Hannah Finlay

Modern History Assessment

Evaluate the role of Reagan and Gorbachev in ending the Cold War. Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev both played critical roles in ending the Cold War in 1989. Their attitudes, aims and policies played vital roles and, in conjunction with their involvement in Disarmament Agreements from 1985 till 1988, both leaders brought about the end of decades of US and Soviet tension. However, comparing Reagans and Gorbachevs policies and attitudes reveals it was Gorbachevs revolutionary outlook, new reforms for Soviet Russia and his genuine desire for peace that initiated peace and disarmament talks, which played the most the significant role in ending the Cold War. Reagan heralded in a new era of Cold War politics when he gained the presidency in 1981. From the beginning he made his attitude towards the Soviets and Communist regimes clearthey will not be tolerated. Reagan promised a restoration of Americas pride as the number one world power by standing up to its opponents, especially the Soviet Union, and by a major defence build up and a return to Cold War value of the fifties. Reagan ended the period of Detente and begun his aggressive hard-line approach. In 1982 he stated the USA would leave Marxism on the ash-heap of history.1 His constant referrals to the Soviets as the Evil Empire and stating communism as a form of insanity that is contrary to human nature2 increased tensions between the US and USSR. Reagan restored credibility to the Truman Doctrine and policies of containment and even touched on the notion of rollback, the removal of communist control of a country as opposed to simply preventing its spread, This is evident in his administrations involvement in Nicaragua. Reagan was adamant on

1 2

Krauthammer, C, The Reagan Doctrine, http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/, August 2011 The Administration of Ronald Reagan, www.hsconline.com.au, August 2011 1

Hannah Finlay

Modern History Assessment

gaining pride and prestige for Americans once again after a series of humiliating events in the 70s including the failures of Vietnam and the Watergate Scandal.3 Reagan aims and attitudes were manifest in the Reagan Doctrine. The doctrine was an aggressive policy that ensured the return to containment and the fostering and support of antiSoviet forces. In 1985, Reagan outlined his policy further "We must not break faith with those who are risking their lives on every continent from Afghanistan to Nicaragua to defy Sovietsupported aggression and secure rights which have been ours from birth . . . Support for freedom fighters is self-defense.4 Reagan assisted in groups opposing Soviet or communist regimes in Nicaragua Central America, the Middle East, Grenada, Asia and Africa. While many supported the new hard line approach taken by Reagan, others opposed his new policy. Journalist Christopher Hitchens wrote an unsympathetic article in 1986 about the Reagan Doctrine. He spoke of Regans neglect of human rights, legality and dictators in the face of fighting Soviet communism. While Schweizer argues Reagan had a comprehensive vision for dealing with the Soviet Union and ending the Cold War5; many historians disagree. Reagans conservative outlook concealed a lack of specific foreign policy objectives. As Bastian states, The Reagan administration, for all of its rhetoric, proved to be both conservative and confused, over committing the vast US military machine to any major conflict.6 A prime example was in 1983 when the US stumbled into the civil war in Lebanon after sending US marines for peacekeeping duties. They were however, quickly withdrawn after 241 men were killed in a suicide attack on their barracks. Reagan simply declared that the marines were going home
3 4

In 1974, led to the resignation of Richard Nixon Krauthammer, C, op. cit. Garrity, P, Reagan and the Cold War, On Principle, Vol X, no. 6, December 2002 Bastian, P, Bearing any burden: The Cold War Years 1946-1991, HTA NSW, 2003

5
6

Hannah Finlay

Modern History Assessment

because they had achieved their aims, but at no stage were these aims ever defined publicly or within the administration.7 Reagans policies assumed that communism and the Soviet Union represented a danger to the USA and that the administration should respond with a hard-line attitude. Yet Reagan ignored the issue of human rights abuses by American allies provided that such nations proved useful allies in the new Cold War. This shows a disparity to what he stood for, freedom, peace and democracy. Reagan attacked the morality of the Soviets; stating they believed they could do anything to further their cause, meaning they had the right to commit any crime, to lie, to cheat in order to attain that end.8 Similarly in 1987, Reagan delivered an address at the Brandenburg gate in West Berlin. He commented, The Soviets themselves may, in limited way, be coming to understand the importance of freedom.9 His actions and words proved inconsistent within his administration. Reagans policies were a return to the height of cold war tensions in the 50s. His early policies demonstrate aggressive behavior, contrastingly different to Gorbachevs reforms. In 1985 Mikhail Gorbachev was elected the new General Secretary. Gorbachevs policies of openness and reconstruction helped reform struggling Russia while his attempts to openly seek arms reductions and to reduce Cold War tensions played an essential role in ending the Cold War. He represented the arrival to a position of influence in soviet society of a whole generation. Dukes notes Gorbachev was, as the new generation, increasingly urbanised and educated, professionally differentiated, and politically, ideologically and culturally diversified.10 His revolutionary ideas and new government leadership for the Soviet Union were critical in ending
7 8 9

