Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila FIRST DIVISION G.R. No.

147525 February 26, 2007 BONIFACIO ESPINOZA, Petitioner, vs. PROVINCIAL ADJUDICATOR OF THE PROVINCIAL AGRARIAN REFORM ADJUDICATION OFFICE OF PAMPANGA and MARIA QUIBULOY, Respondents. DECISION A complaint3 for ejectment was filed against petitioner by private respondent Maria V. Quibuloy, as co-owner and administrator of three parcels of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3676. She alleged that petitioner had reneged (failed to carry-out a promise) on his obligations as tenant to pay the rent and till the subject landholding. Instead of answering the complaint, petitioner moved to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction. He cited Section 1, Rule III of the 1989 Rules of Procedure of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (1989 DARAB Rules), providing for conciliation proceedings before the Barangay Agrarian Reform Council (BARC) prior to initiating the case. He contended that presentation of a certification from the BARC, attesting that the dispute had been submitted to it for mediation or conciliation without any success of settlement, was a jurisdictional requirement. On that note, he concluded that the provincial adjudicator could not take cognizance (action of taking jusdiction) of the agrarian dispute due to Quibuloys failure to present the required certificate. The hearing on the motion to dismiss was set but, petitioner or his counsel failed to appear, hence the motion was submitted for resolution. Again, the provincial adjudicator set the case for another hearing Again, neither petitioner nor his counsel attended the hearing. Thus, Quibuloy was allowed to present her evidence ex-parte(one party appears before the judge). Thereafter, the dispute was ordered submitted for decision.6 Just before the decision was rendered, petitioner filed his answer assailing (attack verbally) Quibuloys personality to bring suit. Petitioner also offered unsubstantiated (unverified) denials of Quibuloys charges. As his defense, he denied allegations of non-payment of rents and non-tillage of the land for lack of knowledge and information to form a belief as to the veracity(truthfulness) thereof. The Prov. Adj. was sufficiently convinced that Quibuloys allegations were true and correct. Accordingly, he decided the case against petitioner.7

Instead of immediately appealing from the adjudicators decision, petitioner allowed the reglementary period (refers to the number of days within which the party must file his/her pleading to court/tribunal/body) to lapse. Thereafter, he filed a petition for certiorari with the CA. The appellate court dismissed the petition as "unavailing and vacuous."(useless and empty)8 It reiterated the well-settled rule that certiorari lies only in cases of errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment. It stressed that certiorari cannot be a substitute for a lost appeal. Petitioner comes to us with practically a rehash (to discuss again) of the issues already raised in the CA, to wit: I. WON PUBLIC RESPONDENT PROVINCIAL ADJUDICATOR OF THE [PARAD] OF PAMPANGA IS CORRECT IN PROCEEDING WITH DARAB CASE NO. 203-P-90 WITHOUT FIRST COMPLYING WITH THE JURISDICTIONAL REQUIREMENTS SET FORTH IN SECTION 1, RULE III OF THE [1989] DARAB REVISED RULES OF PROCEDURE. - On the first assigned error, the 1989 DARAB Rules exempted parties residing in non-adjoining barangays from presenting the BARC certification.15 Since it is undisputed that Quibuloy resided in San Nicolas 1ST, Lubao, Pampanga while petitioner stayed in San Agustin, Lubao, Pampanga, the former was not required to present the BARC certification before the adjudicator taking cognizance of the agrarian dispute. Needless to say, the provincial adjudicator did not err in entertaining the dispute notwithstanding the absence of the BARC (Barangay Agrarian Reform Committee) certification. II. WON PUBLIC RESPONDENT PROVINCIAL ADJUDICATOR OF THE [PARAD] OF PAMPANGA IS CORRECT IN DECIDING DARAB CASE NO. 203-P-90 WITHOUT FIRST RESOLVING PETITIONERS MOTION TO DISMISS. - On the 2nd issue, administrative agencies exercising quasi-judicial functions are not bound by technical rules followed in courts of law. The adjudicator is given enough latitude, subject to the essential requirements of administrative due process, to be able to expeditiously (action done in speed and accuracy) ascertain the facts of the agrarian dispute.16 While there may have been a technical lapse on the part of the adjudicator in disposing of the motion to dismiss, the assailed acts of the adjudicator did not amount to a grave abuse of discretion justifying a writ of certiorari (review). Considering the technical flexibility afforded to agrarian adjudicators, the order may easily be construed as a denial of the motion to dismiss. What would have

