Table of

Contents
Volume 3, Spring 2006

atlantic international studies journal

Trained Cynics?
The importance of optimism in International Relations…………………………………..i
editorial

Nationalism
A compiled review……………………………………………………………………….iii
guy gautreau and laura young, compilers

Situating Micro-Finance on a Theoretical Spectrum:

The case of Bolivia………………………………………………………………………..1
emily shepard

Gender in Women’s Development Organizations:

from participation to empowerment……………………………………………………...10
betsy macdonald

Iraqi Kurdistan…………………………………………………………………………24
mike freen

The Terrorist Threat:

its impact on American civil liberties and democracy…………………………………...34
lindsay gorman

Provincial Reconstruction Teams……………………………………………………...47

shanley macarthur

The Environment and Conflict in the Rwandan Genocide…………………………..58

stephen brosha

The Border of Dreams:

Burmese women working in Thailand’s sex industry…………….………...……………72
melanie mcdonald

Determining the Success of a Transnational Social Movement:

Evaluating the Global Call to Action Against Poverty Coalition………………………..86
allison sephton
 Trained Cynics?
The Importance of Optimism in International Relations
Editorial
W e are discussing the consumption
and adoption of Southern culture by
the North, in a class entitled,
“Geography of the Developing World.” The
jaded international relations students have
brought up tourism and its negative
ramifications on indigenous culture; have
discussed property rights abuses in relation to
indigenous healing; have put forward the oft-
repeated view that the relationship between
the North and the South is exploitative.
Someone raises her hand timidly and queries,
“Maybe this interchance of cultures
between the North and the South broadens
horizons and identities? Maybe it creates
awareness amongst those of us who are so
lucky to live in the North? For humanity, this
is maybe a good thing?”
My friend turns to me, mirroring my
stunned look, and she says what I am sure we
are all thinking: “We are so cynical! We see
the good side, but we only ever talk about the
negatives.”
So often we are pessimistic about the
future. We get caught up in being critical and
overlook the successes we have already
accomplished – success captured in this year’s
journal in the form of remarkably thoughtful
and thought-provoking contributions from
people who are genuinely interested in
making a difference to this world; people who
demonstrate each day their belief that it is
possible to improve the lot of humanity as a
whole.
Students, I think, are particularly
susceptible to pessimism, as we are
encouraged to think critically about each
argument presented to us, to search out flaws.
We become excellent cynics. It is for this
reason (amongst many others) that this journal
is so important, within the Atlantic region,
certainly, but also as a sampling of the
exciting new scholarship being created by
undergraduate students everywhere.
Hopefully, this years ATLIS journal will
inspire and encourage further interest and
innovation in the arena of international
politics.
It has become a tiresome cliché to say that
we live in a time of dramatic change, yet this
sentiment should not be ignored simply
because we hear it so frequently. We do live
in a time of dramatic change. Whether you are
morally for or against globalization, there can
be little doubt that perceptions of space and
time are collapsing thanks to technology such
as the internet. This year, I have had friends
go to Poland, China, Sweden, Argentine, and
Kenya – a diverse range of countries and
experiences. I can talk to them all at the same
time, online (barring time change differences).
To me, this is the epitome of globalization.
The diversification of the International
Relations field reflects this broadening and
ii

deepening of our understanding of the world individual contributor’s unique voice and
and the actors within it. Within this journal experience. This year’s ATLIS journal is
are pieces related to Gender Studies, History, diverse, with no unifying theme other than its
to Political Science and to Geography. Each very diversity.
of these papers further draws on other Enjoy!
disciplines, pulling strands of thought from
the sciences, the social sciences, and personal
experience to create a more encompassing,
engaging, and realistically complex view of
what is occurring in the world today. Gone are
the black and white (or red and white?)
discussions of Cold War politics. Certainly
the theories that originated in that time still
influence today’s thought, but they are not
longer central. Today we worry about the
homogenization of culture, about gender
inequality, about political economy – we
focus not solely on state security, but on
human security. We focus on what we have in
common, rather than on our differences. Our
focus has shifted to humanity. We focus on
improving the lost of millions of people who
were not lucky in their birthplace, and a large
part of our willingness to engage in these acts
of improvement have to do with the
interchange of culture between North and
South. With the broadening and deepening of
our awareness, here in the North, of the
disadvantages and daily struggles of those in
the South, so too is the international relations
discipline enlarged. Of course, we in the
North can never understand these struggles at
a personal level – but we have a willingness to
engage in finding new means of problem
solving, and we have the skills to sift through
development precedents and come up with our
own solutions. And while those solutions may
not solve the problems as we hope, they are at
the very least a step in a bumbling path that
we can hope will only lead to good.
That hope, that optimism and belief in the
existence of solutions, is the foundation of any
scholarship in this discipline, and despite the
critical analyses presented in the following
pages, it sings through this journal, merely in
the fact of its existence, as well as in each
Book Review: Nationalism
Rabindranath Tagore
Guy Gautreau and Laura Young, compilers

Tagore, Rabindranath. “Nationalism.” (Kessinger Publishing, 1917).

Rabindranath Tagore, born in Calcutta in the latter half of the 19th century, has left a literary
legacy encompassing many themes and genres, and was the first Asian to be awarded the Nobel
Prize in 1913 (Literature). He published Nationalism in 1917 after a lecture tour abroad on the
subject, and in it, spoke of human destiny and the duality between mind and spirit. He also deplored
the effects of nationalism and denounced patriotism, arguing instead for the appreciation of spiritual
and humanistic values as well as greater cross-cultural understanding. The following are excerpts
from student book reviews written under the guidance of Owen Griffiths, Ph. D., and Associate
Professor of History at Mount Allison University.

The beginning of the First World War heralded a new era in political theory. Doubts
as to the validity of certain political ideologies began to emerge in intellectual circles as
Europe, followed by the world, deteriorated into conflict. In Europe, doubts centred on
state interactions and the nature of man, while in the colonies, doubts centred on the
previously unchallenged idea of European superiority. Questions regarding Europeans’
natural right to govern so-called inferior peoples emerged as civilization in Europe
crumbled. Until recently, the contributions of nationalism to the rapid cascade of war in
the years preceding World Wars One and Two have been sidelined. In this respect,
Rabindranath Tagore was astoundingly prescient in his series of lectures published in
1917. Published collectively under the title “Nationalism,” the lectures propound that
nationalism was the cause of what was then believed to be the war to end all wars, and
cautions audiences against the “anaesthetizing” influence of the quest for nationalism
(57).
At the time of Tagore’s writing, Social Darwinism was the geo-political catch-phrase
and, as in scientific Darwinism, only those deemed fit by survival were successful.
Those that were unfit “must go to the wall – they shall die, and this is science,” (45).
The problem with adapting ‘survival of the fittest’ to international relations is the
perception of death resulting from unfitness: only nations could be fit – and as a result,
the perception that “As long as nations are rampant in this world we have not the
option freely to develop our higher humanity” (38). Individuality has no place in
success as it is defined under social Darwinism, and so we are hindered by our “fetich
iv atlantic international studies journal

[sic] of nationalism,” (39). It is through competition that each society will be drawn
into this fetish (38-39). The alliances of the First World War further reflect (and lend
support to) Tagore’s concern that nationalistic “machines will come into an agreement,
for their mutual protection, based upon a conspiracy of fear;” a type of international
social contract that is not unlike that suggested by Thomas Hobbes at the
domestic/societal level. Furthermore, this survival of the fittest at the international level
encourages a ‘beggar-thy-neighbour’ sort of policy: the motto of nations becomes
“Help yourself, and never heed what it costs to others,” (96-97). Thus he justifies doubt
in English superiority, tracing the means by which nationalism has underscored the
morality of their actions and subsequently undermined their strong position in the
world: “the West has been systematically petrifying her moral nature in order to lay a
solid foundation for her gigantic abstractions of inefficiency” through the machinery of
nationalism, which supersedes any human characteristic (46). “The veil has been
raised, and in this frightful way the West has stood face to face with her own creation,
to which she had offered her soul,” (59). That the West had begun to doubt itself
further legitimated doubt in the colonies and enabled intellectual circles in those
territories to create alternative paths, that would emerge later in the twentieth century.
(Young)

Although the lectures are presented as discrete units, metaphors across the three serve
to link them to one another, and an overarching theme of heart versus mind can be
discerned. This debate has been a popular one throughout history since the emergence
of science and rational thought in the Enlightenment and the subsequent attempt at
reconciliation between two means of understanding the universe that are frequently
presumed to be diametrically opposed. (Young)

[Tagore’s] use of language throughout [Nationalism] is beautiful and many of his

ideas enduring, but definitions and scientific evidence are mostly absent. It is quite
probable that Tagore abhorred the overtly methodological use of language to express
deep thoughts, simply because it so resembles the stark mechanical character of
capitalist production within the European nation itself. As a result though, what
happens is that many of his most important statements are seemingly lost within
broader descriptions and hidden in the middle of paragraphs…since they do not always
follow a coherent logical sequence. For instance, he states at one point: “I am not
against one nation in particular, but against the general idea of all nations. What is the
Nation? It is the aspect of a whole people as an organized power” (131). This
quotation, as much as any, sums Tagore’s theses, yet it is found in an obscure section
of the text on nationalism in India. Rather than to criticize his writing style, which
again is admirable, I would simply like to draw attention here to the difficulties that
exist in trying to uncover Tagore’s inner logic and rationality. (Gautreau)

…[Tagore] is criticizing, with much wit and inspiration, the direction the entire
human race is taking. The West, he insists, is embarking on a dangerously
dehumanizing path. “The vital ambition of the present civilization of Europe is to have
the exclusive possession of the devil,” (101). The Nation, for Tagore, is based on many
things, some worthy but many entirely abject: organized self-interest, greed for wealth
 special contribution v

and shallow power, fear of exploitation by an alienating and mechanical mode of

production, the delusion of freedom, the fall of virtue, unconsciousness, an
unsustainable future that will either lead to catastrophe or a necessary spiritual rebirth,
and so on. Conversely, those that avoid nationalism (he longed that India, Japan, and
the rest of Asia would do so) and maintain their spiritual integrity thus avoid this grim
fate and have no need for so-called rebirth. “The East with her ideals, in whose bosom
are stored the ages of sunlight and silence of stars, can patiently wait till the West,
hurrying after the expedient, losses breath and stops” (81). His message is
simultaneously naïve and visionary; his stance futile and courageous. Nationalism
challenges the power of words, because the task of showing the decline of spirituality
in the West is far from easy. (Gautreau)

Tagore is addressing his argument specifically to a Western audience. To this end,

although he writes from an Indian perspective, his main goal is to convince the people
of the West of the danger which the Western Nation poses to their own freedom. This
argument introduces one of Tagore’s most potent ideas, that the very idea of the nation
itself is an anaesthetic that blinds people to the truth of its nature and deludes them into
ignoring its oppressive force. Tagore believes that there is a disconnect between the
ideals of the Western spirit and the reality of the Western Nation to which the people of
that nation are blind. Tagore points to the paradox of the West, “while the Spirit of the
West marches under its banner of freedom, the Nation of the West forges its iron
chains of organization,” (37). In Tagore’s opinion the people of the West have deluded
themselves into sacrificing their own freedoms for the good of the Nation, naively
believing that the good of the nation is the same as the good of the people, when in
reality they have simply bartered their “higher aspirations in life for profit and power,”
(40). (MacLachlan)

It is easy to accept [Tagore’s] assertions of an Eastern civilization “devoid of all

politics” and concerned only with the soul (17) while the West is characterized by a
scientifically organized scramble for material wealth. These distinctions at first may
not seem remarkable because we have internalized these ideas of the Orient and the
West and the values that each supposedly hold. However, the legitimacy of these
assumptions is certainly deserving of some examination. The second aspect of these
essays that can perhaps be considered a weak point is Tagore’s idealism of the pasts of
both the West and the East. Throughout the three essays, Tagore makes reference to an
Asia of the past that “…was united with India in the closest tie of friendship…” and
where relations between countries were “not that of self-interest, or exploration and
spoliation of each other’s pockets…” (75). However, we know that Asia has not been
exempt from the forces that have ruled the rest of human history; she has seen her share
of states in conflict and wars of expansion and invasion. Tagore has equally laudatory
words for the Middle Ages of Europe – according to him, “Europe owes all her
greatness in humanity to that period…” (47). A period, if looked at honestly,
characterized by religious persecution in Europe and perpetrated by Europeans abroad,
and an extremely rigid, religiously inspired hierarchy that kept the majority in abject
poverty. Therefore, it is hard to take seriously Tagore’s analysis of history, and these
vi atlantic international studies journal

statements seem intended to appeal to a colonized people resentful of their present

situation and proud of their past rather than as facts supporting his thesis.
Perhaps, however, the above weaknesses are only facets of the kind of writing Tagore
has undertaken. He is not a scholar, but a poet, and he is not writing for academia, but
to get a message out to the population at large. Appealing to peoples’ sentiments, with
messages that have emotional, if not entirely factual truth, is undeniably a powerful
method of promoting and spreading ideas. That today, for a Canadian university
student, some aspects of Tagore’s essays are a little hard to swallow may just prove his
point about the scientific, narrow bent of the Western mind (Williams).

Nationalism provides a rich commentary on the concept of the Nation. Since

Nationalism was written, the world has seen the rise of Nazi Germany, Imperial Japan,
and Soviet Russia propelled by intense patriotism. America, the world hegemon of the
moment, has also been fuelled by patriotism and found itself in several international
situations viewed as less than humanitarian. If the evils of Tagore’s Nation have been
illustrated several times since 1913 and continue to be today, the book must have some
value, despite the fact that Tagore’s solutions lay in a fictional East. (Durrant).

Tagore’s prophecy that the nation will decline like the sun setting in his poem has yet
to be fulfilled. Today the modern nations of the world persist, but we are faced with the
growth of a new beast, one that in many places rivals the power of the nation: the
Corporation. Reading Tagore’s book from a modern perspective one could almost
completely substitute the use of the word “Nation” with “Corporation.” In many ways
their definitions are the same and the destructive power they possess is identical. The
parallels between the two mechanisms are many, but what is truly remarkable is how
Tagore’s writing can act as a lesson about both. His treatise is still magnificent because
it is still applicable to its intended purpose but has also come to mean more than Tagore
intended. One could still read his book as a comment on the modern nations which
have spread out around the globe, but it could also now be read as a warning about the
powerful Corporations which have sprung up and now threaten to exceed the
destructive power of even the Nation. (MacLachlan).

Indubitably, Tagore’s cautionary tales have high relevance in today’s international arena. As
Durrant highlights, the largest conflicts of the 20th century have been inspired by nationalistic
sentiment – and as MacLachlan so provocatively suggests, although nationalism may be on the
decline, we are witnessing the emergence of a new threat, similar in its disregard for humanity, in
the rise of the multinational corporation. Yet the novelty of this threat should in no way overshadow
the original purpose of Tagore’s lectures. Nationalism still plays a crucial role in the events that
occur on the world stage, even in the new 21st century, post 9/11. The attacks of 9/11 may have been
based in differing ideological sentiments, but they were executed both on and through symbols of
national pride: the successful free-market economy, as represented by the World Trade Centre; and
nationally-based airlines. Nationalism should thus remain a fundamental international relations text.
 special contribution vii

WORKS CITED

Durrant, Christopher. Nationalism. Unpublished paper. 2006.

Gautreau, Guy. Nationalism. Unpublished paper. 2006.

MacLachlan, Caitlin. Nationalism. Unpublished paper. 2006.

Roberts, Zoe. Nationalism. Unpublished paper. 2006.

Young, Laura. Nationalism. Unpublished paper. 2006.

Situating Micro-Finance on a Theoretical Spectrum:
The Case of Bolivia
Emily Shepard
A
ccording to the United Nations, 2005
was the year of micro-credit. Touted
as “the newest darling of the aid
community,” micro-credit has been
promoted as a viable tool for development
by influential international organizations
such as the World Bank.1 Despite a
proliferation of literature on the benefits of
micro-finance, few scholars have discussed
the theoretical bases of this recent
phenomenon. As such, this paper will argue
that micro-finance can be theoretically
situated on a continuum which is book ended
by neo-liberalism and participatory
development. The paper will then explore
the parameters of three micro-finance
institutions in Bolivia: Banco Solidario, Caja
Los Andes, and ProMujer, and attempt to
place them along this theoretical spectrum.
In doing so, it will explore some of the
disadvantages of the theoretical situations of
each micro-lender, as they relate to the
Bolivian market.
1 2
Claudio Gonzales-Vega, Richard L. Meyer, Sergio
Navajas, Mark Schreiner. “Microcredit and the
poorest of the poor: Theory and evidence from
Bolivia.” World Development 28.2 (2000): 1.;
François Bourguignon, James D. Wolfenson.
“Development and Poverty Reduction; Looking
Back, Looking Ahead.” The World Bank (2004).
THEORETICAL MOTIVATIONS FOR
MICROCREDIT
Micro-credit can be loosely defined as the
provision of small loans to those who would
not typically be able to borrow due to a lack of
collateral.2
Micro-credit can be provided by a number
of sources, including family members,
pawnshops, non-governmental organizations,
and commercial banks.3 The formalization of
micro-credit in recent years has been embraced
by two theories of development: neo-liberalism
and participatory development.
The theoretical motivations for micro-credit
exist along a spectrum. At one end is the neo-
liberal model, highlighting economics and the
private sector as critical tools of development.
At the opposing end is participatory
development, promoting local diversity and
agendas as the basis of economic growth and
holistic development. Although both
purportedly seek to alleviate poverty, when
actualized, these theories differ in terms of who
provides loans, who receives loans, and how
loans are constructed. Neo-liberalism became a
dominant theory of development in the 1980s,
and continues to be the theoretical motivation
Jonathon Conning, Claudio Gonzales-Vega, Sergio
Navajas, “Lending technologies, competition and
consolidation in the market for microfinance in Bolivia.”
Journal of International Development 15 (2003): 747-
770.
3
Muhammad Yunus. “What is Microcredit?” The
Grameen Bank (2004).
2 emily shepard

for influential organizations such as the growth.”7 By exposing pre-existing informal

World Bank and the International Monetary economic networks, as well as providing the
Fund. Neo-liberal ideology relies on opportunity for the creation of additional formal
individuals to make rational decisions that businesses, neo-liberalism posits that the
are in their best interests, and assumes that macroeconomic situation of the state will
such decisions will lead to the betterment of improve.
society through the growth of the market.4 Whereas neo-liberalism is fundamentally
This market should be as detached from the about economics, participatory development
state as possible, with the state regulating (PD) is focused on power and community. In
rather than initiating PD, economic power
5
economic activity. becomes a part of a holistic
Economic growth and conception of power, which
prosperity is the main goal
Micro-credit… becomes includes structures of
of any development project, a means of developing knowledge, social situations,
and “is considered of local communities and political influences.8 PD
greater value than values local diversity and
individual welfare, local
according to a agendas, seeking to
culture and tradition, and mainstream definition of implement projects using
the environment
6
in development in an local knowledge, local
development proposals.” capital, and local labour.9
Micro-credit does not
alternative way The community is the agent
initially appear as an area in that requires development,
which neo-liberals would rather than the individual or
be interested. As a ‘bottom-up’ method of the state. As such, PD is largely delivered by
poverty alleviation, micro-credit clashes NGOs and community organizations rather than
with the typically ‘top-down’ methodology national or international bodies.10
of neo-liberalism. However, micro-credit for The ‘instrumental’ strain of participatory
micro-enterprise becomes a neo-liberal development best explains the connection
construct when one views it as the between PD and micro-credit. Within the
formalizing an informal economy. instrumental view, “The goals of development
According to a report on poverty reduction are valid although the institutions are
published by the World Bank, “Private malfunctioning, but can be improved by
enterprise operating through the market is involving the beneficiaries.”11 Micro-credit thus
the main engine of sustained economic becomes a means of developing local
communities according to a mainstream
definition of development in an alternative way.

