GUTIERREZ v. HOR COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE (2011) Ponente: Carpio-Morales, J. The Ombudsman, Ma.

Merceditas Gutierrez, challenges via petition for certiorari and prohibition the Resolutions of September 1 and 7, 2010 of the House of Representatives Committee on Justice FACTS: - July 22, 2010 (4 days before the opening of the first session of the 15th Congress): the Baraquel Group (respondents Hontiveros-Baraquel, Lim, and spouses Pestao) filed an impeachment complaint against petitioner, endorsed by some party-list reps. - July 27, 2010: Secretary General of the HOR Barua-Yap transmitted the impeachment complaint to House Speaker Belmonte, Jr. who, by Memorandum of August 2, 2010, directed the Committee on Rules to include it in the Order of Business - August 3, 2010: the Reyes Group (private respondents Reyes, Jr., Mananzan, Ramos, Olalia, Gaite and Ridon) filed another impeachment complaint against petitioner with a resolution of endorsement by other party-list reps; the HOR adopted the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings of the 14th Congress. By letter, the Secretary General transmitted the Reyes groups complaint to Speaker Belmonte who, by Memorandum of August 9, 2010, also directed the Committee on Rules to include it in the Order of Business - August 11, 2010 at 4:47 p.m.: the HOR simultaneously referred both complaints to their Committee on Justice - After hearing, public respondent, by Resolution of September 1, 2010, found both complaints sufficient in form, which complaints it considered to have been referred to it at exactly the same time. - September 2, 2010: the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings of the 15th Congress was published - Petitioner filed a motion for recon, which the COJ refused to accept due to prematurity - After hearing, public respondent, by Resolution of September 7, 2010, found the two complaints, which both allege culpable violation of the Constitution and betrayal of public trust, sufficient in substance. o The determination of the sufficiency of substance of the complaints by public respondent, which assumed hypothetically the truth of their allegations, hinged on the issue of whether valid judgment to impeach could be rendered thereon. o - September 13, 2010 (6 days following her receipt of the notice to file answer): petitioner filed with the SC this present petition. The following day, the Court En Banc RESOLVED to direct the issuance of a status quo ante order and to require respondents to comment on the petition in 10 days. The SC subsequently, by Resolution of September 21, 2010, directed the OSG to file in 10 days its Comment on the petition. - Oral arguments were conducted on October 5 and 12, 2010, followed by petitioners filing of a Consolidated Reply of October 15, 2010 and the filing by the parties of Memoranda within the given 15-day period. ISSUES: 1. WON the impeachment proceedings are beyond the reach of Judicial Review NO

Respondents: public respondent HOR COJ was not exercising any judicial, quasijudicial or ministerial function in taking cognizance of the two impeachment complaints as it was exercising a political act that is discretionary in nature SC: The Philippine Supreme Court, as opposed to the US SC, is granted by the Constitution, not just the power but the duty to exercise Judicial Review and to include the power to correct any grave abuse of discretion on the part of any government branch or instrumentality Respondents: judicial review of impeachments undermines their finality and may also lead to conflicts between Congress and the judiciary. The SC should exercise judicial statesmanship on the principle that "whenever possible, the Court should defer to the judgment of the people expressed legislatively, recognizing full well the perils of judicial willfulness and pride." SC: the Constitution did not intend to leave the matter of impeachment to the sole discretion of Congress. Instead, it provided for certain welldefined limits or "judicially discoverable standards" for determining the validity of the exercise of such discretion, through the power of judicial review Phil. Constitution, though vesting in the HOR the exclusive power to initiate impeachment cases, provides for several limitations to the exercise of such power as embodied in Section 3(2), (3), (4) and (5), Article XI thereof. These limitations include the manner of filing, required vote to impeach, and the one year bar on the impeachment of one and the same official. There is indeed a plethora of cases in which this Court exercised the power of judicial review over congressional action!!!! Finally, there exists no constitutional basis for the contention that the exercise of judicial review over impeachment proceedings would upset the system of checks and balances. 2. WON the petition is premature NO R: Petition is premature and not yet ripe for adjudication since petitioner has at her disposal a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the course of the proceedings before public respondent. HOR COJ: When petitioner filed the present petition, the Committee had not gone beyond the determination of the sufficiency of form and substance of the two complaints SC: Petitioner cannot thus be considered to have acted prematurely when she took the cue from the constitutional limitation that only one impeachment proceeding should be initiated against an impeachable officer within a period of one year 3. WON the HOR COJ committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing its two assailed Resolutions Petitioner: anchors her claim on alleged violation of the due process clause (Art. III, Sec. 1) and of the one-year bar provision (Art. XI, Sec 3, par. 5) of the Constitution A. Due Process of Law P: Actions taken by her office against Rep. Tupas (the COJ Chairperson) and his father influenced the proceedings taken by the COJ in such a way that bias and vindictiveness played a big part in arriving at the finding of sufficiency of form and substance of the complaints against her

