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Macondo Gas Hydrates Shallow Water Flows and Burst Disks

Introduction
Macondo MC 252 is in an area of well known severe geological hazards (known as geohazards, including gas hydrates, slump deposits, weak surface soils, seabed mounds and permeable shallow (< 5,000 ft BML) artesian water pressurised sand layers which can cause casing distortion and even buckling collapse, high inflow of drilling fluids, washout and partial collapse of those layers due to rapid or poorly controlled drilling operations. Ignore the geology at your peril. The plot below shows the Macondo well together with the Texaco Rigel well [OCS-G-18207 #1], drilled in 1999 in 5200 water depth and a number of seabed dome features, Biloxi, Gloria and Marshall. Purple markers are the locations of seabed seeps reported and surveyed in 2010 by NOAA (Ref. 9).

Well site selection appears to have been based upon maximising the distance from these features. However it is of note that the following reports mentioned in the BP original MMS approved Application Permit to Drill (Ref. 14, Attachment 9, p. 11, Shallow Water Flow Zone Management) and the Initial and Supplemental Exploration Plans (Refs. 4 and 5, Section 3.1, Geological and Geophysical Information) do not appear to have been referred to or listed in any of the post-spill investigative Macondo reports to date and appear to be unavailable in the Public Domain.

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a) A regional shallow hazards survey and study carried out in 1998 by KC Offshore, an independent business development company; b) High resolution 2D seismic data along with 3D exploration seismic data collected by Fugro Geoservices in 2003, and mapping of the block by BP America in 2008 and 2009. c) A site specific Shallow Hazards and Archaelogical Assessment produced by C & C technologies in 2009 base upon AUV data acquired in January 2009.

What remains to be explained is the reason why this blow-out did not get contained like many others in the past in similar conditions and water depths, but was so utterly disastrous. This report contends that the source of this gas was shallow melted gas hydrates, which entered the 16 casing annulus probably via channelling in the casing cement and safety valves known as burst disks placed at levels of mapped sand layers present at depths of 1,500 to 4,600 ft. below mudline.

Shallow Water Flow Sands

The well known GoM geohazard known as shallow water flow [SWF] and the associated risks have been extensively reported in the technical literature and have been ranked and mapped by the MMS across much of the GoM (Ref. 13). They were and are very well known by individuals within all major GoM operators, including BP (see Refs. 1, 2 and 7). Shallow water flows are flows from overpressured sands encountered at shallow depth below the mud line in deepwater regions of the world. Frequently sand flows with the water and flow rates as high as 25,000 bbls/day have been reported (~730 gal/min). SWF typically occur in water depths in excess of 1,500 ft, at depths ranging from 300 to 3,500 ft below mudline and represent a recently encountered phenomenon in the Gulf of Mexico, West of the Shetlands, the Norwegian Sea, the South Caspian, and the North Sea. It has been suggested that 30 to 40% of all deepwater wells in the Gulf of Mexico encounter

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this problem. Once the flow begins it is very difficult to stop, making it difficult, and sometimes impossible, to obtain a competent cement job around the casing. Shallow water flow [SWF] is a serious drilling hazard encountered across several areas of the Gulf of Mexico. Numerous incidents have occurred in which intense SWF have disrupted drilling, added millions to the cost of a well, or caused a well to be abandoned. In an extensive survey of 74 offshore wells, Mark Alberty, an SWF specialist at BP Houston and colleagues (Refs. 1 and 2) found that only 34% of the wells did not encounter problems related to SWF. A 1998 Joint Industry Forum reported that 97 of 123 wells in deepwater GoM in 1997 experienced SWF problems, with 30 not reaching target depth. In a paper published in 1999, Eaton of Shell (Ref. 7) commenting on problems caused by SWF at the nearby URSA site in the GoM stated that:
Shallow flow sands can cause problems ranging from preventing full well evaluation to loss of all development wells at a site. Drilling massive shallow sands underbalanced can cause large washouts leading to casing buckling. Minimizing lost returns during drilling and running and cementing casing is essential to preserve site integrity.

