Sie sind auf Seite 1von 12

OBLICON TOP 50 CASES QUICK GUIDE 1.

Barred F: taxicab and caritela collision QUASI-DELICTS: o v Garcia taxicab operator liability > subsidiary (under criminal case first exhausting props of driver) > primary (negligent employer) difference bet crime and quasi-delict > public v private interest > punishment v indemnification > according to penal law v any kind of negligence > beyond reasonable doubt v mere preponderance of evidence 2. Mendo F: Collision of a truck and a jeepney which produces a collision between the jeepney and a mercedez za v benz. Owner of Mercedes Benz sued driver of jeepney and the owner of the truck. Jeepney driver filed Arrieta charges against truck driver. Truck driver found guilty. Case against jeepney driver dismissed. Owner of Mercedes Benz appealed and said that his cause of action arises out of a quasi-delicta negligent act which causes the collision. H: A civil action under quasi-delict may proceed independently of criminal proceedings for criminal negligence, and may prosper regardless of the result of the criminal proceedings. The collision between the owner of Mercedez Benz and the jeepney driver is the result of the truck drivers conduct. The petitioner based his complaint on culpa criminal and not culpa aquiliana and it is believe that the jeepney driver cannot be held liable to such. F: PSBA student Carlito Bautista was stabbed by a person not a student of the school. The parents of Carlito sued the school. H: Carlitos assailants were not from PSBA. Art 2180 establishes the rule of in loco parentis >> damage caused or inflicted by pupils or students of an educational institution were liabilities of said institution while in its custody, hence, PSBA is not liable for the assailants action since they were not PSBAs students. The proper premise would have been based WON there was a breach of contract between PSBA and Carlito. PSBA is supposed to provide an atmosphere of learning and safety. The rule on quasi-delict does not apply. The trial court proceedings must continue in order to determine WON there has been such breach. F: Alfredo Amadora was in the premises of his school. Colegio de San Juan-Recoletos, when a classmate fired a gun at him which killed him. Alfredos parents filed a civil action against the school, its rector, the high school principal, the dean of the boys, and the physics teacher, together with the students liable for the killing, under Art 2180 of the Civil Code. H: Those liable under Art 2180 are the teachers-in-charge for academic institutions and head of schools for schools of arts and trades. In the case at bar, none of the respondents were liable. The rector, the principal and the dean of the boys exercised general authority only. The same reasoning applies for the physics teacher. There was no showing of negligence on the part of the respondents. F: molasses BREACH (substantial/casual): - casual breach only. There was substantial performance RECIPROCAL (rescission): - no bec ause of 20 day rule F: sale of Dasma property and in return, assumption of mortgage payments BREACH (substantial/casual): - substantial breach bec of nonpayment in mortgage VIODABLE (mutual restitution): - considered rescinded under A1191 TF mutual restitution F: mission soft drink franchise FRAUD (incidente/causante): incidente CONSENT (fraud): F: Volare 3 European tour. No European manager, dilapidated hotels. A case of dolo causante F: Collision between a passenger truck and a private automobile while attempting to pass each other over Talon bridge. The collision resulted in Narciso Guttierez having to suffer a fractured right leg. He blames both parties for the collision but the owner of the passenger truck blames the automobile and vice versa. H: Drivers are negligent since they did not give way to each other. Father of the car driver was also liable since he gave his guarantee when his son applied for a drivers license that his son is competent to drive. In the US, it is uniformly held that the head of the house and the owner of the vehicle is liable for the negligent acts of his children when he authorized them to run it. F: Delivery of 4,000 sacks of palay but only 2,488 cavans were delivered. The person responsible for the company, instead of the company delivering it was sued H: A Corporation has a personality of its own. But the person operating the company is also morally responsible for the breach of a contract. There is a difference between a contractual and extracontractual obligation. In the contractual obligation, it is the obligor who fulfill aid contract and not its agents. Hence, the obligor is the party guilty of negligence in the performance of a contract. On the

3. PSBA v CA, Bautista and Baustista

4. Amad ora vs. CA

5.

Song Fo v Hawaiian Phils

6.

Velard e v CA

7.

Wood house v Halili 8. Gerlad ez v CA 9. Guttie rez v Guttierez

10. Vasqu ez v Borja

11. De
Guia v Manila Electric

12. US v Barias

13. Sarmi ento v Sps. Cabrido 14. Crisos tomo v CA

15. Cetus Developm ent Inc. v CA

other hand, if independently from the contract, the person, by his fault or negligence caused damage to the plaintiff, then he would be personally liable for such damage to the plaintiff, then he would be personally liable for such damage. But since the case is based on a contract, the court has no jurisdiction over that issue and not adjudicate. F: train ran over man in platform holding the handle of the door NEGLIGENCE (standard of care required): - An experienced and attentive motorman should have discovered that something was wrong and would have stopped before he had driven the car over the entire distance from the point where the wheels left the track to the place where the post was struck. - The court granted that there is negligence as shown by the distance which the car was allowed to run with the front wheels of the rear truck derailed, aside from the fact that the car was running in an excessive speed. F: train accident; Barias was the motorman of a train. When he stopped to take in some passengers, he looked backwards to note if all the passengers are aboard. He was not able to see the three-year old child who ran in front of the train. The child died. H: Evidence shows that the place where the incident occurred is a public street and at the time where the residents are up and about (6 am). Being such, Barias should have employed more caution. With an exercise of due diligence, the accident would not have occurred. F: resetting a diamond earring into two gold rings. The diamond was removed by twisting the setting with a pair of pliers resulting in the breakage of the gem. H: There is negligence in resetting the jewelry. The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the omission of that diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances or the person, the time and of the place. F: Atty Crisostomo contracted the services of Caravan Travel and Tours International. She missed her flight because she failed to confirm her flight schedule. H: For reasons of public policy, a common carrier in a contract of carriage is bound by law to carry passengers as far as human care and foresight can provide using the utmost diligence of a very cautious person and with due regard for all circumstances. However, a travel agency is not a carrier. Its obligation is to procure tickets and facilitating travel permits or visas and booking customers for tours. It is thus not bound under the law to observe extra-ordinary diligence in the performance of its obligations. F: Payment of rentals, premises were sold to Cetus Development Inc., but petitioners were not able to pay rent because no collector came. Petitioners were asked to vacate premises, and afterwards, an ejection suit was brought against them. H: Section 2, RoC, "Landlord to proceed against tenant only after demand." states that the right to bring an action of ejectment or unlawful detainer must be counted from the time the defendants failed to pay rent after the demand therefor. The demand required partakes of an extrajudicial remedy that must be pursued before resorting to judicial action so much so that when there is full compliance with the demand, there is no need for court action. -for purposes of bringing an ejectment suit, 2 requisites: 1) must be failure to pay rent/comply with conditions of lease, and 2) must be DEMAND to both pay or to comply and vacate. F: Compromise Agreement. Failure to meet obligations upon demand H: When the petitioner failed to pay its due obligation after the demand was made, it incurred delay. Interest as damages is generally allowed as a matter of right. Santos has been deprived of funds to which he is entitled by virtue of their compromise agreement. The goal of compensation requires that the complainant be compensated for the loss of use of those funds. This compensation is in the form of interest. - Article 1169 of the New Civil Code provides: Those obliged to deliver or to do something incur in delay from the time the obligee judicially or extra-judicially demands from them the fulfillment of their obligation. - In order for the debtor to be in default, it is necessary that the following requisites be present: (1) that the obligation be demandable and already liquidated; (2) that the debtor delays performance; and (3) that the creditor requires the performance judicially or extra-judicially. F: Sps Vasquez entered into a Memorandum of Agreement with Ayala Corporation with Ayala buying from the spouses all of their shares of stock in Conduit Development, inc. Sps Vasquez demands Ayala to fulfill the terms of the agreement and sell four lands to them at the prevailing price in 1984. Ayala offered the prevailing price in 1990. H: Although the paragraph has a definite object, i.e., the sale of subject lots, the period within which they will be offered for sale to petitioners and, necessarily, the price for which the subject lots will be sold are not specified. The phrase at the prevailing market price at the time of the purchase connotes that there is no definite period within which AYALA Corporation is bound to reserve the subject lots for petitioners to exercise their privilege to purchase. Neither is there a fixed or determinable price at which the subject lots will be offered for sale. The price is considered certain if it may be determined with reference to another thing certain or if the determination thereof is left to the judgment of a specified person or persons. -Rule on demand and delay F: Tala Estate; failure to pay the price within the time specified H: In holding that the time was an essential element in the contract, the CFI considered that the

