Remedial Law Review I Case Digests in Rules 37, 40-45, 38 and 47 Rule 37 Motion for New Trial/Reconsideration 1.

Mendezona v. Ozamis G.R. No. 43370. February 6, 2002 Facts: Petitioners are relatives of Carmen Ozamis with whom they entered into a Contract of Sale, for consideration, over 3 parcels of land in Lahug, Cebu City. They filed an action to quiet title of a cloud over their properties by reason an inscription of notice of lis pendens caused by the guardians appointed for Carmen Ozamiz through guardianship proceedings (Sp. Proc. No. 1250). Respondents opposed the petitioners claim of ownership of the Lahug property and alleged that the titles issued in the petitioners names are defective and illegal, and the ownership of the said property was acquired in bad faith and without value inasmuch as the consideration for the sale is grossly inadequate and unconscionable. The trial court found the sale valid, and such decision was appealed to the CA who reversed the former. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the appellate court. Subsequent thereto, the petitioners filed a motion for a new trial and/or for reception of evidence. They contended, among other things, that the appellate court totally ignored the testimony of Judge Teodorico Durias regarding the mental condition of Carmen Ozamiz a month before the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale in question, which testimony was taken in the Sp. Proc. No. 1250. However, Judge Durias was not presented as a witness in the action to quiet title. Petitioners alleged that Judge Duriass testimony is a newly-discovered evidence which could not have been discovered prior to the trial in the court below by the exercise of due diligence. Issue: WON the testimony of Judge Durias is a newlydiscovered evidence. Held: No, it is not a newly-discovered evidence. A motion for new trial upon the ground of newly discovered evidence is properly granted only where there is concurrence of the following requisites, namely: (a) the evidence had been discovered after trial; (b) the evidence could not have been discovered and produced during trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; and
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(c) the evidence is material and not merely corroborative, cumulative or impeaching and is of such weight that if admitted, would probably alter the result. All three (3) requisites must characterize the evidence sought to be introduced at the new trial. We find that the requirement of reasonable diligence has not been met by the petitioners. As early as the pre-trial of the case at bar, the name of Judge Durias has already cropped up as a possible witness for the defendants, herein respondents. That the respondents chose not to present him is not an indicia per se of suppression of evidence, since a party in a civil case is free to choose who to present as his witness. Neither can Judge Durias testimony in another case be considered as newly discovered evidence since the facts to be testified to by Judge Durias which were existing before and during the trial, could have been presented by the petitioners at the trial below. The testimony of Judge Durias has been in existence waiting only to be elicited from him by questioning. It has been held that a lack of diligence is exhibited where the newly discovered evidence was necessary or proper under the pleadings, and its existence must have occurred to the party in the course of the preparation of the case, but no effort was made to secure it. Thus, the testimony of Judge Durias cannot be considered as newly discovered evidence to warrant a new trial. 6. People v. Li Ka Kim G.R. No. 148586, May 25, 2004 Facts: Li Ka Kim alias Ed, a Chinese national without proper immigrant documents, was convicted of drug dealing by the trial court and was sentenced the penalty of death. Thereafter, appellant filed a motion to remand the case for new trial, citing Section 14, Rule 121, of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, because of newly discovered evidence, i.e., his passport which would establish his true identity as Huang Xiao Wei, a Chinese National, and as having entered the Philippines as a tourist. Invoking his constitutional right to an effective counsel, appellant chides his former counsel for having failed to secure and present his travel documents. Issue: WON his passport is a newly-discovered evidence. Held: No, the passport is not a newly-discovered evidence.