4 7
Peter March, Terry March. “Neoliberalism not so François Bourguignon, James D. Wolfenson,
new: Philosophy accepts survival of the fittest as “Development and Poverty Reduction; Looking Back,
norm for society.” Daily News 4 Sept. 2000: 14. Looking Ahead.” The World Bank (2004): 9.
5 8
David Simon. “Neo-liberalism, structural Giles Mohan. “Participatory Development.” The
adjustment and poverty reduction strategies.” The Companion to Development Studies Ed. Vandana Desai,
Companion to Development Studies Ed. Vandana Robert B. Potter. New York: Oxford University Press
Desai, Robert B. Potter. New York: Oxford Inc., 2002. 49-54.
9
University Press Inc., 2002. 86-91. ibid.
6 10
John Morris, Kris Stevens. “Struggling toward ibid.
11
sustainability: Considering grassroots development.” ibid., 50
Sustainable Development 9.3 (2001):11.
atlantic international studies journal
By subverting the bureaucratic state, micro-
credit allows the true needs of individual
communities to be addressed
There are three primary grounds on
which neo-liberalism and participatory
development differ in terms of micro-
finance. Firstly, neo-liberalism is focused on
the betterment of the market, whereas
participatory development is focused on the
betterment of a community. Secondly, neo-
liberalism relies of the rational choices of the
individual, whereas participatory
development relies on the collective choices
of groups of and societies. Finally, given the
neo-liberal bias toward economics, neo-
liberals are more likely to view their
borrowers as clients, whereas those valuing
participatory development consider their
borrowers as beneficiaries.
With this theoretical spectrum in mind, it
is pertinent to examine several cases of
micro-lending institutions, their
compositions, their ‘clients’ and their
services. In doing so, the theoretical
applications of both neo-liberalism and
participatory development will become more
apparent, as will the ambiguous middle
ground in between these polarized
ideologies.
MICRO-FINANCE IN BOLIVIA
Bolivia is currently home to a wide
variety of micro-lending institutions. The
Bolivian market was primed for such
institutions throughout the 1980s, when
dense urban populations and the effective
failure of the formal financial sector caused
extreme poverty and disillusionment with
traditional banking.12
Conning et al. (2003) divide the
evolution of the Bolivian market for micro-
credit into three stages. The first stage began
12
Jonathon Conning, Claudio Gonzales-Vega, Sergio
Navajas. “Lending technologies, competition and
consolidation in the market for microfinance in
Bolivia.”
3
in 1992 with the emergence of commercial
bank Banco Solidario (BancoSol). The second
stage began three years later, when financial
intermediary (Fondo Financiero Privado,
henceforth referred to as FFP) Caja Los Andes
entered the regulated market, providing
substantial competition for BancoSol. The third
stage, beginning around 1998 and continuing
into the present, has been characterized by a
dramatic increase in competition. Smaller
micro-lenders have flooded the market,
including innumerable unregulated NGOs
targeting specific populations. In July 2003,
220 regulated organizations existed to provide
micro-credit, compared with the monopoly held
by Banco Solidario nine years earlier.
Based on this evaluation, it is clear that
Bolivia is an excellent market in which to
examine different varieties of micro-lenders.
Three organizations have been chosen, each
characterizing one of Navajas et al.’s stages of
micro-credit in Bolivia: Banco Solidario, Caja
Los Andes, and ProMujer.
Stage I: Banco Solidario
Infrastructure
Banco Solidario (BancoSol) was formed
from the NGO Fundación para la Promoción y
Desarrollo de la MicroEmpresa (PRODEM,
est.1987) in 1992, and was the first NGO to
evolve into a commercial bank.13 An
understanding of the implications of the title
“commercial bank” to micro-finance is critical
to understanding the foundations of BancoSol.
As a commercial bank, BancoSol has been
able to expand its services to include debit
cards, tax payments, mortgages, and loans to
finance the purchases of vehicles.14 In addition
to this expansion of services, the status of
commercial bank has allowed BancoSol to
13
David Schwartz. “Following Bolivia’s example: The
commercialization of microfinance.” Women &
Environments International Magazine 54/55 (2002): 32-
34.
14
BancoSol. “Our Products.” Accessed March 18, 2005.
http://www.bancosol.com.bo/en/productos.e.html
4 emily shepard
attract more foreign and national private
capital.15 This capital has increased the cost
of liabilities, forcing BancoSol to improve
its efficiency through projects such as more
advanced computing systems. More
experienced and business-minded managers
were hired to supervise and implement this
costly process. In order to minimize the
financial impact of a more advanced
infrastructure, BancoSol provided longer and
larger loans, resulting in an increase in
clientele from 23,000 in 1992 to 81,000 in
1998.16
The benefits of commercial bank status
have been accompanied by tight regulation
by the government, including stipulations
regarding eligibility for a loan, hours of
operation, and interest rates.17 As such,
BancoSol has encountered both advantages
and disadvantages in the status of
commercial bank.
Clientèle
In 2002, BancoSol provided loans to
50,904 clients, and an average loan of $827
in 2001.18 Their poorest client in 1999
received an annual salary of $60.19
Comparatively, BancoSol’s clients are
neither extremely wealthy, nor extremely
poor. As the largest micro-lending institution
in Bolivia, BancoSol is unable to offer
specified loans and therefore appeals more
15
Gonzales-Vega, Claudio, Meyer, Richard L,
Navajas, Sergio, Schreiner, Mark. “Microcredit and
the poorest of the poor: Theory and evidence from
Bolivia.” World Development 28.2 (2000): 333-346.
16
Mark Schreiner. “Aspects of outreach: A
framework for discussion of the social benefits of
microfinance.” 14.5 (2002): 591-603.
17
Consultive Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP).
“Bolivia: Country Indicators.” Last Updated: Jul,
2003.
http://www.cgap.org/regsup/docs/pro_Bolivia.pdf
18
BancoSol. “Annual Report: 2002.” (2002).
http://www.bancosol.com.bo/en/memoria_new_e.pdf
19
Paul Mosley. “Microfinance and poverty in
Bolivia.” The Journal of Development Studies 37.4
(2001): 101-133.
to the status quo than any minority. This “one
size fits all” philosophy can hinder both higher-
productivity borrowers and those who need
special accommodations to escape severe
poverty.20 By providing a series of standard
loans, BancoSol is able to reach the broadest
market possible, at a lower overall cost.21
Loan Structure
BancoSol has traditionally provided group
loans at a minimum of $100.22 These groups
consist of three to seven people who own a
variety of businesses, each of which must be at
least six months old. Within a group, there must
be some similarities in terms of credit needs,
and the businesses must not be related in terms
of transactions or family connections. Group
members are individually assessed for their
abilities to repay based on interviews, personal
financial information, and business records.23
Once a group has been formed, it is
accountable for collective installments to repay
the bank. This form of “social collateral”
ensures that if one group member is unable to
pay, the rest of the members must compensate
for the deficit.24 Should the group installment
be incomplete, pressure will be placed on the
entire group through financial penalties and
threats of reporting group members as
defaulters to other credit agencies. Once a
group has repaid the initial loan, it is eligible
for a second, larger loan. This progressive
lending attempts to ensure customer loyalty.25
20
Jonathon Conning, Claudio Gonzales-Vega, Sergio
Navajas. “Lending technologies, competition and
consolidation in the market for microfinance in Bolivia.”
Journal of International Development 15 (2003): 753
21
ibid.
22
Paul Mosley. “Microfinance and poverty in Bolivia.”
The Journal of Development Studies 37.4 (2001): 101-
133.
23
Eric Van Tassel. “A study of group lending and
incentives in Bolivia.” International Journal of Social
Economics 27.7-10 (2000): 927.
24
ibid.
25
ibid.
atlantic international studies journal
Stage II: Caja Los Andes
Infrastructure
Caja Los Andes was established in 1995,
emerging from the NGO Procredito (est.
1992). As of July 2003 Caja Los Andes was
one of seven FFPs in Bolivia, and one of the
most profitable micro-finance agencies in
Bolivia.26 The legal category of FFP was
established in 1993 to designate financial
institutions that are solely devoted to micro-
finance. In order to obtain the status of an
FFP, the micro-finance operation must be
run by those experienced in the provision of
micro-credit.27 An FFP is regulated in
similar ways to a bank, with the main
distinction being much lower minimum
capital requirement.28 However, unlike
banks, FFPs cannot provide specific services
such as chequing accounts or trust funds.
Clientèle
Caja Los Andes serves primarily urban
clients. Clients are generally better educated,
wealthier, and better established that those of
BancoSol. Whereas 3 percent of BancoSol
clients had achieved beyond a grade 12
education in 1995, 11 percent of Caja Los
Andes clients had achieved this level.
Clients of Caja Los Andes are more likely
than those of BancoSol to have access to
running water, electricity, and waste disposal
26
Jonathon Conning, Claudio Gonzales-Vega, Sergio
Navajas. “Lending technologies, competition and
consolidation in the market for microfinance in
Bolivia.” Journal of International Development 15
(2003): 747-770; Consultive Group to Assist the Poor
(CGAP). “Bolivia: Country Indicators.” Last
Updated: Jul, 2003.
http://www.cgap.org/regsup/docs/pro_Bolivia.pdf
27
Consultive Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP).
“Bolivia: Country Indicators.” Last Updated: Jul,
2003.
http://www.cgap.org/regsup/docs/pro_Bolivia.pdf
28
David Schwartz. “Following Bolivia’s example:
The commercialization of microfinance.” Women &
Environments International Magazine 54/55 (2002):
32-34.
5
services within their home. They are also more
likely to own their homes, and possess liquid
collateral.29
Loan Structure
Similar criteria are held for loan eligibility,
including a clean credit history and a business
that has been in operation for at least a year.30
However, the types of loans that are offered
vary significantly with those of BancoSol. Caja
Los Andes offers only individual loans, often
secured through personal guarantees. Loans are
often larger, with an emphasis on financing
manufacturing projects. In 1995, eight percent
of Caja Los Andes loans were over $1000,
whereas zero percent of BancoSol loans
exceeded the same amount. In terms of all loans
offered by both institutions, 27 percent of Caja
Los Andes’s were over $1000, compared to 18
percent of BancoSol’s.31
Screening processes are also more extensive
and precise. A critical component of the
screening process allows Caja Los Andes to
“tailor loan contracts to each borrower’s
productivity level.”32 Caja Los Andes is also
careful to offer loans only to borrowers “to
which it can profitably lend.”33 This
specification of economic potential has allowed
Caja Los Andes to reduce interest rates and
become a more efficient operation. However,
this has also meant a decreased interest in
providing smaller loans, as they are less
profitable.
29
Claudio Gonzalez-Vega, Richard L. Meyer, Guillermo
F Monje, Sergio Navajas, Jorge Rodriguez-Meza, Mark
Schreiner. “Microfinance market niches and client
profiles in Bolivia.” Economics and Sociology (1996)
occ. paper no. 2346.
30
ibid.
31
ibid.
32
Jonathan Conning, Claudio Gonzales-Vega, Sergio
Navajas. “Lending technologies, competition and
consolidation in the market for microfinance in Bolivia.”
Journal of International Development 15 (2003): 747-
770.
33
ibid.
6 emily shepard
Stage III: ProMujer
Infrastructure
ProMujer is a micro-finance institution
that lends solely to women. It began in 1990,
as an NGO that provided training for women
on familial and domestic issues. Services
expanded the following year to include
micro-credit, although this service did not
become remarkably popular until 1994.34
As an NGO, ProMujer experiences the
least regulation of all micro-lenders
examined in this paper.35 As such, the
composition of ProMujer is not determined
by the government. Between 81 and 90
percent of ProMujer’s operations are
concerned with micro-finance, and the
remainder seek to educate women on
everything from childcare to business
management.36 The mission of ProMujer is,
“is to empower women to improve their
social and economic status… Since good
health and self-esteem directly contribute to
a woman’s ability to earn income and care
for her family ProMujer also provides health
and human development and links women
and their families to health services.”37
(ProMujer, 2005) ProMujer is focused on
creating links between women and other
women, and between women and their
communities as a way to attain development.
Clientèle
ProMujer’s clientèle is much more
specific than that of either Caja Los Andes
or BancoSol. ProMujer lends to primarily
urban women, most of whom have recently
34
MixMarket. “ProMujer – Bolivia.” Accessed:
March 15, 2005.
http://www.mixmarket.org/en/demand/demand.show.
profile.asp?ett=153
35
Consultive Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP).
“Bolivia: Country Indicators.” Last Updated: Jul,
2003.
http://www.cgap.org/regsup/docs/pro_Bolivia.pdf
36
ibid.
37
ProMujer. “Mission.” Accessed: March 13, 2005.
http://www.promujer.org/mission.html
migrated from surrounding urban areas. This
specific form of loan has caught on -between
1994 and 2003, ProMujer’s client base grew
from 4,000 to nearly 40,000. The average loan
size is a mere $146, with a minimum loan of
$50, indicating that borrowers are operating
smaller businesses with lower capital needs.38
ProMujer’s clients are generally poorer than
those of other micro-credit agencies, with the
poorest clients earning $45 annually. According
to an analysis conducted by Marconi et al., 38.3
percent of the clients of ProMujer and similar
NGO Crecer were “poor and destitute,” as
opposed to 10.6 percent of clients of other
micro-finance institutions.39 In the same way,
14.1 percent of ProMujer and Crecer clients did
not have the lowest level of education, as
opposed to 5.1 percent of other micro-finance
clients.40
Loan Structure
ProMujer provides the most comprehensive
and time-intensive form of micro-credit. As
previously discussed, ProMujer emphasizes
training as a vital counterpart to the actual loans
offered through micro-credit. This emphasis is
actualized in ProMujer’s three-part credit
program, which includes 16 hours of pre-credit
training, and a four-month initial loan period in
which weekly meetings are held to continue
training. During the pre-credit program, women
form “solidarity groups” similar to those
formed by clients of BancoSol. These groups
are then responsible for the repayment of a
group loan, and the amount offered for a loan
can increase with successful repayment. Unlike
BancoSol, ProMujer stresses the community
aspect of these groups, ensuring that the women
are able to connect on levels transcending the
financial. Larger groups of 25 to 30 women
38
ProMujer. “Mission.” Accessed: March 13, 2005.
http://www.promujer.org/mission.html
39
Reynalda Marconi, Carmen Velasco. “Group
dynamics, gender and microfinance in Bolivia.” Journal
of International Development 16.3 (2004): 8.
40
ibid.
atlantic international studies journal
form communal banks to supervise these
solidarity groups.41 Another way in which
community is emphasized is through the
mandatory saving of 10 percent of the loan
value. This is set aside as an emergency
fund, which can be accessed by any member
of a solidarity group in dire circumstances.42
THEORY: APPLICATIONS & INADEQUACIES
Caja Los Andes is evidently the most
neo-liberal micro-credit institution
examined. Its emphasis on economic
efficiency, the rational individual as a
borrower, and its status as one of the most
profitable micro-lenders are consistent with
neo-liberal principles. However, Caja Los
Andes is not providing micro-credit to the
poorest of the poor, a value of micro-credit
that was specified in a summit on micro-
credit held in 1997.43 This exposes a
weakness in neo-liberal theory. If the market
is to be the driving force behind the
development of micro-finance, then
increased competition, such as is witnessed
in Bolivia, will prompt micro-creditors to
seek more affluent borrowers in an attempt
to receive a greater return on loans.44 This
alienates the poorer sector of society, and
caters only to the development of the elite.
However, this is still consistent with neo-
liberal theory. In fact, a natural progression
to the ‘top’ of society would complement
neo-liberal theory, which often operates as a
top-down model. Perhaps neo-liberalism is
not as suited to the brand of micro-finance it
41
ProMujer. “Mission.” Accessed: March 13, 2005.
http://www.promujer.org/mission.html
42
Paul Mosley. “Microfinance and poverty in
Bolivia.” The Journal of Development Studies 37.4
(2001): 101-133.
43
MicroCredit Summit. “Declaration and plan of
action.” (1997)
http://www.microcreditsummit.org/declaration.htm#C
haractieristics
44
David Schwartz. “Following Bolivia’s example:
The commercialization of microfinance.” Women &
Environments International Magazine 54/55 (2002):
32-34.
7
supports in rhetoric; if the neo-liberal model
followed closely, it avoids development at
lower levels of income.
ProMujer, sits on the opposite end of the
continuum, conforming to the theory of
participatory development. This is theoretical
foundation is demonstrated within ProMujer’s
credit program, where loans promote collective
progress through local communal banks and
mandatory savings. However, this body of
theory has also encountered criticisms. The
mandatory training accompanying loans has
been labeled by some borrowers as unnecessary
– even patronizing – consuming valuable time
that could be used to develop their businesses.45
This is particularly a problem with women, who
are often trying to manage their businesses at
the same time as their households. Secondly, by
refusing to move to higher-profit borrowers like
Caja Los Andes, ProMujer is relying on poverty
to sustain its well being. As stated by Elahi,
“the potential consequence of the establishment
of micro-finance industry in the Third World is
the creation of private groups that might have
vested interests in the perpetuation of
poverty.”46 The conflicts of condescending
training and an unnatural reliance on poverty
restrict the further growth of NGOs such a
ProMujer.
Finally, BancoSol is theoretically mixed. Its
group lending technique is characteristic of
participatory development, but its drive for
status as a commercial bank was largely
motivated by neo-liberal ideals. BancoSol is
most distinctly neo-liberal in its treatment of
borrowers as clients, rather than beneficiaries.
The large size of BancoSol does not allow for
charity or exception, and thus, borrowers are
confronted with a variety of generic loans that
may or may not suit their needs. This “blurring
45
Robyn Eversole. “Help, risk, and deceit:
Microentrepreneurs talk about microfinance.” Journal of
International Development 15.2 (2003): 179-188.
46
Khandakar Q. Elahi, Constantine P. Danopoulos.
“Microfinance and third world development: A critical
analysis.”
8 emily shepard
of banking and social development
discourse,” has alienated borrowers, as they
are often expecting to be treated as
beneficiaries, and are surprised when they
are treated as clients.47 The rift between
BancoSol and its borrowers became a
problem during the Bolivian economic crisis
of 1999, when indebtedness skyrocketed,
and BancoSol’s return on equity fell from 29
percent to 9 percent.48 By attempting to
straddle both theories while new micro-
lenders target specific demographics,
BancoSol is losing its ability to appeal to the
general public.
CONCLUSIONS
It is clear that micro-credit can be
theoretically motivated along a spectrum
wherein neo-liberalism is at one extreme and
participatory development at the other. This
has been exemplified by three micro-
financiers from the Bolivian market:
BancoSol, which is theoretically mixed, Caja
Los Andes, which is primarily neo-liberal,
and ProMujer, which is primarily influenced
by participatory development. Many
complexities exist within this framework,
which have been highlighted as the Bolivian
market has become saturated with micro-
lenders. We have seen that neo-liberalism
can ignore the poor, participatory
development can inhibit innovation and
could preserve poverty, and a hybrid of both
theories can stagnate and alienate borrowers.
Regardless of which theory is employed to
create a lending institution, micro-finance
continues to be a compelling force in
development. Situating micro-finance
theoretically can help to us understand why
it has become so diverse and disjointed.
47
Robyn Eversole. “Help, risk, and deceit:
Microentrepreneurs talk about microfinance.” Journal
of International Development 15.2 (2003): 2
48
David Schwartz. “Following Bolivia’s example:
The commercialization of microfinance.” Women &
Environments International Magazine 54/55 (2002):
32-34
SOURCES
BancoSol. “Annual Report: 2002.” (2002).
http://www.bancosol.com.bo/en/memoria_n
ew_e.pdf
BancoSol. “Our Products.” Accessed March 18,
2005.
http://www.bancosol.com.bo/en/productos.e
.html
Bourguignon, François, Wolfenson, James D.
“Development and Poverty Reduction;
Looking Back, Looking Ahead.” The World
Bank (2004).
Conning, Jonathan, Gonzales-Vega, Claudio,
Navajas, Sergio. “Lending technologies,
competition and consolidation in the market
for microfinance in Bolivia.” Journal of
International Development 15 (2003): 747-
770.
Consultive Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP).
“Bolivia: Country Indicators.” Last
Updated: Jul, 2003.
http://www.cgap.org/regsup/docs/pro_Boliv
ia.pdf
Consultive Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP).
“Regulation & supervision of microfinance
institutions: Stabilizing a new financial
market.” Focus 4 (1996).
Elahi, Khandakar Q, Danopoulos, Constantine
P. “Microfinance and third world
development: A critical analysis.” Journal
of Political and Military Sociology 32.1
(2004): 61-88.
Eversole, Robyn. “Help, risk, and deceit:
Microentrepreneurs talk about
microfinance.” Journal of International
Development 15.2 (2003): 179-188.
atlantic international studies journal
Gonzales-Vega, Claudio, Meyer, Richard L,
Navajas, Sergio, Schreiner, Mark.
“Microcredit and the poorest of the poor:
Theory and evidence from Bolivia.”
World Development 28.2 (2000): 333-
346.
Gonzalez-Vega, Claudio. Meyer, Richard L.
Monje, Guillermo F. Navajas, Sergio.
Rodriguez-Meza, Jorge. Schreiner,
Mark. “Microfinance market niches and
client profiles in Bolivia.” Economics
and Sociology (1996) occ. paper no.
2346.
March, Peter, March, Terry. “Neoliberalism
not so new: Philosophy accepts survival
of the fittest as norm for society.” Daily
News 4 Sept. 2000: 14.
Marconi, Reynalda, Velasco, Carmen.
“Group dynamics, gender and
microfinance in Bolivia.” Journal of
International Development 16.3 (2004):
519-528.
MicroCredit Summit. “Declaration and plan
of action.” (1997)
http://www.microcreditsummit.org/decla
ration.htm#Charactieristics
MixMarket. “ProMujer – Bolivia.”
Accessed: March 15, 2005.
http://www.mixmarket.org/en/demand/d
emand.show.profile.asp?ett=153
Mohan, Giles. “Participatory Development.”
The Companion to Development Studies
Ed. Vandana Desai, Robert B. Potter.
New York: Oxford University Press Inc.,
2002. 49-54.
Mohan, Giles. Stokke, Kristian.
“Participartory development and
empowerment: The dangers of localism.”
9
Third World Quarterly 21.2 (2000): 247-
259.
Morris, John. Stevens, Kris. “Struggling toward
sustainability: Considering grassroots
development.” Sustainable Development
9.3 (2001):149-164.
Mosley, Paul. “Microfinance and poverty in
Bolivia.” The Journal of Development
Studies 37.4 (2001): 101-133.
ProMujer. “Mission.” Accessed: March 13,
2005.
http://www.promujer.org/mission.html
Simon, David. “Neo-liberalism, structural
adjustment and poverty reduction
strategies.” The Companion to
Development Studies Ed. Vandana Desai,
Robert B. Potter. New York: Oxford
University Press Inc., 2002. 86-91.
Schreiner, Mark. “Aspects of outreach: A
framework for discussion of the social
benefits of microfinance.” 14.5 (2002): 591-
603.
Schwartz, David. “Following Bolivia’s
example: The commercialization of
microfinance.” Women & Environments
International Magazine 54/55 (2002): 32-
34.
Van Tassel, Eric. “A study of group lending
and incentives in Bolivia.” International
Journal of Social Economics 27.7-10
(2000): 927.
Yunus, Muhammad. “What is Microcredit?”
The Grameen Bank (2004).
Gender in Women’s Development Organizations:
From Participation to Empowerment
Betsy MacDonald
Thank you to the nine women I interviewed and all the other women whose lives inspired me to
write this paper. Vão com Deus.
T his is a report based on my
experience in Roraima, northern
Brazil, accompanying the work of
the Pastoral da Criança (Pastoral of the
Child). The Pastoral da Criança is a
Catholic, faith-based organization in
Brazil whose work centres on nutrition
and prevention of illnesses among young
children in the country’s poorest areas.
The majority of their volunteers and
beneficiaries are poor women. I was
based with a group of volunteers in the
community of Sant’ana, in the capital city
Boa Vista, with periodic trips to observe
the organization’s work in other parts of
Roraima. I acted as a ‘shadow’ in the
sense that I followed a number of
volunteers, observing and reflecting upon
their work while participating with them
in the organization’s activities. I also
conducted interviews with nine mothers
participating in the program as
beneficiaries, as well as with two people
who had worked with the Pastoral da
Criança in other places.
In this report I will present my own
reflections and findings from my
internship, framing them in an analysis of
gender and participation in women’s
organizations. I will refer to several
relevant readings as well as my own notes
from the field. The first section will look
at some main issues around women and
participation, drawing from past academic
works. Following this discussion I will give a
description of the participation of women in the
Pastoral da Criança in Roraima. Next, I will
discuss gender and participation in the context
of women’s development organizations, with
particular attention to the question: How does
an organization’s approach to gender influence
the quality of women’s participation? In this
section I will use comparisons between the
Pastoral da Criança and other women’s
development organizations to discuss
conceptual framework, practical and strategic
gender interests, and participatory approaches
in the context of women’s participation.
Finally, I will reflect upon some of these
themes and briefly discuss some possible
approaches to facilitating women’s
participation in the Pastoral da Criança.
I. WOMEN & PARTICIPATION:
SOME CENTRAL ISSUES
Much academic work has been done on the
role of gender in development, and the
particular issues surrounding the participation
(or non-participation) of women in
development programs and projects. Studies
have highlighted several barriers to women's
participation and have produced analyses of
measuring participation, the ways in which
women participate, and early attempts to
11
'integrate' women into the development
process. Here I will discuss briefly some
of these ideas, followed by and integrated
into a discussion of the participation of
women in the Pastoral da Criança in
Roraima, northern Brazil.
'Participation': what does it mean?
Participation in development has been
measured both in terms of quantity (how
many people participate) and quality (the
depth of people's engagement in the
development process). There has been a
tendency to measure women's
participation in the quantitative sense;
that is, by numbers of women
participating in a given development
project rather than by the nature of their
involvement.1 Women's participation has
proven to be crucial to the development
process; indeed, most agree (and it will be
the underlying assumption of this paper)
that true development cannot be achieved
without women taking part in and shaping
the goals of development.2 It is therefore
important to look at women's
participation not only in terms of how
many participate, but also at how deeply
they are engaged in a given development
intervention.
How do we participate?
The participation of women in
development without question varies
from place to place, as several factors
such as poverty and culture influence the
extent of women's participation. Also, as
we will see, different development
programs can be tailored either to actively
engage women or exclude them.
1
Marlee Karl, Women and Empowerment:
Participation and Decision Making (London:
United Nations Non-Governmental Liaison
Service, 1995), 1.
2 8
Karl, 1.
betsy macdonald
Keeping in mind these differences, several
barriers have been identified with regard to
women's participation in the development
process in the third world. While occurring at
varying degrees, these barriers do provide some
insight into the continuing challenges of women
who seek to participate meaningfully in
development. These include but are not limited
to: poverty, a lack of time due to paid and
unpaid labour, "sexist cultural patterns",
negative self-images, maternal altruism, and the
restrictions of marriage.3
Another factor to consider when discussing
women's participation is literacy, and the fact
that women have a lower worldwide literacy
rate than men. In fact, there are more than
twice as many illiterate women than illiterate
men in the world.4 During my internship with
the Pastoral da Criança I encountered women,
both volunteers and beneficiaries, who were
illiterate and thus required different techniques
to facilitate their participation.
Women's participation in development has
traditionally been defined in male terms.5
Resultantly, the capacities of women have not
been valued as greatly as men's.6 This
traditional model has also led to the assumption
that women and men learn in similar ways,
when in fact in many cases the contrary has
been demonstrated.7 There are other differences
that women bring into participatory
development. For example, MYRDA has
identified increased moral sensitivity and low
competitiveness as assets that poor women
bring to the development process.8
Because of these differences, it is necessary
to develop participatory approaches that value
3
Julia Cleves Mosse, Half the World, Half a Chance: An
Introduction to Gender and Development (Oxford:
Oxfam, 1993), 178-179.
4
Karl, 139.
5
Society for Participatory Research in Asia,
Participatory Training for Women (New Delhi: Aman
Printers, 1989), 1.
6
Society for Participatory Research: 1.
7
Society for Participatory Research: 3.
Society for Participatory Research: 45.
atlantic international studies journal
women's strengths, ways of learning and
forms of interaction with other people.
For organizations made up mainly of
women, meaningful participation also
requires an analysis of gender in the
organization’s conceptual framework,
support of strategic gender interests, and
a participatory approach that that allows
women to take part in a way that is
sustainable and empowering.
I will now turn to a summary of my
observations of the participation of
women in the Pastoral da Criança,
followed by a more detailed examination
of the question of gender and
participation in women’s organizations.
II. PARTICIPATION OF WOMEN IN THE
PASTORAL DA CRIANCA IN RORAIMA,
NORTHERN BRAZIL
The concept of the Pastoral da
Criança (Childen’s Pastoral) arose from a
1982 discussion between Paulo Evaristo
Arns, then archbishop of São Paulo, and
Mr. James Grant, then director of
UNICEF, in Geneva, Switzerland. A
debate on world hunger led to the idea of
starting an organization in Brazil to
combat child mortality and malnutrition.
In the following year, the CNBB
(Conferência Nacional dos Bispos do
Brasil – National Conference of Bishops
of Brazil) commissioned Geraldo Majella
Agnelo, then archbishop of Londrina,
Paraná, and paediatrician and sanitarian
Dr. Zilda Arns Neumann to create and
develop the Pastoral da Criança.
(Neumann continues to be the
organization’s director to this day.) The
program was launched in 1983 in
Florestópolis, a municipality in Paraná
with an infant mortality rate of 127 deaths
for every thousand children. Fourteen
years later that rate had dropped to less
than twenty deaths per thousand
12
children.9 Today, the Pastoral da Criança
works in numerous parts of Brazil where
children are at risk of malnutrition, from the
slums of large cities like Belo Horizonte to the
country’s impoverished northeast and the
remote north, where I was based for my
internship.
The Pastoral da Criança is a volunteer
organization consisting mainly of poor women.
Its activities include family visits, in which
volunteers ask parents a series of questions on
their children’s health; weighing children to
track their nutrition; and monthly meetings to
evaluate and reflect upon the month’s work.
Volunteers also gather periodically to make
multi-mixture, a powder made of ground up
leaves and seeds that is added to children’s food
to make it more nutritious. Most volunteers I
encountered were Catholic women, though I
did meet a few Protestant and male volunteers.
There are two main ways for women to
participate in the Pastoral da Criança: as
volunteers or as beneficiaries. During my
internship I looked at the participation of both
groups of women and interviewed nine of the
latter group. Here I will describe in brief my
observations on the participation of women in
the Pastoral da Criança in Roraima.
Participation of women as volunteers
The Pastoral da Criança volunteers I
accompanied were mostly low income women
with some involvement in the church. Each
volunteer or leader is responsible for a number
of families (usually around five to ten) whom
she visits on a monthly basis. Most visits are
spread out so that the leader visits families on
several days of the month. The leader carries
around a notebook printed by the Pastoral da
Criança where she records information on each
child and pregnant woman in order to track
their health. The information is gathered
9
Pastoral da Criança (Official Website). Histórico
(History)
http://www.pastoraldacrianca.org.br/htmltonuke.php?filn
avn=historico/historico.html. (Portuguese)
13
through a series of questions, usually to
the mother, that vary depending on the
age of the child. The main purpose of the
questions is to see if the child is being
given the proper conditions for individual
development, taking into account not only
nutrition but also the child’s mental and
emotional needs.
The leader’s notebook is also used to
record each child’s weight when it is
taken on Life Celebration Day or
weighing day. The leader uses a graph to
show mothers if their children are within
the proper weight range for their age. If a
child appears to be malnourished, the
leader makes suggestions to the mother
on how to provide her child with better
nutrition.
I discovered through my interviews
that most leaders have close social ties to
the women they accompany; their
relationships are not limited to the
Pastoral da Criança but extend into the
spheres of church, neighborhood and
friendship networks. Leaders act as
informal sources of information on health
and nutrition for women in their
neighborhoods; as one woman told me:
I’ve known [my community leader] since
I arrived here. If my girl is sick, I go to
her house. If she has the flu, I go there
and she gives me flu syrup. When she’s
sick I go to [my leader’s] house and ask
her which remedy I should give to her,
and [she] shows me and I give it to my
10
daughter.
In some cases, the leader’s advice
substitutes for a visit to the doctor, which
can be costly for women who do not have
transportation. In this sense the leader
plays an important role as a person who is
trusted by the women she accompanies,
and who provides them with continual
10
Interview with a Pastoral da Criança participant,
conducted between May 31 and June 18, 2005.
betsy macdonald
guidance on the health care of their children.
Participation of women as beneficiaries
The women who I came to know as
beneficiaries in the Pastoral da Criança defined
themselves, and were defined by others, using
various terms in relation to their place in the
program. Sometimes they were described as
participants; at other times as women who were
accompanied by the Pastoral da Criança. I will
refer generally to these women as beneficiaries,
although the idea of these women as
participants will be discussed as well.
Conversations with several women revealed
to me that there is a range of participation of
women as beneficiaries in the Pastoral da
Criança. It might be useful to think of their
participation in terms of a scale from low to
high activity. At the low end, women bring
their children to be weighed on Life
Celebration Day and are recipients of monthly
family visits. At the high end, women are
engaged in these activities and also help out
with various tasks associated with Pastoral da
Criança events, such as cleaning the church and
making snacks for Life Celebration Day,
helping to make multi-mixture, and helping to
make home remedies. It appeared to me that
while some women’s participation is mostly
passive, for others it is more active. Of the nine
women I interviewed, six would fall into the
former category and three into the latter.
The active participants were women who
spoke enthusiastically and in detail about their
experience with the Pastoral da Criança. One
of these women, I discovered, participates both
as a beneficiary and as a volunteer. She
explained to me the educational value of her
involvement in the Pastoral da Criança:
… I’ve learned many things through the Pastoral
da Criança; I’ve learned to make home remedies
for myself and for my children. I’ve learned to
make multi-mixture and homemade serum;
everything I’ve learned from the Pastoral da
Criança. … [I receive most of my information
on health] from the Pastoral da Criança. Not
from the TV or the Health Ministry, because it’s
atlantic international studies journal
difficult to watch TV. … Through the
Pastoral da Criança I’ve learned many
things.11
I spoke with another woman who,
besides participating as a beneficiary in
the Pastoral da Criança, also coordinates
the pastoral organization for catechism in
her community. She described to me how
the various pastoral organizations work
together in a mutually beneficial way:
I help out [with Pastoral da Criança
activities]. That’s how we work in the
organization, everybody together. We
find bonds of friendship... I think that
today the most valuable thing in life is
unity. We join hands and unite so that
we can do something of worth. It isn’t
like this because I participate in this
community, but because the Sant’ana
community always works like this: all
the pastoral organizations help each
other… When there’s an event, everyone
comes out and works together. This is
what enriches us in the community, this
unity...12
This woman has a lengthy history of
volunteer experience and work with the
government. Yet she also finds value in
participating as a beneficiary in the
Pastoral da Criança. This, along with
other observations, suggests to me that
there is little, if any, social division
between the Pastoral da Criança’s
volunteers and its beneficiaries. Indeed,
the two roles can overlap, as the first case
demonstrates.
The more passive participants did not
speak of the Pastoral da Criança with the
same zeal, although they did express an
appreciation for the program and spoke of
the important impact it has had on their
lives.
11
Interview with a Pastoral da Criança participant,
conducted between May 31 and June 18, 2005.
12
Interview with a Pastoral da Criança participant,
conducted between May 31 and June 18, 2005.
14
III. APPROACHES TO GENDER IN
WOMEN’S ORGANIZATIONS: FROM
PARTICIPATION TO EMPOWERMENT
I will now turn to a more critical discussion
of the ways in which an organization’s
approach to gender can influence the quality of
women’s participation in development. My
experience with the Pastoral da Criança
indicated to me that, while women were
participating in various activities as volunteers
and beneficiaries, their participation was of a
more nominal nature and certainly not a
transformative one.13 With the strong influence
of liberation theology in the Brazilian Catholic
church14, it surprised me that these women were
not engaged in a deeper process of challenging
their subordination based on gender, class and
race. There are several reasons why this may
have been the case, including social, cultural
and economic factors. One important
dimension, which will underlie the following
discussion, is the role of the organization (in
this case, the Pastoral da Criança) in shaping
women’s participation through its approach to
gender. This includes the organization’s
conceptual framework and analysis (if any) of
gender, the way in which it addresses practical
and strategic gender interests, and the presence
or absence of a participatory approach that
engages and empowers women. I will refer to
my experience with the Pastoral da Criança as
well as examples from other women’s
development organizations to illustrate this
discussion.
13
See White, cited in Andrea Cornwall, “Making a
Difference? Gender and Participatory Development.”
IDS Discussion Paper 378 (Institute of Development
Studies, 2000), 9.
14
While it has been suggested by some that liberation
theology has been on the decline in Brazil, others argue
that activism based on liberationist values is alive and
well in the country. A proponent of the latter argument is
John Burdick, who in his book Legacies of Liberation:
The Progressive Catholic Church in Brazil (Burlington,
Vt.: Ashgate, 2004) asserts that the struggle for racial and
gender equality in Brazil is still influenced significantly
by liberationist teachings.
15
Conceptual framework and addressing
gender
In order to address gender in the first
place, it is necessary to examine gender
and the implications it has for everyone
involved in a given development
intervention. For development
organizations working mainly with
women, this should include an analysis of
gender that can be translated into their
work in specific areas. If an organization
is using a participatory approach, there
may arise a tension between progressive
gender goals and the concerns of local
people, with the possible risk of tacitly
reinforcing the status quo.15 However, it
is possible to employ an analysis of
gender that facilitates participation in a
way that values both local ideas and a
feminist agenda.16
There has been a tendency to think of
gender only in terms of “women’s
interests”, which may hide differences
between women and obscure unequal
gender relations.17 When gender relations
are addressed, they are usually limited to
male-female heterosexual relationships,
with little attention paid to other female-
male relationships (for example, between
mothers and sons) or the gender aspects
of relations between members of the same
sex.18 Whether or not these issues are
addressed can have a significant impact
on the success of a given intervention.19
The Pastoral da Criança is one of
several Catholic pastoral organizations in
15
Cornwall, 13-15.
16
Cornwall.
17
Cornwall, 10.
18
P. Peters, “The use and abuse of the concept of
‘female-headed households’ in research on
agrarian transformation and policy,’ in D. Fahy
Bryceson, ed., Women Wielding the Hoe: lessons
from rural Africa for feminist theory and
development (Oxford: Berg, 1993). 93-108. Cited
in Cornwall, 10.
19
Cornwall, 10.
betsy macdonald
Brazil that addresses a variety of social issues,
including health, education, human rights, the
issues of specific social groups such as youth
and the elderly, and, in the case of the Pastoral
da Criança, the health of young children. Its
conceptual framework is strongly influenced by
faith and the teachings of the Catholic Church:
The mission of the Pastoral da Criança is the
mission of Jesus himself, which is also the
mission of the Church and of all Christians: to
evangelize.20
The organization also states a lack of
distinction of its beneficiaries on the basis of
various social categories:
The Pastoral da Criança has as its objective the
vital development of children, supporting them,
on their part and on that of families and
communities, without distinction of race, color,
profession, nationality, sex, religious or political
creed…”21
While the Pastoral da Criança is not a
women’s organization by name, ninety per cent
of its volunteers are poor women,22 and, from
what I observed in Roraima, almost all of their
direct beneficiaries are women and their
children. Their mission statement does not
include any specific thoughts on gender, but
rather includes ‘sex’ as one of several
categories on the basis of which the
organization claims not to discriminate.
This is quite different from the worldview
of the Self-Employed Women’s Association
(SEWA), a women’s microfinance organization
based in India. With roots in the trade union
20
Translated from Pastoral da Criança (Official
Website): Missão (Mission)
<http://www.pastoraldacrianca.org.br/htmltonuke.php?fil
navn=missao/missao.html>. (Portuguese)
21
Translated from Pastoral da Criança (Official
Website): Missão (Mission)
<http://www.pastoraldacrianca.org.br/htmltonuke.php?fil
navn=missao/missao.html>. (Portuguese)
22
Global Network of Religions for Children: Brazil’s
official indication to the Nobel Peace Prize of the year
2001 <http://www.gnrc.ne.jp/Nobel-nomination.html>.
atlantic international studies journal
movement in India, SEWA works to
empower women by promoting financial
self-reliance and collective action.23 It is
an organization that works with poor
women and has an explicitly political
commitment to challenging gender
inequity. As Kalima Rose describes the
activist outlook of SEWA:
It is an especially feminine philosophy
which adheres to non-violence, to
arbitration and reconciliation, and most
importantly [sic], to a quiet, fiercely
determined resistance to exploitation.24
While the Pastoral da Criança implicitly
claims blindness to gender, SEWA takes
a more head-on approach to challenging
the status quo of gender relations in the
lives of their members. If the Pastoral da
Criança were to adopt a more critical
analysis of gender in their conceptual
framework, I believe it would assist the
organization in addressing gender-related
issues such as poverty and unemployment
among its participants. As Andrea
Cornwall argues, such an analysis is
crucial in any attempt to include and
engage women in development
interventions.25
A critical analysis of gender is
important, although it is not all that is
needed to employ a gender-sensitive
approach to development that engages
women in an empowering way.26 It is
also necessary to take a look at if and
how such an analysis translates into
23
Lee, 21.
24
Kalima Rose, Where Women Are Leaders
(London: Zed Books Ltd., 1992), 32. See both
Lee and Rose for more detailed descriptions of the
history and activities of SEWA.
25
Cornwall, 9-10.
26
A. M. Goetz, “From feminist knowledge to data
for development: the bureaucratic management of
information on women in development,” IDS
Bulletin 25.2 (1994): 27-36. Cited in Cornwall,
26.
16
actions that either facilitate or impede the
participation of women. This can be explored
partly through a discussion of practical and
strategic gender interests, and the question of
whether meaningful participation can take place
if only one or the other is being addressed.
Practical and strategic gender interests
When one speaks of ‘gender interests’, it is
helpful to make the distinction between
practical interests and strategic ones. Practical
gender interests generally include the material
needs of women, such as financial security,
“without changing existing power relations.”27
Strategic gender interests are “…those derived
from an analysis of women’s subordination.28
These two sets of interests are often
interconnected, as Nanci Lee explains with an
example of capacity building for women in
SEWA.29
To address practical gender interests is to
help women better their material conditions; to
address strategic gender interests is to help
women challenge oppressive gender relations
and social structures. Indeed, it is necessary to
support both sets of interests in order to
facilitate women’s participation at a level that
contributes to their empowerment. One way of
doing this is, in addition to providing services
that help women achieve sustainable living
conditions, creating a milieu that facilitates the
coming together of women to discuss issues
that affect their lives. As Nanci Lee explains in
the case of SEWA Bank:
In addition to the forum SEWA Bank provides,
members frequently take the initiative to create
their own discussion spaces. Constructing a
27
Linda Mayoux, Empowering Inquiry: A New Approach
to Investigation (Wyse Development Limited, 2003).
Cited in Nanci Lee, “A Gold Thread: Building Assets
and Courage in SEWA’s Microfinance Members,”
Critical Half. 2.1 (2000), 21.
28
Mosse, 166.
29
Lee explains how capacity building that helps women
develop their reasoning skills can aid the women not only
in developing their financial project but also in better
understanding their financial options. See Lee, 24.
17
context where members are willing and
able to do this requires appropriate
strategies such as group forums, capacity
building, participation in decision-
making, and a systematic process for
fostering courage among members.30
In interviewing nine beneficiaries of
the Pastoral da Criança, I discovered that
some of their most empowering
experiences with the Pastoral da Criança
had to do with the knowledge they
received and were able to share with
other women in their neighborhoods and
families. It seemed that the more
opportunities they had to share
knowledge with other women, the higher
their self-esteem with regard to
knowledge around health issues. This has
also been the case of women participating
in SEWA Bank:
Not all women are initially comfortable
discussing difficult issues, so the
introduction to collective activity often
takes the form of a discussion group with
peers. According to a study on the impact
of the financial education, members of
such groups, especially their leaders,
reported benefits that included an
increased feeling of confidence and
security, and a greater role in household
financial planning.31
Training is another vehicle for
increasing women’s participation and
creating opportunities for empowerment.
As in SEWA,
Training is an integral part of organizing
women, formalizing their skills, and
involving them in shaping their
occupations, incomes, and social
policies. SEWA conducts standard
training sessions for a broad section of
women, and also specific training
programmes for specialized skills.32
30
Lee, 23.
31
Lee, 23.
32
Rose, 274.
betsy macdonald
The Pastoral da Criança provides formal and
informal training for women involved in the
program both as volunteers and as
beneficiaries. As participants, women learn
how to make home remedies and recognize the
signs of common illnesses such as diarrhoea
and influenza, and of tropical diseases
including malaria and dengue fever. These
activities, while low-intensity and employing
simple knowledge and techniques, provide
women with a forum to build their capacity
collectively and individually in the form of
learning practical skills and concepts and
becoming informal educators for others.
While not explicitly stating it, the Pastoral
da Criança does seem to be addressing a
number of practical gender interests through its
work. By educating poor and oftentimes single
women on alternative medicine, the program is
helping them keep health costs to a minimum.
The health accompaniment provided by
monthly weighing day and family visits save
women costly trips to the hospital for their
children. The Pastoral da Criança’s income
generation activities, while not currently in
place in Roraima, do help women in some parts
of Brazil to achieve greater financial security.33
Where the approach of the Pastoral da
Criança appears to fall short, in the sense of
facilitating meaningful participation, is in its
lack of attention to the strategic gender interests
of its participants. Its provision of material
assistance to women is not matched by a
political commitment to challenging gender-
based subordination. This is readily observable
33
In addition to its ‘basic’ programs such as Life
Celebration Day and monthly visits, the Pastoral da
Criança also offers a group of ‘complementary’
programs, one of which focuses on income generation.
The projects offered in this category include initiatives
such as gardens, bakeries, livestock raising, and other
small businesses. In 2001, 42 income generation projects
were approved by the Pastoral da Criança and 309
persons were trained to carry out the projects across
Brazil. See Pastoral da Criança (Official Website): Ações
Complementares (Complementary Actions)
<http://www.pastoraldacrianca.org.br/htmltonuke.php?fil
navn=acoes/acoes_complementares.html>. (Portuguese)
atlantic international studies journal
in the organization’s activities in
Roraima. While there do exist capacity
building activities for leaders, they occur
at the beginning and do not continue on a
regular basis. Women do have an
opportunity to come together monthly to
weigh their children and interact with one
another in a festive atmosphere, though
the activity is planned and guided by the
community’s Pastoral da Criança
coordinator. Resultantly, volunteers are
not engaged in a dynamic process of
learning and reflecting upon their work,
and beneficiaries participate within a
range from passive to active but not in a
way that would be considered
transformative.
These are not the only factors
influencing women’s participation in the
Pastoral da Criança and in other women’s
development organizations, but they are
significant in that they have a direct
impact on the level of empowerment of
both volunteers and beneficiaries.
Another element of facilitating women’s
participation is the presence or absence of
a participatory approach that engages and
empowers women. This, I suggest, also
contributes significantly to the success of
women’s organizations in empowering
their members. It is to this dimension
that I now turn.
Participatory approaches to gender and
women’s participation in development
As Andrea Cornwall explains,
designing and carrying out a participatory
approach that is sensitive to gender is a
complex task. A model such as
Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) can
be restrictive for feminist development
practitioners who, when confronted with
the approach’s requirement of relativism
towards local ideas and concerns, are
challenged in bringing certain gender
18
goals to fruition.34 Still, there is much common
ground shared by feminist and participatory
researchers, including a shared political goal of
social transformation, a concern for listening to
different voices, and attention to the
relationship between practitioner and
beneficiary or participant.35 The task, it seems,
is to tailor an approach that addresses specific
gender concerns in a way that gives women the
opportunity to share ideas and concerns in a
comfortable environment, making decisions
and taking actions to improve their individual
and collective realities.
A participatory approach that is sensitive to
gender requires a number of measures. These
include, but are not limited to: examining
reasons for non-participation and addressing
them; acknowledging and working with
differences between women; and giving women
a positive forum for voicing concerns and
developing strategies. I will discuss these
participatory measures with reference to the
Pastoral da Criança and its approach to
women’s participation in Roraima.
With some participatory approaches there
arises the dilemma of ‘imposing’ participation
on those, in this case women, who do not seem
to want to participate.36 However, just because
women do not appear interested in participating
in a specific intervention does not mean that
they would not like to improve their social
conditions in some way. Moreover, many
women in poorer regions of the world are
illiterate and may not be aware of their rights; a
crucial element in taking action to challenge
oppressive social relationships and structures.37
There needs to be research on why women are
not participating, and what can be done to
facilitate their participation according to their
own interests and concerns.
34
Cornwall, 7.
35
Cornwall, 7.
36
Cornwall, 15.
37
Cornwall, 12.
19 betsy macdonald