SC: Petitioners allegations of bias and vindictiveness are bereft of merit. Mere suspicion of partiality does not suffice. The act of the head of a collegial body cannot be considered as that of the entire body itself (GMCR, Inc. v. Bell Telecommunications Phils.). P: The "indecent and precipitate haste" of the COJ in finding the two complaints sufficient in form and substance is a clear indication of bias (it only took them 5 minutes to arrive at finding) SC: An abbreviated pace in the conduct of proceedings is not per se an indication of bias. Speed in the conduct of proceedings by a judicial or quasijudicial officer cannot per se be instantly attributed to an injudicious performance of functions (Santos-Concio v. Department of Justice). The swift completion of the Investigating Panels initial task cannot be relegated as shoddy or shady without discounting the presumably regular performance of not just one but five state prosecutors. P: Her participation in the determination of sufficiency of form and substance was indispensable. SC: As mandated by Rule III (A) of the Impeachment Rules of the 15th Congress, the participation of the impeachable officer starts with the filing of an answer. P: The COJ failed to ascertain the sufficiency of form and substance of the complaints on the basis of the standards set by the Constitution and its own Impeachment Rules SC: Prudential considerations behoove the Court to respect the compliance by the House of its duty to effectively carry out the constitutional purpose, absent any contravention of the minimum constitutional guidelines. o The Impeachment Rules are clear in echoing the constitutional requirements and providing that there must be a "verified complaint or resolution," and that the substance requirement is met if there is "a recital of facts constituting the offense charged and determinative of the jurisdiction of the committee." o Section 3(2), Article XI of the Constitution basically merely requires a "hearing." o The House deemed that a finding of sufficiency of form and substance in an impeachment complaint is vital "to effectively carry out" the impeachment process. P: Urges the Court to look into the narration of facts constitutive of the offenses vis--vis her submissions disclaiming the allegations in the complaints. SC: The issue calls upon this court to decide a non-justiciable political question which is beyond the scope of its judicial power. P: Questions the lack of or, more accurately, delay in the publication of the Impeachment Rules, citing Section 3(8), Article XI of the Constitution COJ: "Promulgation" refers to "the publication of rules in any medium of information, not necessarily in the Official Gazette or newspaper of general circulation SC: Promulgation must be used in the context in which it is generally understood that is, to make known. It is within the discretion of Congress to determine on how to promulgate its Impeachment Rules. It is not for this Court to tell a

co-equal branch of government how to promulgate when the Constitution itself has not prescribed a specific method of promulgation o The provisional adoption of the previous Congress Impeachment Rules is within the power of the House to promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out the avowed purpose. Moreover, the rules on impeachment, as contemplated by the framers of the Constitution, merely aid or supplement the procedural aspects of impeachment. Being procedural in nature, they may be given retroactive application to pending actions. The Court thus finds no violation of the due process clause. B. The One-Year Bar Rule Article XI, Section 3, paragraph (5) of the Constitution reads: "No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year." SC: Francisco states that the term "initiate" means to file the complaint and take initial action on it. From the records of the Constitutional Commission, to the amicus curiae briefs of two former Constitutional Commissioners, it is without a doubt that the term "to initiate" refers to the filing of the impeachment complaint coupled with Congress' taking initial action of said complaint. Referring the complaint to the proper committee ignites the impeachment proceeding. With a simultaneous referral of multiple complaints filed, more than one lighted matchsticks light the candle at the same time. What is important is that there should only be ONE CANDLE that is kindled in a year, such that once the candle starts burning, subsequent matchsticks can no longer rekindle the candle. The measure of protection afforded by the Constitution is that if the impeachable officer is made to undergo such ride, he or she should be made to traverse it just once. Similarly, if Congress is called upon to operate itself as a vehicle, it should do so just once. There is no repeat ride for one full year. This is the whole import of the constitutional safeguard of one-year bar rule. C. Applicability of Rules on Criminal Procedure Section 16 of the House Impeachment Rules provides that "the Rules of Criminal Procedure under the Rules of Court shall, as far as practicable, apply to impeachment proceedings before the House." P: invokes the application of Section 13, Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure one offense, one complaint rule COJ: There is no requirement in the Constitution that an impeachment complaint must charge only one offense, and the nature of impeachable offenses precludes the application of the above-said Rule on Criminal Procedure; even if Sec. 13 of Rule 110 is made to apply, petitioners case falls under the exception since impeachment prescribes a single punishment removal from office and disqualification to hold any public office even for various offenses. SC: Petitioners invocation of that particular rule of Criminal Procedure does not lie. The Constitution allows the indictment for multiple impeachment offenses, with each charge representing an article of impeachment, assembled in one set

known as the "Articles of Impeachment." An impeachment complaint need not allege only one impeachable offense. WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The assailed Resolutions of September 1, 2010 and September 7, 2010 of public respondent, the House of Representatives Committee on Justice, are NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The Status Quo Ante Order issued by the Court on September 14, 2010 is LIFTED.