AUSTRIA VS. COURT OF APPEALS 39 SCRA 527 FACTS: Maria G.

Abad received from Guillermo Austria a pendant with diamonds to be sold on a commission basis or to be returned on demand. While walking home, the purse containing the jewelry and cash was snatched by two men. A complaint of the incident was filed in the Court of First Instance against certain persons. Abad failed to return the jewelry or pay for its value despite demands made by Austria. Austria brought an action against the Abad spouses for the recovery of the pendant or of its value and damages. Abad spouses set up the defense that the alleged robbery had extinguished their obligation. ISSUE: Should the Abad spouse be held liable for the loss of the pendant? RULING: No. The Court ruled that the exempting provision of Article 1174 of the Civil Code is applicable in the case. It is a recognized jurisdiction that to constitute a caso fortuito that would exempt a person from responsibility, it is necessary that the event must be independent of the human will or of the obligors will; the occurrence must render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill the obligation in a normal manner; and that the obligor must be free of participation in, or aggravation of, the injury to the creditor. To avail of the exemption granted, it is not necessary that the persons responsible for the event should be found or punished. It is sufficient that to unforeseeable event which is the robbery took place without concurrent fault or negligence on the part of the obligor which can be proven by preponderant evidence. It was held that the act of Maria Abad in walking home alone carrying the jewelry was not negligent for at that time the incidence of crimes was not high. G.R. No. 85691 July 31, 1990 BACHELOR EXPRESS, INCORPORATED, and CRESENCIO RIVERA, Petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (Sixth Division), RICARDO BETER, SERGIA BETER, TEOFILO RAUTRAUT and ZOETERA RAUTRAUT,Respondents. GUTIERREZ, JR., J.: This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals which reversed and set aside the order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch I, Butuan City dismissing the private respondents' complaint for collection of "a sum of money" and finding the petitioners solidarily liable for damages in the total amount of One Hundred Twenty Thousand Pesos (P120,000.00). The petitioners also question the appellate court's resolution denying a motion for reconsideration.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library On August 1, 1980, Bus No. 800 owned by Bachelor Express, Inc. and driven by Cresencio Rivera was the situs of a stampede which resulted in the death of passengers Ornominio Beter and Narcisa Rautraut.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The evidence shows that the bus came from Davao City on its way to Cagayan de Oro City passing Butuan City; that while at Tabon-Tabon, Butuan City, the bus picked up a passenger; that about fifteen (15) minutes later, a passenger at the rear portion suddenly stabbed a PC soldier which caused commotion and panic among the passengers; that when the bus stopped, passengers Ornominio Beter and Narcisa Rautraut were found lying down the road, the former already dead as a result of head injuries and the latter also suffering from severe injuries which caused her death later. The passenger assailant alighted from the bus and ran toward the bushes but was killed by the police. Thereafter, the heirs of Ornominio Beter and Narcisa Rautraut, private respondents herein (Ricardo Beter and Sergia Beter are the parents of Ornominio while Teofilo Rautraut and Zoetera [should be Zotera] Rautraut are the parents of Narcisa) filed a complaint for "sum of money" against Bachelor Express, Inc. its alleged owner Samson Yasay and the driver Rivera.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library In their answer, the petitioners denied liability for the death of Ornominio Beter and Narcisa Rautraut. They alleged that ... the driver was able to transport his passengers safely to their respective places of destination except Ornominio Beter and Narcisa Rautraut who jumped off the bus without the knowledge and consent, much less, the fault of the driver and conductor and the defendants in this case; the defendant corporation had exercised due diligence in the choice of its employees to avoid as much as possible accidents; the incident on August 1, 1980 was not a traffic accident or vehicular accident; it was an incident or event very much beyond the control of the defendants; defendants were not parties to the incident complained of as it was an act of a third party who

is not in any way connected with the defendants and of which the latter have no control and supervision; ..." (Rollo, pp. 112113).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library After due trial, the trial court issued an order dated August 8, 1985 dismissing the complaint.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Upon appeal however, the trial court's decision was reversed and set aside. The dispositive portion of the decision of the Court of Appeals states: WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one entered finding the appellees jointly and solidarily liable to pay the plaintiffs-appellants the following amounts: chanrobles virtual law library 1) To the heirs of Ornominio Beter, the amount of Seventy Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00) in loss of earnings and support, moral damages, straight death indemnity and attorney's fees; and, chanrobles virtual law library 2) To the heirs of Narcisa Rautraut, the amount of Forty Five Thousand Pesos (P45,000.00) for straight death indemnity, moral damages and attorney's fees. Costs against appellees. (Rollo, pp. 71-72) The petitioners now pose the following questions What was the proximate cause of the whole incident? Why were the passengers on board the bus panicked (sic) and why were they shoving one another? Why did Narcisa Rautraut and Ornominio Beter jump off from the running bus? The petitioners opine that answers to these questions are material to arrive at "a fair, just and equitable judgment." (Rollo, p. 5) They claim that the assailed decision is based on a misapprehension of facts and its conclusion is grounded on speculation, surmises or conjectures.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library As regards the proximate cause of the death of Ornominio Beter and Narcisa Rautraut, the petitioners maintain that it was the act of the passenger who ran amuck and stabbed another passenger of the bus. They contend that the stabbing incident triggered off the commotion and panic among the passengers who pushed one another and thatpresumably out of fear and moved by that human instinct of self-preservation Beter and Rautraut jumped off the bus while the bus was still running resulting in their untimely death." (Rollo, p. 6) Under these circumstances, the petitioners asseverate that they were not negligent in the performance of their duties and that the incident was completely and absolutely attributable to a third person, the passenger who ran amuck, for without his criminal act, Beter and Rautraut could not have been subjected to fear and shock which compelled them to jump off the running bus. They argue that they should not be made liable for damages arising from acts of third persons over whom they have no control or supervision.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Furthermore, the petitioners maintain that the driver of the bus, before, during and after the incident was driving cautiously giving due regard to traffic rules, laws and regulations. The petitioners also argue that they are not insurers of their passengers as ruled by the trial court.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The liability, if any, of the petitioners is anchored on culpa contractual or breach of contract of carriage. The applicable provisions of law under the New Civil Code are as follows: ART. 1732. Common carriers are persons, corporations, firms or associations engaged in the business of carrying or transporting passengers or goods or both by land, water, or air, for compensation, offering their services to the public.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library ART. 1733. Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy, are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for the safety of the passengers transported by them, according to all the circumstances of each case.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library xxx xxx xxx chanrobles virtual law library ART. 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard for all the circumstances.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library ART. 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733 and 1755. There is no question that Bachelor Express, Inc. is a common carrier. Hence, from the nature of its business and for reasons of public policy Bachelor Express, Inc. is bound to carry its passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard for all the circumstances.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library In the case at bar, Ornominio Beter and Narcisa Rautraut were passengers of a bus belonging to petitioner Bachelor Express, Inc. and, while passengers of the bus, suffered injuries which caused their death. Consequently, pursuant to Article 1756 of the Civil Code, petitioner Bachelor Express, Inc. is presumed to have acted negligently unless it can prove that it had observed extraordinary diligence in accordance with Articles 1733 and 1755 of the New Civil Code.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Bachelor Express, Inc. denies liability for the death of Beter and Rautraut on its posture that the death of the said passengers was caused by a third person who was beyond its control and supervision. In effect, the petitioner, in order to overcome the presumption of fault or negligence under the law, states that the vehicular incident resulting in the death of passengers Beter and Rautraut was caused by force majeure or caso fortuito over which the common carrier did not have any control.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Article 1174 of the present Civil Code states: Except in cases expressly specified by law, or when it is otherwise declared by stipulations, or when the nature of the obligation requires the assumption of risk, no person shall be responsible for those events which could not be foreseen, or which though foreseen, were inevitable. The above-mentioned provision was substantially copied from Article 1105 of the old Civil Code which states" No one shall be liable for events which could not be foreseen or which, even if foreseen, were inevitable, with the exception of the cases in which the law expressly provides otherwise and those in which the obligation itself imposes liability. In the case of Lasam v. Smith (45 Phil. 657 [1924]), we defined "events" which cannot be foreseen and which, having been foreseen, are inevitable in the following manner: ... The Spanish authorities regard the language employed as an effort to define the term 'caso fortuito' and hold that the two expressions are synonymous. (Manresa Comentarios al Codigo Civil Espaol, vol. 8, pp. 88 et seq.; Scaevola, Codigo Civil, vol. 19, pp. 526 et seq.) chanrobles virtual law library

The antecedent to Article 1105 is found in Law II, Title 33, Partida 7, which defines caso fortuito as 'occasion que acaese por aventura de que non se puede ante ver. E son estos, derrivamientos de casas e fuego que enciende a so ora, e quebrantamiento de navio, fuerca de ladrones' (An event that takes place by incident and could not have been foreseen. Examples of this are destruction of houses, unexpected fire, shipwreck, violence of robbers ...) chanrobles virtual law library Escriche defines caso fortuito as an unexpected event or act of God which could neither be foreseen nor resisted, such as floods, torrents, shipwrecks, conflagrations, lightning, compulsion, insurrections, destruction of buildings by unforeseen accidents and other occurrences of a similar nature.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library In discussing and analyzing the term caso fortuito the Enciclopedia Juridica Espaola says: 'In a legal sense and, consequently, also in relation to contracts, a caso fortuito presents the following essential characteristics: (1) The cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence, or of the failure of the debtor to comply with his obligation, must be independent of the human will. (2) It must be impossible to foresee the event which constitutes the caso fortuito, or if it can be foreseen, it must be impossible to avoid. (3) The occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner. And (4) the obligor (debtor) must be free from any participation in the aggravation of the injury resulting to the creditor. (5) Enciclopedia Juridica Espaola, 309)chanrobles virtual law library As will be seen, these authorities agree that some extraordinary circumstance independent of the will of the obligor or of his employees, is an essential element of a caso fortuito. ... The running amuck of the passenger was the proximate cause of the incident as it triggered off a commotion and panic among the passengers such that the passengers started running to the sole exit shoving each other resulting in the falling off the bus by passengers Beter and Rautraut causing them fatal injuries. The sudden act of the passenger who stabbed another passenger in the bus is within the context of force majeure. chanrobles virtual law library However, in order that a common carrier may be absolved from liability in case of force majeure, it is not enough that the accident was caused by force majeure. The common carrier must still prove that it was not negligent in causing the injuries resulting from such accident. Thus, as early as 1912, we ruled: From all the foregoing, it is concluded that the defendant is not liable for the loss and damage of the goods shipped on the lorcha Pilar by the Chinaman, Ong Bien Sip, inasmuch as such loss and damage were the result of a fortuitous event or force majeure, and there was no negligence or lack of care and diligence on the part of the defendant company or its agents. (Tan Chiong Sian v. Inchausti & Co., 22 Phil. 152 [1912]; Emphasis supplied). This principle was reiterated in a more recent case, Batangas Laguna Tayabas Co. v. Intermediate Appellate Court (167 SCRA 379 [1988]), wherein we ruled: ... [F]or their defense of force majeure or act of God to prosper the accident must be due to natural causes and exclusively without human intervention. (Emphasis supplied) Therefore, the next question to be determined is whether or not the petitioner's common carrier observed extraordinary diligence to safeguard the lives of its passengers.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library In this regard the trial court and the appellate court arrived at conflicting factual findings.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The trial court found the following facts: The parties presented conflicting evidence as to how the two deceased Narcisa Rautruat and Ornominio Beter met their deaths.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library However, from the evidence adduced by the plaintiffs, the Court could not see why the two deceased could have fallen off the bus when their own witnesses testified that when the commotion ensued inside the bus, the passengers pushed and shoved each other towards the door apparently in order to get off from the bus through the door. But the passengers also could not pass through the door because according to the evidence the door was locked.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library On the other hand, the Court is inclined to give credence to the evidence adduced by the defendants that when the commotion ensued inside the bus, the two deceased panicked and, in state of shock and fear, they jumped off from the bus by passing through the window.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library It is the prevailing rule and settled jurisprudence that transportation companies are not insurers of their passengers. The evidence on record does not show that defendants' personnel were negligent in their duties. The defendants' personnel have every right to accept passengers absent any manifestation of violence or drunkenness. If and when such passengers harm other passengers without the knowledge of the transportation company's personnel, the latter should not be faulted. (Rollo, pp. 46-47) A thorough examination of the records, however, show that there are material facts ignored by the trial court which were discussed by the appellate court to arrive at a different conclusion. These circumstances show that the petitioner common carrier was negligent in the provision of safety precautions so that its passengers may be transported safely to their destinations. The appellate court states: A critical eye must be accorded the lower court's conclusions of fact in its tersely writtenratio decidendi. The lower court concluded that the door of the bus was closed; secondly, the passengers, specifically the two deceased, jumped out of the window. The lower court therefore concluded that the defendant common carrier is not liable for the death of the said passengers which it implicitly attributed to the unforeseen acts of the unidentified passenger who went amuck.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library There is nothing in the record to support the conclusion that the solitary door of the bus was locked as to prevent the passengers from passing through. Leonila Cullano, testifying for the defense, clearly stated that the conductor opened the door when the passengers were shouting that the bus stop while they were in a state of panic. Sergia Beter categorically stated that she actually saw her son fall from the bus as the door was forced open by the force of the onrushing passengers.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Pedro Collango, on the other hand, testified that he shut the door after the last passenger had boarded the bus. But he had quite conveniently neglected to say that when the passengers had panicked, he himself panicked and had gone to open the door. Portions of the testimony of Leonila Cullano, quoted below, are illuminating: chanrobles virtual law library xxx xxx xxx chanrobles virtual law library Q When you said the conductor opened the door, the door at the front or rear portion of the bus? chanrobles virtual law library A Front door.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Q And these two persons whom you said alighted, where did they pass, the fron(t) door or rear door? chanrobles virtual law library