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There is a strong possibility that either the outer casing(s), the production casing (or both) at Macondo may have been buckled, bent and/or damaged as a result of an SWF drilling fluid fracture, washout and collapse over some or several SWF depth intervals. A similar event occurred at the URSA project to the west (Refs 16 and 17). Severe drilling problems including gas kicks and drilling mud losses were recorded at the depths shown in the Table below, which are all below the level of the probable base of gas hydrate stability (the GHSZ, often represented geophysically as a Bottom Simulating reflector, BSR).

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Table 1: Shallow Water Flow Layers Layer

SWF 1 SWF 2 SWF 3 SWF 4 SWF 5 SWF 6

Description
Overbank channel levee clays and possible silts and sands. Continuous sands and silts with shallow gas to northwest. Interbedded clay turbidites and thin clayprone debris flows with possible sands. Continuous sands Continuous sands Continuous sands

Depth [ft. BML]

1,489 1,620 1,832 1,944 1,944 2,533 3,202 3,367 3,761 3,958 4,372 4,618

Depth [ft. BSL]

6,556 6,687 6,899 7,011 7,011 7,600 8,269 8,434 8,828 9.025 9,439 9,685

Page 13 of the original BP Application Permit to Drill document [the APD, Ref. 14] clearly identifies these six layers, as shown below. The upper 3 layers are described as being at low risk and the lower three of moderate risk from SWF problems. However it is of note that the higher risk due to the lower 3 SWF layers is essentially discounted since they are below the depth of the planned first pressure containment 22-inch casing string. It is possible that this statement was made without knowledge of the placement of the burst disks, or in the knowledge that Macondo was planned to be an eventual production well.

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Gas Hydrates
In addition to SWF, the presence of frozen gas hydrates [GH] in the Mississippi Canyon area continental shelf edge is well known and documented (Refs 1, 2 and 7) and detailed warnings were reported to the MMS in 2009 and apparently ignored (Refs. 18 and 19). The primary cause of blowouts, spills and uncontrolled releases of gases from offshore operations is drilling into methane hydrates, or through them into free gas trapped below The Macondo well was drilled very close to a seabed mound 100s of feet in height to the SW which is almost certainly a gas hydrate bearing mud volcano known as The Biloxi Dome, the edge of which is approx. 5 miles from the well site. Locating the well this close to this deep gas chimney feature, with strata dipping upwards towards the well site was probably viewed as necessary necessary in order to maximise the potential for a positive result at Target Depth, and the risk was accepted, with such a high pay-off anticipated. Similar seabed mounds are observed to the east and northeast of the well site, at similar distances. A US Congressional Research Service report dated May 2010 by P. Folger (Ref. 12) recognises that gas hydrate dissociation may have had a role to play at Macondo (p. 5):
Indeed, gas hydrates may have had some role in the original blowout. If a sufficient amount of methane were present in the seafloor sediments, gas hydrates could have formed at the temperatures and pressures in the sediments 1,000 or perhaps 1,500 feet below the seafloor at the Deepwater Horizon drill site (depending on the geothermal gradienthow rapidly the earth changes temperature with depth in that part of the Gulf of Mexico). As discussed in the text of this report, drilling and well completion activities may have disturbed hydrate-bearing sediments, resulting in depressurization or heating that could have caused the hydrate to dissociate into a gas. If the gas were able to enter the wellbore through some defect in the casing or cement, it may have contributed to the anomalous gas pressure inside the wellbore that led to the April 20 blowout. Pending an analysis of the causes for the blowout, however, it is currently unknown whether gas hydrates were involved.

Reproduced below is Figure 4.2.4 from the Presidential Commission Chief Counsels Report (Ref. 15), which clearly shows a classic seabed mound with drawn down geophysical and gas blanked reflectors. The Biloxi Dome, is the probable source of seabed leaks reported during the NOOA cruises of 2010 (Ref. 9) and again more recently during August 2011. Consideration of the temperature and pressure regime in the shallow tophole section below seabed suggests that naturally occurring in-situ hydrates are likely to have been present at Macondo below mudline. Reports from the Atwater Valley and Walker Ridge sites to the West, investigated in 2005 and 2009 as part of the Chevron-led Gulf of Mexico Gas Hydrate Joint Industry Project (JIP) and work by Archer (Ref. 3) and Milkov (Ref. 8) suggest this depth (the base of potential GH formation, commonly termed the GHSZ) may be of the order of 950 to 1150 m BML (3,100 to 3,800 ft. BML [8,167 to 8.867 ft. bsl]. This level is somewhere between the 4th and 5th of the SWF sand layers. Free gas may have been present within the 5th and 6th SWF layers and below that. There is little to no mention of gas hydrates in the subsequent formal reports on the Deepwater Horizon incident (see Appendix A).