Ibid

Isaacs, J and Taylor, D, Cold War, Bantam Press, 1998, pg 333 Reagan, R, Tear down this Wall, Brandenburg Gate West Berlin, June 12 1987 10 P. Dukes, Superpowers, a Short History, Routledge, 2000, pg 127

Hannah Finlay

Modern History Assessment

the Cold War. Unlike his predecessors, Gorbachev was the first leader to not be trained by Stalin and he actually met the people, talking and smiling his way through many impromptu meetings as well as more formal speeches. Archie Brown acknowledges that Gorbachev saw more clearly than any of his predecessors the links between domestic and foreign policy.11 Indeed, Gorbachev realised that if he downgraded the heavy emphasis on defence he would help reduce the power of the Soviet military industrial complex and therefore remove the imbalance in the economy and at the same time promote a greater element of free enterprise. Gorbachev was not the unanimous choice of the party, though during his career he sat uneasily between the reformers and the old guard throughout 1985 and early 1986. Gorbachev gradually retired old Brezhnevites and introduced new figures such as Ligachev and Yeltsin, surrounding himself with reformists, which allowed him to continue with his reforms and disarmament negotiations. Gaddis observes Not until Gorbachev was a Soviet leader fully prepared to dismantle Stalins structuralist legacythat as it disappeared, so too did the Cold War and ultimately the Soviet Union itself. 12 Gorbachev had come to power with a difficult set of problems. Shultz maintains, He (Gorbachev) was perceptive enough to see them and bold enough to be decisive in dealing with the critical foreign policy issues that he faced.13 Gorbachev recognised the parlous state of the Soviet economy and the desperate need for reform. Much like the reforms made by his predecessors Lenin and Stalin, reform was necessary for Soviet survival. Gorbachev hoped to revitalise the stagnant economic system, to obtain western technology and free the country from

11

ibid Gaddis, L J, We Now Know: Rethinking the Cold War, OUP, Oxford, 1997 Shultz, G, Triumph and Turmoil, Scribiner, New York, 1993 4

12 13

Hannah Finlay

Modern History Assessment

its bureaucratic inertia. He increasingly decided to cut off aid to client states that were costing the economy more that it could afford and was anxious to reach agreements on arms reductions in order to save money from a large defence budget. Gorbachev released his twin policies of Glasnost (openness) and Perestroika (restructuring). Perestroika allowed for greater economic freedom within Russia. The 1988 Law on Enterprise allowed Soviet citizens to seek their own resources, sell their output as they chose and pay their workers as they saw fit. Most significantly in aiding the collapse of the Soviet Union and thus the Cold War, was the new political freedom. Unions were once again allowed to demonstrate and political parties that represented different points of views were accepted. In 1989, multi party elections were held for the first time since 1917. Also, under Glasnost, groups who were living under the Soviet Unions multi-nation empire but were not Russian were allowed to promote their nationalism and celebrate their identity. This was a key factor in the end of the Soviet Union. As the Berlin Wall fell in 1989, East Germany set off a domino-like effect across Eastern Europe, as countries fought for their freedom. Countries such as Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and Albania closely followed East Germany in gaining their political freedom. Gorbachev responded, these changes are welcomed because they are linked to the will of the people...to give a more democratic human face to those societies and to open up the rest of the world.14 While Gorbachevs innovative reforms were not necessarily working at home, his willingness to embrace change endeared him to western commentators. His eagerness for arms reductions and for reducing Cold War tensions offered enormous potential for improved Soviet-US relations. As soon as Gorbachev came to power he made his intentions on an arms reduction clear. He