A Front door.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library xxx xxx xxx chanrobles virtual law library (Tsn., p. 4, Aug. 8, 1984) chanrobles virtual law library xxx xxx xxx chanrobles virtual law library Q What happened after there was a commotion at the rear portion of the bus? chanrobles virtual law library A When the commotion occurred, I stood up and I noticed that there was a passenger who was sounded (sic). The conductor panicked because the passengers were shouting 'stop, stop'. The conductor opened the bus.' chanrobles virtual law library (Tsn. p. 3, August 8, 1984).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Accordingly, there is no reason to believe that the deceased passengers jumped from the window when it was entirely possible for them to have alighted through the door. The lower court's reliance on the testimony of Pedro Collango, as the conductor and employee of the common carrier, is unjustified, in the light of the clear testimony of Leonila Cullano as the sole uninterested eyewitness of the entire episode. Instead we find Pedro Collango's testimony to be infused by bias and fraught with inconsistencies, if not notably unreliable for lack of veracity. On direct examination, he testified: chanrobles virtual law library xxx xxx xxx chanrobles virtual law library Q So what happened to the passengers inside your bus? chanrobles virtual law library A Some of the passengers jumped out of the window.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library COURT: chanrobles virtual law library Q While the bus was in motion? chanrobles virtual law library A Yes, your Honor, but the speed was slow because we have just picked up a passenger.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Atty. Gambe: chanrobles virtual law library Q You said that at the time of the incident the bus was running slow because you have just picked up a passenger. Can you estimate what was your speed at that time? chanrobles virtual law library Atty. Calo: chanrobles virtual law library No basis, your Honor, he is neither a driver nor a conductor.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library COURT: chanrobles virtual law library Let the witness answer. Estimate only, the conductor experienced.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Witness: chanrobles virtual law library Not less than 30 to 40 miles.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library COURT: chanrobles virtual law library Kilometers or miles? chanrobles virtual law library A Miles.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Atty. Gambe: chanrobles virtual law library Q That is only your estimate by your experience? chanrobles virtual law library A Yes, sir, estimate.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library (Tsn., pp. 4-5, Oct. 17, 1983).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library At such speed of not less than 30 to 40 miles ..., or about 48 to 65 kilometers per hour, the speed of the bus could scarcely be considered slow considering that according to Collango himself, the bus had just come from a full stop after picking a passenger (Tsn, p. 4, Id.) and that the bus was still on its second or third gear (Tsn., p. 12, Id.).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library In the light of the foregoing, the negligence of the common carrier, through its employees, consisted of the lack of extraordinary diligence required of common carriers, in exercising vigilance and utmost care of the safety of its passengers, exemplified by the driver's belated stop and the reckless opening of the doors of the bus while the same was travelling at an appreciably fast speed. At the same time, the common carrier itself acknowledged, through its administrative officer, Benjamin Granada, that the bus was commissioned to travel and take on passengers and the public at large, while equipped with only a solitary door for a bus its size and loading capacity, in contravention of rules and regulations provided for under the Land Transportation and Traffic Code (RA 4136 as amended.) (Rollo, pp. 23-26) Considering the factual findings of the Court of Appeals-the bus driver did not immediately stop the bus at the height of the commotion; the bus was speeding from a full stop; the victims fell from the bus door when it was opened or gave way while the bus was still running; the conductor panicked and blew his whistle after people had already fallen off the bus; and the bus was not properly equipped with doors in accordance with law-it is clear that the petitioners have failed to overcome the presumption of fault and negligence found in the law governing common carriers.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The petitioners' argument that the petitioners "are not insurers of their passengers" deserves no merit in view of the failure of the petitioners to prove that the deaths of the two passengers were exclusively due to force majeureand not to the failure of the petitioners to observe extraordinary diligence in transporting safely the passengers to their destinations as warranted by law. (See Batangas Laguna Tayabas Co. v. Intermediate Appellate Court,supra).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The petitioners also contend that the private respondents failed to show to the court that they are the parents of Ornominio Beter and Narcisa Rautraut respectively and therefore have no legal personality to sue the petitioners. This argument deserves scant consideration. We find this argument a belated attempt on the part of the petitioners to avoid liability for the deaths of Beter and Rautraut. The private respondents were Identified as the parents of the victims by witnesses during the trial and the trial court recognized them as such. The trial court dismissed the complaint solely on the ground that the petitioners were not negligent.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Finally, the amount of damages awarded to the heirs of Beter and Rautraut by the appellate court is supported by the evidence. The appellate court stated: Ornominio Beter was 32 years of age at the time of his death, single, in good health and rendering support and service to his mother. As far as Narcisa Rautraut is concerned, the only evidence adduced is to the effect that at her death, she was 23 years of age, in good health and without visible means of support.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library In accordance with Art. 1764 in conjunction with Art. 2206 of the Civil Code, and established jurisprudence, several factors may be considered in determining the award of damages, namely: 1) life expectancy (considering the state of health of the deceased and

the mortality tables are deemed conclusive) and loss of earning capacity; (2) pecuniary loss, loss of support and service; and (3) moral and mental suffering (Alcantara, et al. v. Surro, et al., 93 Phil. 470).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library In the case of People v. Daniel (No. L-66551, April 25, 1985, 136 SCRA 92, at page 104), the High Tribunal, reiterating the rule in Villa Rey Transit, Inc. v. Court of Appeals (31 SCRA 511), stated that the amount of loss of earring capacity is based mainly on two factors, namely, (1) the number of years on the basis of which the damages shall be computed; and (2) the rate at which the losses sustained by the heirs should be fixed.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library As the formula adopted in the case of Davila v. Philippine Air Lines, 49 SCRA 497, at the age of 30 one's normal life expectancy is 33-1/3 years based on the American Expectancy Table of Mortality (2/3 x 80-32). By taking into account the pace and nature of the life of a carpenter, it is reasonable to make allowances for these circumstances and reduce the life expectancy of the deceased Ornominio Beter to 25 years (People v. Daniel, supra). To fix the rate of losses it must be noted that Art. 2206 refers to gross earnings less necessary living expenses of the deceased, in other words, only net earnings are to be considered (People v. Daniel, supra; Villa Rey Transit, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, supra).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Applying the foregoing rules with respect to Ornominio Beter, it is both just and reasonable, considering his social standing and position, to fix the deductible, living and incidental expenses at the sum of Four Hundred Pesos (P400.00) a month, or Four Thousand Eight Hundred Pesos (P4,800.00) annually. As to his income, considering the irregular nature of the work of a daily wage carpenter which is seasonal, it is safe to assume that he shall have work for twenty (20) days a month at Twenty Five Pesos (P150,000.00) for twenty five years. Deducting therefrom his necessary expenses, his heirs would be entitled to Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) representing loss of support and service (P150,000.00 less P120,000.00). In addition, his heirs are entitled to Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) as straight death indemnity pursuant to Article 2206 (People v. Daniel, supra). For damages for their moral and mental anguish, his heirs are entitled to the reasonable sum of P10,000.00 as an exception to the general rule against moral damages in case of breach of contract rule Art. 2200 (Necesito v. Paras, 104 Phil. 75). As attorney's fees, Beter's heirs are entitled to P5,000.00. All in all, the plaintiff-appellants Ricardo and Sergia Beter as heirs of their son Ornominio are entitled to an indemnity of Seventy Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library In the case of Narcisa Rautraut, her heirs are entitled to a straight death indemnity of Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00), to moral damages in the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) and Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) as attorney's fees, or a total of Forty Five Thousand Pesos (P45,000.00) as total indemnity for her death in the absence of any evidence that she had visible means of support. (Rollo, pp. 30-31) WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED. The questioned decision dated May 19, 1988 and the resolution dated August 1, 1988 of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library SO ORDERED. G.R. No. L-47379 May 16, 1988 NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and ENGINEERING CONSTRUCTION, INC., Respondents. G.R. No. L-47481 May 16, 1988 ENGINEERING CONSTRUCTION, INC., Petitioner, vs. COUTRT OF APPEALS and NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, Respondents. These consolidated petitions seek to set aside the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals which adjudged the National Power Corporation liable for damages against Engineering Construction, Inc. The appellate court, however, reduced the amount of damages awarded by the trial court. Hence, both parties filed their respective petitions: the National Power Corporation (NPC) in G.R. No. 47379, questioning the decision of the Court of Appeals for holding it liable for damages and the Engineering Construction, Inc. (ECI) in G.R. No. 47481, questioning the same decision for reducing the consequential damages and attorney's fees and for eliminating the exemplary damages.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The facts are succinctly summarized by the respondent Court of Appeals, as follows: On August 4, 1964, plaintiff Engineering Construction, Inc., being a successful bidder, executed a contract in Manila with the National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority (NAWASA), whereby the former undertook to furnish all tools, labor, equipment, and materials (not furnished by Owner), and to construct the proposed 2nd lpo-Bicti Tunnel, Intake and Outlet Structures, and Appurtenant Structures, and Appurtenant Features, at Norzagaray, Bulacan, and to complete said works within eight hundred (800) calendar days from the date the Contractor receives the formal notice to proceed (Exh. A).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The project involved two (2) major phases: the first phase comprising, the tunnel work covering a distance of seven (7) kilometers, passing through the mountain, from the Ipo river, a part of Norzagaray, Bulacan, where the Ipo Dam of the defendant National Power Corporation is located, to Bicti; the other phase consisting of the outworks at both ends of the tunnel.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library By September 1967, the plaintiff corporation already had completed the first major phase of the work, namely, the tunnel excavation work. Some portions of the outworks at the Bicti site were still under construction. As soon as the plaintiff corporation had finished the tunnel excavation work at the Bicti site, all the equipment no longer needed there were transferred to the Ipo site where some projects were yet to be completed.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The record shows that on November 4,1967, typhoon 'Welming' hit Central Luzon, passing through defendant's Angat Hydro-electric Project and Dam at lpo, Norzagaray, Bulacan. Strong winds struck the project area, and heavy rains intermittently fell. Due to the heavy downpour, the water in the reservoir of the Angat Dam was rising perilously at the rate of sixty (60) centimeters per hour. To prevent an overflow of water from the dam, since the water level had reached the danger height of 212 meters above sea level, the defendant corporation caused the opening of the spillway gates." (pp. 45-46, L-47379, Rollo) The appellate court sustained the findings of the trial court that the evidence preponlderantly established the fact that due to the negligent manner with which the spillway gates of the Angat Dam were opened, an extraordinary large volume of water rushed out of the gates, and hit the installations and construction works of ECI at the lpo site with terrific impact, as a result of which the latter's stockpile of materials and supplies, camp facilities and permanent structures and accessories either washed away, lost or destroyed.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The appellate court further found that: It cannot be pretended that there was no negligence or that the appellant exercised extraordinary care in the opening of the spillway gates of the Angat Dam. Maintainers of the dam knew very well that it was far more safe to open them gradually. But the spillway

gates were opened only when typhoon Welming was already at its height, in a vain effort to race against time and prevent the overflow of water from the dam as it 'was rising dangerously at the rate of sixty centimeters per hour. 'Action could have been taken as early as November 3, 1967, when the water in the reservoir was still low. At that time, the gates of the dam could have been opened in a regulated manner. Let it be stressed that the appellant knew of the coming of the typhoon four days before it actually hit the project area. (p. 53, L-47379, Rollo) As to the award of damages, the appellate court held: We come now to the award of damages. The appellee submitted a list of estimated losses and damages to the tunnel project (Ipo side) caused by the instant flooding of the Angat River (Exh. J-1). The damages were itemized in four categories, to wit: Camp Facilities P55,700.00; Equipment, Parts and Plant - P375,659.51; Materials P107,175.80; and Permanent Structures and accessories - P137,250.00, with an aggregate total amount of P675,785.31. The list is supported by several vouchers which were all submitted as Exhibits K to M-38 a, N to O, P to U-2 and V to X- 60-a (Vide: Folders Nos. 1 to 4). The appellant did not submit proofs to traverse the aforementioned documentary evidence. We hold that the lower court did not commit any error in awarding P 675,785.31 as actual or compensatory damages.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library However, We cannot sustain the award of P333,200.00 as consequential damages. This amount is broken down as follows: P213,200.00 as and for the rentals of a crane to temporarily replace the one "destroyed beyond repair," and P120,000.00 as one month bonus which the appellee failed to realize in accordance with the contract which the appellee had with NAWASA. Said rental of the crane allegedly covered the period of one year at the rate of P40.00 an hour for 16 hours a day. The evidence, however, shows that the appellee bought a crane also a crawler type, on November 10, 1967, six (6) days after the incident in question (Exh N) And according to the lower court, which finding was never assailed, the appellee resumed its normal construction work on the Ipo- Bicti Project after a stoppage of only one month. There is no evidence when the appellee received the crane from the seller, Asian Enterprise Limited. But there was an agreement that the shipment of the goods would be effected within 60 days from the opening of the letter of credit (Exh. N). It appearing that the contract of sale was consummated, We must conclude or at least assume that the crane was delivered to the appellee within 60 days as stipulated. The appellee then could have availed of the services of another crane for a period of only one month (after a work stoppage of one month) at the rate of P 40.00 an hour for 16 hours a day or a total of P 19,200.00 as rental.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library But the value of the new crane cannot be included as part of actual damages because the old was reactivated after it was repaired. The cost of the repair was P 77,000.00 as shown in item No. 1 under the Equipment, Parts and Plants category (Exh. J-1), which amount of repair was already included in the actual or compensatory damages. (pp. 54-56, L-47379, Rollo) The appellate court likewise rejected the award of unrealized bonus from NAWASA in the amount of P120,000.00 (computed at P4,000.00 a day in case construction is finished before the specified time, i.e., within 800 calendar days), considering that the incident occurred after more than three (3) years or one thousand one hundred seventy (1,170) days. The court also eliminated the award of exemplary damages as there was no gross negligence on the part of NPC and reduced the amount of attorney's fees from P50,000.00 to P30,000.00.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library In these consolidated petitions, NPC assails the appellate court's decision as being erroneous on the ground that the destruction and loss of the ECI's equipment and facilities were due to force majeure. It argues that the rapid rise of the water level in the reservoir of its Angat Dam due to heavy rains brought about by the typhoon was an extraordinary occurrence that could not have been foreseen, and thus, the subsequent release of water through the spillway gates and its resultant effect, if any, on ECI's equipment and facilities may rightly be attributed to force majeure.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library On the other hand, ECI assails the reduction of the consequential damages from P333,200.00 to P19,000.00 on the grounds that the appellate court had no basis in concluding that ECI acquired a new Crawler-type crane and therefore, it only can claim rentals for the temporary use of the leased crane for a period of one month; and that the award of P4,000.00 a day or P120,000.00 a month bonus is justified since the period limitation on ECI's contract with NAWASA had dual effects, i.e., bonus for earlier completion and liquidated damages for delayed performance; and in either case at the rate of P4,000.00 daily. Thus, since NPC's negligence compelled work stoppage for a period of one month, the said award of P120,000.00 is justified. ECI further assailes the reduction of attorney's fees and the total elimination of exemplary damages.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Both petitions are without merit.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library It is clear from the appellate court's decision that based on its findings of fact and that of the trial court's, petitioner NPC was undoubtedly negligent because it opened the spillway gates of the Angat Dam only at the height of typhoon "Welming" when it knew very well that it was safer to have opened the same gradually and earlier, as it was also undeniable that NPC knew of the coming typhoon at least four days before it actually struck. And even though the typhoon was an act of God or what we may call force majeure, NPC cannot escape liability because its negligence was the proximate cause of the loss and damage. As we have ruled in Juan F. Nakpil & Sons v. Court of Appeals, (144 SCRA 596, 606-607): Thus, if upon the happening of a fortuitous event or an act of God, there concurs a corresponding fraud, negligence, delay or violation or contravention in any manner of the tenor of the obligation as provided for in Article 1170 of the Civil Code, which results in loss or damage, the obligor cannot escape liability.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The principle embodied in the act of God doctrine strictly requires that the act must be one occasioned exclusively by the violence of nature and human agencies are to be excluded from creating or entering into the cause of the mischief. When the effect, the cause of which is to be considered, is found to be in part the result of the participation of man, whether it be from active intervention or neglect, or failure to act, the whole occurrence is thereby humanized, as it was, and removed from the rules applicable to the acts of God. (1 Corpus Juris, pp. 1174-1175).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Thus, it has been held that when the negligence of a person concurs with an act of God in producing a loss, such person is not exempt from liability by showing that the immediate cause of the damage was the act of God. To be exempt from liability for loss because of an act of God, he must be free from any previous negligence or misconduct by which the loss or damage may have been occasioned. (Fish & Elective Co. v. Phil. Motors, 55 Phil. 129; Tucker v. Milan 49 O.G. 4379; Limpangco & Sons v. Yangco Steamship Co., 34 Phil. 594, 604; Lasam v. Smith, 45 Phil. 657). Furthermore, the question of whether or not there was negligence on the part of NPC is a question of fact which properly falls within the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals and will not be disturbed by this Court unless the same is clearly unfounded. Thus, in Tolentino v. Court of appeals, (150 SCRA 26, 36) we ruled: Moreover, the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are generally final and conclusive upon the Supreme Court (Leonardo v. Court of Appeals, 120 SCRA 890 [1983]. In fact it is settled that the Supreme Court is not supposed to weigh evidence but only to