16. Santo s Ventura Hocorma Foundatio n v Santos

17. Vasqu ez v Ayala Corporati on

18. Abella v

Francisco

19. Vda de Villaruel v Manila Motor Co. Inc. and Colmenar es 20. Tengc o v CA

21. Centra l Bank of the Philippine s v CA

agreement in question was an option for the purchase of the lots. The SC, however, was divided on the question of whether the agreement was an option or a sale. But the SC ruled that regardless of whether it was an option or a sale, having agreed that the selling price would be paid not later than December, 1928, and in view of the fact that the vendor executed the contract to pay off with the proceeds thereof certain obligations which fell due in the same month of December, the time fixed for the payment of the selling price was essential in the transaction. F: Payment for a lease of building and the destruction of the property. Japanese Invasion. While the trial is pending, the property got burned. H: The Japanese occupation (of the building) is a pertubacion de derecho (trespassing under color of title) and not pertubacion de hecho (mere act of trespass). This is because the Japanese Occupation was legitimate following both International and Domestic law recognize the use of private properties at the time of war. Applying Art. 1560 the lessors are liable for it and that such occurrence resulted to the deprivation of the lessee from the peaceful use and enjoyment of the property leased. The obligation ceased during such deprivation. - a fortuitous event F: A contract of lease; then a transfer of property. Tengco, even with the knowledge of this transfer, attempted to pay to the same person. Payment refused. Tengco did not deliver to the new owner nor consign it to the court. H: refusal to accept payment is justified. There was already a new owner. - The tenant's mere failure to pay rent does not ipso facto make unlawful his possession of the leased premises. It is failure to pay rents after a demand therefore is made that entitles the lessor to bring an action of Unlawful Detainer, Moreover, the lessor has the privilege to waive his right to bring an action against his tenant and give the latter credit for the payment of the rents and allow him to continue indefinitely in the possession of the premises. During such period, the tenant would not be in illegal possession of the premises and the landlord can not maintain an action until after he has taken steps to convert the legal possession into an illegal possession. F: Island Saving Bank>> prohibited by the Central Bank to do business in the Philippines; Prior to this event, Island Saving Bank approved a loan application of Sulpicio Tolentino. Island was not able to deliver the whole of the sum because of the prohibition. Tolentino also incurred delay H: Since both are in default, liability should be offset. F: typewriter repair CONTAVENTION OF THE TENOR: - gave back the typewriter with cover and essential parts missing REMEDIES (substituted performance/undoing of poor work): - went to another to have it fixed for P89.00 - payment for repair to another plus other costs for missing parts and moral damages F: The telegram; was not able to deliver the message to the relatives in the US. Relatives was not able to know of their mothers death H: Operator liable to pay damages including moral damages F: Burmese rice, not complied with letter of credit. Substituted with Thailand rice, in dollars BREACH (contravention of the tenor): Letter of credit: PAYMENT (what/identity): - exchange rate at the time of the obligation incurred F: Defendant entered into a contract with US Navy Exchange Subic bay, Phil, for the Operations of a fleet of taxicabs with each cab having its taximeter and radio transceiver; private respondent refused to open letter of credit; bad faith H: The damages which the obligor is liable for includes not only the value of the loss suffered by the obligee [dao 3mergence] but also the profits which the latter failed to obtain [lucro cesante]. If the obligor acted in good faith, he shall be liable for those damages that are the natural and probable consequences of the breach of the obligation and which the parties have foreseen or could have reasonably foreseen at the time the obligation was constituted; and in case of fraud, bad faith, malice or wanton attitude, he shall be liable for all damages which may be reasonably attributed to the nonperformance of the obligation. The same is true with respect to moral and exemplary damages. The applicable legal provisions on the matter, Articles 2220 and 2232 of the Civil Code, allow the award of such damages in breaches of contract where the defendant acted in bad faith. F: Windmill; Jacinto Taguilig (JMT Engineering and General Merchandising) proposed to Vicente Herce jr. to construct a windmill. Afterwards, the petitioner refused to pay the balance. Deep well controversy; Windmill collapsed. O_o H: The words "deep well" preceded by the prepositions "for" and "suitable for" were meant only to convey the idea that the proposed windmill would be appropriate for a deep well pump with a diameter of 2 to 3 inches. -The claim of Guillermo Pili of SPGMI that Herce Jr. wrote him a letter asking him to build a deep well pump as part of the price/contract Herce had with Tanguilig is unsubstantiated. The alleged letter was never presented in court. -If indeed the deep well were part of the windmill project, the contract for its installation would have been strictly a matter between petitioner and Pili himself with the former assuming the obligation to pay the price. -If the price of P60,000.00 included the deep well, the obligation of respondent was to pay the entire amount to petitioner without prejudice to any action that Guillermo Pili or SPGMI may take, if any, against the latter.

