1

Confucianism and the Failure of Japanese Pan-Asianism in Manchukuo: A Study of Tachibana Shirakis Sinology1

Ying Xiong The University of Sydney yxio9022@uni.sydney.edu.au

Two remarkable phenomena of recent times that signal an emerging Asian era are the resurgence of the notion of Asian regionalism and the burgeoning of Chinese Confucius centres worldwide. This promising vista also prompts an opportunity to engage in reflections on shared aspects of recent East Asian history and cultural resources such as Confucianism and pan-Asianism. In the modern history of East Asia, Japanese pan-Asianism has the same conceptual embarrassment as fascism: it is a catch phrase without a clear definition. As Takeuchi Yoshimi observes, it is nigh impossible to ascertain what Japanese panAsianism really stood for.2 Nevertheless, this has not deterred Duara from concluding that, Pan-Asianism was more than a Japanese intellectual-political development; it had enormous consequences on the ground in much of Asia.3 By appraising the Sinology of Tachibana Shiraki () and his endorsement of Confucian concepts in Manchukuo in the 1930s, this article explores both the intimacies and discrepancies that marked the relationship between pan-Asianism and imperialism during that period.

This paper was presented to the 18th Biennial Conference of the Asian Studies Association of Australia in Adelaide, 5-8 July 2010. It has been peer reviewed via a double referee process and appears on the Conference Proceedings Website by the permission of the author who retains copyright. This paper may be downloaded for fair use under the Copyright Act (1954), its later amendments and other relevant legislation. 2 Takeuchi Yoshimi, Nihon to Ajia, Tokyo: Chikuma Shob, 1966, p. 287 3 Prasenjit Duara, Pan-Asianism in Modern Japanese History: Colonialism, Regionalism and Borders (review), Journal of Japanese Studies, Vol. 35, No.1, 2009, p. 186

Tachibana travelled to China in 1906 at the age of 25; seeking renown as a distinguished Sinologist, he undertook a vast journey that spanned Shanghai, Qingdao and Northeast China, working for many journals and newspapers along the way as a journalist, commentator and editor. Tachibana showed an interest in Sinology after witnessing a series of transformations in China, from the Wu Chang uprising in October 1911 that forced the abdication of the last Qing Emperor to the establishment of Yuan Shikais short-lived monarchy between November 1915 and March 1916. 4 His initial interest in Confucian precepts and Chinese history persisted throughout his stay in Manchukuo, shaping the terms of his participation in Manchurian affairs. This article, which aims to investigate the interplay between Confucianism, Japanese imperialism and agrarianism in pan-Asianism, argues that imperialism was not averse to espousing Tachibana Shirakis pan-Asianism during the foundation of Manchukuo, and that the acceleration of imperialism after 1932 was based on the abandonment of the panAsianism of Tachibana's agrarianism.

The Discourse of the Kingly Way in Manchukuo Confucianism was officially adopted as Manchukuos guiding ideology after its founding. Warren Smith notes that the case of Manchuria offers a good example of how the Japanese took advantage of the appeal of Confucianism in attempting to rationalize their expansion on the Asiatic continent and to maintain social and political control.5 Smiths study reveals that the Japanese imperial power endorsed Confucianism in Manchuria as a means of emphasising the ties between Japan and China, of countering Chinese nationalism, and of stressing the anti-communist character of the Manchukuo project. The classical Confucian doctrines Four Books and Five Classics were even officially endorsed as school textbooks to replace the previous education system of the Chinese Nationalist government. Organisations such as the Manchuria Morality Association and the Confucian Association were established to encourage the spread of

Nomura Kichi, Zhang Xuefeng (trans.), Jindai Riben de Zhongguo renshi, Beijing: Central Compilation & Translation Press, 1999, p. 209 5 Warren Smith, Confucianism in Modern Japan, Hokuseido Press, 1973, p.184

