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Standpoint on Knowledge

Dear Iriends,

Apologies Ior this very delayed scheduled contribution. To introduce myselI, I have been
working as librarian at the Centre Ior the Study oI Developing Societies (CSDS) at Delhi
Ior past 4 years and am closely associated with Vidya Ashram at Varanasi
(www.vidyaashram.org). Previously, I worked at the Centre Ior Education and
Documentation (CED) in Bombay Ior close to 14 years where I learnt the craIt oI
documentation and librarianship beIore I went on to get a basic degree in the Iield.
Earlier, I had started out studying physics, but had dropped out to do masters in
philosophy. As it happens, I Ieel a bit oI an intruder whether in the company oI activists,
academics or librarians.

BrieIly, I would like to state the case Ior developing a pro-people standpoint on
knowledge. But to begin, the very idea oI a standpoint on knowledge.

The Very Idea of a Standpoint on Knowledge

The idea oI a standpoint on knowledge seems rather contradictory. How can we take a
stand in matters oI knowledge? Isn't it against the spirit oI open knowledge creation and
in Iact against the very idea oI openness? The spectre oI 'communist distortions oI
knowledge' are immediately oIIered as warnings whenever one attempts to bring
knowledge and politics together. Questions like whether knowledge will be determined
by votes raise their heads. There have been serious investigations oI the sciences and
other knowledge processes and the role oI commitment/trust in research has been well-
documented. These researches have been called into the support oI opposite conclusions
such as knowledge is nothing but a standpoint. These positions are a result oI a
relationship oI mutual exclusion between knowledge and politics that was constituted
along with the more celebrated separation oI knowledge and religion and oI religion and
politics.

We can instead proceed Irom the recognition that talk about knowledge is not essentially
theoretical, but meta-theoretical or normative in nature. The moment we try to say what is
knowledge, we are actually saying what is the right kind oI knowledge, reliable
knowledge, and so on; we begin to outline a normative Iramework oI knowledge.
Secondly, that all normative Irameworks oI knowledge with any kind oI social presence
do indeed generate some kind oI knowledge and organizations oI knowledge. Science is a
normative Iramework oI knowledge, but it does generate real knowledge. Rejecting a
Iramework oI knowledge does not necessarily mean rejecting all knowledge associated
with it. It just means you do not let yourselI be guided by this Iramework in evaluating
and producing knowledge. Thirdly, in order to criticize, reject, or suspend our judgment
on any knowledge, we need not master the Iramework and its protocols. There are
numerous such Irameworks oI knowledge in society. Any social body oI knowledge and
knowledge-activities has a 'philosophy oI right knowledge' or a normative Iramework.

Normative Irameworks oI knowledge begin Irom some new event oI knowledge Ior
example, a discovery or an invention, which proves itselI and comes to be regarded as
authoritative. It is knowledge about whose validity there is little doubt, at least among
some people. When a new discovery is made, accounts oI this discovery are also given or
reconstructed. It is Irom such accounts associated with an important discovery or
invention that a meta-conception oI knowledge is born. This account oI discovery
becomes a guiding Iramework in search oI Iurther knowledge and engenders criteria Ior
evaluating knowledge claims. These accounts are epistemic. In Iact, that is precisely what
they are - epistemic accounts.

Science as a Normative Framework of Knowledge

But some epistemic accounts come to have a sweeping jurisdiction in society. 'Science',
as distinct Irom sciences, is one such account oI knowledge; it constructs the knower, the
known and the right kind oI knowledge in a particular way. Apart Irom creating an order
oI things, science also creates (or 'is') an order oI knowledge in society. Building on the
success oI natural philosophy, 'science' was instituted at the beginning oI 19
th
century.
This is the time when the proIession oI scientists emerged, disciplines were Iormed,
laboratory as the prime site oI knowledge creation developed, the ideal oI disinterested
knowledge was deIined, and so on. Epistemic principles oI natural philosophy were taken
over, crucial among them was a conIiguration oI knowledge and experience which played
a key role in the creation oI new physics. SigniIicantly, science also instituted the
cooperative quest Ior knowledge where researchers build on the work oI others to
advance knowledge.

During the enlightenment, there were two currents oI thought regarding science. One
viewed science as a process oI open-ended enquiry and another sought secure
metaphysical Ioundations Ior science. What is interesting is the way these two currents
were merged when the normative and institutional structure oI science was Iormed.
Science orders the sciences within in a hierarchy, where each oI the sciences pursue
open-ended enquiry by research communities, but their results are to be interpreted
strictly within the overall Iramework oI the metaphysical project which was to Iind
physical explanation Ior everything. One oI the pillars oI this new Iramework was to seek
knowledge without regard to any authority. Science went on to claim a monopoly on such
knowledge production. We were supposed to accord complete authority to science in
matters oI knowledge, on the ground, among others, that it was producing knowledge
without regard to authority. This introduced a deep ambiguity in the whole enterprise oI
science. One was not entitled to accept some parts oI science, reject others, and suspend
one's judgment on yet others.