22. Chave
zv Gonzales

23. Telefa st v Castro

24. Arriet
a v NARIC

25. Magat vs. Medialdea

26. Taguili g v CA

27. Khe Hong Cheng v CA

28. Sigua n v Lim

29. Juan
Nakpil & Sons v CA

-could not claim force majeure. Collapse of the windmill because of strong wind in untenable. Strong winds are ought to be present where windmills are constructed. Oo nga naman. F: Butuan Shipping Lines; Shipment of Copra in M/V PRINCE ERIC owned by Khe Hong Cheng. Prince Eric sank. The shipment has a marine insurance policy issued by American Home Insurance Company. Having been subrogated to the rights of the consignee, American Home instituted a civil case to recover money paid to consignee. While the case is still pending, Khe Hong Cheng executed deed of donations of land to his children. (in fraud of creditors) H: An action to rescind or an accion pauliana must be of last resort, availed of only after all other legal remedies have been exhausted and have been proven futile. For an accion pauliana to accrue, the following requisites must concur: 1) That the plaintiff asking for rescission has a credit prior to the alienation, although demandable later; 2) That the debtor has made a subsequent contract conveying a patrimonial benefit to a third person; 3) That the creditor has no other legal remedy to satisfy his claim, but would benefit by rescission of the conveyance to the third person; 4) That the act being impugned is fraudulent; 5) That the third person who received the property conveyed, if by onerous title, has been an accomplice in the fraud. F: Deed of Donation executed by Lim in favor of her children. H: donation is not in fraud of creditos. Accion Pauliana untenable. Contracts entered in fraud may be rescinded only when the creditors cannot in any manner collect the claims due them. Action for rescission is a subsidiary remedy only. The petitioner was not able to prove that she had exhausted other legal means to obtain reparation for the same. F: construction of PBA Building in Manila. After earthquake, substantial damage FORTUITOUS: - not fortuitous events bec other buildings did not incur damage F: barge pulled by two tugboats crashed into the Nagtahan bridge causing it to list FORTUITOUS: - not fortuitous - presence of two tugboats TF more control F: Laureano borrowed Atty. Dioquinos car. The car was stoned by some mischievous boys. As a result, the windshield broke. H: Laureano has no obligation to pay for the damages sustained due to throwing of stones that broke the windshield. The extraordinary circumstance independent of his will as obligor exempts him of the same by reason of force majeure or caso fortuito; There is no requirement of diligence beyond what human care and foresight can provide. F:Abad received a pendant with diamonds to be sold on commission basis or to be returned on demand. Private respondent Abad said that while she was walking home, she was accosted by two men and the jewelry was taken H: To avail of the exemption granted in the law, it is not necessary that the persons responsible for the occurrence should be found or punished; it would only be sufficient to establish that the unforeseeable event, the robbery in this case, did take place without any concurrent fault on the debtor's part, and this can be done by preponderant evidence. Abad was negligent for coming home at night because of the high crime rate. But that the same rule should obtain ten years previously, in 1961, when the robbery in question did take place, for at that time criminality had not by far reached the levels attained in the present day. F: ECI executed a contract with NAWASA to construct the 2nd IPO-Bicti tunnel in Norzagaray. The construction covered the area of defendant NPC (Ipo Dam); Typhoon Welming devastated the area. To prevent overflow, NPC caused the opening of spillway gates. The rush of water washed away the construction of ECi. H: As held in Juan Nakpil & Sons v. CA, the act of God doctrine requires that the act must be occasioned exclusively by the violence of nature and human agencies had no part therein. When the effect is found to be in part the result of the participation of man, whether it be active intervention, neglect or failure to act, the whole occurrence is humanized and therefore removed from the rules applicable to the acts of God. >> NPC was negligent but it was not gross. F: Yobido Bus Liner bound for Davao City from Surigao del Sur. The left front tire of the bus exploded. The bus fell into a ravine. The tire which exploded was new. H: The fact that a new tire was installed nor even the existence of force majeure does not imply caso fortuito immediately as the carrier must still prove that it was not negligent in causing the death or injury resulting from the accident - There were human factors involved in this case that showed negligence such as the failure of the driver to slow down despite the caution by a passenger, with a speed a little less than the speed limit, on a road that was rough, winding and wet due to the rain. Driver must have taken precautionary measures given the circumstances but the driver did not do anything to this effect - Driver was not able to overthrow the presumption of negligence. F: BMMC is the owner and operator of the sugar central in Bacolod; milling contract; BMMC was unable to use its railroad facilities because it traverse another hacienda. H: petitioner took a calculated risk that all the landowners would renew their contract, which is not the case. F: Globe coordinated the provision of various communication facilities for US military bases in Clark Air base and Subic Naval Base. Globe was contracted which in turn entered into an agreement with

30. Repub
lic v Luzon Stevedori ng 31. Dioqui no v Lauerano

32. Austri a v CA

33. NPC v CA

34. Yobid o v CA

35. Bacolo d- Murcia Milling Co., Inc. v CA 36. Philco msat v

Globe Telecom

37. Easter
n Shipping Lines v CA 38. Crismi na Garments v CA

philcomsat. RP_US Military Bases Agreement expired. Globe wants to terminate agreement with Philcomsat. H: It could not be considered as a force majeure since the expiration was foreseeable. But the Court found it unjust to require Globe to continue paying even though Philcomsat cannot be compelled to continue performing its obligation. 2 fiber drums of riboflavin USURIOUS:

