An Institutional Critique of Intergovernmentalism Author(s): Geoffrey Garrett and George Tsebelis Source: International Organization, Vol. 50, No.

2 (Spring, 1996), pp. 269-299 Published by: The MIT Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2704079 . Accessed: 05/08/2011 11:00
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critique An institutional ofintergovernmentalism

and Garrett GeorgeTsebelis Geoffrey

havetendedto focuson analysesofEuropean integration Intergovernmentalist over the outcome of treaty the bargainingamong national governments of The epochs thattreatiesdemarcateare considereda function negotiations. those preferencesin preferencesand their abilityto further governments' to contrast neofunctionThis bargaining.1 approachstandsin marked interstate alist approaches, which contend that much of the importantaction over Fromtheneofuncrevisions. takesplace betweentreaty European integration spark "spillovers"that emtreatyrevisionsinvariably tionalistperspective, power actors and generate policy dynamicsthat were unintendedby the that governments signedthem.2 As the legislativeoutput of the European Union (EU) has increased in has been perspective increasingly recent years, the intergovernmentalist most Not surprisingly, decisionmaking. of adapted to the dynamics day-to-day in on studiesconcentrate myopically decisionmaking theCouncilof Ministers, betweentreaty bargaining of embodiment interstate whichis the institutional rounds. Numerous scholars have computed "power indexes"-which are a possible winningcoalitionsto of function the portionof all mathematically governof is whicheach government pivotal-to deduce the ability individual The thrustof these studies is that ments to influenceCouncil decisions.3 over stateshavemoreinfluence from EU member larger although governments to theirpower is not proportionate outcomesthan those fromsmallerstates, in theCouncilof Ministers. their voting weights
Frieden, Robert The authors thank Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Daniel Diermeier, Jeffry for reviewer helpful and Madeleine Hosli,JohnOdell, AndrewMoravcsik, an anonymous Gibbons, and comments Neal Jesseand Amie Kreppelforresearchassistance.GeorgeTsebeliswouldliketo recognize financialsupport fromthe Simon GuggenheimFoundation, and National Science SBR 9511485. Foundationgrant 1993. 1. Moravcsik 2. See Ross 1995;and Sandholtz1992. and 1995; Johnston Hunt 1977; Lane and 1985; Hosli 1993; Johnston 3. See Bramsand Affuso Moeland 1995;Widgren1994; and 1995. 50, Organization 2, Spring1996,pp. 269-99 International ? 1996byThe 10 Foundationand the Massachusetts of Institute Technology

Organization 270 International generatesno analytic We argue that thisvariantof intergovernmentalism EU. Unlike traditional leverage over decision makingin the contemporary memit ignoresthe policypositionsof the bargaining intergovernmentalism, the power of to bers. This leads power indexes systematically overestimate notably big (especiallyfrom countries, withextreme preferences governments the United Kingdom) and to underestimatethe power of more centrist suchas theBeneluxgroup). smallercountries, (especiallyfrom governments intergovernmentalmainstream powerindexanalysis-along with Moreover, attention institutional to insufficient ism and, indeed,neofunctionalism-pays all EU. in decisionmaking thecontemporary Most important, rulesthatgovern the these approachesunderestimate impactof the 1986 Single European Act and the 1992 Treatyon European Union on "agenda settingpower"-the to to ability make proposalsthatare difficult amend. detailed the processin Europe onlythrough One can understand legislative the amongthe Council of Ministers, analysisof the interactions institutional and and of Commission theEuropean Communities, theEuropean Parliament, in particularthe sequencing of decisions. Changes in agenda settinghave in policy consequences that have been highlighted only a small systematic We develop this point by number of studies of European integration.4 used likely policy outcomes under the four most frequently contrasting and codecision. cooperation, in procedures Europe today:assent,consultation, of The impactof our analysisis not limitedto the intricacies the legislative process between EU treatyrounds. In a recent article,Andrew Moravcsik claims that "from the signingof the Treaty of Rome to the making of Maastricht,the EC (EU) has developed througha series of celebrated each of whichsets the agenda foran intervening bargains, intergovernmental period of consolidation.The most fundamentaltask facing a theoretical Even ifwe were is accountofEuropean integration to explainthesebargains."5 to agree with Moravcsikabout the importanceof explainingthe formative we eventsof European integration, would nonethelesscontendthatthistask of unlessthepolicyimplications EU treaties undertaken cannotbe successfully of are and ifthesignatories treaties is correct If are wellunderstood. Moravcsik selected of mustexplainwhythe signatories a treaty one rational, strategically over another.That is, one mustanalyze arrangements one set of institutional choices.For thisreason,the institutional of different the policyconsequences we present here is a prerequisiteeven for Moravcsik's type of analysis agenda. intergovernmentalist In of The remainder thisarticleis dividedintofoursections. thenextsection, a we offer briefcritiqueof the powerindexapproachto EU decisionmaking. in coalitionalbehavior theCouncilof on preferences likely The impactofpolicy Ministersis analyzed in the second section. The thirdsection situates the
4. See Garrett1992; 1995; Martin 1993; Schneider 1995; Steunenberg1994; Tsebelis 1994; 1995a; and 1995b. 1993,473. 5. Moravcsik

271 Intergovernmentalism position of the Council in relation to the Commissionof the European legislaunderthe EU's different and the European Parliament Communities for the we tiveprocedures.Finally, concludebyhighlighting directions future researchthatour approachpromotes.

Powerindexanalysesofdecisionmaking in theEuropean Union

While proponentsof power indexes disagree about some special issues, all is TheyassumetheCouncilofMinisters thepreeminent sharea basic method.6 are in institution the EU. Council decisions increasingly decision-making five-sevenths all of in voting whichapproximately subjectto qualifiedmajority are votes are requiredto pass a measure.Governments allocatedvotes in the to Council in loose approximation theircountries'populations,althoughthe In are of weights biased in favor smallercountries. the EU today,these voting Italy,and the United Kingdom:10; Spain: 8; weightsare: France, Germany, and Portugal:5; Sweden and Austria:4; Belgium,Greece, the Netherlands, votes fromthe 2. and Ireland: 3; Luxembourg: Sixty-two Denmark,Finland, a qualified majority. totalofeighty-seven constitute to of the From the powerindexperspective, ability a government influence of all mathematically possible is of Councildeliberations a function theportion "winning"qualified majoritycoalitions to which it is pivotal (i.e., those if threshold the coalitionsthat would cease to attain the qualifiedmajority power, the In order to determinea government's defected). government dividesthe numberof "vulnerable" Banzhafpowerindex,forexample,simply As of coalitions. it is pivotalbythe totalnumber vulnerable coalitionsto which is a result, powerindexof a government a score between0 and 1, and the the sumof all theseindexesis 1. withreference The application thisapproachto the EU is best illustrated of in to journal,whichis moresensitive the to Madeleine Hosli's recentarticle this Hosli in broaderpoliticalenvironment Europe than are most otherstudies.7 is concludesthateven though powerin theCouncilof Ministers monotonically increasing members'votingweights(countrieswiththe same weightsare in from largercountries the the powerofgovernments equallypowerful), relative has decreased witheveryexpansionof the EU fromits originalsix members, the and that this trendwill continuefollowing accession of the three small European Free Trade Associationcountries(Austria,Finland,and Sweden) on 1 January 1995.