been the prudent recourse under the rules was to submit an answer immediately, participate in the hearing and appeal an adverse decision. Sadly, petitioner failed to do any of these. It is now too late for him to dispute the adjudicators decision. III. WON PUBLIC RESPONDENT ERRED IN RULING THAT PETITIONERS ANSWER TO PRIVATE RESPONDENTS COMPLAINT IN DARAB CASE NO. 203-P-90 WAS FILED OUT OF TIME AND IN NOT CONSIDERING THE SAME. - Moving on to the third assignment of error, we hold that petitioners answer was indeed filed out of time. While the 1989 DARAB Rules provides that the non-answering respondent (petitioner) may be allowed to belatedly file his answer, it also provides that the answer should be filed before the matter is submitted for decision. Here, petitioner submitted his answer after the case was submitted for decision. Under the 1989 DARAB Rules,13 an aggrieved party may appeal the decision of a provincial adjudicator to the Adjudication Board within 15 days from receipt (reglamentary period). In this case, petitioner allowed the appeal period to lapse and instead filed a petition for certiorari in the CA roughly three months after the assailed decision was rendered. It is evident that the CA acted on the petition properly. IV. WON Public Respondent is correct in deciding CASE NO. 203-P-90 in favor of the private respondent on the basis of self-serving affidavit and her lone witness considering her failure to present the title of the land in question or any document to show her authority to act as administrator 4th assignment of error, it cannot be overemphasized that only errors of jurisdiction may be reviewed by the CA in a petition for certiorari. "Where the issue or question involved affects the wisdom or legal soundness of the decision not the jurisdiction of the court to render said decision the same is beyond the province of a special civil action for certiorari."17 V. WON THE [CAs] DISMISSAL OF THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI AND DENIAL OF [PETITIONERS] MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION IS PROPER.9 - As correctly found by the appellate court, there is no showing that errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion were committed by public respondent. In sum, the petition failed to prove that the CA committed any reversible error in denying petitioners petition for certiorari as well as his motion for reconsideration. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.

G.R. No. 89914: Jose Bengzon Jr et al vs Senate Blue Ribbon Committee Inquiry in Aid of Legislation When not Allowed FACTS: It was alleged that Benjamin Kokoy Romualdez and his wife together with the Marcoses unlawfully and unjustly enriched themselves at the expense of the Filipino people. That they obtained with the help of the Bengzon law office and Ricardo Lopa Corys brother in law, among others, control over some of the biggest business enterprises in the country including MERALCO, PCI Bank, Shell Philippines and Benguet Consolidated Mining Corporation. Sen. Enrile subsequently delivered a privilege speech alleging that Lopa took over various government owned corporations which is in violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Contained in the speech is a motion to investigate on the matter. The motion was referred to the Committee on Accountability of Public Officers or the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee (SBRC). After committee hearing, Lopa refused to testify before the committee for it may unduly prejudice a pending civil case against him. Bengzon likewise refused invoking his right to due process. Lopa however sent a letter to Enrile categorically denying his allegations and that his allegations are baseless and malicious. Enrile subsequently took advantage of the Senates privilege hour upon which he insisted to have an inquiry regarding the matter. The SBRC rejected Lopas and Bengzons plea. Claiming that the SBRC is poised to subpoena them and require their attendance and testimony in proceedings before the Committee, in excess of its jurisdiction and legislative purpose, in clear and blatant disregard of their constitutional rights, and to their grave and irreparable damage, prejudice and injury, and that there is no appeal nor any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the Bengzon et al filed the present petition for prohibition with a prayer for temporary restraining order and/or injunctive relief.

ISSUE: Whether or not the inquiry sought by the SBRC be granted. HELD: No, the inquiry cannot be given due course. The speech of Enrile contained no suggestion of contemplated legislation; he merely called upon the Senate to look into a possible violation of Sec. 5 of RA No. 3019, otherwise known as "The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act." In other words, the purpose of the inquiry to be conducted by the Blue Ribbon Committee was to find out whether or not the relatives of Cory, particularly Lopa, had violated the law in connection with the alleged sale of the 36 or 39

corporations belonging to Kokoy to the Lopa Group. There appears to be, therefore, no intended legislation involved. Hence, the contemplated inquiry by the SBRC is not really "in aid of legislation" because it is not related to a purpose within the jurisdiction of Congress, since the aim of the investigation is to find out whether or not the relatives of the President or Mr. Ricardo Lopa had violated Section 5 of RA No. 3019, the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act", a matter that appears more within the province of the courts rather than of the legislature. Besides, the Court may take judicial notice that Mr. Ricardo Lopa died during the pendency of this case

