Newtons Theory of Universal Gravitation, the Cause of Gravity, and the General Scholium

Sheldon Chow September 2008

Newtons famous General Scholium did not appear in the rst edition of the Principia, but was included in the second and third editions (appearing with revisions in the third edition). I. Bernard Cohen reports that Newton was constantly changing his mind about how he would conclude the PrincipiaNewton suppressed a draft conclusion intended for the rst edition; he abandoned his initial ideas for a nal discussion for the second edition, composing the General Scholium instead; and he had intended a number of revisions to the General Scholium for the third edition, some of which were never included in the nal publication (Cohen, 1999).1 As it appears in the second and third editions, the General Scholium can be divided into four distinct, yet related, parts. In the rst part, Newton rearms that the celestial phenomena are not compatible with the Cartesian vortex theory. More particularly, Newton stresses that the regular orbital motions of the heavenly bodies cannot be explained by mechanical causes. The second part is devoted to a relatively lengthy discussion on God, and how God relates to space and time. The penultimate paragraph of the General Scholium is its third section. This third part has been given much attention by scholarsthe most discussed portion of all of Newtons writings, according to Cohen (1999, p. 275). It is here where Newton explains that, while the cause of gravity remains a mystery, he has suciently shown (in the Principia) that his theory of universal gravitation explains the planetary motions. The nal paragraph of the General
See in particular Cohen, 1999, p. 274; see also translators footnotes to the General Scholium in the Cohen & Whitman translation of the Principia, pp. 939-944.
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Scholium has also received much scholarly attention, though Newton had intended to omit it altogether from the third edition of the Principia (Cohen, 1999, p. 279).2 In this nal paragraph, which is the fourth part of the General Scholium, Newton introduces a certain very subtle spirit which is supposed to be the agent which is responsible for certain forces and actions. This paper concerns Newtons theory of universal gravitation and his philosophical views on the cause of gravity. My intent is to shed light on these matters by an examination of the General Scholium. Each of its parts bears importantly and in interrelated ways on Newtons theory of universal gravitation and the cause of gravity. By examining each part, I will argue for four things: (1) I reject the possibility that Newton believed that a subtle spiritwhich is introduced in the nal paragraph of the General Scholium and discussed in the Queries to the Opticksis the cause of gravity; (2) I also reject the possibility that he believed that God is the cause of gravity. (3) I argue instead that Newton, on his own methodology, was not required to seek out the cause of gravity, and that he deliberately withheld from making claims about it. (4) I conclude that gravitys cause, for Newton, is an issue that does not bear on the truth of his theory of universal gravitation.

The penultimate paragraph of the General Scholium: Situating the issue

The penultimate paragraph of the General Scholium is what I call its third part. This is the only part of the General Scholium in which Newton mentions gravity. In that paragraph, Newton arms that gravity is that force which acts on heavenly bodies according to the laws he has set forth in the Principia, and is responsible for celestial and terrestrial phenomena, in particular, the planetary motions and the tides. Though he admits that he has not discovered a cause of gravity, Newton declares that gravity is enough to explain these phenomena. As Newton writes:
2 See also the translators footnote to the nal paragraph of the General Scholium (Cohen & Whitman translation, pp. 943-944).

Newtons Theory of Universal Gravitation, the Cause of Gravity, and the General Scholium

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Thus far I have explained the phenomena of the heavens and of our sea by the force of gravity, but I have not yet assigned a cause to gravity. Indeed, this force arises from some cause that penetrates as far as the centers of the sun and planets without any diminution of its power to act, and that acts not in proportion to the quantity of the surfaces of the particles on which it acts (as mechanical causes are wont to do) but in proportion to the quantity of solid matter, and whose action is extended everywhere to immense distances, always decreasing as the squares of the distances. . . . I have not as yet been able to deduce from phenomena the reason for [the] properties of gravity, and I do not feign hypotheses. For what ever is not deduced from the phenomena must be called a hypothesis; and hypotheses, whether metaphysical or physical, or based on occult qualities, or mechanical, have no place in experimental philosophy. In this experimental philosophy, propositions are deduced from the phenomena and are made general by induction. The impenetrability, mobility, and impetus of bodies, and the laws of motion and the law of gravity have been found by this method. And it is enough that gravity really exists and acts according to the laws that we have set forth and is sucient to explain all the motions of the heavenly bodies and of our sea. (Principia, p. 943, original emphases)3

Cohen reports that Ernst Mach hailed Newton as an early positivist given his it is enough remark, and other scholars have followed Mach in this ascription to Newton. Cohen himself, however, believes that Newtons position was altogether free of any taint of positivistic philosophy (Cohen, 1999, p. 277). As Cohen rightly points out, Newton did in fact attempt to nd some causal account for gravity as a force, and this task occupied Newton in varying degrees from the time of composing the Principia in the 1680s, to 1717 when he published the second revised English edition of the Opticks wherein he introduced his Queries (Query 21 in particular, to be discussed below), and even unto his death. According to Cohen, this indicates that it was never enough for Newton that the explanation for the observed celestial and terrestrial phenomena rests on a force that (in Newtons plain words) really exists. What is certain is that Newton believed that gravity and its eects were real. In particular, he believed that the force that keeps the planets and their satellites in their orbits is the same force as that which causes bodies to fall towards the center of the earth; it is this force that really exists for Newton. So, as Cohen claims, although Newton did not understand the cause and mode of action of universal gravity, it nevertheless provided him a fruitful means by which to
All citations of Newtons Principia will refer to The Principia, Mathematical principles of natural philosophy: A new translation, translated by I.B. Cohen & A. Whitman, 1999.
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move ahead with the science of rational mechanics and celestial dynamics. However, this insight still leaves us wanting an understanding of Newtons continual search for gravitys cause, and we must inquire into why it was not enough for Newton that gravity really exists. I will return to this issue in section 4, where I consider the rst part of the General Scholium. Examining the rest of the General Scholium will assist us in understanding Newtons motivations. I will begin this task by looking at its nal paragraph.