6. See Banzhaf1965; and Shapleyand Shubik1954. 7. Hosli 1993.

272 International Organization thingabout the power index approach is thatit Perhaps the most striking in of does not considerthe policypreferences membergovernments Council decision making.The onlypartial exceptionto this is Mika Widgren'smost recent article.8Hosli, for example, acknowledgesin the conclusion to her for policypreferences various articlethat it is possible to discernconsistent at some governments, least on certainsetsof issues. She statesthat"in reality, the thanothers. For instance, preferences to coalitions maybe morelikely form close, as is true of Denmarkand the United Kingdomoftenseem to be rather However,she views the for the Benelux countries, France, and Germany."9 addition of policy preferencesmerely as a supplement to power index use us might their power. analysis-informing oftheends to whichgovernment assumes thattakingpolicypositionsinto accounthas no Hosli thusimplicitly of In impacton the computation power indexes.10 the nextsection,we show into consideration far are thatthe consequencesof takingpolicypreferences innovation into benign.Indeed, thissimpleanalytic calls fundamentally from of questiontheutility thepowerindexapproach. processes In addition, powerindexesdo nottake intoaccountthelegislative rules concerning the used in the EU. Hosli accepts that formalinstitutional mayhave some impact and the European Parliament roles of the Commission thatbecause the Council "represents the on legislation. She argues,however, of organwithrespectto theintroduction newlegislation" final decision-making it to explicitly take intoaccountprior (at least untilMaastricht), is unnecessary In section, arguethatthis we process.1" the third stagesin the decisionmaking to reasoning flawed.ContraHosli, we assertthatthe ability make proposals is to power) is at least as important thatare difficult amend (agenda-setting to the a passed policyoutcomesas is having finalsayon whether bill is ultimately amongthe EU's decision-making (veto power).We thenshowthatdifferences consequences for policy procedures can be expected to have significant outcomes.

Policypreferences powerindexes and

Let us beginour analysisby assuming-forthe moment-that the Council of Ministers the sole decisionmakerin the EU. We considera seven-member is Council, in which each member'svote is weightedequally and fivevotes constitute qualifiedmajority. a This is the simplest way to represent decision underthe qualified thresholds thathave obtainedin all actual majority making of The critical difference betweenour configurations the Councilof Ministers. is and index perspective thatwe includethepolicypreferences analysis thepower
8. 9. 10. 11. Widgren1995. Hosli, 1993,643. Ibid. Ibid.,629.

273 Intergovernmentalism
SQ 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

where = status SQ FIGURE 1. (Ir)relevance ofpower indexes one dimension, in 12346 is impossible, since5 quo and 1-7 = governments' coalition idealpoints: will join of member governments. the firstpart of this section we analyze the In one-dimensional case and demonstrate thatthetypeofcalculations performed different resultsifpolicypositionsare by powerindexesproducescompletely overestitakenintoaccount.Conventional powerindexanalysessystematically matethepowerofextreme members coalitionsand underestimate power of the of centrist members tworeasons.First,onlyconnectedcoalitions-that is, for that are contiguous in the relevantpolicy coalitions among governments vulnerablecoalitions.Second, space-should be consideredwhen calculating the coalitionsthat actuallyformmay often even be oversized,ratherthan thatthese problemsobtainin "minimal coalitions.We demonstrate winning" any numberof dimensions.Finally,we address potentialobjectionsto our of over issues and the argument concerning stability government preferences time. A power index in one dimension Assume that the seven members(1-7) of the Council of Ministershave policypreferences ("ideal points") thatcan be arrayedon a singledimension fromless to more European integration (see Figure 1). Accordingto this can be achieved in approach, the required five-sevenths qualifiedmajority different waysthatfive twenty-one ways(thereare twenty-one [7!/5!2!]distinct ofsevenmembers be puttogether). can Sincewe assumethatall members have the equal voting weights, powerindexapproachwould concludethateach has equal power(one-seventh). in Now considerthese expectations Figure 1. Our first argument that a is more appropriateway of calculatingpower would be to include fromthe decisive coalitionsonly those that are connected. Consider the twenty-one coalition12346. Accordingto the power indexliterature, coalitionhas a this thatthe probability of probability 1/21to occur. We wish to argue,however, is thatunites 12346occurring not 1/21butzero. This is because thereis nothing members 2, 3, and 4 with6 thatwouldnotinclude5. 1, 1 To demonstrate of this, assumethatthestatusquo is to theleft government of are and that the preferences governments Euclidean (that is, theirutility decreases withthe distanceof an outcome fromtheirideal points). All five members the coalition12346 would like a policyoutcomethatis closer to of of theirideal pointsthan is the statusquo (for example,at the preferences the 5. government But so does government When a vote comes to thefloor, 1). 5 for members thewinning of coalitioncannotexcludegovernment from voting

Organization 274 International can A a proposalthatis in its interest. similarargument be made ifthe status 6. (1-6) willvote in favorof of quo is to the right member All sixgovernments between1 it moving to theleft.Now considerthatthestatusquo is somewhere that1 and 6 can agreeupon. In all threemutually and 6. There is no movement cases, the coalition12346 does not occur. exhaustive and collectively exclusive that thereis no cost to votingfor a proposal that a assumes Our argument in to prefers the statusquo. One could envisagea situation which government wishes not to be this assumption might not hold-when a government the of for associatedwitha proposalit prefers, example,to deflect criticism its domesticopponents. However, this is most unlikelyin the contextof the behaviorhas been shroudedin secrecy. because voting Councilof Ministers because they notconnected;thatis, are Coalitionssuchas 12346do notform are located between the theydo not include a memberwhose preferences in eitheran agreement of preferences members the coalition.In thissituation, of amongthemembers thecoalitionis notpossible(in whichcase thecoalition does not form),or if an agreementamong the nonconnectedmembersis willgo along (in whichcase the coalitionis not possible,the excludedmember when decisive,since it can reduce its size byone and stillwin). Consequently, coalitionsdo not nonconnected vote on thebasis of policypositions, countries form. formation. withthatofcoalitiongovernment This outcomecan be contrasted William Riker's theoryof minimumwinningcoalitions was criticizedfor connected As policy positions.12 a result,the notion of minimum ignoring In connected coalitions winningcoalitionswas introduced.13 this literature, of winning approach ere consideredas a plausible refinement the minimum but Riker'sbasic insight not was thatreducedthe possiblerangeof outcomes, challenged. is from in formation verydifferent, however, Coalitionbuilding government Partiesin a coalitioncan excludea in decisionmaking theCouncilofMinisters. in (that is, would-be (connected) member fromparticipating government holding cabinet portfolios).Moreover, they have motives to do so-for This is availableto each member. of exampl , to increasetheperquisites office is impossble in the Council of Ministers.No Eurogovernment formed;and on connectedwithbeingin the majority a givenissue. thereare no perquisites wish.As a whichever policiesthey member can governments votefor Moreover, coalitionsin the calculationsbiases the the result, inclusionof nonconnected of calculation powerindexes. Oversizedcoalitionsshould also be considered.Assume now thatthe status 1 quo in Figure1 is located farto theleftof government and thata decisionto 4's a policyat government ideal pointis proposed(forthemoment, implement
12. Riker1962. 13. Axelrod1970.