determine its substantially (Nuez v. Sandiganbayan, 100 SCRA 433 [1982] and will generally not disturb said findings of fact when supported by substantial evidence (Aytona v. Court of Appeals, 113 SCRA 575 [1985]; Collector of Customs of Manila v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 137 SCRA 3 [1985]. On the other hand substantial evidence is defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion (Philippine Metal Products, Inc. v. Court of Industrial Relations, 90 SCRA 135 [1979]; Police Commission v. Lood, 127 SCRA 757 [1984]; Canete v. WCC, 136 SCRA 302 [1985]) Therefore, the respondent Court of Appeals did not err in holding the NPC liable for damages.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Likewise, it did not err in reducing the consequential damages from P333,200.00 to P19,000.00. As shown by the records, while there was no categorical statement or admission on the part of ECI that it bought a new crane to replace the damaged one, a sales contract was presented to the effect that the new crane would be delivered to it by Asian Enterprises within 60 days from the opening of the letter of credit at the cost of P106,336.75. The offer was made by Asian Enterprises a few days after the flood. As compared to the amount of P106,336.75 for a brand new crane and paying the alleged amount of P4,000.00 a day as rental for the use of a temporary crane, which use petitioner ECI alleged to have lasted for a period of one year, thus, totalling P120,000.00, plus the fact that there was already a sales contract between it and Asian Enterprises, there is no reason why ECI should opt to rent a temporary crane for a period of one year. The appellate court also found that the damaged crane was subsequently repaired and reactivated and the cost of repair was P77,000.00. Therefore, it included the said amount in the award of of compensatory damages, but not the value of the new crane. We do not find anything erroneous in the decision of the appellate court that the consequential damages should represent only the service of the temporary crane for one month. A contrary ruling would result in the unjust enrichment of ECI.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The P120,000.00 bonus was also properly eliminated as the same was granted by the trial court on the premise that it represented ECI's lost opportunity "to earn the one month bonus from NAWASA ... ." As stated earlier, the loss or damage to ECI's equipment and facilities occurred long after the stipulated deadline to finish the construction. No bonus, therefore, could have been possibly earned by ECI at that point in time. The supposed liquidated damages for failure to finish the project within the stipulated period or the opposite of the claim for bonus is not clearly presented in the records of these petitions. It is not shown that NAWASA imposed them.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library As to the question of exemplary damages, we sustain the appellate court in eliminating the same since it found that there was no bad faith on the part of NPC and that neither can the latter's negligence be considered gross. In Dee Hua Liong Electrical Equipment Corp. v. Reyes, (145 SCRA 713, 719) we ruled: Neither may private respondent recover exemplary damages since he is not entitled to moral or compensatory damages, and again because the petitioner is not shown to have acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless or oppressive manner (Art. 2234, Civil Code; Yutuk v. Manila Electric Co., 2 SCRA 377; Francisco v. Government Service Insurance System, 7 SCRA 577; Gutierrez v. Villegas, 8 SCRA 527; Air France v. Carrascoso, 18 SCRA 155; Pan Pacific (Phil.) v. Phil. Advertising Corp., 23 SCRA 977; Marchan v. Mendoza, 24 SCRA 888). We also affirm the reduction of attorney's fees from P50,000.00 to P30,000.00. There are no compelling reasons why we should set aside the appellate court's finding that the latter amount suffices for the services rendered by ECI's counsel.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library WHEREFORE, the petitions in G.R. No. 47379 and G.R. No. 47481 are both DISMISSED for LACK OF MERIT. The decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library SO ORDERED. G.R. No. L-47851 October 3, 1986 JUAN F. NAKPIL & SONS, and JUAN F. NAKPIL, Petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, UNITED CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC., JUAN J. CARLOS, and the PHILIPPINE BAR ASSOCIATION, Respondents. G.R. No. L-47863 October 3, 1986 THE UNITED CONSTRUCTION CO., INC., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., respondents. G.R. No. L-47896 October 3, 1986 PHILIPPINE BAR ASSOCIATION, ET AL., petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., respondents. PARAS, J.: chanrobles virtual law library These are petitions for review on certiorari of the November 28, 1977 decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 51771-R modifying the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch V, in Civil Case No. 74958 dated September 21, 1971 as modified by the Order of the lower court dated December 8, 1971. The Court of Appeals in modifying the decision of the lower court included an award of an additional amount of P200,000.00 to the Philippine Bar Association to be paid jointly and severally by the defendant United Construction Co. and by the third-party defendants Juan F. Nakpil and Sons and Juan F. Nakpil.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The dispositive portion of the modified decision of the lower court reads: WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered: chanrobles virtual law library (a) Ordering defendant United Construction Co., Inc. and third-party defendants (except Roman Ozaeta) to pay the plaintiff, jointly and severally, the sum of P989,335.68 with interest at the legal rate from November 29, 1968, the date of the filing of the complaint until full payment; chanrobles virtual law library (b) Dismissing the complaint with respect to defendant Juan J. Carlos; chanrobles virtual law library (c) Dismissing the third-party complaint; chanrobles virtual law library (d) Dismissing the defendant's and third-party defendants' counterclaims for lack of merit; chanrobles virtual law library (e) Ordering defendant United Construction Co., Inc. and third-party defendants (except Roman Ozaeta) to pay the costs in equal shares.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library SO ORDERED. (Record on Appeal p. 521; Rollo, L- 47851, p. 169). The dispositive portion of the decision of the Court of Appeals reads: WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is modified to include an award of P200,000.00 in favor of plaintiff-appellant Philippine Bar Association, with interest at the legal rate from November 29, 1968 until full payment to be paid jointly and severally by defendant United Construction Co., Inc. and third party defendants (except Roman Ozaeta). In all other respects, the judgment dated September 21, 1971 as modified in the December 8, 1971 Order of the lower court is hereby

affirmed with COSTS to be paid by the defendant and third party defendant (except Roman Ozaeta) in equal shares.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library SO ORDERED. Petitioners Juan F. Nakpil & Sons in L-47851 and United Construction Co., Inc. and Juan J. Carlos in L-47863 seek the reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals, among other things, for exoneration from liability while petitioner Philippine Bar Association in L-47896 seeks the modification of aforesaid decision to obtain an award of P1,830,000.00 for the loss of the PBA building plus four (4) times such amount as damages resulting in increased cost of the building, P100,000.00 as exemplary damages; and P100,000.00 as attorney's fees.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library These petitions arising from the same case filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila were consolidated by this Court in the resolution of May 10, 1978 requiring the respective respondents to comment. (Rollo, L-47851, p. 172).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The facts as found by the lower court (Decision, C.C. No. 74958; Record on Appeal, pp. 269-348; pp. 520-521; Rollo, L47851, p. 169) and affirmed by the Court of Appeals are as follows: chanrobles virtual law library The plaintiff, Philippine Bar Association, a civic-non-profit association, incorporated under the Corporation Law, decided to construct an office building on its 840 square meters lot located at the comer of Aduana and Arzobispo Streets, Intramuros, Manila. The construction was undertaken by the United Construction, Inc. on an "administration" basis, on the suggestion of Juan J. Carlos, the president and general manager of said corporation. The proposal was approved by plaintiff's board of directors and signed by its president Roman Ozaeta, a third-party defendant in this case. The plans and specifications for the building were prepared by the other third-party defendants Juan F. Nakpil & Sons. The building was completed in June, 1966.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library In the early morning of August 2, 1968 an unusually strong earthquake hit Manila and its environs and the building in question sustained major damage. The front columns of the building buckled, causing the building to tilt forward dangerously. The tenants vacated the building in view of its precarious condition. As a temporary remedial measure, the building was shored up by United Construction, Inc. at the cost of P13,661.28.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library On November 29, 1968, the plaintiff commenced this action for the recovery of damages arising from the partial collapse of the building against United Construction, Inc. and its President and General Manager Juan J. Carlos as defendants. Plaintiff alleges that the collapse of the building was accused by defects in the construction, the failure of the contractors to follow plans and specifications and violations by the defendants of the terms of the contract.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Defendants in turn filed a third-party complaint against the architects who prepared the plans and specifications, alleging in essence that the collapse of the building was due to the defects in the said plans and specifications. Roman Ozaeta, the then president of the plaintiff Bar Association was included as a third-party defendant for damages for having included Juan J. Carlos, President of the United Construction Co., Inc. as party defendant.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library On March 3, 1969, the plaintiff and third-party defendants Juan F. Nakpil & Sons and Juan F. Nakpil presented a written stipulation which reads: 1. That in relation to defendants' answer with counterclaims and third- party complaints and the third-party defendants Nakpil & Sons' answer thereto, the plaintiff need not amend its complaint by including the said Juan F. Nakpil & Sons and Juan F. Nakpil personally as parties defendant.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library 2. That in the event (unexpected by the undersigned) that the Court should find after the trial that the above-named defendants Juan J. Carlos and United Construction Co., Inc. are free from any blame and liability for the collapse of the PBA Building, and should further find that the collapse of said building was due to defects and/or inadequacy of the plans, designs, and specifications p by the third-party defendants, or in the event that the Court may find Juan F. Nakpil and Sons and/or Juan F. Nakpil contributorily negligent or in any way jointly and solidarily liable with the defendants, judgment may be rendered in whole or in part. as the case may be, against Juan F. Nakpil & Sons and/or Juan F. Nakpil in favor of the plaintiff to all intents and purposes as if plaintiff's complaint has been duly amended by including the said Juan F. Nakpil & Sons and Juan F. Nakpil as parties defendant and by alleging causes of action against them including, among others, the defects or inadequacy of the plans, designs, and specifications prepared by them and/or failure in the performance of their contract with plaintiff.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library 3. Both parties hereby jointly petition this Honorable Court to approve this stipulation. (Record on Appeal, pp. 274-275; Rollo, L-47851,p.169). Upon the issues being joined, a pre-trial was conducted on March 7, 1969, during which among others, the parties agreed to refer the technical issues involved in the case to a Commissioner. Mr. Andres O. Hizon, who was ultimately appointed by the trial court, assumed his office as Commissioner, charged with the duty to try the following issues: 1. Whether the damage sustained by the PBA building during the August 2, 1968 earthquake had been caused, directly or indirectly, by: chanrobles virtual law library (a) The inadequacies or defects in the plans and specifications prepared by third-party defendants; chanrobles virtual law library (b) The deviations, if any, made by the defendants from said plans and specifications and how said deviations contributed to the damage sustained; chanrobles virtual law library (c) The alleged failure of defendants to observe the requisite quality of materials and workmanship in the construction of the building; chanrobles virtual law library (d) The alleged failure to exercise the requisite degree of supervision expected of the architect, the contractor and/or the owner of the building; chanrobles virtual law library (e) An act of God or a fortuitous event; and chanrobles virtual law library (f) Any other cause not herein above specified.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library 2. If the cause of the damage suffered by the building arose from a combination of the above-enumerated factors, the degree or proportion in which each individual factor contributed to the damage sustained; chanrobles virtual law library

3. Whether the building is now a total loss and should be completely demolished or whether it may still be repaired and restored to a tenantable condition. In the latter case, the determination of the cost of such restoration or repair, and the value of any remaining construction, such as the foundation, which may still be utilized or availed of (Record on Appeal, pp. 275-276; Rollo, L-47851, p. 169). Thus, the issues of this case were divided into technical issues and non-technical issues. As aforestated the technical issues were referred to the Commissioner. The non-technical issues were tried by the Court.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Meanwhile, plaintiff moved twice for the demolition of the building on the ground that it may topple down in case of a strong earthquake. The motions were opposed by the defendants and the matter was referred to the Commissioner. Finally, on April 30, 1979 the building was authorized to be demolished at the expense of the plaintiff, but not another earthquake of high intensity on April 7, 1970 followed by other strong earthquakes on April 9, and 12, 1970, caused further damage to the property. The actual demolition was undertaken by the buyer of the damaged building. (Record on Appeal, pp. 278-280; Ibid.) chanrobles virtual law library After the protracted hearings, the Commissioner eventually submitted his report on September 25, 1970 with the findings that while the damage sustained by the PBA building was caused directly by the August 2, 1968 earthquake whose magnitude was estimated at 7.3 they were also caused by the defects in the plans and specifications prepared by the thirdparty defendants' architects, deviations from said plans and specifications by the defendant contractors and failure of the latter to observe the requisite workmanship in the construction of the building and of the contractors, architects and even the owners to exercise the requisite degree of supervision in the construction of subject building.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library All the parties registered their objections to aforesaid findings which in turn were answered by the Commissioner.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The trial court agreed with the findings of the Commissioner except as to the holding that the owner is charged with full nine supervision of the construction. The Court sees no legal or contractual basis for such conclusion. (Record on Appeal, pp. 309-328; Ibid).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Thus, on September 21, 1971, the lower court rendered the assailed decision which was modified by the Intermediate Appellate Court on November 28, 1977.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library All the parties herein appealed from the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court. Hence, these petitions.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library On May 11, 1978, the United Architects of the Philippines, the Association of Civil Engineers, and the Philippine Institute of Architects filed with the Court a motion to intervene as amicus curiae. They proposed to present a position paper on the liability of architects when a building collapses and to submit likewise a critical analysis with computations on the divergent views on the design and plans as submitted by the experts procured by the parties. The motion having been granted, the amicus curiae were granted a period of 60 days within which to submit their position.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library After the parties had all filed their comments, We gave due course to the petitions in Our Resolution of July 21, 1978.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The position papers of the amicus curiae (submitted on November 24, 1978) were duly noted.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The amicus curiae gave the opinion that the plans and specifications of the Nakpils were not defective. But the Commissioner, when asked by Us to comment, reiterated his conclusion that the defects in the plans and specifications indeed existed.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Using the same authorities availed of by the amicus curiae such as the Manila Code (Ord. No. 4131) and the 1966 Asep Code, the Commissioner added that even if it can be proved that the defects in the constructionalone (and not in the plans and design) caused the damage to the building, still the deficiency in the original design and jack of specific provisions against torsion in the original plans and the overload on the ground floor columns (found by an the experts including the original designer) certainly contributed to the damage which occurred. (Ibid, p. 174).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library In their respective briefs petitioners, among others, raised the following assignments of errors: Philippine Bar Association claimed that the measure of damages should not be limited to P1,100,000.00 as estimated cost of repairs or to the period of six (6) months for loss of rentals while United Construction Co., Inc. and the Nakpils claimed that it was an act of God that caused the failure of the building which should exempt them from responsibility and not the defective construction, poor workmanship, deviations from plans and specifications and other imperfections in the case of United Construction Co., Inc. or the deficiencies in the design, plans and specifications prepared by petitioners in the case of the Nakpils. Both UCCI and the Nakpils object to the payment of the additional amount of P200,000.00 imposed by the Court of Appeals. UCCI also claimed that it should be reimbursed the expenses of shoring the building in the amount of P13,661.28 while the Nakpils opposed the payment of damages jointly and solidarity with UCCI.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The pivotal issue in this case is whether or not an act of God-an unusually strong earthquake-which caused the failure of the building, exempts from liability, parties who are otherwise liable because of their negligence.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library The applicable law governing the rights and liabilities of the parties herein is Article 1723 of the New Civil Code, which provides: Art. 1723. The engineer or architect who drew up the plans and specifications for a building is liable for damages if within fifteen years from the completion of the structure the same should collapse by reason of a defect in those plans and specifications, or due to the defects in the ground. The contractor is likewise responsible for the damage if the edifice fags within the same period on account of defects in the construction or the use of materials of inferior quality furnished by him, or due to any violation of the terms of the contract. If the engineer or architect supervises the construction, he shall be solidarily liable with the contractor.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Acceptance of the building, after completion, does not imply waiver of any of the causes of action by reason of any defect mentioned in the preceding paragraph.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The action must be brought within ten years following the collapse of the building. On the other hand, the general rule is that no person shall be responsible for events which could not be foreseen or which though foreseen, were inevitable (Article 1174, New Civil Code).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library An act of God has been defined as an accident, due directly and exclusively to natural causes without human intervention, which by no amount of foresight, pains or care, reasonably to have been expected, could have been prevented. (1 Corpus Juris 1174).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library There is no dispute that the earthquake of August 2, 1968 is a fortuitous event or an act of God.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library To exempt the obligor from liability under Article 1174 of the Civil Code, for a breach of an obligation due to an "act of God," the following must concur: (a) the cause of the breach of the obligation must be independent of the will of the debtor; (b) the event must be either unforseeable or unavoidable; (c) the event must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner; and (d) the debtor must be free from any participation in, or aggravation of the injury to the creditor. (Vasquez v. Court of Appeals, 138 SCRA 553; Estrada v. Consolacion, 71 SCRA 423; Austria v. Court of Appeals, 39 SCRA 527; Republic of the Phil. v. Luzon Stevedoring Corp., 21 SCRA 279; Lasam v. Smith, 45 Phil. 657).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Thus, if upon the happening of a fortuitous event or an act of God, there concurs a corresponding fraud, negligence, delay or violation or contravention in any manner of the tenor of the obligation as provided for in Article 1170 of the Civil Code, which results in loss or damage, the obligor cannot escape liability.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The principle embodied in the act of God doctrine strictly requires that the act must be one occasioned exclusively by the violence of nature and all human agencies are to be excluded from creating or entering into the cause of the mischief. When the effect, the cause of which is to be considered, is found to be in part the result of the participation of man, whether it be from active intervention or neglect, or failure to act, the whole occurrence is thereby humanized, as it were, and removed from the rules applicable to the acts of God. (1 Corpus Juris, pp. 11741175).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Thus it has been held that when the negligence of a person concurs with an act of God in producing a loss, such person is not exempt from liability by showing that the immediate cause of the damage was the act of God. To be exempt from liability for loss because of an act of God, he must be free from any previous negligence or misconduct by which that loss or damage may have been occasioned. (Fish & Elective Co. v. Phil. Motors, 55 Phil. 129; Tucker v. Milan, 49 O.G. 4379; Limpangco & Sons v. Yangco Steamship Co., 34 Phil. 594, 604; Lasam v. Smith, 45 Phil. 657).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The negligence of the defendant and the third-party defendants petitioners was established beyond dispute both in the lower court and in the Intermediate Appellate Court. Defendant United Construction Co., Inc. was found to have made substantial deviations from the plans and specifications. and to have failed to observe the requisite workmanship in the construction as well as to exercise the requisite degree of supervision; while the third-party defendants were found to have inadequacies or defects in the plans and specifications prepared by them. As correctly assessed by both courts, the defects in the construction and in the plans and specifications were the proximate causes that rendered the PBA building unable to withstand the earthquake of August 2, 1968. For this reason the defendant and third-party defendants cannot claim exemption from liability. (Decision, Court of Appeals, pp. 30-31).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library It is well settled that the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are conclusive on the parties and on this court (cases cited in Tolentino vs. de Jesus, 56 SCRA 67; Cesar vs. Sandiganbayan, January 17, 1985, 134 SCRA 105, 121), unless (1) the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmise and conjectures; (2) the inference made is manifestly mistaken; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts; (5) the findings of fact are conflicting , (6) the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case and its findings are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellees (Ramos vs. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., February 8, 1967, 19 SCRA 289, 291292; Roque vs. Buan, Oct. 31, 1967, 21 SCRA 648, 651); (7) the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) said findings of facts are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents (Garcia vs. CA, June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA 622; Alsua-Bett vs. Court of Appeals, July 30, 1979, 92 SCRA 322, 366); (10) the finding of fact of the Court of Appeals is premised on the supposed absence of evidence and is contradicted by evidence on record (Salazar vs. Gutierrez, May 29, 1970, 33 SCRA 243, 247; Cited in G.R. No. 66497-98, Sacay v. Sandiganbayan, July 10, 1986).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library It is evident that the case at bar does not fall under any of the exceptions above-mentioned. On the contrary, the records show that the lower court spared no effort in arriving at the correct appreciation of facts by the referral of technical issues to a Commissioner chosen by the parties whose findings and conclusions remained convincingly unrebutted by the intervenors/amicus curiae who were allowed to intervene in the Supreme Court.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library In any event, the relevant and logical observations of the trial court as affirmed by the Court of Appeals that "while it is not possible to state with certainty that the building would not have collapsed were those defects not present, the fact remains that several buildings in the same area withstood the earthquake to which the building of the plaintiff was similarly subjected," cannot be ignored.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The next issue to be resolved is the amount of damages to be awarded to the PBA for the partial collapse (and eventual complete collapse) of its building.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The Court of Appeals affirmed the finding of the trial court based on the report of the Commissioner that the total amount required to repair the PBA building and to restore it to tenantable condition was P900,000.00 inasmuch as it was not initially a total loss. However, while the trial court awarded the PBA said amount as damages, plus unrealized rental income for one-half year, the Court of Appeals modified the amount by awarding in favor of PBA an additional sum of