The nal paragraph of the General Scholium: Does Newton posit some entity to explain gravity?

Newton had for a short while entertained the possibility that the cause of gravitational forces were the result dierences in density of an aetherial medium which permeates all matter and empty space. Some scholars speculate that this aetherial medium can be identied with, or is at least somehow related to, the subtle spirit Newton mentioned in the nal paragraph of the General Scholium (which I call the fourth part). Interestingly enough, however, though Newton mentions many phenomena concerning this spirit in his brief discussion in that nal paragraph, he does not include gravity among such phenomena:
A few things could now be added concerning a certain very subtle spirit pervading gross bodies and lying hidden in them; by its force and actions, the particles of bodies attract one another at very small distances and cohere when they become contiguous; and electrical [i.e., electried] bodies act at greater distances, repelling as well as attracting neighboring corpuscles; and light is emitted, reected, refracted, inected, and heats bodies; and all sensation is excited, and the limbs of animals move at command of the will, namely, by the vibrations of this spirit being propagated through the solid bers of the nerves from the external organs of the senses to the brain and from the brain into the muscles. But these things cannot be explained in a few words; furthermore, there is not a sucient number of experiments to determine and demonstrate accurately the laws governing the actions of this spirit. (Principia, pp. 943-944)

There is now no doubt that Newton was referring to an electrical spirit in this nal paragraph; as Cohen (1999, p. 282) reports, Newton, in his intended emendations to the second edition of the Principia, qualied the spirit with the adjectives electric and elastic. Though this emendation did not make it into the third Latin edition, it did make it into the English 4

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translation (by Andrew Motte). Nonetheless, Cohen remarks, that perhaps Newton was not ready at the time to do more than hintby implication of my contextthat this spirit might somehow be related to gravity (Cohen, 1999, p. 279). Cohen later expresses a similar comment when he states that his impression after reading Newtons unpublished conclusion to the Principia (which will be discussed presently) is that if more were known about the action of this spirit, then we would understand the nature of attractive forces in general and so be in a better position to understand the action of gravity (Cohen, 1999, p. 286). However, I am not so sure about Cohens speculation. For it seems as if Newtons concern for the (electric) spirit is not meant to suggest anything about gravity or its cause, but rather to indicate a dierent research programone of electric forces. Evidence for this is found in the aforementioned draft version of a conclusion Newton intended for the second edition of the Principia, but which was replaced by the General Scholium.4 Newton begins his unpublished conclusion by comparing and contrasting three forces of attraction: gravity, electricity, and magnetism. This comparison is absent from the General Scholium, though it helps us understand Newtons mention there of the subtle spirit. Among the similarities and dierences Newton cites in his unpublished conclusion, he observes the following: The laws of the respective attractions of gravity, electricity, and magnetism are dissimilar. Electrical and magnetic attractions are intended and remitted; gravity cannot be
intended or remitted.

Gravity always attracts, whereas electricity and magnetism sometimes attracts and
sometimes repel.

Electricity and magnetism act at small distances; gravity at very great distances. All bodies gravitate in proportion to their quantity of matter; most bodies are electric,
and only iron is magnetic; but neither the electric nor magnetic forces acts in proportion to their quantity of matter.

Gravity is not at all impeded by the interposition of bodies; electric force is impeded and
diminished so; while iron is not impeded by the interposition of cold and nonferrous bodies, yet it is impeded by the interposition of ignited bodies and is propagated through interposed iron bodies.
4

The nal portions of Newtons unpublished conclusion is presented in Cohen (1999, pp. 287-292).

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Gravity is not changed by friction; iron is strongly agitated by friction or percussion, and
thereby readily receives the virtue of magnetism; electric force (in suciently electric bodies) is greatly excited by friction (sometimes the electric spirit is emitted from bodies (e.g., amber, diamond) by heat without friction; the same spirit may also attract bodies at small distances without friction or heat).

Simply put, gravity is a dierent sort of thing than electricity and magnetism. Newton continues in the unpublished conclusion by describing and discussing various experiments (primarily ones performed by Francis Hauksbee) in which Newton believes the electric spirit is at work. It is important to note that once Newton begins his discussion of such experiments, he no longer mentions the actions of gravitational or magnetic forces. Newton explores the possibility that the electric spirit is responsible for other types of phenomena (e.g., the reection and refraction of light), but again, in these speculative remarks Newton does not mention gravitational or magnetic forces. Thus, as in the General Scholium, Newton does not include gravity among the actions of this spirit. This seems to indicate that Newton believed that gravitational forces (and its phenomena) were distinct from electric forces (and its phenomena). At the very least, this suggests that Newton believed that gravity and electricity lacked a common cause. The draft conclusion is not the only other place where Newton discusses the electric spirit. As Cohen reports, in all of the draft versions of the Recensio Libri (or An Account of the Book entitled Commercium Epistolicum5 ), Newton was especially concerned with explaining what his spirit is. Newton wrote that the subtle spirit or agent to which he refers in the nal paragraph of the General Scholium is latent in bodies by which Electrical Attraction & many other phaenomena may be performed (quoted by Cohen, 1999, p. 280). In one draft, however, Newton asserts that he has nowhere denyed that the cause of gravity is Mechanical nor armed whether that subtile spirit be material or immaterial nor declared any opinion about their causes (quoted
This was a review written by Newton, and published anonymously, of the Royal Societys report on priority of the invention of the calculus. The relevant passages of the drafts of Newtons Account are presented in Cohen (1999, pp. 280-282).
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by Cohen, 1999, p. 281). The same sentiment is found in the published version of the Account, though Newton does not express it in these words. Here, too, we nd that Newton is not confounding the cause of gravity with the actions and nature of the subtle spirithe is here addressing these issues separately, and he is not implicating gravitational forces with his talk of the subtle spirit. Query 31 to Newtons Opticks has much in common with the draft conclusion. In Query 31, Newton likewise speaks of three forces of attraction: gravity, electricity, and magnetism. And he also discusses Hauskbees experiments. Yet, he does not mention any kind of spirit. In fact, Newton refrains from speculating about the causes of these forces altogether. He writes, I scruple not to propose the principles of motion, they being of very general extent, and leave their causes to be found out (Opticks, p. 542)6 . Newton does, however, refer to an aetherial medium in some of the other Queries. This is the aetherial medium I mentioned above, which Newton had entertained as the possible cause of gravitational forces. This occurs particularly in Query 21 where Newton famously speculates that a universal aetherial medium, growing denser at greater distances from the heavenly bodies, might explain the gravitational interactions between celestial bodies. He writes, if the elastic force of this medium be exceedingly great, it may suce to impel bodies from the denser parts of the medium towards the rarer [less dense], with all that power which we call gravity (Opticks, p. 521). It should be noted that, unlike the vortex theory favoured by the mechanical philosophers of Newtons day (i.e., the Cartesians), this aether does not act by impact, but is rather governed by short-range repulsive forces (between the particles of the aether) which are responsible for the pressure exerted on bodies and its density, ultimately emulating gravitational forces. This speculation about a possible cause for gravity is consistent with Newtons remarks in the third
All citations of Newtons Opticks will refer to Opticks: or A treatise of the reexions, refractions, inexions and colours of light, based on the fourth edition London, 1730, Robert Maynard Hutchings (Ed.), Great books of the Western world. Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1952.
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part of the General Scholium where he distinguishes the cause of gravity from mechanical causes:
this force arises from some cause that penetrates as far as the centers of the sun and the planets without any diminution of its power to act, and that acts not in proportion to the quantity of the surfaces of the particles on which it acts (as mechanical causes are wont to do) but in proportion to the quantity of solid matter, and whose action is extended everywhere to immense distances, always decreasing as the squares of the distances. (quoted above)