I observed this Criança) does not

need in the work The majority of women with necessarily mean that all
of the Pastoral da whom I spoke seemed aware of will participate equally
Criança in the social, economic and even or with the same
Roraima. When enthusiasm. It is
asked about the political roots of their difficulties, necessary to look at the
participation of and with further education on differences within the
beneficiary their rights could no doubt effect group to be able to
mothers in the engage all members in
program, several significant positive change meaningful
volunteers participation. As
responded that the Cornwall purports,
women didn’t appear interested in the
program; some cited a culture of To make a difference, participatory
dependency as the cause, while others development must engage with questions of
difference: to effectively tackle poverty, it must
offered no explanation. Whatever the go beyond the ‘poor’ as a generic category, and
contributing factors may have been, it engage with the diversity of women’s and men’s
was clear that the women were benefiting experiences of poverty and powerlessness.38
from the program in the practical sense
and had several strategic gender interests The need to address differences between
that could potentially be addressed women was prevalent in my observations of the
through a more engaged level of work of the Pastoral da Criança in Roraima. In
participation. For example, it could prove particular, the question of religion and culture
quite useful to have forums for single emerged time and time again as an issue of
mothers to discuss strategies for income recognizing and responding to differences
generation, an economic factor that is among poor women in Roraima. While the
directly related to the health of their Pastoral da Criança is Catholic in its roots and
children. While women may choose not organization, its approach to outreach is stated
to participate (or to participate passively) in its literature to be ecumenical. Yet, the
in the Pastoral da Criança for several majority of women who participate in the
reasons, I was given no indication that program are practicing or non-practicing
this was for lack of desire for social Catholics, even with the state’s growing
transformation. The majority of women number of Evangelical communities. With
with whom I spoke seemed aware of the Roraima’s high unemployment rate and from
social, economic and even political roots the conditions I observed, there is little
of their difficulties, and with further evidence that poverty discriminates according
education on their rights could no doubt to religious denomination in this region. As
effect significant positive change, given there is no Evangelical organization in Brazil
adequate opportunities to discuss parallel to the Pastoral da Criança, this means
problems and plan actions. that many disadvantaged families are not
Recognizing and working with benefiting from the type of service the program
differences among women is another step provides.
towards a more engaged and effective When I asked Pastoral da Criança
participation. Opening up participation to volunteers why there were not more
all members of a group (e.g. all poor Evangelical women participating in the
women, in the case of the Pastoral da
38
Cornwall, 5.
atlantic international studies journal
program, they usually placed the onus on
the women themselves. They did not
want to participate, I heard, because they
were wary of the intentions of a Catholic
organization, and feared being associated
with the Catholic Church in their
Evangelical communities. One volunteer
with whom I spoke, an Evangelical
woman with two daughters and
experience as a leader with the Pastoral
da Criança, told me that few people in her
church were aware of the program’s
activities. She became involved because
she had been asked to do so by the then-
current Pastoral da Criança community
coordinator. While this woman found
herself participating through a personal
contact, most women from her church
and similar ones, it appeared, were not
participating for various reasons.
The role of the Pastoral da Criança in
addressing this question of religious
differences between women has, I
maintain, much room for growth. Instead
of concluding that Evangelical women do
not want to participate, it may prove
much more useful to look at why they are
not participating, and what can be done to
make the program more appealing to
families from non-Catholic backgrounds.
This could include increasing awareness
of the Pastoral da Criança in Evangelical
churches, encouraging dialogue between
poor women of various denominations,
and creating a friendly space for activities
in which women feel comfortable
regardless of their religious orientation.
Overall, it would require an extra effort to
educate and include women who, while in
need of the program’s services, might be
more reluctant to participate than women
who share the organization’s religious
worldview. This would include taking
into account possible cultural barriers to
the participation of Evangelical women,
such as stricter gender roles, and how
20
they can be addressed to further facilitate
participation.
Finally, and perhaps most important, in
order to foster participation it is vital to provide
women with a forum in which they can
comfortably and in an engaged manner, share
their concerns and discuss strategic plans for
action in the context of development. This is
another area of the Pastoral da Criança where I
observed room for enhancement. Such a forum
can be created by providing an appropriate
space for discussion and facilitating activities to
increase confidence and self-esteem.
It is important, I believe, for a participatory
approach that is sensitive to gender to include
the provision of safe, relaxed and inspiring
spaces for women to share experiences, express
their ideas and concerns and develop strategic
approaches to their own development issues.
Andrea Cornwall explains how time is an
important factor in providing such spaces. As
she writes,
One barrier to women’s participation is time—
to sit and talk, analyse, come to meetings.
Holding sessions at times that women suggest as
convenient, or when women are less engaged in
productive work, at least allows the option to
participate. Spreading discussions over several
sessions may also enable women to take part.39
Time was a constant concern for the women
whose participation I observed and did not
observe with the Pastoral da Criança in
Roraima. Some women did not have time to
come to regular activities such as Life
Celebration Day because of various time
commitments. I encountered many single
mothers whose primary concern was looking
after their children. Other women are involved
in the informal economy and are managing
small businesses from their homes; a few are
lucky to have jobs in the formal sector. Either
way, it is difficult to find a time that
accommodates the different responsibilities of
women participating in the program.
39
Cornwall, 18.
21
Finding an appropriate location is
another key dimension of providing a
forum that cultivates women’s
participation and empowerment. This
includes a consideration of the “gendered
nature of institutional spaces” in order to
ensure a comfortable environment for
women.40 Indeed, this is a relevant
concern for women participating in the
Pastoral da Criança in Roraima. Most of
the program’s activities take place in a
Catholic church setting: Life Celebration
Day usually takes place in the church
itself, and when I went to help make
multi-mixture the activity also took place
at the church. It is not uncommon for
there to be church representatives such as
priests and nuns present at activities, as I
observed at the sensitivity training
session I attended.
It is necessary to consider, I believe,
the participatory advantages and
disadvantages of holding Pastoral da
Criança activities in such a milieu. While
it may encourage and facilitate the
participation of women who are active
Catholics, there is the possibility of
alienating women of an Evangelical, non-
practicing Catholic or other religious
background. Moreover, and more
pertinent to Cornwall’s concern, one must
consider the dynamic of authority that
exists within the framework of an
institution such as the Catholic Church
and the way it may influence the nature
and extent of women’s participation.
Church representatives tend to be well
educated and possess strong leadership
qualities. While the presence of church
representatives at Pastoral da Criança
activities may be a source of guidance
and insight, there is a possibility that it
may shift confidence and agency from the
program’s women, who tend to be poor,
undereducated and sometimes illiterate.
40
Cornwall, 18.
betsy macdonald
For women to be able to grow as leaders and
decision-makers, I believe that it is important to
allow them sufficient space to exercise
confidence and be supported by peers; the
presence of authority figures might be a barrier
to this.
A final dimension of facilitating women’s
participation is promoting activities that help
women build confidence and self-esteem. We
have already touched on the notion of
quantitative versus qualitative participation; it
is useful once more to return to this concept.
Evidence has shown that simply increasing
numbers is not sufficient to engage women in
meaningful participation; there is also a need
for measures “to increase women’s confidence
and awareness of their rights, in order for them
to be more assertive in joining [decision-
making] committees and speaking out.41 Lee
explains the delicacy of such attempts at group
facilitation:
At best, group forums and leadership can
encourage members to strengthen their capacity
and participation—in essence, to become
political. At worst, leadership can be a crutch,
enabling members to defer to their
representatives rather than acting or learning
themselves. Perhaps worse still, groups can
support a coercive process of maintaining the
status quo.42
To prevent these negative outcomes and to
effect positive change, Lee continues, it is a
central goal to promote a culture of courage in
which women feel empowered to “challenge
existing systems and structures.”43 This
requires the presence of positive role models
for women and mutual sharing across different
groups; such is the strategy of SEWA Bank.44
For women participating in the Pastoral da
Criança in Roraima, there also appears a need
for activities that, through mutual support and
sharing of ideas, provide opportunities to build
41
Cornwall, 12.
42
Lee, 24.
43
Lee, 24.
44
Lee, 24.
atlantic international studies journal
self-esteem and awareness of women’s
rights and capacities as agents of change.
The Pastoral da Criança could play an
important role in facilitating such
activities, as an organization that is
concerned with such women’s issues as
poverty and family violence. Existing
social networks of church, family and
neighborhood could be used as channels
for enabling women to come together and
discuss issues that are important to their
lives, and develop collective strategies for
positive social change.
CONCLUSION:
TOWARDS A MORE MEANINGFUL
PARTICIPATION?
In this paper I have discussed the
participation of women in the Pastoral da
Criança in Roraima, with special focus on
the question of how an organization’s
approach to gender can influence the
quality of women’s participation. In June
and July of 2005, I was fortunate to
experience first-hand the participation of
a group of women in a Brazilian
development organization. As I took part
in activities with these women, the main
theme that emerged was engagement. In
what ways do women become engaged as
participants in the Pastoral da Criança?
What factors contribute to a lack of
engagement? This led me to consider a
number of issues and arrive at certain key
findings.
One issue that emerged around
women’s participation was the role of the
organization in analyzing the gendered
aspects of participants’ lives. A recurring
theme in the literature I explored was the
need for an analysis of gender that can be
translated into practice and a definition of
gender that goes beyond ‘women’s
interests’. It appears crucial to support
women’s strategic gender interests by
fostering an environment for women to
22
discuss their own development issues. In a
participatory approach, an organization can
further facilitate women’s empowerment
through examining and addressing reasons for
non-participation, acknowledging and working
with differences, and providing women with a
positive forum for sharing concerns and
developing plans for action. Finally, activities
that increase women’s confidence and self-
esteem have been demonstrated to be both the
means and the end result of women’s engaged
participation.
The Pastoral da Criança is an organization
that has inspired women’s lives through
spiritual healing, community-building,
interpersonal companionship and a practical
approach to community development. By
continuing its efforts to enrich the participation
of women at the grassroots level, the Pastoral
da Criança can strengthen its role as an agent of
social transformation. In a country that is
marked by both staggering inequality and a
vibrant sense of life, this is both a necessity and
an imminent possibility.
SOURCES
Burdick, John. Legacies of Liberation: The
Progressive Catholic Church in Brazil.
Burlington, Vt.: Ashgate, 2004.
Cornwall, Andrea. “Making a Difference?
Gender and Participatory
Development.” IDS Discussion Paper
378. Institute of Development Studies
(2000), 1-39.
http://www.ids.ac.uk/ids/bookshop/dp/d
p378.pdf
Global Network of Religions for Children.
Brazil’s official indication to the Nobel
Peace Prize of the year 2001
http://www.gnrc.ne.jp/Nobel-
nomination.html
23 betsy macdonald

The translated quotes from women

Karl, Marlee. Women and participating in the Pastoral da Criança were
Empowerment: Participation and taken from nine interviews, conducted in
Decision Making. London: Roraima between May 31 and June 18, 2005.
United Nations Non-
Governmental Liaison Service,
1995.

Lee, Nanci. “A Gold Thread: Building

Assets and Courage in SEWA’s
Microfinance Members.” Critical
Half 2.1 (2000): 20-26.
http://www.womenforwomen.org/
Downloads/Crithalf12-04.pdf

Mosse, Julia Cleves. Half the World,

Half a Chance: An Introduction to
Gender and Development.
Oxford: Oxfam, 1993.

Rose, Kalima. Where Women Are

Leaders. London: Zed Books
Ltd., 1992.

Pastoral da Criança (Official Website)

http://www.pastoraldacrianca.org.
br. (Portuguese)
Ações Complementares
(Complementary Actions)
http://www.pastoraldacrianca.org.
br/htmltonuke.php?filnavn=acoes/
acoes_complementares.html.
Histórico (History)
http://www.pastoraldacrianca.org.
br/htmltonuke.php?filnavn=histori
co/historico.html.
Missão (Mission)
http://www.pastoraldacrianca.org.
br/htmltonuke.php?filnavn=missa
o/missao.html.

Society for Participatory Research in

Asia. Participatory Training for
Women. New Delhi: Aman
Printers, 1989.
Iraqi Kurdistan
Mike Freen
T
he Kurds are a group of people who
inhabit the mountainous border region
between Southern Turkey, Northern
Iraq, and Western Iran, as well as parts of
Syria, Azerbaijan and Armenia. This region
possessing a Kurdish majority is generally
referred to as Kurdistan (land of the Kurds),
although this term has a highly contentious
history, particularly in Iraq and Turkey.1
Large numbers of Kurds have relocated from
their traditional heartland to major cities in
Turkey and Iran, and there is a significant
Kurdish diaspora population in Western
Europe. Numbering some twenty five million
in total, the Kurds are frequently called the
largest ethnic group or nation without its own
independent state. Nationality and ethnicity
are two concepts that are similar and
overlapping in some respects, but distinct.
Michael Keating has written widely on the
subject of nationality and particularly stateless
nations, and following his definitional
1
Ofra Bengio, Saddam’s Word: Political Discourse in
Iraq (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002);
Kemal Kirişci, “Minority/Majority Discourse: The
Case of the Kurds in Turkey,” In Making Majorities:
Constituting the Nation in Japan, Korea, China,
Malaysia, Fiji, Turkey, and the United States, edited by
Dru C. Gladney (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
1998), 227-245.
criteria,2 the Kurdish people possess a
nationality in that ‘Kurdishness’ is based on a
shared ethnic identity and tied to claims to a
specific territory. While they possess this
collective identity, the Kurds are nonetheless
a heterogeneous people with great linguistic,
religious, and political diversity.
I believe there is significant value to
be derived from analyzing the Kurdish
experience from the vantage point of the
“political process” literature dominated by
Doug McAdam, Charles Tilly, and Sidney
Tarrow. I believe this body of theoretical
literature, particularly the contributions of
Tarrow3, provides a useful framework for
analyzing and comparing Kurdish nation-
building in different states. Assertions of
Kurdish national identity have both collective
and contentious dimensions, and Tarrow
provides a structure that is well suited to
explaining the forces shaping Kurdish
national expression. I have limited myself to
examining the development of Kurdish
nationalism in Iraq because space constraints
prohibit any analysis dealing with more than
one country. I have chosen to discuss the
2
Michael Keating, Nations Against the State: The New
Politics of Nationalism in Quebec, Catalonia and
Scotland (London: MacMillan Press Ltd., 1996), 4.
3
Sidney Tarrow, Power in Movement: Social
Movements and Contentious Politics (Cambridge, UK:
Cambridge University Press, 1998).
atlantic international studies journal 25

Kurdish nationalist experience in Iraq rather Kurdish nationalist sentiments did not develop
than Turkey, Iran, or elsewhere because its until the twentieth century, as the Middle East
history offers a number of pronounced shifts was reorganized into European-style nation-
in the political opportunity structure which the states.5 In the previous centuries, Kurdistan
Kurds faced than in other locations, making it was nominally divided between the Ottoman
a particularly good subject of analysis using Turkish and Qajar Persian empires, although
Tarrow’s model. the region enjoyed considerable autonomy
The collective Kurdish identity in Iraq and acted as a buffer zone between the two
has been shaped by oppression by the Iraqi empires.6 In the aftermath of World War One
state, and the Kurds have responded through and the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the
armed resistance. The major resistance groups 1920 Treaty of Sèvres promised autonomy to
have been militarized parties founded along the majority-Kurdish region, and the
ostensibly nationalist possibility of statehood in
lines, although many of the future.7 However,
their supporters appear to The collective Kurdish neither autonomy nor
prioritize tribal loyalties identity in Iraq has been statehood for the Kurdish
above any Kurdish people was in the
national identity they shaped by oppression by the interests of the Allied
may feel they possess. I Iraqi state, and the Kurds powers or Kemal
will discuss the have responded through Ataturk’s new Turkish
problematic nature of republic, and Ottoman
Kurdish nationalism with armed resistance. Kurdistan was divided
direct reference to among the new states
Tarrow’s three key created from the carcass
factors of contentious action: political of the empire.8 The territory of what is now
opportunity; framing processes; and modern Iraq, including the mainly Kurdish
mobilizing structures. My analysis is regions in the north, came under the influence
concerned primarily with the historical of the British, who continued to exert
development of Kurdish national identity influence over the newly created state until
since Iraqi independence, and I have avoided the revolution of 1958.9
extensively discussing the political situation As indicated above, the Kurds are a
following the 2003 overthrow of Saddam diverse people. There are two major dialects
Hussein’s regime by the American-led of the Kurdish language (Kurmanji and
coalition. In order to set the stage for a Surani) and several minor ones, and the
discussion of Iraqi-Kurdish nationalism I now language is further divided by the fact that
provide some general background information
about the Kurds and the land they inhabit, and
a brief overview of the major forms of Stefan Sperl, eds. The Kurds: a Contemporary
collective identity relevant to the discussion. Overview (London: Routledge, 1992), 10.
5
Andreas Wimmer, Nationalist Exclusion and Ethnic
Conflict: Shadows of Modernity (Cambridge, UK:
KURDISTAN AND THE KURDS Cambridge University Press, 2002), 161.
People identified as Kurds have lived 6
David McDowall, 12.
7
in the region now known as Kurdistan for at “Treaty of Sèvres.” In David McDowall, A Modern
least 2500 years,4 but most scholars agree that History of the Kurds (London: I. B. Tauris, 1996), 450.
8
David McDowall, A Modern History of the Kurds
(London: I. B. Tauris, 1996), 118.
4 9
David McDowall, “The Kurdish Question: a Judith Yaphe, “Tribalism in Iraq, the Old and the
Historical Overview,” In Philip G. Kreyenbroek and New,” Middle East Policy 7, 3 (June 2000), 53.
26
Kurds in Turkey have adopted a Roman script
for their written language, while Kurds in Iraq
and Iran use an adapted Arabic script.10 The
majority of Kurds practice Sunni Islam, but
there are Shi’a, Christian, Jewish, and Alevi
Kurds, and practitioners of other regional
religious minorities. Political organizations
among the Kurds vary from communist
guerilla groups to radical Islamic groups, with
a great deal of variation in between.
Furthermore, the primary form of social
organization in rural Kurdistan continues to be
the tribe, a fact that has placed its stamp on
Kurdish nationalism. Likewise, Kurdistan,
while possessing a Kurdish majority, also
encompasses Armenian, Turkoman, Assyrian,
Persian, Arab, and Turkish populations.11 In
response to this diversity, some Kurdish
nationalist groups have tried to promote their
nationalism as civic and territorially based
rather than ethnically based.12 For clarity
purposes I use the term ‘Greater Kurdistan’ to
refer to this area, while portion lying within
the Iraqi national border is referred to as
‘Iraqi-Kurdistan’.
Despite the diversity of the Kurdish
nation, one of its unifying characteristics is
the oppression its people have suffered in the
twentieth century by the nation-states that
control the territory of Kurdistan. In
particular, Iran, Iraq, and Turkey have the
most pronounced history of Kurdish
repression, and the vast majority of Kurds
inhabit these three states. The Kurds have
responded to this repression through various
forms of contention, including violent
resistance. Being split among several states
the Kurdish nation is thus inherently
transnational in character, while at the same
time being stateless. These two characteristics
10
Philip G. Kroenbroek, “On the Kurdish Language,”
In Philip G. Kreyenbroek and Stefan Sperl, eds., The
Kurds: a Contemporary Overview (London: Routledge,
1992), 68-83.
11
Michael M. Gunter, “The Kurdish Question in
Perspective.” World Affairs 166, 4 (Spring 2004), 198.
12
Michael Keating, Nations Against the State.
mike freen
have important implications for the
construction of Kurdish nationalism.
Overall, the division of Kurdistan (and
its consequent statelessness) has produced a
division of the nation-building project, as each
state-constrained Kurdish population has
responded to and defined its identity in
relation to local circumstances in their
respective nation-states. The Kurdish diaspora
in Western Europe and elsewhere represents a
countercurrent to this trend in that it is
attempting to create a unified Kurdish national
identity,13 but ironically this contributes yet
another competing version of Kurdish
nationalism. While each group identifies itself
as Kurdish and recognizes there are other
groups in near by states that identify
themselves as Kurds, each is essentially
defining Kurdishness on its own terms.
Even within particular states there is
competition among Kurdish nationalist groups
over what form the Kurdish nation should
take. One notable example of this
phenomenon is the open conflict in the Iraqi
Kurdish Autonomous Region between the
Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), a
relatively conservative built upon tribal
coalitions, and the Patriotic Union of
Kurdistan (PUK), led by urban intellectuals,
that occurred from 1994 to 1998,14 and
divided Iraqi Kurdistan until the US-led
invasion of Iraq in 2003.
NATION, STATE, TRIBE,
& ETHNICITY
Keating, in his exploration of non-state
nationalisms, argues for the need to separate
the nation, the state, and ethnicity as
analytical categories, noting that ethnic groups
do not necessarily make the territorially based
13
Denise Natali, “Transnational Networks: New
Opportunities and Constraints for Kurdish Statehood,”
Middle East Policy 11, 1 (Spring, 2004), 111-114.
14
Andreas Wimmer, Nationalist Exclusion and Ethnic
Conflict (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press,
2002), 193.
atlantic international studies journal
claims characteristic of nations, while the
state does not possess a monopoly on
nationalism.15 Andreas Wimmer and Nina
Glick Schiller caution against identifying the
nation and the state as “two separate objects
of inquiry,” with the state as a neutral set of
governing institutions.16 Keating’s analytical
separation does not fall prey to this risk of
naturalizing the nation-state, but instead
emphasizes that state and nation cannot be
conflated, while acknowledging that a
national identity is very much a necessary
component of any state.
The exact relationship between
ethnicity and nationality is more difficult to
establish. This is because it is very difficult to
define either concept in a precise manner.
Benedict Anderson’s famous characterization
of nations as sovereign and limited “imagined
communities” merely elaborates some of the
most salient aspects of the term rather than
providing an expansive definition.17 Keating
similarly avoids constructing elaborate
definitions and instead concentrates on
highlighting some of the differences between
the two. Both are forms collective identity,
and Keating describes ethnicity as a “fluid and
instrumental” form of identity that is
contextually based.18 Nationalism always
contains a dimension of territoriality, although
this does not necessarily entail claims to an
independent sovereign state. Examples such
as Quebec or Scotland demonstrate that
nations can exist within and potentially across
larger state boundaries. Nationalism can be
framed along ethnic lines, essentially fusing
an ethnic identity with a claim to autonomy
over or simply identification with a given
territory. Alternately, civic nationalism rests
15
Michael Keating, 3.
16
Andreas Wimmer and Nina Glick Schiller,
“Methodological Nationalism and Beyond: Nation-
Building, Migration, and the Social Sciences,” Global
Networks 2, 4 (2002), 306.
17
Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities (London:
Verso, 1991), 7.
18
Michael Keating, 5.
27
not on belief in common ancestry but on
shared values and expectations of the state.19
Most nationalisms contain a mix of these two
ideal types, and Kurdish nationalism is no
exception.
Another form of collective
identification relevant to the discussion of the
Kurdish experience is tribalism, as most rural
inhabitants still identify primarily in terms of
kinship ties, rather than as Kurds or as Iraqis.
Tribes have their own authority figures and
have historically provided a significant
challenge to nationalists, be they Iraqi or
Kurdish, attempting to foster a broader sense
of collective identity.20
POLITICAL OPPORTUNITIES
The last fifteen years has seen the
publication of a number of histories of the
experience of the Kurds in the different
nation-states they inhabit,21 but these have
tended to be descriptive historical accounts
lacking the analytical frameworks necessary
to adequately explain how and why the
Kurdish nationalist movements have emerged.
These texts contain essential historical details
and I have relied especially on McDowall’s
incredibly detailed account, but they are not
equipped with the theoretical apparatus
necessary to adequately explain the processes
of nationalism. Other texts, such as Ofra
Bengio’s analysis of political discourse in
Ba’th Iraq,22 or Adreas Wimmer’s Nationalist
Exclusion and Ethnic Conflict,23 provide
valuable insights into the issue of Kurdish
19
Ibid.
20
Judith Yaphe, “Tribalism in Iraq, the Old and the
New.”
21
Kreyenbroek and Stefan Sperl, eds., The Kurds: a
Contemporary Overview; and Sperl; Gerard Chaliand,
ed., A People Without a Country: the Kurds and
Kurdistan., Michael Pallis trans. (New York: Olive
Branch Press, 1993); McDowall A Modern History of
the Kurds.
22
Ofra Bengio, Saddam’s Word.
23
Andreas Wimmer, Nationalist Exclusion and Ethnic
Conflict.
28
nationalism, but only in the process of
explaining their respective theses rather than
exploring the issue for its own sake. Michael
Gunter’s 2004 article “The Kurdish Question
in Perspective” offers an explanation of the
history of Kurdish nationalist contention,24 but
it is unsatisfactory as described below. In
response to the lack of theoretical analysis of
Kurdish nationalism, I have borrowed
Tarrow’s ‘contentious politics’ model to
better explain the subject.
According to McAdam, McCarthy,
and Zald, there are three main factors used by
so-called ‘movement scholars’ in analyzing
the development of contentious action:
political opportunities; mobilizing structures;
and framing processes.25 Tarrow describes
these factors at length in Power and
Movement. First, ‘political opportunities’ are
the changes in the set opportunities and
constraints imposed upon social groups that
encourage contentious action.26 One of
Tarrow’s key points is that objective
conditions such as deprivation of resources,
denial of identity, and so forth are not in
themselves sufficient to produce contentious
political action, and that action will only occur
if a catalyst in the form of a change in
opportunities is provided.27
Gunter makes the argument that the
prevalence of revolt and uprising among the
Iraqi-Kurds is the product of the
proportionately higher Kurdish population in
Iraq compared to Turkey or Iran, the
supposedly artificial nature of the Iraqi state,
24
Michael M. Gunter, 201.
25
Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N.
Zald, “Introduction: Opportunities, Mobilizing
Structures, and Framing Processes - Toward a
Synthetic Perspective on Social Movements,” in Doug
McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald, eds.
Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1996),
2.
26
Sidney Tarrow, Power in Movement, 71.
27
Sidney Tarrow, “Transnational Politics: Contention
and Institutions in International Politics,” Annual
Review of Political Science 4 (2001), 14.
mike freen
and the division of the Arab population along
Sunni/Shi’a lines.28 This interpretation is
overly simplistic and fails to explain why
Kurdish revolt has been more pronounced at
some times than others: these factors are
objective conditions that have been consistent
since the formation of the Iraqi state.
According to Tarrow, they are thus
insufficient to produce contentious action (i.e.
uprisings) on their own. It was the shifts in the
opportunity structure of the Iraqi political
system that enabled the contentious outbursts
that have been critical in the formation of
Iraqi Kurdish identity. The politically unstable
period from 1958 to 1975 saw the leadership
of the Iraqi state change with great frequency,
and often the new regimes courted Kurdish
support in order to solidify their positions, but
just as quickly would turn against the Kurds if
they were seen as a threat.29 The prominent
Kurdish tribal leader Mustafa Barzani
received arms and funding in return for
supporting Brigadier Qasim, the leader of Iraq
following a republican coup in 1958, and was
thus able to gain a great deal of power in
Iraqi-Kurdistan,30 but Qasim was soon
unnerved by Barzani’s influence and moved
against him. In response to the republican
government’s indiscriminate violence in the
Kurdish regions, Barzani was able to muster a
broad-based coalition Kurdish groups that was
able to resist the government and gain control
of Iraqi Kurdistan and set up a “shadow
state”, although admittedly with Iranian
patronage.31
In 1974 conflict once again erupted
between the Kurdish coalition led by Barzani
and the Iraqi government, at that time under
28
Michael M. Gunter, 201.
29
Andreas Wimmer, Nationalist Exclusion and Ethnic
Conflict. 190; David McDowall, A Modern History of
the Kurds, 316; David McDowall, “The Kurdish
Question: a Historical Overview,” 27.
30
David McDowall, A Modern History of the Kurds,
307.
31
Andreas Wimmer, Nationalist Exclusion and Ethnic
Conflict, 191.
atlantic international studies journal
the control of the Ba’th party. As with
Qasim’s republican regime the Ba’th was
initially conciliatory towards the Kurds,32 but
soon moved to extend its authority over Iraqi-
Kurdistan. Again a broad coalition comprised
of a wide spectrum of Kurdish society was
organized under Barzani to resist Iraqi forces,
and the armed resistance lasted until 1975,
when Iran withdrew its support for the
Kurds.33 This period from 1958 to 1975 saw
the strengthening of unity and commonality of
purpose among Kurdish groups as a result of
their participation in resistance against the
various governments in Baghdad. Was this
unity an expression of nationalism or merely a
reaction to aggression by an outside party?
This question has been debated by scholars
and will be discussed in more detail below in
the analysis of the approaches used by
Kurdish leaders to frame their contention.
Although Kurdish groups occasionally
worked together to provided a unified front
against Iraqi aggression, they were just as
often in conflict with each other. In particular,
there was an ideological rift between the
Barzani and his relatively conservative tribal
supporters and the urban leftist ideologues
such as Jalal Talabani who sought the creation
of a Kurdish national identity along Euro-
American lines.34 While allied to one another
within the KDP for several years, in the early
1960s Barzani expelled the leftists, who
would later become the leadership of the
PUK. Both parties were heavily militarized by
the 1980s and were often in conflict with one
another during the Iran-Iraq War, despite their
mutual antagonism towards the Iraqi
government, now led by Saddam Hussein. A
united front emerged towards the end of the
war, primarily because the two Kurdish
32
Ofra Bengio, 111.
33
The withdrawal of Iranian support for the Iraqi Kurds
was part of the settlement of a territorial dispute
between Iran and Iraq regarding sea access. See
McDowall, A Modern History of the Kurds, 339.
34
Ibid., 289.
29
parties shared Iranian patronage.35 In this
case, contentious action against the Iraqi
government was not sufficient to bring the
Kurds together, in part because of the
significant difference in the frames used by
Kurdish elites to encourage contention.
COMPETING FRAMES
Framing processes are the manner in
which actors ‘package’ their grievances and
offer ways to redress these grievances.36
Tarrow suggests that nationalism, along with
religion, provides “ready-made symbols,
rituals, and solidarities that can be accessed
and appropriated by movement leaders”.37
This is true, but only up to a point. When the
issue at stake is the nation’s identity itself, and
there is no acknowledged ‘national’ (i.e. state)
authority, competing groups of actors will
attempt to frame the identity of the nation
along lines that are in accord with their own
ideological, religious, class, and intellectual,
and other viewpoints. In the Kurdish case, this
phenomenon is manifested in the multiplicity
of Kurdish nationalist movements with
significantly different approaches: Marxists,
tribal coalitionists, Islamic fundamentalists, et
cetera.
Framing Kurdish nationalism in Iraq
has proved difficult. While educated urban
Kurds have though in nationalist terms since
the partition of Greater Kurdistan, the rural
population has continued to organize along
tribal lines, dominated politically be landlords
(aghas) and religious shaykhs. The Kurdish
national project in Iraq has depended on the
mobilizing of these ‘traditionalist’ elements
for nationalist causes.38 There were a number
of Kurdish revolts from 1920 to 1946, but
35
Ibid., 350-351.
36
Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N.
Zald, 5.
37
Sidney Tarrow, Power in Movement, 112.
38
A. Sherzad, “The Kurdish Movement in Iraq: 1975-
88,” In Philip G. Kreyenbroek and Stefan Sperl, eds.
The Kurds: a Contemporary Overview (London:
Routledge, 1992), 135.
30
these were all essentially expressions of tribal
grievances towards the central government’s
negligence of regional socioeconomic
issues.39 The most notable of these early
revolts was that of Mustafa Barzani, who
enjoyed prestige both as a notable tribal leader
and as a religious authority. In 1943 he
escaped detention (having been put there by
the Baghdad government for his participation
in an earlier revolt) and returned to his base of
power in Barzan, in the far north of Iraq. His
personal dispute with the central government
provided a focal point for broader regional
dissatisfaction with inadequate government
response to a famine in the Kurdish regions,
allowing Barzani to create a broad coalition of
Kurdish tribes opposing the government.40
The broad base of rural support
Barzani enjoyed made him a natural focal
point for the Kurdish nationalist movement in
Iraq.41 1946 saw the formation of the Kurdish
Democratic Party (KDP), which incorporated
both modernizing nationalists and tribal
leaders. Some particularly left-leaning
nationalists, unwilling to cooperate with
‘traditional’ or ‘feudal’ elements, allied
themselves instead with the Iraqi Communist
Party. The issue of cooperation with the
landlords and shaykhs was only one of many
contentious issues facing the actors attempting
to promote Kurdish nationalism. Another
dilemma was whether to promote a
nationalism that encompassed Greater
Kurdistan or one that merely applied to Kurds
living in Iraq. The creation of a specifically
Iraqi KDP appeared to support the latter
approach.42
The KDP reframed its approach
slightly in 1953, changing its name to the
Kurdistan Democratic Party. This implied a
39
David McDowall, A Modern History of the Kurds,
290.
40
Ibid., 292.
41
Michael M. Gunter, 200.
42
David McDowall, A Modern History of the Kurds,
296.
mike freen
civic approach to the nationalism, centred on
territory rather than Kurdish ethnicity, and
was intended to draw in support of non-
Kurdish groups. The party also attempted to
tie nationalism to the improvement of
socioeconomic conditions among the tribal
peasantry, although actual progress on this
front was limited by the KDP’s dependence
on tribal authorities.43 Wimmer argues that
attempts to infuse a sense of national loyalty
among the “rank-and-file” tribe members was
unsuccessful, and their participation in the
nationalist movement was (and remains) a
product of their loyalty to established tribal
leaders.44 McDowall suggests that the
alignment of most Iraqi Kurds to either the
KDP or PUK after 1991 represented not
success in instilling nationalist ideas in the
Kurdish populace, but the replacement of the
old tribal systems that were largely wiped out
in the decades of violence and repression with
a ‘neo-tribalism’ that features the nationalist
parties as the new centre of allegiance and
loyalty.45 The division of the autonomous
Iraqi Kurdistan into two separate PUK- and
KDP-administered regions and subsequent
conflict beginning in 1994 appeared to
reinforce McDowall’s suspicion, although the
reunification of the autonomous Kurdish
parliament in 2002 could equally be presented
as evidence of a commitment to democratic
governance.46 Wimmer makes a strong case
for the relationship between democratic
representation and national self-
47
determination. Since the overthrow of the
Ba’th regime, the Kurds have shown a great
willingness to engage in Iraqi politics, if
election turnout numbers or Jalal Talabani’s
43
Ibid., 297.
44
Andreas Wimmer, Nationalist Exclusion and Ethnic
Conflict, 188.
45
David McDowall, A Modern History of the Kurds,
385.
46
Michael M. Gunter, 202.
47
Andreas Wimmer, Nationalist Exclusion and Ethnic
Conflict, 54.
atlantic international studies journal
position as Iraqi president can be used as
indicators.48
Generally speaking, there was a sense
of common national identity among Iraqi
Kurds (at least educated urban Kurds), but
there was little consensus regarding the
content of that national identity. Different
nationalist groups offered competing ways of
framing the national struggle (coalition-based
vs. leftist, ethnic vs. civic, et cetera) and
frames changed over time in response to new
political opportunities and constraints.
MOBILIZING STRUCTURES
The third major category of analysis
for Tarrow and other social movement
theorists is mobilizing structures: the
networks, organizations, and other vehicles
through which actors engage in collective
action.49 The characteristic organizational
expression of Kurdish nationalism in Iraq
proved to be the militant party, a fusion of
urban-bred nationalist ideology relying on a
‘traditional’ tribal power bases to engage in
nationalist contention. The KDP under
Mustafa Barzani was the prototype for this
model, which was later replicated by the more
progressive and intellectual PUK because the
recurring governmental threats to the very
survival of Kurdish nationalism radicalized
and militarized the movement.
As mentioned above, the militarized
nationalist parties often formed networks and
connections with governing elites in order to
secure resources such as funding, arms and
legitimacy not otherwise available. A similar
process of network formation can be observed
at various periods between Kurdish
nationalists and Iraq’s external rivals,
particularly Iran. This generally occurred
when the nationalist movements could not
48
Liz Sly, “Shiites Short of majority; Kurds 2nd in
Iraqi Vote.” Chicago Tribune, February 14, 2005.
49
Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N.
Zald, 3.
31
access the resources of the state, and thus felt
compelled to look elsewhere.
The creation of the Kurdish Regional
Government in the early 1990s saw the
incorporation of an additional role for the
militarized parties: component of a
representative governing assembly. Both the
PUK and KDP appear to have taken on
characteristics familiar to a political party in a
typical representative democracy. This role is
likely to become more salient in the future as
the two parties have formed an alliance
representing the Kurdish nationalist
movement on the state level.50
The three factors (political
opportunities, framing processes, and
mobilizing structures) are all interrelated, and
changes in one can alter the others. The
overthrow of Saddam Hussein’s regime in
2003 and subsequent reorganization of the
Iraqi state was a huge shift in the political
opportunities available to Iraqi Kurds. Both
the KDP and the PUK reframed their
approaches, moving from policies of each
running their own essentially independent
quasi-states in Northern Iraq to participating
in the creation of the new Iraqi state, in which
the Kurds enjoy significant autonomy but are
still a part of the broader nation-state. In
response to these changes in political
opportunity and framing approaches, the two
organizations have also moved from a
competitive and antagonistic stance towards
one another to forming an alliance with each
other and other Kurdish groups, and
representing Kurdish interests in the Iraqi
assembly.
CONCLUSION
Like any form of collective activism,
nationalist movements can be understood
through studying the political opportunities
that enable their existence, the frames they
50
BBC News, “Who’s Who in the Iraq Election,” BBC
News (accessed 11 December, 2005 – link no longer
active).
32
construct in defining themselves, and the
structures they adopt to mobilize support. The
case of Kurdish nationalism in Iraq is an
example of a highly contentious stateless and
transnational form of nationalism that was
largely reterritorialized within state
boundaries. The ideal of Kurdish nationalism
has been forced to compromise with tribal
reality and the fact that the regional and great
powers have no interest in the statehood of
Greater Kurdistan, while Iraqi nationalists
have struggled with incorporating the Kurdish
identity into a broader Iraqi national identity.
The resulting years of conflict between the
Kurds of Iraq and the state have indeed
fostered a Kurdish nationalism, but it is a
specifically Iraqi- Kurdish nationalism, a
product of a particular Iraqi-Kurdish
experience.
The problematic state of Kurdish
collective identity has unclear implications for
the ‘new’ Iraq. While Kurds appear to be
among the most enthusiastic participants in
the Iraqi electoral system, their participation
seems contingent on the retention of Kurdish
autonomy in northern Iraq. It could be argued
that the participation of Kurds in the Iraqi
democratic system as Kurds (i.e. voting for
political parties specifically claiming to
represent Kurdish interests in the state
legislature) will reinforce Iraqi Kurdish
national identity by offering an expression of
collective identity that is not influenced by
tribal relationships. However, such an
argument could not be sustained without first
undertaking a detailed study of Iraqi electoral
politics and particularly Kurdish voting
patterns in the recent elections. The political
opportunities and constraints facing the Kurds
have changed frequently since the American
occupation began, as have the framing
processes and organizational structures used
by Kurdish leaders. The speed and complexity
of these recent developments makes it
difficult to assess their ramifications for
Kurdish nationalism, especially as the
mike freen
instability of the circumstances in Iraq
suggests even more change in the near future.
Despite the complexity of the situation, the
occupation of Iraq has also raised the profile
of Kurdish issues, which will hopefully
encourage more scholarship on the subject in
the future, and a raised awareness of the
condition of Kurdish identity not only in Iraq,
but in other countries with Kurdish minorities
as well.
SOURCES
Anderson, Benedict. Imagined Communities.
London: Verso, 1991.
BBC News. “Who’s Who in the Iraq
Election.” BBC News (11 December,
2005 – link no longer active).
Bengio, Ofra. Saddam’s Word: Political
Discourse in Iraq. New York: Oxford
University Press, 2002.
Chaliand, Gerard, ed. A People Without a
Country: the Kurds and Kurdistan.
Michael Pallis trans. New York: Olive
Branch Press, 1993.
Gunter, Michael M. “The Kurdish Question in
Perspective.” World Affairs 166, 4
(Spring 2004), 197-205.
Keating, Michael. Nations Against the State:
The New Politics of Nationalism in
Quebec, Catalonia and Scotland.
London: MacMillan Press Ltd., 1996.
Kirişci, Kemal. “Minority/Majority
Discourse: The Case of the Kurds in
Turkey.” In Making Majorities:
Constituting the Nation in Japan,
Korea, China, Malaysia, Fiji, Turkey,
and the United States, edited by Dru C.
atlantic international studies journal 33

Gladney. Stanford: Stanford University Tarrow, Sidney. Power in Movement: Social

Press, 1998, 227-245.
Kroenbroek, Philip G. “On the Kurdish
Language.” In Philip G. Kreyenbroek
and Stefan Sperl, eds. The Kurds: a
Contemporary Overview. London:
Routledge, 1992, 68-83.
Kroenbroek, Philip G. and Stefan Sperl, eds.
The Kurds: a Contemporary Overview.
London: Routledge, 1992.
McAdam Doug, John D. McCarthy, and
Mayer N. Zald. “Introduction:
Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures,
and Framing Processes - Toward a
Synthetic Perspective on Social
Movements.” In Doug McAdam, John
D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald, eds.
Comparative Perspectives on Social
Movements. Cambridge, UK:
Cambridge University Press, 1996, 1-
20.
McDowall, David. “The Kurdish Question: a
Historical Overview.” In Philip G.
Kreyenbroek and Stefan Sperl, eds. The
Kurds: a Contemporary Overview.
London: Routledge, 1992, 10-32.
McDowall, David. A Modern History of the
Kurds. London: I. B. Tauris, 1996.
Movements and Contentious.
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University
Press, 1998.
Tarrow Sidney. “Transnational Politics:
Contention and Institutions in
International Politics.” Annual Review
of Political Science 4 (2001); 1-20.
Tarrow, Sidney. 2005. The New Transnational
Social Movements. Cambridge, UK:
Cambridge University Press, 2005.
“Treaty of Sèvres.” In David McDowall. A
Modern History of the Kurds. London:
I. B. Tauris, 1996, 450-451.
Wimmer, Andreas. Nationalist Exclusion and
Ethnic Conflict: Shadows of Modernity.
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University
Press, 2002.
Wimmer, Andreas and Nina Glick Schiller.
“Methodological Nationalism and
Beyond: Nation-Building, Migration,
and the Social Sciences.” Global
Networks 2, 4 (2002): 301-334.
Yaphe, Judith. “Tribalism in Iraq, the Old and
the New.” Middle East Policy 7, 3 (June
2000): 51-58.

