The affect structure revisited 1

The affect structure revisited

Vronique Elefant-Yanni and Maria-Pia Victoria-Feser1 University of Geneva

Both author acknowledge the support of the Swiss national Science Foudation, grant no PP001106465.

The affect structure revisited 2 Abstract

In affective psychology, there is a persistent controversy about the number, the nature and the definition of the affect structure dimensions. Responding to the methodological criticisms addressed to the preceding studies, we conciliated the principal theories regarding the affect structure with the same experimental setting. In particular, using the semantic items all around the circumplex we found three bipolar independent dimensions and using only the PANAS semantic items, we found two unipolar dimensions. Finally, we propose a heuristic theorization of affect based on a current firmly established in social sciences, coherent from semantics to sociology, but largely ignored by researchers in affective psychology , that allows to postulate that affect is all at once cognition, motivation and behaviour.

The affect structure revisited 3 Introduction Over the last years a long debate took place regarding the affect structure. The affect is the momentary feeling a person has at any time that is induced by the situation as a whole, including internal and external stimuli. It has to be distinguished from mood and emotion which are affective phenomena of another nature. The affect structure is commonly described by means of different dimensions such as valence or evaluation, activation, tension or potency. These dimensions are either evaluated on a continuum (bipolar dimension) or separated into a positive and negative directions (unipolar dimension). There is however a current controversy about the number, the nature and the definition of the affect structure dimensions. If a consensus was recently established (Feldman-Barrett & Russell 1998, Watson & Tellegen 1999) to recognize a two-dimensional circumplex affect structure between the two principal currents of research carried out on the one hand by Russell (Russell 1980) and on the other hand by Watson (Watson & Tellegen 1985), they still disagree on the uni- or bipolarity and the nature of the two dimensions. Since several authors claim that the underlying reason for the existence of this controversy lies in the methodological aspects of the research plans, the aim will then be to highlight the various difficulties in implementing research on affect structure, and provide a complete study that will show that depending on the experimental plan, the analysis results will support with the same statistical method one or another of the leading theories. In addition, a persisting alternative current of research postulates an affect structure with three correlated dimensions (Sjsberg, Svensson & Persson 1979). Lastly, a current firmly established in social sciences, coherent from semantics to sociology, supports an affect structure with three independent and bipolar dimensions. The results of the present research are perfectly integrated in this current, generally ignored by researchers in affective psychology, and allow to postulate that affect is all at once cognition, motivation and behavior.

The affect structure revisited 4 The first studies regarding the affect structure took place by means of introspections and were made by Wundt, Stumpf and Titchener (see Reisenzein 1992, Reisenzein & Schonpflug 1992). They focused on the bipolar dimension of valence (pleasure/displeasure) that they thought to be the base of the conscience. On the other hand, Cannon (1927) emphasizes the activation dimension (see also Lindsley 1951, Hebb 1955, Duffy 1957, Berlyne 1960, Schachter & Singer 1962, Zillman 1983, Mandler 1984, Thayer 1989, 1996). From these two first currents a third approach was born that includes two independent, bipolar and of same magnitude dimensions of valence and activation (Russell 1978, 1980, Lang 1978, 1994, Larsen & Diener 1992, Lang, Bradley & Cuthbert 1992, Bradley 1994). According to these authors, the valence and activation dimensions define a circumplex on which all affects can be represented (see also Schlosberg 1952). This representation takes over the circumplex semantic representation for two of the three dimensions of connotative meaning (i.e. evaluation and activity) found by Osgood to underlie language (Osgood & Suci 1955, Osgood, Suci & Tannenbaum 1957, Osgood 1966, Osgood, May and Miron 1975). Nevertheless the bipolarity hypothesis of the valence was disputed by the hypothesis of unipolarity (Nowlis & Nowlis 1956, Bradburn 1969, Bradburn & Caplovitz 1965). Researches on mood scales seem to confirm this unipolarity hypothesis (Borgatta 1961, McNair & Lorr 1964, Thayer 1967, Warr, Barter & Brownridge 1983, Watson & Tellegen 1985). However, Cacioppo and Berntson (1994) pointed out that an important part of the literature regarding the unipolarity had developed because experiments were based on the PANAS (Positive And Negative Affect Schedule, Watson, Clark & Tellegen 1988). PANAS is a questionnaire that measures the affective experiences by means of 20 semantic items chosen to correspond to a high degree of activation and pleasure, and to a high degree of activation and displeasure (Watson & Tellengen 1985). Actually, the resulting circumplex model based on the PANAS has the two orthogonal dimensions of Positive Affect (PA) and

The affect structure revisited 5 Negative Affect (NA), and it should be specified that for the authors these two factors have been characterized as descriptively bipolar but affectively unipolar dimensions (Zevon & Tellegen 1982, p. 112) to emphasize that only the high end of each dimension represents a state of emotional arousal (or high affect), whereas the low end of each factor is most clearly and strongly defined by terms reflecting a relative absence of affective involvement (Watson & Tellegen 1985, p. 221). However, while some authors accumulate evidence in favour of unipolarity (Tellengen 1985, Mayer & Gaschke 1988, Meyer & Shack 1989, Morris 1989, Watson & Clark 1997), others defend the bipolarity (Russell & Mehrabian 1977, Lorr & Wunderlich 1980, Lorr & McNair 1982, Russell & Steiger 1982, Diener & Emmons 1984, Larsen & Diener 1992, Ortony, Clore & Collins 1988, Russell 1989, Lang, Greenwald, Bradley & Hamm 1993, Reisenzein 1994, Feldman 1995). As when rotated of 45 the PA and NA factors correspond to the valence and activation dimensions of Russells circumplex model, Watson and Tellegen suggest a simpler explanation, namely that the extent of their relations varies with the terms used to construct the Positive and Negative Affect measures (1985, p. 233). If their parsimonious model corresponded to the true affect structure than the choice of more indicators representing more affects facets by the use of the entire semantic circumplex should lead to the same dimensional affect structure. In the present case, it will be showed however that the too restrictive choice of semantic items consists of a methodological bias. Watson and Clark (1994) have more recently proposed the PANAS-X which expanded the first version of PANAS and used 60 semantic terms to assess specific emotions or enduring affective states. On the other hand, some researchers in the psychology of personality domain proposed an affect model with three slightly correlated dimensions (Sjsberg, Svensson & Persson 1979, Matthews, Jones & Chamberlain 1990, Steyer, Schwenkmezger, Notz & Eid 1994, Schimmak & Grob 2000). For example, Matthews, Jones and Chamberlain found the three