275 Intergovernmentalism we will not discuss how this proposal was made). All the membersof the 4 Councilprefer to thestatusquo. Ifone wereto allowforoversizedcoalitions, 123456,234567,and 1234567.We will itis clear thatanotherthreecould form: eitherbecause theyare soon showthatsuch coalitionsoccur quite frequently: or setting because the membersof the Council requiredby the institutional further of of agreeon issues.Thus,exclusion thepossibility oversizedcoalitions of biases calculations powerindexes. of assumptions by The consequencesofthebiases introduced theunrealistic and nonconnectivity decisivenessare serious. We present only the biases and leave the size calculations assumption introduced the nonconnectivity by for the interestedreader. If one considers only the connected winning the onlypossible decisive coalitionsare 12345, coalitionsin one dimension, once each; 23456,and 34567. In these coalitionsmembers1 and 7 participate 3, 2 and 6 twiceeach; and members 4, and 5 threetimesapiece. Thus, members membersis as follows:PI(1) = 1/15, the power index (PI) of the different PI(2) = 2/15,PI(3) = 3/15,PI(4) = 3/15,PI(5) = 3/15,PI(6) = 2/15,PI(7) = 1/15[PI(n) = 1]. withtraditional powerindexesshowsthatonce of A comparison theseresults a single policy dimensionis introduced,the potential number of decisive to coalitions is reduced from twenty-one three. All possible connected of 3, willincludegovernments 4, and 5. The inclusion thesemembers coalitions of as is one and a halftimesas likely theinclusion 2 and 6 and twiceas probable as the inclusionof members1 and 7. Even thoughthe votingweightsof all membersin our example are the same-and hence each memberwould be calculationsof powerindexesby consideredequallypowerful conventional of the likelyinfluence these countriesover policies is clearlyrelated to their in centrality thepolicyspace. Power indexes in two dimensions coalitionshas connectedwinning of RobertAxelrod'ssuggestion minimum Here because it does not generalizein multipledimensions.14 been criticized of conceptin multipledimensions we providea definition the connectedness and showthatour critiqueof powerindexesobtainsforanynumberof policy and proofswill be in two dimensions).We need not dimensions (our figures discuss oversized coalitions because there is nothingto be added to the case. one-dimensional of 123 Considerthetriangle composedofthreemembers a coalitionand any that so long as point4 inside it (Figure 2). In the appendixwe demonstrate 1, are policypreferences Euclidean, a coalitionof members 2, and 3 willnever Either1, 2, and 3 cannotagreeto form coalitionor 4 willbe included any form.
14. Lijphart1984.

Organization 276 International

w~~~~~~~

123~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

in where coalitions twodimensions, and nonconnected FIGURE 2. Connected W positions, = winset,and quo, 1-4 = governments'preferred SQ = status to C 123 if W123 W4:coalition is nonconnected 4 belongs theParetosetof1, 2, 3 If is in the coalitionwiththem.The logicof the argument straightforward.the is locatedinsidethetriangle 123,thenthecoalition123 cannotform. statusquo On the other hand, if the statusquo is outside the triangle123, any policy to overthestatusquo willalso be thata coalition123 is willing support position as 123,123cannot by supported 4. Consequently, longas 4 is insidethetriangle coalition. be a vulnerable This argumentextends the notion of connectednessin more than one body in a multidimensional dimension.Considern membersof a legislative M considera coalition = (1,2,. . ., Euclidean space. Without loss of generality m}out ofN = {1,2,... , n} possiblemembers. is if DEFINITION. A coalition m (outofn) members nonconnected at leastone of member in ParetosetofM and ifi E {N} - {M}. belongs the nonconvoteon thebasis ofpolicy positions, 1. Whenmembers PROPOSITION coalitions not do nected form. What is the relevance of proposition 1 for our purposes? Consider a of configuration Council membersas shown in Figure 3, where one of the by members(government is includedinside the hexagonformed the other 7) coalitionto be wouldpredict each five-member six.Whilepowerindextheories coalitionthat one five-member 1 that is proposition indicates there only decisive,

Intergovernmentalism 277

where 1-7 FIGURE 3. Bias introduced powerindexes twodimensions, by in but 12456is decisive and 7' = govemments'preferred positions: coalition nonconnected sinceitexcludes which to 7, belongs 'itsParetoset can form thatdoes not includegovernment 12356. In particular, 7: coalitions 12345,12346,13456,12456,and 12346 are not possible,because theyare nonin If 7 connected. one movesthepositionofmember a bithigher thefigure, say to point7', thereis no decisivecoalitionthatexcludes7' altogether. As in the one-dimensional powerindexcalculationsare case, conventional and theycount biased. Theyincludeimpossible coalitionsin the denominator This bias operates in favorof members these coalitionsin the numerator. of countries. isolatedcountries and againstcentrist spatially These examples are hypothetical. However,theycan be easily replicated withactual positionsof different countrieson different issues. For example, Roland Stephen has located the positionsof the different European governthe mentsin the "catalytic converters" case in twodimensions: levelofcontrol of different emissionsand the variance in standardstoleratedby different It space to governments.'5 would be possible to use his two-dimensional calculatedifferent powerindexes. Instead of making elaborate mathematicalcomputationshere, we will bill the converters untilwe discussthe postponethetaskof discussing catalytic of ruleson policymaking. implications the EU's institutional The stabilityofpolicy positions and coalitions There is one possible objectionto the analysispresentedabove: that it is in of impossible talkabout the policypreferences governments the Council to basis. If thiswere true,the spatial of Ministers anything a case-by-case on but
15. Stephen1995.

Organization 278 International acrosstherangeof wouldbe random preferences allocation government of this about scenario way A technical tothink EU issues under jurisdiction.more in all dimensions theEU is so largethat policy of the is that number effective thenarguethatwhilepower are One might coalitions connected. winning of the approximationthe they are indexes flawed, arenonetheless bestfeasible of decisions overtheentire spectrum EU to of ability governmentsinfluence jurisdiction. across preferences of distributiongovernment of Is theassumption a random most EU? in issuesappropriate thecase ofthecontemporary We agreewith well-known examples. the that commentators itis not.Consider following and Kingdom Germany theUnited index approach, to According thepower in becausethey havethe decisions theCouncil able to influence are equally all contradicts thejournalistic But conclusion flatly of samenumber votes. this of Kingdom about isolation theUnited the literature speaks that andscholarly from greatimportance the resulting sinceit joined the EU-an isolation and alike.'6 politicians citizens by attached nationalsovereignty British to between refer frequently to theconfrontation most Similarly, commentators "south"insidethe EU. Spain's and theless-developed "north" thewealthy the associated at to funds Maastricht offset dislocations demands cohesion for union werea clearexample.17 and to the with transition economic monetary the of analyzing distributional the Moreover, basic thrust the literature of and market of program theprinciple "mutual consequences the internal from 1992 the haveemerged and winners losers is consistent recognition"that of decision making for of the Finally, consider implications Council Ministers index and Finland, Swedento theEU. The power theaccession Austria, of that aboutthis issueis to assume that way assumes theonly to think approach to as are thesecountries just as likely allywithGermany withthe United knowledge European of no However, one whohas evena passing Kingdom. with most conclusion. we wouldcometo this Rather, along economy political of believethatthemostrecent expansion theEU willbenefit commentators the of Kingdom. and reduce influence theUnited Germany further The but all One couldcitemore examples, they lead tothesameconclusion. in the of divisions Europedo notresemble motion gasmolecules a container in Instead, may at of where anypoint time twomolecules be closetogether. any expectations that thecoalitions form dependon issues.Thus,one can form as wellas about between likely coalitions of about policy positions governments of theissueor thecombination issues.The assumption on them, depending flies to index approach, in is that goes, anything which fundamental thepower evidence. thefaceofall existing
1991. 16. Moravcsik 17. Eichengreen1992. 1991. 18. Smithand Wanke 1993;Streeckand Schmitter

agenda.'8

279 Intergovernmentalism

procedures Decision-making
of The analysisin the precedingsectionaccepted the basic assumption power in dynamics the EU by policymaking index analysisthatone can understand in governments the Council amongmember on exclusively bargaining focusing is In of Ministers. thissection,we argue thatthis assumption inappropriate. The balance of legislativepower between the Council of Ministers,the and the European Parliament Commissionof the European Communities, underwhich EU in variessystematically thecontemporary withtheprocedures by (shared implicitly withHosli's assumption decisionsare made. In contrast that power lies withthe institution that mostintergovernmentalists) effective of the we acts last (i.e., that can veto new legislation), highlight importance to to (i.e., theability make proposalsthatare difficult amend). agenda setting to procedures,the right initiate In almostall of the EU's decision-making legislativeproposals is vested solely in the Commissionof the European controlover giveit effective Communities. However,thisdoes not necessarily the cannotkeep issues off agenda. thepolicymaking process.The Commission (the the Since the 1957 TreatyEstablishing European Economic Community Treatyof Rome), the Commissionhas been bound to make proposalswhen requested by the Council of Ministers.This power was extended to the for in European Parliament the Treatyon European Union. More important makes the first proposal does presentpurposes,the factthatthe Commission not mean that it can always constrain-much less determine-the final game. voted on in the last stage of the legislative proposal that is ultimately power varies with the EU's agenda-setting Who possesses this effective different decision-making procedures. Assumptions and methods In order to substantiatethis argument,we base our analysis on the in one-dimensional spatialmodelpresented Figure1 (in whichtheCouncilhas seven memberswithequal votingweights).The previoussectionestablished that once policy positions are taken into account, the numberof decisive to fallsfrom twenty-one theonlythreeconnected the thatcould form coalitions coalitions:12345,23456,and 34567. In thissectionwe show qualifiedmajority and the otherrelevant betweenthe Council of Ministers how the interactions in institutions the EU-the Commissionof the European decision-making Communitiesand the European Parliament-not only determinewhich of the likelypolicy these coalitionswill formin the Council but also influence outcomes that will ensue. Our analysis can be generalized in multiple case forease of presentabut dimensions, we examinethe one-dimensional tion.'9
19. Tsebelis 1994.