P200,000.00 representing the damage suffered by the PBA building as a result of another earthquake that occurred on April 7, 1970 (L-47896, Vol. I, p. 92).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The PBA in its brief insists that the proper award should be P1,830,000.00 representing the total value of the building (L47896, PBA's No. 1 Assignment of Error, p. 19), while both the NAKPILS and UNITED question the additional award of P200,000.00 in favor of the PBA (L- 47851, NAKPIL's Brief as Petitioner, p. 6, UNITED's Brief as Petitioner, p. 25). The PBA further urges that the unrealized rental income awarded to it should not be limited to a period of one-half year but should be computed on a continuing basis at the rate of P178,671.76 a year until the judgment for the principal amount shall have been satisfied L- 47896, PBA's No. 11 Assignment of Errors, p. 19).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The collapse of the PBA building as a result of the August 2, 1968 earthquake was only partial and it is undisputed that the building could then still be repaired and restored to its tenantable condition. The PBA, however, in view of its lack of needed funding, was unable, thru no fault of its own, to have the building repaired. UNITED, on the other hand, spent P13,661.28 to shore up the building after the August 2, 1968 earthquake (L-47896, CA Decision, p. 46). Because of the earthquake on April 7, 1970, the trial court after the needed consultations, authorized the total demolition of the building (L-47896, Vol. 1, pp. 53-54).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library There should be no question that the NAKPILS and UNITED are liable for the damage resulting from the partial and eventual collapse of the PBA building as a result of the earthquakes.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library We quote with approval the following from the erudite decision penned by Justice Hugo E. Gutierrez (now an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court) while still an Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals: There is no question that an earthquake and other forces of nature such as cyclones, drought, floods, lightning, and perils of the sea are acts of God. It does not necessarily follow, however, that specific losses and suffering resulting from the occurrence of these natural force are also acts of God. We are not convinced on the basis of the evidence on record that from the thousands of structures in Manila, God singled out the blameless PBA building in Intramuros and around six or seven other buildings in various parts of the city for collapse or severe damage and that God alone was responsible for the damages and losses thus suffered.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The record is replete with evidence of defects and deficiencies in the designs and plans, defective construction, poor workmanship, deviation from plans and specifications and other imperfections. These deficiencies are attributable to negligent men and not to a perfect God.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The act-of-God arguments of the defendants- appellants and third party defendants-appellants presented in their briefs are premised on legal generalizations or speculations and on theological fatalism both of which ignore the plain facts. The lengthy discussion of United on ordinary earthquakes and unusually strong earthquakes and on ordinary fortuitous events and extraordinary fortuitous events leads to its argument that the August 2, 1968 earthquake was of such an overwhelming and destructive character that by its own force and independent of the particular negligence alleged, the injury would have been produced. If we follow this line of speculative reasoning, we will be forced to conclude that under such a situation scores of buildings in the vicinity and in other parts of Manila would have toppled down. Following the same line of reasoning, Nakpil and Sons alleges that the designs were adequate in accordance with pre-August 2, 1968 knowledge and appear inadequate only in the light of engineering information acquired after the earthquake. If this were so, hundreds of ancient buildings which survived the earthquake better than the two-year old PBA building must have been designed and constructed by architects and contractors whose knowledge and foresight were unexplainably auspicious and prophetic. Fortunately, the facts on record allow a more down to earth explanation of the collapse. The failure of the PBA building, as a unique and distinct construction with no reference or comparison to other buildings, to weather the severe earthquake forces was traced to design deficiencies and defective construction, factors which are neither mysterious nor esoteric. The theological allusion of appellant United that God acts in mysterious ways His wonders to perform impresses us to be inappropriate. The evidence reveals defects and deficiencies in design and construction. There is no mystery about these acts of negligence. The collapse of the PBA building was no wonder performed by God. It was a result of the imperfections in the work of the architects and the people in the construction company. More relevant to our mind is the lesson from the parable of the wise man in the Sermon on the Mount "which built his house upon a rock; and the rain descended and the floods came and the winds blew and beat upon that house; and it fen not; for it was founded upon a rock" and of the "foolish upon the sand. And the rain descended and man which built his house the floods came, and the winds blew, and beat upon that house; and it fell and great was the fall of it. (St. Matthew 7: 24-27)." The requirement that a building should withstand rains, floods, winds, earthquakes, and natural forces is precisely the reason why we have professional experts like architects, and engineers. Designs and constructions vary under varying circumstances and conditions but the requirement to design and build well does not change.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The findings of the lower Court on the cause of the collapse are more rational and accurate. Instead of laying the blame solely on the motions and forces generated by the earthquake, it also examined the ability of the PBA building, as designed and constructed, to withstand and successfully weather those forces.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The evidence sufficiently supports a conclusion that the negligence and fault of both United and Nakpil and Sons, not a mysterious act of an inscrutable God, were responsible for the damages. The Report of the Commissioner, Plaintiff's Objections to the Report, Third Party Defendants' Objections to the Report, Defendants' Objections to the Report, Commissioner's Answer to the various Objections, Plaintiffs' Reply to the Commissioner's Answer, Defendants' Reply to the Commissioner's Answer, Counter-Reply to Defendants' Reply, and Third-Party Defendants' Reply to the Commissioner's Report not to mention the exhibits and the testimonies show that the main arguments raised on appeal were already raised during the trial and fully considered by the lower Court. A reiteration of these same arguments on appeal fails to convince us that we should reverse or disturb the lower Court's factual findings and its conclusions drawn from the facts, among them: chanrobles virtual law library The Commissioner also found merit in the allegations of the defendants as to the physical evidence before and after the earthquake showing the inadequacy of design, to wit: chanrobles virtual law library Physical evidence before the earthquake providing (sic) inadequacy of design; chanrobles virtual law library 1. inadequate design was the cause of the failure of the building.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

2. Sun-baffles on the two sides and in front of the building; chanrobles virtual law library a. Increase the inertia forces that move the building laterally toward the Manila Fire Department.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library b. Create another stiffness imbalance.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library 3. The embedded 4" diameter cast iron down spout on all exterior columns reduces the cross-sectional area of each of the columns and the strength thereof.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library 4. Two front corners, A7 and D7 columns were very much less reinforced.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Physical Evidence After the Earthquake, Proving Inadequacy of design; chanrobles virtual law library 1. Column A7 suffered the severest fracture and maximum sagging. Also D7.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library 2. There are more damages in the front part of the building than towards the rear, not only in columns but also in slabs.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library 3. Building leaned and sagged more on the front part of the building.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library 4. Floors showed maximum sagging on the sides and toward the front corner parts of the building.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library 5. There was a lateral displacement of the building of about 8", Maximum sagging occurs at the column A7 where the floor is lower by 80 cm. than the highest slab level.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library 6. Slab at the corner column D7 sagged by 38 cm.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The Commissioner concluded that there were deficiencies or defects in the design, plans and specifications of the PBA building which involved appreciable risks with respect to the accidental forces which may result from earthquake shocks. He conceded, however, that the fact that those deficiencies or defects may have arisen from an obsolete or not too conservative code or even a code that does not require a design for earthquake forces mitigates in a large measure the responsibility or liability of the architect and engineer designer.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The Third-party defendants, who are the most concerned with this portion of the Commissioner's report, voiced opposition to the same on the grounds that (a) the finding is based on a basic erroneous conception as to the design concept of the building, to wit, that the design is essentially that of a heavy rectangular box on stilts with shear wan at one end; (b) the finding that there were defects and a deficiency in the design of the building would at best be based on an approximation and, therefore, rightly belonged to the realm of speculation, rather than of certainty and could very possibly be outright error; (c) the Commissioner has failed to back up or support his finding with extensive, complex and highly specialized computations and analyzes which he himself emphasizes are necessary in the determination of such a highly technical question; and (d) the Commissioner has analyzed the design of the PBA building not in the light of existing and available earthquake engineering knowledge at the time of the preparation of the design, but in the light of recent and current standards.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The Commissioner answered the said objections alleging that third-party defendants' objections were based on estimates or exhibits not presented during the hearing that the resort to engineering references posterior to the date of the preparation of the plans was induced by the third-party defendants themselves who submitted computations of the thirdparty defendants are erroneous.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The issue presently considered is admittedly a technical one of the highest degree. It involves questions not within the ordinary competence of the bench and the bar to resolve by themselves. Counsel for the third-party defendants has aptly remarked that "engineering, although dealing in mathematics, is not an exact science and that the present knowledge as to the nature of earthquakes and the behaviour of forces generated by them still leaves much to be desired; so much so "that the experts of the different parties, who are all engineers, cannot agree on what equation to use, as to what earthquake coefficients are, on the codes to be used and even as to the type of structure that the PBA building (is) was (p. 29, Memo, of third- party defendants before the Commissioner).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The difficulty expected by the Court if tills technical matter were to be tried and inquired into by the Court itself, coupled with the intrinsic nature of the questions involved therein, constituted the reason for the reference of the said issues to a Commissioner whose qualifications and experience have eminently qualified him for the task, and whose competence had not been questioned by the parties until he submitted his report. Within the pardonable limit of the Court's ability to comprehend the meaning of the Commissioner's report on this issue, and the objections voiced to the same, the Court sees no compelling reasons to disturb the findings of the Commissioner that there were defects and deficiencies in the design, plans and specifications prepared by third-party defendants, and that said defects and deficiencies involved appreciable risks with respect to the accidental forces which may result from earthquake shocks.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library (2) (a) The deviations, if any, made by the defendants from the plans and specifications, and how said deviations contributed to the damage sustained by the building.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library (b) The alleged failure of defendants to observe the requisite quality of materials and workmanship in the construction of the building.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library These two issues, being interrelated with each other, will be discussed together.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The findings of the Commissioner on these issues were as follows: chanrobles virtual law library We now turn to the construction of the PBA Building and the alleged deficiencies or defects in the construction and violations or deviations from the plans and specifications. All these may be summarized as follows: chanrobles virtual law library a. Summary of alleged defects as reported by Engineer Mario M. Bundalian.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library (1) Wrongful and defective placing of reinforcing bars.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library (2) Absence of effective and desirable integration of the 3 bars in the cluster.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