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Drilling, Casing and Burst Disks

Despite the risks inherent in all of the above, BP took the decision to continue to attempt to drill the one of the worlds deepest wells to date in a slapdash, corner-cutting, driving down cost, maximise added value fashion. These cut corners and lack of management control have been well documented to date and will not be recounted here. With proper drilling design, control and cementing, wells have been completed under these conditions in the past. However the risks should always be thoroughly assessed, with appropriate prevention and mitigation techniques and controls in place. Such measures are also well documented based upon the past experiences of GoM operators, including BP. The original well plan with casing depths is shown below, taken from the original Application Permit to Drill [APD] document approved by the MMS (Ref. 14).

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In addition to adopting a high risk "long string" well, the Macondo Exploration Well was designed to be fitted with safety valves (known as "Burst or Rupture disks) at shallow depths, coincident with the levels of two of the SWF sands, and in a GH prone area. This was part of the plan to convert the exploration well to production at a later stage, in order to further reduce costs.

Table 3: Burst Disk Depths in 16 Casing

BD No.
1 2 3

Depth [ft. BML]

980 3,237 4,493

Depth [ft. BSL]

6,047 8,304 9,560

The burst disks are believed to have been Hunting APRS (Annular Pressure Release System) type as shown in Table 3 above, which are used in order to provide insurance against trapped annular pressure build-up and subsequent catastrophic structural well failure as a result of thermal pressure increases. Page 56 of the National Commission Chief Counsels Report (Ref. 15, Chapter 4.2 Well Design) discusses the rupture disks. The plot below shows that two were placed more or

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less coincidental with the two lowest SWF sand units identified and reported in the original BP Application for Permit to Drill document for Macondo (Ref. 14), presumably as potential permeable pathways for any outward pressures blowing through the 7500 psi rated disks. However the inward pressure of 1600 psi was probably not thought of as a risk from a build up of either free gas below a GHSZ level or from melted hydrate gas at pressure. Further, it appears that due to the severe drilling problems, lost returns and gas kicks, as shown in Table 2 below, the 18 and 16 casing strings were set to depths much shallower than intended based upon the original Application to Drill permit (see Fig. 47 from Ref. 10 shown below). Table 2: Lost Returns and Kicks Date
Kicks March 8
th

Depth [ft. BML]

Depth [ft. BSL]

8,232
th*1

13,305 15,113

March 25

10,046

Lost Returns February 17 21st March 2

nd th

7,283 6,520 6,508 8.083 12,096 12,694

12,350 11,587 11,575 13,150 17,163 17,761 18,260 18,193

March 3 5th March 21 March 31 April 3

rd st

rd

st

April 4 7 April 9 Notes:

th

th

th

13,193 13,126

1. BML = Below Mudline; BSL = Below Sea level 2. Mudline @ 5.067 ft. 3. Ballooning. 11 7/8 casing set @ 15.103 BSL

It is of note that the lost returns and gas kicks started occurring at depths of 6,520 ft. BML, which is well below the likely depth of the possible gas hydrate stability zone [GHSZ].

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Table 3: Planned Vs Actual Casing String Depths Casing String 36 28 22 18 16 13-5/8 11-7/8 Planned [ft. BSL] 5,361 6,275 8,000 9,900 12,500 15,300 n/p Actual [ft BSL] 5,321 6,217 7,937 8,969 11,585 13,145 15,103 Difference (-ve) [ft.] 40 58 63 931 915 2,155 n/a

The above summary diagram and Table 3 show that the planned and actual depths of the 18 and 16 casings were substantially different, with the 18 casing terminating at roughly the level of the 5th SWF layer and the 16 casing terminating at a level such that there was a considerable depth interval between the cement jobs for the 18 and 16 casing strings where there was no cement seal. This interval also contains the lowest 6th SWF sand, is in a depth zone of potential free gas below the GHSZ and contains an unprotected burst disk. The

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following diagram illustrates this, showing the as-built casing depths together with the depths of the three burst disks and the depths and thicknesses of the 6 SWF sand layers.