It seems unlikely, however, that Newton had transformed his thoughts on the spirit into the action of the aetherial medium.7 Again, Newton does not mention this aetherial medium in Query 31 where he discusses the phenomena he believed to be caused by the electric spirit, as he also did not do so in his unpublished conclusion. I will later return to Newtons speculations on an aetherial medium, though it is dubious that Newtons aetherial medium should be identied with his electric spirit. At the very least, it is dubious that Newton intended his electric spirit to serve as the cause of gravitational forces. Howard Stein, in a footnote in his Newtonian Space-Time (1967) paper, suggests that arguments that Newton was confronted with concerning the absence of any eect of a material aether in planetary gravitational interactionsspecically, Newtons Third Law applies only to the two gravitating bodies, whereas if a material aether was responsible for propagating gravitational forces, his Third Law would have to be applied to the interactions of the two bodies and the intervening mediumcontributed to Newtons doubt whether a material aether causes gravity. Stein indicates, however, that Newton was not wholly decided against an aether theory of gravitation. However, he continues to say that Newtons leaning away from an aether theory of gravitation does not entail Newtons rejection of aethers altogether in physics. He writes, One should distinguish skepticism about the ether as a cause of gravitation from skepticism about the existence of hidden elastic uid media aecting some physical interactions. I am not convinced that Newton ever showed serious doubt on the latter point (Stein, 1967, p. 283, footnote 6, original emphasis). This may help us understand why Newton was interested in discussing an
7

Cohen, on the other hand, expresses the opposite opinion (see Cohen, 1999, p. 286, footnote 24).

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aetherial medium without committing himself to the view that it is the cause of gravity. Cohen suggests that Newtons consideration of the subtle spirit is an attempt at introducing new areas of research that may illuminate fundamental problems of cause and mode of operation (Cohen, 1999, p. 279). As Cohen indicates, this reading of Newtons talk of his spirit explains Newtons nal remarks in (the fourth part of) the General Scholium. I believe that such a reading can just as well be taken to explain Newtons unpublished conclusion, and his draft versions of the Account. Indeed, in one draft of his Account, Newton writes (of himself), But what is this Agent or spirit & what are the laws by which it acts he leaves to be decided by experiments (quoted by Cohen, 1999, p. 281). And in yet another draft version, Newton declares that he did not propose [the hypothesis of a very subtile spirit at the end of the Principia] by way of an Hypothesis but in order to [lead to] an inquiry (quoted by Cohen, 1999, pp. 281-282). We might likewise understand Newtons talk of the aetherial medium as suggesting new areas of research. In this vein, we need not take Newton to be intending his spirit or aetherial medium to serve as an explanation of the cause of gravity.

The second part of the General Scholium: Does Newton posit God as the cause of gravity?

The second part of the General Scholium is devoted to a relatively lengthy discussion on God, and how God relates to space and time. For instance, he writes,
[God] rules all things, not as the world soul but as the lord of all. . . . For god is a relative word and has reference to servants, and godhood is the lordship of God, not over his own body as is supposed by those for whom God is the world soul, but over servants. . . . [God] is not duration [i.e., time] and space, but he endures and is present. He endures always and is present everywhere, and by existing always and everywhere he constitutes duration and space. . . . . . . God is one and the same God always and everywhere. He is omnipresent not only virtually but also substantially; for action requires substance. In him all things are contained and move, but he does not act on them nor they on him. God experiences nothing from the motions of bodies; the bodies feel no resistance from Gods omnipresence. (Principia, pp. 941-942, original emphases)

The importance of this part of the General Scholium pertains not only to Newtons theology, but 9