Organization 280 International in of analysis: assumptions theinstitutional We make number additional a the that of is quo (1) Thestatus atthebeginning theanalysis a policy reflects intheCouncil. Thiscanbe government of preferences theleastintegrationist the under Luxembargaining of as understood theoutcome intergovernmental of until decision making theratificationthe that compromise dominated bourg Act(see below). European Single of actors-theothermembers the Councilof (2) All the otherrelevant and of Communities, the the Commission theEuropean Ministers, European in the to Parliament-prefer increase levelofintegration theEU. European since that the that Thisisthescenario bestdescribes environment hasobtained relax assumpWe compromise. ultimately this thedemise theLuxembourg of the under codecifor backintegration the tionto analyze possibilities rolling sionprocedure. of of (3) The preferences the Commission the EuropeanCommunities as voter the in actoror,moreprecisely, themedian as (considered a unitary member the than of of are extreme those any of College Commissioners) more literature This with of highlightCouncil Ministers. is consistent thequalitative in forward the pushing of ingthevestedinterests commissioners vigorously may agendaof commissioners seem agenda.The pro-integration integration owncommissioners and national select that governments their given puzzling constraints informal terms. However, can replacethemat the end of their as theirpartisans commissioners. militate choosing againstgovernments' take that evidence also suggests commissioners on increasingly Considerable in after arrive Brussels.20 positions they pro-integration for Parliament (again, isshorthand this of (4) Thepreferences theEuropean are on of voter thefloor theparliament) similar of thepreferences themedian of of observers the This with of tothose theCommission. accords theview most the account possibility later We this parliament.2' relax assumption totakeinto in will over of control parliamentarians increase time. that degree citizen the on focuses thelaststepsof different decision-making proceOur analysis we information, in For complete dures theEU today. theselaststeps assume of know and each other's preferences thelocation the thatis,thatall actors information assumpone extend complete the status quo. While couldreadily tionto the wholeprocedure-asopposedto the last steps-we avoid the to that are difficult support because it leads to conclusions temptation the under information decisionmost important, complete Perhaps empirically. The would be the never reach final would proposal stages. initial game making most however, and thegamewouldend. In practice, by accepted all actors the Nonetheless, reachthe finalstageof a given -procedure. deliberations is reasonable theendofthegame at because information assumption complete

20. Ross 1995. 21. Tsebelis 1995a.

281 Intergovernmentalism by this time the relevantactors have exchangedconsiderableinformationprocedureand outsideit. behaviorunderthedecision-making bothbytheir believethatitis We also assumethattheactorsengagedin EU policymaking a notfeasible(at least in the shortrun) to reintroduce policyissue once it has thisassumpthe procedure.Indirectevidencesupports gone through relevant to rare foranypolicyinitiative end in a it tion. Most important, is extremely stalemate withno decisionreached.It is thusreasonableto analyzepolicymakplayerin a gamewillacceptproposals game inwhichthefinal ingas a one-shot to thatitprefers thestatusquo ante. efforts fail It is theoretically possible,ofcourse,forissueson whichlegislative of the possibility indefinite to be raised again in the future.Introducing iterationof these games complicatesmatters.One would have to analyze and theactorthat bargaining gamesbetweentheagenda setter noncooperative mustaccept or rejectthe agenda setter'sproposal.This actormustdetermine to whether rejecta proposalitprefers the statusquo ante in theexpectation to ofsecuring morefavorable a outcomein a subsequentplayof thegame.There in It difficult are unique equilibria to such games in theory.22 is extremely factors. One of on parameters the relevant however, put empirical to practice, governoutcomes involving of the most important determinants bargaining but mentsis likelyto be theirdomesticpolitical environments, the precise are bargaining notyetknown.23 effects domestic of conditions international on it framework, is the last two stagesof each EU decision Using thisanalytic makingprocess that are pivotal: which actor makes the finalproposal? to whom?underwhatvoting rules?We now addressthesequestionswithrespect procedures in the EU today: assent, to the four major decision-making and codecision. cooperation, consultation, The legacy of the Luxembourgcompromise governed decision Under the Luxembourgcompromisethat effectively makingin the EU fromat least 1966 until 1986, the Council of Ministers Though dominatedthe policymaking process. Figure 4 depictsthissituation. with the Commissionof the the formal rightto propose lay exclusively European Communities,proposals could only become law if they were in gave all the decisionsupportedunanimously the council.This effectively in the withthe least interest changing status making powerto the government bias in Council "lowestcommondenominator" quo. Therewas thusa powerful as and was slow,determined it deliberations thepace ofintegration accordingly member government was by the preferencesof the least integrationist 1 (government in Figure4).

22. Rubinstein 1982. 23. Evans,Jacobson, and Putnam1993.

Organization 282 International

Status under quo the Luxembourg compromise assent and

Winning proposal under codecision

Winning proposal under and consultation cooperation

and Commission Parliament European

Less integration
FIGURE

Moreintegration

in 4. Decision-makingprocedures andpolicyoutcomes theEuropean where 1-7 = govemments'preferred positions Union,

by In thecontemporary some issues are stilldominated lowestcommon EU, or First,the membergovernments denominator pressuresin the Council.24 in theirrepresentatives the Council of Ministers-actingunanimously-are for for the relationships, solelyresponsible revising EU's treaties, its external and for the new areas added to EU jurisdictionin the Maastrichttreaty policy and cooperationin justice and home (common foreignand security in of The dynamics decisionmaking theseareas are identicalto thatin affairs). the era of the Luxembourgcompromise.Second, some contentiouspolicy in but issues are decided unanimously the Council of Ministers on a proposal made by the Commission.These include indirecttaxation,exchange rate policyand environmenUnion,industrial paritiesforEconomicand Monetary fiscalmatters, tal issues concerning energypolicy,and land use. Since the the can amend all Commissionproposals unanimously, Council of Ministers has commission no agenda-setting powerwherethe councilvotesunanimously in (because itis just as easyto amendas to pass proposals).Policymaking these to to areas is thusagainlikely resultin outcomessimilar thosegenerated the by Luxembourg compromise. The final legacy of the Luxembourgcompromiseis more interesting. Numerousareas are coveredbythe assentprocedurein whichthe Council of Ministers votes on a Commission rule,subjectto proposal under a unanimity in These includeestablishing theassentofa majority theEuropean Parliament. citizenshiprights,the creation of cohesion funds to aid less-developed electoralrules forselectingmembersof the European Parliament, members, of and the accession of new members to the EU. The introduction a veto of Council decisions would seem to be' a significant parliamentary of comprodeparturefromthe pure intergovernmentalism the Luxembourg mise. However, so long as the median voter in the Parliament is more memberof the Council,it is clear than the least integrationist integrationist thatParliament notexerciseitsveto right. will
and Shackleton1992,203-5. 24. Jacobs,Corbett,