Potential Casing Failure and Leak Mechanisms

The detailed DNV forensic report on the BOP failure (Ref. 6) as well as an internal highly detailed Transocean Report (see Appendix A) leads to the conclusion that a BOP would have failed even if it had been in perfect condition, due to the condition of the well, its out of vertical alignment and the sudden immense force of the gas and fluid flow. The question that should be asked is: where did that huge quantity of gas come from? Calculations may show that the valve system at the bottom of the well is unlikely to have somehow failed as a result of the sudden pressure changes far up the drillstring during the end of the negative leak-off test, causing a sudden influx of a vast quantity of gas from the hydrocarbon reservoir some two and half miles below seabed to burst upwards through fairly dense drilling mud at such a high velocity. The final negative leak off test is well documented, including the fact that the displacement of drilling mud with seawater to a depth of 3,000 ft. below mudline was excessive and miscalculated. This would have led to a sudden large pressure difference between the production string and annulus pressures and the possibly gas charged zones in the sand layers adjacent to the burst disks. Due to increased temperatures during cement curing, expanding pressurised melted hydrate gas may have blown through damaged/leaking casing and weak pathways in the bad cement job following the final negative leak off test. Drilling mud was displaced by seawater within the drillstring over too great a depth, leading to reduced internal hydrostatic pressure and a sudden imbalance between the internal (fluid) and external (expanding gas in sand) pressures. The hydrate almost certainly would have been steadily melting around the casing due to heat given off by the curing cement, a problem well understood by Halliburton (Ref. 11), explaining their concerns over the use of a nitrogen based lightweight foam cement. The heat generated as a result of cement curing is likely to have led to melting of some sections of this natural hydrate bearing zone some distance radially from the cement and a subsequent increase in pressure as the gas rapidly expanded and flowed into and within one or more of the known SWF sand layers. The presence of channels at certain levels within the cement is likely to have permitted a pathway(s) to form along part(s) of the 16 casing. Due to possible earlier drilling disturbance of the known layers of SWF sands prior to the melting of the hydrates, the 16 casing may have been out-of-straight or even slightly buckled as a result of partial liquefaction and softening of the SWF sands (similar to that observed at the BP/Shell URSA in 1999 in the GoM). This loss of lateral support may have caused a crack or breach in the casing, or a loosening at the casing joint(s). This casing is suspected to have been of too low a yield strength for the well design. At the point during the negative leak-off test when the pressure differential became sufficiently high, it is well documented and accepted that the three burst disks placed at certain points on the casing joints down the casing string blew out at their inwards blowing rated burst pressure of 1600 psi. At this point the large pressure drop occurring within the mud fluids in the annulus between the production casing and the 16 casing might have been sufficiently dramatic to allow a rapid influx of trapped pressurised gas lying within the SWF sand(s) and in the pathways worked within the cement. This build up may have caused a very high pressure jet to blow

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out some or all of the rupture disks in the 16 casing, if the pressure differential between the seawater filled production casing and the annulus on the other side were sufficiently high. This gas would have travelled very quickly up the production casing,

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The subsequent upwards rush of gas probably caused a siphoning of seawater, mud and subsequently oil with it as the production casing shoe was blown due to the very high suction force exerted. Once the initial shallow blast of GH sourced gas blew the BOP, reservoir pressures would have been sufficient to allow the flow of oil to be maintained.

Conclusion
Much has been written in detail in formal reports, books and publications to date about the mechanics of what happened at Macondo. However virtually nothing has been stated about the probable root "geohazard" causes - shallow water flows and gas hydrates, a horrible but all too feared combination, which when combined with a series of serious organisational failures, cost cutting, schedule pressures, design errors led to the blowout. However, the main root cause was the decision to locate the well so close to a major mud volcano and gas chimney. The identification of the probable true source of the high velocity gas stream matters hugely, since gas hydrates are present in many offshore deepwater areas, including environmentally highly sensitive areas such as Alaska. It is clear that current drilling technology is unable to guarantee absolute safety in such cases. The potential consequences of further blowouts are too enormous for such risks to be allowed to continue to be taken in pursuit of ever more remote oil and gas reserves