39. Keng Hua Products v CA

40. Securi ty Bank v RTC Makati

41. Almed
a v CA

F: Girls denim pants; petitioner failed to pay alleging that 6,164 of 20,762 denims were defective. H: Because the amount due in this case arose from a contract for a piece of work, not from a loan or forbearance of money, the legal interest of six percent (6%) per annum should be applied. Furthermore, since the amount of the demand could be established with certainty when the Complaint was filed, the six percent (6%) interest should be computed from the filing of the said Complaint. But after the judgment becomes final and executory until the obligation is satisfied, the interest should be reckoned at twelve percent (%12) per year. F: Respondent sea-land service, inc., a shipping company received 76 bales of unsorted waste paper for shipment to Keng Hua Paper products, Co. in Manila. Notices of arrival were transmitted to the petitioner but the latter failed to discharge the shipment from the container during the grace period. Demurrage charges accrued. Petitioner countered that accepting the shipment which was 10 metric tons more than what was stipulated would violate Central bank rules and regulations of custom and tariff laws. H: Mere apprehension of violating customs, tariff and central bank laws without a clear demonstration that taking delivery of the shipment has become legally impossible cannot defeat the petitioners contractual obligation and liability under the bill of lading. The contract of carriage, as stipulated in the bill of lading, must be treated independently of the contract of sale between the seller and the buyer, and the contract for the issuance of a letter of credit between the buyer and the issuing bank. Any discrepancy between the amount of the goods described in the commercial invoice in the contract of sale and the amount allowed in the letter of credit will not affect the validity and enforceability of the contract of carriage as embodied in the bill of lading. Petitioners remedy in the case of overshipment lies against the seller/shipper, not against the carrier. - The case involves an obligation not arising from a loan or forbearance of money, thus pursuant to Art. 2209 of the Civil Code the applicable interest rate is 6% per annum to be computed from the date of the trial courts decision. The rate of 12% per annum shall be charged on the total then outstanding from the time the judgment becomes final and executory until its satisfaction. NOTE: A bill of lading serves 2 functions. 1st, it is a receipt for the goods shipped. 2nd, it is a contract by which three parties, namely, the shipper, the carrier, and the consignee undertake specific responsibilities and assume stipulated obligations. F: Magtanggol Eusebio executed several promissory notes in favor of Secutiry Bank and Trust Co. with a 23% interest per annum. RTC ordered Eusebio to pay the balance with 12% interest. H: Central Bank Circular 905 was issued by Central Bank Monetary Board which empowers them to prescribe the maximum rates of interest for loans and certain forebearances - This circular did not repeal or in any way amend the Usury Law but simply suspended the latters effectivity; basic is the rule in statutory construction that when the law is clear and unambiguous, the court is left with not alternative but to apply the same in its clear language - respondent did not question the rate and it is not for the court to change the stipulation in the contract where it is not illegal. USURIOUS: 21% to 68% not valid, unconscionable, unilaterally raised the rates CONDITION (vs period): 11 iron lode mineral claims - What characterizes a conditional obligation is the fact that its efficacy or obligatory force (as distinguished from its demandability) is subordinated to the happening of a future and uncertain event; so that if the suspensive condition does not take place, the parties would stand as if the conditional obligation had never existed - this is a case of suspensive period or term F: Transfer of title to the property in Gonzales name as a condition precedent to the payment of the agreed purchase price. H: Condition is defined as every future and uncertain event upon which an obligation or provision is made to depend. It is a future and uncertain event upon which the acquisition or resolution of rights is made to depend by those who execute the juridical act. - Without the fulfillment of the condition, sale of the property under the Contract cannot be perfected, and Gonzales cannot be obliged to purchase the property. F: Conditional contract of sale of house and lot H: What is clearly established by the plain language of the subject document is that when the said Receipt of Down Payment was prepared and signed by the Coronels, the parties had agreed to a conditional contract of sale, consummation of which is subject only to the successful transfer of the certificate of title from the name of petitioners father, Constancio P. Coronel, to their names. The Court significantly notes that this suspensive condition was, in fact, fulfilled on February 6, 1985. CONDITION (resolutory): Donation; build park.

42. Gaite
v Fonacier

43. Gonzal es v Heirs of Thomas

44. Coron el v CA

45. Parks
v Province

of Tarlac

46. Centra
l Philippine University v CA 47. Quijad a v CA

CONDITION (resolutory): PERIOD (court may fix): Donation; build medical College

48. Naga
Telephone Co, Inc v CA

F: Donation of two-hectare land to the municipalty of talacogon, Agusan del Sur with the condition that the parcel of land shall be used solely and exclusively as part of the campus of the proposed provincial high school of the said municipality. The donor sold a part of the lot to a third person. H: At the time of the sales, Trinidad could not have sold the lots since the ownership had been transferred by virtue of the deed of donation. So long as the resolutory condtion subsists and capable of fulfillment, the donation remains effective and the donee continues to be the owner subject only to the rights of the donor or his successors-in-interest under the deed of donation. - Since no period was imposed by the donor on when the must the donee must comply with the condition, the latter remains the owner so long as he has tried to comply with the condition within a reasonable period. In this case, the Municipality manifested in a resolution that they cannot comply with the condition of building a school and the same was made known to the donor. This was when the ownership reverted back to Trinidad as provided in the reversion clause of the deed of donation. -the donor still has an inchoate interest over the land. Such inchoate interest may be the subject of contracts including a contract of sale. Here what the donor sold was the land itself which she no longer owned. It would have been different if what she sold were her interests over the property under the deed of donation which is subject to the possibility of reversion of ownership arising from the nonfulfillment of the resolutory condition. - Ownership by the seller on the thing sold at the time of the perfection of the contract of sale is not an element for its perfection. Perfection per se does not transfer ownership which occurs upon the actual or constructive delivery of the thing sold. IMPOSSIBILITY (vs difficulty):

49. Osme
na v Rama

50. Hermo
sa v Longora

51. Taylor
v Uy Tieng Piao

52. Rusta
n Pulp and Paper Mills v IAC 53. Smith Bell v Sotelo Matti

F: promised to pay debt next sugar harvest with her house as pledge CONDITION (mixed): - A condition imposed upon a contract by the promisor, the performance of which depends upon his exclusive will, is void, in accordance with the provisions of article 1115 of the Civil Code. - It was suggested during the discussion of the case in this court that, in the acknowledgment of the indebtedness made by the defendant, she imposed the condition that she would pay the obligation if she sold her house. If that statement found in her acknowledgment of the indebtedness should be regarded as a condition, it was a condition which depended upon her exclusive will, and is, therefore, void. (Art. 1115, Civil Code.) The acknowledgment, therefore, was an absolute acknowledgment of the obligation and was sufficient to prevent the statute of limitation from barring the action upon the original contract. F: sale property in Spain CONDITION (mixed): - The condition in question is not a condicion potestativa since it also depends upon other circumstances beyond the debtors control. The condition of the obligation was not purely a potestative one, depending exclusively upon the will of the intestate, but a mixed one, depending partly upon the will of the intestate and partly upon chance. The will to sell on the part of the intestate was present in fact, or presumed to legally exist, although the price and other conditions thereof were still within his discretion and final approval. There were still other conditions that had to concur to effect the sale, mainly that a buyer, ready, able and willing to purchase the property under the conditions demanded by the intestate. F: operator for expeller machines CONDITION (mixed): - A condition at once facultative and resolutory may be valid even though the condition is made to depend upon the will of the obligor. CONDITION (effect prevention of fulfillment of condition by obligor): - If it were apparent, or could be demonstrated that the defendants were under positive obligation to cause the machinery to arrive in Manila, they would of course be liable, in the absence of affirmative proof showing that the non-arrival of the machinery was due to some cause not having its origin in their own act or will. - The contract, however, expresses no such positive obligation, and its existence cannot be implied in the face of the stipulation, defining the conditions under which the defendants can cancel the contract. F: supplier of raw materials in paper mill CONDITION (mixed): - Petitioners contend that they are within the right stoppage guaranteed by par 7. There is no doubt that the contract speaks loudly about petitioners' prerogative but what diminishes the legal efficacy of such right is the condition attached to it which is dependent exclusively on will of the petitioner for which reason, the SC treated the controversial stipulation as inoperative F:delivery of machines but the date of the delivery and the delivery itself was not ensured because of the war. Refusal to accept the delivery because of the supposed delay. H: When no definite date has been fixed for the delivery of goods, the obligor shall not be held guilty of delay in the fulfillment of its obligation if it delivers the goods within a reasonable time.