The requisites of newly discovered evidence in order to justify a new trial are that - (a) the evidence is discovered after trial; (b) such evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; and (c) the evidence is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative, or impeaching, and of such weight that, if admitted, would likely change the judgment. Not one of the requisites mentioned is attendant. Appellants passport could have easily been presented and produced during the trial. Then, too, the presentation of appellants passport, would hardly be material to the outcome of the case. Appellant was positively identified by the prosecution witnesses as being the perpetrator of the crime. Most importantly, appellant even identified himself as Li Ka Kim at the trial and not as Huang Xiao Wei,that bolsters the conclusion that appellant deliberately concealed his true identity in the nefarious enterprise. 8. Philippine Phosphate Fertilizer Corp. v. CIR G.R. No. 141973, June 28, 2005 Facts: Petitioner is an EPZA-registered corporation and seeks the refund of excise taxes it paid by way of petroleum products from Petron. In its claim for refund from the CTA, the body denied such refund by reason of lack of proper invoices in its evidence. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration alleging that it failed to submit invoices because it thought that the presentation of said invoices was not necessary to prove the claim for refund, since petitioners previous claims, in CTA Case Nos. 4654, 4993 and 4994, involving similar facts, were granted by the CTA even without the presentation of invoices. CTA denied the MR because of the effectivity of CTA Circular No. 1-95 requiring such invoices to be presented for refunds, that bound said transactions already. Petitioner sought to present the invoices as additional evidence. The CTA denied such motion, saying that the prayer to present additional evidence partakes of the nature of a motion for new trial under Section 1 Rule 37. It has already been emphasized in several cases that failure to present evidence already existing at the time of trial does not warrant the grant of a new trial because said evidence can no longer be considered newly discovered but is more in the nature of forgotten evidence. Neither can such inadvertence on the part of the counsel to present said evidence qualify as excusable negligence.
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Issue: WON the subject invoices can be presented as additional evidence. Held: Yes the invoices can be presented as additional evidence. The SC adopted the dissenting opinion of CTA Justice Ernesto Acosta, to wit: The reason advanced by the Petitionerthat they thought the presentation by the Manager of Petron Corporation of a duly notarized certification (supporting the schedules of invoices), coupled with testimonies of witness, Mrs. Sylvia Osorio of Petron Corporation, are enough to prove their case could easily fall under the phrase "mistake or excusable negligence" as a ground for new trial under Sec. 1(a) of Rule 37 and not under the phrase "newly discovered evidence" as stated in our said resolution. The denial of this motion is too harsh considering that this case is only civil in nature, govern (sic) merely by the rule on preponderance of evidence. It is true that petitioner could not move for new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence because in order to have a new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence. This does not mean however, that petitioner is altogether barred from having a new trial. As pointed out by Judge Acosta, the reasons put forth by petitioner could fall under mistake or excusable negligence. The "mistake" that is allowable in Rule 37 is one which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against. Negligence to be "excusable" must also be one which ordinary diligence and prudence could not have guarded against and by reason of which the rights of an aggrieved party have probably been impaired. The test of excusable negligence is whether a party has acted with ordinary prudence while transacting important business. In this case, it cannot be said that petitioner did not act with ordinary prudence in claiming its refund with the CTA, in light of its previous cases with the CTA which did not require invoices and the non-mandatory nature of CTA Circular No. 1-95.