283 Intergovernmentalism it wherevoting theCouncilis byunanimity, is in In sum,in all thoseinstances reasonable to conceive of decision making in terms of the Luxembourg In compromise period and to ignorethe rolesplayedbyotherEU institutions. qualifiedmajority voting all the remaining areas of EU jurisdiction, however, of has been the rule of the day in the Council since the ratification the Single European Act. Below we demonstratethat the consequences of qualified betweenthe Council and the other majority voting varywiththe relationships relevant institutional actorsin the EU. Thus our analysisis morefine-grained of assumethatthespecifics thanmostneofunctionalist studies, whichimplicitly bearing thepace of on procedures haveno significant different decision-making integration. The consultationprocedure in proceduresare illustrated Figure5. The The threeEU decision-making votingin the simplestand oldest of the proceduresusing qualifiedmajority is Councilof Ministers theconsultation procedure(see thetop panel ofFigure was 5). It was elaborated in the Treaty of Rome, but its implementation procedure compromise. Today, the consultation blocked by the Luxembourg the of areas,including freemovement capital,competition appliesto numerous between the policy, and industrialsubsidies. The fundamentaldifference consultationprocedure and the Luxembourgcompromise(and the assent Commission proposalsbecome law iftheyare procedure)is thatin the former of members. majority CouncilofMinisters acceptedbya qualified of The consequences for policymaking the consultationprocedure are wants the voting, Commission delineatedin Figure4. Under qualifiedmajority to make the most pro-integrationist proposal that will be supportedby a in This coalitionis clearly34567. qualifiedmajority the Council of Ministers. 1 3 Moreover,government replaces government as the pivotalplayerin the will make the proposal that is closest to its ideal Council. The Commission 3 that to pointand thatgovernment prefers thestatusquo (and to all solutions in can defeatthestatusquo unanimously). Giventhepreference configurations would thusmake a proposaljust to the leftof the Figure4, the Commission by 3. 5, ideal pointofgovernment and thiswouldbe supported government The likelypolicy consequence of replacingthe Luxembourgcompromise will withthe consultation procedureis thatthe pace of integration increase. can Moreover, Recalcitrant governments be outvotedby a qualifiedmajority. the powerlies withtheCommission, pivotalplayerin giventhatagenda-setting the Council will not be able to set policy at its ideal point. Rather, the will propose a more pro-integrationist Commission policy-but one thatthe in the Council stillprefers the statusquo and hencewillvote to pivotalplayer forin thefinalstageoftheconsultation game.

Organization 284 International

CONSULTATION Commission: proposal Council (Council's "common position")
.... .

COOPERATION

Amend: unanimity
. . . .

ccept: QM Parliament: absolute majority

SQ
...

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .

~~~~ A~~~~~~melnI
Accept mC)

'~

1 Commission

Rejct Counciloverride:

Accept Council:QM

Reject
I

Councilovemde:unanimity

~~~~unanimity

lty

Accept SQcet

SQ

" common position

SQ

CODECISION

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .........................,

Committee Conciliation Council:QM absolute majority Parliament:

Agreetojointtext Council:QM Affirm common position majority Parliament: absolulte |Accept| FIGURE 5. SQ SQ

No jointtext

[legislation is passed vote QM: qualified majority SQ: billlapses

FromGarrett, in "DecisionMaking theEuropean Union."

Consultation, cooperation, codecision and

ElsevierScience Ltd., Garrett 1995withkindpermission from from Source. Reprinted UnitedKingdom. Kidlington,

The cooperation procedure The SEA introduced a new legislative procedure for the EU. Until the issues subjectto thiscooperationprocedure Maastricht, most important to were those pertaining the completionof the internalmarket(the "1992" agenda). Today,the cooperationprocedure(see Article189c of the Treatyon European Union) applies to a range of policy areas includingsocial policy of implementation opted out ofthisprovision), (althoughtheUnitedKingdom and a numberof regional funds,research and technologicaldevelopment, environmental issues.

285 Intergovernmentalism and between the consultation difference institutional The most important cooperation procedures is that the power of the European Parliamentis role it playsunder greaterin the latterthan the purelyadvisory significantly consultation(see the middle panel of Figure 5). Under this procedurethe European Parliamentgained "conditional agenda settingpower"; it may (which proposals.Iftheseare acceptedbytheCommission amendCommission the is thecase forthreeout offouramendments), proposalsare thenpresented them.25 for making difficult theCouncilto modify it to theCouncilofMinisters, The European Parliamentalso can reject proposals that are accepted by a can be in readingof a bill. This rejection qualifiedmajority the Council's first Council.In practice, however, poweris not this overridden only a unanimous by if than is verysignificant the Parliament more pro-integration anymemberof to the Council.A proposalthatis preferred the statusquo bythe Councilwill by invariably be preferred theParliament. also If the European Parliament's preferencesare similar to those of the the Commissionof the European Communities, policyconsequences of the cooperation procedure will be the same as those under the consultation will agree to make the most and the Parliament procedure.The Commission in majority the of proposalthatwillwinthesupport a qualified pro-integration to of Council.In thecontext Figure4, thisproposalwouldbe marginally theleft policythat ofgovernment ideal pointbecause thisis themostintegrationist 5's thepivotalgovernment prefers thestatusquo. 3 to innovations thecooperation of procedureand thefact Giventheinstitutional betweenthe market to thatit was centralto the effort completethe internal we of mid-1980suntilthe ratification the Maastrichttreaty, will examinein on thatrevealtheimpactofagenda setting some detailtwopieces oflegislation is case; the catalyticconverters policy outcomes. The first the well-known in of regulation prevailing the second pertainsto the system healthand safety EU. considerthe following Withrespectto catalytic quotationfrom converters, the authoritative work of Francis Jacobs, Richard Corbett, and Michael calculationsof the European Parliamentunder Shackletonon the strategic cooperation: can A good exampleof how theParliament use thesepowerswas whenin for 1989it consideredexhaustemissionstandards smallcars.Here, itwas it facedwitha Councilcommonpositionthatfellbelow thestandards supto thesestandards was keen on raising reading.Parliament portedin itsfirst the levelsequivalentto thoserequiredin,forinstance, USA and Sweden, concern, and itwas knownthatsome MemberStatessharedParliament's on committee the environin buthad been a minority Council.Parliament's thatwould restore menttherefore preparedsecond readingamendments to In was put on the Commission thehigher standards. the debate,pressure