54. Romer o vs. CA

55. Roma
n Catholic Arch of Manila v CA 56. Herrer av Leviste

57. Boysa
wv Interphil Promotion s

58. UP v
Delos Angeles

59. De
Erquiaga v CA

60. Ong v
CA

F: A Central Warehouse in Manila; a parcel of land was offered, but there were squatters in the area. Squatters were not evicted within the contractual period stipulated. H: Private respondent's failure "to remove the squatters from the property" within the stipulated period gives petitioner the right to either refuse to proceed with the agreement or waive that condition in consonance with Article 1545 of the Civil Code." This option clearly belongs to petitioner and not to private respondent. -The undertaking required of private respondent does not constitute a "potestative condition dependent solely on his will" that might, otherwise, be void in accordance with Article 1182 of the Civil Codebut a "mixed" condition "dependent not on the will of the vendor alone but also of third persons like the squatters and government agencies and personnel concerned.". Where the so-called "potestative condition" is imposed not on the birth of the obligation but on its fulfillment, only the condition is avoided, leaving unaffected the obligation itself. F: donated land subject to condition not to be sold in 100 years CONDITION (impossible): - the prohibition in the deed of donation against the alienation of the property for an entire century, being an unreasonable emasculation and denial of an integral attribute of ownership, should be declared as an illegal or impossible condition within the contemplation of Article 727 of the Civil Code. Consequently, as specifically stated in said statutory provision, such condition shall be considered as not imposed. No reliance may accordingly be placed on said prohibitory paragraph in the deed of donation F: Leviste had obtained a loan from the GSIS. As security therefore, Leviste mortgaged two (2) lots, one located at Paranaque and the other at Buendia with the 3-storey building thereon. Leviste sold to Herrera the Buendia property with the condition that he would assume Levistes indebtedness to the GSIS among others. Was not able to comply. Properties were foreclosed. Leviste assigned the right to redeem to Marcelo. Herrera contests the action as unjust enrichment to Marcelo. H: 1.Neither the GSIS, Marcelo nor Leviste benefited in any way at the expense of Herrera. They paid and received what is due them. 2. Though Herrera actually suffered loss (amount he paid to Leviste, payment to GSIS less rentals received), but this loss are attributable to his fault in: (a) not being able to submit collateral to GSIS in substitution of Paranaque property, (b) not paying off the mortgage debt, and (c)not making earnest effort to redeem the property as possible redemptioner. F: fight of Elorde RECIPROCAL (rescission): - Boysaw violated the contract when he fought with Avila. Civil Code provides, the power to rescind obligations is implied, in reciprocal ones, (as in this case) in case one of the obligors shld not comply w/ what is incumbent upon him. Another violation was made in the transfers of managerial rights. These were in fact novations which, to be valid, must be consented to by Interphil. When a contract is unlawfully novated, the aggrieved creditor may not deal with the substitute. - The appellees could have opted to rescind or refuse to recognize the new manager, but all they wanted was to postpone the fight owing to an injury Elorde sustained. The desire to postpone the fight is lawful and reasonable. The GAB did not act arbitrarily in acceding to the request to reset the date of the fight and Yulo himself agreed to abide by the GAB ruling. - The appellees offered to move the fight w/in the 30 day period for postponement but this was refused by the appellants, notwithstanding the fact that by virtue of the appellants violations, they have forfeited any right to the enforcement of the contract. F: UP land with contract to ALUMCO for lumber but did not pay TF UP rescinded contract and got another company RECIPROCAL (rescission): UP can treat the contract with ALUMCO as rescinded without any judicial pronouncement. The party who deems the contract violated may consider it resolved or rescinded, and act accordingly, without previous court action, but it proceeds at its own risk. It is only the final judgment of the corresponding court that will and finally settle whether the action taken was or was not correct in law. F: bought shares but rescinded bec only property is hacienda RECIPROCAL (rescission): - The Hacienda San Jose and 1,500 shares of stock have already been returned to Erquiaga. Therefore, upon the conveyance to him of the remaining 1,600 shares, Erquiaga (or his heirs) should return to Reynoso the price of P410,000 which the latter paid for those shares. Pursuant to the rescission decreed in the final judgment, there should be simultaneous mutual restitution of the principal object of the contract to sell (3,100 shares) and of the consideration paid (P410,000). This should not await the mutual restitution of the fruits, namely: the legal interest earned by Reynoso's P410,000 while in the possession of Erquiaga, and its counterpart: the fruits of Hacienda San Jose which Reynoso received from the time the hacienda was delivered to him on November 4, 1968 until it was placed under receivership by the court on March 3, 1975. - However, since Reynoso has not yet given an accounting of those fruits, it is only fair that Erquiaga's obligation to deliver to Reynosa the legal interest earned by his money, should await the rendition and approval of his accounting. F: Sps Robles enetered in an agreement to sell land to Ong. It was stipulated that Ong pay loan of Sps Robles in BPI as payment. But he did not comply. Sps Robles now asking for rescission under A1191. RECIPROCAL (rescission): - Article 1191 refers to rescission applicable to reciprocal obligations. Rescission of reciprocal obligations under Article 1191 should be distinguished from rescission of contracts under Article 1383. - While Article 1191 uses the term rescission, the original term which was used in the old Civil Code, from which the article was based, was resolution. Resolution is a principal action which is based on

61. Visaya
n Saw Mill v CA

breach of a party, while rescission under Article 1383 is a subsidiary action limited to cases of rescission for lesion under Article 1381 of the New Civil Code, which expressly enumerates the rescissible contracts. - The "Agreement of Purchase and Sale" shows that it is in the nature of a contract to sell, as distinguished from a contract of sale. In a contract of sale, the title to the property passes to the vendee upon the delivery of the thing sold; while in a contract to sell, ownership is, by agreement, reserved in the vendor and is not to pass to the vendee until full payment of the purchase price. In a contract to sell, the payment of the purchase price is a positive suspensive condition, the failure of which is not a breach, casual or serious, but a situation that prevents the obligation of the vendor to convey title from acquiring an obligatory force. F: Scrap iron; a telegram to cancel the contract because of failure to comply with the conditions thereof. Non-fulfillment of a positive suspensive condition. H: What obtains in the case at bar is a mere contract to sell or promise to sell, and not a contract of sale. The contract is not one of sale where the buyer acquired ownership over the property subject to the resolutory condition that the purchase price would be paid after delivery. There was to be no actual sale until the opening, making or indorsing of the irrevocable and unconditional letter of credit. F:An agreement to construct a 3-storey dormitory between Sps carungay and Deiparine. However, the Carungays found out that Deiparine was deviating from the plans and specifications, thus impairing the strength and safety of the building. H: The facts show that Deiparine deliberately deviated from the specifications of the Carungays (changing the minimum strength, concrete mixture, etc.), possibly to avoid additional expenses so as to avoid reduction in profits. His breach of duty constituted a substantial violation of the contract, which is correctible by judicial rescission. Particularly for reciprocal obligations, Art.1191 CC provides that: The power to rewind obligations is implied in reciprocal ones, in case one of the obligors should not comply with what is incumbent upon him. Tugeugarao Cadastre (usual case of nonfulfillment and then rescission)) Parcel of land in Meycauayan Bulacan