Confucian morality.6 Although the range of Confucian ideas deployed in Manchuria was broad, the entire intellectual enterprise was succinctly encapsulated in the single slogan The Kingly Way in Paradise), a concept with pan-Asian appeal; as Hotta notes: Both Japanese and Chinese supporters of Sun Yat-sen had earlier referred to the Confucian concept of the Kingly Way () as a specifically Asian phenomenon.7 The problem with the Kingly Way was that the frequency with which it was cited in contemporary research on Manchukuo robbed it of much of its clarity of definition and meaning. It is not uncommon to find it used in the literature with no apparent understanding of what it referred to and how it was contextualised. As early as 1933, Nait Konan expressed his exasperation as follows: This Kingly Way slogan is being repeated and celebrated as the nation-building ideal for Manchukuo, but could someone please explain what it actually means? Nait knew an explanation would be difficult, given that even in the birthplace of the term itself, in China, the Kingly Way has almost never existed as a historical reality. It has always been, since ancient times, not much more than a proverbial ideal.8 As Nait suggests, the meaning of the Kingly Way was ambiguous. This is partly because the discourse of the Kingly Way is formed in an interplay among the following: 1) Yano Jinichi ();9 2) Zheng Xiaoxu (); 3) Yu Chonghan (), head of the Department of Local Autonomy () established shortly after the Manchurian Incident;10 4) Tachibana Shiraki; 5) Ishiwara Kanji, the Army Staff College

6 7

Ibid, pp. 193-194 Eri Hotta, Pan-Asianism and Japans War 1931-1945, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007, p. 117 8 Joshua Fogel, Politics and Sinology: the Case of Nait Konan (1866-1934), Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984, pp. 255-258. 9 For research on Yano Jinichi, see Joshua Fogel, Politics and Sinology. 10 Research that has elaborated on Yu Chonghans Kingly Way includes Eri Hotta, PanAsianism and Japans War 1931-1945, Prasenjit Duara, Sovereignty and Authenticity: Manchukuo and the East Asian Modern, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003. pp. 6465, Rana Mitter, The Manchurian Myth: Nationalism, Resistance, and Collaboration in Modern China, Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000, pp. 94-95, Kenichiro Hirano, The Japanese in Manchuria 1906-1931: A Study of the Historical Background of Manchukuo, published PhD Thesis, Harvard University, 1983, p. 419

instructor and consultant to the Kwantung Army in Manchuria; 11 6) contributors to a journal named Si Wen ();12 and 7) Sun Yat-sens speech delivered in Kobe in 1924. The Kingly Way concept appeared in both the proclamation of Manchukuos establishment () on 1 March 1932 that was drafted by Zheng Xiaoxu, and the Proclamation of a Chief Executive () announced by Zheng Xiaoxu eight days later, when Pu Yi officially assumed the position of Chief Executive (1932-1934) ( ).13 Immediately after the Manchurian Incident of 18 September 1931, the preferred ideology of Manchukuo was the Imperial Way (), rather than the later widely known the Kingly Way. The Kwangtung Army's official proclamation, issued on 4 October 1931, declared that in the best interests of the 30 million people living in Manchuria and Mongolia, the Kwangtung Army was determined to build "a happy land of co-prosperity and co-existence". In order to ensure an enduring peace in the East, Manchuria would implement the Imperial Way.
14

However, after March 1932,

represented by the proclamation of Manchukuos establishment, the Kingly Way was adopted by both the Japanese and the Chinese in Manchukuo. The Confucian notion of the Kingly Way, which became the dominant ideology during the period between late October 1931 and early 1932, was endorsed by both the Chinese and the Japanese.

11

Research that has elaborated on Ishiwara Kanjis Kingly Way includes Joshua Fogel, Politics and Sinology, Mark R. Peattie, Ishiwara Kanji and Japans Confrontation with the West, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975. pp. 34, 55-56, 142-145 12 A magazine in Japan that was exclusively dedicated to Confucianism. When Manchukuo was established in 1932, Si Wen, assembling many scholars, launched a special issue to laud the establishment of Manchukuo. For research on Si Wens discourse on the Kingly Way, see Warren Smith, Confucianism in Modern Japan, Joshua Fogel, Politics and Sinology. 13 Manshkoku shi Hensan Kankkai (ed.), Manshkoku shi, Tokyo: Manm Dh Engokai 1970, p. 219 14 Katakura Tadashi, Mansh jihen kimitsu kryaku nisshi, in Kobayashi Tatsuo and Shimada Toshihiko (eds.), Gendaishi shiry, Tokyo: Misuzu shob, 1977, Vol.7, pp. 200-201. Also see Komagome Takeshi, Shokuminchi teikoku Nihon no bunka tg, Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1996, p. 241

