It is a more Eurocentric perspective than likely characterizes the principal foreign policy makers in Russia today. This is a fair portrayal of a moderate Russian view from the mid-1990s. However, one remarkable aspect is the definition, by even so sophisticatedan observer as Arbatov, of 'Central Asia' as comprising only 459

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Uzbekistan,Turkmenistan and Tadjikstan (with Azerbaijan added to the category). For Arbatov, Kazakhstanand Kyrgyzstan are to be classedwith Georgia and Armenia because(p 443) they all 'need Russiansecurity guarantees the in form of a Russianmilitary presenceto protect their outer bordersagainstforeign threats': presumablyChina in the caseof Kazakhstanand Kyrgyzstan, although Arbatov never clarifies whence this threat arises.This seemsa rather superficial distinction. Arbatov seeksa new Euro-Atlantic securityframework and settles(p 456), by processof elimination, on the OSCE as the only existing organization capable of providing one. Chayes, Olson and Raach make a complementary argument in the book's concluding chapter, insisting (p 536) on the need 'to engageRussia in a truly cooperative enterprise for dealing with external and domestic controversiesthrough the major international organizations'. As they observein their concluding remark, this is necessary even if the US must assume an unaccustomed junior role. Tishkov's policy recommendations summarizedin Table 1. He arrives at are them after two penultimate chapters that first survey the nature of post-Soviet nationalismsand then focus on the RussianFederationand its multifarious ethnic groups. In the latter, chapter 12, he attempts to drive home his case for the neologism 'Rossia', which he first introduced in the beginning of the book. For this, the rationale is common sense.The Russian languagehas different words for the state(Rossiya)and for the people and their language(russkii). He points out the contradiction in referring, for example, to the 'Russian army' in Chechnya(many troops were not ethnic Russians).This is in line with Yeltsin's introduction a number of years ago of the noun rossiyaneto refer to the citizens of the federation. As reasonableas this suggestionis, it is not clear whether it will be generally adopted in the English language. Comparative synoptic analysis of Central Asian conflicts How to evaluate the recommendationsof these two works? Let us distinguish four types of conflict situations,of which at least one exampleof each is present in Central Asia. 1. Absenceof conflict. Here the goal is conflict-prevention. If peace is threatened, then the goals may be peacekeeping and/or peacemaking.Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan are caseswhere conflict-Leo internal conflict or conflict with Russia-is absent. 2. Conflict of interest. In this instance the principal goal is conflict-resolution. Subsidiarygoals are conflict-reduction and conflict-management. Uzbekistan exemplifies a case of conflict of interest with Russia. 3. Implicit or explicit threat of coercive force. Here the principal goal is conflict-reduction;subsidiary goals are conflict-management conflict-resand olution, with peacekeepingpossibly as an end in itself. Kazakhstanexemplifies a case of implicit or explicit threat of coercive force by Russia. 4. Military conflict. The principal goal is conflict-management. Subsidiary goals

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are conflict-reduction and conflict-resolution, with peacekeeping possibly as a meansto peacemaking. Tajikstan is an exampleof open military conflict in which Russia is involved. Table 2 summarizesthe relations among types of conflict situation and types of goals in this enumeration.(Note that the first is similar to Tishkov's definition in the first column of Table I; the second and third, similar to his second column; the fourth, similar to his third column.) The casesare then summarized below, on the basis of materials in the works under review and additional information adducedby this writer. Absenceof conflict: Turkmenistan Despite the economic conflict over gas exports, Russia's relations with Turkmenistanhave been the least problematic in nearly all of Central Asia. There are no securityproblemsbetweenthe two countriesand relations betweenthem have focusedon the developmentand exportation of natural resources.Turkmenistan was the secondbiggest producer of natural gas in the fonner Soviet Union, next to Russia.Western interest in Turkmenistan is relatively recent and originally focused on facilitating arrangementsfor Ukraine's payments of its debts to Turkmenistanfor natural gas supplies. Turkmenistanretains the heavy hand of the old regime and has not greatly returned the relatively small amount of Westerninterest demonstrated. Absenceof conflict: Kyrgyzstan Kyrgyzstanhas not had significant relations with Russiasince independence. Its officially announced foreign policy priorities give pride of place to China, Turkey, Iran and Pakistan.Russia and the US are somewhatless central though far from unimportant. Kyrgyzstan has no border with Russiaand Russian-speakers are valuedfor their skills. PresidentAkaev haspromotedrefonn and received international praise as well as financial support for this, despite authoritarian tendenciesrecently in evidence. Aside from events in the Fergana Valley in 1989, which attracted international attention but little in the way of practical security assistance, country has not been involved in international conflicts. the Thus there has been little Western engagement either of these two countries, in with the exception of engagement economicrefonn in Kyrgyzstan. Kyrgyzsfor tan has proceededwith marketizing and democratizingrefonns and has reaped the benefit of Western engagement, mainly in the field of positive international publicity but with rather little economic result either in commerce or in investment. Given the relative absenceof Western interest in thesetwo countries and the relative absenceof conflict in them, the principal instruments applied by the 462