(3) Oversize coarse aggregates: 1-1/4 to 2" were used. Specification requires no larger than 1 inch.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library (4) Reinforcement assembly is not concentric with the column, eccentricity being 3" off when on one face the main bars are only 1 1/2' from the surface.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library (5) Prevalence of honeycombs, chanrobles virtual law library (6) Contraband construction joints, chanrobles virtual law library (7) Absence, or omission, or over spacing of spiral hoops, chanrobles virtual law library (8) Deliberate severance of spirals into semi-circles in noted on Col. A-5, ground floor,chanrobles virtual law library (9) Defective construction joints in Columns A-3, C-7, D-7 and D-4, ground floor, chanrobles virtual law library (10) Undergraduate concrete is evident, chanrobles virtual law library (11) Big cavity in core of Column 2A-4, second floor, chanrobles virtual law library (12) Columns buckled at different planes. Columns buckled worst where there are no spirals or where spirals are cut. Columns suffered worst displacement where the eccentricity of the columnar reinforcement assembly is more acute.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library b. Summary of alleged defects as reported by Engr. Antonio Avecilla.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Columns are first (or ground) floor, unless otherwise stated.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library (1) Column D4 - Spacing of spiral is changed from 2" to 5" on centers, chanrobles virtual law library (2) Column D5 - No spiral up to a height of 22" from the ground floor, chanrobles virtual law library (3) Column D6 - Spacing of spiral over 4 l/2, chanrobles virtual law library (4) Column D7 - Lack of lateral ties, chanrobles virtual law library (5) Column C7 - Absence of spiral to a height of 20" from the ground level, Spirals are at 2" from the exterior column face and 6" from the inner column face, chanrobles virtual law library (6) Column B6 - Lack of spiral on 2 feet below the floor beams, chanrobles virtual law library (7) Column B5 - Lack of spirals at a distance of 26' below the beam, chanrobles virtual law library (8) Column B7 - Spirals not tied to vertical reinforcing bars, Spirals are uneven 2" to 4", chanrobles virtual law library (9) Column A3 - Lack of lateral ties, chanrobles virtual law library (10) Column A4 - Spirals cut off and welded to two separate clustered vertical bars, chanrobles virtual law library (11) Column A4 - (second floor Column is completely hollow to a height of 30" chanrobles virtual law library (12) Column A5 - Spirals were cut from the floor level to the bottom of the spandrel beam to a height of 6 feet, chanrobles virtual law library (13) Column A6 - No spirals up to a height of 30' above the ground floor level, chanrobles virtual law library (14) Column A7- Lack of lateralties or spirals, chanrobles virtual law library c. Summary of alleged defects as reported by the experts of the Third-Party defendants.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Ground floor columns.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library (1) Column A4 - Spirals are cut, chanrobles virtual law library (2) Column A5 - Spirals are cut, chanrobles virtual law library (3) Column A6 - At lower 18" spirals are absent, chanrobles virtual law library (4) Column A7 - Ties are too far apart, chanrobles virtual law library (5) Column B5 - At upper fourth of column spirals are either absent or improperly spliced, chanrobles virtual law library (6) Column B6 - At upper 2 feet spirals are absent, chanrobles virtual law library (7) Column B7 - At upper fourth of column spirals missing or improperly spliced.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library (8) Column C7- Spirals are absent at lowest 18" chanrobles virtual law library (9) Column D5 - At lowest 2 feet spirals are absent, chanrobles virtual law library (10) Column D6 - Spirals are too far apart and apparently improperly spliced, chanrobles virtual law library (11) Column D7 - Lateral ties are too far apart, spaced 16" on centers.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library There is merit in many of these allegations. The explanations given by the engineering experts for the defendants are either contrary to general principles of engineering design for reinforced concrete or not applicable to the requirements for ductility and strength of reinforced concrete in earthquake-resistant design and construction.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library We shall first classify and consider defects which may have appreciable bearing or relation to' the earthquake-resistant property of the building.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library As heretofore mentioned, details which insure ductility at or near the connections between columns and girders are desirable in earthquake resistant design and construction. The omission of spirals and ties or hoops at the bottom and/or tops of columns contributed greatly to the loss of earthquake-resistant strength. The plans and specifications required that these spirals and ties be carried from the floor level to the bottom reinforcement of the deeper beam (p. 1, Specifications, p. 970, Reference 11). There were several clear evidences where this was not done especially in some of the ground floor columns which failed.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library There were also unmistakable evidences that the spacings of the spirals and ties in the columns were in many cases greater than those called for in the plans and specifications resulting again in loss of earthquake-resistant strength. The assertion of the engineering experts for the defendants that the improper spacings and the cutting of the spirals did not result in loss of strength in the column cannot be maintained and is certainly contrary to the general principles of column design and construction. And even granting that there be no loss in strength at the yield point (an assumption which is very doubtful) the cutting or improper spacings of spirals will certainly result in the loss of the plastic range or ductility in the column and it is precisely this plastic range or ductility which is desirable and needed for earthquake-resistant strength.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

There is no excuse for the cavity or hollow portion in the column A4, second floor, and although this column did not fail, this is certainly an evidence on the part of the contractor of poor construction.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The effect of eccentricities in the columns which were measured at about 2 1/2 inches maximum may be approximated in relation to column loads and column and beam moments. The main effect of eccentricity is to change the beam or girder span. The effect on the measured eccentricity of 2 inches, therefore, is to increase or diminish the column load by a maximum of about 1% and to increase or diminish the column or beam movements by about a maximum of 2%. While these can certainly be absorbed within the factor of safety, they nevertheless diminish said factor of safety.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The cutting of the spirals in column A5, ground floor is the subject of great contention between the parties and deserves special consideration.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The proper placing of the main reinforcements and spirals in column A5, ground floor, is the responsibility of the general contractor which is the UCCI. The burden of proof, therefore, that this cutting was done by others is upon the defendants. Other than a strong allegation and assertion that it is the plumber or his men who may have done the cutting (and this was flatly denied by the plumber) no conclusive proof was presented. The engineering experts for the defendants asserted that they could have no motivation for cutting the bar because they can simply replace the spirals by wrapping around a new set of spirals. This is not quite correct. There is evidence to show that the pouring of concrete for columns was sometimes done through the beam and girder reinforcements which were already in place as in the case of column A4 second floor. If the reinforcement for the girder and column is to subsequently wrap around the spirals, this would not do for the elasticity of steel would prevent the making of tight column spirals and loose or improper spirals would result. The proper way is to produce correct spirals down from the top of the main column bars, a procedure which can not be done if either the beam or girder reinforcement is already in place. The engineering experts for the defendants strongly assert and apparently believe that the cutting of the spirals did not materially diminish the strength of the column. This belief together with the difficulty of slipping the spirals on the top of the column once the beam reinforcement is in place may be a sufficient motivation for the cutting of the spirals themselves. The defendants, therefore, should be held responsible for the consequences arising from the loss of strength or ductility in column A5 which may have contributed to the damages sustained by the building.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The lack of proper length of splicing of spirals was also proven in the visible spirals of the columns where spalling of the concrete cover had taken place. This lack of proper splicing contributed in a small measure to the loss of strength.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The effects of all the other proven and visible defects although nor can certainly be accumulated so that they can contribute to an appreciable loss in earthquake-resistant strength. The engineering experts for the defendants submitted an estimate on some of these defects in the amount of a few percent. If accumulated, therefore, including the effect of eccentricity in the column the loss in strength due to these minor defects may run to as much as ten percent.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library To recapitulate: the omission or lack of spirals and ties at the bottom and/or at the top of some of the ground floor columns contributed greatly to the collapse of the PBA building since it is at these points where the greater part of the failure occurred. The liability for the cutting of the spirals in column A5, ground floor, in the considered opinion of the Commissioner rests on the shoulders of the defendants and the loss of strength in this column contributed to the damage which occurred.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library It is reasonable to conclude, therefore, that the proven defects, deficiencies and violations of the plans and specifications of the PBA building contributed to the damages which resulted during the earthquake of August 2, 1968 and the vice of these defects and deficiencies is that they not only increase but also aggravate the weakness mentioned in the design of the structure. In other words, these defects and deficiencies not only tend to add but also to multiply the effects of the shortcomings in the design of the building. We may say, therefore, that the defects and deficiencies in the construction contributed greatly to the damage which occurred.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Since the execution and supervision of the construction work in the hands of the contractor is direct and positive, the presence of existence of all the major defects and deficiencies noted and proven manifests an element of negligence which may amount to imprudence in the construction work. (pp. 42-49, Commissioners Report). As the parties most directly concerned with this portion of the Commissioner's report, the defendants voiced their objections to the same on the grounds that the Commissioner should have specified the defects found by him to be "meritorious"; that the Commissioner failed to indicate the number of cases where the spirals and ties were not carried from the floor level to the bottom reinforcement of the deeper beam, or where the spacing of the spirals and ties in the columns were greater than that called for in the specifications; that the hollow in column A4, second floor, the eccentricities in the columns, the lack of proper length of splicing of spirals, and the cut in the spirals in column A5, ground floor, did not aggravate or contribute to the damage suffered by the building; that the defects in the construction were within the tolerable margin of safety; and that the cutting of the spirals in column A5, ground floor, was done by the plumber or his men, and not by the defendants.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Answering the said objections, the Commissioner stated that, since many of the defects were minor only the totality of the defects was considered. As regards the objection as to failure to state the number of cases where the spirals and ties were not carried from the floor level to the bottom reinforcement, the Commissioner specified groundfloor columns B-6 and C-5 the first one without spirals for 03 inches at the top, and in the latter, there were no spirals for 10 inches at the bottom. The Commissioner likewise specified the first storey columns where the spacings were greater than that called for in the specifications to be columns B-5, B-6, C-7, C-6, C-5, D-5 and B-7. The objection to the failure of the Commissioner to specify the number of columns where there was lack of proper length of splicing of spirals, the Commissioner mentioned groundfloor columns B-6 and B-5 where all the splices were less than 1-1/2 turns and were not welded, resulting in some loss of strength which could be critical near the ends of the columns. He answered the supposition of the defendants that the spirals and the ties must have been looted, by calling attention to the fact that the missing spirals and ties were only in two out of the 25 columns, which rendered said supposition to be improbable.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The Commissioner conceded that the hollow in column A-4, second floor, did not aggravate or contribute to the damage, but averred that it is "evidence of poor construction." On the claim that the eccentricity could be absorbed within the factor of safety, the Commissioner answered that, while the same may be true, it also contributed to or aggravated the damage suffered by the building.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The objection regarding the cutting of the spirals in Column A-5, groundfloor, was answered by the Commissioner by reiterating the observation in his report that irrespective of who did the cutting of the spirals, the defendants should be held liable for the same as the general contractor of the building. The Commissioner further stated that the loss of strength of the cut spirals and inelastic deflections of the supposed lattice work defeated the purpose of the spiral containment in the column and resulted in the loss of strength, as evidenced by the actual failure of this column.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Again, the Court concurs in the findings of the Commissioner on these issues and fails to find any sufficient cause to disregard or modify the same. As found by the Commissioner, the "deviations made by the defendants from the plans and specifications caused indirectly the damage sustained and that those deviations not only added but also aggravated the damage caused by the defects in the plans and specifications prepared by third-party defendants. (Rollo, Vol. I, pp. 128142) chanrobles virtual law library The afore-mentioned facts clearly indicate the wanton negligence of both the defendant and the third-party defendants in effecting the plans, designs, specifications, and construction of the PBA building and We hold such negligence as equivalent to bad faith in the performance of their respective tasks.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Relative thereto, the ruling of the Supreme Court in Tucker v. Milan (49 O.G. 4379, 4380) which may be in point in this case reads: chanrobles virtual law library One who negligently creates a dangerous condition cannot escape liability for the natural and probable consequences thereof, although the act of a third person, or an act of God for which he is not responsible, intervenes to precipitate the loss.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library As already discussed, the destruction was not purely an act of God. Truth to tell hundreds of ancient buildings in the vicinity were hardly affected by the earthquake. Only one thing spells out the fatal difference; gross negligence and evident bad faith, without which the damage would not have occurred.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby MODIFIED and considering the special and environmental circumstances of this case, We deem it reasonable to render a decision imposing, as We do hereby impose, upon the defendant and the third-party defendants (with the exception of Roman Ozaeta) a solidary (Art. 1723, Civil Code, Supra, p. 10) indemnity in favor of the Philippine Bar Association of FIVE MILLION (P5,000,000.00) Pesos to cover all damages (with the exception of attorney's fees) occasioned by the loss of the building (including interest charges and lost rentals) and an additional ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND (P100,000.00) Pesos as and for attorney's fees, the total sum being payable upon the finality of this decision. Upon failure to pay on such finality, twelve (12%) per cent interest per annum shall be imposed upon afore-mentioned amounts from finality until paid. Solidary costs against the defendant and third-party defendants (except Roman Ozaeta).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library SO ORDERED. URBANO v. IAC Facts: Urbano had a dispute with Javier due to latters opening of irrigation system which flooded farmers palay storage. Urbano hacked Javier with a bolo but they had amicable settlement later on. 22 days after incident, Javier died due to tetanus. Issue: WON Urbano is criminally liable? Held: No. Civil liabilities only. Death wasnt directly due to the hacking. Proximate cause is that cause, w/c, in natural & continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces injury & w/o w/c the result wouldnt have occurred. The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural, & logical consequence of the wound inflicted upon him by the accused to be proven beyond reasonable doubt (because this is a criminal conviction). Infection of wound was efficient intervening cause between wounding & hacking w/c was distinct & foreign to the crime. The petitioner at the very least is guilty of slight physical injury. But because Urbano & Javier used the facilities of barangay mediators to effect a compromise agreement, the criminal liability is wiped out by virtue of PD 1508, 2(3) w/c allows settlement of minor offenses. August 29, 1947 G.R. No. L-208 INES CONSOLACION CUYUGAN, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JOSE P. DIZON, defendant-appellant. Franciso M. Ramos for appellant. Juan G. Lagman for appellee. , J.: Plaintiff brought this action in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga on November 25, 1943, and obtained judgment of the following tenor dated September 26, 1944: Declarando rescindido el contrato de arrendamiento otorgado entre las partes, y condena al demandado a pagar a la demandante: (a) la cantidad de P1,767.50 con sus intereses legales desde la interposicion de la demanda de canones vencidos y no pagados correspondientes a los aos agricolas de 1942-1943 y 1943-1944; (b) la cantidad de P1,000, en concepto de canon vencido y pagado correspondiente al ao agricola de 1944-1945, con sus intereses legales desde la fecha de su vencimiento hasta su completo pago; y (c) las costas del juicio.

The facts, so far as they are not controverted, are these: In a written contract acknowledged before a notary public on October 8, 1940, the plaintiff leased to the defendant several registered parcels of land which have a combined area of over 33 hectares, situated in the municipality of Mabalacat, Province of Pampanga, and apparently adjoining or close to one another. The contract contained the following stipulations: (a) Que el termino de este arrendamiento es de cinco (5) aos a contar desde la fecha de esta escritura, prorogable a otros cinco aos siempre y cuando ambas partes asi lo hayan convenido; (b) Que el arrendatario pagara en el domicilio un canon anual de mil pesos (P1,000) pagadero por adelantado en el domicilio de la arrendadora, empezando el 1. o de Enero del proximo ao de 1941 y el 1.o de Enero de cada ao sucesivamente; entendiendose; sin embargo, que el arrendatario pagara la suma de quinientos pesos (P500) el 1.o de Noviembre de este ao de 1940 a cuenta del canon correspondiente al primer ao; (c) Que los canales de riego actualmente existentes en los terenos objecto de este arrendamiento no podran ser quitados ni removidos ni desviados por el arrendatario sin consentimiento por escrito de la arrendadora; (d) Que en este arrendamiento van incluidas las cuotas de azucar correspondientes a los referidos terrenos; (e) Que cualquiera infraccion o incumplimiento de todas y cada una de estas condiciones dara lugar a la revocacion de esta escritura y la parte agraviada podra exigir los correspondientes daos y perjuicos. Upon the execution of this contract, the defendant paid the plaintiff P500, and on or about January 1, 1941, another P500, both as rental for that year. Allegedly because of the outbreak of war in December, 1941, it was not until about February, 1943, that the defendant paid P23.50 as rent for 1942. The plaintiff made a receipt for this amount but the defendant said at the trial that it had been lost . No other rental was ever paid after February, 1943, as a consequence of which this suit was instituted to rescind the lease and to recover the total yearly rental for 1943 and P76.50 for 1942. On March 4, 1944, before trial, the plaintiff filed a supplemental complaint asking "in addition to the various reliefs prayed for in the original complaint . . . that the defendant be condemned to pay the sum of P1,000 as rentals in arrears for the year 1944." The defendant resisted the suit and put up various special defenses. Roughly, he averred that the P23.50 he had paid was in full payment of the 1942 rental. He said that on account of the war, he proposed to the plaintiff and the latter agreed, that he should pay 100 cavanes of palay in lieu of P1,000 in cash. He added that, as the plaintiff had not empty sacks in which to put the 100 cavanes of palay, he sold the cereal for P23.50, which was the Naric price, and turned the proceeds over to the lessor. As to the rentals for 1943 and subsequent years he invoked article 1575 of the Civil Code, which gives the lessee of agricultural land a right to reduction in case of loss or destruction of more than one-half of of the crops by reason of war or other extraordinary fortuitous events. The article reads in full: ART. 1575. A lessee shall not be entitled to a reduction of the rent on account of the sterility of the land leased or on account of the loss of the fruits through ordinary fortuitous events; but shall be entitled to such reduction in case of the loss of more than half of the fruits through extraordinary and unforeseen fortuitous events, unless there in a special agreement to the contrary. By extraordinary fortuitous events shall be understood fire, war, pestilence, extraordinary inundations, locusts, earthquakes, or any other equally unusual events which the contracting parties could not have reasonably foreseen. Before taking up the main legal question raised by the pleadings certain matters about which there is conflict evidence should be disposed of kvyLTY. The P232.50 payment, according to the plaintiff, was an installment to be applied on account of the yearly rental of P1,000 for 1942. She swore that the receipts she issued made this clear. The defendant countered with the statement that the payment was in full satisfaction of the 1942 rental. The trial court believed the plaintiff and we find no occasion to disagree with His Honor. The alleged loss of the receipt had not been satisfactorily established. The defendant's testimony that he did not take good care of it because it was not important is unconvincing. As a matter of fact, the paper was important; and to a lawyer like the defendant its importance could not have been underestimated, especially if we are to believe his assertion that the receipt cancelled, in effect, the balance of the rental for 1942, amounting to P767.50. The preservation of the receipt should have had an added significance to him if we are to accept his other statement that when he made the payment he asked the plaintiff for one-half reduction of the rentals for 1943 and subsequent years but that the plaintiff refused to make any commitment. There is one other factor worth bearing in mind: the basic contract was in a public document and the defendant, as a lawyer, must have known that to vary its terms he had to have a writing as proof if not as essential requisite to the validity of the supposed change. The presumption of law, therefore, against a party who suppresses material evidence is applicable in this case rL9T. Independent of what the receipt might reveal, the defendant's version of the alleged reduction, which the plaintiff brands as an outright falsehood, does not ring true. He testified that he casually met the plaintiff at a store in Mabalacat in January or February, 1943. There, he said, he and the plaintiff talked about the rental and she then and there agreed to receive 100 cavanes of palay in full discharge of the 1942 rental. Going into details, he said that when his tenants began to bring palay he told his overseer to get empty jute sacks from the plaintiff; that as the plaintiff told his emissary she did not have empty sacks, he personally went to see her