The Kingly Way as a Collaboration The Kingly Way discourse which prevailed by 1932-1933, was produced in late October and November 1931 through the joint effort of the Japanese and Chinese elites in Manchuria. During the initial period of Japanese occupation, due to the strong Chinese reaction to the Manchurian Incident it was crucial for the Kwangtung Army to gain the cooperation of the Chinese elites at the local level. After it had been propagated as a popular concept by China experts and intellectuals in newspapers and journals, the Kingly Way was adopted by the Kwangtung Army in order to coordinate local support. On the other, the Kingly Way not only existed as a result of Japans strategy of enlisting the collaboration of the Chinese, as noted by Rana Mitter; it also helped the Japanese military to develop an alliance with key intellectual figures such as Tachibana, Koyama Sadatomo ( ) and Noda Ranz ( ) among the Japanese settler community on the Kwantung peninsula. As Komagome Takeshi suggests, the slogan of the Kingly Way started to emerge in Mansh nipp as early as 29 September 1931, in the context of resistance to Zhang Xueliangs regime in Northern China.15 Commentary articles argued that the principle of Chinese politics was the Kingly Way, a historical Confucian notion of rulership that follows the Will of Heaven and sanctions revolution to purge corrupt rule contrary to the heavenly mandate. This political philosophy of the Kingly Way stemmed from the Chinese sage Mencius (or Meng-Tsu, c371-289 BC). Sun Yat-sens Nationalist Revolution of 1911, which dethroned the Qing, was considered a classic example. But, the rule of Zhang Xueliang and Chiang Kai-shek was seen as a deviation from the authenticity of Suns philosophy of the Kingly Way. These articles were surprisingly well received by members of the local Chinese elite such as Yuan Jinkai (). Kanai Shji (), the Director-General of the Manchurian Youth League () wrote in his memoirs that he visited Yuan on 30 October 1931 to elicit Yuans support. 16 During their meeting, Yuan disclosed his
15 16

Ibid. The Manchurian Youth League was established on 4 May 1928 with the founding of the South Manchurian Railway Company (SMR). Kanai Shji, who was then head of the

inclination to favour the Kingly Way elaborated in editorial articles in Mansh nipp and asked whether this could be accepted by the Kwangtung Army. Yuan and Kanai together met with the Army commander Honj Shigeru (), who agreed to endorse the notion of the Kingly Way.17 At the same time, the Kwangtung Army approached Yu Chonghan, who had a long history of working for the Japanese dating back to the Russo-Japanese War, when he had functioned as a spy on their behalf. 18 In semi-retirement at the time of the Manchurian Incident, Yu received a visit from Morita Fukumatsu on behalf of the Kwantung Army on 1 November 1931. During this visit, Yu generously contributed his wisdom on how to rule the Manchurian area, proposing the Kingly Way as the basis for Sino-Japanese cooperation in Manchukuo. Yu subsequently met Honj Shigeru on 3 November 1931 to outline his eight points for the effective rule of Manchuria. He also reasserted his opinion of the Kingly Way, convincing Honj that, though the Kingly Way seemed an outmoded concept, it could be loaded with new meaning and new content according to need, since it had Eastern spirit and culture. 19 Two weeks later, on 14 November 1931, the Department of Local Autonomy was founded in Shenyang. 20 Yu was appointed its director: Tachibana Shiraki and Noda Ranz were consultant.21

SMRs health ministry, was elected Director-General of the Manchurian Youth League. On 23 October, 1931, the League proposed The Outline of Establishing a Free Land of Manchuria and Mongolia () on 23 October 1931. The Outline was drafted by Kanai Shji and addressed to Honj Shigeru, the general commanding the Kwangtung Army. Ranging from the autonomy of Manchuria to isolating Manchuria from the rest of China, this outline contained many ideas similar to those of the Department of Local Autonomy. However, there was no mention of the Kingly Way. See "Thoku Jiykoku kensetsu kry", in Inaba Masao (ed.), Gendaishi shiry, Tokyo: Misuzu shob, 1965, Vol. 11, p.561 This visit was also recorded in Kanai Shjis memoir; see Kanai Shji, Mansh kenkoku senshi, p. 24 17 Komagome Takeshi, Shokuminchi teikoku Nihon no bunka tg, Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1996, p. 254 18 Rana Mitter, The Manchurian Myth: Nationalism, Resistance and Collaboration in Modern China, Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000, p. 83 19 Yu Chonghan no shutsuro to sono seiken, in Inaba Masao (ed.), Gendaishi shiry, Tokyo: Misuzu shob, 1965, Vol. 11, pp. 564-566 20 The Department of Local Autonomy draw its staff from the Manchurian Youth League and the Daiyhkai (). The Daiyhkai was created by Kasagi Yoshiaki ( ) at the end of 1929 when he was transferred from Tokyo to the SMR in Dalian.