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Table 2. Modalitiesof interventionand their relativepriority as instruments, degree conflict by of Conftict Conflict Conflict Conftict Peace- Peaceprevention resolution reduction management keeping making

Absence conflict of Conflict interest of Threat coercive of force Open military conflict

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EndsMeans

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West have been 'ideological' (in the non-pejorativesense),viz. the moral bully pulpit of developedcapitalism an its associated democratictendencies. Conflict of interest: Uzbekistan Uzbekistan had conflicts of interestwith Russia,but thesehavenot engendered has threatsof coerciveforce. Theseconflicts of interesthavemainly concerned exports of primary materialsfrom Uzbekistan and the military situation in Tajikstan. By the time Russiagot around to defining its interestsin Tajikstan, Uzbekistanhad playedits supportingmilitary role there:the questionwhich Tajikstani faction held the levers of power was already answered.This was about the time that Russia began to seek to reinforce the CIS organizationally and to give it a higher institutionalprofile. In part because disagreements the situationin Tajikstan, of over Russia's relations with Uzbekistan have been distant. The West's diplomatic instruments towardsUzbekistanhave beenprincipally economic,seekingthrough bilateral interstaterelations to promote marketization.In 1995thesebeganto bear fruit, although 'privatization' was still limited to sell-offs of large state firms to foreign buyersand the signatureof contractswith the largestWesterncompanies for investment the metallurgicalandmachine-buildingsectors. in The IMP's failure to imposeits desiredmacroeconomic policies illustratesthat availablemeansin this situationare limited to economicinstrumentsand do not extendto legal-financial instruments. Threat of coercion: Kazakhstan Westerninterestsin Kazakhstanhave been fairly clear from the beginning. First, therewastheneedto regulateof thequestionof nucleararmsfollowing thebreak-up of the SovietUnion; largely through US efforts this interestwas satisfied.Second, it hasbeenin the West's interestto promotethe development export of natural and resourcesin Kazakhstan, particularly energy. This requires implantation of domesticlegalandeconomicregimescomplementing normsof the international the trading system,and with Westernassistance therehasbeensignificant progressin this. Third hasbeenthe questionof a law on property in agricultural land, which would providea solution to the ethnic strife notablybetweenRussians Kazakhs and in the north of the country. Indeed the issueof a law on property in agricultural land held up the passage of a law on property in land generally. This in 463