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also to his metaphysics. In turn, from Newtons metaphysics we could glean his thoughts on the ultimate cause of gravity. A more detailed account of Newtons metaphysics, and in particular his conceptions of God and how God relates to space, time, and matter, can be found in Newtons De Gravitatione et Aequipondio Fluidorum, an essay Newton wrote prior to the rst edition of the Principia, but which was never published in his lifetime. De Gravitatione provides explicit arguments against the Cartesian doctrines of matter and motion, dismissing them as ctions. Newton then proceeds to expound his absolutist doctrine of space, and discuss how this doctrine relates to his conception of matter (or body). In Article 4 of De Gravitatione, Newton declares, Space is an aection of a being just as a being. No being exists or can exist which is not related to space in some way. God is everywhere, created minds are somewhere, and body is in the space that it occupies . . . . And hence it follows that space is an emanative eect of [God] . . . (from Janiak, 2004, p. 25). Later in De Gravitatione, Newton explains the nature of matter (or body). He asserts that we may suppose that there are empty spaces scattered throughout the world, one of which [is] dened by certain limits (from Janiak, 2004, p. 28). The limits to which Newton is referring dene matter (or body)
as determined quantities of extension with omnipresent God endows with certain conditions. These conditions are: (1) that they be mobile, . . . ; (2) that two of this kind cannot coincide anywhere, that is, that they may be impenetrable, and hence that oppositions obstruct their mutual motions and they are reected in accord with certain laws; (3) that they can excite various perceptions of the senses and the imagination in created minds, and conversely moved by them . . . (From Janiak, 2004, p. 28, original emphasis)

Hence, according to Newton, God endows certain regions of space with matter (or body) primarily by instituting the laws of motion, distinguishing it from empty space. These regions are thus matter (or body). Michael Friedman (unpublished paper) believes that this formulation of space and matter 10

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leads Newton to his theory of universal gravitation of Book 3 of the Principia. This seems, however, to be a bit of an overstatement. Strictly speaking, Newton derived his theory of universal gravitation from astronomical phenomenadata on the motion of the planets and their satellitesand the laws he expounded in Books 1 and 2. However, to be charitable, we might understand Friedmans point as claiming that Newtons theory of universal gravitation is metaphysically based on his conception of space and matterthat gravity and its eects result from matters mobility, impenetrability, and obedience to the laws of motion. This, at least, is a good starting place for us to follow Friedman in an investigation of the metaphysical assumptions underlying Newtons theory of gravity, and how God gures into it. Friedman believes that Newton is suggesting that the true cause of gravity may be an immaterial agent, perhaps even God himself.8 He asks us to consider Newtons remark in De Gravitatione that God is everywhere (quoted above). This assertion can also be found in Query 31 to the Opticks where Newton describes God as a powerful ever-living agent, who [is] in all places (Opticks, p. 542). Newton continues in this passage by saying, [God] is [therefore] more able by his will to move the bodies within his boundless uniform sensorium, and thereby to form and reform the parts of the universe, than we are by our will to move the parts of our own bodies (Opticks, p. 542). A similar remark to this latter one is found in De Gravitatione:
Since each man is conscious that he can move his body at will, and believes further that other men enjoy the same power of similarly moving their bodies by thought alone, the free power of moving bodies at will can by no means be denied to God, whose faculty of thought is innitely greater and more swift. (From Janiak, 2004, p. 27).

Friedman then gestures toward Newtons words in the General Scholium, where he writes, God is one and the same God always and everywhere. He is omnipresent not only virtually but also
Friedman gestured toward this position in an earlier paper of his in which he commented, Newton does not of course explicitly assert that the Agent responsible for gravity is either immaterial or divine. Nevertheless, although we are clearly on shaky ground here, it is perhaps permissible to speculate that this is in fact his true conviction (Friedman, 1990, p. 199). Friedman then briey provides evidence that this position is not inconsistent with Newtons writings. However, he does not there produce any substantial argument for his position as he does in his unpublished paper.
8

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substantially; for action requires substance (quoted above). This, then, is the evidence he provides for his assertion that it is likely that Newton believed that God was the cause of gravity. However, Friedman leaves the remainder of the latter passage for a short comment in a footnote; recall that Newton continues this passage by saying, In [God] all things are contained and move, but he does not act on them nor they on him. God experiences nothing from the motions of bodies; the bodies feel no resistance from Gods omnipresence (quoted above, my emphasis). In his footnote, Friedman suggests that we might suppose that Newtons subtle spirit, which is mentioned at the end of the General Scholium, is the cause of gravitational attraction. However, as I had argued in the previous section, it is doubtful that Newton believed his spirit is responsible for gravity and its eects. Nevertheless, Friedman insists that Newton denitely excludes mechanical impact from the possible causes of gravity. This seems to be the case given Newtons remarks in the third part of the General Scholium: this force [of gravity] . . . acts not in proportion to the quantity of the surfaces of the particles on which it acts (as mechanical causes are wont to do) but in proportion to the quantity of solid matter (quoted above). But precluding mechanical causes does not necessarily lead Newton to the conclusion that some immaterial agent (perhaps God) is responsible for gravitational forces. On Friedmans argument, since God creates matter and its fundamental laws by an immediate act of the divine will, it is natural to suppose that the ubiquitous immaterial agent ultimately responsible for gravitational attraction is either God himself or an ubiquitous immaterial spirit directly resulting from Gods own ubiquity (Friedman, unpublished paper). Friedman refers to Query 31 to the Opticks where Newton suggests that Gods act of creating matter in space is responsible not only for impenetrability and matter (in accordance with the three passive Laws of Motion), but also for specic forces or active principles, including gravity:
[I]t seems probable to me, that God in the beginning formed matter in solid, massy, hard, impenetrable, moveable particles, of such sizes and gures, and with such other properties, and in such proportion to space, as most conduced to the end for which he formed them; . . .

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It seems to me farther, that these particles have not only a vis inertiae, accompanied with such passive laws of motion as naturally result from that force, but also that they are moved by certain active principles, such as is that of gravity. (Opticks, pp. 541-542)