The affect structure revisited 6 dimensions as being pleasant-unpleasant (valence), energetic arousal and tense arousal. Energetic arousal contrasts feelings of vigour and energy with tiredness and fatigue and can be considered as an activation dimension, whereas tense arousal contrasts tension and nervousness with relaxation and calmness and can be associated to a tension or potency dimension. The resulting model is different from Russells model not only because one dimension has been added, but also because the valence is correlated with the activation dimension. Wundt (1896) already postulated an affect model with three dimensions pleasantunpleasant, low-high activated and tense-relaxed and Thayer (1978) showed that participants were able to subjectively discriminate energetic arousal and tense arousal. It should be noted that the research on affect structure in the psychology of personality is relatively recent and needs to be distinguished from the numerous studies on the structure of personality, personality trait and mood which concerns the enduring dispositions of the participants. For long the Gigantic three dimensions of Eysencks model of personality (1991, neuroticism, extraversion, psychoticism) dominated, but recently a consensus has been achieved about a five independent dimensions model of which most known is Costa and McCraes Big Five model of personality (1992, neuroticism, extraversion, openness, agreeableness,

conscientiousness). In both theoretical frameworks, the associations between neuroticism, extraversion, and bad mood, good mood are highlighted by various authors (Watson & Clark 1992, Tellegen 1985, Emmons & Diener 1986, Watson, Clark & Tellegen 1988, Thayer 1989, Williams 1989, Matthews, Jones & Chamberlain 1990, Costa & McCrae 1992) and tend to accredit that for mood the negative and positive dimensions are indeed unipolar and independent. In another domain, the three dimensions of valence, activation and tension have been considered for a long time now. In linguistics, Osgood and colleagues (Osgood & Suci 1955, Osgood, Suci & Tannenbaum 1957) have developed semantic differential bipolar scales

The affect structure revisited 7 based on semantic opposites such as good/bad, strong/week, active/passive and so on, in order to measure the attitude of participants regarding symbolic concepts represented by words. These authors were interested in the connotative meanings of words as apposed to their denotative meanings. The denotative usage gives to things represented by words their essential and objective meanings as in dictionaries. On the other hand, the connotative usage presents things enriched by their affective associations which, though intangible, are nonetheless real. These authors highlight a semantic structure based on the three dimensions of Evaluation, Potency and Activity, known as EPA. Osgood has presented convincing evidence that this simple structure is a universal characteristic of human thinking and is exhibited by all of the cultural groups and languages (Osgood 1960, Osgood, May & Miron 1975). It should be noted that semantic differential scales actually measure the connotative meaning of symbolic concepts by examining how people "feel" about, that is by measuring their induced affects. Largely inspired by Osgood's cross-cultural research, Heise (1979) created his Affect Control Theory (ACT). The ACT postulates that all individuals evolving in any situation evaluate the situation according to the affective meanings of all its elements, which, combined, produce a global impression that gives a meaning to the situation. This last meaning is transient since the affective meanings of the situation elements change while the situation progresses. The meaning of the situation is compared by the individual to the expected sentiment that his social group attributes to that situation (Heise 1966). Usual situations produce transient impressions that match expected sentiments, whereas situations that generate impressions deviating widely from those sentiments seem abnormal (Heise & MacKinnon 1987). According to the ACT, people manage situations so as to match transient impressions with their expected sentiments and to maintain normality in their experiences. For Heise (1979), since affects reflect the impressions that the situation in progress generates,

The affect structure revisited 8 they are a way of directly sensing the kinds of social identities people are taking, the operative social structure in the situation and also a way of sensing in which direction the situation is evolving according to its expected sentiment. Given the central importance of affect in his theory, it was quite naturally that Heise got interested in the controversy about the affect structure (Morgan & Heise 1988), but none of his results conformed to a circumplex model of affect structure. On the contrary, his results highlighted that the affects "array themselves naturally in a three-dimensional space involving evaluation, activation and potency" (p. 27). He concluded that "the affective dimensions correspond to basic mental processes [] and that much of people's cognitive information concerning emotions is generated within the dimensional framework" (p. 29). Therefore, since the different models of affect structure disagree on the number of dimensions, their bipolar or unipolar nature, their definitions, and since the methodology to unveil them differ sometimes substantially, we investigate the different experimental plans used until now and analyze in this paper the important aspects on which they differ, their potential influence on the empirical construction of the affect structure which has led to the present controversy.

Important aspects of the experimental plan

Type of affective phenomena

Many authors view the distinction pleasant-unpleasant (i.e. valence dimension) as the primary criteria that discriminates affective states in self-reported affective experiences (Wundt 1896, 1906, Ortony & al. 1988, Schimmack & Reizenzein 1997, Shaver & al. 1987). When we ask people to answer about their mood or more globally about how they feel on a

The affect structure revisited 9 relatively long period of time, they aggregate momentary feelings in their minds (Thomas & Diener 1990, Parkinson, Briner, Reynolds & Totterdell 1995, Schimmack & Reisenzein 1997, Reisenzein & Schimmack 1999). As valence is the salient criteria of discrimination, they differentiate the global amount of pleasant state from the global amount of unpleasant state, and evaluate simultaneously how good they felt as well as how bad they felt at the precise moment when they are asked. If time is given to recall information from the episodic memory, participants are surely able to remember a bad or good feeling at a special moment in which they were globally in a good or bad mood. The contrast with our mood in background is precisely why those moments are specially remembered. This pattern of outcome has led to the view that affective states are supported by two orthogonal unipolar dimensions, namely positive affect and negative affect (Watson, Clark & Tellegen 1988). However a participant will deny being able to be at the same time cheerful and sad, because in that case, no confusion is made about the moment at which the feeling occurs, i.e. at exactly the same point in time (Diener & Emmons 1984, Zautra, Potter & Reich 1997, Russell 2003). Since by definition affective experiences are temporary states that change from moment to moment, the main problem in determining these states resides in the definition of moment. There is an agreement to differentiate trait affect and state affect, in that a distinction is made between mood and emotion as in common language (Diener & IranNejad 1986, Reisenzein & Schnpflug 1992, Fridja 1993, Clore & al. 1994). However for the valence dimension in affect structure, we must first address the questions of the duration and definition of the different affective states. No consensual taxonomy has been reached until now, and a good share of the debate is due to the difficulty in distinguishing clearly between various types of affective phenomena (Scherer 2000). We propose here to consider three of them, namely emotion, mood, and affect.