What was unscientiIic was not explained as a result oI error or ignorance. What is not
scientiIic is not knowledge at all, but something else, which is mistaken Ior knowledge. It
is to be explained as a necessary product oI 'Iorces', cultural or natural; our knowledge
becomes an extension oI our being. Is it here that science joins colonialism? While the
whole oI humanity may have a common essence, the being oI the western culture could
be seen to be transIormed by the possession oI science. The West possesses Knowledge,
while other cultures only have Being. Even iI that being was sometimes regarded as
beautiIul and moving.

The same normative structure oI knowledge that enables this construction oI non-
European knowledge, was operative within Europe. You aspired Ior knowledge by
shedding your culture and accidental accretions oI knowledge, and strove to create a
knowledge entirely embodied in propositions or texts. Your being, your culture, your
knowledge traditions were all a barrier to be overcome to possess that knowledge which
was the collective burden, and redemption, oI Europe.

rder of Knowledge

II I have spoken oI science it is only to indicate how a historically developed normative
Iramework is at the core oI the social existence oI science in society. How in Iact, our
relationship to the knowledge in the sciences (and all other knowledge in society) is
mediated by 'Science'. I could have spoken about the way the authority oI Vedas was
constructed in India. The problem is how to constitute a Iree relationship with knowledge
in society. And whether the prevalent Iramework allows it. It is not certitudes which are a
problem, but the way the authority oI certitudes is constructed. It is not the authority oI
some knowledge which is a problem, it is how the authority is constructed. From these
social relations oI knowledge emerges what we can call an order oI knowledge in society.
Needless to say, this cannot be isolated Irom the political and economic order. Neither
can it be reduced to them. Normative Irameworks oI knowledge cannot be ultimately
Iounded. But they are not without any ground. They are grounded ultimately in liIe and in
time.

Large number oI communities and people around the world continued to live by their
own knowledge, despite it having lost all legitimacy in colonial and post-colonial
regimes. This knowledge does not remain static. With each new wave oI technologies
and scientiIic development, they have had to adapt, learn and assimilate. Older
knowledge traditions are transIormed and new ones are created. While the non-European
institutionalised knowledge traditions rose and Iell according to whether they could
create a niche in the modern knowledge Iramework and institutions, the knowledge
which has its location not in institutions but in ordinary liIe oI the people continued to
provide values, criteria, skills, and insights Ior productive and other activities. We should
remember that the modern sector accounted Ior only a part oI the production and
consumption in the countries oI the third world. OI course, this knowledge was absent
Irom the public sphere and had no legitimacy within the modern governance. It was
recognized, iI at all, under the headings oI 'Iolk and religious traditions', 'traditional
knowledge', or 'cultural practices'.

It is in such context, that the idea oI 'lokvidya' or people's knowledge was conceived as a
standpoint Irom which to query the prevailing social order and organize resistance. In
most Indian languages 'lok' means people or world and 'vidya' means any body oI
knowledge or knowledge tradition. Lokvidya acquires particular resonance on account oI
'lok' meaning both world and people at the same time. But lokvidya is not an ancient
concept. It is a concept in progress.

Meanwhile, the wheel has turned and we are seeing the emergence oI what is oIten
termed 'knowledge society'. Whenever words like knowledge society, knowledge
economy, etc. are mentioned we are leIt in no doubt that what is being reIerred to is a
society whose organization is somehow or other based on ICT. We also notice, to quote
Irom the poser oI one oI our workshops in Karachi WSF, that "the activity, development,
interaction, Iormulation, transaction, creation, invention, discovery, collaboration,
criticism etc. in the virtual world have taken lead and tend to give direction to human
activity everywhere, .Iinance, science, art, entertainment, name any". In this period, the
authority oI science as a Iramework to organize all knowledge in society has begun to
crumble. What is taking its place is not entirely clear, but there is a noticeable shiIt in the
stand towards what is normally reIerred to as traditional knowledge. There is more
recognition Ior knowledge created on a number oI sites. We have not entered a wonderIul
era oI pluralism however.

Knowledge Dialogue

What we witness today can be understood in terms oI narratives oI capitalism's
development, expansion oI the inter-state system, growth oI civilization and colonization.
Or, it can be analysed in terms oI work, Iinance, technology, institutions etc. We can
interrogate the categories oI inIormation, gene, property, labour. We must do all this,
especially in the university context, but it seems to us that it is the question oI knowledge
which might prove decisive Ior understanding the emerging order and the sources oI its
power and, to conceive oI a pro-people standpoint which can resist this order and point a
way to a Iuture world that is not just a variant oI the current one. Even iI we just agree
that knowledge question in its various dimensions is important, and not central, we will
argue that a standpoint on knowledge is the need oI our time. It is needed at least to
provide a counter-position to the kind oI aggressive game plan oI instituting a destructive
relation between knowledge and society as being suggested in the 'opening statements' oI
the conIerence on new converging technologies that I posted earlier.