25. Tsebelis 1994,136.

Organization 286 International vote.It was made tookitsfinal beforeParliament accepttheseamendments would insteadreject did clear thatiftheCommission notdo so, Parliament no wouldfallas therewas clearly and thelegislation thecommonposition, The Commission Parliament. the within Councilto overrule unanimity whichwere dulyincorporated amendments acceptedParliament's therefore in proposal.Councilthenhad threemonths whicheither intothereviewed (whichit or majority, to amenditbyunanimity to approveitbyqualified could notdo as at least threeMemberStates agreedwithParliament)or to as see it fall(whichit could notcountenance, thiswould have createdhavoc as market and uncertainty to what witha dividedinternal in thecar industry again). A reluctant to standards adapt to whilethewholeprocedurestarted incidentext(which, adopted the reviewed in majority Counciltherefore an smallcar purchaser extra?300 or so as a result, could cost every tally, in butwilllead to a majorimprovement theenvironment).26 The quotation providesa verbal account of the Parliament'sconditional power under the cooperation procedures and the strategic agenda-setting in this involved exercising power.Unlikethescenariowe envisaged calculations withthoseof the were notcongruent preferences in Figure4, the Parliament's betweenthese interaction an Commission and, as a result, additionalstrategic it is twoinstitutions discussed.Nonetheless, is clear thatthe typesof decision The in analysis. those anticipated our theoretical made in thiscase are exactly the was forcedto agree withthe Parliamentbecause otherwise Commission status quo would prevail. Then, the Council was forced to accept the to because of fearof reversion the status position, environmental Parliament's quo. protection of The outcomewas muchmoreadvancedin terms environmental in government the thanwas preferred not onlythe least environmentalist by Council but also probablyby its pivotalmember.What Jacobs,Corbett,and the is majority" essentially Shackletoncall adoptionof the textby"a reluctant 3 calculationof government in Figure4 (to accept a proposal at 5). strategic calculation. Note also that the empiricalrecordreportsno power-index-like proposal,and theParliament The Councilagendawas setbytheparliamentary selected its allies. Winnersand losers in the councilcould not in thiscase be of coalitions. calculations probabilistic some a priori deduced from health and concerning The second example involvesa series of directives safetyat work issues: the "Health and Safetyat Work" directive(89/391/ EEC), the "Machinery"directive(89/392/EEC), and the "Display Screen overshot the (90/270/EEC). In thisexample,legislation Equipment"directive extantpolicies in all memberstates. Volker Eichener concluded that "the at healthand safety work adopted thehighest definitety European Community He argued that level whichis to be foundamong the 12 Member States."27 because the underlyto regulations it sometimes is difficult comparedifferent
and Shackleton1992,186. 26. Jacobs,Corbett, 27. Eichener1993,6.

287 Intergovernmentalism is (for ingphilosophiesare different example,electricalsafety reachedbysafe but switches France). Nonetheless, in electricalutensilsin Germany by safety about hisoverallassessment: he was confident thereare some MemberStateswith To be sure,lookingat singleprovisions, regarding carsuch as Denmark'sregulations tighter regulations, somewhat timeat visual the working regarding cinogenoussubstances, Netherlands' But iflevelsof health radiation. regarding or displayterminals Germany's is and safety workcan be comparedat all, theoverallassessment thatthe at at a healthand safety workconceptwitha established coherent Community and at top whichis certainly thevery of theranking levelof protection levelsof all 12 Member whicheven appears to exceed theprotective
States.28

to GiandomenicoMajone argued that "it is difficult findequally Similarly, in of environment') thelegislation major advancedprinciples (like the'working inside and outside the EC. In orderto explainsuch countries, industrialized theories thepolicyprocessin the of we policyoutputs need new,moreanalytic of the arguments Eichener and Majone. With some Figure 6 summarizes the EU has tended to adopt more advanced legislationon each exceptions, the of issue than existsin anymemberstate. Consequently, combination EU A is provisions outsidethe Pareto set of its members. detailed accountof the outcome would yield very strategiccalculations that led to this surprising similar to insights those in the exhaustemissionscase.30The moreinteresting workplacehealth and safetyregulationasks whyit was question regarding thanthatin anymember to possibleforEuropean legislation be morestringent state. is There are two possible explanations.The first thatwhile the observed the existing of resultmay be outside the regulations the membercountries, in did regulations each country not comprisethe ideal pointof the individual in Accordingto thisaccount,each government governments these countries. but havewantedmoreadvancedregulation, each was unableor unwilling might of The institutions the EU solved the resulting to adopt it unilaterally. collectiveaction problem.We do not thinkthatthisis a plausible argument along the social because althoughcommonlegislation eliminates competition of the dimension within EU, it certainly imposesa heavyburdenon the ability to European products competeoutsidetheEU. of The second explanation comes from modification Figure4. Let thefirst a remainat the same points.But considera case in threemembergovernments are whichtheideal pointsoftheotherfourgovernments tightly packed around procedure(stillat point5) point4. In thiscase, theoutcomeofthecooperation
28. Ibid.,8. 29. Majone 1993. 30. Tsebelis 1994.

Community.'29

Organization 288 International Issue2

High

A Country

Europe

set Pareto (lnearcombination)

Low
Low FIGURE 6.

Country B
High

Issue1

states outside Paretosetofmember the Europeanregulation

This outcomeassumes is outsidethe Pareto set of the membergovernments. a 1 to thatgovernmentsand 2 wouldnotbe willing support Councilamendment can at at regulation point4 (recall thatthe Council of Ministers alwaysamend would leave the proposals unanimously),and hence their intransigence qualifiedmajority (34567) withno otherchoice but to accept point5. In this since it leads to the scenario,the behaviorof countries1 and 2 is "irrational" wouldbe better all members for of adoptionofpoint5 insteadofpoint4, which the Council. This behaviorcan be explained if one takes into account the 1 1 domestic politics gameofcountries and 2. It maybe thatgovernments and 2 increase in preferto be on the record as havingvoted down any significant the thanto decrease marginally level of regulation point5 to (from regulation measuresis very unpopularback home point4), because supportof regulatory If to eitherwithvotersor nationallegislators.31 countries1 and 2 prefer vote the the down any increasein regulation, restof the countriescannotmodify parliament's proposaland have no otherchoicebutto acceptpoint5. this The basic pointto be derived from exampleis that, giventheinstitutional of innovations the SEA, one should not be surprisedif outcomes of the legislative process sometimesare outside the Pareto set of membergovernof this ments.Under certainconfigurations government preferences, typeof
31. Tsebelis 1990.

289 Intergovernmentalism product-of the agenda-setting outcomewillbe the product-a verydramatic powers vested in the Commissionof the European Communitiesand the European Parliament. The codecision procedure The codecision A finaldecision-making procedurewas added at Maastricht. procedure(see article189b of the Treatyon European Union) replaces the of pertaining thecompletion theinternal to procedureformatters cooperation market.It also applies to various new areas of EU jurisdictionsuch as protection. education, culture, publichealth,and consumer in institutionally two The cooperation and codecision procedures differ criticalways (see the bottompanel of Figure 5). First,codecision greatly power of the Commission of the European reduces the agenda-setting do of The amendments legislation notgo Communities. European Parliament's back to the Commissionbefore theyare considered again by the Council. initiate a proposal if a conciliation Moreover, Parliament can effectively is committee convened(see below). the Second, the roles of the Council and the Parliamentare reversedfrom amendments the to cooperationprocedure.Under codecision,ifParliament's Council's "common position" (i.e., a Commissionproposal that won the in readingof a bill are of support a qualifiedmajority the Council) on the first in committee not acceptableto a qualifiedmajority the Council,a conciliation all is convened.If this committee(comprising membersof the Council and from Parliament)cannotagree to a joint the equal representation numerically to reverts the Council. In the finalstage of the text, proposalpowereffectively textofthelaw unlessan absolutemajority game,theCouncilproducesthefinal in theParliament vetoesit. What are the likelypolicy consequences of codecision? Let us begin by of and thatthestructure actors'preferences the statusquo are those assuming in Figure 4. The proposals that could be supportedby all three connected coalitions in the council-12345, 23456, and 34567-would clearly all be 34567can offer Of however, acceptedbytheParliament. thesethreecoalitions, thanthe othertwo.The finalsolutionwillthus a betterdeal to the Parliament Withrespectto theinternal be theone acceptedby34567 and the Parliament. that any solution acceptable to bargainingof coalition 34567, we know to 3 government (that is, any positionit prefers the statusquo) is a fortiori as of thecoalitionand to the Parliament acceptableto theotherfourmembers 35 well.This reduces the expectedoutcomesto the segment in Figure4. It is 4 thatit cannotaccept any conceivablethatgovernment willmake a statement is otheroutcomebut itsown ideal point.If thisstatement consideredcredible A 4 bytheothergovernments,willbe theoutcomeofthecodecisionprocedure. is 3 morereasonable assumption, however, thatgovernment has the effective power,and it willbe able to impose its will on the Council. It will bargaining