Tachibana was actively involved in the Department of Local Autonomy. Through his editing of the journal Mansh hyron, Tachibana maintained a degree of interaction with Yu. They shared some similarities in their understanding of the Kingly Way. They both believed that this Confucian concept had new viability, and argued that, above all, the Kingly Way meant "the Local Autonomy of Manchukuo". Great Harmony () was the ultimate goal of the Kingly Way while harmony of peoples ( ) functioned as the means towards it. Tachibanas Local Autonomy as the Realization of the Kingly Way () was originally a speech delivered to the Department of Local Autonomy when Yu was director. According to Tachibana, the major achievement of the Department of Local Autonomy would be its contribution to paving the way for the politics of the Kingly Way in Manchukuo. 22 Tachibana also formed a relationship with the Manchurian Youth League, many members of which also became members of the Department of Local Autonomy. Tachibanas journal Mansh hyron was established in August 1931. Its legal proprietor was Koyama Sadatomo, who at the time was an executive of the Manchurian Youth League.23 Tachibanas views on China and the Kingly Way in turn influenced Ishiwara Kanjis perception of China and his Manchurian policy. Tachibana confessed in his My Change in Direction that he once attempted to persuade Ishiwara Kanji to adopt the Kingly Way discourse. Tachibana first met Ishiwara on 12 March 1931 as recorded in Ishiwaras diary,24 although Tachibana insisted that he only started to associate with the

Kasagi was heavily influenced by kawa Shmei (). See Okabe Makio, Manshkoku, Tokyo: Sanseid, 1978, p. 29 21 Yamaguchi Masao, Zasetsu no Shwa shi, Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1995, pp. 239241 22 Tachibana Shiraki, Tanmei narishi Jichi Shidbu, Mansh hyron, Vol. 3, No.4, 1932.7.23, quoted from Tachibana Shiraki chosakush, Tokyo, Keis shob, 1966, Vol. 2, p. 94 23 Yamamoto Hideo, Mansh hyron kaidai smokuji, Tokyo: Fuji Shuppan, 1982, p. 3 24 Sagakuchi Yko, Tachibana Shiraki to Ishihara Kanji, Yamamoto Hideo, Tachibana Shiraki to Chgoku, Tokyo: Keis Shob, 1990, p.194. Also see the diary of Ishihara Kanji, in Tsunoda Jun (ed.), Ishihara Kanji shiry: kokub ronsaku hen, Tokyo: Hara Shobo, 1978, p.14

Kwantung Army after September 1931. 25 As Mark R. Peattie notes, Ishiwara s discussion with Tachibana in the spring of 1931 is of particular interest, covering as it did a wide range of China problems, and considering the fact that Tachibana, on the basis of extensive historical research, had recently come to the conviction that China was not a stagnant society and that, by itself, the force of Chinese nationalism was capable of modernizing China from within. 26 It was in 1931 that, through his contact with Sinologists such as Tachibana, Ishiwara changed his stance from advocating the occupation of Manchuria and Mongolia to supporting their independence. In October 1931, they had a second meeting, during which Tachibana discussed the issue of the Kingly Way with Ishiwara.27 Noda Ranz and Koyama Sadatomo were also present on that occasion. The meeting officially marked Tachibanas joining with the Kwantung Army to promote the Kingly Way ideology for Manchukuo. As recorded by Katakura Tadashi, Noda and Koyama were assigned the task of dealing with the ideological issue of Manchuria on 25 September 1931, immediately after the Incident.28 On 31 October 1931, Noda was virtually the first writers to publish articles regarding the Kingly Way of Manchukuo in Mansh hyron, which was then under the direct supervision of Tachibana.29 Thus, through Noda and Koyama and through the output of Mansh hyron, Tachibana was drawn into the founding of Manchukuo from October 1931 onwards. In the early stage of the founding of Manchukuo, Sinologists such as Tachibana played a significant role in deciding Manchurian policy alongside the military power. Chinese landlords, former Qing loyalists, Japanese Sinologists and Kwantung military officers all participated in the promotion of the Kingly Way discourse in 1931. It was a joint effort to harmonise different interests in Manchukuo. This seems to testify what Duara calls Manchukuo's "new imperialism", which was expressed not as a strategy
25