Natali, Denise. “Transnational Networks:

New Opportunities and Constraints for
Kurdish Statehood.” Middle East Policy
11, 1 (Spring, 2004): 111-114.

Sherzad, A. “The Kurdish Movement in Iraq:

1975-88.” In Philip G. Kreyenbroek and
Stefan Sperl, eds. The Kurds: a
Contemporary Overview. London:
Routledge, 1992, 134-142.

Sly, Liz. “Shiites Short of majority; Kurds

2nd in Iraqi Vote.” Chicago
Tribune, February 14, 2005.
The Terrorist Threat:
Its Impact on American Civil Liberties and Democracy
Lindsay Gorman

W ithin the international system,

terrorist attacks threaten the
security of their target states.
Terrorism can be defined “as the threat or use
rights in order to defeat and capture terrorists,
ending the democratic regime. Alternatively,
states that do not react in this manner ensure
civil liberties are protected but leave their
of violence to spread fear to lead to political citizens vulnerable to security threats.3 As
change.”1 However, state responses to Michael Ignatieff points out, “A terrorist
terrorist threats differ emergency is
according to its political precisely a case
system. For authoritarian where allowing
regimes, the responses are individual liberty – to
virtually limitless. plan, to plot, to evade
Appropriate responses detection—may
become inherently more threaten a vital
complex for a liberal majority interest that
democracy that is national security.4
guarantees its citizens a This is the “catch-22”
certain level of civil and of the liberal
human rights. In fact, the democratic state
strategy used by terrorists response to terrorism.
“is to force the liberal Since the terrorist
government to reveal its true, authoritarian attacks of September 11th, 2001, the United
nature…through restrictions on civil liberties States government under George Bush has
as would be imposed in a crisis or state of highlighted homeland security as one of his
siege.”2 A paradox ensues, in which a state government’s top priorities, and thus new
can clamp down on civil liberties and human legislation has been implemented to fight
terrorism along with the corresponding wars
1 in Afghanistan and Iraq. One such legislation
Michael Freeman, Freedom or Security: The
consequences for democracies using emergency powers
3
to fight terrorism (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, Paul Wilkinson, Terrorism Versus Democracy: The
2003), 26. liberal state response (London: Frank Cass Publishers,
2
Robert H. Kupperman and Darrell M. Trent, 2000), 115.
4
Terrorism: Threat, reality, response (Stanford, CA: Michael Ignatieff, The Lesser Evil: Political ethics in
Hoover Institution Press, 1979), 26-27. an age of terror (Toronto: Penguin, 2004), 4.
atlantic international studies journal
is the USA Patriot Act, enacted on October
24, 2001. The purpose of this controversial
legislation is to provide law enforcement with
enhanced investigatory tools to aid in
deterring and prosecuting terrorist acts, on
American soil and abroad.5 Critics argue this
act erodes America’s civil liberties by
removing checks that limit law enforcement’s
freedom. However, proponents of the bill
assert that the Patriot Act is necessary as a
measure to counter terrorism and ensure
national security.6
The controversy surrounding this
legislation raises an age-old debate; what
measures must a state be willing to undertake
in order to secure its own survival? What are
the limits of state responses to security
threats? Should national security take
precedence over civil liberties? Where should
the line be drawn? Do emergency legislations
restricting civil liberties defend or attack
democracy? What implications do US
governmental policies –intended to guarantee
American security -have for democracy? Are
they a threat to the quality of American
democracy or a necessary measure to
guarantee state security?
I intend to examine to what extent liberal
democratic states can restrict civil liberties to
protect against the threat of terrorism before
they cease to be democratic. Doherty et al.
outline four specific areas in which legislation
following the 9/11 terrorist attacks erode civil
liberties they are: open government; the right
to privacy; treatment of immigrants, refugees,
5
Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing
Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct
Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001. HR 3162,
107th Cong., 1st sess., (24 October 2001), preamble.
6
There are many organizations against these new
legislations; examples include the American Civil
Liberties Union and Human Rights First (formerly
Lawyers Committee for Human Rights). Supporters of
the Patriot Act include The Foundation for the Defense
of Democracies; for example, see Viet D. Dinh, “How
the USA Patriot Act Defends Democracy”,
(Washington, DC: The Foundation for the Defense of
Democracies, 2004), 1.
35
and minorities; and finally security detainees
and the criminal justice system.7 I will focus
specifically on two sections, the right to
privacy and the security detainees. Then I
will use Freeman’s theory in a detailed
analysis to examine the impact for American
democracy. In particular, Freeman’s work
will help determine whether or not the
restriction of civil liberties is an effective use
of emergency powers. In addition, Wilkinson
offers three safe guards to which democratic
anti-terrorist legislation should adhere, which
will help explore the impact of such
legislations on American democracy.8
My research has shown that, due in part to
the international reach of this terrorist
network, the restriction of civil liberties is
relatively ineffective.9 In addition, some of
the post-9/11 legislation does not meet
Wilkinson’s criteria, and therefore may inhibit
and threaten American democracy. However,
I cautiously predict the erosion of civil
liberties to decrease American democratic
quality, but at the same time not pose a valid
threat to democratic stability.
Before beginning any discussion regarding
the impact of terrorism on liberal
democracies, it is necessary to define the
term. Liberal democracy is one of the many
definitions of democracy to add a qualifier,
therefore changing or expanding its meaning.
The term democracy on its own has been
widely defined as ‘rule of the people’: that is,
a system of government selected by the
people through the process of open, fair
elections.10 Juan J. Linz considers a
7
Fiona Doherty et al., “A Year of Loss: Reexamining
civil liberties since September 11” (New York:
Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, 2002).
8
Wilkinson, 113-18.
9
Freeman supports the conclusion that due to the
international nature of the 9/11 terrorist attacks,
restricting civil liberties is not the most effective
counter-terrorism tool.
10
See Fareed Zakaria, The Future of Freedom: Illiberal
democracy at home and abroad (New York: W.W.
Norton and Company, 2004).
36
government democratic “if it supplies regular
constitutional opportunities for peaceful
competition for political power … to different
groups without excluding any significant
sector of the population by force.”11 Linz’s
definition accounts for a measure of equality,
which takes us to where the qualifier liberal
fits into this definition. Fareed Zakaria
defines liberal democracy as “a political
system marked not only by free and fair
elections but also by the rule of law, a
separation of powers, and the protection of
basic liberties of speech, assembly, religion,
and property.”12 The collection of basic
inalienable liberties or freedoms is how
liberalism is included in the definition; these
liberties are protected from a purely majority
rule via the constitution. In general, a
constitution aims to ensure a balance between
equality and individual liberty.13
Thus, for a liberal democracy, the rule of
law via a written Constitution that serves to
check and balance separate government
branches is paramount. For this reason, I will
use examples of Constitutional violations to
illustrate the breakdown of the rule of law,
which consequently may diminish the quality
and stability of a liberal democracy. The
breakdown of the rule of law, and situations in
which the Constitution is not directly upheld,
threaten the ability of a liberal democracy to
hold free and fair elections. When laws can
be applied arbitrarily, the government in
power has the potential to abuse this authority
by limiting the opposition. Clearly, if this
occurs, the state will no longer be classified as
democratic.
It is generally accepted that states must
balance their reaction to terrorist acts with the
preservation of civil liberties.14 Benjamin
11
Juan J. Linz, “An Authoritarian Regime: The case of
Spain,” in Mass Politics: Studies in Political Sociology,
eds. Erik Allardt and Stein Rokkan (New York: Free
Press, 1970), 254.
12
Zakaria, 17.
13
Freeman, 36.
14
Kupperman and Trent, 10-11.
lindsay gorman
Barber echoes this idea of balance, asserting
“an effective national security strategy must
secure America against terrorism without
destroying the liberty in whose name its
struggle is waged.”15 However, this concept
of balancing remains fairly murky and
rhetorical. If we consider this idea as existing
on a continuum, this implies that civil liberties
are given up for increased security. Does this
mean that policy, in order to be balanced,
should remain in the middle of this
continuum? This idea is what Michael
Freeman calls “the tradeoff of using
emergency powers”, a tradeoff which occurs
when states weigh the benefits and costs
associated with using emergency powers to
fight a terrorist threat.16 Emergency powers
are one tool used by states to counter terrorist
security threats, which “can increase the
power of the state along many
dimensions…[by suspending] normal due
process laws, allowing the police to conduct
searches without warrant, arrest citizens
without charge, [or] hold them in jail without
bringing them to trial.”17 Freeman’s
definition of emergency powers also includes
legislation that limits civil liberties (like the
right to free speech or assembly), and powers
that suspend the separation of different
branches of government.18 From Freeman’s
description, legislation suspending civil
liberties and giving law enforcement a broader
scope, such as the USA Patriot Act, could be
included in the category of possible state
responses to terrorism.
The tradeoff concept has been widely
established in related literature.19 The debate
has instead focused on the acceptance of the
tradeoff, which is influenced by the goal
protected, democracy or state security. Here,
15
Benjamin R. Barber, Fear’s Empire: War, terrorism,
and democracy (New York: W.W. Norton & Company,
2003), 145-46.
16
Freeman, 2-3.
17
Freeman, 28.
18
Ibid.
19
Freeman, 3-5.
atlantic international studies journal
Freeman suggests that norms play a role in
how actors (whether scholars writing on the
subject or politicians drafting legislation)
place greater value on either protection of
democracy or security goals. Freeman
identifies the tradeoff concept as one that rests
on the assumption that restraining civil
liberties is always an effective tool for
combating terrorism, which he argues is not
necessarily the case. His research looks at
four case studies, and distinguishes between
ineffective/effective and abused/not abused
emergency powers. With this analysis, he
aims to provide policy recommendations
outlining when states can expect emergency
powers to be effective and not abused.
Freeman concludes that although citizens fear
the invocation of emergency powers to
combat terrorism and the “tradeoff between
effectiveness and abuses” of these powers,
“the tradeoff does not always materialize.”20
Freeman’s research is quite innovative as
it correctly makes the distinction between
effective and ineffective uses of emergency
powers. However, his application to the
current American situation was not fully
developed. Freeman concludes that the abuse
of emergency powers would be unlikely in the
United States because institutional safeguards
would remain in place (for example, the free
press, the Congress and the Supreme Court)
and because there is a strong commitment to
democracy. Although these powers would not
likely be abused, Freeman also emphasizes
that they could be ineffective, and therefore
unnecessary.21
Freeman applies his theory to the
American example, but does not present an in-
depth analysis.22 One major weakness is
Freeman’s failure to consider the USA Patriot
Act. This legislation could be categorized as
an exercise of emergency power, albeit one
relatively limited in scope. In regards to the
20
Freeman, 194.
21
Freeman, 192-95.
22
Ibid.
37
USA Patriot Act, Freeman effectively points
out that emergency powers are the most
controversial counter-terrorism tool that
democratic governments can implement
because they restrict civil liberties.23 He
argues that,
[o]nly emergency powers promise the
benefits of defeating terrorism while
also imposing costs on a democratic
society…[at best], emergency powers
entail temporary curtailments of
individual liberties. At worst, the
emergency powers can lead to the
end of democracy.24
Freeman’s description of emergency powers
includes relaxations of normal due process
laws and searches without warrants. 25
Therefore, the USA’s Patriot Act could fit into
this description, as it relaxes some safeguards.
Due to the loosening of these safeguards,
abuse becomes possible. Therefore, a more
current and complete analysis of the American
example would have to include this new
legislation.
One constraint of focusing my analysis on
Freeman’s work is that his four case studies
were instances of domestic terrorism. His
first case study is Great Britain, which used
emergency powers in Northern Ireland against
the Irish Republican Army (IRA), without
restricting liberty and democracy but also
without much success in limiting terrorist
operations.26 Freeman’s second case study is
Canada and its response to the Front de
Libération du Québec (FLQ)’s kidnappings in
1970. In this case, the FLQ was eliminated
with the use of emergency powers with little
cost to democracy.27 Uruguay is Freeman’s
third study, where emergency powers were
invoked from 1968-72 against the Tupamaros
terrorist group. In this case, the military took
23
Freeman, 28.
24
Ibid.
25
Freeman, 28-29.
26
Freeman, 15, 18.
27
Freeman, 15, 19.
38
over counter-terrorist policing, and the
emergency powers it was given to investigate
were abused. This created the opportunity for
the military to stage a successful coup in
1973, thus ending democracy.28 The final
case, in which the use of emergency powers
were both abused and ineffective is Peru,
where such powers were used to target the
Shining Path terrorist organization, just as the
country was returning to democracy in the
early 1980s. In this case, the abuse of
emergency powers was horrific, as security
forces murdered many innocent civilians and
completely suspended basic civil liberties in
specific areas.29
All these cases encompass commonalities,
as the target states were relatively democratic
and the terrorists to whom they responded
were domestic. Of course, it has become
common knowledge that international
terrorists, linked to the Al Qaeda network,
performed the attacks on the United States.
This poses a conceptual challenge, because
the methods for combating domestic and
international terrorism are inherently
different. Therefore, the evaluation of the
effectiveness of emergency power use would
be slightly different.
Nevertheless, I believe this challenge will
strengthen my argument against the use of
emergency powers by the United States
government. Due to the fact that the Al
Qaeda network has cells operating in many
countries all over the globe means that the use
of emergency powers within the domestic
borders of the United States will have little or
no impact on terrorists who are plotting and
planning in other countries. As Freeman
acknowledges, “[e]mergency powers will be
more likely to be ineffective if a terrorist
group has a large base of supporters and
sympathizers, relative to the size of the active
terrorist group.”30 In this case, he was
28
Freeman, 15-19.
29
Freeman, 15-20.
30
Freeman, 31.
lindsay gorman
referring to domestic terrorist organizations,
but we can infer the efficacy of emergency
powers to be compromised further when
applied to the expansive and complex
networks of terrorist organizations like Al
Qaeda: “[w]hen terrorist groups are very
large, numbering in the tens of thousands of
members spread out throughout a country,
emergency powers are unlikely to be
effective.”31 Because this limitation is
augmented when we consider international
terrorism, it is safe to assume that only when
these terrorists physically enter the United
States will emergency powers be of any use.
Even then, due to their broad support and
organizational base, it is doubtful these
emergency powers would actually threaten the
international terrorist organization.
Furthermore, since a number of the
hijackers involved in the 9/11 attacks attended
flight school in the United States, and thus
obtained their commercial pilot licenses on
American soil, their activities could have been
impacted by more stringent emergency
powers. Consequently, improved
enforcement of existing immigration laws
would have dealt a sizeable blow to the
organization of these attacks. Six of the
hijackers were in violation of immigration
laws (more specifically, visa overstays and
violations of student status) that were never
detected by immigration officials.32 In these
cases, enforcement of existing laws would
have limited terrorist movement into the
United States; however, it is doubtful that
emergency powers and minor limitations of
civil liberties would have been effective.
In attempting to decipher what effects post
9/11 legislation has had on democracy, I will
use Wilkinson’s three recommendations for
anti-terrorist legislation to analyze further the
31
Ibid.
32
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the
United States, Entry of the 9/11 Hijackers into the
United States, Staff Statement No. 1., (Washington:
2004), 8.
atlantic international studies journal
level of harm to American democracy.
Wilkinson outlines three crucial safeguards
that democratic anti-terrorist legislation
should follow:
1) All aspects of the anti-terrorist policy
and its implementation should be under
the overall control of the civil authorities
and hence democratically accountable.
2) The government and security forces
must conduct all anti-terrorist operations
within the law. They should do all in
their power to ensure that the normal legal
processes are maintained, and that those
charged with terrorists offences are
brought to trial before the courts of law.
3) Special powers, which may become
necessary to deal with a terrorist
emergency, should be approved by the
legislature only for a fixed and limited
period, at the very minimum on an annual
basis. This should be subject to the
legislature’s right to rescind the special
powers in whole or in part if
circumstances alter. Emergency powers
should be clearly and simply drafted,
published as widely as possible, and
administered impartially.33
Using Wilkinson’s three safeguards, along
with the initial criteria provided by Doherty et
al. (in particular, the right to privacy, and
security detainees in relation to the criminal
justice system), I will attempt to synthesize
the evidence in order to provide a basis from
which I can posit that some of the post-9/11
legislation is threatening the quality of
American democracy.
The Patriot Act’s restrictions on civil
liberties fall under the category of the right to
privacy. This piece of legislation provides the
Federal Bureau of Intelligence (FBI) with the
power to bypass the need for a warrant to
access personal information. In particular,
section 215 of the act allows for access to
information such as library records, medical
information, financial records, rental car
records, academic records and grades, and
33
Wilkinson, 117.
39
internet site records, without demonstrating
any suspicion regarding an individual’s
alleged ties to terrorists.34 As previously
argued, restrictions of this type are generally
ineffective tools in combating international
terrorism. Therefore, the existence of this
unnecessary legislation creates the
opportunity for abuse. The misuse of these
special investigatory tools could have harmful
effects on democracy, mostly due to their
possible use in targeting political opponents
and minorities.
Of the four areas outlined by Doherty et
al., the evidence on unclassified detainees
pertains directly to Wilkinson’s second
safeguard criteria for democratic anti-
terrorism legislation. I will use the most
current report from the Lawyers Committee
for Human Rights as evidence to support the
argument that Wilkinson’s second criteria,
which ensures that “the normal legal
processes are maintained, and that those
charged with terrorists offences are brought to
trial before the courts of law”, is not always
followed.35 Acer et al. argue that the
incarceration of unclassified detainees violates
both domestic and international law.36 They
point to the creation of the term ‘enemy
combatant’, which can be used by the
president (solely executive power, and
therefore no checks and balances) instead of
using the classification of prisoner of war or
criminal suspect. This is a blatant use of
semantics to bypass both the American
constitution and International law. If the
prisoners labeled by the United States’
government as ‘enemy combatants’ were
called prisoners of war, their detainment
without trial would be in direct violation of
34
Eleanor Acer et al., “Assessing the New Normal:
Liberty and security for the post-September 11 United
States” (New York: Lawyers Committee for Human
Rights, 2003), 16-17.
35
See Acer et al, 49-50, for the report from the
Lawyers Committee for Human Rights. See also
Wilkinson, 117, for criteria for anti-terrorist legislation.
36
Acer et al., 49-50.
40
Article 103 of the Geneva Convention, which
states that:
Judicial investigations relating to a
prisoner of war shall be conducted as
rapidly as circumstances permit and so
that his trial shall take place as soon as
possible. A prisoner of war shall not be
confined while awaiting trial unless a
member of the armed forces of the
Detaining Power would be so confined if
he were accused of a similar offence, or if
it is essential to do so in the interests of
national security. In no circumstances
shall this confinement exceed three
months.37
Additionally, as Acer et al. point out, the
Geneva Convention ensures every person
status under the law, either as a prisoner of
war or a civilian.38
However, since September 11th, 2001,
there have been two American citizens held
without charge by the United States in a
military detention facility. One of these men,
José Padilla, was denied both counsel and
family visitation for approximately 15 months
(prior to the writing of Acer et al.’s report).39
Because United States citizens cannot be
classified as prisoners of war, they must
therefore be criminal suspects if they are
detained. However, due to the creation of this
‘enemy combatant’ category, the executive
branch of American government is completely
bypassing normal legal processes that
Wilkinson warns must remain intact.40
According to Acer et al., Padilla’s treatment is
illegal, as it violates “constitutional
protections against arbitrary detention,
including the right to counsel; the right to a
jury trial; the right to be informed of the
charges and confront witnesses against
them.”41 This violates Wilkinson’s second
37
Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of
Prisoners of War, art. 103.
38
Acer et al., 50.
39
Acer et al., Introduction, ii.
40
Wilkinson, 117.
41
Acer et al., Introduction, xii.
lindsay gorman
recommendation for anti-terrorist legislation
in democratic states, where normal legal
processes should be maintained and
performed under the law, and terrorists should
be charged and tried before the courts of
law.42 The United States’ Constitution
guarantees the writ of habeas corpus, which is
a check against the arbitrary application of
imprisonment, and is an important tool in
upholding the constitution and personal
liberty.43 The Constitution does provide for
exceptional circumstances of rebellion or
invasion, during which the writ can be
constitutionally suspended;44 however, it
seems a stretch to justify the suspension of the
writ by classifying the terrorist threat as an
‘invasion.’ This means the detention of
prisoners, like Padilla, directly violate the
American constitution, and therefore threaten
democracy due to the arbitrary application of
Constitutional law.
This raises a second area where the
American government is using what Acer et
al. refer to as ‘extra-legal institutions’, which
violate the United States Constitution, and
where “[t]he judicial Power of the United
States, shall be vested in one supreme Court,
and in such inferior Courts as the Congress
may from time to time ordain and establish”.45
Trying some of the aforementioned
Guatánamo Bay detainees by established
military commissions, instead of trial by the
criminal courts, is a process that operates
outside both the United States criminal courts
and court martial, and therefore outside the
judicial institutions and power.46 As this
development violates both the Constitution
and rule of law, in addition to bypassing the
Judiciary institutions, it has the potential to
threaten democracy by undermining the rule
of law and the democratic institutions
42
Wilkinson, 117.
43
U.S. Constitution, art. 1, sec. 9, cl. 2.
44
Ibid.
45
U.S. Constitution, art. III, sec. 1.
46
Acer et al., 52; See also Appendix A, page 44.
atlantic international studies journal
essential to the stability of liberal
democracies. The military commission
process also violates Wilkinson’s second
criteria, the necessity of maintaining normal
legal and due process for those suspected of
47
terrorist activities. Therefore, this is an
additional development that jeopardizes
American democracy.
Given the implications for American
democracy due to the suspension of civil
liberties explored in this
paper, it becomes relevant to
consider whether these means If the war on terror is Union took the Department of
are necessary, given the
genuine security threat posed unwinnable,
by international terrorism. Is implications does this the Patriot Act, but lost due to
the erosion of civil liberties have for… civil liberty the further restrictions placed
justified in view of the actual
threat posed? Are limited interruptions?
restrictions of civil liberties
warranted in terms of the
terrorist security threat? How serious is this
security threat? These questions require
another paper, but I will offer some
preliminary comments. Prominent Canadian
journalist Gwynne Dyer argues that the threat
to the domestic American population is
inherently miniscule:
As for the 300 million Americans at
home, exactly as many of them have been
killed by terrorists since 9/ 11 as have
been killed by the Creature from the
Black Lagoon in the same period. None. 48
Those opposed to the Patriot Act argue that
the threat of domestic terrorism is relatively
small, and that the Patriot Act is therefore
unnecessary. Conversely, proponents of the
Patriot Act argue that the absence of an attack
on American soil is a testament to the
legislation’s efficacy.49 Therefore, the Patriot
47
Wilkinson, 117.
48
Gwynne Dyer, “Despite the Rhetoric, the ‘war on
terror’ can never be won,” Kingston Whig – Standard, 8
September 2004, n.p.
49
Dinh, 2.
41
Act’s concrete ‘success’ is difficult to
measure because both sides are claiming the
lack of terrorist attacks on the American
homeland as ‘proof’ of their arguments.
In addition, the use of the Patriot Act is
shrouded in a veil of secrecy. Due to
restrictions on the Freedom of Information
Act (FOIA) enacted after the terrorist attacks,
information regarding the frequency of the
Department of Justice’s use of the Patriot Act
has been classified.50 The
American Civil Liberties
Justice to court to request
what information about their use of
on the FOIA.51 Evidently, this
makes it increasingly difficult
to gauge the effectiveness of
the Patriot Act in regards to the
security threat. In addition, the secrecy
surrounding the use of the Patriot Act
provides ample opportunity for its abuse,
which has been established as a threat to
American democracy.
After reading Dyer’s article, another facet
of this complex issue comes to light; if the
war on terrorism is unwinnable (he compares
it to the war on crime, where no one actually
expects a day where all criminals will
surrender), what implications does this have
for the duration of civil liberty interruptions?
Dyer offers a comment from Stella Rimington
(the former director of MI5, Britain's domestic
intelligence agency), who is
afraid that terrorism didn't begin on 9/11
and it will be around for a long time. …
terrorism has been around for 35 years ...
[and it] will be around while there are
people with grievances…there will
always be terrorism. One can be misled
50
Acer et al., Introduction, vii.
51
Acer et al., Introduction, vii.
42
by talking about a war, as though in some
way you can defeat it.52
If this is the case, the suspension of civil
liberties for emergency power purposes
becomes potentially infinite; if the war will
never be ‘won’, can an endless restriction of
civil liberties be justified to the American
population? This is certainly an interesting
perspective making the use of emergency
powers in this situation even more
problematic.
In conclusion, I argue that restricting
civil liberties as an anti-terrorist measure in
the United States has not necessarily been
effective, due to the large scope of
international terrorist organizations. This
weakens the tradeoff assumed to exist
between democratic civil liberties and the
terrorist security threat. In this respect, I
agree with Freeman’s conclusion that
emergency powers would be ineffective and
unnecessary against an international terrorist
threat.53 However, I disagree with Freeman’s
assertion that, if implemented, these
emergency powers would not be abused.54
The extensive research of the Lawyers
Committee for Human Rights highlighted
areas where post-9/11 anti-terrorist legislation
was abused.55 In addition, their research
highlighted examples where new legislation
was actually deemed unconstitutional (for
example, the Padilla case and the use of
military commissions instead of trial by jury
for detainees). These examples along with
Wilkinson’s criteria illustrate that the United
States legislation did not comply with his
recommendations. While not a perfect
evaluation of how democracy is threatened, it
provides a framework to argue that the quality
of American democracy is possibly suffering
from post-9/11 legislation. In addition, I
52
Dyer, n.p.
53
Freeman, 193.
54
Ibid.
55
Please refer to Acer et al. for this report.
lindsay gorman
attempted to evaluate whether specific
restrictions of civil liberties violated the
Constitution, which threatens democracy
qualitatively by limiting pluralism.
Therefore, I posit that the use of
emergency powers, like the restriction of civil
liberties, is an ineffective tool for the United
States in combating terrorism. In addition, I
argue that the abuse of emergency powers,
like the suspension of due process laws,
arresting citizens without charging them,
indefinite detention without trial, and
conducting searches without warrants, violate
the rule of law, threatening both the quality,
and – although mildly - the stability of
American democracy. Thus, I adapted
Freeman’s56 original table that classified
countries and their response to terrorism and
propose the United States be included in the
ineffective and abused category.57
Finally, I warn against the potential
negative and international repercussions of the
United States’ abuse of civil liberties. In this
respect, I am in accord with the most recent
report from Doherty et al., who caution that:
[t]he actions of the U.S. government are
being closely followed and emulated by
other governments around the world. The
United States must address security
concerns in a manner consistent with the
fundamental principles of human rights.
By turning its back on these principles,
the United States forfeits the very values
for which it claims to be fighting.58
Although I doubt the abuse of civil liberties
will lead to the imminent demise of American
56
Freeman, 15.
57
See Table 1.1, p. 43. I recognize the distinction
between Peru, located further to the outskirts of the
table, and the United States, which I placed as close to
the center as possible to illustrate that the abuses were
not nearly as threatening to democratic stability as in
the case of Peru.
58
Fiona Dohery et al., “Imbalance of Powers: How
changes to U.S. law & policy since 9/11 erode human
rights and civil liberties” (New York: Lawyers
Committee for Human Rights, 2003), 78.
atlantic international studies journal 43

democracy, the implications for worldwide
democratization efforts are potentially
disastrous. This is clearly an issue too large
for this paper, but as a superpower the actions
of the United States speak louder than its
words. Therefore, some regimes with more
tenuous democratic institutions may follow
the American lead by enacting civil liberty
restrictions and bypassing institutions. In this
respect, the American citizens will not be
those most negatively impacted by the United
States response to international terrorism.
Therefore, terrorist attacks affect their target
states, but also the stability and security of the
entire international system due to the state
response and its potential threat to democracy.

TABLE 1.1
DEMOCRATIC STATES THAT HAVE USED EMERGENCY POWERS AGAINST TERRORISM

x-Canada x-Uruguay

Effective

x-Italy

x-United States

x-Spain

Ineffective

x-Britain
x-Peru
x-Israel

Not Abused Abused

(Adapted from Freeman, 15)

44 lindsay gorman

APPENDIX B
COMPARING FAIRNESS PROTECTIONS

RIGHTS U.S. CRIMINAL U.S. COURT MILITARY

COURT MARTIAL COMMISSION

Jury Yes No No

Counsel of defendant’s choice Yes Yes No

Know all evidence against the Yes Yes No

defendant

Obtain all evidence in favor of the Yes Yes No

defense

Attorney-client confidentiality Yes Yes No

Speedy trial Yes Yes No

Appeal to an independent court Yes Yes No

Remain silent Yes Yes Yes

Proof beyond a reasonable doubt Yes Yes Yes

(Reproduced from Acer et al., 57)

atlantic international studies journal
SOURCES
Acer, Eleanor et al. “Assessing the New
Normal: Liberty and security for the
post-September 11 United States.” New
York: Lawyers Committee for Human
Rights, 2003.
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/pubs/de
scriptions/Assessing/AssessingtheNewN
ormal.pdf (13 Feb. 2005).
Barber, Benjamin R. Fear’s Empire: War,
terrorism, and democracy. New York:
W.W. Norton & Company, 2003.
Dinh, Viet D. “How the USA Patriot Act
Defends Democracy.” Washington, DC:
The Foundation for the Defense of
Democracies, 2004.
http://www.defenddemocracy.org/usr_d
oc/USA_Patriot_Act.pdf (5 Feb. 2005).
Doherty, Fiona et al. “A Year of Loss:
Reexamining civil liberties since
September 11.” New York: Lawyers
Committee for Human Rights, 2002.
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/us_law/
loss/loss_report.pdf (11 Feb. 2005).
___. “Imbalance of Powers: How changes to
U.S. law & policy since 9/11 erode
human rights and civil liberties.” New
York: Lawyers Committee for Human
Rights, 2003.
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/us_law/
loss/imbalance/powers.pdf (4 Feb.
2005).
Dyer, Gwynne. “Despite the Rhetoric, the
‘war on terror’ can never be won.”
Kingston Whig – Standard, 8 September
2004, n.p.
http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=69
2593401&sid=2&Fmt=3&clientId=1337
0&RQT=309&VName=PQD (20 March
2005).
45
Freeman, Michael. Freedom or Security: The
consequences for democracies using
emergency powers to fight terrorism.
Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2003.
Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment
of Prisoners of War. Adopted on 12
August 1949 entry into force 21 October
1950. UNHCHR website.
http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/91.
htm (4 March 2005).
Ignatieff, Michael. The Lesser Evil: Political
ethics in an age of terror. Toronto:
Penguin, 2004.
Kupperman, Robert H. and Darrell M.Trent,
Terrorism: Threat, reality, response.
Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press,
1979.
Linz, Juan J. “An Authoritarian Regime: The
case of Spain.” In Mass Politics: Studies
in Political Sociology, eds. Erik Allardt
and Stein Rokkan. New York: Free
Press, 1970, 251-83, 374-81.
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks
Upon the United States. Entry of the
9/11 Hijackers into the United States,
Staff Statement No.1., Washington:
2004.
http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/terr
orism/911comm-ss1.pdf. (27 Feb. 2005).
Uniting and Strengthening America by
Providing Appropriate Tools Required
to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism
(USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001. HR
3162,107th Cong., 1st sess., 24 October
2001, Electronic Privacy Information
Centre.
http://www.epic.org/privacy/terrorism/hr
3162.html (4 Feb. 2005).
46 lindsay gorman

Wilkinson, Paul. Terrorism Versus

Democracy: The liberal state response.
London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2000.