Friedman thus maintains that it is Newtons metaphysics of space and matter that provide the grounds for universal gravitation acting at a distancean immediate exchange of momentum across empty space. Friedman may be right about this. However, he takes the further step of asserting that Newtons metaphysics introduces an immaterial agent to explain how this action at a distance can occur. Yet, Friedman recognizes, referring to Robert DiSalle, that the requirement that all causal interaction in the material world be limited to the communication of motion by impact seems to be an entirely arbitrary restriction on the basic principles governing the exchange of momentum (Friedman, unpublished paper). Consequently, Friedman claims that there does not seem to be any reason that a direct (equal and opposite) exchange of momentum at a distance via universal gravitation may not be viewed as a perfectly legitimate example of causal interaction (Friedman, unpublished paper). Nevertheless, he dismisses this view as post-Newtonian, claiming this was not Newtons opinion, since in Newtons time it was taken for granted that one substance can act on another by ecient causality only if they are locally present to each other. But I do not think that Friedmans account provides sucient grounds for assuming that Newton posited an immaterial medium through which gravity works its eects. Rather, it seems that what is (minimally) required by Newtons metaphysics is that gravity is a law among those which God bestowed upon matter. Positing some immaterial medium therefore seems superuous to his metaphysics. A similar position was held by Robert DiSalle (1990, p. 206), and it seems to be representative of Newtons thoughts given Newtons later remarks in Query 31: These principles [the active principles including gravity] I consider, not as occult qualities, supposed to result from the specic forms of things, but as general laws of nature, by which the things

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themselves are formed; their truth appearing to us by phenomena, though their causes be not yet discovered (Opticks, p. 542). Such a sentiment may also be gleaned from Newtons remark in the third part of the General Scholium: it is enough that gravity really exists and acts according to the laws we have set forth. That gravity is a God-given law does not imply, however, that God, as an immaterial medium, is directly involved in all gravitational interactions. This objection to Friedmans argument mirrors the way in which Newton responded to a criticism given by Leibniz. Leibniz wrote a letter to Nicholas Hartsoeker in which he claimed that the Principia renders gravitation a perpetual miracle because it fails to specify its physical causal mechanism underlying it.9 This sentiment was repeated in Leibniz letter to Samuel Clarke:
If God wanted to cause a body to move free in the aether round about a certain xed center, without any other creature acting upon it, I say it could not be done without a miracle, since it cannot be explained by the nature of bodies. For a free body naturally recedes from a curve in the tangent. (Quoted in DiSalle, 2002, p. 47)

In his (unpublished) rebuttal to Leibniz, Newton wrote,

But he [Leibniz] goes on and tells us that God could not create planets that should move round of themselves without any cause that should prevent their removing through the tangent. For a miracle at least must keep the planet in. But certainly God could create planets that should move round of themselves without any other cause than gravity that should prevent their moving through the tangent. For gravity without a miracle may keep the planets in. (From Janiak, 2004, p. 117)

Given Newtons remarks here, as well as what he has written in his Query 31 and in the third part of the General Scholium cited above, it seems as if Newton turned away from invoking God or some immaterial entity to explain gravitational eects. However, if we are to endorse the view that Newton believed that gravity is a law among those of which God had bestowed upon matter, we must reconcile it with Newtons assertion that gravity is not an essential property of matter (or body). In a remark he made in the Advertisement to the second edition of the Opticks, Newton wrote, to show that I do not take
9

See Janiak, 2004, pp. xxix-xxx.

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gravity for an essential property of bodies, I have added one question concerning its cause (Opticks, p. 378); and in a letter to Richard Bentley in 1693, Newton wrote,
It is inconceivable that inanimate brute matter should, without the mediation of something else, which is not material, operate upon and aect other matter without mutual contact, as it must be, if gravitation in the sense of Epicurus, be essential and inherent in it. And this is one reason why I desired you would not ascribe innate gravity to me. That gravity should be innate, inherent, and essential to matter, so that one body may act upon another at a distance through a vacuum without the mediation of anything else, by and through which their action and force may be conveyed from one to another, is to me so great an absurdity, that I believe that no man who has in philosophical matters a competent faculty of thinking can ever fall into it. (From Janiak, 2004, p. 102-103)

Some insight into this matter can be gained by returning to Newtons De Gravitatione. After expounding his doctrine of space, Newton writes,
it remains to give an explanation of the nature of body. Of this, however, the explanation must be more uncertain, for it does not exist necessarily but by divine will, because it is hardly given to us to know the limits of the divine power, that is to say, whether matter could be created in one way only, or whether there are several ways by which dierent beings similar to bodies could be produced. And although it scarcely seems credible that God could create beings similar to bodes which display all their actions and exhibit all their phenomena, and yet would not be bodies in essential and metaphysical constitution, as I have no clear and distinct perception of this matter I should not dare to arm the contrary, and hence I am reluctant to say positively what the nature of bodies is, but would rather describe a certain kind of being similar in every way to bodies, and whose creation we cannot deny to be within the power of God, so that we can hardly say that it is not body. (From Janiak, 2004, p. 27)

According to Stein (2002), Newton is here admitting that his doctrine of matter is fundamentally conjectural, since bodies (unlike space) are eects of Gods will, and we do not know the ways in which God may accomplish such eects. There remains, then, the possibility that observable phenomena, or matter in particular, are eected in some dierent way than what Newton had conceived. We might thus observe further that, although Newton asserts earlier in De Gravitatione that in constituting or creating matter God must impose (among other properties) gravity and its laws, he refrains from asserting that gravity (and the other properties) is essential to matter, since he is ignorant of the workings of God, and God could have brought about gravitational forces in some other way than which he conceives. Stein asserts that the demand 15