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turn stunted the growth of small and medium enterprisessince the absenceof title to land means that an entrepreneurcould be arbitrarily dispossessed a of factory. The solution was first to privatize housing (property in residential land), then to makepossiblethe creation of industrial enterprises (property in industrial land), and only then to tackle the problem of property in agricultural land. Western governments and multilateral institutions were in the forefront of seekinga pacific arrangement.The EU around Aqmola and the US Agency for InternationalDevelopmentin the north experimentedwith various legal arrangementssuch as 99-year transferableleases,or lO-year trial leaseswith ownership to be given basedupon the results of agricultural production by the particular farmer. The law proposedby Nazarbaevto permit private ownership in land was approvedby the Kazakhstani Parliament in 1994 by a very close 66-56 vote, with 10 abstentions, several weeksbefore Parliamentwas suspended. the end, In the law was voided when Nazarbaevextraordinarily dissolved Parliament. His executiverule in the interim before new electionsgenerally confirmed by decree such laws already passed;but the agricultural-land property law was not made the subjectof such a decree.Oddly enough,neither book under review mentions this important episode.It is only one exampleof the cogencyand power of legal and financial instruments in the service of Western diplomacy. Moreover, it demonstrates exclusive reliance on the 'traditional' multilateral international that security organizations(such as recommended the ACCO volume) can lead to by overlooking other institutional instruments for ameliorating conflict situations. Military conflict: Tajikstan Tajikstan is a case of open military conflict. In Russia this situation was interpretedas a test of Russia's resolve and as a failure of the CIS to adopt a commonmilitary strategy.This resultedfrom the Russianinability in 1992to act as effective mediator among the Tajik factions. The basic cleavagebetween the sides is not between communists and islamists, nor is it between clans. It is, rather, a war betweenregions, basedon opposing identities. The so-called clans are not irrelevant, but the real issue is the opposition of social networks that developedunder Soviet administration. These provided the organizational basis for furnishing security goods after the Tajik state apparatus fell apart in conditions of generaleconomic deprivation. From the facts about Tajikstan one would supposethat the West either has relatively little interest or relatively little leverage. Western governments have, however, worked infonnally through internationalorganizationsto promote a settlement.Even more active have been para-governmental and non-governmentalorganizationsin the West with dedicatedif limited resources.For example,the Center for PreventiveDiplomacy of the Council for Foreign Relations in New York, funded by private American philanthropy interested in peace and development, has had recent successes. Summary and conclusion When the Soviet Union beganto fall apart in the late 1980s,it had been decades since any Western power had had a genuine opportunity directly to influence
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events in the Soviet area. Although the West was not accustomedto having interestsin many of thesenewly self-constitutinginternationalregions,it had not lost the habit of engagingin diplomatic conduct accordingto establishednorms. This was, indeed, a necessity.The West after 1989 therefore acted as if it had interestsand its actions were interpretedby all concernedas intendedto promote those interests.It was assumedthat the West acted in such-and-such manner a because supposed it that it could thereby achieve such-and-such goal. Western a behaviourthus created its interestsin the minds of thoseconcerned,who reified that behaviour into interest. An interest, whether defined by an objective analyst or by a concerned internationalactor, comprises four components: 1. An 1Oterest grounaea10mstoncal mnenlance 1OclUa1Og IS 1OtemauonaI usage and custom. 2. Upon this ground an interest proceedsfrom knowledgebelieved to be true, including a 'definition of the situation' where the interest may be asserted (i.e. a cognitive framing of the problem being confronted). 3. On such a basis, that interest projects into such a situation the particular normsarising from the interestedparty's particular experience.Theseit either implies or explicitly assertsto be universal (e.g. the naturalness desirabiland ity of 'democracy and the market'). 4. Basedupon the assumed'definition of the situation', an interest is realized through the particular interested party's exercise of power, i.e. behaviour intended to bring about a future state of affairs that is consonantwith the particular norms assertedto be universal. To summarize: The knowledgeexpresses actor's understanding the present the of situation basedupon its historical inheritance. The particular norms formalize that knowledgethrough projecting that understanding that inheritanceinto the of future. The exercise of power is behaviour that is designed to realize those norms. Table 3 schematizes above country sketches(and materials from the two the works under review) in the terms here introduced. For purposesof comparison, all NIS are classified. althou2h only those in Central Asia are here discussed. 1. If there is no conflict, as in Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan, then the key component of interest that determines the emergence of conflict is the historical inheritance.The most efficient instrumentsof Westerninfluence are ideological. 2. If there is conflict of interest, as between Uzbekistan and Russia, then knowledge and understandingdetermine the exacerbation of conflict. The West's most efficient instrument of influence to restrain that developmentare economic, though not to the exclusion of ideological instruments. 3. If there ;s the implicit or explicit threat of coerciveforce, as in the case of Kazakhstan'srelations with Russia, then the key componentof interest that determines exacerbationof conflict is particular norms. The most efficient the instrumentsof influence are legal-financial, though not to the exclusion of economic or ideological instruments.

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4. Finally, if there is open military conflict, as in the caseof Tajikstan, then the key componentof interest that determinesthe continuation of conflict is the exerciseof power. The principal instrumentsof influence are military, but not to the exclusion of financial, economic, or ideological instruments.
We may conclude: the smaller the NIS, the more practicable is Western engagement; and the larger the NIS, the more required is that engagement. Peacemaking and peacekeeping tend to require the deployment military and ideological instruments. Conflict regulation in its various forms (conflict-prevention, conflict-resolution, conflict-reduction, and conflict-management) favours