The affect structure revisited 10 The emotion consists of a relatively short episode of synchronized response by several or all subsystems of the organism at a time of evaluation of an external or internal event having a major importance for the participant. Emotions are, for example, anger, sadness, joy, fear, shame, pride, exaltation, despair. Regarding emotion, the principal discussion between researchers is about the changes in different modalities that are necessary and sufficient components of an emotional episode. There is a consensus on the "reactional triad" of the emotion that is supposed to be composed at least of physiological activation, motor expression (vocal, facial and body) and participative feeling. Some authors also include motivation and cognitive evaluation (Buck 1985, 1993, Frijda 1986, 1987, Scherer 1984 a & b, 1993). Although we still often speak about "emotional state" suggesting a relative stability in time, the authors seem to consider an emotion as a process implying fast changes in the duration of an episode. The affect consists of an elementary process accessible to conscience in terms of valence, activation and tension (Wundt 1896, Thayer 1978). It corresponds, for a part, to the component of the subjective experience of emotion (Scherer 1993, Russell 2003), but it is not necessarily directed by a precise event and in course of time it is always present, fluctuating for reasons we are not always aware of, like for instance weather, circadian cycle (Thayer 1989, Watson, Wiese, Vaidya & Tellegen 1999). The affect varies in intensity throughout the day, it is particularly salient when its degree of activation is rather low or high into positive or negative, but with an average degree of activation it has tendency to disappear in the back of our consciousness. Perhaps also it remains generally unconscious because it exists first and mainly at the present time to which we do not have access. And it is only by a work of selflistening that we get aware of what we just felt. For example, it is this affective phenomenon that is in question when with the alarm clock one feels depressed, tired, or merry. The affect is also called activation by Thayer (1986), felt, feeling, sentiments or emotions by other

The affect structure revisited 11 authors. It is difficult to be consistent in the denomination because the various authors use the same terms to indicate affective phenomena of different nature. Although sometimes also mistaken as affect, the mood is distinguished from affect by its duration and the fact that it can be without apparent cause (Russell & Feldman Barrett 1999). It consists of an affective diffuse state of relatively low intensity that acts as a background on which are played the fluctuations of affect. Thus a participant can be basically happy but for example feels temporarily sad with the listening of a melancholic melody. It is this affective phenomenon that is in question in mood disorder, for example dysthymia, characterised by a lack of enjoyment/pleasure in life that continues for at least six months (APA, DSM-IV 1994). Hence, in experimental plans, when studying affect structure, it is crucial that the participants receive clear instructions about what type of affective phenomena they should describe. Indeed, we observed that the participants use the semantic scales in ways suggesting they have frames of reference based upon a lifetime of making such judgments about what they feel. However, mood has undoubtedly an impact on the coloration and intensity of affects, and therefore they are difficult to discriminate. If the period during which the participant has to evaluate what he/she feels is long, the participant could be tempted to retain only what showed invariant over this period and to answer according to his mood rather than according to his affect. On the other hand, the participant could answer according to his different affects that followed one another by melting them together. Diener and Emmons (1984) thus concluded that the valence dimension was bipolar when it was examined in a short period of time, but that positive and negative affects seemed independent when they were examined over an extended time period (Warr & al. 1983, Gotlib & Meyer 1986). Therefore, a suitable way to distinguish between mood, emotion and affect, is to create a

The affect structure revisited 12 situation in which the participant is placed and his affective experience is immediately recorded. This is what we will do in our experimental plan.

Choice of semantic items

The hypothesis of bipolarity comes mainly from the semantic representation of items relating to affect. The concepts of joy and sadness appear to us like bipolar opposites primarily because merry and sad are regarded as antonyms. The semantic differentiation studies of Osgood (1969) as well as the interlinguistic comparisons (Russell, Lewicka & Niit 1989, Russell 1991) support the hypothesis of bipolarity. To test this assumption empirically, it is thus initially necessary to specify a model that is bipolar, i.e. selected semantic items must be antonyms or at least be semantically interpreted as bipolar opposites. However, all terms related to positive affects are not bipolar opposites of each term related to negative affects. Thus we regard sad as opposite to merry rather than tense, and tense as opposed to relax rather than sad. The terms can have between them more complex degrees of relation than only antonym, synonym or independent. The operationalization of affect bipolarity has to go through the selection of terms that are bipolar opposites on valence but also on activation as we now have a consensus that it constitutes a second independent dimension (Bush 1973, Averill 1975, Neufeld 1975, 1976, Russell 1978, Whissell 1981, Thayer 1989). It is also necessary to ensure that the selected terms adequately come from the entire range of pleasant or unpleasant affects descriptors. Otherwise, the retained semantic items would not be representative of the entire affect structure, and consequently bipolarity could artificially not be represented. Currently, a majority of authors recognize a semantic representation of items related to affect under the form of a circular structure (circumplex structure) in which the horizontal diameter corresponds to the bipolar dimension of valence and the vertical

The affect structure revisited 13 diameter corresponds to the bipolar dimension of activation. The semantic items are placed on the circle according to theirs scores in valence and activation obtained on the basis of empirical research (Russell & Feldman Barrett 1999). The antonyms are then diametrically opposite. More generally, bipolar opposites are theoretically separated by angles of 180, whereas synonyms are angularly very close. The number of clusters of semantic items that we can define is arbitrary, but it is important to note that choosing to work with items from some sections rather than the whole circumference can lead to an affect structure that is specific to the selected items. By selecting a cluster of items without selecting items that are diametrically opposed on the circumplex structure, we exclude the semantic items that are the bipolar opposites. By doing so, the bipolarity we seek to test is excluded. Therefore several authors questioned the use of the PANAS as able to adequately measure affects (Morris 1989, Larsen & Diener 1992, Green & Al. 1993, Nemanick & Munz 1994, Carver 1996). Indeed, Watson and his colleagues chose their positive semantic items according to a theoretical dimension defined by high degree of activation and pleasure, and their negative semantic items according to a theoretical dimension defined by high degree of activation and displeasure. Since the semantic items are not opposed on activation, the resulting model excludes in fact bipolarity. Watsons clusters correspond to two adjacent quadrants in the circumplex where positive items are mirrored into their negative counterparts compared to valence dimension. Therefore it is not surprising that Watson found correlations close to zero between what he had named "positive affect" and "negative affect". In our research we will supplement the PANAS semantic items to include all the bipolar opposites so as to cover the entire range of activation of positive and negative affects.