14

Sproule, A, Mikhail Gorbachev, Exley Publications, 1990

Hannah Finlay

Modern History Assessment

immediately declared a six month freeze on the deployment of any new soviet SS-20 Missiles in Europe and declared a moratorium on all Soviet nuclear tests. Reagans attitude was contrastingly different. Throughout his first administration (1981-1985) there was a massive arms buildup. In 1980 he stated So far as an arms race is concerned, theres one going on right now, but theres only one side racing. Reagan increased the size of the defence budget to 1.7 trillion over 5 years15, causing the Soviets to have to follow suit thus placing strains on their economy. Many opponents were worried Reagan was becoming more of a threat to world peace than the Soviets. In 1981 Reagan signed off on the development of the neutron bomb. Later that year work began on the MX missile and the B1 bomber. Most importantly was the development of the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) more commonly known as Star Wars. Reagan wanted the US to establish antiballistic missile defences in outer space, which could shoot down Soviet missiles before they could reach the US. The scheme was extremely controversial and was ridiculed by scientists who saw it as nave, incredibly expensive and counter productive. It was also a breach of the 1972 ABM Treaty. Bastian comments, SDI was a clever ploy to force the Soviets into another expensive arms race since they could not afford to let the US develop such a scheme alone.16 Reagan had long been a critic of SALT I and SALT II and did not want to rush into SALT III. As a result the administration was cool to a continuation of arms negotiations with Soviets. The Committee on the Present Danger (CPD) opposed arms talks and advocated a strong defence build up.17 However in 1982 Reagan and Gorbachev finally began arms negotiations, renamed START, in order to herald a new beginning.

15 16 17

Bastian, P op. cit.

Bastian, P, op. cit. After the fall of USSR in 1991 many CPD took credit for the destruction of communism through their advocacy of this policy 6

Hannah Finlay

Modern History Assessment

Yet, it appears that Reagan had no overall vision of where arms policies actually fitted in the context of US Soviet relations, as he had not intended on reducing arms.18 The US nuclear build up was designed to allow for the US to negotiate from a position of strength. Reagan remained insistent on his SDI plan therefore in 1986 Reagan responded to the Gorbachev proposal for 50% reduction in all long range missiles in return for US abandonment of SDI, with the offer to abolish all nuclear missiles within 10 years providing that SDI went ahead.19 While there was little progress made, the discussions were an indication of better relations and advancements in peace to come. Gorbachev realised that Reagan would not back down on his SDI project, but realised it was unachievable in the foreseeable future and was of little threat.20 Therefore he changed his Soviet policy that allowed for an agreement. However, after the Iran-Contra affair in 1986, the embattled president was now surrounded by men who were pragmatic professionals with a greater sense of moderation on the issue of US Soviet relations including support for Gorbachevs reforms, as Reagan could not afford more scandals within his administration. Through these circumstances both leaders were able to come to an agreement and signed the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty on December 1987 (US destroyed 859 and USSR 1752 intermediate range missiles). The treaty was symbolic of a dramatic change in relations between two superpowers. The policies of Reagan and Gorbachev are contrastingly different. Reagan renewed Cold War tensions with his policies of aggression. It was not until Gorbachev initiated peace and

18 19

Bastian, P, op. cit. which threw the soviets into confusion because if all missiles were eliminated there was no reason for SDI 20 Bastian, P, op. cit. 7

Hannah Finlay

Modern History Assessment

disarmament discussions, that Reagan agreed to begin negotiations. Their success with disarmament agreements and friendlier relations between the two superpowers and therefore the ending of the Cold War ultimately came from Gorbachevs genuine desire for peace.

Hannah Finlay

Modern History Assessment

Bibliography Articles and Books

Bastian, P Sproule, A P. Dukes Garrity, P Reid, T Bearing any Burden: The Cold War Years 1946-1991, HTA NSW, 2003 Mikhail Gorbachev, Exley Publications, 1990 Superpowers, a Short History, Routledge, 2000 Reagan and the Cold War, On Principle, Vol X, no. 6, December 2002 How Reagan and Gorbachev made a real breakthrough in the arms race, The Sunday Times, February 2009 Walker, F Spenceley The Cold War. Vintage, Great Britain, 1994. A World In Shadow, US-Soviet Relations in the Nuclear Age, Oxford University Press, New York, 1989. Gaddis, L J Shultz, G We Now Know: Rethinking the Cold War, OUP, Oxford, 1997 Triumph and Turmoil, Scribiner, New York, 1993

Websites
The Administration of Ronald Reagan, www.hsconline.com.au, August 2011 Krauthammer, C, The Reagan Doctrine, http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/, August 2011 Nuclear Files, www.nuclearfiles.org, August 2011

Speech
Reagan, R Tear down this Wall, Brandenburg Gate West Berlin, June 12 1987