Now, oI course, no one can simply come up with a standpoint. What is proposed is a
process oI knowledge dialogue, a process where no paradigm oI knowledge is allowed to
extract or pay what Amit called a 'discursive price oI entry'. I do not think this dialogue is
Habermasian (please correct me iI I am wrong) because it is about constructing ground
rules oI knowledge in society and is itselI grounded in the Ireedom that we have as
epistemic beings with respect to normative Irameworks oI knowledge. We do not have to
pursue any speciIic discipline in order to become an epistemic being. Living ordinary
lives we are epistemic beings and carriers oI knowledge traditions. This dialogue is
premised on the condition that a knowledge dialogue is possible between, say, a Iarmer
and an artisan, or between educated and the uneducated, between the European and the
non-European. They do not have to reach a consensus on speciIic knowledge claims. But
they can take a stand on knowledge together.

As a matter oI Iact, we all do indeed keep talking about knowledge, keep evaluating
knowledge, reIlect on criteria oI knowledge and values, and so on. It is just that such talk
is considered non-rigorous chatter and without any consequence. We can see this
discourse as a necessary reIlection oI knowledge's social existence and as a realm oI
Ireedom, which can be used as a space Ior constructing a potentially emancipatory
standpoint on knowledge.

I will agree with Danny Butt when he says in his recent mail: "I think the most important
stance Ior a truly inclusive educational platIorm is a level oI skepticism about any
platIorm's ability to provide the space oI open cosmopolitanism which is held as the
implicit ideal oI liberatory pedagogy. Such a pedagogical space only emerges, Ior me at
least, in the gaps which emerge when very speciIic and particular Iorms oI knowledge
meet each other with a sense oI precisely their particularity and diIIerence." But my point
is that particularity and diIIerence does not preclude the possibility oI solidarity in a stand
on knowledge. I would also suggest that such 'meetings' between diIIerent knowledges
need not be invested with the risk, danger, and labour which European encounters with
'other' cultures have traditionally called Iorth. It is as iI the soul teeters on a boundary
between one's own culture and the other, and is either ejected into the dark area oI the
other (like Conrad's Kurtz), or retreats to one's own with a superior understanding oI the
other.

okvidya Standpoint

The burden oI this contribution has been to emphasize the possibility and need Ior a pro-
people standpoint oI knowledge Ior our times. A Iew words about the lokvidya stadpoint.
In the broadest terms we are exploring the Iollowing proposition:

A pro-people standpoint on knowledge in the age oI inIormation is the standpoint oI
people's knowledge or lokvidya.

I will not try to deIend this proposal. You are invited to look at various documents at the
Vidya Ashram website (www.vidyaashram.org) and especially, Sunil Sahasrabudhey's
writings, Ior attempts at Iormulation and exposition oI lokvidya standpoint. You will also
Iind some discussion at this e group: http://groups.yahoo.com/group/knowledge-dialogue/

Standpoint oI people's knowledge looks at knowledge that exists in society.
Knowledge in Society may be seen as knowledge in diIIerent locations - like the
university and research institutions, Internet, monasteries oI diIIerent traditions, media,
artisans, peasants, ethnic social Iormations, social movements, ideological Iormations etc.
These are places where people engage in a variety oI activities - productive, religious,
artistic, scientiIic and others. Their activities exhibit paradigms oI knowledge that are
diIIerent Irom one another. Another way oI saying this would be they have diIIerent
bodies oI knowledge, with diIIerent structure and logic, values, ontologies, ways oI
thinking and speculation.

Grounded in the existence oI knowledge traditions oI people in various parts oI the world
despite marginalisation and exclusion, people's knowledge is conceived as knowledge
which is located in the ordinary liIe oI people. It is not merely some body oI knowledge
that has been passed on, but these are streams oI knowledge in constant Ilux and they are
adapting, assimilating, and transIorming the knowledge which emerges Irom more
organised knowledge traditions oI science, technology, religion. A society will always
have both people's knowledge traditions and organised & institutionalized traditions.

Dominance oI the virtual domain seems to legitimize all traditions and locations oI
knowledge while elevating itselI to a higher position Irom where all knowledge is sorted
and organized. In the process it creates a new hierarchy in the sphere oI knowledge. It is
not merely a structural rearrangement oI locations but entails a certain emaciation or
atrophy oI knowledge in society. They are now seen as places oI genuine human activity
only to the extent and in the manner they relate to virtuality. Can we propose a radical
equality oI all knowledge locations as the basis oI a Iuture democratic society which is
also at peace with virtuality?


Yours in dialogue,

Avinash Jha