Tachibana Shiraki, Mansh jihen to watashi no hk tenkan, in Tachibana Shiraki chosakush, Vol.2, p.18 26 They met on 12 March 1931; see Mark R. Peattie, Ishiwara Kanji and Japans Confrontation with the West, p. 156 27 Tachibana Shiraki, Tairiku seisaku jnen no kent, Mansh hyron, Vol. 7, No. 6, 11 August 1934, quoted from Tachibana Shiraki chosakush, Vol.3 p. 550 28 Katakura Tadashi, Mansh jihen kimitsu kryaku nisshi, p. 192 29 Komagome Takeshi, Shokuminchi teikoku Nihon no bunka tg, p. 249

of assimilation and homogenization-as manifested in Taiwan and Korea-but as independence and alliance.30 However, as I will demonstrate later, this effort eventually failed: Manchukuo was, after all an imperialised site for rival interests. The schism between pan-Asianism and "new imperialism" was irreconcilable although in some phases a degree of intimacy was shared. Tachibana Shirakis Kingly Way as a Representation of Pan-Asianism Tachibana was an active participant in the fostering of Confucian concepts; thus, the question of what differentiated his Kingly Way from that of others merits further investigation. Although it was adopted by the colonial authority as a means to conceal colonial discrimination and to lessen social tensions, the Kingly Way was not merely a political slogan. Manchuria was a point of confluence for imperial expansionists and panAsianists. As Louise Young observes: Circumstances brought left-wing researchers and right-wing officers together in the puppet state and there they remained, strange bedfellows, until the early 1940s when a wave of arrests ended this bizarre collaboration. 31 It is through this examination of Tachibanas early thought on the Kingly Way that we can understand how pan-Asianism once worked as a utopian alternative to Japanese imperialism in the early 1930s and how this nascent utopianism was thwarted by imperialism. To Tachibana in late 1931 and 1932, the Kingly Way was not a set of fixed concepts; rather, it contained many opportunities to develop new meanings in response to new eras. The goal of the Kingly Way was to realise the Great Harmony, which had two meanings: harmony of peoples and agrarian autonomy (). As Tachibana noted: The relation between the Kingly Way and local autonomy is as the relation between principles and methods.32 In the context of Manchukuo, the Kingly Way was inseparable from local autonomy.

30

Prasenjit Duara, "Nationalism, Imperialism, Federalism, and the Example of Manchukuo", Common Knowledge Vol.12, No.1, 2006, p. 56 31 Louise Young, Japans Total Empire: Manchuria and the Culture of Wartime Imperialism, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998, p. 269 32 Tachibana Shiraki, Han Ajia und no shinriron, Mansh hyron, Vol.5, No.2, 8 July, 1933, quoted from Tachibana Shiraki chosakush, Vol. 2, p. 587

10

Tachibanas concept of the Kingly Way soon grew from its origins in state philosophy to develop economic aspects. In December 1931, Tachibana joined a complementary organisation entitled The State Founding Association (), for which Noda Ranz drafted the political manifesto. In this manifesto, Noda stated that the Kingly Way was not simply a Confucian moral philosophy but also a politics for the production and distribution of wealth, for the protection of peoples lives, for the eradication of all reactionary elements in society, and for the realisation of the Great Harmony.33 Tachibana saw Manchuria as a familistic agricultural society ( ). In his opinion, the politics of the Kingly Way would liberate people from their semi-feudal status and maximise their potential for local autonomy according to Chinese traditional values. In this way, the Confucian concept of the Kingly Way was transformed by Tachibana from a moral or religious concept in a new political idea of agricultural autonomy that would ultimately lead Manchukuo to the Great Harmony. The active discourse surrounding the Kingly Way in 1932 and 1933 soon elicited a new discourse of pan-Asianism. In July and August 1933, Tachibana developed his theory of pan-Asianism by criticising the Greater Asian faction () led by Kuchida Yasunobu. Tachibana held many ideas similar to those of the Greater Asian faction; but, he criticised the latter for being "idealist". While giving them credit for recognising that the Kingly Way aims to overcome Western civilisation and to revive Eastern spirit, at the same time he asserted that the Greater Asian faction seems to imply that as long as Japan follows the Kingly Way or the Imperial Way, anything can be resolved. 34 Tachibana saw this as nothing more than purely an idealist and religious stance. In contrast, he believed that the economic and material power Japan holds derives from Western materialist civilisation. In addition, in order to exert its power, Japan has also followed in the footsteps of western imperialism. Japan and Japanese people have already abandoned the Eastern social form in favour of Western