9. Fernandez v. CA G.R. No. 131094, May 16, 2005 Facts: Petitioner Fernandez was the defendant in an unlawful detainer case filed before the MeTC, where decision was in his favor. Private respondent Olivares appealed his case before the RTC who reversed the decision. Petitioner filed an MR which was denied and thereafter, he filed a Motion to extend period to file Petition for Review before the CA, which was granted. In the meantime, Petitioner filed a Motion for New Trial, before the RTC of Manila, citing newly discovered evidence of receipts proving his rental payments. In view of his Motion for New Trial, Fernandez, thru counsel, filed on 29 December 1994 in the Court of Appeals a Motion to Withdraw his Petition For Review which the court duly noted in its resolution dated 19 January 1995. In an Order dated 06 February 1995, the RTC denied the Motion for New Trial. It explained that when Fernandez went to the Court of Appeals and filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for Review, and the Court of Appeals accordingly acted on the same by granting the extension sought, jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over the parties and the subject matter had already attached. Issues: WON the mere filing by petitioner of a motion for extension to file petition for review, which was later withdrawn, automatically divested the RTC of its jurisdiction over the case, as to entertain a Motion for New Trial; WON the motion for new trial should be given due course. Held: CA has not acquired jurisdiction over the case. With regards the jurisdiction of an appellate court, additional rules are required for jurisdiction to attach therein, to wit: (1) the petitioner must have invoked the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals within the time for doing so; (2) he must have filed his petition for review likewise within the time for doing so; (3) he must have paid the necessary docket fees; and (4) the other parties must have perfected their appeals in due time. The Rule requires that in an appeal by way of Petition For Review, the appeal is deemed perfected as to the petitioner upon the timely filing of the petition and the payment of docket and other lawful fees. Thus, it may be argued, and rightly so, that the Court of Appeals has not yet acquired jurisdiction over the case because
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Fernandez merely filed a motion for extension of time to file petition but not the petition itself. Withal, sans the petition, it cannot be said that the Court of Appeals has acquired jurisdiction over the case as to say that the trial court is without authority to act on a motion for new trial. On this point we fully agree in the position taken by Fernandez that when he filed the motion for extension of time to file petition for review, jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals had not yet attached, such that his failure to file the petition itself would normally have the effect of rendering the decision of the lower court final and executory. What is the legal effect of the filing of Fernandez of the motion for new trial before the trial court? The residual jurisdiction of the trial court is available at a stage in which the court is normally deemed to have lost jurisdiction over the case or the subject matter involved in the appeal. This stage is reached upon the perfection of the appeals by the parties or upon the approval of the records on appeal, but prior to the transmittal of the original records or the records on appeal. Considering that no appeal was perfected in this case and the records of the case have not yet been transmitted to the Court of Appeals, the case has not as yet attained the residual jurisdiction stage so as to say that the trial court already lost the jurisdiction it first acquired and that it is left with only its residual powers. Thereby, we hold that the trial court still had jurisdiction to rule on the matter as the jurisdiction it originally acquired had not yet been lost, assuming that Fernandez filed his motion for new trial on time. Motion for New Trial must be denied having been filed out of time. Fernandez received a copy of the RTC Decision on 28 June 1994. Fourteen (14) days after the receipt of the decision or specifically on 12 July 1994, he filed a motion for reconsideration. This motion was denied by the RTC and the Order of denial was received by Fernandez on 29 November 1994. Applying Rule 37, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Court, he had only one (1) day left to file a motion for new trial since a motion for new trial should be filed within the period to appeal, that is, within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment. The motion for new trial suspends the running of the period to appeal but does not extend the time within which an appeal must be perfected. Hence if denied, a movant, like Fernandez in this case has only the balance of the reglementary period within which to appeal. He filed a motion for reconsideration

fourteen (14) days after receipt of the decision. The motion was denied and he had only the remaining one (1) day to file a motion for new trial which day fell on 01 December 1994. Since 30 November 1994 was a holiday, Fernandez had up to 01 December 1994 to file the motion for new trial. Extant from the records, instead of a motion for new trial, he filed before the Court of Appeals on 01 December 1994 the motion for extension of time to file petition for review. Thereafter, and pending the resolution of his motion before the Court of Appeals, Fernandez went back to the RTC and filed on 09 December 1994 a motion for new trial. Applying the foregoing, Fernandez's motion for new trial was filed out of time. Period to file Motion for New Trial is non-extendible. The fifteen (15)-day period for filing a motion for new trial cannot be extended. As early as the case of Habaluyas v. Japzon, cited in Naguiat v. IAC motions for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration may no longer be filed before all courts, lower than the Supreme Court. The rule in Habaluyas applies even if the motion is filed before the expiration of the period sought to be extended because the fifteen (15) days period for filing a motion for new trial or reconsideration with said court is nonextendible. Thus, motions for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration may be filed only in connection with cases pending before the Supreme Court, which may in its sound discretion either grant or deny the extension requested. Rule 40-45 Appeals 2. JMM Promotion & Mngmt. V. CA G.R. No. 139401, October 2, 2002 Facts: Petitioner is an agency which deployed private respondents to Korea as entertainers. However, PRs were not able to complete their contract because such was ended/rescinded by their Korean employers before the period was terminated, which they contend was because of the inclusion of a certain Ms. Flores as the singer of the band. Upon their return to the country, they filed with the POEA an illegal dismissal case and money claim for the unfinished employment contract against petitioner. They claimed that petitioner was mainly responsible for their aborted stint as a band in Seoul, Korea. The last-minute replacement of Domatican with Flores, a singer of allegedly
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questionable talent, resulted in the bands poor performance. This, in turn, led to the premature termination of the bands contract. Petitioner denied any liability or responsibility for the untimely termination of private respondents employment contract. The POEA and NLRC decided for the PRs, thus petitioner raised their case through certiorari under Rule 65 to the CA. The CA affirmed the findings of fact and the decision of the NLRC. Petitioner argues that the Court of Appeals erroneously sustained the findings of fact of the NLRC and files this petition for review on certiorari to the SC. Issue: WON petition for review on certiorari is proper. Held: Petitioners arguments border on despair. As an overture, clear and unmistakable is the rule that the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. Just as well entrenched is the doctrine that pure issues of fact may not be the proper subject of appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court as this mode of appeal is generally confined to questions of law. We therefore take this opportunity again to reiterate that only questions of law, not questions of fact, may be raised before the Supreme Court in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. This Court cannot be tasked to go over the proofs presented by the petitioners in the lower courts and analyze, assess and weigh them to ascertain if the court a quo and the appellate court were correct in their appreciation of the evidence. We note that petitioners arguments are based on factual and evidentiary matters which the Supreme Court does not inquire into in an appeal on certiorari. The issues propounded by petitioner involve only questions of fact previously raised and satisfactorily ruled upon by the courts a quo. Moreover, it is a time-honoured rule that "the factual findings of the Court of Appeals are conclusive on the parties and not reviewable by the Supreme Court and they carry even more weight when the Court of Appeals affirms the factual findings of the trial court." Any exception to these principles, as set forth in the case of Ramos v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. must be clearly and convincingly proven. Petitioner, however, failed to prove that this case falls within the exception. Nonetheless, we find it necessary to discuss the issue of validity of the quitclaims. We have time and again held that quitclaims, waivers and/or complete releases

executed by the employees do not stop them from pursuing their claims arising from unfair labor practice - if there is a showing of undue pressure or duress. 4. Tres Reyes v. Maxims Tea House G.R. No. 140853, February 27, 2003 Facts: Petitioner was a driver for the respondent. While in the course of his duties, a truck without brakes crashed into the van he was driving, causing injuries and damages. Respondent terminated him, citing this cause. Aggrieved, petitioner filed with the LA a complaint for illegal dismissal, which the LA denied. Filing a Motion for Partial Reconsideration with the NLRC, which considered the motion as an appeal, the NLRC reversed the LA and found that there was illegal dismissal in the case. The respondent filed a SCA for Certiorari to the CA against the decision of the NLRC. The CA found for the respondent, stating that the motion should not have been considered an appeal for it lacked formalities; and that there was proper factual finding of negligence on the part of petitioner to cause his dismissal. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari under to the SC, citing errors of the CA. Issue: WON CAs decision was correct; WON the SC may resolve whether or not there was negligence on the part of the petitioner for him to be validly be terminated. Held: The petition is with merit. Respondents argue that petitioner has to comply with the requisites for perfection of an appeal. Petitioner insists that his pleading was in form a motion for reconsideration, but in substance it was an appeal which complied with all the technical requirements. Respondents counter that the formal requisites take precedence. Despite findings of the CA and the arguments of the respondent. The Supreme Court found sufficiency in the compliance with the requirements of appeal in the said motion for partial reconsideration, to consider it an appeal. First, the pleading contained the date when the LA decision was received and the date when the pleading was filed in accordance with the reglementary period. Second, against the finding of the CA, the pleading was in fact verified. Lastly, the proper fees for filing of the appeal was paid, not in accordance with the finding of the CA.