in her house; that the plaintiff reiterated her inability to furnish empty sacks and suggested that if possible he use his own sacks; that he thereupon sold the palay at the prevailing NARIC prices, which were P2 for colored rice and P2.65 for white; that "at that moment I returned twice and handed to her P232.50 as the sale price of 100 cavanes." There are lapses in this testimony which lead to doubts of its exact veracity. The defendant, for example, did not say that the plaintiff authorized him to sell the palay, much less at reduced prices. It seems strange that simply because there were no sacks available, the defendant, without so much as insinuation from the plaintiff, should have hastened to dispose of the cereal very cheap. Our skepticism applied to the defendant's statement that the plaintiff accepted 100 cavanes of palay as full annual rental. The fact that P323.50 tallied to the last centavo with the alleged NARIC quotations is not, without more, evidence that the money was paid by the defendant and accepted by the plaintiff in full satisfaction of the yearly rental for 1942, or that the plaintiff abided by the reduction he claims to have asked for. The defendant might have sold in reality 100 cavanes of palay at the price stated by him and turned the entire proceeds over to the plaintiff in check or in cash, or else he might have sold a smaller quantity, say 50 cavanes at double or quadruple the alleged NARIC price per cavan, thereby realizing the same amount of cash. In any case, we cannot see how from the mere fact that the payment was not in round figure can be wrested the conclusion that it was all the money the defendant got for 100 cavanes of palay, or that it was intended as a complete discharge of his liability for 1942 in the concept of rent. With these details out of the way, we now proceed to consider the applicability to this case of article 1575 of the Civil Code qyQp8z. The rental for 1941 having been paid on time and in the specified amounts, is out of the case. If the defendant lost the 1941 sugar cane crops and wants a reduction of the rental for that year, he had not sought an affirmative relief or given any indication of his purpose in his answer. Moreover, Manresa after pointing out that under article 1617 of the Italian Code, if the lease is for a number of years and during its life the whole or at least one-half of the fruits corresponding to one year have perished, the tenant could ask for a reduction of the rent states that the principle of compensation, set-offs among the products of different years is not legaly possible under the Spanish Civil Code. (10 Manresa, Codigo Civil Espaol, pp. 599-600.) The conclusion at which the lower court and this Court have arrived, that the P232.50 was intended only as an advance on the annual rent for 1942, and that there was no separate stipulation, express or implied, between the parties to change the annual rental to 100 cavanes of palay, also removes the 1942 rental out of the provision of article 1575 of the Civil Code. We believe that the acceptance by the defendant of the receipt embodying an implied promise to pay the balance later, operated as a waiver of any right to a reduction or compensation which he might have under that provision. However this may be, there is another aspect of the case which in our opinion precludes availability to the defendant of the benefits of article 1575 of the Civil Code as regards not only the rentals for 1943, 1944 and 1954, but also those of 1942. Article 1575 lays down as basis of rental discount a loss of more than one-half of the product of the land on account of war, etc. There is no pretense that the region where where the land under lease is located had ever been a combat zone, and no destruction of, or damage to, the 1942-1945 crops arising out of the war has been proved. The purported loss of his share of the rice crops for one of the years during which the contract of lease was in force was due to his tenants' dishonesty or his own negligence. The gravamen of the defendant's contention is that the leased land by its nature was sugar land and that he was unable to plant sugar cane on it in 1942 and the following seasons because the sugar miling centrals were closed. If it be assumed that the defendant's crops were totally lost in 1942, 1943, and 1944, his case would not be any better. One vital point which escapes the defendant's argument is that, although the contract was for five years and it had four more years to run when the war broke out, yet he could have rescinded the lease at the beginning of 1942 and the plaintiff would have gladly taken back her property. Planting season had not yet started. But the defendant chose to continue with the lease and hired tenants to plant rice. If he lost in the venture, the loss was not due to any extraordinary event he had not thought of. It was rather due to mismanagement, miscalculation and/or other factors not entirely unexpected by him. It should be noted that under article 1575 the cause of the loss must not only have been an extraordinary event but must also have been one which the parties could not have reasonably foreseen. In the face of the willingness of the plaintiff to have the lease rescinded early in 1942 before planting season commenced and after the country was plunged into war and to release the defendant from any obligation to pay rental for that and the following years, he cant not say that the war to whcih he attributed his losses was an unforeseen circumstance within the contemplation of article 1575. War was already going on when he decided to cling to the contract in spite of the plaintiff's wishes to terminate it. He was then fully aware of the hazards incident upon the conflict of arms which was raging, hazards which he ought to have known might turn against the success of his enterprise. Manresa's commentary on article 1575 of the Civil Code is applicable and pertinent to the contract under consideration from the second year of its life, as it would be to the entire contract if the latter had been enacted into after the war started. The situation of the parties with reference to the war in both cases would be exactly the same. Now, this is what the learned commentator says: Por lo tanto, no podra el arrendatario exigir esa rebaja cuando se trata de casos fortuitos extraordinarios previstos, si bien es logico contraer esta prevision al tiempo de la perfeccion del contrato, y no a otro momento posterior. Por ejemplo, si cuando el arrendamiento se pacto el pais ardia ya en guerra o la region estaba infestada de longasta, aunque no le estuviera la finca arrendada, es claro que se trata de casos fortuitos extraordinarios previstos, que, desde luego, ejercian su influencia en la fijacion del precio, y que las partes tendrian en cuenta al contratar; de donde no resulta justo el que tal supuesto se rebaje la renta. Pero si, por el contrario, esos sucesos se iniciaron estando ya el arrendamiento en el periodo de su ejecucion, la rebaja de renta es, sin duda, la solucion adecuada. Coming to the evidence, the testimony of the plaintiff that she was willing and ready to have the contract rescinded early in 1942, when the defendant had defaulted in the payment of the rental for that year, is not open to serious doubt. The defendant's own testimony tends to confirm it. By his admission, he continued to work the land, "notwithstanding previous losses, in the expectation

of gaining something in the subsequent years." He himself declared taht "la madre de la arrendadora me quiere quitar el terreno. " In answer to a question of the trial judge he gave the court to understand that he was unwilling to return the lands unless he was paid or reimbursed the debts of his tenants. On cross-examination he said that he would not surrender the possession of the land to the lessor without a court order because he wanted, he explained, to recoup some of his losses. He was so bent on not giving up the land that he tenaciously fought the suit for rescission. As Manresa also points out, the reduction of rent to exemption from its payment, judged by the context of article 1575, has all the appearance of being founded on equity and not on strict law. The facts of the case as developed by his own testimony do not show the defendant in good light on this score. If some of the defendant's crops in 1942, 1943 or 1944 perished, the evidence does not give the ratio of the loss in relation to the usual production of the land. Needless to say, the burden is on him to prove that the loss was more than one-half in order that he might be entitled to compensation. The only thing that is certain from his testimony is that at the outbreak of the war, that is after the calendar year 1941, he was unable to plant sugar cane. But whatever benefits he failed to make because of his inability to plant sugar cane after the first year and after he decided to go ahead with the contract, are not losses within the purview of article 1575 of the Civil Code and cannot serve as legal standard for computing the proportion of the injury. As has been adverted to before, after the first year he was fully conscious that because of lack of milling facilities sugar planting on a large scale was out of the question. And damage in the form of palay not accounted for by his tenants is not kind of damage recognized by the Civil Code provision cited by him. Impairment arising from the fact that the leased property was not totally made use of comes under the same juridical category. Not only in law but in equity also the lessor cannot be made to share the lessee's adversity in such circumstances. The fault was the lessee's and his alone; it was due to poor judgment, negligence or inefficiency on his part. His failure was not caused by war in the legal sense of the term. Fighting had ceased, at least such fighting as would have made destruction of crops inevitable. All that can be said in the way of obstacles to his full enjoyment of the land was that thefts were more rampant, tenants perhaps had become more unruly, and the like. But these obstacles entered into the transaction; they were part of the game, so to say, and, what is more, were not by any means insurmountable. As the learned trial judge, a native of Pampanga and familiar with local conditions, insinuated in his interrogatories, other land owners and planters had succeeded in working their farms and gathering their harvests. Furthermore, if the defendant did not raise sugar, he planted a crop that was a important as, if not more, and commanded better price, than sugar in the years above named, besides being easier and less expensive to raise. In all likelihood these considerations exercised a powerful influence in his decision to keep the land during the remainder of the lease aXWVk40P. The plaintiff introduced no evidence relative to the area planted to rice by the defendant or regarding the normal yield of the land. It is possible that she did not concern herself with this phase of the case because it was not an essential issue. In the absence of any other proof, we are force to rely largely upon the defendant's testimony. All the same, the defendant had not made such a showing as to entitle him to a reduction of the rent. Granting that the land brought him less than he expected, and granting that the shortage was not due to his own shortcomings, the other end ot the bargain must not be overlooked. One who seeks equity must do equity. In demanding justice one must weigh his side against the other, and actualities should always be kept in view. What were then the situations of the parties? The defendant testified that only four hectares of the plaintiff's land was provided with an irrigation system. Even so, he admitted that one-half of the whole tract was adapted to rice planting; that from 18 to 20 hectares was planted to rice in 1942 and the two following years; that the rest of the land although high could be used also for planting rice; that the normal production of the entire tract was 1,000 cavanes of palay; that the land under cultivation yielded 500 cavanes in 1942 and about the same quantity in 1943, and that out of these crops his share was 190 cavanes a year from which the cost of seeds and so on were to be deducted. His statement as to the reason why he did not farm the other half of the land, like many others, is not explicit CHby. Having come from an interested and biased source, the defendant's evidence had to be taken with plenty of allowances for understatement both as to the acreage utilized and the quantity of palay gathered. Much of his testimony is so equivocal as to invite distrust. But taking this testimony on its face value, we still fail to see justice in his claim to a reduction of rent. Compared with what he admitted having received as his part of the harvests in 1942, 1943, and 1944, P2,767.50 in August ,1944, was insignificant. That was the amount which was due as rents in arrears in that month, when the trial was held and when he persisted in fighting the case. At that time the price of rice had risen to fabulous heights while the value of the peso had topped down in inverse proportion, with the result that P3,000 could hardly have bought five or ten cavanes of rice. It is to the credit of the plaintiff that no increase in rent was asked by her to compensate for the tremendous slump which the "Mickey Mouse" notes had taken. As equity is the philosophy undelying article 1575, conditions as they were and not as they might have been are important factors in arriving at a just decision. Now, of course, things are different. A judgment against the defendant has to be satisfied with legitimate money. This may be fortunate for the plaintiff and unfortunate for the defendant. If it is his misfortune, the blame can only be laid at the door of his own unjustified stubbornness. A party who would not budge an inch to do simple justice to his opponent when he could have done so without doing himself an injustice was taking a chance and had to suffer the consequences. The first assignment of error attacks the validity of the judgment on the ground that the plaintiff's husband was not joined as plaintiff. It is contended, with support of law and authorities, that even though the subject matter of the contract is a separate property of the wife, yet the suit seeks to recover rents which under article 1401 of the Civil Code belong to the conjugal partnership. We, however, do not believe that the case should be dismissed for plaintiff's failure to join her husband. (Sec. 11, Rule 2, Rules of Court.) Nor should the case be remanded to the court below and a new trial ordered on this accoount. The complaint may and should be amended here, to cure the defect of party plaintiffs, after final decision is rendered. Section 11, Rule 2, and section 2,

Rule 17, explicitly authorize such procedure. As this Court had occasion to say in Quison vs. Salud (12 Phil. 109, 1169), "a second action would be but a repetition of the first and would involved both parties, plaintiffs and defendant, in much additional expense and would cause much delay, in that way defeating the purpose of the section, which is expressly stated to be 'that the actual merits of the controversy may speedily be determined without regard to techincalities and in the most expenditious and inexpensive manner.'" (See also Diaz vs. De la Rama, 73 Phil. 104.) This procedure is all the more reasonable in the present case because it does not appear nor is there the slightest hint that the plaintiff's husband is hostile to his wife's demand or claims any interest in the suit adverse to hers, or that the defendant, by any possibility, has any evidence to present with reference to the husband. Wherefore, it is ordered that the plaintiff within ten days from notice hereof file an amended complaint making her husband party plaintiff; and after said complaint is filed, let judgment be entered affirming the decision of the lower court with cost of both instances against the appellant. Moran, C.J. Feria, Bengzon, Briones, and Padilla, JJ., concur. PARAS, J., I concur, subject to the order in Moratorium. Separate Opinions PABLO, M., disidente: Disiento. Una simple confirmacion de la sentencia dara derecho al demandante a pedir la ejecucion de la sentencia en contravencion de la orden de moratoria. (Orden Ejecutiva No. 25, tal como fue enmendada por Orden Ejecutiva No. 32, 41 O.G. 56; Cruz contra Avila, 76 Phil. 133; De la Fuente contra Borromeo, 76 Phil. 442; y Ordoez contra, Angkiangco, 77 Phil. 378.) Esta medida es de orden publico, de emergencia y no debe ser ignorada por este Tribunal solamente porque el demandado no lo haya utilizado como defensa. Su fin primordial es evitar el completo colapso de la economia nacional, desquiciada ya por la guerra. Si el Congreso hasta la fecha no ha levantado su adopcion. Si el demandado quiere no acorgerse a sus disposiciones, puede hacerlo; pero creo que este Tribunal debe ordenar, como sana politica judicial, que la sentencia no se ejecutara hasta que se haya decretado el levantamiento de la orden de moratoria. PERFECTO, J., dissenting: On September 26, 1944, Judge P. Angeles David, of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, rendered judgment declaring rescinded the contract of lease on three parcels of land located at Mabalacat, Pampanga, executed by the parties on October 8, 1940, and ordering defendant to pay plaintiff P2,766.50 as rents for three agricultural years from 1942-1943, plus legal interest, and the costs. Said decision, having been rendered during enemy occupation and by a court acting under the Japanese imperial government, is among the judicial processes which, according to our opinions in Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon (75 Phil. 113), are null and void. See also our opinion in Laurel vs. Misa (77 Phil. 856). On the merits of the controversy between the parties, it appearing that the duration of the lease contract was only for five years and, therefore, it expired on October 8, 1945, it is proper to declare so and, therefore, plaintiff is entitled to recover the possession of the properties in question. With regard to the monetary obligation of defendant as found by the lower court and by the majority of this Court, for rents due for the leased lands, we are of opinion that no action should be taken by this Court or any other court until the debt moratorium provided in Executive Order No. 25, as amended by Executive Order No. 32, is lifted. In our decision in Palacios vs. Daza, dated October 16, 1945, (75 Phil. 279), we declared suspended the execution of a final judgment rendered on August 28, 1940, ordering the Province of Batangas to pay a monetary obligation. For all the foregoing, we are of opinion that, as we have explained in Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon, supra, the appealed decision should be declared null and void, or failing it, the lease contract between the parties should be declared terminated on October 8, 1945, plaintiff being entitled to recover the possession of the leased lands, and all action upon the rents the defendant should pay to plaintiff should be held in abeyance until the debt moratorium provided in Executive Order No. 25, as amended by Executive Order No. 32, is lifted lF5Qt8. With regard to the procedural question raised by defendant, asking that the case be dismissed, because plaintiff failed to join her husband as co-plaintiff, it being merely a technical defect, it can be cured at any stage of the proceedings. It is not even necessary to order plaintiff to file an amended complaint including her husband as party plaintiff, as the purpose of the rules can expeditiously be attained by a pronouncement to the fact that the husband should be considered, for all legal purposes, as partly plaintiff. RESOLUTION September 18, 1947 "In G. R. No. L-208, Ines Consolacion Cuyugan vs. Jose P. Dizon, the Court resolved to deny the motion for reconsideration of the defendant and appellant in so far as the said motion goes to the merits of the case; and that as to the application of Executive Order No. 25 as amended by Executive Order No. 32, it is and was the opinion of this Court that the time of invoke the benefits of that Executive Order, in this particular case, is when writ of execution is issued, considering that if the Moratorium Order was not pleaded it was because it was promulgated after this cause was decided by the lower court. Mr. Justice Perfecto voted to grant." 98or. G.R. No. L-2826 June 11, 1951