the deployment of economic and legal-financial instruments of policy. For Westernpoliticians, these are politically less costly, although their deployment is not feasible in states whose governmentsdo not fully control the temtories over which they assertsovereignty. Westernpolicy encountersfour possibilities: 1. Engagement may be neither practicable nor required. In this case,there is no need for policy.
2. Engagement may be required yet not practicable. In this case, policy must be designed first of all to make possible what is necessary. Examples of policy instruments in this instance include confidence-building measures and the provision of specific incentives for specific actions. 3. Engagement may be practicable yet not required. In this case, policy must be designed according to what should and should not be made possible. Much economic policy is concerned with precisely this question. 4. Engagement may be both practicable and required. In this case, policy must be designed to capable of outgrowing itself If necessary. The US Cold War policy of containment, which was implemented as escalation dominance but which transcended that specific strategy, is an example. Which of these four possibilities obtains, will vary with the geographic domain and the issue areas pertinent there. Inspection of the cases of Western engagement in Central Asia produces the following conclusions: I. Western interest does not determine Western engagement; however, practicability determines Western interest. Situations where engagement is neither practicable nor required tend to evolve into situations where engagement is both practical and required. This occurs in the following manner. 2. When economic or legal-financial issues are key, engagement moves from being not practicable to being practicable, and once practicable it becomes required by the force of things. The case of Kazakhstan exemplifies this pattern. 3. When military issues are key, engagement movesfrom being neither required nor practicable, to heing required yet not practicable, whence means are sought to make the engagement practicable. Tajikstan provides an example of this pattern.

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4. When military and economic/legal-financial issues are both present, then

Black Sea cooperation and the much less successfulinitiatives for Caspian cooperationfurnish examplesof how the settlementof military and strategic differences allows issues of economic reform to come to the fore. These cannot be comprehensively resolved without commonly subscribed, hence multilateral, legal-financial arrangements. 466

ideological/political issues are added.The experience the multilateral of

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The recent collapse of Russianfinances only emphasizes what should earlier havebeenobvious, viz. that the Westernquestfor post-Sovietstability must seek to optimize not just the domestic economic or international financial stabilization: but, as a prerequisiteto the political stability, also the regularization of the transnational and reciprocally multilateral financial relations among the NIS including Russia.Western policy has in generaldealt with this issue on an only ad hoc basis.The statesin the fonner Soviet areaare ensembles national legal of regimesthat representthe interface betweenthe national economy (and society) of the individual state and the dominant noons of the international political and economic order. Transnational currency and financial relations are and always have beencentral here, regardlessof the countriesconcerned.The effects of the contractionof the ruble zone to Russia alone in 1993 made this clear early on. Microeconomicpolicy areassuch as privatization and price reform are linked to the creationof systemsfor accounting law, property ownership,inheritance law, contract law and bankruptcy law; macroeconomicpolley areassuch as convertibility, currency reform and international borrowing are linked to the development of foreign trade, banking and insurance systems.Within this framework there are three policies of special significance: coordination of foreign direct investment(including the laws that govern it), macroeconomicstabilization and currency cooperation. These are an integrated policy area but have not been treated as such in international public policy toward the NIS. Even Tishkov overlooks them. The most successful indigenous Central Asian multilateral initiative deals precisely with those policy areas. That initiative, motivated by Kazakhstani diplomacy, originally involved the establishmentof a common economic space with Uzbekistanand Kyrgyzstan, including not only a customs union but also currency co-operation and a trilateral development bank that has received substantive support from the EU and the EuropeanBank for Reconstructionand Development.This co-operation makes good sense:the national economiesof the countries complement one another, and they already participate in an economicand financial union aimed in the first instanceat currency stabilization. The principal obstacleto its further developmentis the statusof the Uzbek som: it is not freely convertible and subject to multiple exchangerates in the country. The West would do well systematicallyto promote indigenousmultilateralism within the fonner Soviet area in respect of multilateral financial and payments issues. However, the West's power-politics interests get in the way of this: directly, because of the desire to avoid creating blocs; and indirectly, by promoting the preoccupation with power-political concernsby elites and subelites in the former Soviet area. However, as Tishkov comprehensivelydemonstrates,such a preoccupationonly slows the NIS populations' accessto food, shelter,and medical care on a regular basis. It is thesepopulations--considered (as Tishkov shows necessary)as distinct from their elites and sub-elites-that have the weakestvoices in Western and international policy councils. Another indigenous project for multilateral financial co-operation that the West may reasonably promote, in addition to the Central Asian Union, is a paymentsunion in the South Caucasus. 468

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