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for a further explanation [for the fundamental constitution of corporeal nature] . . . stems from the Cartesian illusion that we must in principle have a clear and distinct apprehension of the necessity of the basic constitution of nature (Stein, 2002, p. 279). Stein continues by claiming that Newtons discovery of the law of universal gravitation led him to a new conception of how it may be fruitful not, as for Descartes, how it is necessaryto conceive of the actions that characterize nature, with a view to the deeper understanding of natural phenomena (Stein, 2002, p. 282, original emphases). The deeper understanding of natural phenomena, as Stein asserts, comes from Newtons program for natural philosophy. As Stein understands it, Newtons program for natural philosophy is spelled out in the Preface to the Principia (rst edition). Newton there wrote,
rational mechanics will be the science, expressed in exact propositions and demonstrations, of the motions that result from any forces whatever and of the forces that are required for any motions whatever. . . . [S]ince we are concerned with natural philosophy . . . , we concentrate on aspects of gravity, levity, elastic forces, resistance in uids, and forces of this sort, whether attractive or repulsive. And therefore our present work sets forth mathematical principles of natural philosophy. For the basic problem of philosophy seems to be to discover the forces of nature from the phenomena of motions and then to demonstrate the other phenomena from theses forces. It is to these ends that the general propositions on books 1 and 2 are directed, while in book 3 our explanation of the system of the world illustrates these propositions. For in book 3, by means of propositions demonstrated mathematically in books 1 and 2, we derive from celestial phenomena the gravitational forces by which bodies tend toward the sun and toward individual planets. Then the motions of the planets, the comets, the moon, and the sea are deduced from these forces by propositions that are also mathematical. If only we could derive the other phenomena of nature from mechanical principles by the same kind of reasoning! For many things lead me to have a suspicion that all phenomena may depend on certain forces by which the particles of bodies, by causes not yet known, either are impelled toward one another and cohere in regular gures, or are repelled from one another and recede. Since these forces are unknown, philosophers have hitherto made trial of nature in vain. But I hope that the principles set down here will shed some light on either this mode of philosophizing or some truer one. (Principia, pp. 382-383)

Newtons program for natural philosophy, then, as Stein describes, is one of deriving the phenomena of nature from mechanical principles, not in the sense previously understood by mechanical philosophy, but in the sense of principles governing forces of attraction and repulsionthemselves to be discovered by reasoning from the phenomena (Stein, 2002, p. 283, 16

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original emphasis). Stein further claims that the last few words of the sentence, But I hope that the principles set down here will shed some light on either this mode of philosophizing or some truer one (quoted above), indicates that Newtons program is put forward as tentative and open to revision. This position is certainly consistent with Newtons exclamation, I do not feign hypotheses. Stein later writes, we are not to suppose, dogmatically, that whatever principles we have managed to discover are necessarily the fundamental ones: it will be a question for the future whether (yet deeper) causes of these principles may remain to be found out. In particular, this explains why Newton never claimedand strongly denied holdingthat gravity is essential to bodies (Stein, 2002, p. 291, original emphasis). Stein later comments that Newton intended to bring emphatically forward a new notion of the unity of interaction as the form of a force of nature. . . . [T]his means that exactly those bodies that are susceptible to the action of a given interaction-eld [i.e., a central eld constituting forces of nature] are also the sources of the eld (Stein, 2002, p. 288). Bringing this to bear on Newtons metaphysics in De Gravitatione, it implies that in creating a body, God (or in the constitution of a body, nature) must impose, not only the eld of impenetrability and the laws of motion appropriate thereto, but other elds as well, with their laws, characterizing forces of interaction (Stein, 2002, p. 288-289). Newton expresses this sentiment in Query 31 to the Opticks: These principles [the active principles such as gravity] I consider, not as occult qualities, supposed to result from the specic forms of things, but as general laws of nature, by which the things themselves are formed ; their truth appearing to us by phenomena, though their causes be not yet discovered. For these are manifest qualities, and their causes only are occult (Opticks, p. 542, my emphases). The task of natural philosophy, as seen in Newtons Preface to the Principia (rst edition), is to discover these elds constituting the forces of naturethe basic problem of [natural] philosophy seems to be to discover the forces of nature from the phenomena 17

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of motions and then to demonstrate the other phenomena from these forces (quoted above). It is, therefore, not necessary for Newton to conceive of gravity as essential to matter. Yet, according to Newtons program, we may discover that certain forces are essential to matter, and gravity may be among such essential forces. Nevertheless, such a discovery will not be something that acts as a constraint on Newtons natural philosophy or his metaphysics. Rather, it will be the result of us learning something about matter (DiSalle, 1990).

The rst part of the General Scholium: An indication that Newtons methodology did not need a cause of gravity

In the Scholium to Section 11 of Book 1 of the Principia, Newton describes a two-tiered analysis of force:
Mathematics requires an investigation of those quantities of forces and their proportions that follow from any conditions that may be supposed. Then, coming down to physics, these proportions must be compared with the phenomena, so that it may be found out which conditions [or laws] of forces apply to each kind of attracting bodies. And then, nally, it will be possible to argue more securely concerning the physical species, physical causes, and physical proportions of those forces. (Principia, p. 589)

Thus, the two tiers, for Newton, are a physical treatment of force and a mathematical treatment of force. Whereas a physical treatment of force describes, among other things, the causes and qualities of forces, a mathematical treatments eschews such a description, providing instead a characterization of its quantities (Janiak, 2004). In Denition 8, Newton declares that he is treating the concept of force as purely mathematical, for I am not now considering the physical causes and sites of forces (Principia, p. 407). The physical treatment of force is given in Book 3, which, as mentioned, is the culmination of his argument for universal gravitation. George Smith observes that Newton can characterize forces by its mathematical components (e.g., direction, magnitude) without regard to the particular physical components that happen to be giving rise to it (Smith, 2002, p. 149). As he explains further,

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the mathematical theories of motion of Galileo and Huygens are primarily aimed at predicting and explaining phenomena. The mathematical theories of motion developed [by Newton] in Books 1 and 2 of the Principia do not have this aim. Rather, their aim is to provide a basis for specifying experiments and observations by means of which the empirical world can provide answers to questionsthis in contrast to conjecturing answers and then testing the implications of these conjectures. Newton is using mathematical theory in an eort to turn otherwise recalcitrant questions into empirically tractable questions. (Smith, 2002, p. 147)