ALFREDO N. CRUZ, Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. JOSE M. VALERO and LUZON and LUZON SUGAR COMPANY,DefendantsAppellees. PADILLA, J.: chanrobles virtual law library This is an action to recover from the Luzon Sugar Company and Jose M. Valero, as its President and General manager, 634.03 piculs of domestic centrifugal sugar and 1,341 gallons of molasses, 152.39 piculs of reserve centrifugal sugar and 297.37 piculs of additional centrifugal sugar or their value, in default of delivery of such sugar and molasses, at the rate of P91 per picul which was the market value at the time of the filing of the complaint; to collect P140, the value of two tires and tubes of Ford truck taken by the Luzon Sugar Company; and to secure a pronouncement that Jose M. Valero, in his capacity aforesaid, had sold the 634,03 piculs of centrifugal sugar belonging to the plaintiff without without the latters knowledge and consent and appropriated the proceeds thereof to his own use and benefit and to the damage and prejudice of the plaintiff.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library After the trial, the court dismissed the complaint, for the reason that the centrifugal sugar deposited by the plaintiff in the warehouse of the Luzon Sugar Company within its compound was lost due to a fortuitous event or force majeure, directed the plaintiff to pay the costs of the suit, and dismissed the counterclaim of the defendants, because it was not shown that the plaintiff acted with malice in bringing the suit. From this judgment the plaintiff appealed.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library There is no dispute that the appellant was a sugar cane planter adhered to the Luzon Sugar Company, a sugar central to located in the municipality of Calumet, province of Bulacan, which extracted juice from sugar cane by crushing it and manufactured centrifugal sugar out of the juice extracted from the sugar cane delivered to it by the planters (Exhibit F); that the appellant had a share amounting to 1,544.38 piculs export centrifugal sugar, known as A sugar, which was exchanged for an equal amount of domestic centrifugal sugar, known as B sugar, deposited in the Luzon Sugar Company's .warehouse within its compound, with the obligation on its part to deliver it to the appellant on demand; that in addition to such amount of domestic centrifugal sugar, the appellant was entitled to 238.20 piculs of domestic centrifugal sugar, as his share in the 1940-1941 crop, and to 5,594 gallons of molasses; that on different dates and occasions, the appellant had withdrawn several piculs of sugar, reducing it to 632.03, and several thousands of gallons, reducing the number of gallons of molasses to 1,341; that the appellant was entitled to 152.39 piculs reserve centrifugal sugar known as C sugar; that the appellant was also entitled to 297.37piculs of additional centrifugal sugar as his share in the 19391940 and 1940-1941 crops, all of which were stored in the warehouse and in the cylindrical tanks of the Luzon Sugar Company, which the other appellee was the president and General Manager. Adding up the amounts of Sugar stored by the appellant in the warehouse of the Luzon Sugar Company, to wit: 632.03 of domestic sugar, 152.39 of reserve sugar, and 297.37 of additional sugar, gives a total of 1,081.79 piculs of centrifugal sugar.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The appellant claims that on 26 and 27 December 1941, the Luzon Sugar Company did not have in its warehouse in the Calumpit the amount of centrifugal sugar he had stored in its warehouse for safekeeping and the number of gallons of molasses he had left in its possession contained in cylindrical tanks, because the appellee Jose M. Valero had disposed of the same without the knowledge and consent of appellant and that on December 28, when the appellant wanted to withdraw his sugar from the warehouse of the Luzon Sugar Company, the amount of sugar stored in the warehouse was not manufactured by the Luzon Sugar Company but by Pampanga Sugar Development Company. On the other hand, the appellee contend that before 28 December 1941, the Luzon Sugar Company had in its warehouse sufficient amount of centrifugal sugar manufactured by it and was in a position to deliver sugar to planters who wished to withdraw and take delivery thereof, but that on the last mentioned date, the central was bombed by Japanese airplanes the warehouse damaged by shrapnel and some piculs of centrifugal sugar were looted, some taken by the Imperial Japanese Army after the occupation of the town of Calumpit by the said Army on January 1942, and the remaining brought by the Japanese Army to Northern Luzon; that for that reason it rendered impossible the delivery of the centrifugal sugar and molasses belonging to the appellant; and that the Ford truck tires and tubes, the value of which is sought to be collected, were taken by the management of the sugar central under the Japanese Military Administration.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The appellant relies on the testimony of Amado de Guzman, an accountant of the Luzon Sugar Company, who said that the amount of domestic centrifugal sugar deposited by the appellant with the Luzon Sugar Company was disposed of by the latter without the consent of the former (pp. 26, 27, 34 t.s.n. - Peralta), to be replaced by or with centrifugal sugar , known as C sugar, was sent to the subsidiary warehouse of the central located at the Insular Refining Company in Mandaluyong(pp. 46, 47, 69, t.s.n. - Peralta); and on that of Petra Cristobal who said that she wanted to buy twenty sacks of sugar from the appellant, but that when she together with the wife of the appellant and one from Malolos, accompanied by Ciriaco B. Serrano, the chemist of the Luzon Sugar Company, went to the warehouse of the Luzon Sugar Company on Monday before Christmas of 1941, she found that the sacks were wet and were not Luzon Sugar Company but Pasudeco sugar; that for that reason she desisted from buying (pp. 74 76, 80, t.s.n. - Peralta); and that she figured out there were 100 or less than 100 of sugar on that Monday she went to the warehouse (pp. 76, 79, t.s.n. Peralta).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The appellant testified that after learning that there was no Luzon Sugar Company but Pasudeco sugar in the Calumpit warehouse, he wrote on 26 December 1941 a latter to appellee Jose M. Valero, copy of which is Exhibit P, expressing his desire to withdraw all his sugar; and that the following day after receipt on 27 December of the answer (Exhibit G), he together with Jose B. Timbol went to the warehouse and "found out that there were no more Luzon sugar in the bodega, but only small pile of Pasudeco sugar." )pp. 129, 145, t.s.n. - Peralta).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The appellant relies also on Exhibit G, which is a letter signed by Jose B. Timbol, a bookkeeper of the Luzon Sugar Company pp. 91, t.s.n. - Peralta), but the sheet of paper on which the letter had been written was cut, the upper part thereof is missing and the remaining part of the sheet is less than one half of an 8" X 10 1/2" size paper sheet and less than one third of an 8" X 13" sized paper sheet. The appellant attempted to supply the contents of the missing part of the letter by introducing a purported copy thereof marked Exhibit G 1. In the supplied contents of the missing part of the letter, it is made to appear that on 27 December 1941, the Luzon Sugar Company had 56.55 sacks or piculs of sugar in its warehouse in Calumpit and 1,097.50 in its subsidiary in Mandaluyong, meaning the Insular Refining Company.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library If the contents of the missing part of the letter marked Exhibit G are as they appear in Exhibit G-1, then on 27 December 1941, the Luzon Sugar Company did not have appellant had deposited with it. The inference maybe drawn from such supplied contents of missing part of the letter marked Exhibit G that there was stored and kept in the subsidiary warehouse in Mandaluyong, referring to the Insular Refining Company, an amount more than sufficient to cover the amount of sugar belonging to the appellant deposited by him with the Luzon Sugar Company in Calumpit. And if that were the case, then the Luzon Sugar Company could not make delivery

in Calumpit of the appellants sugar upon his demand and would be answerable or liable to the appellant for his sugar or would have to pay its market price at the time of the demand for its delivery.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library On their part, the appellees presented Ciriaco B. Serrano, the chemist of the Luzon Sugar Company, the only one entrusted with the safekeeping of the keys to the warehouse (pp. 4-6, t.s.n. - Sanchez )where the sugar of the central and of the planters was kept, who testified that Petra Cristobal did not go to the warehouse of the central on Monday before Christmas of 1941 )pp. 16, 26, t.s.n. Sanchez); that on 28 December 1941, the Luzon Sugar Company compound did not go to the warehouse in Calumpit (pp. 655-7 11, 17, 27, t.s.n. - Sanchez; (Monico Arceo, the mechanical engineer of the Luzon Sugar Company, corroborates him on the bombing of the compound and on the fact that the appellant did not go to the warehouse on 28 December 1941 [p. 84, t.s.n. - Sanchez; that on the date there were 1,200 piculs of domestic sugar belonging to the planters in the warehouse in Calumpit ( p. 8, t.s.n. - Sanchez); and 11,000 gallons of molasses deposited or kept in two cylindrical tanks near the warehouse, the big tanks having been hit by a bomb (pp. 9, 10, t.s.n. - Sanchez); that the compound of the Luzon Sugar Company was abandoned by its officers and employees and occupied by the Japanese from 1 January to 20 February 1942 (pp. 7, 17, t.s.n. - Sanchez); that on the last mentioned date, when he (Ciriaco B. Serrano) returned to the compound of the Luzon Sugar Company in Calumpit, he found that the sugar deposited there had almost completely disappeared (pp. 10, 36, 66, 76 t.s.n. - Sanchez), and only 5,000 gallons of molasses were left (p.10, t.s.n. -Sanchez); and that after the Japanese soldiers had left Calumpit, the compound and offices of the of the Luzon Sugar Company in said place were immediately occupied by the Japanese Military Administration, which through its representative Captain Nunaka, had absolute control of said compound and offices (pp. 18, 32, -37, t.s.n. - Sanchez). The part of Ciriaco B. Serrano's testimony as to the amount of sugar stored in the warehouse of the Luzon Sugar Company on 28 December 1941 (p. 8, t.s.n. - Sanchez) is corroborated by Nicolas S. Cruz who together with the appellant went to the warehouse on 27 December 1941, and saw 1,000 sacks or piculs of sugar, more or less )pp. 47, 48, 57, 58, t.s.n. - Sanchez; by Fausto Carlos, incumbent municipal mayor of the town of Calumpit, went together with an American Army captain to see the extent of the damage caused to the compound by the bombing and there saw a large amount of sugar (pp. 62, 63, 65, 66, 77, 78, t.s.n.-Sanchez); and by Jose Lopez, who went to the warehouse on 29 December 1941 to withdraw 25 sacks or piculs of sugar and there saw 1,000 piculs of sugar, more or less (pp. 103.104, 118, 119, t.s.n. - Sanchez.).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The testimony of Petra Cristobal cannot be relied upon, because Ciriaco B. Serrano, the only person or employee of the Luzon Sugar Company who kept the keys to the warehouse and who, according to Petra, accompanied her to the warehouse (p. 80, t.s.n. - Peralta), testified that Petra did not go to the warehouse on Monday immediately preceding the Christmas of 1941 (pp. 16, 26, t.s.n. Sanchez). Assuming that what she testified was true and that the Pasudeco sack was of the same weight as that of the Luzon Sugar Company although the latter's sack might have looked larger (p. 77, t.s.n. - Peralta), the reason why she did not get the sugar was flimsy. If she needed it, a small difference in the size of the sack was of little importance. Asked how many sacks she saw in the warehouse, she said that she did not count them (pp. 76, 79, t.s.n. - Peralta). On cross-examination, however, she said that it was 100 piculs, more or less. She further said that previous to (p.79, t.s.n. - Peralta), but in the same breath she said that it was only that Monday before Christmas of 1941 that she went to the warehouse of the Luzon Sugar Company (p. 81, t.s.n. Peralta).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The supplied contents of the missing part of the letter marked Exhibit G, appearing on Exhibit G - 1 , which state that before noon of 27 December 1941, appellee Jose M. Valero came to Calumpit, to whom Jose B. Timbol showed or gave the appellant's letter dated 26 December (Exhibit P), and that there only 56.55 piculs of sugar in the site, meaning in the warehouse at Calumpit, cannot also be relied upon to prove the amount of sugar that was in the warehouse of the Luzon Sugar Company in Calumpit on 27 December 1941 because Jose M. Valero testified that the last time he went to Calumpit was on December 1941 and in the afternoon of that day he together with his family left Manila to seek refuge in Antipolo (p. 24, t.s.n., Rebuttal - Sanchez). According to Petra Cristobal, a witness for the appellant, when she went to the warehouse in Calumpit on Monday before Christmas of 1941, she saw 100 sacks or piculs of sugar, or more or less. This testimony contradicts the supplied contents of the missing part of the letter Exhibit G, appearing on Exhibit G - 1, which state that there were only 56.55 sacks or piculs of sugar in the warehouse of Luzon Sugar Company in Calumpit, there being no showing that during the short interval there had been withdrawal of sugar from the warehouse. The appellant's explanation how the letter Exhibit G was cut and the upper part of the sheet destroyed or lost can hardly be believed, because so important a document as Exhibit G could not have left or placed so carelessly by him on his stable that it was used to wrap up coins (pp. 131-133, t.s.n. - Peralta).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The preponderance of evidence is to the effect that there was enough sugar to cover and deliver 1,081.79 piculs of domestic, reserve and additional sugar belonging to the appellant who, according to the milling contract, was in duty bound to take delivery thereof at the warehouse. And it having been established that the Luzon Sugar Company compound was bombed on 28 December 1941 and the Japanese Army occupied it from 1 January to 20 February 1942; that some taken by the Imperial Japanese Army and the remaining brought to Northern Luzon by said Army; and that the two tires and tubes, the price or value of which is sought to be collected, had been taken by Captain Nunaka of the Imperial Japanese Army, as testified to by appellant of holding that the appellees are responsible for said sugar, molasses, tires, and tubes because the loss was due to the war or to a fortuitous event.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The judgment appealed from is affirmed, without costs.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Vda. De Bataclan vs Medina 102 Phil 181 Torts and Damages Proximate Cause After one midnight in September 1952, Juan Bataclan rode a bus owned by Medina from Cavite to Pasay. While on its way, the driver of the bus was speeding through and when he applied the brakes it cause the bus to be overturned. The driver, the conductor, and some passengers were able to free themselves from the bus except Bataclan and 3 others. The passengers called the help of the villagers and as it was dark, the villagers brought torch with them. The driver and the conductor failed to warn the would-be helpers of the fact that gasoline has spilled from the overturned bus so a huge fire ensued which engulfed the bus thereby killing the 4 passengers trapped inside. It was also found later in trial that the tires of the bus were old. ISSUE: Whether or not the proximate cause of the death of Bataclan et al was their burning by reason of the torches which ignited the gasoline.