33

Tachibana Shiraki, Mansh kenkoku shoks hihan, Mansh hyron, Vol.3, No.7, 13 August, 1932, quoted from Tachibana Shiraki chosakush, Vol. 2, p. 106 34 Tachibana, Han Ajia und no shinriron, p. 598

11

capitalism. 35 Tachibana seriously doubted Japans capacity to exercise leadership in agrarian pan-Asianism; he held that neither nationalism () nor capitalism could develop pan-Asianism or cosmopolitanism. What he was pursuing was national, industrial and geographical unification dominated by non-capitalism and opposed to any form of class and industrial monopoly.36 This unification would eventually liberate Asia from the domination of Western imperialism. This ideal vision left room for the possibility of reforming Japan itself, a reformation in which Tachibana believed the Japanese Army should play a significant role.

From the Kingly Way to the Imperial Way: the Failure of Agrarianism in Manchukuo The Department of Local Autonomy was disbanded on 15 March 1932, after existing for a fleeting four months only. Subsequently, many former members of the Department formed a new institution called the Finance and Politics Bureau (). According to Tachibana, whereas the Department of Local Autonomy was founded spontaneously as a response to the Manchurian reality in 1931, the Finance and Politics Bureau was established in full accordance with the law of Manchukuo and supervised by the State Council (). 37 However, its attempt to act as a ruling organ irritated Itagaki Seishir, who disbanded it in July 1932. 38 In total, these two institutions that advocated local autonomy were in existence for a mere seven months. In the same year, the Manchurian Youth League was dissolved. In August 1933, the Civil Minister of Manchukuo announced the reformation of the counties of Manchukuo. This indicated the waning of local autonomy and the acceleration of the centralisation of authority, despite the fact that at that time the movement towards local autonomy had developed into on large scale in Shenyang.39 In general, the influence of

35 36

Ibid, p. 597 Ibid, p. 600 37 Tachibana Shiraki, Mansh kenkoku shoks hihan, p. 100 38 Zhongyang danganguan, Zhongguo dier lishi danganguan, Jilinsheng shehui kexueyuan (eds), Riben diguo zhuyi qinhua dangan ziliao xuanbian, Vol.3, Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1994, p. 438 39 Ibid, pp. 436-437

12

Tachibana and the intellectual group associated with the Department of Local Autonomy declined in central government circles although Tachibana continued to enjoy considerable influence at the local level. However, Tachibanas Kingly Way, which strongly opposed the idea of restoring the monarchy, met with failure when on 1 March 1934 Manchukuo was declared an empire and Pu Yi was crowned emperor. The era known as Datong() was replaced by that of Kangde (). Zheng Xiaoyu justified the imperium, arguing that China had experienced twenty years of chaos following its adoption of democracy, thus showing itself as unsuited to the Republican form of state.40 By advocating monarchy under Pu Yi for Manchuria, Zheng sought to realise his dream of restoring the Qing. However, Zhengs argument was not acceptable to Tachibana, who rejected the notion that the Qing had permanent entitlement to rule. As long as the Qing emperor failed to obey the Mandate of Heaven, he should be dethroned and replaced by a more progressive regime. 41 Tachibana criticised not only Zhengs hypocrisy but also the ignorance of Manchuria's Japanese elites. He complained that after the establishment of Manchukuo in March 1932, Japanese officers flooded from Japan into Manchuria with little knowledge of Manchukuo and Manchukuos history and culture. All they achieved was transferring Japanese capitalistic bureaucracy to Manchukuo. They failed to understand the true meaning of the Mandate of Heaven. 42 However, Tachibana could no longer influence the Kwangtung Armys decision-making as he had in 1931 and 1932 after Honj Shigeru, Ishiwara Kanji and Itagaki Seishir, the initial founders of Manchukuo, were replaced and transferred back to Japan in July 1932. In 1935, while Tachibana was lecturing on the Kingly Way at Datong College (), which was founded by the Department of Local Autonomy, Zheng Xiaoxu was promoting his