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Respondents counter that the factual findings of the Labor Arbiter showing gross negligence on petitioners part were correctly upheld by the Court of Appeals as these were based on the Labor Arbiters independent evaluation of the evidence before him. Thus, they add, said findings are final and conclusive. The issue of whether a party is negligent is a question of fact. As a rule, the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts and this applies with greater force in labor cases. But where the findings of the NLRC and the Labor Arbiter are contradictory, as in this case, the reviewing court may delve into the records and examine for itself the questioned findings. Our perusal of the records shows that the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter primarily involved the submission of position papers by the parties. No trialtype hearing was conducted at all by the Labor Arbiter. Thus, the finding of the Court of Appeals that the latter was in a better position to evaluate the evidence as he had the better opportunity to observe the demeanor of the parties at the hearing has no leg to stand on. Moreover, based on the police traffic accident investigation report, we are convinced that the accident was the fault of the ten-wheeler trucks driver. On seeing the signal light change to red, this driver stepped on his brake, not just once but three times, but his truck could not stop. Since the truck was on the wrong lane, petitioners van, which was in its proper lane with the green light, smashed into the out-ofcontrol truck. To hold that petitioner was grossly negligent under the circumstances goes against the factual circumstances shown. It appears to us he was more a victim of a vehicular accident rather than its cause. There being no clear showing that petitioner was culpable for gross negligence, petitioners dismissal is illegal. It was error for the Court of Appeals to reverse and set aside the decision of the NLRC. Rule 38 Petition for Relief from Judgment 3. Mesina v. Meer G.R. No. 146845, July 2, 2002 Facts: This is a land titles case where herein respondent found out at some time that the land he is owning is registered in anothers name. After having a notice lis pendens annotated on the title in the RD, the property was registered in favor of herein petitioners who are innocent purchasers of said land. Respondent sought

the cancellation of such TCTs in the name of petitioners in the MeTC, where he lost because it was adjudged that the petitioners had better right over the property. Respondent appealed decision to the RTC, who reversed the MeTC. Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the ruling of the Regional Trial Court in a Resolution dated May 10, 2000. On July 17, 2000 and after reglementary period for appeal has lapsed, petitioners filed a Petition for Relief from Judgment and prayed that the Court of Appeals set aside its Resolution dated May 10, 2000. Issue: WON the CA can hear the petition for relief case filed before it. Held: After careful examination of the case, we resolve to deny the petition. Under the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, the petition for relief must be filed within sixty (60) days after the petitioner learns of the judgment, final order or other proceeding to be set aside and must be accompanied with affidavits showing the fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence relied upon, and the facts constituting the petitioners good and substantial cause of action or defense, as the case may be. Most importantly, it should be filed with the same court which rendered the decision, viz: "Section 1. Petition for relief from judgment, order, or other proceedings.When a judgment or final order is entered, or any other proceeding is thereafter taken against a party in any court through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, he may file a petition in such court and in the same case praying that the judgment, order or proceeding be set aside." As revised, Rule 38 radically departs from the previous rule as it now allows the Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Court which decided the case or issued the order to hear the petition for relief. Under the old rule, petition for relief from the judgment or final order of municipal trial courts should be filed with the regional trial court. Petitioners argue that apart from this change, the present Rule extends the remedy of relief to include
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judgments or orders of the Court of Appeals since the Rule uses the phrase "any court". We disagree. The procedural change in Rule 38 is in line with Rule 5, prescribing uniform procedure for municipal and regional trial courts and designation of municipal/metropolitan trial courts as courts of record. While Rule 38 uses the phrase "any court", it refers only to municipal/metropolitan and regional trial courts. The procedure in the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court are governed by separate provisions of the Rules of Court and may, from time to time, be supplemented by additional rules promulgated by the Supreme Court through resolutions or circulars. As it stands, neither the Rules of Court nor the Revised Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals25 allow the remedy of petition for relief in the Court of Appeals. Relief from judgment is an equitable remedy and is allowed only under exceptional circumstances and only if fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence is present. Where the defendant has other available or adequate remedy such as a motion for new trial or appeal from the adverse decision, he cannot avail himself of this remedy. It is a settled rule that relief will not be granted to a party who seeks to be relieved from the effects of the judgment when the loss of the remedy at law was due to his own negligence, or a mistaken mode of procedure; otherwise, the petition for relief will be tantamount to reviving the right of appeal which has already been lost either because of inexcusable negligence or due to mistaken mode of procedure by counsel. 