62. Deipar ine,Jr. v CA

63. Iringa n v CA 64. Vda Mistica v Sps Naguiat 65. Lachic av Araneta

66. Ponce
de Leon v Syjuco

67. Buce v CA

68. Aranet av Philippine Sugar Estate

F: Lachica wanted to pay Araneta before date stipulated PERIOD (presumption): - presumption is that period is for the benefit of both the creditor and debtor TF cannot compel Araneta to accept such payment in advance F: Ponce tried to pay in advance Syjuco because he was being hunted down by the Japanese being a member of the guerilla force PERIOD (presumption): - presumption is that the period is deemed constituted in favor of both the creditor and the debtor unless from its tenor or from other circumstances it appears that the period has been established for the benefit of either one of them (Art. 1127, Civil Code). - creditor cannot be forced to accept payment contrary to the stipulation because he may (1) want to keep his money invested safely instead of having it in his hands, or (2) want to protect himself against sudden decline in the purchasing power of the currency loaned specially at a time when there are many factors that influence the fluctuation of the currency Rentals; automatic renewal of the lease contract? Held: The phrase "subject to renewal for another ten (10) years" is unclear on whether the parties contemplated an automatic renewal or extension of the term, or just an option to renew the contract; and if what exists is the latter, who may exercise the same or for whose benefit it was stipulated. -There is nothing in the stipulations in the contract and the parties' actuation that shows that the parties intended an automatic renewal or extension of the term of the contract. The fact that the lessee was allowed to introduce improvements on the property is not indicative of the intention of the lessors to automatically extend the contract. Neither the filing of the complaint a year before the expiration of the 15-year term nor private respondents' acceptance of the increased rentals has any bearing on the intention of the parties regarding renewal. Fernandez v. CA is applicable to the case at bar, thus: In a reciprocal contract like a lease, the period must be deemed to have been agreed upon for the benefit of both parties, absent language showing that the term was deliberately set for the benefit of the lessee or lessor alone. F: PSED bought land from Araneta with condition that he will construct roads surrounding the future Sto. Domingo Church. Because of the squatters, Araneta has not complied with his end in constructing the roads. PSED asked that the court fix a period for which Araneta should comply. TC and CA fixed it to 2 years PERIOD (court may fix): - Article 1197 is predicated on the absence of any period fixed by the parties and it involves a two-step process. The court must first determine that the obligation does not fix a period (or that the period is made to depend upon the will of the debtor), but from the nature and the circumstances it can be inferred that a period was intended. The court must then proceed to the second step, and decide what period was probably contemplated by the parties. > here there was no date set probably bec of the presence of the squatters and they know the construction of the roads will be predicated upon their eviction TF period set until squatters evicted not

69. Yncha
usti v Yulo

70. Jaucia
n v Querol

71. RFC v
CA

72. Quiom bing v CA

73. Incion
g v CA

74. Alipio v CA

75. Makati Devt Co. v Empire Insurance Co. 76. Tan v CA

2 years - An obligation to pay a sum of money is not novated in a new instrument wherein the old is ratified, by changing only the term of payment and adding other obligations not incompatible with the old one. SOLIDARY (defenses available to solidary debtor against creditor):? F: deceased Rogero (represented by administrator Querol) thought he signed as surety for Dayadante but clear in contract that they are solidarily bound (jointly and severally) SOLIDARY: English (common law): joint > solidaria in fact Spanish (civil law): mancomunadamente joint pro rata, mancomunidad simple, mancomunidad solidary - mancomunidad solidaria, in solidum, jointly and severally F: Anduiza and Cano jointly and severally owed Agricultural and Industrial Bank (now RFC) P13,800. Madrid, who stayed at Anduizas during the war, paid their debt when they did not pay such loan. > debts due because of the phrase on or before > payment can be made by any person, whether approved by the debtor or not. One who makes the payment may recover from the debtor, unless it was made against his express will. In the latter case, he can recover only in so far as the payment was beneficial to him. > Madrid then is entitled to pay the obligation irrespective of Anduizas will or the bank. SOLIDARY:? Construction and Service Agreement whereby Nicencio Tan Quiombing and Dante Biscocho, as the 1st Party, jointly and severally bound themselves to construct a house for private respondents Francisco and Manuelita Saligo, as the 2nd Party. F: signed promissory note as solidary debtor (jointly and severally liable) not guarantor for P50,000 which they thought to be P5,000 only (for buying chainsaw) > no trickery since signature above typewritten figure) SOLIDARY: - difference between guarantor and suretyship - difference between solidary co-debtor and fiador in solidum > A guarantor who binds himself in solidum with the principal debtor under the provisions of the second paragraph does not become a solidary co-debtor to all intents and purposes. There is a difference between a solidary co-debtor, and a fiador in solidum (surety). The later, outside of the liability he assumes to pay the debt before the property of the principal debtor has been exhausted, retains all the other rights, actions and benefits which pertain to him by reason of the fiansa; while a solidary co-debtor has no other rights than those bestowed upon him in Section 4, Chapter 3, title 1, Book IV of the Civil Code. F:Lease of 14.5 hectare of Fishpond; The lease was for a period of five years. Respondent subleased the pond. Placido Alipio, the sublease, died. Jaring sued for collection while Alipios wife move for dismissal on the grounds that her husband is dead. H: Under the law, the Alipios' obligation (and also that of the Manuels) is one which is chargeable against their conjugal partnership. When petitioner's husband died, their conjugal partnership was automatically dissolved[9] and debts chargeable against it are to be paid in the settlement of estate proceedings. F: Lot in Urdaneta Village; H: - penal clause in this case was inserted not to indemnify MDC for any damage it might suffer as a result of a breach of the contract but rather to compel performance of the so-called "special condition" and thus encourage home building among lot owners in the Urdaneta Village 2 loans from the CCP H: Article 1226 of the New Civil Code provides that: In obligations with a penal clause, the penalty shall substitute the indemnity for damages and the payment of interests in case of non-compliance, if there is no stipulation to the contrary. Nevertheless, damages shall be paid if the obligor refuses to pay the penalty or is guilty of fraud in the fulfillment of the obligation. The penalty may be enforced only when it is demandable in accordance with the provisions of this Code. The promissory note expressly provides for the imposition of both interest and penalties in case of default on the part of the petitioner in the payment of the restructured loan. Lease Agreement involving the Avenue, Broadway and Capitol theaters H: As a general rule, in obligations with a penal clause, the penalty shall substitute the indemnity for damages and the payment of interests in case of non-compliance. However, there are exceptions: 1) when there is a stipulation to the contrary 2) when the obligor is sued fro refusal to pay the agreed penalty 3) when the obligor is guilty of fraud The forfeiture clause in the lease agreement would not unjustly enrich OVEC at expense of Sy and CBISCOcontrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or policy. A penal clause is an accessory obligation which the parties attach to a principal obligation for the purpose of insuring the performance thereof by imposing on the debtor a special prestation (generally consisting in the payment of a sum of money) in case the obligation is not fulfilled or is irregularly or inadequately fulfilled. In the case at bar, the penalty cannot substitute for the P100,000.00 supposed damage suffered by OVEC from opportunity cost. It represents the P10,000 per month in additional rental during the ten months of injunction period. Thus, it must be applied against the injunction bond. F: engineering services by Kalalo to architect firm of Luz. Agreement in dollars. Also Kalalo sent statement of account to Luz stating the fees for the projects but when Kalalo demanded payment, it was higher than was stipulated in the statement of account