Zakaria, Fareed. The Future of Freedom:

Illiberal democracy at home and
abroad. New York: W.W. Norton and
Company, 2004.
Provincial Reconstruction Teams
Shanley McArthur
A
new development paradigm is
evolving. According to prominent
development theorists such as Mark
Duffield, a new, more direct relationship is
emerging between the traditionally distinct
fields of security and development. Due to the
understanding that “development is ultimately
impossible without stability and, at the same
time, security is not sustainable without
development,”1 new partnerships are forming
between non-governmental humanitarian
agencies (NGHAs), state governments,
militaries, and private companies. The theory
emphasizes that these “new multilateralisms”
have arisen as a response to significant world
changes resulting in part from the processes of
globalization as well as the events of
September 11, 2001.
In theory, and at first glance, the potential
of these partnerships appears great.
Combining previously incompatible
viewpoints of security and development as
well as providing a secure environment within
which aid can be provided simultaneously
with an ongoing conflict could address some
of the complex issues that have arisen as a
result of the “new wars.” However, part of the
problem seems to be that these ideas have
reached implementation stage without all of
1
M. Duffield. Global Governance and the New Wars:
The Merging of Development and Security. (London:
Zed Books, 2001).
the possible ramifications having been
examined.
One of the most prominent
implementations of this new integration of
security and development is the Provincial
Reconstruction Team (PRT) concept in
Afghanistan. These small teams, composed of
military, development, and political affairs
staff, can be seen as a pilot project for this
new theory. As such, they have been highly
controversial and have sparked much debate
within the political, military, and development
fields.
This paper proposes to examine these
PRTs within the context of the “merging of
security and development,” as proposed by
Duffield. A brief theoretical background will
be provided followed, by a detailed
examination of the PRT concept, its evolution
and the different ways it has been
implemented on the ground. As Canada’s own
PRT team began its operation in August 2005,
this is a relevant time to examine the
functionality of the structure and its
operations. Critical evaluation of the PRTs,
from the viewpoints of both the NGHAs and
the military, will be considered, followed by a
broader evaluation of this version of the
security/development interface. How is this
concept indicative of the new directions
development and security are heading? How
does it fit into the bigger picture of global
48
political interactions, including the changing
nature of war, and motivations for
international interventions? What does this
mean for development and security in the
South, and the North? Could this be a
meaningful conception of international
interventions in the future? The answers to
these questions could lead to fundamental
changes in the methods of international
development and humanitarian assistance.
BACKGROUND & THEORETICAL BASIS
It is undeniable that the nature of conflict,
and the resulting interventions by the
international community, have changed. Over
the past two decades, we have seen an
increasing number of intrastate conflicts,
many based on ethnicity or resources, rather
than the previous interstate disputes over
territoriality. According to Mark Duffield, a
leading theorist in development, this is part
and parcel of the currently dominant form of
capitalism and the resulting economic
globalization. He posits that globalization has
led not to the creation of an inclusive global
market, but to the deepening and
strengthening of trade links between countries
and regions already benefiting from the
capitalist system – primarily the global North.
The result of this has been an increasing
exclusion of developing countries (the global
South) from the world trade system, leading to
a pronounced gap in wealth, both between the
North and the South and within Northern and
Southern nations. Conflict has arisen due to
resource restriction in the South and this
continued economic exclusion, faced by weak
and often corrupt governments, has resulted in
lengthy civil wars, failing states, and
environments conducive to crime and
violence.
Whether or not one accepts Duffield’s
exclusion theory, it is clear that these failing
states have become a source of growing
security concern for the North. While purely
humanitarian motivators have been
shanley mcarthur
considered, it is clear that this is not the sole
deciding factor for the intervention of
Northern militaries or governments in these
conflicts, as the international community’s
apathy towards the conflicts in Rwanda,
Congo and Sudan have shown. In fact, since
September 11, 2001, the main security
concern for Northern governments has been
their protection from terrorist activity. The
economic frustration and essentially lawless
environments in these failing Southern states
present perfect “breeding grounds” for
terrorists; according to King, the objectives of
these new types of conflict are “to undermine
state morale and governments and, therefore,
the state system itself… the entire globe is a
possible theatre of war and no place is secure
from the new warfare.”2 It is obvious that this
can present a serious threat to world security.
The North has rationalized that intervention,
reconstruction, and democratization of these
states is the best way to combat terrorism and
protect their own domestic security. In this
way, development efforts have become the
realm of not only humanitarian aid agencies,
but also Northern governments and their
militaries, which have realized that
“underdevelopment has become dangerous.”3
The types of fundamental changes
required to transform these societies are
beyond the capabilities or legitimacy of
individual Northern governments. For this
reason, the radical agenda of social
transformation is embodied within Northern
strategic networks and complexes that are
bringing together governments, NGOs,
military establishments and private companies
in new ways.
Of course, there are numerous questions
raised by these new cooperative efforts. Most
important is their obvious divergence in
2
J.H. King. The New Warfare and the Need for an
Interactive Military. Refugee Survey Quarterly 23.4
(2004): 50.
3
Duffield, “Global,” 2.
atlantic international studies journal
motivations for providing aid and
reconstruction. The power differential
between the Northern state governments and
militaries and the NGHAs is significant, and
has resulted in the politicization of these
efforts,4 supporting Northern goals of their
own domestic security. It is difficult to
imagine that these goals could coincide
exactly with the goals of those in the societies
being “reconstructed”, nor is it obvious how
these aims could be implemented by a
collaboration of military and NGHA staff,
considering the conflict in their primary
motivations. The NGHAs’ fear of
humanitarian goals being overtaken by
Northern security needs is real and well-
founded.
In order to examine these concerns in a
more concrete way, it is helpful to observe the
implementation of one of these new strategic
complexes. Our example here is found in the
Provincial Reconstruction Team concept in
Afghanistan. For reasons to be discussed in
the next section, this idea has evolved to be
one of the main strategies by the intervening
international community used to further the
reach of the established Afghani central
government and re-establish security and the
rule of law.
PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS:
THEIR EVOLUTION & IMPLEMENTATION
The United States and their ‘Coalition of
the Willing’ invaded Afghanistan in October
2001 under Operation Enduring Freedom
(OEF.) The governing regime of the Taliban
fell two months later. At this point, the OEF
was transitioning from a more conventional
military operation to a force focused on
counter-insurgency and intelligence.5
“Information was critical to cue the special
operations forces’ response in the anti-Al
4
see STC, 2004; Duffield, 2001; Sedra, 2004
5
S. M. Maloney. From Kabul to Konduz: Lessons for
Canadian Reconstruction of Afghanistan. Policy
Options May 2005, 57-62
49
Qaeda mission, and the best means to get it
was to lay a web of human sensors all over the
country.”6 In order to achieve this effectively,
infrastructure needed to be rebuilt throughout
the country due to the extensive destruction
caused by 25 years of civil war. Furthermore,
the US was painfully aware that public
support for its intervention, both with the
Afghani locals and the US population at
home, were critical for the success of this
mission. As a result of these concerns, the
U.S. established a Joint Civil-Military
Operations Task Force (CJCMOTF) in order
to manage civil components of the
intervention, and “Coalition Humanitarian
Cells” (CHLCs) were deployed in several
areas.7 These were the predecessors to the
eventual development of the PRTs. The
CHLCs were established with the following
mission:
to ‘win hearts and minds’ among the Afghan
population; to secure the support of local
communities by showing ‘the benign face of
the Coalition’; to jumpstart reconstruction
efforts; and to gain positive publicity for the
war effort in the United States.8
Quite obviously, this strategy was much more
tailored to achieving Coalition goals and
creating positive public relations than it was
to meeting reconstruction and humanitarian
aid needs of the Afghan population.
Reconstruction projects were limited to ‘quick
impact’ projects such as building of schools
and hospitals, digging of wells, and minor
infrastructural repairs.9 This activity drew
immediate fire from NGHAs, some of whom
had been active in Afghanistan for years.
CHLCs were duplicating their work, they
6
Maloney, 60.
7
M. Sedra. 2004, “Civil-Military Relations in
Afghanistan: The Provincial Reconstruction Team
Debate.”
<http://www.asiapacificresearch.ca/caprn/afghan_proje
ct/m_sedra.pdf> (11 August 2005).
8
Sedra, 5.
9
Ibid.
50
said, and worse, doing so in civilian dress and
vehicles, creating confusion amongst the local
population as to humanitarian versus military
roles. In protest, they refused to participate in
discussions regarding planning and project
selection for the CHLC teams.10 In November
2002 saw the US-led Coalition attempted to
revitalize the concept and relations with the
local and NGHA communities by creating
Joint Reconstruction Teams (JRTs.)11 At the
request of the Afghani government, these
were renamed Provincial Reconstruction
Teams, and despite their new name, these had
quite similar goals to the CHLCs.12 Primary
goals of the PRTs were established by the
Office of the U.S. Ambassador in February
2003, and were: “To extend the influence of
the central government outside of the capital;
provide a security umbrella for NGHAs to
operate; facilitate information sharing; and
carry out small-scale reconstruction projects
based on concise needs assessments and local
consultations.”13
The effort to extend international security
presence outside Kabul was welcomed by the
interim Afghani government, as they had been
requesting this for some time in order to
extend their reach and structures of control.
However, these teams were small, consisting
of between 50 and 150 personnel, of which 90
to 95% were military,14 drawn from civil
affairs units, special forces, and army units.15
The other 5 to 10% consisted of civilian staff
representing USAID, the US State
Department, and the Department of
Agriculture. A cabinet committee was
developed in order to create policy and
procedure for these teams, and an executive
steering committee to supervise them. This
executive committee is chaired by the Afghan
10
Ibid.
11
Sedra, 2004 and STC, 2004.
12
Sedra.
13
Sedra, 5.
14
STC.
15
Sedra.
shanley mcarthur
minister of the Interior, and includes the
commanders of the Coalition and ISAF (the
UN-mandated international peacekeeping
force that entered after the fall of the
Taliban.)16
Three PRTs were initially established as
pilot projects by the US in Gardez, Bamiyan,
and Kunduz provinces. Shortly thereafter, the
UK established their own PRT in Mazar-i-
Sharif. Germany took over control of the
Kunduz team, and New Zealand took over the
one in Bamiyan.17 Once NATO took over
ISAF command in August 2003, it adopted
the concept, and by October 2004, completed
the first major deployment of PRTs, sending 9
teams out to the Northern provinces.18
Interestingly, each country controlling a
PRT was given significant freedom to
establish priorities, projects, command
structure, and coordination efforts. This has
led to noticeable differences between the
activities of specific PRTs. While the ethnic,
economic, geographic, political, and security
conditions vary widely between Afghan
regions, “the differences in the main PRT
models can be attributed more to the approach
and vision of the individual implementing
countries than a desire to customize the
concept to meet local conditions.”19 The main
focus in the literature has been the significant
differences between the UK-led PRT in
Mazar-i-Sharif, and the US-led PRTs in other
provinces.
The US model has borne the brunt of the
criticism levelled at the PRTs. Generally, this
is a result of the US’s use of the PRT to
16
Ibid.
17
S. Klingebiel & K. Roehder. “Development-Military
Interfaces: New Challenges in Crises and Post-Conflict
Situations,” Working Paper for German Development
Institute, <http://www.die-
gdi.de/die_homepage.nsf/6f3fa777ba64bd9ec12569cb0
0547f1b/3c1afada7a2d054cc1256e1400333faa/$FILE/
Englisch-Final-EZ-Militär-Komplett.pdf> (10 August
2005).
18
Sedra.
19
Sedra, 7.
atlantic international studies journal
pursue its own goals (OEF goals) as opposed
to those of the local community and of
Afghanistan as a whole. The US teams hand-
picked their projects through their USAID
staff,20 funding largely “hearts and minds” or
“quick impact” projects intended to win the
approval of local Afghanis. Much of their
work was done out of uniform, until early
2004 when uniforms were donned in
concession to intense criticism from
NGHAs.21 Several incidents have highlighted
the effects of the confusion and perhaps
incompatibility between OEF’s military goals
and the reconstruction goals of the PRTs.
First, in Peetai village, Ghazni province in
2004, US rockets were fired in an attempt to
target a terrorist or murderer, identified by
local intelligence.22 However, this person was
not there, and the rockets instead killed nine
children and one adult male. Weeks later,
when a PRT team arrived to provide
reconstruction assistance and offer
condolences, they were rejected by the
villagers. It is easy to see how the local
population could misunderstand the
differentiation in function between US
militaries, one undertaking aggressive military
operations, while the other attempting to dig
them a well. This confusion was perpetuated
by the ambiguity of the PRT’s goals. Are all
US military there to achieve OEF objectives
such as intelligence and counterinsurgency?
Why then are some (the PRT) attempting to
provide reconstruction? A further example of
the confusing role undertaken by the US PRT
is exemplified in the following incident: “the
delivery of aid by the US-led coalition in
Zabul province was accompanied by leaflets
distributed to civilians that called upon them
to provide intelligence information or to face
losing aid altogether.”23
20
Pedwell.
21
Sedra.
22
STC, 2004; Sedra, 2004.
23
STC, 39-40.
51
Conditionality of aid violates the basic
principles of aid delivery as laid out by UN
agreements in conflict situations.24 As OEF’s
mandate is outside the UN parameters, it
circumvented these principles seriously
violating ethical principles of humanitarian
aid and endangering the potential of NGHAs
by politicizing the aid environment among
Afghani civilians. As Mark Sedra notes: “It
has become clear… that the goals of OEF and
that of the wider Afghan reconstruction
process can be incompatible.”25 The American
PRTs goals are, as stated by General David
Barno the Commander of U.S. and Coalition
forces in Afghanistan, to: “meld security and
reconstruction, and extend the reach of the
central government.”26 Given these stated
goals, it is unclear, for instance, why OEF
forces would have been distributing aid in the
first place, this traditionally being the work of
NGHAs; further, conditionality of aid and
resulting conflict between Afghani people and
PRTs could only serve to reduce local
stability and security. In this way the US
PRTs’ activities have been short-sighted and
destructive, and may have negated any
positive effects of their emphasis on “hearts
and minds” activities designed to win over the
Afghani people. Primary to the problems with
the US PRT model is the lack of a clear
mandate and mission, which they seem to
have left purposely unclear in order to use the
PRTs to their own military advantage.
The UK team in Mazar-i-Sharif, in
contrast, has been much more successful in
establishing relations and cooperation with the
local NGHA community, although there is
little information on the perception of any of
the PRTs within the local Afghani
communities they attempt to serve. The UK
team is composed of 90 staff, predominantly
military. Also included are civilian advisors
from the UK Department for International
24
Duffield.
25
Sedra, 7.
26
Ibid.
52
Development (DfID), the Foreign and
Commonwealth Office (FCO), their
counterparts from the US State Department
and USAID, a US military liaison officer, and
a representative of the Afghani government.27
“Security sector reform, support to institution-
building, and the promotion of economic
development have been identified as its
central priorities.”28
Interestingly, within this UK-led PRT,
both DfID and USAID have budgets to fund
reconstruction projects. DfID, however, has
made it clear that its budget should not be
used towards “projects deemed to be better
serviced through the capabilities of NGOs”29
and rather have geared its reconstruction
efforts towards security-sector reform (SSR)-
oriented projects. This has included
renovation of police stations, government
buildings, and judiciary buildings, as well as
training programs for police officers and
office equipment for government offices.30
USAID’s budget, in contrast, has continued to
be spent on infrastructure, such as schools,
hospitals, and roads, tasks which are usually
left to NGOs with experience in local needs
assessment.
Of course, the UK-led PRT has gone
uncriticized; it too has conducted “hearts and
minds” activities such as setting up a 3-day
medical camp, without consultation of
NGHAs already providing similar services in
the region.31 Furthermore, in efforts to
establish itself as a mediator between local
factions, this PRT has had extensive
communication with local warlords, which
some claim could make it vulnerable to
manipulation by these groups.32
Despite criticism of these PRT models,
both have seen moderate success in
27
STC.
28
Sedra, 8.
29
STC, 26.
30
STC.
31
Ibid.
32
STC, 2004; Sedra, 2004.
shanley mcarthur
establishing security in their respective
regions of activity; in fact, the sheer fact of
their presence in these areas and the
conduction of regular patrols has led to local
stability. Local police and Afghan National
Army personnel have expressed positive
views of the PRTs’ support and willingness to
share information.33 In this respect, the PRTs
have partially achieved their goal.
Overall, it is unclear how successful these
teams have been in achieving greater human
security in Afghanistan. Much of the criticism
of the PRT model has come from the NGHAs
active in Afghanistan, who have a number of
problems with the structure, activities and
coordination of the PRTs. The next section
will review the main concerns with the PRT
model, the resulting implications for human
security and the potential for the North to
achieve its goal of creating a stable, secure
and democratic Afghanistan.
EVALUATION OF THE PRT MODEL IN THE
CONTEXT OF HUMAN SECURITY
The critical problem with the PRT concept
as a whole is its role confusion. What is it
there to do? We know that there is certainly a
need for cooperation between military forces
and aid providers in the context of these new
attempts at total national reconstruction of
failing states. However, who should be
responsible for what? Whose goals should and
will take precedence? Who will take control,
and what will be the structure of command?
As the PRT concept is really a test run for this
type of interaction, conflict and problems
were an inevitability. However, the question is
whether these problems are just “growing
pains” that can be worked out into a
functional solution for all, or intrinsic to their
link with Northern political and security
goals, and thus useless towards the
achievement of true human security and
development for local people. A survey of the
33
STC.
atlantic international studies journal
main concerns of NGHAs regarding PRTs
should reveal a sense of the issues at hand.
First and foremost, the NGHAs have
aggressively criticized the PRTs for their
“blurring of the lines” between military and
aid work.34 In examination of the incidents
detailed earlier, this has proven to be a real
problem, and can affect the effectiveness of
both the NGHAs and the PRTs in achieving
their respective goals. Afghanis’ confusion as
to the role of international actors in their
communities risks their own security, that of
PRT staff, and that of humanitarian aid
workers. Often noted is the murder in
Afghanistan of five aid workers with
Médecins Sans Frontières, after which the
NGO ceased all operations in Afghanistan. A
representative of the group claiming
responsibility for the murders was quoted later
as: “We killed them because they worked for
the Americans against us using the cover of
aid work. We will kill more foreign aid
workers.”35 While it remains unclear as to
whether this claim was related to the
confusion caused by PRT teams, it is obvious
that clear distinctions between military
operations and aid providers are absolutely
necessary in order to maintain a secure
environment. Furthermore, the NGHAs have
pointed out, development and aid activities
are beyond the expertise of the military staff
undertaking them.
While some military members may have
relevant technical skills, they do not have
sufficient understanding of local culture and
political/social dynamics to be able to foresee
the consequences of their interventions, which
could undercut longer-term reconstruction
goals and otherwise be contrary to the
interests of intended beneficiaries.36 This is a
very important point. While it is true that
development theory has yet to discover a
“perfect” model for development projects, it
34
InterAction.
35
STC, 35.
36
InterAction.
53
must be conceded that NGHAs have a better
grasp on development theory, including past
errors and lessons learned, than the military.
For this reason they are much better equipped
to design, undertake and evaluate
development projects. An example of this lack
of understanding of local conditions was
found in an aid airdrop by US forces. The
meals provided were one-meal packages,
when families were in need of basic supplies
such as rice and oil; furthermore, the rations
were dropped into the fields, causing people
to risk landmine injuries in order to retrieve
them.37 It is assumed that the airdrops were
done with the best of intentions, but
inappropriate aid or causing unnecessary risk
to the population it serves is
counterproductive and easily avoided though
knowledge and experience with these
populations. Furthermore, while their motives
are not beyond question, it can be assumed
that NGHAs’ mandates are more likely to be
geared to local people’s benefit than those of a
military force employed to ensure Northern
security.
Save the Children UK, in their study of
PRTs in Afghanistan, has established the
following causal relationship between human
security in Afghanistan and the PRT activity.
Despite the NGHAs’ criticisms, and as is clear
from this model, there is a definite positive
relationship between the activities of PRTs
and the security of local Afghanis. In addition,
NGHAs have identified clear areas where
these activities contribute negatively to human
security. In essence, the conclusion has been
that while most of the positive effects of PRT
activities on humanitarian security come from
activities in the areas of security,
reconstruction and expanding central
authority, most of the negative consequences
of PRT activities for humanitarian security
follow from PRT relief activities (including
37
STC.
54
‘hearts and minds’ activities and ‘quick-
impact projects.’)38
It should be noted at this point that the
opinions of the NGHAs have been given
significance throughout this paper’s
evaluation of the PRTs’ success. This is
primarily as a result of accessibility of this
information and the proximity of the NGHAs’
relationship to the PRT activities. However,
this comes with the recognition that NGHAs
are not without their own organizational
priorities, which of course do not consist
solely of selfless interests in humanitarian
needs. Were the military to overtake the bulk
of humanitarian operations, the NGHAs
would quite simply be out of a job. In
addition, the lack of international intervention
in humanitarian conflicts has given the
NGHAs considerable power and freedom in
their relief operations.39 Besides their
resentment of this lengthy inaction in the face
of what they see as dire humanitarian need,
the NGHAs may understandably resent the
sudden intervention and overtaking of what
they see as their professional space. For this
reason, caution should be exercised when
evaluating the NGHA reaction to PRT
interventions.
Nevertheless, recommendations on the
part of these NGHAs have been extensive and
are certainly useful in the re-evaluation of the
PRT concept. Drawn from documents by
InterAction, Save the Children UK, and Mark
Sedra, the main recommendations have been:
1. PRTs should focus their efforts on their
areas of comparative advantage, namely,
security.40 This is beyond the expertise of
the NGHAs and absolutely necessary for
them to provide adequate assistance to the
local populations. Furthermore, this is one of
the main stated goals of the PRT and of the
North’s intervention in the first place. One
suggested area that the PRTs could be of
much use in achieving goals of stability,
38
STC, 34.
39
See Duffield, “NGO.”
40
See STC, 2004, Sedra, 2004, & InterAction, 2003
shanley mcarthur
security and extension of the Afghani
government is in security sector
reconstruction (SSR).
2. Missions should be clearly defined,
avoiding duplication of aid work undertaken
by NGHAs and other organizations.
3. NGHAs should be consulted during the
setup of PRTs as well as during their
continued activity, in order to facilitate
communication, avoid conflict, and take
advantage of their knowledge of local
culture and situations.
4. PRT staff, both military and civilian,
should receive training in order to ensure
their understanding of local culture and
tradition.
5. Clear exit or transition strategies should
be established to ensure the continued
stability and security of the local population
and the NGHAs who remain.
6. Expansion of the military component of
the PRTs should be considered in order that
true security and stability can be ensured.
The Canadian team has had the advantage of
being aware of these recommendations and
problems with previous PRTs before the
implementation and design of their own PRT.
For this reason, the expectations of the
international community and NGHAs should
be higher. In fact, it does appear that Canada
has taken some of these considerations into
account. Canadian implementation of the PRT
model, beginning this month, August 2005,
appears to be following the UK model more
closely than the American. This could result
in significant differences in effects, as the
Canadians will be taking over a US-run PRT
in Kandahar, southern Afghanistan,
considered to be the most insecure and
dangerous area in the country. Canada’s
priorities in its operations are to reinforce the
authority of the Afghan government in and
around Kandahar and help stabilize and
rebuild the region. It will also help monitor
security, promote Afghan government policies
and priorities with local authorities, and
facilitate security sector reforms.41 Canada’s
41
DND, Canadian Forces Operations in Afghanistan;
Overview of Current Activities,
atlantic international studies journal
explicit focus is security sector reform, and
this is prevalent in all Canadian PRT
components, including the RCMP and CIDA
operations. The Canadian team will consist of
250 members, more than double the size of
the US PRT before it. This will include one
CIDA representative, two officials from
Foreign Affairs, and two RCMP officers,42
emphasizing Canada’s “3D” approach to
foreign policy: Defence, Diplomacy, and
Development.
While this seems like a promising step in
the effectiveness of the PRT concept, the
larger questions still remain. If there is one
thing to be learned from six decades of North-
South development policy, it is that true
development can never be achieved when the
underlying aim is the North’s benefit.
Colonialism, neo-colonialism, modernisation
theory – all of this experience has taught us
that Northern attempts to gain from
“developing” Southern countries has not led
to sustainable progress, and further, that it is
egotistical and counterproductive to attempt to
rebuild developing countries in the image of
the North. At first glance, creating stability
and development in Afghanistan seems a
laudable goal on the part of the US and its
allies. Yet, in practice it appears that the
development undertaken, at least on the part
of the PRTs, has been superficial and
primarily to achieve positive public relations
for the intervention itself, not for the Afghani
people. While Canada’s implementation of the
PRT does appear to be an improvement over
others’ attempts, it remains that “Canada’s
overarching goal is to prevent Afghanistan
from relapsing into a failed state that gives
terrorist and terrorist organizations a safe
haven.”43 In fact, Canada’s International
Policy Statement has been criticized on the
grounds that it exaggerates the terrorist threat:
<http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/newsroom/view_news_e.
asp?id=1703> (10 August 2005)
42
CTV.
43
DND, “Forces.”
55
“Canadian foreign policy should be clear that
the complex conflicts raging outside Canada
are primarily human catastrophes – not threats
to Canada’s security or potential harbours for
terrorists.”44 Furthermore, the Canadian
Council for International Cooperation (CCIC)
notes, Canada’s International Policy
Statement has proposed greater integration
between the 3 D’s, which is going too far:
“Defence, diplomacy and development have
separate but related goals; the notion of a
‘three block war’ for the Canadian military
potentially conflates support for local peoples’
self-determined development paths with
‘hearts and mind’ operations.”45
Unfortunately, it appears that the merging
of development and security will need to learn
again the painful lessons development policy
has endured throughout its experience.
Realism prevails: the North will not cease its
protection of its own rights and security over
those of others, and thus the development of
Afghanistan, and other failing states under the
auspices of ensuring global stability, will be
manipulated to ensure the North’s benefit.
Until we allow these failing states the freedom
to determine their own path of development,
instability and human insecurity will prevail.
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news_e.asp?Id=1660 (10 August 2005).
44
CCIC, 5.
45
CCIC, 7.
56
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(1997): 527 – 543.
Duffield, M. Global Governance and the New
Wars: The Merging of Development and
Security. London: Zed Books, 2001.
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operation (CCIC.) 2005. “A Role of Pride and
Influence in the World: Canada’s
International Policy Statement: A CCIC
Commentary.”
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04_ips_key_messages.pdf (10 August 2005).
Canadian International Development Agency
(CIDA.) 2005. “Canada’s Development
Commitment for Afghanistan.”
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cida.gc.ca/cida_ind.nsf/0/7c6aff06b5a98c5c85
257045006ec885?OpenDocument (10 August
2005).
CTV.ca. 2005. “A Dangerous Mission Ahead
for Canada’s PRT.”
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TVNews/20050804_afghanistan_timeline_05
0804 (10 August 2005).
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in Kandahar – Provincial Reconstruction
Teams (PRT).” http://www.dfait-
maeci.gc.ca/cip-pic/library/transcriptprt-
en.asp?pm=1 (12 August 2005).
Goodson, L. P. 2004. “Canada’s Security
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n%5Fproject/l_goodson.pdf (10 August
2005).
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Afghanistan: The International Policy
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afghanistan.gc.ca/IPS-in-action-
en.asp?Print=1 (10 August 2005).
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Teams in Afghanistan – Position Paper
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D/ACOS-64CAFT?OpenDocument (15
August 2005).
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for an Interactive Military.” Refugee Survey
Quarterly 23.4 (2004): 48-57.
Klingebiel, S., & Roehder, K. 2004.
“Development-Military Interfaces: New
Challenges in Crises and Post-Conflict
Situations.” Working Paper for German
Development Institute. http://www.die-
gdi.de/die_homepage.nsf/6f3fa777ba64bd9ec
12569cb00547f1b/3c1afada7a2d054cc1256e1
400333faa/$FILE/Englisch-Final-EZ-Militär-
Komplett.pdf (10 August 2005).
Klingebiel, S., & Roehder, K. 2004. “The
Development-Military Interface: The Start of
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nce-2004-1/conference%202004-1-
papers/Klingebiel-Rhoeder-2204.pdf (11
August 2005).
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Grave Dangers, Top General Warns.” Globe
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(25 July 2005).
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Afghanistan from a Refugee Point of View.”
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120.
Maloney, S. M. “From Kabul to Konduz:
Lessons for Canadian Reconstruction of
Afghanistan.” Policy Options May 2005, 57-
62.
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and Development Cooperation: A Conceptual
Framework for Enhancing Policy Coherence.”
DAC Journal 2.3 31-72.
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.pdf (11 August 2005).
Pedwell, T. “A Canuck-Kandahar Approach:
Canadian style of rebuilding troubled area
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12 August 2005.
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“Canadian Police involvement in a Provincial
57
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2005. http://www.rcmp-
grc.ca/peacekeeping/prt e.htm. (10 August
2005).
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Reconstruction Teams and Humanitarian-
Military Relations in Afghanistan.” 2004.
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e/scuk/cache/cmsattach/2029_PRTs%20in%2
0Afghanistan_Sep04.pdf (11 August 2005).
Sedra, M. “Civil-Military Relations in
Afghanistan: The Provincial Reconstruction
Team Debate.” 2004.
http://www.asiapacificresearch.ca/caprn/afgha
n_project/m_sedra.pdf (11 August 2005)
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n?menuPK=477815&pagePK=64168092&piP
K=64168088&theSitePK=477803 (11 August
2005)
The Environment and Conflict in the Rwandan Genocide
Stephen Brosha
I n the years following the violence that
shook Rwanda and the world in 1994,
there have been many attempts to explain,
or at least understand, the nature of the human
tragedy known as the Rwandan genocide.
Most accounts describe how two rival ethnic
groups, the Hutu and the Tutsi, were engaged
in a bitter dispute culminating in 1994. During
a period of less than three months, widespread
torture and brutality resulted in 500,000 to
800,000 (mainly Tutsi) deaths. 1 After over
three years of civil war following an invasion
of mainly Tutsi refugees from neighbouring
Burundi, a series of negotiations resulted in
the adoption of the Arusha accord, which
called for the eventual sharing of power
between the invaders (known as the Rwandan
Patriotic Front or RPF) and the former regime
of Hutu President Juvénal Habyarimana, and
his party, the Movement for Democracy and
Development (MRND). The widespread
killings, mainly committed by the
interahamwe, a group of Hutu extremist
militias, began after the plane carrying
President Habyarimana was shot down on the
night of April 6, 1994. In the months that
1
Philip Gourevitch, We Wish to Inform You that
Tomorrow We Will Be Killed With Our Families:
Stories from Rwanda (New York: Farrar, Straus, and
Giroux, 1998); Roméo A. Dallaire, Shake Hands with
the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda
(Toronto: Random House Canada, 2003).
followed, the international community
essentially turned a blind eye to the bloody
massacre that was to unfold in the Rwandan
anarchy.
It seems no overstatement to portray the
Rwandan genocide of 1994 as a “failure of
humanity,” to use the words of the
commander of the United Nations Assistance
Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), Canadian
General Roméo Dallaire.2 There is a distinct
danger, however, of oversimplifying Rwanda
as a case of ethno-tribal conflict in remote
Africa. Though it may be easier to accept as
somehow being “unavoidable” if left in ethnic
terms - as if to somehow vindicate the global
failure to stop it from occurring - the
international community has a responsibility
to do its best to learn from the Rwandan case
by understanding the various factors that led
to the humanitarian crisis of 1994. In
particular, there is compelling evidence to
suggest that a number of environmental
factors, especially population and land
pressure coupled with unsustainable
agricultural practices, played a key role in
allowing the conflict in 1994 to arise and
evolve as it did. This is not to say that such
environmental problems caused the genocide
in and of themselves, but their role was
anything but trivial.
2
Dallaire, Shake Hands with the Devil.
atlis international studies journal 59