The affect structure revisited 14 The affect space

The choice of semantic items is not the unique issue in setting an experiment plan that is able to uncover the affect structure. But, it may give an idea of the hierarchical bond between affect space and semantic space in which participants draw to formulate their answers based on introspection of what they felt. Indeed, the semantic items are used by participants to describe what they just felt but are not pure inner feelings states in that they only reflect some particular aspects of an affective experience (Feldman 1995). Therefore, in order to unveil the affect structure, one must have a substantial number of different situations inducing different affects (observations) from the entire affect space. In the literature, experiments on self-reported affect experiences often ignore to take into account the variability of the situations inducing the different affects, by for example asking the participants to remember a personal situation. Although in these situations one could expect to have a large enough spectrum of different affects, it is well know that the experimental condition itself will influence the participant in his choice of affect (Tulving & Thomson 1973, Golden & Baddeley 1975, Tulving 1979, Baddeley 1982, Tulving 1983), and since the experimental condition is the same for all participants, there is a doubt that all the reported affects reflect the entire affect space. The consequence is that the unveiled affect structure can be biased in the direction of fewer dimensions. To ensure that the observations reflect the entire affect space, the participants must be put into a given situation and the set of all situations must potentially produce all kinds of affects. This can be done using for example the International Affective Picture System (IAPS, Lang, Bradley & Cuthbert 1995) as we will develop it later.

The affect structure revisited 15 The response format

To measure each semantic item one can use different scales, bipolar and unipolar ones. In the first case, the graduated scale has at its ends one semantic item of the bipolar opposites pair and in its medium the neutral point (zero). In the second case, the two semantic items of the bipolar opposites pair are measured separately on two graduated scales having each one a neutral point (zero) for the situations where the participants consider the corresponding item not relevant to qualify their affects. Between these two formats, there is a whole range of rather bipolar or rather unipolar ambiguous scales. Since Russell and Carroll (1999) showed that in these ambiguous cases participants subjectively rebuild unipolar scales in bipolar scales, it is essential to measure semantic items in strictly unipolar scales in order not to force bipolarity artificially.

Measurement errors

Another potential source of bias in the evaluation of affect structure is the measurement error due to the participants response styles on likert scales, a longstanding methodological concern (Bentler 1969). Using multitrait-multimethod analyses on repeated measurements, several authors concluded that there is little if not no difference in the estimated affect structure compared to the one unveiled when using single measurement per participant (see e.g. Green & al. 1999). Watson and Clark (1997) and Russell and Carroll (1999) reached the same conclusion in a different manner. Moreover, it can be argued that even if there exists a source of variability due to the participants response style, there is also a confounded variability due to the type of affect induced by the situation (for example a picture). The participants will especially respond differently according to the unicity of their

The affect structure revisited 16 own background, i.e. describe different affects when presented with the same situation. Judgment of a particular stimulus on a series of semantic scales is really a comparative judgment against a multitude of previous stumuli scales allocations. Although it is not easily measurable, it is reasonable to suppose that this second source of variability is much larger than the one induced by response style, and since it is confounded with the variability of the affect itself, i.e. the observation, it shouldnt bias the results. In summary, the experimental plan has to pay a detailed attention so that the investigated affective phenomenon is clearly definite for the participants, their affective experiences are immediately recorded, the indicators represent the whole circumference of the semantic circumplex and include the semantic bipolar opposites to allow to test the bipolarity of affect dimensions, the variability of the induced affects is sufficient to highlight the affect structure, and finally the graduated scales are strictly unipolar not to force bipolarity artificially. Those important methodological aspects taken care of, we can now operationalize the question about the number, nature and definition of the affect structure dimensions.

Method

Population

A total population of 162 women (age 18-56, mean 24.3) participated in this research. Most of them (128) were second year students in the section of psychology enrolled for course credit. The remaining women responded to an advertisement and participated on a voluntary basis. We did not retain male participants to avoid an increase of variability due to the difference in response between gender when the affect is induced by pictures (Lang,

The affect structure revisited 17 Bradley & Cuthbert 1995). The front page of the questionnaire collected various information on the participants that was also used to form a code and identify participants while preserving their anonymity (more details on the sample upon request to the authors).

Material

We use a series of 604 pictures elaborated and digitized by the Center for the Study of Emotion and Attention of the University of Florida (1995). This series of pictures is known under the name of International Affective Picture System (IAPS) and was already largely used in studies on affect (see e.g. Lang, Greenwald, Bradley & Hamm 1993, Spence, Shapiro & Zaidel 1996, Vanman, Boehmelt, Dawson & Schell 1996). The various pictures were subjectively evaluated in term of valence, activation and of control by the participants of Lang (Lang, Bradley & Cuthbert 1995). We chose 162 pairs of pictures that are close on their rating on valence as well as on activation. The chosen pairs are distributed on the whole space so that affects induced by the pictures are varied., i.e. spread over the entire latent space. We also chose one pair and a picture that are used respectively as trial pictures and as final picture after the experimental pictures.

Experimental plan

Each participant was submitted to the experiment twice, at a week of interval. One of the time chosen randomly, the participant had to respond on strictly unipolar likert scales, the other time on strictly unipolar continuous scales. The aim was to investigate if the type of scale (likert or continuous) had an influence in the estimation of the affect structure. Each time, the participant had to describe her affects induced by 4 pictures (scenes): the trial

The affect structure revisited 18 picture, two experimental pictures and the final picture. The two experimental pictures (2nd and 3rd scenes) were different between the two times, but belong to the same pairs, i.e. they are matched on valence and activation as given in the IAPS. The choice of the pairs and the order of the pictures within the pair and between the times were chosen randomly. We chose to use two experimental pairs of pictures in order to control for the possible variability due to the style of response and/or the interaction between the participant and the induced affect. In order to have enough pairs, we roled them over the participants, in that the second experimental pair of the ith participant was used as the first experimental pair for the (i+1)th participant. Soon after the participant has seen a picture for 10 seconds (time calibrated on the basis of a preliminary study), she was asked to evaluate her affect using a questionnaire containing various semantic items presented in the following paragraph.