77. Countr y Bankers Insurance v CA

78. Kalalo
v Luz

79. St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Co. V Macondra y and Co., Inc.

PAYMENT (what/identity): - payment in dollars prohibited by RA 529 but if agreement prior to enactment (June 16, 1950), exchange rate set at the time of the obligation was incurred BUT it cannot be ascertained TF exchange rate at the time of payment shall be applied ESTOPPEL (definition): - essential elements of estoppel in pais party to be estopped 1) conduct amounting to false representation or concealment of material facts or at least calculated to convey the impression that the facts are otherwise than, and inconsistent with, those which the party subsequently attempts to assert 2) intent, or at least expectation that this conduct shall be acted upon by, or at least influence, the other party 3) knowledge, actual or constructive, of the real facts party claiming estoppel 1) lack of knowledge and of the means of knowledge of the truth as the facts in question 2) reliance in good faith upon the conduct or statements of the party to be estopped 3) action or inaction based thereon of such character as to change the position or status of the party claiming the estoppel, to his injury, detriment or prejudice > statement of account was written by mistake TF Kalalo not estopped F: Winthrop products shipped onboard SS Tai Ping, owned and operated by Wilhelm Wilhelmsen, 218 cartons and drums of drugs and medicine. The shipment was insured by St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company. Insurance company paid Winthrop the amount of damage materials and became subrogated to the rights of Winthrop. H: the liabilities of the defendants-appellees with respect to the lost or damaged shipments are expressly limited to the C.I.F. value of the goods as per contract of sea carriage embodied in the bill of lading. The plaintiff-appellant, as insurer, after paying the claim of the insured for damages under the insurance, is subrogated merely to the rights of the assured. As subrogee, it can recover only the amount that is recoverable by the latter. Since the right of the assured, in case of loss or damage to the goods, is limited or restricted by the provisions in the bill of lading, a suit by the insurer as subrogee necessarily is subject to like limitations and restrictions. The C.I.F. Manila value of the goods which were lost or damaged, according to the claim of the consignee dated September 26, 1960 is $226.37 and $324.3 or P456.14 and P653.53, respectively, in Philippine Currency. The peso equivalent was based by the consignee on the exchange rate of P2.015 to $1.00 which was the rate existing at that time. The trial court committed no error in adopting the aforesaid rate of exchange. F:Testate of Angela Butte; land ws mortgaged by the deceased. However, that same land was sold by Papa, who was acting as attorney-in-fact of the deceased, to respondent Penarroyo. But before the title of the land was released, Angela passed away. Petitioner kept on collecting rentals from tenants and refused to deliver the property. Petitioner further alleges that he could no longer recall the transaction that happened about 10 years ago. He also testified that he did not encash the check. H: It is untenable for petitioner not to have encashed the check after all these years. In the case that he did not, it is thru his own fault and delay While it is true that the delivery of a check produces the effect of payment only when it is cashed, pursuant to Art. 1249 of the Civil Code, the rule is otherwise if the debtor is prejudiced by the creditor's unreasonable delay in presentment. The acceptance of a cheek implies an undertaking of due diligence in presenting it for payment, and if he from whom it is received sustains loss by want of such diligence, it will be held to operate as actual payment of the debt or obligation for which it was given. The cause of action for specific performance which respondents Valencia and Pearroyo have against petitioner is different from the cause of action which the estate of Ramon Papa, Jr. may have to enforce whatever rights or liens it has on the property by reason of its being an alleged assignee of the bank's rights of mortgage. F: Absconding Sheriff H: Payment should be made to the right person and in the case that that person absconded, debtor would still be liable. Defense of Fortuitous event untenable. F: Universal bought 6 ships from Reparations Commission schedule of payment in equal payments spread over 10 years APPLICATION OF PAYMENTS (most onerous): - first installments due & demandable at time of the action & payment of Universal of P10,000 shall be applied to surety company as guaranteed portion of the debt (most onerous)

80. Papa v Valencia

81. PAL vs CA

82. Repar
ations Commissi on v Universal Deep Sea Fishing 83. Paculd ov Regalado

F: Lease on several properties; wet market; non performance; application of payments H: There was no clear assent from the petitioner to the change in the manner of application of payment. The silence of the petitioner with regard the request of the respondent with regard the application of the rental did not mean that he consented thereto. - Assuming further that petitioner did not choose the obligation to be first satisfied, giving the respondent the right to apply the payments to the other obligations of the petitioner, the law provided