Hence, all that Newton really needs for his theory of universal gravitation is the t of the evidence with the mathematical theory; the physical cause of gravity does not gure into the mathematical description of the force of gravity. In a similar vein, Cohen remarks that There is no way of telling whether the Newtonian style of initially dealing with the subject on a mathematical rather than a physical plane was only a subterfuge to avoid criticism or a sincere expression of methodological principle. But, from Newtons point of view, this style enabled him to develop the laws of the action of a gravity-like force in a mathematical analogue of the world of nature without having to be concerned with whether or not gravity exists (Cohen, 1999, p. 278). It is no wonder, then, why the lack of a physical cause of gravity did not hinder Newton in the advancement of his theory of universal gravitation. As Newton remarks in Query 31 to the Opticks, we must learn from the phenomena of Nature what bodies attract one another, and what are the laws and properties of attraction, before we enquire the cause by which the attraction is performed (Opticks, p. 531). Newtons main concern, in the Principia and in his natural philosophy in general, was to discover or establish the manifest principles of motion. The physical cause of the resulting forces, on the other hand, can be left to hypotheses or speculation, though no further than this unless there is sucient empirical evidence to support them. As Newton remarks in the third part of the General Scholium, whatever is not deduced from the phenomena must be called a hypothesis (quoted above). Later on in Query 31, Newton writes,
These principles [the active principles such as gravity] I consider, not as occult qualities, supposed to result from the specic forms of things, but as general laws of nature, by which

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the things themselves are formed; their truth appearing to us by phenomena, though their causes be not yet discovered. For these are manifest qualities, and their causes only are occult . . . Such occult qualities put a stop to the improvement of natural philosophy, and therefore of late years have been rejected. To tell us that every species of things is endowed with an occult specic quality by which it acts and produces manifest eects, is to tell us nothing; but to derive two or three general principles of motion from phenomena, and afterwards to tell us how the properties and actions of all corporeal things follow from those manifest principles, would be a very great step in philosophy, though the causes of those principles were not yet discovered: and therefore I scruple not to propose the principles of motion above mentioned, they being of very general extent, and leave their causes to be found out. (Opticks, p. 542)

We might therefore understand Newtons exclamation in the third part of the General Scholium, I do not feign hypotheses, as an assertion that he does not propose or adopt any hypothesis regarding the physical treatment of gravitational forces (as opposed to the mathematical treatment, on which the cause and nature of gravity simply does not bear). Newton thus eschews the physical hypotheses which are supposed to account for the celestial phenomena, such as the Cartesian vortex theory,10 not only because they cannot recover the celestial phenomena, but because they make reference to entities that lack independent empirical support. This is exactly what Newton is conveying in the rst part of the General Scholium, in which he rearms that the celestial phenomena are not compatible with the Cartesian vortex theory. In particular, Newton stresses there that the regular orbital motions of the heavenly bodies cannot be explained by mechanical causes. As Cohen astutely observes, Newton does not contrive ctions (or hypotheses) to be oered in place of sound explanations based on phenomena (Cohen, 1999, p. 275). It must be acknowledged, however, that Newtons concern was for whether empirical phenomena ts physical theory. Newtons use of empirical evidence to argue for theory can be found in the rst part of Book 3 of the Principia, where Newton presents his central argument for the law of universal gravitation. This is the argument Newton is recapitulating in the rst part of
Leibniz uid theory is another example of a theory that employs the kinds of hypotheses Newton eschews. In his Essay on the Causes of Celestial Motions (or Tentamen) of 1689, Leibniz introduced some kind of uid that surrounds, and is contiguous to, the planetary bodies, and he argued that this uid is in motion causing the planetary motion. Of course, there is no empirical evidence to support the existence of such a uid.
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the General Scholium. The premises of the argument, as mentioned, are celestial phenomenadata on the motions of the planets and their satellites essentially in the form of Keplers laws. Stein asserts, however, that Newtons conclusions (so far from being logical consequences) stand in formal contradiction to its premises. For according to the theory of universal gravitation, which is of course the product of this argument, Keplers laws (which were its premises) cannot give an exact representation of the motion of the planets (Stein, 1967, p. 261, original emphasis). According to Stein, Newton had not found a simple general postulate which accounts for the phenomena in close approximationand that he then chose to regard the general postulate as exact, in preference to the empirical laws of the phenomena (Stein, 1967, p. 261). Rather, Stein claims that Newtons analysis entails that the celestial phenomena with which he begins can be represented by supposing that the celestial bodies are surrounded by central acceleration-elds whose intensities vary inversely with the square of the distance from the center (Stein, 1967, p. 262); and this supposition yields Keplers laws exactly. This was a great strength for Newtons theory. Stein reports that this result led Leibniz and Huygens to accept the inverse square law in astronomy, although they rejected the theory of universal gravitation as theoretically objectionable and empirically unproved (Stein, 1967, p. 262). Stein suggests, however, that there is a prima facie reason to consider that there may be something both sound and deep in the method that led Newton along this path where his great contemporaries could not follow (Stein, 1967, p. 262). It is interesting to note, as Stein has, that when Newton responds to criticism of the Principia, he appears to rest his case for universal gravitation, not upon the argument leading to the theory, but upon the extremely detailed agreement of its consequences with observed phenomena (Stein, 1967, p. 264, original emphases). The detailed agreements Stein is referring to are things such as the a satisfactory representation of the motion of the moon, an explanation of the precession of the equinoxes, the theory of the tides, and the mutual 21

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perturbation of the orbits of Saturn and Jupiter when the planets were near each other.11 A great importance of the rst part of the General Scholium, then, is that it is a demonstration of Newtons reliance on empirical evidence to argue for his theory, where he recapitulates his arguments presented in the Principia against the Cartesian vortex theory; his arguments concern whether the vortex theory is compatible with observed celestial phenomena:
The hypothesis of vortices is beset with many diculties. If, by a radius drawn to the sun, each and every planet is to describe areas proportional to the time, the periodic times of the parts of the vortex must be as the squares of the distances from the sun. . . . If the smaller vortices revolving about Saturn, Jupiter, and the other planets are to be preserved and are to oat without agitation in the vortex of the sun, the periodic times of the parts of the solar vortex must be the same. The axial revolutions [i.e., rotations] of the sun and planets, which would have to agree with the motion of the vortices, dier from all these proportions. The motions of comets are extremely regular, observe the same laws as the motions of planets, and cannot be explained by vortices. Comets go with very eccentric motions into all parts of the heavens, with cannot happen unless vortices are eliminated. . . . All bodies must move freely in [the celestial spaces above the earth], and therefore planets and comets must revolve continually in orbits given in kind and in position, according to the laws set forth above [in the Principia]. They will indeed preserve in their orbits by the laws of gravity . . . (Principia, p. 940)