This paper explores the manners in which other issues related to the scarcity of
environmental stresses set the stage for renewable resources will be the root of serious
violence in Rwanda, both directly and violent conflict in coming years. 4 This new
indirectly in the years leading up to the paradigm, which seeks out links between the
genocide. Building upon earlier research of environment and security, attempts to extend
other scholars, Rwanda’s decades-long build- beyond viewing environmental problems
up of land and resource scarcity is analyzed in simply as “global issues” requiring United
historical and contemporary context. The shift Nations (UN) conferences and agreements in
from traditional agricultural practices to less order to effect change. Rather, the emerging
sustainable alternatives ultimately helped to field of environmental security examines how
trigger the violence in 1994, will be environmental problems that exist at the local
highlighted. 3 By April level interact with the
of 1994, such global to produce
unsustainable practices instability and conflict.
had created increased Environmental degradation Environmental issues,
tensions in communities and other issues related to the one must remember, have
throughout Rwanda and scarcity of renewable “interpretations,
eroded the capacity of implications and
Rwandan society and resources will be the root of mitigations not only at
government to respond serious violent conflict in the global level but also
to crises, thereby giving coming years. at national and local
the Rwandan genocide scales,” which is aptly
an unmistakable demonstrated by the
5
environmental component. Indeed, it is Rwandan case. Further, as Bruce Jones
becoming clear that the Rwandan genocide summarizes, “social conditions, such as
cannot be properly understood without poverty, environmental degradation, land and
critically considering the role of the population density, economic collapse—are
environment. all fuel for history’s fires.”6 In Rwanda, many
such factors converged to weaken the
THE ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITY APPROACH resilience of Rwanda’s ecological-political
Since the mid-1980s, a growing number of
scholars have sought to better understand the
role the environment plays in international 4
politics. Recognizing the rising scale and Robert D. Kaplan, “The Coming Anarchy,” Atlantic
Monthly 272.2 (1994), 44-76; Thomas F. Homer-
severity of environmental problems across the Dixon, “On the Threshold: Environmental Changes as
globe, influential thinkers such as Robert Causes of Acute Conflict,” International Security 16.2
Kaplan and Thomas Homer-Dixon have (1991), 76-116; “Environmental Scarcities and Violent
argued that environmental degradation and Conflict: Evidence from Cases,” International Security
19.1 (1994), 5-40.
5
David J. Campbell, “Conceptualizing Global Change
3
In particular, Valerie Percival and Thomas Homer- as Society-Environment Interaction: From the Local to
Dixon, “Environmental Scarcity and Violent Conflict: the Global in Rwanda,” Rwanda Society-Environment
The Case of Rwanda,” Occasional Paper for the Project, Working Paper 6 (East Lansing, Michigan:
Project on Environment, Population and Security Department of Geography and the Center for Advanced
(Washington, D.C.: American Association for the Study of International Development, Michigan State
Advancement of Science and the University of University, 1994), 1.
6
Toronto, 1995), Bruce D. Jones, Peacemaking in Rwanda: The
<http://www.library.utoronto.ca/pcs/eps/rwanda/rwand Dynamics of Failure (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne
a1.htm> (8 March 2005). Rienner, 2001), 45.
60
system, creating conditions that would later
facilitate human tragedy.7
THE ETHNIC FACTOR
As previously mentioned, the Rwandan
genocide is traditionally described primarily
in terms of the ethnic nature of the conflict.
Curiously, however, the Hutu and Tutsi “were
not tribes, for the people shared the same
religion, told the same ancestral stories, and
spoke the same language, Kinyarwanda.”8 In
fact, there is very little physiological
difference between those described as either
“Hutu” or “Tutsi,” but what is a fact, is that
the Hutu/Tutsi distinction played a key role in
the evolution of Rwandan society in the
twentieth century. Indeed, both the German
and then Belgian colonial authorities used and
furthered the pre-existing “ethnic” division to
consolidate their hold on power, and the
events leading up to the 1994 violence seem
to differ little from the colonial past.9 Three
Rwandan scholars argue in their study linking
land scarcity and distribution to the genocide,
that ethnicity was at most a “cover” for
competition over control of scarce land.10 To
most Rwandan citizens prior to 1994, ethnic
differences mattered little, and ethnic
intermarriage was common. 11 This is not to
say that tensions did not exist, for they
7
Resilience can be defined as “the capacity of a system
to recover from perturbations, shock, and surprises.” –
Partha Dasgupta, Carl Folke, and Karl-Göran Mäler,
“The Environmental Resource Base and Human
Welfare.” In Kerstin Lindahl-Kiessling and Hans
Lindberg, eds., Population, Economic Development,
and the Environment (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1994), 26.
8
Linda Melvern, A People Betrayed: The Role of the
West in Rwanda’s Genocide (New York: St. Martin’s
Press, 2000), 7.
9
Linda Melvern, 9-10.
10
Jean Bigagaza, Carolyn Abong, and Cecile
Mukarubuga, “Land Scarcity, Distribution and Conflict
in Rwanda,” In Jeremy Lind and Kathryn Sturman,
eds., Scarcity and Surfeit: The Ecology of Africa’s
Conflicts (Pretoria, South Africa: Institute for Security
Studies, 2002), 51.
11
Valerie Percival and Thomas Homer-Dixon,
“Environmental Scarcity and Violent Conflict: The
Case of Rwanda.”
stephen brosha
certainly did, but the violence of 1994 shows
that there were other factors at play. Perhaps a
more realistic view of the role of ethnicity in
Rwanda would be that “severe economic,
demographic, and environmental pressures on
Rwandan society unleashed local grievances,
while extremist forces among the Hutu
manipulated ethnic identities and resorted to
large scale violence.”12
A SIMPLE MALTHUSIAN TRAP?
While the majority of explanations of the
Rwandan genocide follow the pattern loosely
outlined above, most make at least a cursory
reference to the role of environmental and
demographic pressures in contributing to the
breakdown of social order in Rwanda. By the
end of the 1980s, Rwanda was among the
poorest nations on earth, and had the highest
population density in Africa. 13 According to
the perspective of Thomas Malthus, who in
1798 wrote his highly influential work An
Essay on the Principle of Population, such a
situation as that in Rwanda should be seen as
a recipe for disaster. Malthus argued that food
production will fail to keep pace with
population growth, dooming the world to
crisis. He believed that “positive checks,”
defined as readjustments in population due to
disease, famine, war, and other means, will
always ensure that populations do not go over
the carrying capacity of their resource base.14
Over time, Malthus’ theory has been largely
proven wrong. Despite calamitous predictions
to the contrary, population has continued to
increase relatively unabated in the world. That
is, although Malthus provides important
insights regarding the potential limits to what
12
Michael Renner, Fighting for Survival:
Environmental Decline, Social Conflict, and the New
Age of Insecurity (New York: Norton, 1996), 122.
(Emphasis added)
13
Richard Nyrop et al., Rwanda: A Country Study
(Washington, D.C.: The American University, 1985
[1974]), Ch.4, p. 1.
14
Thomas R. Malthus, An Essay on the Principle of
Population (New York: August Kelley, 1965 [1798]).
atlis international studies journal
the environment can withstand, there are
several problems with the basic Malthusian
thesis. It does not take into account the ability
of societies to adapt to increase carrying
capacity and avoid crisis, through
technological advances or other means.
Therefore, while Malthus is useful as an
introduction to how environmental stresses
might have played a role in Rwanda, the
simple fact of increasing population densities
does not explain why the country’s response
was so brutal and widespread.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF RWANDA’S
ECOLOGICAL CRISIS
In order to discover the role of
environmental pressures in fuelling the events
of 1994, one must go beyond Malthus, and
examine the way in which environmental
practices brought Rwanda to the breaking
point. To do so, the most appropriate place to
begin is by analysing the agricultural sector of
the country. As Valerie Percival and Thomas
Homer-Dixon note, “Rwanda’s ecosystem is
extremely diverse, which makes it difficult to
generalize about its vulnerability to
population pressures and resource
degradation.”15 The problem with Rwanda’s
ecosystem, however, lies not in its natural
diversity; in fact, what made the system so
vulnerable to stresses by the 1990s was the
lack of diversification in its agricultural sector.
That is, while Rwanda’s diversity would have
theoretically lend itself to resilience (at least
in comparison with other countries in sub-
Saharan Africa), human agricultural practices
all but obliterated any potential strength. In
1969, when Richard Nyrop’s research team
from the American University in Washington,
D.C. completed the analysis Rwanda: A
Country Study, the environmental dilemma
was becoming clear:
15
Valerie Percival and Thomas Homer-Dixon,
“Environmental Scarcity and Violent Conflict: The
Case of Rwanda.”
61
The country’s diverse climate, soil,
and topography provide the potential
for productive and varied agriculture.
Fulfillment of this potential is
thwarted, however, by the
concomitant problems of extremely
high population density on existing
arable land, increasing soil erosion,
and depletion of soil fertility.16
Upon close study of the available sources
dating back several decades, there have been
signs of Rwanda’s eventual environmental
catastrophe for a long period; it was just a
matter of time until the tipping point was
reached.
In 1948, for example, a UN mission
traveling to Rwanda and Burundi (then
officially known as Ruanda-Burundi)
established, that in light of high and
increasing population density, along with soil
erosion and regular drought, “the basic
problem was how to feed all the people.” 17
With the highest population density in Africa,
even in 1969, at 360 inhabitants per square
mile, coupled with food crop production that
failed to keep pace with the rapid population
growth, Rwanda’s future prospects were
grim. 18 Some have argued that because two
earlier cases of Hutu-Tutsi violence (in 1959-
1963 and 1973) occurred during periods of
“high growth of food production per capita
and the absence of famine,” they could not be
explained by hunger or other environmental
factors.19 This line of reasoning fails to take
into account that those earlier cases of
violence were much more limited in scale,
with a more concentrated and radical group of
people carrying out the vast majority of
violent actions. 20 Furthermore, the evidence
clearly shows that population and resource
16
Richard Nyrop et al., Ch.9, p. 1.
17
Linda Melvern, 11.
18
Richard Nyrop et al., Ch. 4, p. 1.
19
Peter Uvin, Aiding Violence: The Development
Enterprise in Rwanda (West Hartford, Connecticut:
Kumarian Press, 1998), 197.
20
Ibid., 19.
62
pressures were quickly coming to a head even
during the 1960s and 1970s, precisely when
these previous outbreaks of violence took
place.
The genocide of 1994 differentiated from
these earlier cases of hostility, perhaps most
clearly in the extent to which Rwandans
participated in the violence. According to
Central News Network (CNN), as many as
600,000 people took part in the 1994
genocide; however, this cannot be fully
confirmed. 21 Environmental considerations
were especially strong incentives among the
masses, who, unlike the elite, profoundly felt
the effects of land and resource scarcity. In
Rwanda, a country in which the agricultural
sector is vastly predominant, with very low
levels of urbanization, most people depended
on the land and its fruits for subsistence, so
any threat to the environment could only be
considered a threat to their very survival. 22
Fittingly, Johan Pottier in 1986 described the
Rwandan agricultural sector as a system in
decline, warning that “the likelihood of a
major catastrophe in the near future must not
be dismissed lightly.”23
LOCAL SUSTAINABILITY STRATEGIES
BECOME UNTENABLE
Over the years, Rwandan farmers, like
their counterparts around the world, have
developed local strategies for interacting with
their environment in a manner that (in their
experience and in that of their ancestors) best
ensures their survival. Not to romanticize the
farmer’s place in world history, but it is
logical to conclude that the vast majority of
21
CNN, “Insight: Rwandan Genocide 10 Years Later,”
<http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0404/06/i_
ins.00.html> (10 March 2006).
22
Richard Nyrop et al. describe Rwanda in the late
1960s as a “very poor agricultural country with a
largely subsistence economy.” Ch. 8, p. 1.
23
Johan P. Pottier, “The Politics of Famine Prevention:
Ecology, Regional Production and Food
Complementarity in Western Rwanda,” African Affairs
85.339 (1986): 215
stephen brosha
farmers are interested in sustaining
themselves not only for the short term. Instead
they seek to engage in sustainable agricultural
practices so as to best assure their long-term
survival and prosperity. In large measure,
Rwandan farmers have acted in accordance
with this pattern, at least until recent years.
During the 1960s, for instance, “in many
cases, a family will work several small
scattered tracts of land, each at different
elevations or having different characteristics,
in order to reduce the risk of food
shortages.” 24 As David Campbell notes,
Rwandan farmers
build terraces, dig ditches and alter
cropping patterns to reduce soil
degradation and erosion; they plant
trees for fodder and tether animals to
obtain manure to add to the soil; and
they diversify their economies to
include off-farm and non-farm
income.25
Preferably, a farmer’s land should be filled
with a diverse array of crops, with regular
rotations and ample time allotted for fallow
(in order to facilitate the recovery of soil
nutrients). However, “under increasing
population pressure, such a complex system is
difficult to maintain, and during the 1980s
more and more families could no longer
afford to let their plots rest and recover
through periods of fallow.” 26 Furthermore,
local sustainability strategies have not been
available to all, but have been socially
stratified, meaning that most strategies were
open only to certain more privileged sectors
24
Richard Nyrop et al., 26.
25
David J. Campbell, “Conceptualizing Global
Change,” 5.
26
Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to
Rwanda. Historical Perspective: Some Explanatory
Factors. Study 1 of the International Response to
Conflict and Genocide: Lessons from the Rwanda
Experience. (Odense: Steering Committee of the Joint
Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, 1996),
18.
atlis international studies journal
of Rwandan society. 27 Perhaps more
alarmingly, the overall ability of farmers to
utilize such strategies had become virtually
nonexistent in the years leading up to 1994 as
environmental pressures mounted.
It is important to recognize that the blame
for pursuing non-sustainable practices in the
wake of increasing population pressures and
resource scarcity should not be placed firmly
on the shoulders of those farmers who
“abandoned” the strategies they knew would
work. One reason farmers began to use short-
term strategies, such as farming on the
steepest slopes (which were vulnerable to soil
erosion), was the imminence of their concerns
for survival. Another reason involves both the
central government of Rwanda and the
international community as a whole.
Recognizing how food production was not
keeping up with rapid population growth,
The government encouraged crop
production in the river valleys, the
alternative source of grazing for livestock.
The role of livestock as a source of
manure essential to maintaining the soil
fertility was not recognized by the central
government, yet it was a critical
component of local strategies.28
With this top-down “solution,” which is but
one of many similar examples, the Rwandan
government did little to ensure that local
conditions were properly taken into account in
their attempts to solve Rwanda’s population
crisis. Thus, the invaluable knowledge of
farmers who had been getting by for years
was more or less ignored.
COFFEE AND THE DECAY OF RWANDA’S
RESILIENCE
Throughout Rwanda’s attempts to
ameliorate its position in the world economy,
its path has been fraught with obstacles, and
27
David J. Campbell, “Conceptualizing Global
Change,” 5.
28
David J. Campbell, “Conceptualizing Global
Change,” 4.
63
the result has more often than not been
devastating for the country’s ecological and
political stability. This phenomenon can be
illuminated within the context of the long and
tenuous relationship between the Rwandan
economy and its primary resource, coffee.
Since the colonization of Rwanda by the
Germans, who had been eager to find a way to
extract funds from their new colonial holding,
coffee has been cultivated as the principal
cash crop in Rwanda. 29 In effect, Rwanda’s
economy has been “almost exclusively” built
around coffee and the other main cash crop in
Rwanda—which was also introduced by
colonial authorities—tea. 30 The almost
singular focus on the former, though, was so
ingrained that by the 1980s, 75 per cent of
Rwanda’s export earnings came from the
coffee crop.31
Though coffee provided the Rwandan
government and economy with a source of
revenue, there was obvious danger in
concentrating so much on a single crop. Not
only did it leave the Rwandan economy
vulnerable to the unstable world coffee
market; it also had dire consequences for
Rwanda’s agricultural sector. Moreover,
throughout the 1980s, “foreign lenders had
encouraged Rwanda to step up its cultivation
of coffee for export as a way to finance the
rapidly rising foreign debt.”32 In Rwanda, the
shift to a cash crop monoculture as the
backbone of its agricultural economy
significant damaged the system’s resilience.
As the Rwandan economy became more
market orientated in order to keep pace with
global trends, many farmers found themselves
pressured to find new sources of revenue, as
opposed to their traditional focus on
producing food for subsistence. As a result,
they often—with their government’s
29
Richard Nyrop et al., 10.
30
Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to
Rwanda, 19.
31
Linda Melvern, A People Betrayed, 40.
32
Michael Renner, 120. (Emphasis added)
64
encouragement—shifted to cultivating more
and more coffee as opposed to the traditional
variety of food crops. Between 1982 and 1992,
Rwanda’s production of coffee doubled, from
19,800 to 38,824 metric tonnes, while in the
same period, both millet and sorghum
production was cut in half.33 By doing so, the
decreased biodiversity of their farm holdings
left their crops more susceptible to disease. As
well, fewer crop types meant less crop
rotation, and fewer opportunities for the soil
to replenish its nutrients. All in all, the
Rwandan agricultural sector’s over-reliance
on coffee had the effect of placing the
environmental system on the brink.
Within a short period of time, disaster
struck. In June 1989, the International Coffee
Agreement (ICA), which regulated and
stabilized coffee prices around the globe, fell
apart, resulting in a dramatic drop in world
prices and devastating consequences for
Rwanda. At the same time, Rwanda’s coffee
yields were falling significantly as a result of
low levels of rainfall and decreasing
productivity of land due to decreased soil
quality.34 With few other crops to fall back on,
such factors cannot be considered minor
shocks to the economic system. Ultimately,
“revenues decreased drastically and foreign
earnings diminished by 50 per cent. Poverty
increased. Very few countries had
experienced such a rapid decline. Rwanda was
a desperate case.”35
ON THE BRINK: RWANDAN AGRICULTURE IN
THE EARLY 1990S
By the end of the 1980s, Rwanda’s
agricultural resource base had been decimated.
In terms of croplands, forestry, and livestock,
traditional coping strategies had given way to
short-term thinking and survival instincts.
Though the total amount of land being farmed
actually increased by 50 per cent between
33
FAOSTAT Data, 2006, <http://faostat.fao.org>.
34
Bruce D. Jones, 27.
35
Linda Melvern, 40.
stephen brosha
1970 and 1986, much of this expansion
“involved marginal land with poor soil quality
or inadequate rain.”36 As well, by the end of
the decade half of all farming was taking
place on steep slopes which hitherto would
have been considered unfit for agriculture. 37
Consequently, Rwanda had experienced over
a decade of declining land productivity.38 As
Luc Bonneux summarizes, the general
situation in 1993 was such that
half of Rwanda’s citizens were under 15
years of age. Less than 10% lived in cities;
most were living ‘up the hill’, in fragile
ecosystems that were fast eroding due to
deforestation and unsustainable agriculture.
Nevertheless, 40% of the gross domestic
product was generated by agriculture, there
being virtually no other industries in the
country.39
As Bonneux suggests, the problem rested not
only with unsustainable crop production.
Though often separated rather arbitrarily for
the purposes of discussion, it is more sensible
to consider crop cultivation, livestock
husbandry, and forestry as an interrelated
entity. This separation may have been one of
the reasons why policies emanating from the
central government of Rwanda often appear
myopic, and seem to have done little to
address many pressing issues of the Rwandan
ecological system as a whole.
Prior to the genocide of 1994, the
Rwandan government made several attempts
at agricultural and environmental reform, but
they often suffered from unintended
consequences precisely because of the
artificial compartmentalization of agriculture,
forestry, and animal husbandry. The
government-sponsored conversion of pasture
into cropland, for example, resulted in not
only decreased livestock production, but also
36
Michael Renner, 118.
37
Ibid.
38
Bruce D. Jones, 27.
39
Luc Bonneux, “Rwanda: A Case of Demographic
Entrapment,” Lancet 344 (17 December 1994), 1689.
atlis international studies journal
in the side effect of producing less manure to
replenish soil fertility, which completes the
circle back to crop cultivation. 40 In another
example, “although the Rwandan government
began a reforestation campaign [in the early
1990s], the tree usually planted was
eucalyptus, which consumes large amounts of
water and nutrients.”41 Placed in the context
of routine water shortage, and over-worked,
nutrient-deficient soil, the consequences of
this program were bound to be
counterproductive.
DISTRIBUTION AND DEMOGRAPHICS
The evidence demonstrating Rwanda’s
environmental instability is compelling,
however, the extent of the crisis (and, as a
consequence, its potential to descend into
violence) was heightened by the inequitable
distribution of those resources that were
available to the Rwandan populace during the
1990s. 42 Paradoxically, “land pressure has
resulted in declining overall production, but
increasing agricultural production for
individuals with favourable land and resource
access.” 43 Given the drastic status of the
aggregate figures regarding the state of
Rwanda’s agricultural economy in the years
leading up to the genocide of 1994, one is
immediately drawn to the conclusion that the
40
Daniel C. Clay and Thomas Reardon, “Linking
Population, Development, and the Environment: How
Households Confront Poverty and Demographic
Pressure in Rwanda,” Population Research Group,
Research Paper 96-04 (East Lansing, Michigan:
Institute for Public Policy and Social Research and the
Center for Advanced Study of International
Development, Michigan State University, 1996), 4.
41
Valerie Percival and Thomas Homer-Dixon,
“Environmental Scarcity and Violent Conflict.”
42
For a thorough treatment of this argument, see
Gareth Austin, The Effects of Government Policy on the
Ethnic Distribution of Income and Wealth in Rwanda:
A Review of Published Sources (Washington, D.C.:
Consultancy Report for the World Bank, 1996). Also
consider Bigagaza, Abong, and Mukarabuga, “Land
Scarcity,” 52.
43
Jean Bigagaza, Carolyn Abong, and Cecile
Mukarubuga, “Land Scarcity,” 51.
65
less privileged in Rwandan society—the
masses that later participated in the violence
to such a large extent—had more than a
simple axe to grind.
Additionally, as Daniel Clay and Thomas
Reardon have discovered, results of a
nationwide random sample of farming
households conducted in 1991 by Rwanda’s
ministry of agriculture demonstrate that the
most unsustainable behaviour was carried out
most often by those with the smallest farms,
as their concern for survival was even more
pressing as the situation worsened.44 Because
small farmers were forced to “push their
farms harder to make room for cash crops,”
they consequently had lower shares of their
land under fallow.45 This is not to suggest that
such farmers did not know better, but it is not
difficult to perceive how they were pushed to
the point of desperation in light of the
pressures acting on them.
Aside from the environmentally-damaging
agricultural practices noted above, poor
Rwandan farmers also exacerbated the
country’s demographic crisis by having more
children to use as farm labourers, despite the
obvious problems this posed for society at
large. Unfortunately, “when asked about what
children will need to do to survive in the
absence of sufficient land resources, the
overwhelming response from parents is that
children will just have to ‘make do on their
own’.”46 There were certainly some perceived
advantages of having an increased labour pool
at the household level. However, having more
children simply added perilously to the
already rapid population growth of the most
densely populated country in Africa. The fact
that such high birthrates remained despite
Rwanda’s population pressures is not
altogether surprising due to the prevalence of
low income, low access to formal education
44
Daniel C. Clay and Thomas Reardon, 14.
45
Ibid.
46
Ibid., 15.
66
and little knowledge of birth control amongst
citizens in the country.
CONFLICT AND THE ENVIRONMENT: HOW
DIRECT WERE THE LINKS?
Taken in sum, environmental pressures
delivered a critical blow to Rwanda’s
resilience, rendering the country virtually
unable to deal with environmental and other
stresses in an effective and rational fashion.
As time went on, the government proved its
inability to deliver appropriate responses to
the crisis in Rwanda’s agricultural sector.
Their incapacity is clearly demonstrated by
the government’s ill-fated campaigns geared
toward deforestation that were run side-by-
side with attempts to increase agricultural
output clearing forests and draining
marshes.47 According to Percival and Homer
Dixon, “the government’s increasing inability
to solve the country’s problems created a
crisis of legitimacy,” partially setting the stage
for the later descent into violence. 48 In their
view, the weakening of government
legitimacy was probably the clearest link
between the environment and conflict in the
Rwandan case. This sentiment is echoed by
Bigagaza, Abong, and Mukarabuga, who
arrive at the conclusion that
The multiple effects of economic decline,
population pressure, structural adjustment
policies (SAPs) and growing internal
opposition weakened the government’s
legitimacy and its administrative ability,
thus contributing to the conflict in
Rwanda.49
Other research, though, suggests a much more
direct link between environmental stresses
47
Catherine André and Jean-Phillippe Platteau, “Land
Relations Under Unbearable Stress: Rwanda Caught in
the Malthusian Trap,” Journal of Economic Behavior &
Organization 34 (1998), 2.
48
Valerie Percival and Thomas Homer-Dixon,
“Environmental Scarcity and Violent Conflict.”
49
Bigagaza, Abong, and Mukarabuga, “Land Scarcity,”
57.
stephen brosha
and the descent into violence that shook
Rwanda in 1994.
On the eve of the Rwandan genocide, two
Belgian economists (Catherine André and
Jean-Phillippe Platteau) were engaged in field
work in the north-western area of the country
documenting the evolution of land access
rights and social relations in one Rwandan
community. André spent a total of sixteen
months in the community on two separate
occasions in 1988 and 1993, developing close
ties with the local inhabitants and
interviewing members of most households in
the area. During the time between her first and
second visits, a number of striking changes
had taken place. As population density in the
area rose from 1,740 people per square mile in
1988 to 2,040 in 1993, there was not only a
predictable drop in the amount of food that
was available, but also “a noticeable increase
in the inequality of land holdings…as well as
an abrupt fall in the median size of owned
farms.” 50 To add to the problem, there was
also a significant increase in the average
number of inhabitants per household, largely
due to the growing inability of young adults to
marry and establish their own farms and
households for want of land. By 1993, this
phenomenon had reached such a point that not
a single man in his early twenties lived
independent of his parents, which would have
been unheard of just five short years earlier.51
In light of the growing land pressures, a
familiar predicament soon developed around
the question of how to feed all the people on
so little land. As Jared Diamond notes,
the percentage of the population
consuming less than 1,600 calories per
day (i.e., what is considered below the
famine level) was 9% in 1982, rising to
40% in 1990 and some unknown higher
percentage thereafter.52
50
Catherine André and Jean-Phillippe Platteau, 8.
51
Ibid., 12.
52
Jared Diamond, Collapse: How Societies Choose to
Fail or Succeed (New York: Viking Press, 2005), 321.
atlis international studies journal
For many years, it had been necessary for
people in this area of Rwanda to supplement
their income—and more importantly, their
caloric intake—with jobs that took them away
from their farms because the average
household obtained only seventy-seven per
cent of its calorie needs from the farm.53 As
pressures mounted, however, even the
opportunities for regular off-farm income
decreased drastically, especially for those with
the least to begin with. As a result, a growing
number of people were pushed to the pursuit
of short-term survival strategies. As André
observed first-hand in 1993, “in this market,
many land parcels are sold under duress
conditions and purchased by people with
regular non-agricultural incomes” which
contributed to the already significant gulf
between the haves and have-nots in this
region of Rwanda.54 Thus, in a very short time,
Kanama’s Malthusian quandary coupled with
its crisis of distribution meant that there were
a large number of people on the edge of
survival.
What is perhaps most gripping about
André and Platteau’s study, is not their study
of the perilous state of land pressures in the
Kanama region. Rather, their study is unique
because instead of hypothesizing in an
abstract fashion, it examines in very concrete
terms the links between land, population, and
environmental stresses and actual conflict.
Noting a high incidence of all sorts of conflict
within the study area, they proceeded to
examine those cases of conflict in detail,
discovering that the majority of such conflicts
were rooted in land disputes. 55 Furthermore,
they claim that a good number of these
conflicts were not simply petty squabbles, but
indeed resulted in (often quite serious) bouts
of “sheer violence,” including everything
53
Ibid.
54
Catherine André and Jean-Phillippe Platteau, 28.
(Emphasis added)
55
Ibid., 30.
67
from destruction of another’s property to
physical assaults with machetes. 56 Not
surprisingly, André and Platteau conclude that
“collective security and peace seemed to be
under severe threat at the time of our field
study (as early as 1988).”57
For those interested in seeing the links
between the environment and conflict, the
André and Platteau study is uniquely
revealing, and almost perfectly (yet tragically)
timed. Following the genocide of 1994,
curious to trace back the actual links between
such land problems and the violence of 1994,
the authors of the study went back to Kanama.
In their opinion, “an unexpectedly clear
picture emerges.”58 In particular, people who
(according to the previous survey data) were
resented for their economic success were
killed at a much higher rate than the general
population. In addition, older land-holding
males were also executed at an extraordinary
rate, which lends much support to the notion
that environmental stresses were inextricably
linked to the events of 1994. 59 A study in
another area of the country would have faced
difficult obstacles to identify such direct links
between the environment and conflict, due to
the potential conflation of the ethnic roots to
conflict and those caused by environmental
stresses. In Kanama, however, the population
was ethnically homogenous, with every single
inhabitant of the area being Hutu, except one
woman who was a Tutsi.60 For that reason, the
ethnic hatred variable can be controlled in
their naturalistic experiment, and other causes
of the 1994 violence (that eventually killed
56
Ibid., 29.
57
Ibid., 37.
58
Ibid., 39.
59
Ibid., 40.
60
Catherine André and Jean-Phillippe Platteau, 6. The
woman, who was the owner of a large estate—therefore
belonging to the socio-economic class of many Hutus
who were resented by large segments of the
population—was killed along with the rest of the
Kanama victims of the 1994 genocide, the rest of
whom were Hutu.
68
over five per cent of the population of the
area) must be identified.61 Given the evidence
André and Platteau have gathered, there
seems little doubt that environmental factors
played a role that was more than subsidiary.
As they note in conclusion,
The 1994 events provided a unique
opportunity to settle scores, or to reshuffle
land properties, even among Hutu
villagers…. It is not rare, even today, to
hear Rwandans argue that a war is
necessary to wipe out an excess of
population and to bring numbers into line
with available land
resources.62
The Rwandan case does
Upon closer examination,
not demonstrate that environmental
there is a necessary link appear to have interacted on environmental role in the
between
environmental/populati
many levels to contribute
on pressures and both directly and indirectly
genocide; what to the genocide.
becomes clear, though,
is that such factors were
most certainly at play both leading up to and
during the events of 1994.
THE OVERALL ASSESSMENT
There are, without question, a number of
other salient factors that must be considered in
order to arrive at a comprehensive
understanding of what took place in Rwanda
in 1994, for what reasons, and by whom. The
object of this paper has been to give a
thorough treatment of the environment’s role
as one of those contributing factors. Though
some observers of the Rwandan situation have
downplayed the ultimate role of resource and
land scarcity as direct triggers of the genocide
of 1994, the evidence seems to suggest a
different story. Percival and Homer-Dixon,
for instance, suggested in 1995 that there was
a lack of “conclusive evidence” that
environmental stressors in fact motivated
61
Ibid., 39.
62
Ibid., 47.
stephen brosha
people to engage in violence.63 Research that
has been published recently, such as the in-
depth study of André and Platteau, as well as
the many accounts of the precursors to
disaster that could be found in the agricultural
data available in the years leading up to the
genocide, imply much greater potency to the
environmental aspects of the events of 1994.
Many nuanced accounts of the Rwandan
genocide do make at least a passing reference
to the country’s environmental crisis that had
developed by the early 1990s.64 Unfortunately,
the case is normally placed
in simplistic Malthusian
terms, which risks
rendering the discussion of
factors the true nature of the
1994 violence merely an
“interesting side note” at
best. Upon closer
examination,
environmental factors
appear to have interacted
on many levels to contribute both directly and
indirectly to the genocide. By the late 1980s,
unsustainable agricultural practices had
become ubiquitous and almost unavoidable—
often precisely because of government
policies responding to the international market.
The resulting blow to Rwanda’s ecological
and political resilience tolled the death knell
for Rwanda’s chances at being a success story
in Africa. Furthermore, land and population
pressures drove large segments of the
Rwandan population to the point of utter
desperation, the results of which became all
too evident in 1994.
63
Valerie Percival and Thomas Homer-Dixon,
“Environmental Scarcity and Violent Conflict: The
Case of Rwanda.”
64
For example, Dallaire, Shake Hands with the Devil:
The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda, and Gérard
Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis 1959-1994: History of a
Genocide, (London: Hurst & Co., 1995).
atlis international studies journal
To be sure, as was apparent even before
the genocide took place, the Rwandan
case illustrates that environmental
sustainability and social and economic
development can no longer be analyzed as
separate phenomena but that the melding
of these objectives is crucial.65
Rather than waiting until disaster or calamity
strikes, state leaders, NGOs, and the
international community as a whole would be
well advised to take the lessons of Rwanda’s
environmental catastrophe to heart.
SOURCES
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“Land Relations Under Unbearable
Stress: Rwanda Caught in the
Malthusian Trap.” Journal of Economic
Behavior & Organization 34 (1998): 1-
47.
Austin, Gareth. The Effects of Government
Policy on the Ethnic Distribution of
Income and Wealth in Rwanda: A
Review of Published Sources.
Washington, D.C.: Consultancy Report
for the World Bank, 1996.
Bigagaza, Jean, Carolyn Abong, and Cecile
Mukarubuga. “Land Scarcity,
Distribution and Conflict in Rwanda.” In
Scarcity and Surfeit: The Ecology of
Africa’s Conflicts, eds. Jeremy Lind and
Kathryn Sturman, 51-84. Pretoria, South
Africa: Institute for Security Studies,
2002.
65
David J. Campbell, Jennifer M. Olson, and Len
Berry, “Population Pressure, Agricultural Productivity
and Land Degradation in Rwanda: An Agenda for
Collaborative Training, Research and Analysis,”
Rwanda Society-Environment Project, Working Paper
1 (East Lansing, Michigan: Department of Geography
and the Center for Advanced Study of International
Development, Michigan State University, 1993), 3.
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Bonneux, Luc. “Rwanda: A Case of
Demographic Entrapment.” Lancet 344
(17 December 1994): 1689-1690.
Campbell, David J. “Conceptualizing Global
Change as Society-Environment
Interaction: From the Local to the
Global in Rwanda.” Rwanda Society-
Environment Project, Working Paper 6.
East Lansing, Michigan: Department of
Geography and the Center for Advanced
Study of International Development,
Michigan State University, 1994.
Campbell, David J., Jennifer M. Olson, and
Len Berry. “Population Pressure,
Agricultural Productivity and Land
Degradation in Rwanda: An Agenda for
Collaborative Training, Research and
Analysis.” Rwanda Society-
Environment Project, Working Paper 1.
East Lansing, Michigan: Department of
Geography and the Center for Advanced
Study of International Development,
Michigan State University, 1993.
Clay, Daniel C., and Thomas Reardon.
“Linking Population, Development, and
the Environment: How Households
Confront Poverty and Demographic
Pressure in Rwanda.” Population
Research Group, Research Paper 96-04.
East Lansing, Michigan: Institute for
Public Policy and Social Research and
the Center for Advanced Study of
International Development, Michigan
State University, 1996.
CNN. “Insight: Rwandan Genocide 10 Years
Later.”
<http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRI
PTS/0404/06/i_ins.00.html> (10 March
2006).
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Dallaire, Roméo A. Shake Hands with the
Devil: The Failure of Humanity in
Rwanda. Toronto: Random House
Canada, 2003.
Dasgupta, Partha, Carl Folke, and Karl-Göran
Mäler. “The Environmental Resource
Base and Human Welfare.” In
Population, Economic Development,
and the Environment, eds. Kerstin
Lindahl-Kiessling and Hans Lindberg.
Oxford: Oxford UP, 1994.
Diamond, Jared. Collapse: How Societies
Choose to Fail or Succeed. New York:
Viking Press, 2005.
FAOSTAT Data, 2006.
<http://faostat.fao.org>.
Gourevitch, Philip. We Wish to Inform You
that Tomorrow We Will Be Killed With
Our Families: Stories from Rwanda.
New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux,
1998.
Homer-Dixon, Thomas F. “On the Threshold:
Environmental Changes as Causes of
Acute Conflict.” International Security
16.2 (1991): 76-116.
Homer-Dixon, Thomas F. “Environmental
Scarcities and Violent Conflict:
Evidence from Cases.” International
Security 19.1 (1994): 5-40.
Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to
Rwanda. Historical Perspective: Some
Explanatory Factors. Study 1 of the
International Response to Conflict and
Genocide: Lessons from the Rwanda
Experience. Odense: Steering
Committee of the Joint Evaluation of
Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, 1996.
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Jones, Bruce D. Peacemaking in Rwanda: The
Dynamics of Failure. Boulder,
Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 2001.
Kaplan, Robert D. “The Coming Anarchy.”
Atlantic Monthly 272.2 (1994): 44-76.
Kuperman, Alan J. The Limits of
Humanitarian Intervention: Genocide in
Rwanda. Washington, D.C.: Brookings
Institution, 2001.
Malthus, Thomas R. An Essay on the
Principle of Population. New York:
August Kelley, 1965 [1798].
Melvern, Linda. A People Betrayed: The Role
of the West in Rwanda’s Genocide. New
York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000.
Nyrop, Richard F., et al. Rwanda: A Country
Study. Washington, D.C.: The American
University, 1985 [1974].
Olson, Jennifer M. “Land Degradation in
Gikongoro, Rwanda: Problems and
Possibilities in the Integration of
Household Survey Data and
Environmental Data.” Rwanda Society-
Environment Project, Working Paper 5.
East Lansing, Michigan: Department of
Geography and the Center for Advanced
Study of International Development,
Michigan State University, 1994.
Percival, Valerie, and Thomas Homer-Dixon.
“Environmental Scarcity and Violent
Conflict: The Case of Rwanda.”
Occasional Paper for the Project on
Environment, Population and Security.
Washington, D.C.: American
Association for the Advancement of
Science and the University of Toronto,
1995.
<http://www.library.utoronto.ca/pcs/eps/
rwanda/rwanda1.htm>. (8 March 2005).
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Pottier, Johan P. “The Politics of Famine

Prevention: Ecology, Regional
Production and Food Complementarity
in Western Rwanda.” African Affairs
85.339 (1986): 207-237.

Prunier, Gérard. The Rwanda Crisis 1959-

1994: History of a Genocide. London:
Hurst & Co., 1995.

Renner, Michael. Fighting for Survival:

Environmental Decline, Social Conflict,
and the New Age of Insecurity. New
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Uvin, Peter. Aiding Violence: The

Development Enterprise in Rwanda.
West Hartford, Connecticut: Kumarian
Press, 1998.
The Border of Dreams:
Burmese Women Working in Thailand’s Sex Industry
Melanie McDonald