84. DBP vs. CA

85. Filinve st Credit Corp. v Philippine Acetylene

that no payment shall be made to a debt not yet due (Article 1252 of the Civil Code) and that payment must be first applied to the debt most onerous to the debtor (Article 1254 of the Civil Code). F: Plaintiff CUBA is a grantee of a fishpond Lease Agreement from the Govt; failed to pay H: On NOVATION: the said assignment merely complemented or supplemented the notes; both could stand together. The obligation to pay a sum of money remained, and the assignment merely served as security for the loans covered by the promissory notes. - on CESSION: Article 1255 contemplates the existence of two or more creditors and involves the assignment of all the debtor's property, but in the case only DBP is the creditor - on DATION: The assignment, being in its essence a mortgage, was but a security and not a satisfaction of indebtedness so not Dation as defined in Article 1254 F: PAC purchased from Lim a 1969 Chevrolet and as security, he executed a chattel mortgage over vehicle in favor of Lim. Lim then assigned all his rights, title, and interest to the Filinvest Finance Corporation, which later on assigned all its rights to filinvest Credit Corporation. Lim became fully paid, but Phil Acetylene defaulted in nine successive payment. PAC alleges that it has already returned the vehicle and thus extinguished its obligation. H: The mere return of the mortgaged motor vehicle by the mortgagor, the herein appellant, to the mortgagee, the herein appellee, does not constitute dation in payment or dacion en pago in the absence, express or implied of the true intention of the parties. Dacion en pago is the transmission of the ownership of a thing by the debtor to the creditor as an accepted equivalent of the performance of obligation. In dacion en pago, as a special mode of payment, the debtor offers another thing to the creditor who accepts it as equivalent of payment of an outstanding debt. The undertaking really partakes in one sense of the nature of sale, that is, the creditor is really buying the thing or property of the debtor, payment for which is to be charged against the debtor's debt. As such, the essential elements of a contract of sale, namely, consent, object certain, and cause or consideration must be present. Dacion en pago=objective novation The fact that the mortgaged motor vehicle was delivered to him does not necessarily mean that ownership thereof, as juridically contemplated by dacion en pago, was transferred from appellant to appellee. In the absence of clear consent of appellee to the proferred special mode of payment, there can be no transfer of ownership of the mortgaged motor vehicle from appellant to appellee. F: Sale of two parcel of land between de Guzman (seller) and Singh (buyer). Singh asked for a statement of account, Petitioner refused. Singh defaulted in payment. A Compromise Agreement was entered into. Singh allegedly did not deliver. H: Singh had substantially complied with the terms and conditions of the compromise agreement. Her failure to deliver to the petitioners the full amount on January 27, 1978 was not her fault. The blame lies with the petitioners. The record shows that Singh went to the sala of Judge Bautista on the appointed day to make payment, as agreed upon in their compromise agreement. But, the petitioners were not there to receive it. Only the petitioners' counsel appeared later, but, he informed Singh that he had no authority to receive and accept payment. The next day, January 28, 1978, Singh went to the office of the Clerk of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasay City Branch, to deposit the balance of the purchase price. But, it being a Saturday, the cashier was not there to receive it. So, on the next working day, Monday, January 30, 1978, Singh deposited the amount of P30,000 with the cashier of the Office of the Clerk of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasay City Branch, to complete the payment of the purchase price of P250,000. F: Bearcon Trading Co., Inc v Juan Fabella. Lease, sublease H: - In general, Art. 1260: Before the creditor has accepted the consignation, or before a judicial declaration that the consignation has been properly made, the debtor may withdraw the thing or the sum deposited, allowing the obligation to remain in force.

86. De Guzman v CA

87. TLG Internatio nal Continent al Enterprisi ng, Inc. V Flores 88.

89. McLau
ghlin v CA

90. Soco v
Militante

F: Compromise agreement wherein to pay in June and in December balance for sale of real property. In Oct 15, made a demand for payment of June installment. 17 days later, they complied. But, creditor wanted rescission of contract. CONSIGNATION: - no rescission since substantial compliance (20 day rule in Song Fo) - valid tender of payment but did not follow it with consignation TF still liable F: Soco, lessor felt cheated when lessee subleased for P3,000 from P800 of what the lessee was paying to lessor. When the collector did not come for lease payments, lessor made arrangements with bank to issue Soco checks as payment CONSIGNATION: - in order to have a valid consignation, debtor must show, (a) debt due; (b) creditor to whom tender of payment was made refused to accept it, or because he was absent or incapacitated, or because several persons claimed to be entitled to receive the amount due previous notice of the consignation had been given to the person interested in the performance of the obligation (d) amount due was placed at the disposal of the court (e) after the consignation had been made the person interested was notified thereof - failed to prove the ff requisites of a valid consignation,

91. Sotto v Mijares

(a) tender of payment of the monthly rentals to the lesser except that indicated in the June 1977 letter (b) first notice to the lessor prior to consignation, except payment in the June 1977 letter. The lessee must give prior notice of consignation for each monthly rental; second notice to lessor except the consignation referred to in the May and June cashiers check. Should have given notice for each deposit of monthly rental. Bank did not send notice to Soco that checks with the Clerk of Court because no instructions were given by its depositor; (d) actual deposit or consignation of the monthly rentals except the two cashiers checks. Not a single copy of the official receipts by the Clerk of Court presented Foreclosure of real estate mortgage - Whether or not to deposit at all the amount of an admitted indebtedness, or to do so under certain conditions, is a right which belongs to the debtor exclusively - If he refuses he may not be compelled to do so, and the creditor must fall back on the proper coercive processes provided by law to secure or satisfy his credit, as by attachment, judgment and execution - From the viewpoint of the debtor a deposit such as the one involved here is in the nature of consignation, and consignation is a facultative remedy which he may or may not avail of. - Indeed, the law says that "before the creditor has accepted the consignation or before a judicial declaration that the consignation has been properly made, the debtor may withdraw the thing or the sum deposited, allowing the obligation to remain in force. - If the debtor has such right of withdrawal, he surely has the right to refuse to make the deposit in the first place

92. Meat Packing Corp of the Phil. V SB

PCGG terminated the lease-purchase agreement of MPCP, a corporation wholly owned by GSIS. The Sandiganbayan already approved the consignation by the PCGG wherein consignation is the act of depositing the thing due with the court or judicial authorities whenever the creditor cannot accept or refuses to accept payment, and it generally requiresa a prior tendser of payment. Tender on the otherhand is the antecedent of conmsignation, an act preparatory to the consignation, which is the principal, and from which are derived the immediate consequences which the debtor desires or seeks to obtain. Tender of payment maybe extrajudicial while consigning is necessarily judicial. The priority of tendering payment is to attempt to make a private settlement before proceeding to the solemnities of consignation. Both tender and consignation validly made produces the effect of payment and extinguishes the obligation. F: Sale of 1.239 square meters along Jacaranda St., North Forbes Park H: There is a valid tender of payment in an amount sufficient to extinguish the obligation, the consignation is valid. F: Tropical Homes asked that the terms of the subdivision contract be modified because of the spiraling oil prices IMPOSSIBILITY (vs difficulty): - Release could have been granted. However, they seek not release from contract but that the court modify the terms and conditions. Court does not have authority to remake, modify, revise contract. Modification has no basis in law. F: Lease; Raymundos; MHS; supposed abrupt change in the political climate (EDSA Revolution) H: The debtor in obligations to do shall also be released when the prestation becomes legally or physically impossible without the fault of the obligor. However, petitioner cannot successfully take refuge in the said article, since it is applicable only to obligations to do, and not to obligations to give. The obligation to pay rentals or deliver the thing in a contract of lease falls within the prestation to give; hence, it is not covered within the scope of Article 1266. At any rate, the unforeseen event and causes mentioned by petitioner are not the legal or physical impossibilities contemplated in the said article. Besides, petitioner failed to state specifically the circumstances brought about by the abrupt change in the political climate in the country except the alleged prevailing uncertainties in government policies on infrastructure projects.

93. Pabug ais v Sahijwani 94. Occen a v CA

95. PNCC vs. CA

96. Yam vs CA

F: IGLF Loan H: Art. 1270, par. 2 of the Civil Code provides that express condonation must comply with the forms of donation. Art. 748, par. 3 provides that the donation and acceptance of a movable, the value of which exceeds P5,000.00, must be made in writing, otherwise the same shall be void. In this connection, under Art. 417, par. 1, obligations, actually referring to credits, are considered movable property. In the case at bar, it is undisputed that the alleged agreement to condone P266,146.88 of the second IGLF loan was not reduced in writing.