290 International Organization propose a policy at its ideal point. This will be accepted by the four In the to governments itsright. turn, Council'sproposalwillalso be acceptedby the willbe passed implementing ideal pointof the Parliament, and legislation 3. government in Thus, we should expect a crucial difference policy outputs between and cooperation, the one hand,and codecision,on the other. on consultation than anymemberof the Assumingthatthe Parliament more integrationist is Council and thatthe statusquo was achievedunderthe Luxembourg comprowill mise,the pace of European integration be slowerunder codecisionthan theolderprocedures. The reason forthisdifference the transfer agenda-setting is of powerfrom the Commissionand the Parliamentto the Council of Ministers.In the or makes consultation/cooperation endgame,the Commission the Parliament be proposalsto theCouncilthatcan only amendedunanimously. Government 3 so is pivotalin the Council,but itwill acceptproposalsto itsright longas they it are preferable the best amendment could make thatwould be acceptable to since the to all Council members(in Figure4, thereare no such amendments understand this statusquo is at government ideal point).The agenda setters l's of and thusproposea policy theright government ideal point.In contrast, to 3's the situation reversed is undercodecisionbecause agenda-setting powerrests withtheCouncil.Here, government effectively 3 controls and policyoutcomes, itwillthusbe able to determine pace ofEuropean integration. the This impliesthatcommoninterpretations the codecisionprocedureare of wrong.The fact that the parliamentgained an absolute veto over Council proposals is consideredby many to give the Parliamentconsiderably more influence overpolicythaneverbefore.Jacobs,Corbett,and Shackleton write thatthe codecisionprocedureis "essentially upgrading the cooperation an of procedure" and that "the rightto say 'no' gives Parliamenta bargaining lacked regarding positionwhichit has hitherto Community legislation." They concludethatthe"codecisionprocedureis thusan important, limited, but step forward Parliament'slegislative in powers" and that the "European Parliament'spowerswere increased... through introduction the codecision the of procedure."32 Neil Nugentadds that "The EP [European Parliament]is the mostobviousbeneficiary the SEA and TEU [Treatyon European Union] of for reforms, itis placed in a muchmoreadvantageous position pressurize to the Commission and theCouncilto acceptitsviews."33 Emile Noel, former secretary-general the Commissionof the European of Communities,concurs with this view of codecision. He claims that "in conferring considerablygreater powers on the European Parliament,the Maastricht Treatytipped the institutional balance," and that "as the MaastrichtTreaty provides the European Parliamentwith considerably greater
32. Jacobs,Corbett, and Shackleton1992,191,192,194,and 277,respectively. 33. Nugent1994,326.

291 Intergovernmentalism powers,its applicationwill graduallylead to a change in the institutional balance."34WilliamNicoll and TrevorSalmon add thatunderthe codecision a of procedure"the Parliamentalwayshas the possibility rejecting proposal process.The Maastricht of and so enjoysthe right veto in the decision-making rights."35 Treaty thusincreasesParliament's vetopowerundercodecisionwas gained at theexpense But theParliament's the to ofitsability influence Council'sagenda.Underthereasonablepreference policymaker analyzed here, the Parliamentis a less effective configurations and one shouldexpecttheintroducundercodecisionthanundercooperation, in newprocedureto put a brakeon thepace ofintegration tionofMaastricht's it the EU. Unfortunately, is not possible at this time to test this argument The codecision procedureonlycame into forceon 1 December empirically. 1993, and as yet there are no documentedaccounts of legislationpassed to pursuant it. two we of Beforeclosingour discussion codecision, would like to reconsider builtinto our analysis.First,recall thatwe have assumed of the assumptions This is compromise. thatthe statusquo was generatedunderthe Luxembourg reasonable for cases where new issue-areas are broughtunder EU entirely as jurisdiction, was the case at Maastrichtfor manymatterssubject to the for however, themajorarea under codecisionprocedure.It is not appropriate, codecision:the internalmarket.While the internalmarketprogramhas not and public been "completed" in a few notable cases (such as immigration procurement),the volume of legislation passed in this area under the been great.Bytheend of 1992,oversix procedurehas nonetheless cooperation hundred measures had been passed in this manner-double the number envisagedin the commission's1985 White Paper on the Completionof the Market.36 Internal reforms to it For theinternal market, seemsmoreappropriate discussfuture is in whichmuchof theenablinglegislation thatthestatusquo is one assuming becomes can the Council use the agendaalreadyin place. The questionnow settingpower to roll back this legislation? So long as the Parliament's than those of the Council, the answeris are preferences more integrationist We possible no. Figure7 depictsthissituation. assumethemostextreme clearly would ideal point.Parliament case-where thestatusquo is at theParliament's wouldmake.It is in thistype councilmajority vetoanyproposalthata qualified veto powerundercodecisionis important-it of scenariothatthe parliament's to legislation. to existing allowsParliament blockefforts dismantle than is A secondassumption-thattheParliament moreintegrationist all the in governments the Council-might also be relaxed. This assumptionis of members theEuropean Parliament possess to upon thefreedom contingent
34. Noel 1995 35. Nicoll and Salmon 1994,83. and Shackleton1992,193. 36. The whitepaper is citedin Jacobs,Corbett,

Organization 292 International

Luxembourg Status under quo to vulnerable compromise; codecision 3 governmentunder cooperation; Status under quo codecision under stable veto becauseofParliament's

European Parliament

Less integration

Moreintegration =

1-7 where procedure, the under codecision stability FIGURE 7. Policy positions preferred govemments'
proposal Winning under codecision

quo Status under cooperation

Parliament

Less integration

Moreintegration

and accountability theEuropeanParliament the of FIGURE 8. Theelectoral positions 1-7 where = governments'preferred codecision procedure, is this that of act independently theconstituencies electthem.In turn, freedom in of a function the generalpublic'sdisinterest politicsat the European level. Today, this is an entirelyreasonable assumption. Turnout in the 1994 electionswas verylow,and the mostintensecampaigns European Parliament in (mostnotably the United Kingdom)were dominatedbydomesticconsiderthanbyEU policyissues. ations,rather In the future, however,this situationcould change. As citizenscome to the maywelltake moreseriously they the understand poweroftheParliament, If divisionbetween thatgeneratesits members. the current electoralprocess political elites and the mass public continues-with the latterbeing more than the bulk of nationalpoliticiansskepticalabout European integration of one could envisagea scenarioin whichthe preferences the medianvoterin than those of come to be less integrationist the European Parliamentmight in governments theCouncilof Ministers. Figure 8 depictsthisscenario.Here we assume thatthe statusquo is very 7-but the Parliament at integrationist-say, the ideal point of government 1. than does government In this extremecase, it is prefersless integration the mostlikely, concerning internal possible thatsome European legislation, wouldbe determined of could be rolledback. The extent thisrollback market,

Intergovernmentalism 293 in of by the preferences the pivotalgovernment the Council under qualified 5 majority voting(government in thiscase). Government knowsthatit can 5 in proposeitsideal point, thatthiswillwina qualified majority theCouncil,and will thattheParliament also acceptit. Summary The fundamental purpose of thissectionhas been to show thatstudiesof on decision makingin the EU that focus exclusively dynamicswithinthe Council of Ministersare likelyto misperceivemost policy dynamics.The was Council-centric perspective justified duringthe Luxembourg compromise some issues today.But in these cases, period and stillis usefulforanalyzing of studies should not concentrate votingweightsbut on the preferences on member governments theability countries and of opposed to integration either to blockreforms extract or highpricesfortheiracquiescence. In all theremaining areas ofEU decisionmaking, lowestcommon denominatorpressuresdo not obtain. Moreover,one cannot analyzequalifiedmajority voting the Council without in knowing how the agenda on whichthe Council deliberatesis set. In areas decided under the consultation and cooperation procedures, pace of European integration likely be significantly the is to faster of thanunder a system nationalvetoes because of the agenda-setting powers Commissionand Parliament.Contrary to possessed by the pro-integration commonunderstandings, pace of integration likely slowerin policy the will be areas covered by the codecision procedure because agenda-setting power reverts the Council-at least where new issues-areasare legislatedunder to codecisionand so long as the policypreferences members the European of of Parliament detachedfrom are thoseoftheirconstituents.