40

Tachibana Shiraki, Nikkei kanshi no teisei riy hihan, Mansh hyron, Vol. 6, No. 5, 2, February, 1934, quoted from Tachibana Shiraki chosakush, Vol. 2, p. 149 41 Ibid, p.150 42 Tachibana Shiraki, Nikkei kanshi e no kigo, Mansh hyron, Vol. 6, No. 5, 2, February 1934, quoted from Tachibana Shiraki chosakush, Vol. 2, p. 154

13

version of the Kingly Way to a summer lecture hosted by the Xinjing municipal government..43 1935 in fact saw the start of Japans accelerating penetration into Manchuria. The restoration of Pu Yis emperorship was merely a by-product of intensified centralisation in Manchukuo. Tachibanas ideal of the Great Harmony was adopted by the Kwangtung Army in the initial stage of the founding of Manchukuo because it was associated with Chinese revolutionary thought. This helped to justify Japans military action in Manchuria. However, it was abandoned immediately when Manchukuo headed towards a stable stage of development.44 The tension between Tachibana and the Kwantung Army grew particularly evident when the slogan Japan and Manchuria Are Inseparable ( ) began to gain more prominence. The tension between Tachibanas agricultural autonomy and the Manchurian reality became irreconcilable in 1936 and 1937 when Manchukuo adopted a five-year industrialisation plan and Ayukawa Gisuke of Nissan Industries invested three billion yen to establish the Manchurian Heavy Industries Corporation. 45 Industrialism and the monarchy, rather than agricultural autonomy and democracy, reigned over Manchuria. Of the various competing theories surrounding the establishment of Manchukuo in October 1931, the Kingly Way of local agricultural autonomy as the leading principle actively existed for less than a year. Post-1933, when the Honj era was over and Tachibanas advocacy of noncapitalism and agrarianism ceased to be popular in Manchukuo, Ishiwara's notion of an East Asian League started to gain currency.46 It was at this juncture that Tachibana began to voice his opinion on pan-Asianism. 47 Tachibana and Ishiwara had more frequent contact after 1937, a time when Tachibana was shocked by the outbreak of the Second
43 44

Komagome Takeshi, Shokuminchi teikoku Nihon no bunka tg, p. 275 Ibid, p. 276 45 Lincoln Li, The China Factor in Modern Japanese Thought : the Case of Tachibana Shiraki, 1881-1945, New York: State University of New York Press, 1996, p. 60 46 The idea of an East Asian League first appeared in Gunjij yori mitaru kkoku no kokusaku narabi kokub keikaku yk; see Tsunoda Jun (ed.), Ishihara Kanji shiryo: kokub ronsaku hen, Tokyo: Hara Shobo, 1978, pp.113-114 47 Hamaguchi Yko, Tachibana Shiraki to Ishiwara Kanji, in Tachibana Shiraki to Chgoku, p. 201

14

Sino-Japanese War and Ishiwara was demoted from Japan to Manchukuo due to his opposition to the war with China. Both Tachibana and Ishiwara believed that Japan should cooperate with China to contain the threat of the Soviet Union in the Far East. So it comes as no surprise that Tachibana supported Ishiwaras East Asian League proposal after July 1938 when the latter resigned from the Kwantung Army to concentrate exclusively on this project. Tachibana visited Ishiwara to discuss politics in Kyoto in 1939.48 Around this time, Tachibana was recruited into the Shwa Research Association formed by Prince Konoye Fumimaro. The Kingly Way, which had its origins in Manchukuo, became a crucial concept of Ishiwaras Theory on Showa Restoration (). According to Ishiwara, the final battle would be between the Kingly Way and the Imperial Way, a basic theme of Sun Yat-sens speech delivered in Japan in 1924. Tachibana not only agreed with this theme but also applied his own understanding to develop the Kingly Way aspect of Ishiwaras Theory. He theorised that the history of Asian countries progressed from confrontation to co-operation and harmony. The end point of this progress would be the Great Harmony.49 Tachibana saw this form of the Kingly Way, a new guidance for a new era with the goal of Great Harmony, already expressed in Sun Yat-sens concept of Conciliationism ().50 In 1941, Tachibana was a frequent contributor to Ishiwaras journal East Asian League (), in which he published some modifications to his early thought on the Kingly Way.51 In order to secure Japans leadership of the East Asian League, Tachibana made a distinction between two different forms of the Kingly Way: the general and the specific. Japans Imperial Way belonged to the general Kingly Way; therefore, it was legitimate for it to assume the leadership of the East Asian League. And, as Manchukuo was in lockstep with Japan, the specific concept of the Kingly Way of Manchukuo should