Semantic indicators

As there is not a consensual list of semantic items, we constructed one by taking care that the entire circumplex structure is represented and that each item has its bipolar opposite. We started with semantic items that have been used in similar studies. We also included the semantic items of the PANAS and for each one we added, if necessary, its bipolar opposite on valence and on activation. Once the list of the semantic items in English was built, it was translated by four researchers using this time the antonyms and synonyms in French according to the method of back-translation (see Appendix). The French translation of the PANAS items used in our research were mainly taken from Lapierre, Gaudreau & Cableway (1999). The resulting list includes twenty semantic pairs of bipolar opposites terms that we presented on a circumplex structure on Figure 1. In the questionnaire, the two semantic items of the same pair of bipolar opposites were presented on the same line side-by-side in order to

The affect structure revisited 19 prevent the participants to rebuild subjectively unipolar scales in bipolar scales (Russell & Carroll, 1999). The presentation of the items was controlled to avoid a positive or a negative coloration of the questionnaire.

Results

Data analysis method

With the data collected on the likert scales, we estimated polychoric correlations matrices (Olsson 1979) as input for an exploratory factor analysis. We used two different software and methods that are in some sense equivalent (see Jreskog 2003) to estimate the factor loadings. In LISREL 8.54 (Jreskog & Srbom 2003), more specifically in PRELIS 2.54, we carried out exploratory factor analysis using the estimation method MINRES (MINinmum RESiduals) that was first introduced by Harman (1960) and is based on the direct minimization of least squares to fit a matrix of factor loadings to the correlation matrix. The MINRES method can be used with small samples even when the number of variables is large and when the correlation matrix is not positive definite as it might be the case with polychoric correlation matrix. In Mplus 3.0 (Muthn & Muthn 1998-2004), we used the ULS method (Unweighted Least Squares) of Jreskog and Srbom (1977) which is based on eigenvalues and eigenvectors of the reduced correlation matrix. Again, the ULS method is known to work well with relatively small samples even when the number of variables is large. We note that we used exploratory factor analysis since not only our aim is to determine the number of dimensions, but also because structure theory postulates that all the manifest variables saturate on all the latent factors and therefore constrained loadings to a value of zero has no theoretical support.

The affect structure revisited 20 To determine the number of dimensions, we used the eigenvalues of the estimated correlations matrices. Again the difference in the affect structure models could be due to methodological preferences, as most researchers use the eigenvalue-greater-than-one criterion to determine the number of factors while at the same time others found that this criterion can underestimate or overestimate the number of factors (Horn 1965, Cattell & Jaspers 1967, Browne 1968, Linn 1968, Lee & Comrey 1979, Revell & Rocklin 1979, Yeomans & Golder 1982). In our analysis, we considered both the percentage of explained variance (at least 60%) and also the criteria provided by parallel analysis (Horn 1965). The later method compares the eigenvalues obtained from uncorrelated variables by simulation to the ones obtained with the sample, so that one can find eigenvalues significantly higher than one found randomly with uncorrelated variables. Zwick and Velicer (1986) showed in a comparison study that parallel analysis provided always the best solution. It should be noted that we didnt use the data collected on the continuous scales to estimated the affect structure since preliminary descriptive analyses showed that for all scenes, the distributions of all the variables (semantic items) were far from the necessary normality assumption and could not be corrected neither by a robust method, nor by a transformation. The possible explanation concerns the structural problem of a use of continuous scale. Indeed, since participants are used to likert scales, they seem to use continuous scales as likert ones, with the important consequence that most responses were set to the minimal value (zero). The responses can be seen as dichotomized between a value of zero and another positive value. Since the hypothesis of normality was not respected, we could neither carry out a factor analysis, nor calculate correlation coefficients.

The affect structure revisited 21 Affect structure

Our analyses are consistent across software, methods and datasets (different experimental scenes), so that from now on we report the analyses made using Mplus on the 2nd scene. First we retained three factors, i.e. three dimensions, on the basis of the parallel analysis and contrasted eigenvalues. It should be noted that this criterion is known to be more accurate than the criterion eigenvalues greater than one used by most authors (Russel 1980, Watson & Tellegen 1985). These three factors explain 67.28% of the total variance (2 factors explain only 57.74%). The exploratory factor analysis (with varimax rotation) lead to three (independent) factors that can be interpreted as activation-tension (Factor 1), valence (Factor 2) and activation-energy (Factor 3). In Table 1 are presented the factor loadings given by pairs of opposites for the three factors, as well as the uniqueness that can be used to evaluate how well the factorial structure explains the different semantic items. Some socially stigmatized negative semantic items show a relatively bigger uniqueness (guilty, bored, resigned, inattentive, ashamed, hostile), and generally negative semantic items have a slightly bigger uniqueness than their positive counterparts. This could be explained by the Pollyanna effect, which consists of a human tendency, showed stronger among women, to use positive semantic items in an evaluative context, as for personal judgments, more frequently, easily and diversely than negative semantic items (Boucher & Osgood 1969, Warr 1971, Matlin & Gawron, 1979, Osgood & Hoosain 1983). Consequently, the tendency to avoid brain processing for the negative semantic items (Matlin & Stang, 1978) results in a part of variance that cannot be explained by the three factors and could artificially make believe to the necessity of more explanatory variables, particularly for those that have strongly marked taboo value in French as in English (Armstrong & Hogg 2002). In addition, some semantic

