TAYLOR v. MANILA ELECTRIC RAILROAD AND LIGHT CO.

Nature: An action to recover damages for the loss of an eye and other injuries, instituted by David Taylor, a minor, by his father. Facts: Defendant is a foreign corporation engaged in the operation of a street railway and an electric light system in the city of Manila. Plaintiff David was 15 years old at the time of the incident. He and Manuel Claparols, about 12 years of age, went to the power plant owned by the defendant to visit one Murphy, defendant s employee. Not being able to find Murphy, the boys spent some time wandering in the compound. The said compound was where the company dumped in the cinders and ashes from its furnaces. There they found some 20-30 fulminating caps scattered on the ground. The caps are intended for explosion of dynamites, and have in themselves a considerable explosive power. The boys picked up the caps and carried them home. Along the way they met Jessie Adrian, a 9-year old girl. The 3 went to Manuel s house and made a series of experiments with the caps. First, they thrust the ends of the wires into an electric socket and obtained no result. They next tried to break the cap with the stone and failed. They opened the caps and found yellowish substance. They got matches and David held the cap while Manuel applied a lighted match to the contents. The girl became frightened and ran away. The substance exploded, causing a slight cut on Jessie s neck, burns on Manuel, and loss of David s eyesight. Plaintiff sued the company for damages. Issue: 1. Whether or not the defendant company was negligent. 2. Whether or not the plaintiff has the right to recover. Held: 1. (The Court first settled the issue of defendant s ownership over the fulminating caps or detonators.) SC held that fulminating caps or detonators used for dynamites are not articles in common use by the average citizen, and under all the

circumstances, and in the absence of all evidence to the contrary, were defendant s property. They were willfully and knowingly thrown by the company or its employees at the spot where they were found, with the expectation that they would be buried out of sight by the ashes which it was engaged in dumping in that neighborhood, exposed at a point on its premises which the general public, including children at play, where not prohibited from visiting, and over which the company knew or ought to have known that young boys were likely to roam about in pastime or in play. It is clear that the accident could not have happened if the fulminating caps had not been left exposed at the point where they were found, or if their owner had exercised due care in keeping them in an appropriate place. The company should have introduced the necessary evidence to support its contention if it wished to avoid the reasonable inference that it was the owner of the material and that it was responsible for the tortuous or negligent acts of the agents employed therein. Even though the workman employed in the blasting well was from J. G. White and Co., a firm of contractors, he did the work on the well directly and immediately under the supervision and control of defendant s foreman. 2. Defendant was negligent in not properly disposing of the fulminating caps but it was not the proximate cause of the injury received by the plaintiff. Plaintiff s action in cutting open the detonating cap and putting a match to its contents was the proximate cause of the explosion and of the resultant injuries inflicted upon the plaintiff, and that the defendant, therefore, is not civilly responsible for the injuries thus incurred. a. Plaintiff rested its case upon the provisions of Article 1089 of the Civil Code read together with articles 1902, 1903, and 1908. Art. 1089. Obligations are created by law, by contracts, by quasi contracts, and by illicit

acts and omissions or by those in which any kind of fault or negligence occurs. Art. 1902. A person who by an act or omission causes damage to another when there is fault or negligence shall be obliged to repair the damage so done. Art. 1903. The obligation imposed by the preceding article is demandable, not only for persons for whom they should be responsible Owners or directors of an establishment or enterprise are equally liable for the damages caused by their employees in the service for the branches in which the latter may be employed or on account of their duties. Art. 1908. The owners shall also be liable for the damages caused 1. By the explosion of machines which may not have been cared for with due diligence, and for kindling of explosive substances which may not have been placed in a safe and proper place. The Court held that for the defendant company to be held liable and for the plaintiff to have a right of recovery, it must be proven by the latter through competent evidence recover that: 1. Damages to the plaintiff 2. Negligence by act or omission of which defendant personally or some person for whose acts it must respond, was guilty 3. The connection of cause and effect between the negligence and the damage The plaintiff argues that plaintiff s youth and inexperience, his entry upon defendant company s premises, and the intervention of his action between the negligent act of defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its premises and the accident which resulted in his injury should not be held to have contributed in any way to the accident. It invokes the doctrine laid down in many ways in U.S. cases known as Torpedo cases or Turntable cases. In the said cases, the question has been a. whether a railroad company is liable for an injury received by an infant of tender years, who from mere idle curiosity or for purposes of amusement, enters upon the

railroad company s premises, at a place where the railroad company knew, or had good reason to suppose, children would be likely to come, and there found explosive signal torpedoes left exposed by the company s employees, one of which when carried away by the visitor exploded and injured him; or b. where such infant found upon the premises a dangerous machine, such as a turntable, left in such condition as to make it probable that children in playing with it would be exposed to accident or injury therefrom and where the infant did in fact suffer injury in playing such machine. The Torpedo cases, in sum, established the doctrine that even though the person entering the premises of a railroad company could be regarded as a trespasser, it cannot be held that said company had no duty to regard for the safety of such person. The railroad company did not provide for a clear prohibition for people who might enter its premises. The Court held that there is no difference between an express license and habit of the defendant to permit entry without objection or warning. The Doctrine of Implied invitation to visit the premises of another says that in the case of young children, and other persons not fully sui juris, an implied license might sometimes arise when it would not in behalf of others. Children are actuated by similar childish instincts and impulses. Therefore, owners of premises must calculate upon this and take precautions accordingly. Where there is an implied license to enter, and the child does so and gets injured, there is a breach of duty, a negligent omission, for which he may and should be held responsible, if the child is actually injured. This is founded on the idea that private property shall not be used to injure the equal rights of others. The Court also noted that for adults to entitle him to recover damages for an injury resulting from the fault or negligence of another he must himself have been free from fault. This does not apply in cases where children are involved. The care and caution required of a child is according to his maturity and capacity only, and this is to be determined in each case by the circumstances of the case. The Torpedo cases cited by the plaintiff

involved children of tender years who did not have the capacity to understand the nature or character of the explosive instruments which fell into their hands. Plaintiff here is a well-grown youth of 15, more mature both mentally and physically than the average boy of his age; he had been to sea as a cabin boy; earned money as a mechanical draftsman and was proven to be exceptionally qualified to take care of himself. He well knew the explosive character of the cap shown by the series of the experiments he had done; that a more or less dangerous explosion might be expected from his act, and yet he willfully, recklessly, and knowingly produced the explosion. The law fixes no arbitrary age at which a minor can be said to have the necessary capacity to understand and appreciate the nature and consequences of his own acts to determine negligence; the question of negligence depends on the ability of the minor to understand the character of his own acts and their consequences. Plaintiff in this case was sui juris in the sense that his age and experience qualified him to understand the necessity to for the exercise of that degree of caution which would have avoided the injury he had suffered from. He cannot recover damages because his own act in putting a match to the contents of the cap contributed to the principal occurrence which caused his injuries. Judgment reversed. (The case discussed other concepts such as proximate cause, proportional damages and etc. to be discussed in the latter part of the syllabus)