References
1. Alberty, M. W., M. E. Hafle, J. C. Minge and T. M. Byrd, "Mechanisms of Shallow Water Flows and Drilling Practices for Intervention," Proc. Offshore Tech. Conference, Houston, Texas, Paper No. OTC 8301, 1997. Alberty, M., "Shallow Water Flows: A Problem Solved or a Problem Emerging," OTC Paper No. 11971, 2000 Offshore Technology Conference, Houston, Texas. Archer, D. (2007), Methane Hydrate Stability and Anthropogenic Climate Change, Biogeosciences, Vol. 4, pp. 521544 [www.biogeosciences.net/4/521/2007]. BP Exploration & Production Inc. (2009), Initial Exploration Plan, Mississippi Canyon Block 252, OCS-G-32306, p.53. [Public Information Copy; Information Withheld]. BP Exploration & Production Inc. (2010), Supplemental Exploration Plan, Mississippi Canyon Block 252, OCS-G-32306, p.60. [Public Information Copy; Information Withheld]. Det Norske Veritas (2011), Final Report for United States Department of the Interior Bureau OF Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement; Washington DC 20240. Forensic Examination of Deepwater Horizon Blowout Preventer, Contract Award No. M10PX00335, Volumes I and II (Appendices). Report No. EP030842, 20th March 2011. Eaton, L.F. (1999), Drilling Through Deepwater Shallow Water-Flow Zones at Ursa, by L.F. Eaton, Shell Deepwater Development Inc., SPE 52780, 1999 SPE/IADC Drilling Conference, Amsterdam, 9th 11th March 1999. Milkov, A.V., Sassen, R., Novikova, I. And Mikhailov, E., (2000), Gas Hydrates at Minimum Stability Water Depths in the Gulf of Mexico: Significance to Geohazard

2. 3. 4. 5.

6.

7.

8.

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Assessment, Gulf Coast Association of Geological Societies Transactions, Vol. 1, 2000,, p.217 224. 9. NOAA (2010), NOAA Ship Thomas Jefferson Deepwater Horizon Response Mission Report, Interim Project report Leg 2, June 3-11, 2010, 11th June 2010, p.42.

10. Parsons, P. (2010), The Macondo Well; Part 3 in a Series about the Macondo Well (Deepwater Horizon) Blowout, Energy Training Resources Llc, July 15th 2010, p. 40. 11. Tahmourpour, F. (2009) Halliburton Presentation: Deepwater Cementing Consideration to Prevent Hydrates Destabilization, AADE Chapter Meeting, 18th November 2009, p. 25. 12. United States Congressional Research Service (2010), Gas Hydrates: Resource and Hazard, Peter Folger, Specialist in Energy and Natural Resources Policy, Ref. RS22990, May 25th 2010, 13. United States Dept. of the Interior. Minerals Management Service, Gulf of Mexico, OCS Region, (2009), Updated SWF Risk Map on 4/15/2009 15th April 2009. 14. United States Dept. of the Interior. Minerals Management Service, (2009), Application for Permit to Drill a New Well; Form MMS 123A/123S, Lease G2306, Area/Block MC 252, ref. BP-HZN-CEC018022, p. 29. 15. United States National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling (2011), Macondo; The Gulf Oil Spill Disaster; Chief Counsels Report 2011, p.371. 16. Winker, C.D. and Stancliffe, R.J. (2007), Geology of Shallow Water Flow at Ursa: 1. Setting and Causes Proc. Offshore Technology Conference, Houston Texas, 30th April 3rd May 2007, OTC Paper No. 18822. 17. Winker, C.D. and Stancliffe, R.J. (2007), Geology of Shallow Water Flow at Ursa: 2. Drilling Principles and Practice, Proc. Offshore Technology Conference, Houston Texas, 30th April 3rd May 2007, OTC Paper No. 18823. 18. Zimmerman, D. (2009), 2010-2015 Oil and Gas Leasing in the Outer Continental Shelf , Northcoast Ocean and River Protection Association (NORPA), PO Box 1000, Trinidad, CA 95575 ; Letter To: Ms. Renee Orr, Chief, Leasing Division, Minerals Management Service, MS 4010, 381 Elden Street, Herndon, VA 20170-4817, 26th August 2009, p.59. 19. Zimmerman, D. (2010), An Open Letter to the Offshore Oil and Gas Industry, Especially BP, June 2010, p.2. The Gallowglaich 11th September 2011 grinch.fortytwo@gmail.com