The affect structure revisited 22 items resulting correctly from the back-translation seemed to have a different usage in French than in English. Thus the French terms corresponding to strong, determined, inspired and resigned were objects of question from the participants, who, while seeming to know the adjectives, appeared perplexed when asked to use them to qualify what they just felt, with again for consequence relatively important uniqueness and loadings deviating from what could be expected. However, without those particular cases, the uniqueness of the semantic items are quite satisfactory (from pleased .104 to dull .449 with an average of .292) highlighting that the variables are globally well explained by the three-dimensional structure. For the loadings also there are some exceptions that primarily correspond to cases in which the loadings are very small and could be considered as not significantly different from zero, but most of the semantic items have loadings of opposite signs that their bipolar opposites on the three dimensions. Although the results of the factor analysis already show that the hypothesis of bipolarity can not be rejected, we nevertheless examine the polychoric correlations of the opposite semantic items in Table 2. Except for the pair determined/scared and very low correlations for inspired/worried and resigned/hopeful, which indicate again that the usage of those semantic items is culturally marked, all correlations are negative from medium to high (from -.315 to -.674, with an average of -.534) accrediting the bipolarity. To summarize this first stage, responding to the criticisms addressed to the precedent studies, the innovation of this research lies in the particular care taken to the experimental plan and the statistical analysis method which allows us to unveil three independent and bipolar dimensions, namely activation-tension, valence and activation-energy. In what follows, we will strengthen this finding with the choice of the semantic items.

The affect structure revisited 23 Bipolarity

As argued in the introduction, Watsons analyses showed that the affect structure is two-dimensional with a positive affect (PA) and a negative affect (NA) dimensions because the items were chosen without their opposites. We reproduce here the experiment by performing the same factor analysis as before, but with only the items of the PANAS. The parallel analysis lead us to two dimensions (64.80% of explained variance) and the exploratory factor analysis (with varimax rotation) indicates that these factors can indeed be interpreted as NA (Factor 1) and PA (Factor 2). As expected, the items with a rather negative connotation (like afraid, scared, ashamed, guilty, distressed, etc.) have high loadings on the NA factor and the others have high loading on the PA factor. There is a cultural exception, which could not be avoided by a correct back-translation, with the semantic item excited (in French agit) because it has a negative connotation in French whereas excited has a positive connotation in English. The factor loadings along with the uniqueness are presented in Table 5. Our results thus confirm that the unipolarity found by Watson can be attributed to an artefact of the experimental plan. Since one could argue that the unipolarity found by Watson can be only due to the smaller number of items (20 instead of 40), we performed the following analysis. We retain as semantic indicators only every second pair along the circumference of the circumplex and thus obtain 2 groups A and B of 10 pairs of bipolar opposites with which we replicate the same statistical analysis. For both the parallel analysis retained three factors, i.e. three dimensions. These three factors explain 64.98% for group A and 75.52% for group B of the total variance (2 factors explain only 55.31% and 64.99% respectively). The exploratory factor analysis (with varimax rotation) lead to three (independent) factors that can be interpreted as activation-tension (Factor 2 or 1), valence (Factor 1 or 2) and activation-energy

The affect structure revisited 24 (Factor 3). In Tables 3 and 4 are presented the factor loadings given by pairs of opposites for the three factors, as well as the uniqueness to evaluate how well the factorial structure explains the different semantic items of the groups A and B. As previously, we observe bigger uniqueness for negative semantic items due to the Pollyanna effect and for the same socially stigmatized terms, but again most variables are well explained by the three dimensional structure (from pleased .072 to dull .507 with an average of .294). With the same exceptions that we saw before, the majority of the semantic items have again loadings of opposite signs that their bipolar opposites on the three dimensions. Thus, with twenty or ten pairs of bipolar opposites chosen from the whole circumference of the semantic circumplex, the results highlight the same affect structure based on three independent and bipolar dimensions. This was not the case when the items were chosen without their bipolar opposites.

Interpretation and theoretical extensions

It is interesting to note that the three independent and bipolar dimensional affect structure model was already highlighted by Russell and Mehrabian (1974, 1977) using an exploratory approach. They postulated that the three dimensions of pleasure-displeasure, arousal-nonarousal, and dominance-submissiveness are both necessary and sufficient to describe a large variety of emotional states (p. 291). Although they qualified the affective phenomena as emotional states, we believe that they correspond to affects as we have defined them, since they described the affective phenomena through a person is viewed as being in some emotional state at all times, a state that can be described as a region within a three dimensional space and emotion does not merely include occasional passionate states (p. 274). They recognized (see also Mehrabian 1972a & b, Mehrabian & Ksionzky 1974) that the

The affect structure revisited 25 three dimensions they found correspond to the three EPA dimensions of Osgood that adequately describe human affective (emotional) responses to all types of stimuli. Nevertheless later Russell (1978, 1979, 1980) questioned those first results because he was skeptic on the reliability of the third dimension (beyond the valence and activation) which he also considered as too cognitive. Indeed from its smaller percentage of explained variance, the interpretation of this third dimension is more sensitive to the choice of semantic items, and maybe interpreted very differently by the various authors: tension/relaxation (Wundt 1896, Schimmack & Grob 2000), submissiveness/dominance (Russell & Mehrabian 1977), potency (Osgood & Suci 1955, Morgan & Heise 1988), etc. It seems to us however that this plurality maybe reduced at the phenomenological level according to whether we place ourselves from the subjective point of view of the person who feels tension or relaxation, or from the objective, external point of view that sees the person in a situation of potency or not on her material environment, in a situation of submissiveness or dominance regarding her social entourage. Russells step was then to validate the circumplex affect structure, in an hypothesis-testing rather than exploratory fashion (p. 1172). Similarly, Feldman (1995) showed by means of factor analysis that people give a greater weigh to the valence dimension than to the activation in self-reported affects, so the affect structure could be best characterized as a quasi-circumplex rather than an ideal circumplex. Even if she offered a dissenting view, she found for all samples three factors solutions, but for theoretical reason she interpreted only the first two factors as valence and arousal dimensions. Lately Russell (2003) defined a new concept of core affect based on the two valence and arousal dimensions along with a psychological representation of Object (person, condition, thing, or event at which a mental state is directed), called affective quality (p. 147). As illustration, he wrote that whereas core affect exists within the person (it is Alice who feels upset), affective quality exists in the stimulus (it is the bear that is upsetting) (p. 148). Our point of