G.R. No. L-29169 August 19, 1968 ROGER CHAVEZ,petitioner,vs.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THE PEOPLE OF THEPHILIPPINES and THE WARDEN OF THE CITY JAIL OF MANILA, respondents. FACTS: This is a petition for habeas corpus. Petitioner invoking jurisdiction of the Supreme Court that he is entitled to be freed from imprisonment upon ground that trial which resulted his conviction, HE WAS DENIED OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT NOT TO BE COMPELLED TO TESTIFY AGAINSTHIMSELF. Judgment of conviction was for qualified theft of a motor vehicle (thunderbird car together with accessories)an information was filed against the accused together with other accused, that they conspired, with intent to gain and abuse of confidence without the consent of owner Dy Lim, took the vehicle. All the accused plead not guilty. During the trial, the fiscal Grecia (prosecution) asked Roger Chavez to be the first witness. Counsel of the accused opposed. Fiscal Grecia contends that the accused (Chavez) will only be an ordinary witness not an state witness. Counsel of accused answer that it will only incriminate his client. But the jugde ruled in favor of the fiscal on the grounds that (1) the right of the prosecution to ask anybody to act as witness on the witness stand including the accused (2) If there should be any question that is incriminating then that is the time for counsel to interpose his objection and the court will sustain him if and when the court feels that the answer of this witness to the question would incriminate him. (3) Counsel has all the assurance that the court will not require the witness to answer questions which would incriminate him. Prosecution version of what happened: Chavez saw Lee driving the thunderbird (car) and asked if it is for sale. Lee answered yes. Chavez met Sumilang and informed about the car. The two went to Asistio and made a plan to capitalize on Romeo Vasquez' reputation as a wealthy movie star, introduce him as a buyer to someone who was selling a car and,

after the deed of sale is signed, by trickery to run away with the car. Asistio would then register it, sell it to a third person for a profit. Chavez known to be a car agent was included in the plan. He furnished the name of Johnson Lee who was selling his Thunderbird. Chavez arranged the meeting with Lee. They agreed on the price and went to Dy Sunk which is the registered owner of the car. Deed of sale was drawn and signed by Sumilang. At Eugene's, a man approached Sumilang with a note which stated that the money was ready at the Dalisay Theater. Sumilang then wrote on the same note that the money should be brought to the restaurant. At the same time he requested Lee to exhibit the deed of sale of the car to the note bearer. The two Chinese were left alone in the restaurant. The two Chinese could not locate Sumilang and Chavez. They went out to the place where the Thunderbird was parked, found that it was gone. They then immediately reported its loss to the police. Much later, the NBI recovered the already repainted car and impounded it. Chavez, Sumilang and Asistio converged that same day at Barrio Fiesta, a restaurant at Highway 54 near the Balintawak Monument in Caloocan. There, Asistio handed to Sumilang P1,000.00 cash and a golf set worth P800.00 as the latter's share in the transaction. On the14th of November, the registration of the car was transferred in the name of Sumilang in Cavite City, and three days later, in the name of Asistio in Caloocan. Sumilangs version (one of the accused):Sumilang saw Chavez at gas station and told about the Thunderbird. They raised the money. Chavez went to Sumilang house and asked if he was ready for the rest of money. He affirmed. At Eugenes Sumilang saw Pascual and warned Chavez was a smart agent and advised that Sumilang should be careful. Then the deed of sale was executed. Two or three days after, Asistio offered to buy the car of Sumilang and tendered the down payment. Trial Court gave credence to the testimony of Sumilang. As to Chavez, his testimony established his guilt beyond reasonable doubt and branded him Self confessed culprit. Trial Court decision: freed all

other accused except Chavez who was foundguilty beyond reasonable doubt. Chavez appealed to the Court of appeals but it was dismissed. ISSUE: Whether or not constitutional right of Chavez against self incrimination had been violated? HELD:Petitioner claims that there was a violation of right against self incrimation. Compulsion as it is understood here does not necessarily connote the use of violence; it may be the product of unintentional statements. Pressure which operates to overbear his will, disable him from making a free and rational choice, or impair his capacity for rational judgment would in our opinion be sufficient. During the trial, the petitioner declined to be a witness but the judge had impliedly forced him by saying that the prosecution has the right and that his testimony will not be used against him. Petitioner was enveloped by a coercive force; they deprived him of his will to resist; they foreclosed choice. With all these, we have no hesitancy in saying that petitioner was forced to testify to incriminate himself, in full breach of his constitutional right to remain silent. It cannot be said now that he has waived his right. He did not volunteer to take the stand and in his own defense; he did not offer himself as a witness; on the contrary, he claimed the right upon being called to testify. There is no waiver of the privilege. "To be effective, a waiver must be certain and unequivocal, a n d intelligently, understandably,and willingly made; such waiver following only where liberty of choice has been fully accorded. After a claim a witness cannot properly be held to have waived his privilege on vague and uncertain evidence. The course which petitioner takes is correct. Habeas corpus is a high prerogative writ. It is traditionally considered as an exceptional remedy to release a person whose liberty is i l l e g a l l y r e s t r a i ne d s u c h a s wh e n t h e accused's constitutional rights are

disregarded. A void judgment is in legal effect no judgment. By it no rights are divested. From it no rights can be obtained. Being worthless in itself, all proceedings founded upon it are equallyworthless. Supreme Court decision: Petition granted. Accused must be discharge.