48 49

Ibid, p. 220 Tachibana Shiraki, Seijiryoku to kokumin soshiki, Tachibana Shiraki chosakush, Vol. 3, p. 393 50 Ibid, pp. 393-394 51 From December 1939 to February 1943, Tachibana contributed 9 commentary articles to Ishiharas East Asian League. See Sakaguchi Yko, Tachibana Shiraki to Ishihara Kanji, pp. 221-222

15

eliminate its revolutionary tone to ensure the eternal rule of Japans emperor. Finally, national harmony between the Asian nations became a significant element of the Kingly Way.52 In fact, Tachibanas early interest in pan-Asianism and Manchukuo paved the way for his interest in how to reform Japan to meet the requirements of leadership. In his On Nationality () he gave equal space to the emperor system and to the Kingly Way in early Manchukuo. As Koyasu Nobukuni notes, the East Asia depicted by Tachibana was actually a picture of Japans community as one emperor leading the masses53 ().

Conclusion: The Demise of Pan-Asianism and its Consequences Many researchers, such as Hashikawa Bunzo and Nakajima Makoto, have opted to list Tachibana under the category of ultranationalism () alongside Kita Ikki, Okawa Shumei, and Tyama Mitsuru. Ultranationalism, to the Japanese means, ideas dealing with issues above national concerns. However, almost without exception, all of them failed to realise their dreams. At the beginning they stood for the liberation of Asian peoples, admiring and assisting Chinas national revolution, but ended as the catalyst for Japanese imperialism.54 Nakajimas words summarise well the contradictions that marked Tachibanas life. Similar to Kita Ikki, who was attracted to the cause of the Chinese National Revolution of 1911, Tachibanas stance in Manchuria sprang from his early experience of the Chinese Revolution. The Chinese intellectual resources that had developed in the Republican era were deftly used by Sinologists such as Tachibana in Manchukuo to realise their Japanese pan-Asianism. The Kingly Way proposed in Sun Yat-sens speech in 1924 severed as a warning vis--vis Japans accelerating imperialism and was the precursor to his later Theory of the Five Peoples () that intended to secure Chinas hegemony. Kang Youweis theory of Great Harmony also had the explicit intention of unifying

52 53

Ibid, pp. 400-401 Koyasu Nobukuni, Nihon nashonarizumu no kaidoku, Tokyo: Hakutakusha, 2007, p. 233 54 Nakajima Makoto, Ajia shugi no kb, Tokyo: Gendai Shokan, 2001, p. 64

16

China against foreign invasion. However, these intellectual resources, which were appropriated in Japans occupation of Manchukuo, transformed into Tachibanas theory of the harmony of the peoples and agrarian autonomy. Tachibana felt sympathetic towards Chinas national revolution, a sympathy derived from his understanding of the Chinese farmers suffering ironically that led him to become an accomplice to Japans expansion in China. Based upon his early experience of the Chinese national revolution, Tachibana believed the best way to revive China was to destroy the country's warlords, which was also the priority issue in the founding of Manchukuo which Tachibana saw as in the best interests of both China and Asia. This was not unusual for Japanese intellectuals at that time. Many of them followed a mental route similar to that of Tachibana, having lost confidence in Chinas future due to the failure of Chinas 1911 revolution; yet, at the same time they assumed the leadership of liberalising Asia. In 1931, immediately after the Manchurian Incident, when the Kwantung Army leadership was unsure about how to organise Manchurian society and politics, Sinologists including Tachibana played a crucial role in helping the Army to found Manchukuo. During this process, Sinologists knowledge of China as well as of traditional values such as Confucian thought, were tactically deployed in the political sphere by the Army. Tachibana himself seized the opportunity of cooperating with the Army to realise his dream of reforming and liberating Asia. In the short period between 1931 and 1932, Tachibanas pan-Asianism almost matched that of the Japanese imperialist Army. However, what distinguished Tachibanas pan-Asianism and his yearning for a Japanese-controlled Manchurian state was his insistence on agrarianism, based on his study of Chinese history. However meagre his influence may have been, Tachibanas early ideal of agrarian autonomy, beyond Japans imperialistic capitalistic advancement, formed a significant part of Japans pan-Asianism. Tachibanas case offers an opportunity to reflect on the many theories of Japanese imperialism in Manchukuo, making a differentiation of pan-Asianism from Manchukuo's "new imperialism" possible.