The affect structure revisited 26 view is that the independent bipolar three dimensional model of affect structure is more consistent because it results from an exploratory step, is conceived without theoretical a priori, and while being parsimonious it takes into account the three necessary and sufficient dimensions on which we are able to subjectively evaluate any temporary affective state. The three-dimensional structure has also been defended by Sjsberg, Swensson & Persson (1979), Matthews, Jones & Chamberlain (1990), Steyer, Schwenkmezger, Notz & Eid (1994) and Schimmack & Grob (2000), but with correlated dimensions (oblique rotation). However, in our analyses the correlations between valence and activation-tension is relatively small (-.228) as well as the one between valence and activation-energy (-.110). The possibility of correlation between dimensions was mainly introduced for goodness-of-fit reasons rather than for theoretical reasons (Schimmack & Grob 2000). From a psychometric point of view, a model with orthogonal dimensions seems preferable. For example diurnal rhythms studies demonstrate that activation-energy follows a circadian rhythm but not activation-tension or valence (Thayer 1989, Watson & al. 1999). In fact, the affect model we estimate is in agreement with Heise's affect model (1988) based on the three dimensions of Evaluation, Potency and Activation. This last model was developed upon Osgood semantic model and one may legitimately wonder if the three dimensional model is not simply the semantic structure model inducted by the semantic items. If this were the case, then all studies using most of the semantic items (not only those of the PANAS), should always find a three dimensional structure. This is not the case, since we have seen that when the affective phenomenon is the mood, the structure is twodimensional (Bradburn 1969, Warr 1978, Lorr & Shea 1979, Zevon & Tellegen 1982, Warr, Barter & Brownbridge 1983, Diener & Emmons 1984, Diener & Iran-Nejad 1986, Diener 1994).

The affect structure revisited 27 The similarities between the three dimensions of the affect, semantic, and social spaces is striking and might seems disconcerting at first. Although it is perhaps not possible to bring a satisfactory response to the problem of knowing which of hen or egg is first, we can favor the hypothesis that it is the affect structure that conditions the semantic and social structures. Not only the affect gives a sense to all instants, but also a sense to every aspect of our environment. Affect is meaning, in the most primary and visceral manner. Already from a formal point of view, we can note that the overall schema is the same in the generation of the meaning in sociology (Heise 1979) and in linguistics (De Saussure 1916). As the global meaning (social situation, sentence or text) is given by a combination of all the present elements meanings, the meaning of each element is produced by its position in relation to other elements in a given context. The meaning of an element is generated not by its denotative1 meaning but by its place in a signifying chain, its connotative2 meaning. Indeed in linguistics, after Humboldts determinism postulating that thought was determined by language3, and then Sapir-Whorfs relativism postulating that the way we experience and categorize our environment is predisposed by our culture and for a large part through our language4, Osgood caused an epistemological revolution when he highlighted that an universal meaning system operates prior to and independent of languages and cultures and makes mediation between all human beings. In Osgood's mediation theory of meaning, the factor analysis of the semantic judgments of concepts against semantic differential scales revealed the three-dimensional EPA structure of connotative meanings. For structural symbolic interactionists (Heise 1987, 1998, MacKinnon 1994, Stryker 1992), social structure and culture are interdependent as affective meaning reflects how people perceive, think, or feel things together in space and/or time. Affects signal subjectively and interpersonally who people are and how well they are maintained by social interaction.

The affect structure revisited 28 The affective dimensions and the psychological processes associated with those dimensions provide an extremely efficient way of people to assimilate knowledge about social life. After learning basic social categories, distributional constraints on categories, and sentiments associated with each category, people can generate automatically a wide range of social expectations. Only the core of social knowledge is learned piecemeal; the rest is assembled as needed in various circumstances. Thus the affective dimensions are central in the social psychological sense. (Morgan & Heise, 1988, p. 30) Affective meaning can be seen as a metalanguage that translates the social status, power and expressivity in more fundamental psychological dimensions of evaluation, potency and activity (Parsons & Shils 1951, Kemper 1978, 1987). "Classifications of places, peoples, objects and behaviours get transformed into a domain of feelings, where they lose their qualitative uniqueness, become comparable to one another, and begin obeying quantitative principles" (Heise 1987, p. 6). The relation between social structure and psychological processes isolates something basic to the structuring of human judgments. Whether it refers to affective, subjective or connotative meaning, essentially the same phenomenon is being considered, which from the psychological point of view can be formulated within the general framework of perception and learning. Affects are the primary mode of apprehending the environment, of appraisal of the present situation in regard of the coping resources at hand (Frijda, 1993, p. 384), that could correspond to the Evaluation dimension. As affective dimensions correspond to basic mental processes that account for our knowledge of the world, people's cognitive information is generated within the threedimensional framework which can then be found in all the domains (Mehrabian 1980). Affects account for availability or unavailability of coping resources in a given situation (Morris 1992) or the individual's trust in them (Moms, 1992), that could correspond to the

The affect structure revisited 29 Potency dimension. But in the process, they are also at the origin of increased readiness or lowered thresholds for consonant responses vis--vis the situation in progress or in the eventuality of an expected event in this situation, that could correspond to the Activation dimension. Viewed in this way, the three affective dimensions allow to postulate that affect is all at once cognition, motivation and behavior.

Conclusion

In this paper, through the analysis of real data issued from an appropriate experimental plan and data analysis method, we show that the affect structure has three independent dimensions, namely activation-tension, valence and activation-energy. This three-dimensional structure was already uncovered by several researchers (Bush 1973, Averill 1975, Russell & Mehrabian 1977, Morgan & Heise 1988). In order to give validity to our results, we paid special attention to the experimental plan which across studies on this subject, can vary quite substantially. First, it was important to specify what is really intended by affect, especially its difference from mood which, as several studies have shown, has not the same structure as affect. Second, the choice of the semantic items is crucial, since we have shown that choosing the ones in the PANAS only, lead to a two-dimensional structure with a PA and a NA dimensions. Third, the statistical criteria chosen to determine the number of dimensions can also play an important role, in that when it is based on the number of eigenvalues greater than one, two dimensions are found (Russell 1980, Watson & Tellegen 1985) while when using parallel analysis, three dimensions are suitable. We postulate that these three independent and bipolar dimensions of the affect structure model highlighted by our results correspond to the human primary modalities to apprehend our material and social environment. We believe that these dimensions correspond

The affect structure revisited 30 to the Evaluation, Potency and Activation dimensions of Osgoods mediation theory of meaning where they play the role of a common logical structure of all human beings, prior and independent of the language, in the cognitive processes. Those same dimensions are also at the basis of Heises Affect Control Theory in which as a metalanguage they translate everything in our environment: objects, persons, behaviors in comparable affective quanta used by a on-going monitoring judgment process which makes us assimilate knowledge about our social and material environment, directs our response and makes us behave accordingly. That expression of the three affective dimensions allows to postulate that affect is all at once cognition, motivation and behavior. Admittedly more than a consensual taxonomy, it still remains much to conceptualize, the particular nature of affects and their place relatively to other concepts, the type of connection between affect and mood, affect and emotion, emotion and mood, mood and personality, but the theorization that we propose in this article based on affect takes into account a large panel of domains and offers a promising structural framework to affect psychology.