HELD: No. The proximate cause was the overturning of the bus which was caused by the negligence of the driver because he was speeding and also he was already advised by Medina to change the tires yet he did not. Such negligence resulted to the overturning of the bus. The torches carried by the would-be helpers are not to be blamed. It is just but natural for the villagers to respond to the call for help from the passengers and since it is a rural area which did not have flashlights, torches are the natural source of lighting. Further, the smell of gas could have been all over the place yet the driver and the conductor failed to provide warning about said fact to the villagers. WHAT IS PROXIMATE CAUSE? Proximate cause is that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred. And more comprehensively, the proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinary prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom. G.R. No. L-24101 September 30, 1970 MARIA TERESA Y. CUADRA, minor represented by her father ULISES P. CUADRA, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees, vs.ALFONSO MONFORT, Defendant-Appellant. MAKALINTAL, J.: This is an action for damages based on quasi-delict, decided by the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental favorably to the plaintiffs and appealed by the defendant to the Court of Appeals, which certified the same to us since the facts are not in issue. Maria Teresa Cuadra, 12, and Maria Teresa Monfort, 13, were classmates in Grade Six at the Mabini Elementary School in Bacolod City. On July 9, 1962 their teacher assigned them, together with three other classmates, to weed the grass in the school premises. While thus engaged Maria Teresa Monfort found a plastic headband, an ornamental object commonly worn by young girls over their hair. Jokingly she said aloud that she had found an earthworm and, evidently to frighten the Cuadra girl, tossed the object at her. At that precise moment the latter turned around to face her friend, and the object hit her right eye. Smarting from the pain, she rubbed the injured part and treated it with some powder. The next day, July 10, the eye became swollen and it was then that the girl related the incident to her parents, who thereupon took her to a doctor for treatment. She underwent surgical operation twice, first on July 20 and again on August 4, 1962, and stayed in the hospital for a total of twenty-three days, for all of which the parents spent the sum of P1,703.75. Despite the medical efforts, however, Maria Teresa Cuadra completely lost the sight of her right eye. In the civil suit subsequently instituted by the parents in behalf of their minor daughter against Alfonso Monfort, Maria Teresa Monforts father, the defendant was ordered to pay P1,703.00 as actual damages; P20,000.00 as moral damages; and P2,000.00 as attorneys fees, plus the costs of the suit. The legal issue posed in this appeal is the liability of a parent for an act of his minor child which causes damage to another under the specific facts related above and the applicable provisions of the Civil Code, particularly Articles 2176 and 2180 thereof, which read: ART. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasidelict and is governed by provisions of this Chapter. ART 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for ones own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. The father and, in case of his death or incapacity are responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their company. xxx xxx xxx The responsibility treated of in this Article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. The underlying basis of the liability imposed by Article 2176 is the fault or negligence accompanying the act or the omission, there being no willfulness or intent to cause damage thereby. When the act or omission is that of one person for whom another is responsible, the latter then becomes himself liable under Article 2180, in the different cases enumerated therein, such as that of the father or the mother under the circumstances above quoted. The basis of this vicarious, although primary, liability is, as in Article 2176, fault or negligence, which is presumed from that which accompanied the causative act or omission. The presumption is merely prima facie and may therefore be rebutted. This is the clear and logical inference that may be drawn from the last paragraph of Article 2180, which states that the responsibility treated of in this Article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. Since the fact thus required to be proven is a matter of defense, the burden of proof necessarily rests on the defendant. But what is the exact degree of diligence contemplated, and how does a parent prove it in connection with a particular act or omission of a minor child, especially when it takes place in his absence or outside his immediate company? Obviously there can be no meticulously calibrated measure applicable; and when the law simply refers to all the diligence of a good father of the family to prevent damage, it implies a consideration of the attendant circumstances in every individual case, to determine whether or not by the exercise of such diligence the damage could have been prevented. In the present case there is nothing from which it may be inferred that the defendant could have prevented the damage by the observance of due care, or that he was in any way remiss in the exercise of his parental authority in failing to foresee such damage, or the act which caused it. On the contrary, his child was at school, where it was his duty to send her and where she was, as he had the right to expect her to be, under the care and supervision of the teacher. And as far as the act which caused the injury was concerned, it was an innocent prank not unusual among children at play and which no parent, however careful, would have any special reason to anticipate much less guard against. Nor did it reveal any mischievous propensity, or indeed any trait in the childs character which would reflect unfavorably on her upbringing and for which the blame could be attributed to her parents.

The victim, no doubt, deserves no little commiseration and sympathy for the tragedy that befell her. But if the defendant is at all obligated to compensate her suffering, the obligation has no legal sanction enforceable in court, but only the moral compulsion of good conscience. The decision appealed from is reversed, and the complaint is dismissed, without pronouncement as to costs. Cuadra vs Monfort by Howard on August 21, 2011 1 Comment 35 SCRA 160 Torts and Damages Liability of Parents Maria Teresa Cuadra and Maria Teresa Monfort were both classmates in Mabini Elementary School Bacolod City. In July 1962, their teacher assigned to weed the school premises. While they were doing so, MT Monfort found a headband and she jokingly shouted it as an earthworm and thereafter tossed it MT Cuadra who was hit in her eye. MT Cuadras eye got infected. She was brought to the hospital; her eyes were attempted to be surgically repaired but she nevertheless got blind in her right eye. MT Cuadras parents sued Alfonso Monfort (MT Monforts dad) based on Article 2180 of the Civil Code. The lower court ruled that Monfort should pay for actual damages (cost of hospitalization), moral damages and attorneys fees. ISSUE: Whether or not Monfort is liable under Article 2180. HELD: No. Article 2180 provides that the father, in case of his incapacity or death, the mother, is responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their company. The basis of this vicarious, although primary, liability is fault or negligence, which is presumed from that which accompanied the causative act or omission. The presumption is merely prima facie and may therefore be rebutted. This is the clear and logical inference that may be drawn from the last paragraph of Article 2180, which states that the responsibility treated of in this Article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. In the case at bar there is nothing from which it may be inferred that the Alfonso Monfort could have prevented the damage by the observance of due care, or that he was in any way remiss in the exercise of his parental authority in failing to foresee such damage, or the act which caused it. On the contrary, his child was at school, where it was his duty to send her and where she was, as he had the right to expect her to be, under the care and supervision of the teacher. And as far as the act which caused the injury was concerned, it was an innocent prank not unusual among children at play and which no parent, however careful, would have any special reason to anticipate much less guard against. Nor did it reveal any mischievous propensity, or indeed any trait in the childs character which would reflect unfavorably on her upbringing and for which the blame could be attributed to her parents. JUSTICE BARREDO Dissenting; MT Monfort is already 13 years old and should have known that by jokingly saying aloud that she had found an earthworm and, evidently to frighten the Cuadra girl, tossed the object at her, it was likely that something would happen to her friend, as in fact, she was hurt. There is nothing in the record that would indicate that he had properly advised his daughter to behave properly and not to play dangerous jokes on her classmate and playmates, he can be liable under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. There is nothing in the record to show that he had done anything at all to even try to minimize the damage caused upon by his child. 161 Libi vs. IAC | FACTS on of Libi spouses, Wendell was a sweetheart of the private respondents (Spouses S Gotiong) named Julie Ann who eventually fell out of love from the former (due to being sadistic and irresponsible) which led to a fateful day of their death by a gunshot from a gun owned by Wendells father. The Gotiongs believe that Wendell caused the death of their daughter and himself due to frustration while the Libis believe that some unknown third party did it in relation to Wendells work as informer for Anti-Narcotics Unit. Spouses Gotiong sued Libi spouses for damages invoking Art. 2180 of the Civil Code for Vicarious liability of Parents with respect to their minor children. RTC ruled in favor of Libis by reason of lack of evidence. CA held the reverse holding them subsidiarliy liable. ISSUES & ARGUMENTS W/N Libi spouses are subsidiarily liable in the instant case. HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI CA wrongly interpreted the vicarious liability of parents. It must be primary using Article 101 of the RPC. If subsidiary only: the diligence of bonus pater familias will not lie since they will answer for the minor at any rate but if primary: it will be direct, hence the defense. In this case however, the parents as still failed to discharge themselves of any defense because evidence shows Wendell knew of the location of the keys for the Gunsafe, Libis do not know of his being a CANU agent and photography of Julie Ann was with the accused upon his death with the gun 165 Tamargo vs. CA| Feliciano G.R. No. 85044, June 3, 1992| FACTS On 20 October 1982, Adelberto Bundoc, 10 yrs old, shot Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle causing injuries which resulted in her death. A civil complaint for damages was filed by petitioner Macario Tamargo, Jennifer's adopting parent, and petitioner spouses Celso and Aurelia Tamargo, Jennifer's natural parents against respondent spouses Victor and Clara Bundoc, Adelberto's natural parents with whom he was living at the time of the tragic incident. In addition to this case for damages, a criminal information for Homicide through

Reckless Imprudence was filed against Adelberto Bundoc. Adelberto, however, was acquitted and exempted from criminal liability on the ground that he bad acted without discernment. Prior to the incident, or on 10 December 1981, the spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisura had filed a petition to adopt the minor Adelberto Bundoc in Special Proceedings No. 0373-T before the then Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur. This petition for adoption was granted on, 18 November 1982, after Adelberto had shot and killed Jennifer. In their Answer, respondent spouses Bundoc, Adelberto's natural parents, reciting the result of the foregoing petition for adoption, claimed that not they, but rather the adopting parents, namely the spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisura, were indispensable parties to the action since parental authority had shifted to the adopting parents from the moment the successful petition for adoption was filed. Petitioners contended that since Adelberto Bundoc was then actually living with his natural parents, parental authority had not ceased nor been relinquished by the mere filing and granting of a petition for adoption. The trial court on 3 December 1987 dismissed petitioners' complaint, ruling that respondent natural parents of Adelberto indeed were not indispensable parties to the action. ISSUES & ARGUMENTS W/N the effects of adoption, insofar as parental authority is concerned may be given retroactive effect so as to make the adopting parents the indispensable parties in a damage case filed against their adopted child, for acts committed by the latter, when actual custody was yet lodged with the biological parents. HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI NO. The biological parents are the indispensable parties. It is not disputed that Adelberto Bundoc's voluntary act of shooting Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle gave rise to a cause of action on quasi-delict against him. And consequently, the law imposes civil liability upon the father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, for any damages that may be caused by a minor child who lives with them. Article 2180 of the Civil Code reads: The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their company. xxx xxx xxx The responsibility treated of in this Article shall cease when the person herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. (Emphasis supplied) This principle of parental liability is a species of what is frequently designated as vicarious liability, or the doctrine of "imputed negligence" under Anglo-American tort law, where a person is not only liable for torts committed by himself, but also for torts committed by others with whom he has a certain relationship and for whom he is responsible. Thus, parental liability is made a natural or logical consequence of the duties and responsibilities of parents their parental authority which includes the instructing, controlling and disciplining of the child. The civil liability imposed upon parents for the torts of their minor children living with them, may be seen to be based upon the parental authority vested by the Civil Code upon such parents. The civil law assumes that when an unemancipated child living with its parents commits tortious acts, the parents were negligent in the performance of their legal and natural duty closely to supervise the child who is in their custody and control. Parental liability is, in other words, anchored upon parental authority coupled with presumed parental dereliction in the discharge of the duties accompanying such authority. The parental dereliction is, of course, only presumed and the presumption can be overtuned under Article 2180 of the Civil Code by proof that the parents had exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage. In the instant case, the shooting of Jennifer by Adelberto with an air rifle occured when parental authority was still lodged in respondent Bundoc spouses, the natural parents of the minor Adelberto. It would thus follow that the natural parents who had then actual custody of the minor Adelberto, are the indispensable parties to the suit for damages. Spouses Bundoc invokes Article 36 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code which states that the decree of adoption shall be effective on the date the original petition was filed. Court is not persuaded. As earlier noted, under the Civil Code, the basis of parental liability for the torts of a minor child is the relationship existing between the parents and the minor child living with them and over whom, the law presumes, the parents

exercise supervision and control. Article 58 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code, re-enacted this rule: Article 58 Torts Parents and guardians are responsible for the damage caused by the child under their parental authority in accordance with the civil Code. 162 Exconde vs. Capuno | Bautista Angelo G.R. No. L-10134, June 29, 2957 | 101 Phil 843 FACTS Dante Capuno was a member of the Boy Scouts organization and a student of the Balintawak Elementary School. He attended a parade in honor of Jose Rizal upon instruction of the city schools supervisor. He boarded a jeep, took hold of the wheel and drove it while the driver sat on his left side. The jeep turned turtle and and two passengers (Isidiro Caperina and Amado Ticzon) died. At the time this happened, Dantes father, Delfin was not with him, nor did he know that his son was going to attend a parade. Dante was then charged with double homicide through reckless imprudence. After conviction by the RTC and CA, petitioner Sabina Exconde (mother of one of the deceased) filed a separate civil action against Dante and Delfin for damages in the amount of P2,959.00. Defendants averred as a defense that Dante should be the only one civilly liable because at the time of the accident he was not under the control, supervision, and custody of Delfin. The lower court sustained the defense, and so Exconde appealed, the case certified to the SC. ISSUES & ARGUMENTS W/N Delfin can be held jointly and severally liable with his son Dante for damages resulting from the death of Isidro caused by the negligent act of his minor son Dante. HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI DELFIN JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY LIABLE WITH DANTE. Article 1903, 1st and 5th paragraphs: The father, and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are liable for any damages caused by minor children who live with them. Teachers and directors of arts and trades are liable for any damages caused by their pupils or apprentices while they are under their custody. The 5th paragraph only applies to an institution of arts and trades and not to any academic educational institution. Hence, neither the head of the school, nor the city schools supervisor, could be held liable for the negligent act of Dante because he was not then a student of an institution of arts and trades as provided by law. The civil liability imposed upon the father and mother for any damages that may be caused by the minor children is a necessary consequence of the parental authority they exercise over them, which imposes upon parents the duty of supporting them, keeping them in their company, educating them and instructing them in proportion to their means, while, on the other hand, gives them the right to correct and punish them in moderation. The only way to relieve them is if they prove that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family. This defendants failed to do. Palisoc vs Brillantes et al by Howard on September 3, 2011 Leave A Comment 41 SCRA 548 Torts and Damages Liability of teachers/heads of establishments of arts and trades In March 1966, while Dominador Palisoc (16 years old) was watching Virgilio Daffon and Desiderio Cruz work on a machine in their laboratory class in the Manila Technical Institute (a school of arts and trades), Daffon scolded Palisoc for just standing around like a foreman. This caused Palisoc to slightly slap the face of Daffon and a fistfight ensued between the two. Daffon delivered blows that eventually killed Palisoc. The parents of Palisoc sued Daffon, the school president (Teodosio Valenton), the instructor (Santiago Quibulue), and the owner (Antonio Brillantes). The basis of the suit against Valenton, Quibulue, and Brillantes was Article 2180 of the Civil Code. The lower court, as well as the CA, ruled that only Daffon is liable for damages and that Valenton, Quibulue, and Brillantes are not liable because under Article 2180, they are only liable so long as they [the students] remain in their custody. And that this means, as per Mercado vs Court of Appeals, that teachers or heads of establishments are only liable for the tortious acts of their students if the students are living and boarding with the teacher or other officials of the school which Daffon was not. ISSUE: Whether or not the ruling in the Mercado Case still applies. HELD: No. The SC abandoned the ruling in the Mercado Case as well as the ruling in the Exconde Case as they adopted Justice JBL Reyes dissenting opinion in the latter case. Valenton and Quibulue as president and teacher-in-charge of the school must be held jointly and severally liable for the quasi-delict of Daffon. The unfortunate death resulting from the fight between the students could have been avoided, had said defendants but complied with their duty of providing adequate supervision over the activities of the students in the school premises to protect their students from harm, whether at the hands of fellow students or other parties. At any rate, the law holds them liable unless they relieve themselves of such liability, in compliance with the last paragraph of Article 2180, Civil Code, by (proving) that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. In the light of the factual findings of the lower courts decision, said defendants failed to prove such exemption from liability. The SC reiterated that

there is nothing in the law which prescribes that a student must be living and boarding with his teacher or in the school before heads and teachers of the school may be held liable for the tortious acts of their students.