To be sure, the General Scholium itself was added to the second addition of the Principia to answer the Cartesian critics and other adherents of the mechanical philosophy of the day (Cohen, 1999). But even before the second edition of the Principia, we nd Newton defending his theory of universal gravitation by means of the agreement with its consequences with observed phenomena. In a letter Newton wrote to Leibniz in 1693 (between the rst and second editions of the Principia) in response to certain criticisms regarding the physical cause of gravity, he says,
For since celestial motions are more regular than if they arose from vortices and observe other laws, so much so that vortices contribute not to the regulation but to the disturbance of the motions of planets and comets; and since all phenomena of the heavens and of the sea follow precisely, so far as I am aware, from nothing but gravity acting in accordance with the laws described by me; and since nature is very simple, I have myself concluded that all other causes are to be rejected and that the heavens are to be stripped as far as may be of all matter, lest the motions of planets and comets be hindered or rendered irregular. (From Janiak, 2004, p. 108).
This last point, according to Stein, would have converted Huygens to believing at least of the mutuality of astronomical forces, if not universal gravitation, had it been established when Huygens read the Principia.
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Stein continues by commenting that it is a fundamental principle of method [for Newton] to press empirical generalizations as far and as exactly as possible, subject to empirical correction; and to do so without regard for theoretical considerations of a speculative kind (Stein, 1967, p. 263). The fundamental principle of method Stein is referring to is spelled out in Newtons Rule 4 of his Rules for the Study of Natural Philosophy given in the Principia:
In experimental philosophy, propositions gathered from phenomena by induction should be considered either exactly or very nearly true notwithstanding any contrary hypotheses, until yet other phenomena make such propositions either more exact or liable to exceptions. (Principia, p. 796)

Newton follows this rule with the remark, This rule should be followed so that arguments based on induction may not be nullied by hypotheses (Principia, p. 796)hence, the theoretical considerations of a speculative kind, in Steins words, are Newtons dreaded hypotheses.

Conclusion

In conclusion, I echo Newtons remarks in the third part of the General Scholium: Notwithstanding that he had not established a cause of the gravity, his theory of gravitation is enough to show that gravity really exists and acts according to the laws that [he has] set forth and is sucient to explain all the motions of the heavenly bodies and of our sea. Although Newton did not discover a mechanical explanation for gravity, he maintained that he nonetheless had established that gravity itself was causalgravity had been successfully identied as the cause of the celestial phenomena of planetary orbits. Thus, Newton argued that one should not infer that gravity itself is not a causeor, more precisely, a force which causes actiongiven that there is no intelligible cause of gravity. Indeed, in the Principia Newton denes gravity as a type of cause (i.e., as one sort of force that alters the states of motion of material bodies). And it is this force that alters the states of motion of material bodies within his theory of universal gravitation, and is responsible for the celestial phenomena of planetary orbits. Newton believed

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that the the celestial phenomena is evidence enough to establish his theory of universal gravitation, and the cause of gravity is an issue that does not bear on the truth of the theory. In Newtons own words (in his letter to Bentley, referred to above), Gravity must be caused by an agent acting constantly according to certain laws; but whether this agent be material or immaterial, I have left to the consideration of my readers (from Janiak, 2004, p. 103). In short, all that needs to be established and armed is that the celestial motions accord with his laws of motion and his theory of universal gravitation; the nature of the cause of the celestial motions (i.e., the cause of the apparent force of gravity) is an issue that need not be resolved to accept that gravity is indeed the force responsible for the phenomena.

References
Cohen, I. B. (1999). Guide to Newtons Principia. In The Principia, Mathematical principles of natural philosophy: A new translation (p. 1-370). University of California Press: Berkeley. Cohen, I. B. (2002). Newtons concepts of force and mass, with notes on the Laws of Motion. In I. B. Cohen & G. E. Smith (Eds.), The Cambridge companion to Newton (p. 57-84). Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, U.K. DiSalle, R. (1990). The essential properties of matter, space, and time: Comments on Michael Friedman. In P. Bricker & R. Hughes (Eds.), Philosophical perspectives on Newtonian science (p. 203-209). The MIT Press: Cambridge, Mass. DiSalle, R. (2002). Newtons philosophical analysis of space and time. In I. B. Cohen & G. E. Smith (Eds.), The Cambridge companion to Newton (p. 33-56). Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, U.K. Friedman, M. (1990). Kant and Newton: Why gravity is essential to matter. In Philosophical perspectives on Newtonian science (p. 185-202). The MIT Press: Cambridge, Mass. Friedman, M. (unpublished paper). Newton and Kant on absolute space: From theology to transcendental philosophy. Gabbey, A. (2002). Newton, active powers, and the mechanical philosophy. In I. B. Cohen & G. E. Smith (Eds.), The Cambridge companion to Newton (p. 329-357). Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, U.K. Janiak, A. (Ed.). (2004). Cambridge texts in the history of philosophy. Newton: Philosophical writings. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, U.K. Opticks: or A treatise of the reexions, refractions, inexions and colours of light. Based on the fourth edition London, 1730. (1952). Robert Maynard Hutchings (Ed.) Great books of the Western world. Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc. The Principia, Mathematical principles of natural philosophy: A new translation (I. B. Cohen &

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A. Whitman, Trans.). (1999). University of California Press: Berkeley. Containing a Guide to Newtons Principia by I. B. Cohen. Smith, G. E. (2002). The methodology of the Principia. In I. B. Cohen & G. E. Smith (Eds.), The Cambridge companion to Newton (p. 138-173). Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, U.K. Stein, H. (1967). Newtonian space-time. In R. Palter (Ed.), The Annus Mirabilis of Sir Isaac Nweton 1666-1966 (p. 258-284). The MIT Press: Cambridge Mass. Stein, H. (2002). Newtons metaphysics. In I. B. Cohen & G. E. Smith (Eds.), The Cambridge companion to Newton (p. 256-307). Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, U.K.

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