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Appendix A- Formal Macondo Disaster Reports

Ref. A Title US National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling
Deep Water; The Gulf Oil Disaster and the Future of Offshore Drilling, Report to the President, January 2011, p.398

www.oilspillcommission.gov/sites/default/files/documents/
Macondo; The Gulf Oil Spill Disaster; Chief Counsels Report 2011, p.371.

http://bookstore.gpo.gov/actions/GetPublication.do?stocknumber=040-000-00787-3 B US National Academy of Engineering and National Research Council

Interim Report on Causes of the Deepwater Horizon Oil Rig Blowout and Ways to Prevent Such Events. Committee for the Analysis of Causes of the Deepwater Horizon Explosion, Fire, and Oil Spill to Identify Measures to Prevent Similar Accidents in the Future; National Academy of Engineering; National Research th Council, November 16 2010, p.29.

www.nap.edu/catalog/13047.html C

[Final Report Due in June 2011]

Center for Catastrophic Risk Management, University of California, Berkeley.

Progress Report 2, Deepwater Horizon Study, July 15 2010, p. 42.
th

http://ccrm.berkeley.edu/deepwaterhorizonstudygroup/dhsg_articles.shtml D The Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement (BOEMRE)/U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) Joint Investigation Team
The Official Site of the Joint Investigation Team

www.deepwaterinvestigation.com/go/site/3043/ E US Congressional Research Service

[Final report Due 27 July 2011]

th

Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill: Selected Issues for Congress, Curry L. Hagerty, Coordinator Specialist in Energy and Natural Resources Policy and Jonathan L. Ramseur, Coordinator Specialist in Environmental Policy, July 30, 2010, p. 29. Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill: Highlighted Actions and Issues, Curry L. Hagerty, Coordinator Specialist in Energy and Natural Resources Policy and Jonathan L. Ramseur, Coordinator Specialist in Environmental Policy, January 28, 2011, p. 10. Gas Hydrates: Resource and Hazard, Peter Folger, Specialist in Energy and Natural Resources Policy, th May 25 2010, p.9.

www.fas.org/sgp/crs/

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BOEMRE Presentation
Perspectives on Deepwater Drilling Safety and Blowout/Spill Containment Bureau of Ocean Energy Management Hosted Forum, September 13, 2010 - Lafayette, LA, p.17.

www.boemre.gov/forums/documents/Panel_II_Presentation_4_lafayette.pdf G BP Accident Investigation Report

Deepwater Horizon; Accident Investigation Report, September 8 2010, p. 191 plus Appendices.
th

www.bp.com/liveassets/bp_internet/globalbp/globalbp_uk_english/incident_response/STAGING/l ocal_assets/downloads_pdfs/Deepwater_Horizon_Accident_Investigation_Report.pdf www.bp.com/liveassets/bp_internet/globalbp/globalbp_uk_english/incident_response/STAGING/l ocal_assets/downloads_pdfs/Deepwater_Horizon_Accident_Investigation_Report_Executive_su mmary.pdf H DNV Report on Blowout Preventer

Final Report for United States Department of the Interior Bureau OF Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement; Washington DC 20240. Forensic Examination of Deepwater Horizon Blowout Preventer, Contract Award No. M10PX00335, Volumes I and II (Appendices). Final Report. Report No. EP030842, 20th March 2011.

www.deepwaterinvestigation.com/external/content/document/3043/1047291/1/DNV%20Report% 20EP030842%20for%20BOEMRE%20Volume%20I.pdf www.deepwaterinvestigation.com/external/content/document/3043/1047295/1/DNV%20BOP%2 0report%20-%20Vol%202%20(2).pdf J US Department of the Interior

National Incident Command, Interagency Solutions Group, Flow rate Technical Group: Assessment of Flow th Rate Estimates for the Deepwater Horizon/Macondo Well Oil Spill, March 10 2011, p.30.

www.doi.gov/deepwaterhorizon/loader.cfm?csModule=security/getfile&PageID=237763 K Transocean
Macondo Well Incident; Transocean Investigation Report, Volume I and I plus Appendices A to Q.

http://www.deepwater.com/fw/main/Public-Report-1076.html

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