T
first day of work at Empower (Education
he river officially separating the
Means the Protection of Women Engaged in
boundary between Burma and
Recreation), a Non-Governmental
Thailand is known as the “border
Organization (NGO) which advocates rights
blocking our dreams.” Political
for sex workers in Thailand. She is a smart
repression, torture, detention, forced
Burmese woman who possesses three
relocation, forced labour, rape, and lack
valuable qualities: she is young, she is pretty
of opportunity are just some of the
and she disagrees with what is happening in
reasons Burmese women are migrating
Burma today. Bo came to Thailand so that her
to Thailand. Currently there are
daughter would not suffer from the effects of
between two and three million migrant
the military regime. She also came searching
workers in Thailand. Approximately
for “opportunity.” Her work at a massage
80% are Burmese. 1 Many of these
parlour earns her enough money to support
women are working under conditions
herself and her daughter. Bo feels very
that Thai people would refuse to accept.
privileged to have made it to where she is
Most Burmese sex workers working in
today. She holds the dream of returning home
Thailand make the conscious choice to
with a sense of wonder.
migrate and work in the sex industry.
However, they do not make the choice
OBJECTIVE
to work under unfair and unsafe
In this paper I will be discussing the
conditions. They do not make the
political situation in Burma and the reasons
choice to make the lowest wages. They
why many women are migrating to Thailand
do not make the choice to incur debt
to work in the sex industry. There will be
upon arrival. They also do not make the
four main components to this paper. First, for
choice to be discriminated against by
the purpose of context, I will discuss the
the community and the law.
current political situation, women’s rights,
Combinations of factors contribute to
and history in Burma. Second, I will illustrate
this reality, which is often ignored or
the migration process including information
simply not talked about in the context of
about the complexities of human trafficking
Thai culture and integration policies.
and the push/pull factors for women
I met Bo (synonym for name) on my
migrating to Thailand. Third, I will portray
the working conditions of Burmese sex
workers and highlight the issues they face.
1
Dennis Arnold, “Work, Rights, & Lastly, I will describe the Empower’s role in
Discrimination Against Burmese Workers in helping the situation and their
Thailand,” City University of Hong Kong, 2004,
www.amrc.org/hk/5306.htm recommendations for the Thai government,
atlantic international studies journal
the Burmese government, NGOs, and
the international community.
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
This section will illustrate the
approaches I used in order to carry out
my research. It also includes issues
arising when researching sex work,
such as academic selfishness and
formality.
Issues Surrounding Research and Sex
Work
When studying sex work,
researchers stand on ethically sensitive
ground. This is because sex workers
have been exploited for years by
researchers constantly victimizing the
women involved in order to obtain
intrigue, sex appeal, and shock effect. It
is true that many women are victims of
the sex industry, yet often researchers
ignore the requests that sex worker’s
have on what issues they would like
written about.
Through the course of my research,
I was a volunteer at Empower in Mae
Sai on the border of Burma. Empower
Foundation has been established since
1985 with the attention of addressing
the need to provide support and
education for sex workers in Thailand.
Empower has four centers around
Thailand including in: Mae Sai, Chiang
Mai, Patpong Bangkok, and most
recently, in Phuket. Empower supports
the right of women to choose whichever
profession they feel best meets their
needs, and provides the support women
seek. A policy at Empower protects the
privacy of their women by not allowing
researchers to interview the women at
the center. As I had the fortunate
opportunity to be a part of the sex
worker community I did not want to
abuse my role for the purpose of
research. Therefore it is important to
note that when researching sex work,
academic adherence to strict research
73
policies obliterates the voices which are most
relevant. This is a significant flaw in much
academia surrounding sex work. In this paper
I will be taking into account these voices, yet
I will not make any direct references to
informal interviews and conversations, for the
purpose of privacy and context.
It is clear that this research has certain
biases as I am not a sex worker, nor have I
ever lived in Burma. As a result this paper is
based on my perceptions about the issues
facing Burmese sex workers as a foreign
Canadian university student volunteering at
Empower Mae Sai. I will be drawing my
research from secondary sources and my
personal experiences at Empower, living on
the border, attending meetings and
conferences surrounding migrant sex workers,
and informal interviews.
Research Design
My research can best be described as
participatory observation research. By being
an active participant in the sex worker
community in Mae Sai, I have been able to
draw conclusions about the issues facing them.
I will attempt to highlight the needs, interests,
and realities of Burmese sex workers in
Thailand in order to create awareness about
the false perceptions that other people have in
relation to these women. As a result of
spreading awareness about the situation of
Burmese sex workers in Thailand, it is hoped
that there will be less discrimination against
them and more positive action taken in the
future.
The first step in my research was to
collect information about the history of
Burma and the current political situation. I
read many accounts about the issues facing
Burmese citizens written in NGO and INGO
(International NGO) reports; I also heard
many stories from people who had just come
across the border. The biggest problem I
faced was that it is very difficult to obtain
accurate information about the current
political situation in Burma. For one, the
military regime has a strangle-hold on all the
information coming and out of the country.
74
Journalists are not allowed to report
inside the country. And all of the
documents published by the country are
generally inaccurate and biased
information. Therefore, I did my best to
ensure source accuracy by only using
content produced by credible NGOs,
INGOs and scholars, and by confirming
every source in at least one other place.
The second step was to observe,
question, and research how and why the
political situation is bringing so many
women to Thailand. This process
included analyzing the situation for
women once they arrive in Thailand. I
looked at the process of migration and
the issue of trafficking. I also looked
into the conditions of sex work for
migrant women, particularly in Mae Sai.
Because during my research I was
situated in Mae Sai, which is an open
border crossing between the Shan State
in Burma and Thailand, most of the
information in this paper will pertain to
this region.
In order to enrich this information, I
conducted a large literary review. In
particular, I focused on secondary
sources that pertained to the current
political situation in Burma and the
affect it is having women. I also read
human right reports that focused on the
country and for sex workers.
The third step was to compile,
interpret and analyze the collected data.
This process involved screening what I
deemed to be appropriate for this paper.
Here is where I have particularly taken
my biases into account.
The methodology I have outlined
could easily be labelled as
unsophisticated. The informality of my
research and exclusion of formal
interviews could also be deemed as a
weakness. Yet in context of my research
topic, I believe it is this informality that
is this paper's greatest strength.
Key Terms
melanie mcdonald
In this paper I will use the term sex work
instead of prostitution. According to
Empower staff sex work is a gender neutral
term and pertains to an income generating
activity instead of an identity. Furthermore, it
emphasizes a variety of income generating
activities such as dance, massage, and
karaoke. Prostitute on the other hand is
narrowly applied. The act of sex and money is
a mere connotation. The term prostitute is
very commonly used in colloquial language
as well as in scholarly writing about sex work.
Therefore it can be assumed that the people
using this term do not take into account that it
is considered derogatory among sex workers.
Commercial sex business is the umbrella
term used to describe a variety of
entertainment businesses. A commercial sex
business is a place of work where sexual
services are sold, including but not limited to:
massage parlours, karaoke bars, bar-beers,
Go-Go, internet sites, and phone operators.
Brothels differ from the other places of work
because they do not offer any other form of
labour other than sex.
The second form of terminology in this
paper concerns Burmese migrants. According
to the Report of the Special Rapporteur on the
Human Rights of Migrants, “migrants are
persons who are outside the territory of their
state of nationality or citizenship and
therefore not subject to its legal provisions.”2
In this paper, I will be focusing on migrant
workers who are not subject to Thailand’s
legal provisions.
I choose to use the name Burma instead of
Myanmar in order to follow the current pro-
democracy movement. Burma’s English name
was changed to Myanmar in 1988 by the
military government without consulting its
citizens.3 Lastly, I will not be referring to the
Burmese military dictatorship as a
government due to the fact that it is clearly a
military regime. In protest, I will be using the
words junta, State Peace and Development
2
Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants,
World Conference Against Racism, 2000.
3
Christina Fink, Living Silence; Burma Under Military
Rule (Bangkok: White Lotus, 2001).
atlantic international studies journal
Council (SPDC), and military regime.
THE SITUATION IN BURMA
In order to set the context, the
following section includes a brief
history of Burma. A discussion about
the current political situation and the
position of women in the country will
follow.
A Brief History
During the pre-colonial period,
numerous kingdoms were situated in the
territory known as Burma today. This is
because the territory was, as it is today,
made up with numerous indigenous
groups each composed of different
cultures and identities.
In 1824, the British Empire seized
Southern and Western Burma, and
continued to annex the rest of the
country until 1885, when they received
control of Northern Burma. The British
brought with them infrastructure, the
idea of representative government, and
the expansion of political and economic
ideas.4 They also brought with them the
Western notions of states and fixed
boundaries in order to make policy.
However, this split many ethnic
communities. As a result, bitter
feelings developed between the
Burmese, the indigenous ethnic
nationalities and the British. The
colonial administration continued with
limited local self-government until the
Union of Burma achieved independence
in 1948.5
The new state came into being as a
parliamentary democracy and, although
beset by ethnic strife, territorial dispute,
and little social welfare they survived as
a representative government until an
4
Ibid.
5 10
Ibid.
75
army coup in 1962. 6 A military-dominated
regime led by the Burma Socialist Program
Party (BSPP) held power for the next 26 years.
There were no free elections, and freedom of
expression and association were almost
entirely denied to the people of Burma.
Torture, political imprisonment, and other
human rights abuses were common.7
Once among the largest rice-exporting
countries in Asia, Burma was facing food
shortages by 1988. 8 At this time the silence
was broken by the beginning of extreme pro-
democracy movements. The military
“responded” by announcing the start of the
State Law and Order Restoration Council
(SLORC) which was renamed the State Peace
and Development Council (SPDC) in
November 1997. 9 An election was held in
1990, and the Pro-Democracy party won by a
landslide. Again this did not instil any change
in governance. Instead the leader of the
National League of Democracy (NLD) Daw
Aung San Suu Ky was detained. She
remained under house arrest until 1996. 10
Burma's political history is coloured with
political strife, civil war, human rights
atrocity, and economic disparity. This is not
because the country lacks sufficient natural
resources, because the country is flourishing
with natural resources. Nor is it because the
civilians possess a war-like mentality. Instead,
it is due to a complex war between ethnic
minorities and the Burmese military
dictatorship and the abuse of power and
political mismanagement.
Current Political Situation
It is relevant to understand the current
political situation in Burma in order to
comprehend why so many women come
6
Images Asia, With Migrating Hope: Burmese Women
Working in the Sex Industry in Thailand (Chiang Mai,
1997).
7
Karen Human Rights Group, Wholesale Destruction
(Images Asia: Chiang Mai, 1998).
8
Images Asia.
9
Brenda Belak, Gathering Strength: Women From
Burma on their Rights (Chiang Mai: Images Asia,
2002).
Images Asia.
76
across the border to work in Thailand. It
is crucial to note that the majority of
women come to work in Thailand as a
result of the junta’s actions and the
endless civil war, not because they
would prefer to leave their culture to
live and work in Thailand.
Presently there are two key political
issues facing Burma. The first issue is
the restoration of democracy and the
second is the resolution of political
rights for ethnic minorities.
Daw Aung San Suu Kyy is the
symbol of hope and freedom in Burma.
Surprisingly she has achieved this while
spending the majority of the past 15
years under house arrest. On May 30,
2003 she was re-detained and remains
under house arrest today. According to
the United Nations, in January 2005 her
detainment was postponed for another
year.11 The president of the Shan State
Peace Council and the Chairman of the
Shan National League of Democracy
were both arrested for no apparent
reason in early 2005. According to
Amnesty International, currently there
are 1,300 political prisoners. The
detainment of these political activists
who oppose the government portrays
the lack of freedom, speech and choice
in the country. Citizens of Burma are
currently experiencing unnecessary
social and economic hardships without
an inclusive decision making process.
From the military regime’s
perspective, they must use their power
through force in order to protect people
from ethnic armed organizations.
Propaganda is rampant through the
country in order to make people live in
fear, so they will adhere to the SPDC. A
common saying on the front page of
11
Commission on Human Rights, “Special
Envoy; Razili Ismail Facilitating National
Reconciliation & Democratizion in Burma,”
2005,
http://www.ohchr.org/english/bodies/chr/docs/6
1/E.CN.4.2005.130.139.doc
melanie mcdonald
state controlled newspapers is “The
Tatmandow has been sacrificing much of its
blood and sweat to prevent the disintegration
of the union.” 12 This illustrates the SPDC’s
efforts to promote themselves through control
of the media.
In regards to national reconciliation, the
regime wants to bring all ethnic areas, which
compose approximately half of the country,
under the centralized control of the
government. 13 The largest ethnic groups
include Burmese, Mon, Karen, Shan, Kachin,
Chin and Arkanese.14
The SPDC does not see any room for
political autonomy outside of their centralized
force. Nor do they believe in cultural
autonomy for these ethnic groups. Because
the country is so divided ethnically,
religiously, and politically, it is difficult to
generalize want and needs of different groups.
However, a common thread between all
ethnic groups is the oppression they face from
the government.
According to the United Nations Special
Envoy in facilitating national reconciliation
and democratization in Burma, Razili Ismail,
the current situation is far from
democratization and national reconciliation.
In fact, Razili Ismail has only been to Buma
once in 2004, and he is not allowed back.15
Razili Ismail’s role is to ensure people receive
the same benefits of economic, social and
political development in the country. This
illustrates that the state of Burma does not
want the international community to be aware
of their political and economic corruption.
Women’s Status in Burma
Men and women have suffered equally
from harassment under the current regime in
Burma. Yet the opportunities for women are
much smaller than men because of the status
of women in the country and because of
traditional cultural roles.
12
Fink, 143.
13
Belak.
14
Images Asia.
15
Commission on Human Rights.
atlantic international studies journal
According to the military regiment,
technically, the legal status of women in
Burma is equal to men. The Myanmar
National Committee for Women’s
Affair’s claims that the Myanmar (or
Burmese) constitution hold’s laws to
protect women’s rights. 16 The
government also claims that during the
colonial period women’s rights
flourished and continue to today.
However, presently there is no valid
constitution in the country. A draft was
started in 1993 but there is no final
document. Much of the law in Burma
was codified 100 years ago before
women’s rights were recognized;
therefore, most legislation does not
ensure equality.17
For many well educated and higher
class women affiliated with the SPDC, a
feeling of equality holds true. Yet the
reality is that most women in the
country are not well educated and do
not have access to relevant information
pertaining to their rights. It is
especially difficult for ethnic women
and rural women to access education.
However, it is not in the interest of the
SPDC to improve the current education
system because the more people
become educated the more chances
there are for opposition. 18 In addition,
approximately 50% of the SPDC annual
budget goes to military expenditures.
The Tatmandow currently maintain an
astounding army of 400,000. 19 Thus
there is no room to improve the
education system. Even if the laws to
protect women’s rights in Burma were
sufficient in context to the international
community, it is difficult for the junta to
be held accountable. If the government
is not accountable then laws are not
legitimate.
16
Ni Ni Myint, The Status of Myanmar Women
(Myanmar: Historical Research Center, 2002).
17
Belak.
18
Ibid.
19
Images Asia.
77
The restriction of movement for women
within the country’s borders is an attempt by
the SPDC to control the status of women.
Accordingly, in the Shan State a women
under the age of 25 is required to travel with a
legal guardian or an agent usually connected
to the SPDC. 20 On the other hand, it is
extremely difficult for a Burmese woman of
any age to obtain a passport. Women must
pay between 100,000 and 200,000 kyat (or
approximately 16,200 Canadian dollars) in
order to receive a valid passport. This makes
traveling outside the country very difficult.
Theoretically, everyone in the country is
eligible for a national identity card which
enables one to cross the Thai border for one
day to trade, shop or do business. Yet, in
many ethnic areas it is difficult to get an
identity card, which makes it impossible to
travel anywhere legally.
Culturally, women hold an important role
in the family. In the Burmese language, the
term relating to family is “mi thar zu.”
Literally, this means mother with a group of
children.21 However, traditionally the man is
viewed as the head of the household. In many
remote areas, women live under traditional
roles. Yet because of recent actions of the
SPDC, many women face the burden of
protecting their families. Forced re-location,
forced labour, detention, execution, and
torture has taken many men away from their
homes.22 Therefore women are left to fend for
themselves and their family. It is not an
uncommon situation that in these
circumstances many women are raped by
soldiers or forced to marry. The physical and
psychological impacts are very damaging for
those involved, yet there is a severe lack of
social welfare for women to get help.
THE MIGRATION PROCESS
“Everyone has the right to work, to free
choice of employment, to just and favourable
20
Belak.
21
Myint.
22
Karen Human Rights Group.
78
conditions of work and to protection
against unemployment.”23
“Everyone has the right to freedom of
movement and residence within the
borders of each state. Everyone has the
right to leave any country, including his
own, and to return to his country.”24
Every year, thousands of Burmese
women flee their country in search of
safety from violence and a “better life.”
Some migrate legally; however, the
majority of women cross undocumented.
An undocumented migrant must find
work illegally. This holds true for the
majority of Burmese women working in
the sex industry in Thailand.25
The Trafficking Complex
The universal definition of human
trafficking created by the UN Protocol
to Prevent Suppress and Punish
Trafficking is as follows:
Trafficking in personals shall mean
the recruitment, transportation,
transfer, harbouring or receipt of
persons, by means of the threat or
use of force or other forms of
coercion, abduction, of fraud, of
deception, of the abuse of power or
of a position of vulnerability or of
the giving or receiving of payments
or benefits to achieve the consent of
a person having control over another
person for the purpose of
exploitation.
Over the past ten years there has
been a large focus from the
international community on the issue of
human trafficking. In particular, the
23
United Nations, “Universal Declaration of
Human Rights: Article 23” 1948,
http://www.un.org/overview/rights.html
24
United Nations, Article 13.
25
Empower Labour and Health Conference,
Labour Laws and Health Issue’s Facing Sex
Workers Today (Chiang Mai, March 25-29,
2005).
melanie mcdonald
topic of Burmese sex workers in Thailand has
been a subject of much concern in the context
of trafficking. However, according to
Empower, NGOs and INGOs that deal with
human trafficking often have little or no
experience on the issues of migration, labour,
sex work or women’s rights. They also often
neglect to look at the issue from the
“victim’s” perspective.
Because Burmese women are not allowed
to travel without a legal guardian or “agent”
under the age of 25 it makes it very difficult
for a women to legally leave the country
looking for employment opportunity. 26
However, if a woman does not have a
passport or ID card she will pay the agent to
get her across check points so that she can
come to Thailand. It costs 400 baht
(approximately 15 Canadian dollars) to cross
the Mae Sai River illegally without going
through the official immigration post.
Therefore it is not very difficult for a woman
to get around the government induced
restrictions on traveling in Burma.
Women crossing the border this way are
often perceived as “trafficked” if they end up
working in the sex industry. However,
typically the woman does not see herself as a
“victim of trafficking.” This poses to be a
complex situation, especially in context to
“raid and rescues,” where an anti-trafficking
organization or the Thai government will raid
a brothel, close it down and “rescue” the
women.27 Generally raid and rescues are a sex
worker’s worst nightmare. A common saying
at Empower is, “Find out if we need to be
rescued before you rescue us.” This is
because the raids do not pose a solution. In
turn, these women are then out of work and
face the possibility of jail or deportation as an
undocumented migrant working in Thailand.
Another contradiction with the issue of
Burmese sex workers who have been
“trafficked” is that of coercion. An important
component to the universal definition of
human trafficking is the use of coercion, force,
26
Ibid.
27
Images Asia.
atlantic international studies journal
or the abuse of power over a victim.
Yet it is difficult to define what
constitutes these forms of coercion with
the various forces compelling women to
migrate. Most women make a conscious
choice to seek work outside Burma
because SPDC policies make it nearly
impossible for women to support
themselves and their families. Therefore,
there is no other alternative left to the
women other than migration from
Burma. Thereby, the situation can be
perceived as, the government that is
coercing or forcing them to leave the
country.
Push and Pull Factors for Migration
An interconnected web of push and
pull factors has resulted in the number
of Burmese women working in the sex
industry in Thailand; social, economic
and political factors combined.
Most women face the same realities
which push them to leave Burma,
including human rights abuses, gender
discrimination, and lack of economic
opportunity. Lack of employment in
Burma forces women to seek socio-
economic opportunities elsewhere. In
addition, political suppression has
caused uncountable incidences of
human rights abuses through enforced
government policies. Forced village re-
location, the detainment of political
activists, rape, torture, execution, and
the destruction of property are some of
the harsh realities imposed by the SPDC.
According to Amnesty International, the
Burmese “government” has one of the
worst human rights records in the
world.28 If one is suspected to be apart
of an opposition group, torture is not
uncommon. Rape is a regular
occurrence. In traditional society, a
28
Amnesty International USA, “Myanmar The
Administration of Justice- Grave and Abiding
Concerns,” 2003,
http://www.amnestyusa.org/myanmar_burma/do
cumentdo?id
79
woman who has been raped is not desirable
by men. Therefore, victims of rape live with
guilt and shame and often think that it is
better to be a sex worker than be a sex object
for soldiers.29 A common saying for migrant
sex workers in Thailand is that “sex work in
Thailand is better than being raped by the
military, because you get paid.”30
There is almost an equivalent abundance
of pull factors for Burmese women to work in
Thailand. First, the relative ease of crossing
the border illegally makes the transition to
Thailand accessible. Second, the perception of
an abundance of wealth and opportunity in
Thailand is another pull factor. The idea of
economic development in Thailand infiltrates
Burma by word of mouth. The prospect of
less political and social oppression is enough
to make many women decide to migrate from
Burma. However, most often the romanticized
idea of coming to Thailand to work does not
hold true once women arrive in the country.
This is because real information about labour
opportunity, laws, and migrant rights is hard
to find because of restrictions in press and
freedom of speech in Burma.
Another common pull factor for women is
the notion of high wages in the Thai sex
industry, with which they will be able to
support their family. Many daughters are
persuaded into the sex trade by their mother.
Often it is one’s mother who arranges her
“agent” to get her across the border. Young
virgin girls under the age of 18 are in a high
demand in Thai brothels. 31 It is these women
who get paid the most. A virgin girl is worth
between 20,000 and 30,000 baht
(approximately 600 Canadian dollars) for her
first time.32 However, her wage decreases after
she is no longer a virgin. It is these young girls
who are more commonly the “victims” of
trafficking. It is these women who should be
“rescued.” Yet sadly it is often their mothers
and fathers who victimize them in the first place.
29
Images Asia.
30
Empower Labour and Health Conference.
31
Louise Brown, Sex Slaves: The Trafficking of
Women in Asia (London: Virago Press, 2002).
32
Empower Labour and Health Conference.
 80
The amalgamation of the mentioned
push and pull factors establishes why the
number of Burmese sex workers is
increasing. A combination between the
ease of crossing the border, the Thai
economy, the perception of the Thai
economy, and the demand for cheap
labour pulls Burmese women across the
border. The combination of political
suppression, human rights abuse, and lack
of labour/opportunity for women in
Burma drives them across.
Thai Policy in Terms of Migrant Workers
Thailand started a policy of
“constructive engagement” with Burma
over ten years ago under the Chatichai
Choonhavan government. This policy
aimed to increase the cross-border
exchange between Thailand and Burma in
terms of capital goods and labour.33 The
cost of labour increased during Thailand’s
economic boom between 1986 and 1996.
As a result, an influx of migrants came to
Thailand to work under cheaper
conditions. Although the crash in 1997
caused a decrease in labour opportunities,
the Thai economy is now starting to boom
again and there is a large increase in the
demand for jobs. Therefore, the desire for
migrant workers to do jobs that the Thai
would not do is increasing by the day.
Technically, legal migrant workers
are entitled to protection under the Thai
Labour Law 2541. 34 The law restricts
discrimination on the basis of religion,
ethnicity, and gender. Accordingly, this
law is meant to protect workers who are
most vulnerable in Thai society; for
example, unskilled migrant workers.
However, if one is working as an
undocumented migrant the law will not
protect them. Unfortunately, as previously
mentioned, most Burmese sex workers
are undocumented migrant workers.
33
Arnold.
34
Empower Labour and Health Conference.
melanie mcdonald
Another problem with the Thai labour law
is that it does not cover sex work. Because of
the Prevention and Suppression of
Prostitution Act in Thai legislation, it is
impossible to protect sex workers, not to
mention migrant sex workers, in their
workplaces.35 The only way for this to change
is for the Thai government to decriminalize
sex work and disregard the Prevention and
Suppression of Prostitution Act. On a positive
note, the Thai labour law does include some
entertainment establishments. This gives
many sex workers some hope for change.
Because there are between two and three
million migrants living and working in
Thailand, one would come to the conclusion
that it would be in the government’s interest
to protect them. As mentioned above, the
majority of these people are doing jobs that
the Thai would not do, therefore it should be
deemed important, by the government, to
ensure their safety. This should also include
the safety of migrant sex workers.
CONDITIONS IN THAI ENTERTAINMENT
PLACES FOR BURMESE WOMEN
Most documents say that Burmese women
working in the sex industry are exposed to
violence, coercion, abuse, rape, and
HIV/AIDS. Documents also say that most
Burmese women face the worst working
conditions in the sex-industry.36 Much of this
is true. Burmese sex workers commonly face
the “3 Ds” of sex work: Dirty, Dangerous and
Difficult. 37 The demand for cheap labour is
high, especially in border towns such as Mae
Sai. And, with a lack of Thai language and
access to information, Burmese women are
more subject to cheap labour and poor
working conditions. Largely, this is because
Burmese women do not have legal status in
Thailand. Hence they are not subject to the
same working conditions that many Thai
35
Trish McKeough, In Pursuit of Justice: Finding
Support for the Thai Decriminalization in the Laws of
Other Countries (Chiang Mai: University of Chiang
Mai, 2004).
36
Brown.
37
Images Asia.
atlantic international studies journal
entertainment workers are entitled too.
On the other hand, as mentioned above,
poor working conditions in Thai
brothels are often favourable to the
human rights abuses many women face
or live in fear of in Burma.
In Mae Sai there are three main
places of work for sex workers: brothels,
karaoke bars and massage parlours.
Each of these places offer different
services and have different conditions to
work. However, social benefits are
invisible in each of these workplaces,
and days off are rare. Generally a sex
worker will have 1-2 days off in a
month.
According to Empower records,
there are currently approximately 400
women working in Mae Sai. Yet this
number is constantly in fluctuation
because Mae Sai is generally a starting
point for sex workers. If the opportunity
arises, often Burmese women will move
to Chiang Mai, Bangkok, or if they are
really lucky, to Phuket. This is because
the working conditions, opportunities
and salaries are much better in these
locations.
Brothels
The situation is different in every
brothel, so it is difficult to generalize.
Therefore I will give the most basic
non-biased review of the circumstances
that I am able.
The managers of brothels are
generally called Mae or Pae (Thai for
mother or father). The sex workers are
commonly referred to as their children.
Sometimes women are expected to live
at their brothel, but this is not always
the case. Nonetheless, they are
expected to be on call 24 hours a day.
In Mae Sai, the managers receive 60%
of sex worker's earnings. The worker
earns 40%. Brothels usually do not offer
extra services; therefore, the customer is
only paying for sex. Women working in
brothels work under the worst
81
conditions. Expected to sleep with many
customers, it is not uncommon for a woman
to have 18 clients in one night. Customers
usually pay between 150 and 350 baht
(between four-eight Canadian dollars). With
a 60% wage cut, the woman does not earn a
significant amount. On top of the wage cut,
often women acquire a loan. Expected surgery
such as nose jobs, room and board, and travel
costs are common debts. The unfortunate
reality is that it is nearly impossible to pay off
these debts with such a low salary, wage cuts,
and family payments.38
Massage Parlours
There are two main types of massage
parlours: traditional massage and modern
massage. In traditional massage parlours, the
women are not on display for men to choose.
In contrast, modern massage means that
women are on display. Modern massage
includes a bath, as well as massage and sex.
Sex is not necessary; however, it is generally
expected. If a woman does not want to have
sex with a customer, they are usually not
forced to. Workers in massage parlours
generally get 1/3 of the pay cut. In Mae Sai,
women are paid every 15 days. Usually the
working conditions in massage parlours are
better than in brothels and karaoke bars.
A positive factor about massage parlours
is that women cannot get fined for illegal
work. This is because massage is offered and
sex is not publicized. The drawback is that
women, especially migrants, do not get any
social welfare.
Karaoke Bars
Like massage parlours, there are two main
types of karaoke bars. The first is the high
class closed karaoke bar. Burmese sex
workers are rarely employed here. The
second is the road-side open karaoke bar. This
is the type of karaoke bar that operates in Mae
Sai. Karaoke and drinks are sold in these
establishments. Sex is not always an outcome;
38
Empower Labour and Health Conference.
82
however, it is usually also expected by
customers.
Unsafe working conditions and
overly intoxicated customers are
frequent workplace dangers. Another
drawback is that if one is late they get
fined 2 baht per minute in Mae Sai. The
rate and frequency women are paid
varies. Some women are paid daily and
some every 15 days.39
Problems Sex Workers Face
Deportation:
One of the biggest fears women face
as illegal migrant workers is deportation.
The consequences for a woman who has
crossed the border illegally upon arrival
back to Burma can be terrible. Often it
is unknown what happens to these
women. However, the stigma attached
to sex work is clearly known and is not
good. Arrest and deportation is not
uncommon in border towns. During my
research, I regularly saw trucks of
women being deported back across the
border.
Brothel raids by the police often
amount to arrest and deportation.
Brothels are illegal in Thailand.
However, the police have accounts on
every operating brothel. In fact, the
police personally benefit from the
presence of these establishments. In
Mae Sai, brothels pay off police 1000
baht (thirty Canadian dollars) per
women per month. The amount the
brothels pay the police is different in
each province because it is based on
personal negotiation. Brothel raids are
usually in response to outside criticism
or for an authority to further their own
career.
Health Concerns:
The health system in Thailand is
legally bound to give treatment to
39
Empower Labour and Health Conference.
melanie mcdonald
anyone who is ill. 40 However, this is not
publicized and therefore it is widely unknown
to most migrant workers. Fear of arrest or
deportation and lack of communication skills
often prohibits women from using public
health facilities.
Burmese workers often suffer from
malnutrition when entering Thailand due to
economic disparity. This puts them at greater
risk for contracting diseases as a sex worker.
The risk of contracting HIV/AIDS for a
migrant sex worker is very high. This is not
because they are engaging in sex work. It is
because they are put at high risk because of
unsafe working conditions; for example, a
lack of condom distribution, unclean facilities,
and unattainable customer quotas. There has
been much interest and research about the
high prevalence of HIV/AIDS amongst
Burmese sex workers. However, it is almost
impossible to obtain accurate statistics
because “counting sex workers is like
counting stars.” 41 Sex workers are generally
very informed about precautions to protect
themselves from HIV/AIDS. This is because
there are many education programs aimed to
educate sex workers about health issues. As a
result, the prevalence of HIV/AIDS is
declining among sex workers in Thailand.
Unfortunately, the prevalence is rising among
students and housewives.42
Discrimination:
The amount of discrimination Burmese
migrants have to face living in Thailand is
astonishing. Add the label of "prostitute" on
top of being Burmese, and you are a
guaranteed mark. There is literally no space in
the context of Thai culture to celebrate being
Burmese. If one does not adhere to Thai
cultural norms including dress, speech, action,
and music, it is close to impossible to be
accepted. As a result, it is rare to meet a
Burmese sex worker who does not look, act,
and talk like a “Thai.” And it is even rarer to
40
Images Asia.
41
Empower Labour and Health Conference.
42
Empower Labour and Health Conference.
atlantic international studies journal 83