7. Mercury Drug v. CA G.R. No. 138571. July 13, 2000 Facts: Plaintiffs Yee, now private respondents filed a complaint for annulment and reformation of the contract of lease it entered into with defendant corp, now petitioner. On 28 February 1995, the lower court rendered judgment against plaintiffs case. The former counsel for the petitioners Atty. Willkom received a copy of the decision on 3 March 1995 but did not inform petitioners nor take any step to protect the interests of his clients by presenting a motion for reconsideration or taking an appeal. Petitioners learned of the judgment only on 24 March 1995 when they

visited his office. The 15-day period within which to appeal lapsed. On 15 May 1995 petitioners filed thru their present counsel a petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38. The lower court denied the petition. Aggrieved by the Order of the RTC, the spouses Eduardo and Carmen Yee, the herein respondents, appealed to the Court of Appeals, which granted their Petition and set aside the order of the RTC. Hence this petition where the petitioner, Mercury Drug Corp. raises the following issues: Issue: WON the Court of Appeals erred in reckoning the sixty-day period to file the Petition for Relief from judgment from the date of actual receipt by Respondents of a copy of the decision of the trial court and not from the date of receipt thereof by their counsel. Held: The petitioner contends that the respondents petition for relief from judgment failed to comply with the requirements of the Rules of Court inasmuch as the petition was filed more than sixty days from the receipt by their lawyer of the decision of the RTC. Petitioner argues that it is long established by jurisprudence that notice to the counsel is binding upon the client and that the client is bound by the mistakes of his lawyer. The threshold issue to be resolved in this present petition is whether the YEES timely filed their petition for relief. After a careful analysis of the issues presented for consideration, we rule in the negative and find the petition impressed with merit. Nature of Petition for Relief Equitable Remedy A petition for relief from judgment is an equitable remedy that is allowed only in exceptional cases when there is no other available or adequate remedy. When a party has another remedy available to him, which may be either a motion for new trial or appeal from an adverse decision of the trial court, and he was not prevented by fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence from filing such motion or taking such appeal, he cannot avail himself of this petition. In order for a petition for relief to be entertained by the court, the petitioner must satisfactorily show that he has faithfully and strictly complied with the provisions of Rule 38. It is also incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the said petition was filed within the reglementary period specified in Section 3, Rule 38 (within sixty (60) days after the petitioner learns of the judgment, final order, or other proceeding to be set
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aside, and not more than six (6) months after such judgment or final order was entered, or such proceeding was taken). And the rule is that the reglementary period is reckoned from the time the partys counsel receives notice of the decision for notice to counsel of the decision is notice to the party for purposes of Section 3 of Rule 38. In the present case, the YEES were served a copy of the judgment of the lower court through their counsel, Atty. Willkom on March 3, 1995. Thus, the YEES are considered to have received notice on March 3, 1995 when their counsel was served notice and not on March 24, 1995 when they actually learned of the adverse decision. Consequently, their petition for relief, which was filed on May 15, 1995 or over sixty days from notice of their counsel, was filed out of time. This Court has consistently held that the failure of a partys counsel to notify him on time of the adverse judgment to enable him to appeal therefrom is negligence, which is not excusable. However, notice sent to counsel of record is binding upon the client and the neglect or failure of counsel to inform him of an adverse judgment resulting in the loss of his right to appeal is not a ground for setting aside a judgment valid and regular on its face. Rule 47 Annulment of Judgement 1. Durisol Phils v. CA G.R. No. 121106 : February 20, 2002 (Petition of AJ barred by laches) Facts: Petitioner Durisol obtained loans from respondent Development Bank of the Phils (DBP), which it secured by mortgage over 2 parcels of land, whose titles were surrendered to DBP. Upon default of petitioner, DBP filed a petition for extra-judicial foreclosure of the mortgage. Meanwhile, petitioner, through its president, borrowed the TCTs purportedly to obtain new titles in accordance with the new subdivision plan of the properties. DBP gave the TCTs to them. The properties were foreclosed with DBP as the highest bidder. Petitioner filed a complaint for annulment of the foreclosure but such was dismissed by the trial court. Meanwhile the titles were not given back by petitioner, thus respondents filed an action to surrender TCTs covering subject properties against Durisol in the RTC. Petitioner filed its answer and decision was rendered in favor of respondent. Petitioner appealed the decision to the CA who affirmed the decision. After a period of hearing, judgment was ultimately rendered for respondent DBP.