Conclusion
In thisarticle, have presenteda generalcritiqueof intergovernmentalism we an from institutional pointofview.The traditional focusofintergovernmentalist attentionon treatybargainingonly analyses the tip of the iceberg and ignoresthe everyday realityof European integration. But incompleteness is onlya minorflawof the approach.The major problemis intergovernmentalism'spoor theoretical The modusoperandiof intergovernmentalfoundation. ism-that all important decisionsmade in Europe pertain treaties to and hence thatwe need to understandhow the treatiescame about-seems obvious. this Upon closerexamination, however, premiseconceals morethanit reveals. Froma strategic of of pointofview,the understanding the policyimplications different treaties a necessary is for pre-condition theselectionofone particular institutional structureby the foundingactors. Consequently,one cannot understand process of treaty the the adoptionwithout understanding (likely) policy consequencesof different possibletreaties.

Organization 294 International popular power increasingly A new variantof intergovernmentalism-the indexapproach-has triedto addressthisissue. However,because it relieson assumption-all decisions are productsof bargaining the same fundamental ratherthan at the treaty amongnations,thistimein the Council of Ministers table-power index analysis produces an inaccurate picture of European decision making. It has two fundamentallimitations.First, power index influence different of abouttheeffective conclusions come to mistaken analyses and thelikelihood coalitions of of outcomes, the countries, likelihood different that supportthese outcomesbecause such analysesignorethe policypreferin ences ofgovernments theCouncilof Ministers. Second, the power index approach-together with all other formsof of structure the EU. the intergovernmentalism-ignores actual institutional that different procedures,by givingthe power to We have demonstrated lead to actors, systematically propose and the power to veto to different of careful study cannotbe reachedwithout outcomes.This conclusion different processesinsidethe Council bargaining While informal the EU's institutions. we coalitions, have shownthatthecoalitions of Ministers maylead to different thatprevaildepend not onlyon policypositionsbut also on the institutional insidethe For example,coalitionformation of structure European procedures. cannotbe studiedin isolationundereitherthe consultaCouncil of Ministers tion or cooperationprocedure.It is the Commissionor the Parliamentthat makes a proposal to the Council,and thisproposal aims at the supportof the mostfavorable (fortheagenda setter)coalitioninsidetheCouncil.Even in the powersarevestedintheCouncilcodecision procedure-whereagenda-setting The Council has to select a in coalitionformation the Council is constrained. proposal that will not be rejected by the Parliament,and this restriction are of increasesthepowerof members the Councilwhose preferences close to thatare further and weakensthehand of themembers thoseoftheParliament away. mathematical whether sophisticated Whetherit is the old or the new form, is calculationsare presentor absent,the problemwithintergovernmentalism are Nationalgovernments not the onlyimportant not cosmeticbut congenital. decision makersin the EU. The Commissionof the European Communities roles.It is onlyby also playimportant legislative and theEuropean Parliament among these rules on the interactions of analyzingthe effects institutional day the institutions one can understand policiesthatare producedevery in that processitself. theEU and hence thenatureoftheintegration

Appendix have ideal pointsin space in Assumethatgovernments the Councilof Ministers and wantadoptedand implemented) circular of (combinations policiesthatthey

Intergovernmentalism 295

13

2N

3Wf>,fS2;

and W13 C W12C W2

FIGURE Al.

Win sets (W) ofgovernments 2, and 3, whereSQ= 1,

statusquo

indifference curves; that is, they are indifferent among points that have the same theirideal point. distancefrom to DEFINITION 1. Call thewinsetofthestatus quo with respect a setofpoints{i} thesetof to are pointsthat preferred thestatus quo byall i.
DEFINITION

of improved uponbyall members thecoalition.

COROLLARY.

2. The Pareto set of a coalition M is the set of outcomes that cannot be

idealpoints.

123 TheParetoset ofthree countries 2, 3 is thetriangle defined their 1, by

the closest side of the triangle;at least one of the threecountrieswill object to any of movement thestatusquo ifit is locatedinsidethetriangle. nonconnected coalitionswillnot form(the In orderto provethatin two dimensions The winset of quo (SQ) as in FigureAl. The winset of thestatusquo of 1 and 2 is W12.
the status quo for 1 and 3 iS W139 proposition in the text) we will startwith a series of lemmas. Consider three members on the same line having to agree on a movement of the status

The proof is simple: any point outside the triangle can be defeated by its projection on

296 International Organization

FIGURE

A2.

Winsets(W) ofgoverments 1, 2, and 3, where W13C W12C W12'

a subset W12. of

LEMMA

1 1. Ifpoints 2, and 3 are on a straight and 2 liesbetween and 3, then line, W13iS 1,

23SQ is smallerthanthesumoftheothertwosides, Proof. The side 3SQ ofthetriangle the and consequently distance3P3 is smallerthanthedistance2P2. of Considernowthreegovernments 2, 3 and thestatusquo SQ in theconfiguration 1, 2 quo, and FigureA2 wherecountry is locatedon theotherside ofline 13 thanthestatus 2' theprojection of2 on theline 13 lies between1 and 3.
LEMMA 2. Ifpoints 2,and 3 are noton a straight line,the 1, of projection 2 (2') on theline side 1 13 is between and 3, and thestatus W13 quo is locatedon theother of13 than2, then iS

a subset W12. of

Since 2 is on the otherside of 13 to Proof. According lemma 1, Wi3 is a subsetOf W12.the thanSQ, thecirclearound2 intersects circlearound1 at thesymmetric pointofSQ the W12' is a awayfrom line 13. Consequently (withrespectto line 12) whichis further subsetOfW12.The lemmafollows transitivity. by

isa subset W4. of

LEMMA

the 3. For anythree 123, point4 locatedinside triangle Wi23 points1, 2, 3, and any

two parts.(1) If SQ belongsin the Pareto set (is located Proof. The proofcomprises is because thewinset ofthethreepoints insidethetriangle 123), theproposition trivial, to is bydefinition (2) empty. IfSQ does notbelong. theParetoset (is locatedoutsidethe

Intergovernmentalism 297

side assume loss (without ofgenerality one 123) at triangle then least sideofthetriangle 2. of the 4 quo 13),thestatus andpoint willfollow assumptions lemma Consequently, of matter translation. 123 1 propositionin thecase ofcoalition is a simple Proving a thatexcludes is coalition a coalition that The readeris reminded nonconnected because A2 123 set. in belonging itsPareto In Figure coalition isnonconnected, member is there is lemma claims that 3 set. in belongs itsPareto What point which 4, itexcludes also. overthe statusquo that4 does not prefer that1, 2, and 3 prefer nothing be 4 if preferences,cannot vote Consequently, governments on the basis of policy 123. from coalition Or, the excluded not andwill form.
coalition 123 is nonconnected is positions, PROPOSITION 0. When voting based on policy and is it In W13 a subsetof W14. addition, is alwaysthe case thatW123 a subsetof W13; is D of W14 a subset W4. is

Ifa point is in is three in than points straightforward. Generalizationthecaseofmore j that in be then thePareto ofa polygon, itwill included at leastone triangle canbe set of the and of formed connecting oftheangles thepolygon, since coalition these three by of of is the (excluding members nonconnected, coalition themembers thepolygon three with In member has the same preferences the j j) is also nonconnected. addition, three coalition); more restricted member of with members thepolygon (sinceitagrees be for itcannot excluded thecoalition. consequently, do nonconnected coalitions not positions, basedonpolicy voting PROPOSITION 1. When form. in the 1 of the Although proof propositionwas presented twodimensions, arguments of of dimensions theissue-space. of canbe replicated regardless thenumber underlying

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