come across a Burmese sex worker who with migrant workers, particularly Burmese
will speak openly about her life in migrants. It is difficult to engage in work with
Burma. The irony is that most Burmese this target population because of the fact that
women preferred their life at home. the business is very “underground.”
Economic and political conditions out Nonetheless, Empower has the ability to
of their control force them to adopt a connect with the Burmese. This is because the
new life. staff have experience in the industry, as
Another aspect to discrimination is Burmese migrants or previous sex workers.
through victimization by the press and Therefore, there is a common-thread of
academics. While many Burmese understanding which breaks the conception of
women working in the worst brothels “underground work.” Empower works on the
could be classified as “victims,” doing basis that every woman has the right to
so does not help the choose their profession as
situation. There have long as they are safe. This
been countless books Undocumented migrants enables them to have
and scholarly articles direct contact with women
written about the usually do not have access working in the sex
prostitution problem to the resources to protect industry giving them the
in Thailand. themselves; therefore, they ability to address needs,
According to Leslie wants, and desires without
Ann, the foreign are the most vulnerable in misconception.
author of the book Sex the sex industry. Undocumented
and Borders, “the migrants usually do not
prostitute is always have access to the
problematic. Seen as resources to protect
an agent, she is an accomplice in the themselves; therefore, they are the most
destruction of national identity; seen as vulnerable in the sex industry. Empower
a victim she is sympathetic but also strives to help decrease this vulnerability by
powerless.”43 Many of the books I read giving women the opportunity, knowledge,
during my research described the and resources for them to protect themselves.
prostitute in the same light: as a victim Education, advocacy, and outreach are the
with no power, no choice, and no three main components of Empower, which
identity. Yet the reality is that sex many other programs fountain out of. In Mae
workers are people, they are friends, Sai, the non-formal education program
and they do have an identity, if society includes: Thai language, English language,
allows them. They do have a voice sewing classes, life-skills classes, and health
which can be heard, if we listen and do education. Health education is performed at
not discriminate. the Empower clinic which is open 6 days a
week. The clinic distributes information about
LOOKING FORWARD HIV/STD’s, performs STD checks, performs
Empower Mae Sai health check ups, distributes condoms, and
Each Empower center in Thailand acts like a drop-in center. Thai classes,
works with a different target population English classes and sewing classes are held
of sex workers. Empower Mae Sai is daily at the Empower school. Life-skills
situated strategically in order to work classes are on a weekly basis and are subject
to women’s wants and needs. Conferences
43
Leslie Anne Jeffery, Sex and Borders: and meetings about border health, HIV/AIDS,
Gender, National Identity and Prostitution STDs, and migrant rights are held monthly.
Policy in Thailand (Chiang Mai: Silkworm Women’s rights and law are discussed daily
Books, 2002), 9.
84
through the advocacy component of
Empower. Freedom and awareness
marches are not uncommon. Because
Burmese migrants are unable to go to
state education institutes, Empower has
been registered as a non-formal
education school. Therefore, students of
Empower are issued student
identification cards which enable them
to seek employment elsewhere in
Thailand with more legitimacy.
Outreach is an integral part to the
Empower program. This is because
women who are unable to visit the
clinic and school are able to be reached.
The outreach team visits entertainment
places weekly distributing information
about STD’s/HIV, health, condoms,
emergency contacts, Thai language, and
women’s rights. Psychological
counselling is also offered. One of the
most important components to outreach
is the ability for women working under
harsh conditions to receive friendship
outside of their box. Friendship is the
first step Empower takes in order to
distribute vital information. This is the
step that many other organizations fail
to recognize.
What Migrant Sex Workers Want in a
Workplace
In this section “we” will be used to
describe what sex workers want.
First, and foremost we want sex
work to be decriminalized so that we
will not be arrested for our work. We
want to be treated like equals under the
labour law. We want to be recognized
for our work. We want to have a fair
pay and share of our income. We want
social benefits such as: occupational
health and safety, days off, sick leave,
overtime pay, maternity leave, and
compensation when customers abuse us.
We want to stop ignorant “raid and
rescues.” We want to be apart of the
community. We want to celebrate our
own culture. We want the ability to
melanie mcdonald
travel without fear of deportation. We want
equal opportunity in education. We want our
voice heard.
RECOMMENDATIONS
“We dream of peace so that we can return
home in safety.”
Until life under the SPDC gives peace a
chance in Burma, women will continue to
migrate illegally to Thailand. Therefore, it is
time for the Thai government to take more
responsibility while networking with
grassroots NGOs and INGOs to improve the
situation Burmese women face. Furthermore,
the solution should not be to wait until Burma
starts to engage in its seven step process to
democratization.44
Policies need to be made to respect
women’s rights as migrants. Women should
be granted the freedom to travel and migrate
independently. Sex work should be
decriminalized and protected under Thai and
international labour laws. Work permits
should be granted for sex workers enabling
women to access vocational training and
movement. Adult women should not be
arrested nor deported as a result of measures
aimed to protect trafficked children. Women
in need of assistance should have appropriate
services suiting their needs. Lastly, legal
authorities and police should be more
informed about the situation facing women in
Burma today.
If the Burmese military regime takes the
responsibility of democratization, this
situation could improve much more
efficiently. However, to count on this would
be naïve. Therefore, it is in the responsibility
of other governments and international
organizations to urge for a transition for
democracy. Many attempts have been made
44
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crimes,
“Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking
in Persons Especially Women and Children,” 2005,
http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/trafficking_convention
.html
atlantic international studies journal
by the international community, but the
action is not enough. We need action
with sustainable answers. And we need
it now. Women are suffering, and this
must stop. Amid the suffering, we must
not victimize, ignore, judge, or
discriminate. Instead, we must act with
an alliance of understanding.
SOURCES
Amnesty International USA. “Myanmar
The Administration of Justice-
Grave and Abiding Concerns.” 2003.
http://www.amnestyusa.org/myanm
ar_burma/documentdo?id
Arnold, Dennis. “Work, Rights, &
Discrimination Against Burmese
Workers in Thailand.” City
University of Hong Kong. 2004.
http://www.amrc.org/hk/5306.htm
Belak, Brenda. Gathering Strength:
Women From Burma on their Rights.
Chiang Mai: Images Asia, 2002 .
Brown, Louise. Sex Slaves: The
Trafficking of Women in Asia.
London: Virago Press, 2002.
Commission on Human Rights.
“Special Envoy; Razili Ismail
Facilitating National Reconciliation
& Democratizion in Burma.” 2005.
http://www.ohchr.org/english/bodie
s/chr/docs/61/E.CN.4.2005.130.139.
doc
Empower Labour and Health
Conference. Labour Laws and
Health Issue’s Facing Sex Workers
Today. Chiang Mai, March 25-29,
2005.
Fink, Christina. Living Silence; Burma
Under Military Rule. Bangkok:
85
White Lotus, 2001.
Images Asia. With Migrating Hope: Burmese
Women Working in the Sex Industry in
Thailand. Chiang Mai, 1997.
Jeffery, Leslie Anne. Sex and Borders:
Gender, National Identity and
Prostitution Policy in Thailand. Chiang
Mai: Silkworm Books, 2002.
Karen Human Rights Group. Wholesale
Destruction. Images Asia: Chiang Mai,
1998.
McKeough, Trish. In Pursuit of Justice:
Finding Support for the Thai
Decriminalization in the Laws of Other
Countries. Chiang Mai: University of
Chiang Mai, 2004.
Myint, Ni Ni. The Status of Myanmar Women.
Kitakysushu Forum on Asian Women.
Myanmar: Historical Research Center,
2002.
Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of
Migrants. World Conference Against
Racism, 2000.
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crimes.
“Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish
Trafficking in Persons Especially Women
and Children.” 2005.
http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/traffickin
g_convention.html
United Nations. “Universal Declaration of
Human Rights.” 1948.
http://www.un.org/overview/rights.html
Determining the Success of a Transnational Social Movement:
Evaluating the Global Call to Action Against Poverty Coalition
Allison D. Sephton
T he recent emergence of the Make
Poverty History (MPH) campaign on
the international scene has garnered
much attention. The global movement (under
the Global Call to Action Against Poverty
[GCAP] coalition) has been joining domestic
MPH movements to pressure national
governments and international institutions
(specifically, members of the G8 and the
United Nations, the World Bank, and the
International Monetary Fund) to essentially
eradicate global poverty by changing their
policies to cancel the debts owed by heavily-
indebted poor countries (HIPCs), to increase
and ameliorate aid, to achieve trade justice,
and by living up to the Millennium
Development Goals (MDGs) established by
the United Nations (UN) in 2001. Each
national GCAP campaign has a huge umbrella
of member organizations, including existing
coalitions, community groups, trade unions,
individuals, religious and faith groups,
campaigners, celebrities, etc. The campaign
has gained substantial international media
attention through its protests, mega-concerts,
and celebrity endorsements, and links
individuals across the globe with trademark
white bracelets. The leaders of the G8 and
representatives at the UN paid lip-service to
supporting GCAP’s goals, but it has yet to be
seen if these policy changes will lead to
substantial policy implementation.
However, after the G8 commitment made
in July 2005, the World Bank and IMF
recently announced that they will cancel the
external debt of the world’s 18 most heavily-
indebted poor countries. Were these actions a
result of GCAP’s pressure, and do these
actions constitute GCAP’s success?
To answer this question, a key question
must be asked - what factors or determinants
lead to the success of a social movement, and
how can success be measured? This paper will
draw on sociological and international
relations literature on transnational politics to
assemble criteria in order to determine the
level of success achieved thus far by GCAP,
and to predict the future success (or failure) of
the movement. The criteria will be grouped
under five broad categories. Because the
campaign is so new, it has proven difficult to
evaluate its success. At the present time, the
conclusion can be drawn that the GCAP
campaign has had limited success in changing
the policies of states and international
financial institutions, but it remains to be seen
if this will translate into changes in state and
institutional behaviour. Furthermore, while
the GCAP coalition and campaign itself might
not survive in the long-term, the broader anti-
poverty network underpinning it is well-
atlantic international studies journal
established, and will continue to push for
change as time goes on and as the anti-poverty
norm becomes stronger.1
DEFINING GCAP
Before this discussion begins, the nature of
GCAP must be determined – is it a
transnational advocacy network, a information.”5 Transnational coalitions are
transnational coalition, or a transnational
social movement? While trying to categorize
the campaign might seem irrelevant,
especially since GCAP contains elements of
each, determining the nature of the campaign
will help to look for the appropriate and
expected factors of its success.
Above all, no matter the specific typology,
transnational civil society movements aim to
set the international agenda, by identifying a
problem of international concern and
producing information; to develop solutions to
the problem, by creating norms or
recommending policy change; to build
networks and coalitions of allies; and to
implement solutions by employing tactics of
persuasion and pressure to either change the
target actor’s practices and/or to encourage
compliance with norms.2 Tarrow argues that
“mass-based transnational social movements
are hard to construct, are difficult to maintain,
and have very different relations to states and
international institutions than more routinized
international NGOs or activist networks.”3 He
defines transnational contention as “the
coordinated struggle of actors and
organizations from more than one society
against a state,
1 5
Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink define a norm
as “a standard of appropriate behaviour for actors with
a given identity.” In Martha Finnemore and Kathryn
Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political
Change,” International Organization 52, 4 (1998): 891.
2
Richard Price, “Transnational Civil Society and
Advocacy in World Politics,” World Politics 55 (July
2003): 584.
3 8
Sidney Tarrow, “Transnational Politics: Contention
and Institutions in International Politics,” Annual
Review of Political Science 4 (2001), 1-20.
87
international economic actors, or international
institutions.”4
A transnational advocacy network is best
described by Keck and Sikkink as “those
actors working internationally on an issue,
who are bound together by shared values, a
common discourse, and dense exchanges of
defined by Tarrow as “collaborative, means-
oriented arrangements that permit distinct
entities to pool resources in order to effect
change,” and frequently form around short-
term threats and opportunities.6 Tarrow
stresses the importance of building alliances
and coalitions in creating and sustaining
transnational contention, especially when
transnational actors come from a plethora of
political, cultural, and religious backgrounds
and might not necessarily share the common
identity needed for group cohesion.7
Coalitions can be seen as a precursor to (but
do not necessarily lead to) social movements,
evolving when opportunities and threats
persist and result in strong underlying
identities.8 Lastly, transnational social
movements, as defined by Khagram, Riker
and Sikkink, are “sets of actors with common
purposes and solidarities linked across
country boundaries that have the capacity to
generate coordinated and sustained social
4
Sidney Tarrow, “The New Transnational Contention:
Organizations, Coalitions, Mechanisms,” paper
prepared for presentation at the panel on “Social
Movements and Transnational Social Movements,”
APSA Annual Meeting, August 31, 2002, Chicago.
Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, “Transnational
advocacy networks in international and regional
politics,” International Social Science Journal 51, 1
(March 1999): 89.
6
Sidney Tarrow, The New Transnational Activism,
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005) 163.
7
Tarrow, “The New Transnational Contention:
Organizations, Coalitions, Mechanisms,” 18.
Donatella della Porta and Mario Diani, Social
Movements (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing 1999), in
Tarrow, The New Transnational Activism, 165.
88
mobilization in more than one country to
publicly influence social change.”9
Based on these definitions, GCAP can be
best described as a transnational coalition,
since it formally links a pre-existing network
of actors with new actors for the specific
purpose of “making poverty history” in 2005.
It has clearly defined goals and missions.
However, GCAP also displays social
movement qualities, as it encourages actors to
mobilize and participate in contentions action,
and its nationally-based campaigns organize
events for mobilization such as concerts,
protests and awareness days. GCAP cannot
yet be fully considered a transnational social
movement because it has yet to be seen for
how long the coalition will last, and it is
unclear if participants truly share common
purposes and solidarities.
In his book The New Transnational
Activism, Tarrow lays out four specific types
of coalitions. Deciding the coalition type of
GCAP can help us to better evaluate its level
of cooperation and success. Among Tarrow’s
coalitions are instrumental and event
coalitions (which are short-term), and
federated and campaign coalitions (which are
long-term). Event coalitions are short-term in
duration and have a high degree of
involvement, with the potential for future
collaboration and a recognition of shared
identities. They “form to mount international
protest events, but their dependence on
opportunities offered by international
institutions puts them at the mercy of changes
in international politics.”10 Since the GCAP
coalition originally formed to make 2005 a
year of change based on the political events
that would occur (G8 summit, UN World
9
Sanjeev Khagram, James V. Riker, and Kathryn
Sikkink, “From Santiago to Seattle: Transnational
Advocacy Groups Restructuring World Politics,” in
Restructuring World Politics: Transnational Social
Movements, Networks, and Norms, Sanjeev Khagram,
James V. Riker, and Kathryn Sikkink, eds,
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2002), 8.
10
Tarrow, The New Transnational Activism, 166-8.
allison d. sephton
Summit, etc), it is best categorized as an event
coalition. It is also similar in nature to other
event coalitions, such as the 1995 Seattle
protests and the Jubilee 2000 campaign which
preceded it. GCAP cannot yet be considered a
long-term campaign coalition.
BACKGROUND OF GCAP
Before evaluating the success of GCAP, it
seems appropriate to discuss why such a
movement has arisen, to look at its historical
predecessors, and to examine the current
relationship between transnational civil
society, multilateral institutions, and the inter-
state system.
While the majority of scholars agree that
states are still the key actors on the
international stage, many recognize that in our
increasingly globalized world, international
governmental and financial institutions, non-
state actors and civil society also play an
important role in global governance. Keohane
and Nye were among the first to give credit to
this relationship, naming it “complex
interdependence.”11 O’Brien, Goetz, Scholte
and Williams use the term “complex
multilateralism” to describe the
transformation in the specific relationship
between multilateral economic institutions
(MEIs) and global social movements - civil
society interaction and the public interest is
increasingly factoring in to MEI governance.12
This recognition is significant, for it has a
great impact on the success of transnational
social movements such as GCAP and the anti-
poverty movement at changing the policies
and behaviours of MEIs.
11
Robert Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and
Interdependence: World Politics in Transition,
(Boston: Little, Brown, 1977).
12
Robert O’Brien, Anne Marie Goetz, Jan Aart Scholte
and Marc Williams, “Complex Multilateralism: MEIs
and GSMs.” In Contesting Global Goverance:
Multilateral Economic Institutions and Global Social
Movements, O’Brien, Robert, Anne Marie Goetz, Jan
Aart Scholte, and Marc Williams, (Cambridge, UK:
Cambridge University Press, 2000): 206-34.
atlantic international studies journal
Rucht reminds us that the anti-globalization
and anti-poverty movements against
international institutions are not anything new
(there have been protests surrounding G7 and
G8, WTO, World Bank and IMF summits
since Seattle, and other campaigns were
predecessors to GCAP), and that most of the
groups who are participating were already
active in prior contentious activities; none of
the arguments raised were new.13 It seems as
if GCAP is just reframing an old package, but
the fact that the anti-poverty norm has already
been on the international agenda for a while
can help explain its relative success.
The anti-poverty movement fighting for
debt relief actually began as early as the
1970s, when mainly church groups were
lobbying and raising awareness locally. The
movement grew in the 1980s, being picked up
by larger social groups and national (and
eventually international) NGOs, and evolved
into a functioning transnational network in the
early 1990s.14 In its infancy, the network was
relatively weak due its complex, technically
difficult, and geographically diffuse nature.
But with events like the “Fifty Years is
Enough” campaign in 1994, the Battle of
Seattle in 199515 and the Jubilee 2000
13
Dieter Rucht, “Social Movements Challenging Neo-
liberal Globalization,” in Pedro Ibarra (ed.) Social
Movements and Democracy, (New York: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2003.), 211-229.
14
Elizabeth A. Donnelly, “Proclaiming Jubilee: The
Debt and Structural Adjustment Network,” in,
Restructuring World Politics: Transnational Social
Movements, Networks and Norms, Sanjeev Khagram,
James V. Riker, and Kathryn Sikkink, eds
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2002),
156.
15
The “Battle of Seattle” in 1995, which was a large
anti-globalization protest against the WTO Ministerial
Summit in Seattle, built on this activism from the 1980s
and 1990s, and utilized the many “local, national and
transnational popular mobilizations around the world
that have opposed regional and bilateral trade
liberalization agreements, the policies of the World
Bank and IMF, and the failures of nation-states to
protect human rights.” See Jackie Smith, “Globalizing
Resistance: The Battle of Seattle and the Future of
89
campaign (which were anti-globalization and
anti-World Bank and IMF policy campaigns
fighting for debt relief, fair trade, and the
reform of Structural Adjustment Policies and
the Heavily Indebted Poor Country
Initiatives), the network gained concessions
from the G8, WTO, World Bank and IMF, as
well as from individual states, and momentum
for the movement grew.16 However, activists
felt that the concessions gained were still
insufficient – they demanded more aid, more
debt relief to more countries, more policy
reforms, and more civil society consultation
and input.17 Thus the movement continued.
During this time, the number of
transnational social movement organizations
and NGOs also proliferated (first in the North,
then in the South), making communication
and coordination between the North and South
easier.18 The anti-poverty movement was
dominated by Northern NGOs and civil
society groups in the beginning and tensions
sometimes inhibited the South from becoming
involved. However, over time more Southern
voices have been incorporated.19 After all, the
very impetus for the anti-poverty campaign
came from the problems experienced by the
South, so it is only appropriate that the
movement includes the actors it is fighting
for. It will be discussed later as to whether or
not imbalanced power relations persist in the
movement.
Social Movements,” Mobilization: An International
Journal, 1994.
16
Elizabeth A. Donnelly, “Proclaiming Jubilee: The
Debt and Structural Adjustment Network,” in
Restructuring World Politics: Transnational Social
Movements, Networks and Norms, Sanjeev Khagram,
James V. Riker, and Kathryn Sikkink, eds
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2002):
156-160.
17
Donnelly, “Proclaiming Jubilee,” 165-166.
18
Smith, “Globalizing Resistance,”5
19
Paul J. Nelson, “Agendas, Accountability, and
Legitimacy among Transnational Networks Lobbying
the World Bank,” and Donnelly, “Proclaiming Jubilee,”
in Khagram, Riker and Sikkink, Restructuring World
Politics.
90
Today’s GCAP coalition is said to involve
around 30 million participants from more than
200 countries.20 The platform of GCAP calls
for more and better aid, trade justice, debt
cancellation, and national-level action, as well
as making world leaders live up to their
promises. National campaigns under the
GCAP umbrella incorporate these tenets, as
well as adding some of their own, to help
make their campaigns more relative to their
constituents. For example, MPH in Canada
has a focus on ending child poverty in
Canada, and the ONE Campaign in the US
puts an emphasis on the HIV/AIDS crisis.21
GCAP relies on its national and local partners
to mobilize individuals by urging them to join
local groups who are part of the campaign, to
wear the trademark white bracelet, to attend
the organized awareness and protest events,
and to sign online petitions and send emails to
policy makers, among other things. GCAP’s
strategies will be evaluated in the following
section.
DETERMINANTS OF SUCCESS
This paper will now critically examine the
GCAP campaign to determine its level of
success, using a collection of criteria and
determinants for success as identified in the
literature. The criteria will be organized under
five broad categories: questions of collective
identity formation and the framing of
collective action; strength, density,
institutionalization, and internal resources of
the network; mobilizing structures; political
opportunity structures and institutions; and
arena of struggle and influence – changes in
policy-making vs. policy-implementation.
I. Questions of collective identity formation
and the framing of collective action
20
GCAP, www.whiteband.org
21
Please refer to Make Poverty History Canada
(www.makepovertyhistory.ca) and the US’s ONE
campaign (www.one.org)
allison d. sephton
For a movement to be successful, it must
be able to mobilize a large group of
individuals. Some form of collective identity
or purpose must be fostered among the group
that will prompt them to act collectively. An
“attribution of similarity,” is needed,
described by McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly as
“the mutual identification of actors in
different sites as being sufficiently similar to
justify common action.”22
But collective identities are hard to
coordinate at best – trying to foster
transnational collective identities is even more
difficult. Transnational movements need a
wide geographic representation if they are
going to be effective in multilateral politics
today, so there must be a dialogue to come up
with common goals and identities, and
relationships of trust must be built for ongoing
cooperation among actors.23 Snow highlights
the importance of framing in identity
formation. He defines a frame as a “schemata
of interpretation” that allows individuals to
“locate, perceive, identify, and label” events;
“by rendering events or occurrences
meaningful, frames function to organize
experience and guide action, whether
individual or collective.”24
In our case, borrowing from Taylor, the
collective identity for members of the anti-
poverty movement stems from a framed
collective sense of injustice; poverty is framed
in such a way that individuals across the globe
can agree that it is inherently wrong and
22
D. McAdam, S. Tarrow and C. Tilly, Dynamics of
Contention (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2001) in Tarrow, “The New Transnational Contention:
Organizations, Coalitions, Mechanisms,” 29.
23
Smith, “Globalizing Resistance,” 6; see also Tarrow,
“The New Transnational Contention: Organizations,
Coalitions, Mechanisms.”
24
David A. Snow et al, “Frame Alignment Processes,
micromobilization, and movement participation,”
American Sociological review 51, 4 (August 1986),
464.
atlantic international studies journal
something which must be fought.25 Keck and
Sikkink discuss the importance of issue
resonance in a society, as well as within
existing national and institutional agendas, as
we will see later on.26 Norms pushed by
transnational movements are more likely to be
successful to the extent that they “fit” or are
framed within cultural contexts, or can be
broad enough to be applied universally.27
Looking at the manifestos of some of the
national campaigns under GCAP, anti-poverty
is clearly the norm being framed to foster a
collective identity. It is common for the issue
of poverty to be framed as something that
affects the vulnerable; highlighted are the
plight of women and children.28 Keck and
Sikkink believe that some of the most
successful issues fought for are those
involving bodily harm to vulnerable
individuals29; in our case, the disease and
death caused by poverty to vulnerable sectors
of the population makes for a cause worth
fighting for. Catchy TV advertisements shown
in the UK and Canada involve celebrities
snapping their fingers every three seconds, to
represent the death of a child from poverty.
Poverty is also framed as a “violation of
human rights on a massive scale.”30 These
frames make it hard for the general public to
deny that this campaign is something worth
25
Verta Taylor, “Mobilizing for Change in a Social
Movement Society,” Contemporary Sociology 29, 1
(2000), 222.
26
Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists
Beyond Borders (Ithaca and London: Cornell
University Press, 1998), 26.
27
Richard Price, “Transnational Civil Society and
Advocacy in World Politics,” World Politics 55 (July
2003), 596.
28
For example, please refer to the platforms and
manifestos of Canada’s Make Poverty History
campaign, the US’s ONE campaign, the UK’s Make
Poverty History campaign, and the Global Call to
Action Against Poverty campaign itself.
29
Keck and Sikkink, Activists beyond Border, 204.
30
Make Poverty History Canada – platform. Available
online from www.makepovertyhistory.ca.
91
fighting for, and it is an easy, relatively non-
contentious frame to relate to.
Since it is very difficult to construct a
collective identity on a transnational level,
national identities and concerns are appealed
to for leverage by individual national
campaigns. In the Canadian MPH platform,
readers are reminded of the incredible
outpouring of aid they gave to victims of the
Asian tsunami, showing that Canadians care
deeply about humanitarian crises; it is implied
that involvement in the anti-poverty campaign
should be natural. The national interest card is
played in the American ONE Campaign, as
citizens are shown how poverty is a threat to
their national security, since impoverished
countries are breeding grounds for terrorists.31
It is very strategic of the campaigns to call on
these feelings of national identity and security
to get citizens on board.
While GCAP has successfully used the
media and its national campaigns to frame
poverty in such a way that will mobilize the
masses, it is hard to tell if GCAP has
successfully built a strong transnational
collective identity. Individuals might be told
that they are acting in solidarity with other
activists across the globe, but in speaking to
the everyday individual wearing a white
bracelet, most are unaware of the
transnational campaign to which they belong,
and are unlikely to identify with actors in the
South, for example.
II. Strength, density, institutionalization, and
internal resources of the network
Networks and coalitions function best
when they are dense, with many actors, strong
connections among groups and individuals in
the network, and reliable flows of
information.32 Risse-Kappen reminds us that
easy access to governments and institutions
does not guarantee policy impact – a
transnational movement must be able to form
31
US ONE platform, www.one.org.
32
Keck and Sikkink, Activists beyond borders, 28.
92
a “winning coalition,” both within target
countries and on the international scene.33 But
Keck and Sikkink are quick to reassure us that
network density and quality are hard to
measure.34 By looking at the websites of
GCAP and its national campaigns, we see that
hundreds of thousands of individuals, civil
society groups and NGOs are part of the
network – but it is difficult to evaluate how
strong and meaningful the linkages and
information exchanges are between them.
Transnational coalitions must have a
perception of authority and legitimacy in
order to influence both target actors and the
general public to join their cause. This
authority can be derived from expertise, moral
influence, and a claim to political
legitimacy.35 Moral principles can even be
considered a form of power.36 A transnational
movement’s moral authority is linked to its
claim that it somehow represents the “public
interest” or the “common good.”37
Transnational coalitions also claim legitimacy
and gain leverage from their ability to
represent affected communities, such as the
South in GCAP’s case.38 To reaffirm its
legitimacy and authority, GCAP highlights the
33
Thomas Risse-Kappen, “Bringing Transnational
relations back in: Introduction,” in Bringing
Transnational Relations Back in: Non-state actors,
domestic structures and international institutions,
Thomas Risse-Kappen, ed (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1995) 25-6.
34
Risse-Kappen, “Bringing Transnational Relations
back in: Introduction,” 29.
35
Price, “Transnational Civil Society and Advocacy in
World Politics,” 587.
36
Ann Florini, The Third Force: The Rise of
Transnational Civil Society, (Tokyo and Washington,
DC: Japan Centre for International Exchange and
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2000),
10.
37
T. Risse, “The Power of Norms versus the Norms of
Power: Transnational Civil Society and Human
Rights,” in Florini, The Third Force: The Rise of
Transnational Civil Society, 186.
38
Nelson, “Agendas, Accountability and Legitimacy
among Transnational Networks Lobbying the World
Bank.”
allison d. sephton
fact that it has support from many Southern
leaders and NGOs, and that it is the largest
transnational coalition of its kind in
existence.39
Just as civil society movements are trying
to account for the democratic deficit in global
governance, they themselves must also be
accountable, transparent and democratic –
especially when they are transnational – and
must incorporate Southern and non-capitalist
voices. They should also try to maximize
public participation and education.40 Tarrow
reminds us that maintaining transnational
coalitions is difficult, and only those with a
degree of institutionalization and capacity to
socialize participants will outlast the issue that
brought them together one it is gone.41
Beyond institutionalization and centralization,
coalitions move from being short-term to
long-term when they are able to seize and
create new opportunities (as opposed to
relying on them), and once they can socialize
their participants from the local level to
“rooted cosmopolitans.”42 It is for this reason
that Tarrow would say that GCAP needs to
move from an event coalition to a long-term
campaign coalition.43
In this second category, it is harder to
evaluate the success of GCAP. It is not very
transparent – the information on its website
does not discuss how and by whom it is run
and organized – and from where it receives its
funding. It is hard to determine if the
network’s inner workings are egalitarian and
if unequal power relations between Northern
and Southern actors prevail. It can be assumed
39
GCAP, www.whiteband.org
40
Jan Aart Scholte, “Civil Society and democracy in
global governance,” Global Governance 8, 2 (2002),
298-300.
41
Tarrow, The New Transnational Activism, 163.
42
Ibid, 175-8. Tarrow defines “rooted cosmopolitans”
as “people and groups who are rooted in specific
national contexts, but who emerge in contentious
political activities that involve them in transnational
networks of contacts and conflicts.” (Ibid, 29).
43
Ibid 179.
atlantic international studies journal
that the sheer size of the coalition and the fact
that it does include Southern groups means
that it should bear weight against states and
international institutions, but this impact is
hard to measure. The fact that GCAP holds
little material or serious political threat
weakens its leverage against states and
international institutions. Because the
coalition is only about a year old, it is hard to
measure its degree of institutionalization.
Since it is so focused on a specific goal and
centres its activities around high-profile
events, it doesn’t seem likely that it will turn
into a long-term campaign. While it has strong
mobilizing tactics (which will be discussed
next) and it has tried to build a collective anti-
poverty identity, it seems too broad and relies
too much on diverse local organizations to be
effective at socializing participants – beyond
the fact that they all wear white bracelets.
III. Mobilizing structures
McAdam, McCarthy and Zald define
mobilizing structures as “those collective
vehicles, informal as well as formal, through
which people mobilize and engage in
collective action.”44 According to McAdam,
Tarrow and Tilly, “people do not protest in
response to threat alone: mobilization depends
on social networks, mobilizing frames, and on
at least the attribution of opportunity.”45
Many scholars tell us how the strength of
a transnational network depends very much on
the nonformal, “indigenous” interpersonal
networks of friends, family and coworkers in
local areas who spread information about the
44
Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy and Mayer N.
Zald, “Introduction: Opportunities, mobilizing
structures, and framing processes,” in Comparative
Perspectives on Social Movements, Doug McAdam,
John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald, eds (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1996), 3.
45
McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly, Dynamics of
Contention, in Tarrow, “The New Transnational
Contention: Organizations, Coalitions, Mechanisms.”
19
93
campaign through informal channels.46
Transnational campaigns will also rely
heavily on “intra-national bloc recruitment”
because of proximity and network effects.47 It
must be remembered that not everyone will be
part of one of the larger NGOs partnered to
the transnational campaign, so informal
networks and more local-based recruitment
are necessary for mobilization. Groups such
as local churches, community organizations,
trade unions, and student groups are vital for
recruiting members to the movement,
engaging in local campaigns and activities,
and providing resources for the movement. 48
GCAP and its national affiliates promote the
fact that they are largely comprised of such
groups who promote the campaign on very
local levels, alongside larger NGOs at the
more national level (who perform much more
of the promotional, educational and lobbying
activities, and who have more routine
transnational ties). McCarthy says that routine
contacts between these groups and the broader
society promote wider participation and
legitimacy for the social movement or
coalition.49 Keck and Sikkink attest that some
of a campaign’s most important type of
impact comes in the form of grassroots
46
Tarrow, “The New Transnational Contention:
Organizations, Coalitions, Mechanisms.” 12; Verta
Taylor, “Mobilizing for Change in a Social Movement
Society,” Contemporary Sociology 29, 1 (Jan 2000),
222; Susan Burgerman, Moral Victories: How Activists
Provoke Multilateral Action (Ithaca and London:
Cornell University Press, 2001), 16-18; Price,
“Transnational Civil Society and Advocacy in World
Politics,” 594-6.
47
Ibid 13
48
Smith, “Globalizing Resistance,” 2.
49
John D. McCarthy, “Mobilizing Structures:
Constraints and Opportunities in Adopting, Adapting
and Inventing,” in Political Opportunities, Mobilizing
Structures and Framing: Social Movement Dynamics in
Cross-National Perspective, D. McAdam, J. McCarthy
and M. Zald, eds (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 1996) in Smith, “Globalizing Resistance,” 5.
94
education and network building, which GCAP
certainly has done.50
Numerous authors have recognized the
huge positive impact that the internet and
other advances in communication and travel
have had on the organization and facilitation
of transnational networks and campaigns.51
According to Tarrow, the internet can
“leapfrog over the organizational deficits that
plague social movement organizations, as well
as strain towards goal displacement that
affects large bureaucratic organizations.”52 To
appeal to individuals, GCAP, its national
campaigns, and partner NGOs rely heavily on
the internet as a means of communication and
recruitment. Participation is made as simple
and non-committal as going online and
signing a petition or adding one’s name to a
pledge or email distribution list. Individuals
are kept involved through informative emails
sent periodically. Incidentally, GCAP was
recently awarded the Inter Press Service’s
2005 International Achievement Award for
Excellence in Communication.53 But some
scholars point out that while the internet is
helpful for transnational networks where
participants do not necessarily know or have
contact with each other, it has not replaced
interpersonal networking. Bennett warns that
the medium can affect the message – internet-
based networks may lack the capacity to
develop clear ideologies and decision-making
coherence, and the movement message is
harder to monitor and turn off.54
50
51
Keck and Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders, 20.
See Tarrow, “Transnational Politics: Contention and
Institutions in International Politics;” Taylor,
“Mobilizing for Change in a Social Movement
Society;” Smith, “Globalizing Resistance;” Donnelly,
“Proclaiming Jubilee.”
52
Tarrow, “The New Transnational Contention:
Organizations, Coalitions, Mechanisms,” 14.
53
GCAP, www.whiteband.org
54
W. Lance Bennett, “Communicating Global
Activism: Some Strengths and Vulnerabilities of
Networked Politics.” Presented at the Pacific
Sociological Association Meetings, Vancouver, BC.
allison d. sephton
Again, framing, and the use of the media
and celebrities is crucial to GCAP in
mobilizing support, especially in the Northern
states. Celebrities and events such as the
Live8 mega-concerts are especially important
for mobilizing the younger generation. Critics,
however, are wary about the short life span of
media agendas, and recognize that celebrities
can only push an issue so far. But, the use of
the media and celebrities are a good jump-off
point for most campaigns, and once
campaigns gain momentum (and if the
celebrity endorsements continue), they have a
better chance at making their movements
sustainable.55 Trendy items like the trademark
white bracelets are also used to link
individuals across the globe and to raise
awareness about the campaign.
GCAP relies heavily on tactics such as the
mega Live8 concerts, protests at summits, and
the awareness days it organizes. These
activities are great for gaining awareness,
encouraging sympathizers, mobilizing action,
and disseminating information about the
coalition to the general public, but it is still
questionable if people “get the point.” These
types of activities also rely heavily on the
media, and the amount of coverage these
events receive can make or break their
success. Protests are no longer as successful
as they used to be, because they have become
“normalized” in the collective action
repertoire. Security officials and summit
organizers are more prepared for protesters,
and plan accordingly by either prohibiting
protesting near the summit location, or
moving the summit to an out-of-the-way
“Consumerism and Global Citizenship: Lifestyle
Politics, Logo Campaigns, and International Regimes
of Democratic Accountability.” Unpublished Paper.
University of Washington, 2002, in Tarrow, “The New
Transnational Contention: Organizations, Coalitions,
Mechanims,” 17.
55
Stefania Bianchi, “Africa: If Music be the food of
development, play on,” Global Information Network
(New York: June 10, 2005).
atlantic international studies journal
locale.56 This is true now: the G8 summit was
held at a remote golf resort in Gleneagles,
Scotland, and the upcoming WTO Ministerial
summit is in Hong Kong – far away from
most Western protesters.
It is questionable whether GCAP’s tactics
of relying on local groups, concert and protest
events, trendy white bracelets and the internet
for mobilization create a sufficient link
between individuals and the transnational
coalition to which they belong, and if
transnational identities are truly being
fostered. Do people really realize what they
are a part of? While these tactics might
mobilize individuals to attend a concert, wear
a white bracelet, or visit a website, do they
mobilize individuals enough to participate in
protests and to actually go out and lobby their
governments? It is doubtful whether GCAP’s
tactics mobilize individuals to leave their
computer desks and to take to the streets.
IV. Political opportunity structures and
institutions
McAdam, McCarthy and Zald explain
how social movements are shaped by the
wider set of political constraints and
opportunities unique to the national (and
international) context in which they are
embedded.57 International opportunities can
include international events, allied states, and
international institutions. The structure and
openness of target states and institutions is
relevant for a movement’s success. The
dominance of liberalism in the international
system gives activists many openings to
pressure states and institutions, and to expose
the gap between discourse and practice.58
On the matter of states as allies, many
international campaigns such as GCAP seek
56
Rucht, “Social Movements Challenging Neo-liberal
Globalization,” 15.
57
McAdam, McCarthy, Zald, “Introduction:
Opportunities, mobilizing structures, and framing
processes,” 3.
58
Keck and Sikkink, Activists beyond borders, 206.
95
to change international policy by trying to
shape the decisions of individual states by
urging participants to target their own (or
other) states’ domestic policies. This is
certainly evidenced by the efforts to influence
the G8 policies, since the G8 is simply the
world’s eight most powerful states. GCAP
national movements in the UK, the US,
Canada, Germany, France and Italy most
definitely focused their efforts at getting
individuals to pressure their own
governments, through means such as emails,
letter-writing, and postcard sending. 59 The
fact that the domestic politics in the UK were
focused at he time on debt relief and relieving
poverty in Africa made the British
government an “ally” (or sympathizer, or
accessible target, however one wants to look
at it) for GCAP; it must be remembered that
the Make Poverty History began in the UK.
But for any of this to be effective,
government leaders must be sensitive about
their own reputations, as well as the reputation
of the state. The target actors must be
persuaded that the costs of violating norms are
unacceptably high or that their actions are
intolerably wrong.60 Again, we see the
importance of targeting states whose domestic
politics are favourable to the movement’s
position, and targeting leaders who might be
in vulnerable political situations or who could
be seeking re-election (such as the UK’s Tony
Blair and Canada’s Paul Martin).
International institutions were also the
main targets of this campaign. O’Brien and
others say that “international institutions not
only provide an opportunity structure for
contention but provide unifying themes and
identities for those who oppose them – despite
their significant differences.”61 Tarrow uses
59
Please consult the individual websites, through the
links on the GCAP website, www.whiteband.org.
60
Price, “Transnational Civil Society and Advocacy in
World Politics,” 587.
61
O’Brien et al, Contesting Global Governance:
Multilateral Institutions and Global Social Movements,
96
the analogy of a “coral reef” to describe how
international institutions help to create
horizontal connections among activists with
similar claims across borders.62 The limited
support for demands gained at the
international financial institutions by the anti-
poverty network in earlier campaigns were a
political opportunity that GCAP could build
on.63 In GCAP’s case, there were several
international events (such as the G8 summit
and the Live8 concerts), which GCAP
capitalized on to give activists from all over
the world an opportunity to come together to
lobby these institutions. But O’Brien and
others remind us how multilateral economic
institutions might not always be open to civil
society pressure, since their ultimate goal is to
maintain their existing policy directions and
facilitate smoother operation, and their aim is
to improve policy implementation – not to
consult with civil society groups.64 They also
remind us that some institutions, such as the
United Nations, are better at engaging civil
society and incorporating their concerns into
its policies and structure than the international
financial institutions (although among these,
the World Bank is better than the rest). 65 The
fact that these institutions are more receptive
to civil society now is a result of the 25 years
of lobbying that civil society has done to gain
access to these institutions. However, in the
end, activists argue that they still hold very
little influence. This is why social movements
in Tarrow, “The New Transnational Contention:
Organizations, Coalitions, Mechanisms,” 29.
62
Tarrow, “Transnational Politics: Contention and
Institutions in International Politics,” 15
63
Donnelly, “Proclaiming Jubilee,” 167.
64
O’Brien et al, “Complex Multilateralism: MEIs and
GSMs”
65
O’Brien et al, “Multilateral Economic Institutions
and Global Social Movements,” Rucht, “Social
Movements Challenging Neo-liberal Globalization,”
17.
allison d. sephton
must engage in “contentious politics”66 to
bring about change within these institutions.
As this paper has shown, the anti-poverty
movement has gained more access and
influence to international institutions over
time, providing the political opportunity
needed for the current GCAP coalition to
make an impact on G8, World Bank, IMF and
UN policies. But will the opportunities
disappear once the big flashy conferences
end? And for how long will this movement’s
objectives coincide with state interests? Will
governments lose interest in the anti-poverty
agenda soon? The fact that GCAP relies so
heavily on ephemeral opportunity structures
such as concerts and the media could lead to
its downfall. However, the opportunity
structures within international institutions are
well-established, and they will always hold
conferences at which coalitions like GCAP
can lobby. GCAP’s long-term success will
rely more on its internal organization and its
mobilizing structures.
V.Arena of struggle and influence – changes
in policy-making vs. policy-implementation
As stated before, Keck and Sikkink state
that some of the most important goals and
areas of influence of transnational movements
are to get an issue on the international agenda,
to get international actors to change their
discursive positions and institutional
procedures, and to influence policy change
and actor behaviour.67 But they warn that
while “explicit policy shifts seem to denote
success…we must take care to distinguish
between policy change and change in
behaviour.”68
66
Sidney Tarrow defines contentious politics as
“episodic, collective interaction among makers of
claims and their objects when a) at least one
government is a claimant, an object of claims, or a
party to the claims and b) the claims would, if realized,
affect the interests of at least one of the claimants.”
(McAdam et al 2001 in Tarrow 2001)
67
Keck and Sikkink, Activists beyond Borders, 25.
68
Ibid, 26.
atlantic international studies journal
Movements are more likely to be successful at
developing and implementing new norms to
the extent that they can be attached to
previously accepted norms.69 As the
background of the anti-poverty movement has
shown, GCAP is building on the anti-poverty
norm that has been developing since the early
1980s, and the progress that previous activists
made at having their voices heard at
multilateral institutions. It is because of this
that the G8, World Bank and IMF so “easily”
agreed to the debt relief proposal, as “weak”
as it still seems.
A movement’s success also depends on
the tactics used to influence the policies and
behaviours of target actors. GCAP uses
several tactics outlined by Keck and Sikkink,
including shaming and accountability politics.
Accountability politics involve obliging
powerful actors to act on vaguer policies or
principles they formally endorsed. 70 One of
the largest frames GCAP used to pressure
state and international institutions into
practice was the fact that the G8 countries had
all signed on to the UN’s Millenium
Development goals in 2000 (which aim at
reducing poverty by 2015), and had pledged
to relieve debt, but so far have failed to
substantially live up to these commitments.
Overwhelmingly, critics and members of
the GCAP coalition alike feel that the recent
concessions made by the World Bank, IMF,
and the G8 are a step in the right direction, but
are not enough. Many still feel that the
external debt of all countries (not just the
HIPC countries) should be cancelled, and that
the conditionalities to achieving debt relief
should also be loosened or abolished.71 Some
69
Price, “Transnational Civil Society and Advocacy in
World Politics,” 585
70
Keck and Sikkink, “Transnational Advocacy
Networks in international and regional politics,” 95.
71
Susanna Mitchell, “Can ‘Make Poverty History’
really make poverty history?” Jubilee Research UK
2005; Jubilee Research, “G8 Debt Relief Proposals: a
first step in the right direction – and a long way to go.”;
Jubilee Research, “World Bank and IMF endorse G8
97
critics, such as Donnelly, also feel that while
state-society-institution relations are being
configured in a positive way, the interaction
between civil society and these institutions is
also enhancing the IMF and World Bank’s
influence over the debt-relief process and
through the conditionalities of domestic
policy change required for debt relief.72
Even though the establishment of weak
agreements or rhetorical commitments might
seem disappointing at first, it is important to
remember that these are important steps in the
process of norm implementation and
internalization.73 But at this stage, it is too
early to determine whether or not policy
implementation and substantial action on the
part of the UN and international financial
institutions will occur.
CONCLUSION
Based on the criteria outlines in this paper,
the success of GCAP can be looked at in two
ways: culturally and materially. Tarrow has
observed a complex political process that
intervenes between a movement’s resources
and goals, and its success or failure.
Movements realize that there is a trade-off
between what they hope to achieve and what
they will actually achieve given the state and
international politics. The end result can mean
a compromise between the achievement of
rhetorical and actual goals.74
Culturally, while GCAP has managed to
mobilize millions of actors across the globe, it
does not seem like it has the potential to build
a strong transnational collective identity that
debt deal – but what does it mean? And where does it
leave us?”
72
Nelson, “Agendas, Accountability, and Legitimacy
among Transnational Networks Lobbying the World
Bank,” 149; Donnelly, “Proclaiming Jubilee,” 166.
73
Burgerman, Moral Victories: How Activists Provoke
Multilateral Action, 22-3.
74
Tarrow (1994, 171) in Thomas Legler, “Chapter
One: The Politics of Economic Restructuring in Rural
Mexico: A Theoretical Overview,” Doctoral
Dissertation Thesis, 44.
98
will carry the coalition well into the future.
While it may have created a media frenzy, it is
hard to tell if its internal structure is
institutionalized enough and representative
enough of all global actors to be sustainable.
Its reliance on media opportunities also makes
it more vulnerable to external political
opportunities, rather than being able to create
its own. But it has been recognized that
GCAP is not a new phenomenon. Rather, it
has built on a pre-existing anti-poverty
network that has been active for over 25 years
in attempts to get the poverty norm on the
international agenda, and in influencing states
and international institutions to change their
policies. States and the UN have also been
“broken in” to listening to civil society. While
the GCAP coalition itself might not last, it is
likely that the anti-poverty network and social
movement will remain until it has achieved its
ultimate goals.
In material terms, GCAP has been
successful at convincing the G8 countries and
the World Bank and IMF to change their
policies. But it is only that – policy change. It
has yet to be seen if the policy rhetoric will
translate into policy implementation and
substantial action on behalf of states to
eradicate poverty. It should also be noted that
GCAP’s demand of trade justice has not been
dealt with at all thus far. GCAP activists are
also still heavily criticizing the World Bank
and IMF policies that have been changed,
arguing that the concessions simply are not
enough, and that more debt cancellation and
more aid is needed if poverty is ever going to
be made history.
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