More than four years later, or on September 2, 1994, petitioner instituted before the Court of Appeals a petition to annul the trial courts decision dated January 10, 1989 and Resolution dated April 4, 1990, alleging for the first time that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the case. The CA denied said petition, thus recourse to the SC. Issues: WON the trial court had jurisdiction over the petition for issuance of new duplicate owners certificate of title; and WON petitioner was estopped from challenging the courts lack of jurisdiction. Held: At the outset, it should be stressed that in a petition for annulment of judgment based on lack of jurisdiction, petitioner must show not merely an abuse of jurisdictional discretion but an absolute lack of jurisdiction. Lack of jurisdiction means absence of or no jurisdiction, that is, the court should not have taken cognizance of the petition because the law does not vest it with jurisdiction over the subject matter. The RTC is a court of general jurisdiction; but it is also a court of limited jurisdiction over, among others, cadastral and land registration cases. All proceedings involving title to real property, or specifically land registration cases, including its incidents such as the issuance of owners duplicate certificate of title, are matters cognizable by the regional trial courts. It has been ruled that the regional trial courts have jurisdiction over all actions involving possession of land, except forcible entry and illegal detainer. Even assuming arguendo that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the surrender of duplicate title, petitioner can no longer raise this ground after having actively participated in the prosecution of the case. A judgment rendered by a trial court for alleged lack of jurisdiction cannot be considered void where the party who has the right to challenge it failed to do so at the first instance. In the case at bar, petitioner did not raise the defense of lack of jurisdiction in its answer to respondent DBPs petition for surrender of owners duplicate certificate. Neither did petitioner file any motion to dismiss on this ground. On the contrary, petitioner raised the affirmative defenses of failure to state a cause of action and payment. To be sure, a courts lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter and the failure of the complaint to state a cause of action are distinct and separate grounds for dismissal of a case.
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As stated, petitioner actively participated in the course of the proceedings both in the trial court and in the appellate court. In its motion for reconsideration, petitioner assailed the merits of the decision without raising any argument pertaining to lack of jurisdiction of the trial court. When the case was elevated to the IAC and when the case was remanded to the trial court, petitioner did not allege lack of jurisdiction. In its motion for reconsideration of the trial courts order directing the issuance of new certificates of title, petitioner again failed to raise the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Indeed, it was only two decades after the institution of the case at bar, when the issue of lack of jurisdiction was first raised. However, it is already too late since the judgment had already attained finality, considering that more than four years have elapsed without any action from petitioner. Rule 47, Section 3 expressly provides that a petition for annulment of judgment based on lack of jurisdiction must be filed before it is barred by laches or estoppel. Hence, it has been held that while jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case may be raised at any time of the proceedings, this rule presupposes that laches or estoppel has not supervened. 3. Rexton Realty Group 128412, March 15, 2002 v. CA G.R. No.

Facts: On August 17, 1989, petitioner Rexlon Realty Group, Inc. (Rexlon, for brevity) entered into an agreement with respondent David for the purchase of the said two (2) parcels of land as evidenced by a document denominated as "Absolute Deed of Sale". On February 18, 1994, David filed with the Regional Trial Court a petition for the issuance of owners duplicate copies of TCT Nos. T-72537 and T-72538 to replace the owners duplicate copies which were allegedly lost. The RTC, after due notice and hearing, issued an order for the issuance of new titles to David. Respondent David subsequently executed on September 20, 1994, a deed of sale of the subject parcels of land in favor of Paramount. Petitioner Rexlon then filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for annulment of the said Decision of the trial court on the ground that respondent David allegedly employed fraud and deception in securing the replacement owners duplicate copies of the subject TCTs; that there was absence of due process; and, that the decision of the trial court was tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. public

respondent CA rendered a decision dismissing the petition of petitioner Rexlon, thus this petition. Issue: WON judgment of RTC should be annulled on the ground of fraud and lack of jurisdiction. Held: The SC ruled that there is no extrinsic fraud in this case to annul judgment but there is lack of jurisdiction, such that the judgment or order must be annulled. The Court is presented in the case at bar with the issue of whether such misrepresentation or fraud of respondent David can be characterized as extrinsic fraud so as to merit the annulment of the trial courts decision granting respondent Davids petition for the issuance of new owners duplicate certificates of title. Extrinsic fraud contemplates a situation where a litigant commits acts outside of the trial of the case, "the effect of which prevents a party from having a trial, a real contest, or from presenting all of his case to the court, or where it operates upon matters pertaining, not to the judgment itself, but to the manner in which it was procured so that there is not a fair submission of the controversy." The overriding consideration is that the fraudulent scheme of the prevailing litigant prevented a party from having his day in court. Hence, the Court has held that extrinsic fraud is present in cases where a party (1) is deprived of his interest in land, because of a deliberate misrepresentation that the lots are not contested when in fact they are; (2) applies for and obtains adjudication and registration in the name of a co-owner of land which he knows has not been allotted to him in the partition; (3) intentionally conceals facts and connives with the land inspector, so that the latter would include in the survey plan the bed of a navigable stream; (4) deliberately makes a false statement that there are no other claims; (5) induces another not to oppose an application; (6) deliberately fails to notify the party entitled to notice; or (7) misrepresents the identity of the lot to the true owner, causing the latter to withdraw his opposition. Fraud, in these cases, goes into and affects the jurisdiction of the court; thus, a decision rendered on the basis of such fraud becomes subject to annulment. In Straight Times, Inc. v. CA, the Court held: It is well-settled that the use of forged instruments or perjured testimonies during trial is not an extrinsic fraud, because such evidence does not preclude the participation of any party in the proceedings. While a perjured testimony may prevent a fair and just determination of a case, it does not bar the adverse
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party from rebutting or opposing the use of such evidence. Furthermore, it should be stressed that extrinsic fraud pertains to an act committed outside of the trial. The alleged fraud in this case was perpetrated during the trial. In consonance with the Straight Times case, respondent Davids act of misrepresentation, though not constituting extrinsic fraud, is still an evidence of absence of jurisdiction. In the Straight Times case and in Demetriou v. Court of Appeals, also on facts analogous to those involved in this case, we held that if an owners duplicate copy of a certificate of title has not been lost but is in fact in the possession of another person, the reconstituted title is void and the court rendering the decision has not acquired jurisdiction. In the case at bar, the authenticity and genuineness of the owners duplicate of TCT Nos. T-52537 and T-52538 in the possession of petitioner Rexlon and the Absolute Deed of Sale in its favor have not been disputed. As there is no proof to support actual loss of the said owners duplicate copies of said certificates of title, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction and the new titles issued in replacement thereof are void. In this case at bar, we simply annulled the decision of the RTC, acting as a land registration court, to issue new owners duplicate copies of TCT Nos. T-52537 and T-52538, for lack of jurisdiction. The dispute between petitioner Rexlon and respondent David regarding ownership over the parcels of land will have to be threshed out or determined in a more appropriate proceeding. In a petition for the issuance of a new owners duplicate copy of a certificate of title in lieu of one allegedly lost, the RTC, acting only as a land registration court, has no jurisdiction to pass upon the question of actual ownership of the land covered by the lost owners duplicate copy of the certificate of title. Possession of a lost owners duplicate copy of a certificate of title is not necessarily equivalent to ownership of the land covered by it. The certificate of title, by itself, does not vest ownership; it is merely an evidence of title over a particular property.