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The affect structure revisited 46 Appendix The following table shows the correspondence between the English and French semantic items, by opposite pairs and according to their orientation on valence and activation dimensions. English valence+ activation+ alert* active* elated enthusiastic* hopeful cheerful proud* inspired* attentive* interested* activationstrong* determined* confident pleased friendly peaceful relaxed satisfied calm serene valence activationsleepy dull depressed lethargic resigned sad guilty* worried inattentive bored activation+ afraid* scared* ashamed* distressed* hostile* irritable* nervous* upset* excited* jittery* valence+ activation+ alerte veill exalt enthousiaste optimiste joyeux fier inspir attentif intress activationimpassible dtermin confiant content amical paisible dtendu satisfait calme serein French valence activationsomnolent engourdi dprim lthargique rsign triste coupable soucieux distrait ennuy activation+ craintif effray honteux dsespr hostile irritable nerveux fch agit anxieux

*indicates semantic items of the PANAS

The affect structure revisited 47 Authors Note This research is supported by grants from the Swiss National Science Foundation (FNRS 610-057883.99 and PP001-106465). We would like to thank Susanne Kaiser, Michael Eid and Grazia Ceschi for their helpful comments on a draft of this article. Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Vronique ElefantYanni, Department of Psychology, University of Geneva, Boulevard du Pont-d'Arve 40, 1205 Geneva, Switzerland, or Rue de Monthoux 38, 1201 Geneva, Switzerland. E-mail: veronique.elefant-yanni@pse.unige.ch

The affect structure revisited 48 Footnotes The denotative usage gives to the thing represented by the word its essential and objective meaning. 2 The connotative usage presents the thing enriched by affective associations which, though intangible, are nonetheless real. 3 Wilhelm von Humboldt 1767-1835 4 Edward Sapir 1884-1936 & Benjamin Lee Whorf 1897-1941
1

The affect structure revisited 49

Table 1 Mplus: Varimax factor loadings estimated with ULS Mplus EFA 3F Items interested bored afraid strong inattentive attentive determined scared inspired worried ashamed confident guilty proud pleased distressed cheerful sad hostile LP2bis: Varimax-rotation Factor loadings estimated by ULS (RMSR=0.0663) Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Uniqueness 0.126 0.144 0.856 -0.346 -0.208 0.600 0.585 0.886 0.108 0.889 0.549 -0.268 0.400 0.030 -0.380 0.799 -0.378 0.748 0.606 0.665 -0.278 -0.068 -0.186 0.081 0.367 0.504 -0.173 0.750 -0.145 -0.372 0.735 -0.241 0.769 0.864 -0.357 0.852 -0.286 -0.358 -0.378 0.476 -0.231 0.525 0.599 -0.383 -0.121 -0.206 -0.192 -0.080 -0.062 0.270 -0.225 0.018 -0.065 -0.001 -0.016 0.026 -0.003 0.399 0.676 0.209 0.570 0.592 0.359 0.389 0.142 0.389 0.182 0.557 0.314 0.731 0.407 0.104 0.234 0.131 0.358 0.504

The affect structure revisited 50 friendly resigned hopeful peaceful irritable enthusiastic lethargic nervous relaxed depressed elated satisfied upset active dull excited calm sleepy alert serene jittery -0.269 0.577 -0.176 -0.455 0.727 -0.231 0.262 0.815 -0.465 0.713 -0.096 -0.362 0.792 0.343 -0.080 0.708 -0.447 -0.078 0.541 -0.327 0.778 0.744 0.031 0.829 0.539 -0.335 0.868 -0.100 -0.111 0.666 -0.225 0.759 0.863 -0.423 0.584 0.031 0.084 0.389 0.039 0.380 0.715 -0.179 0.001 0.179 0.045 0.424 0.131 -0.112 0.790 -0.225 0.265 0.218 -0.214 -0.001 0.014 -0.408 0.737 -0.311 0.491 0.868 -0.393 0.356 -0.294 0.375 0.634 0.280 0.323 0.341 0.180 0.297 0.273 0.270 0.393 0.369 0.124 0.193 0.375 0.449 0.395 0.407 0.239 0.408 0.255 0.276

The affect structure revisited 51 Table 2 Polychoric correlations for the opposite semantic items LP2bis Items interested, bored afraid, strong inattentive, attentive determined, scared inspired, worried ashamed, confident guilty, proud pleased, distressed cheerful, sad hostile, friendly resigned, hopeful peaceful, irritable enthousiastic, lethargic nervous, relaxed depressed, elated satisfied, upset active, dull excited, calm sleepy, alert serene, jittery Polychoric -0.519 -0.435 -0.538 0.408 -0.025 -0.564 -0.177 -0.663 -0.606 -0.67 -0.042 -0.523 -0.22 -0.591 -0.315 -0.674 -0.394 -0.616 -0.429 -0.591

The affect structure revisited 52 Table 3 Mplus: Varimax factor loadings estimated with ULS Mplus EFA 3F Items afraid strong inattentive attentive ashamed confident guilty proud hostile friendly resigned hopeful nervous relaxed depressed elated excited calm sleepy alert LP2bisVA: Varimax-rotation Factor loadings estimated by ULS (RMSR=0.0739) Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Uniqueness 0.179 0.075 -0.127 -0.230 0.519 -0.843 0.336 -0.789 0.430 -0.786 0.024 -0.849 0.184 -0.710 0.264 -0.722 0.017 -0.448 -0.069 -0.308 0.785 -0.217 -0.050 0.483 0.496 -0.152 0.356 0.081 0.550 -0.158 0.598 -0.068 0.806 -0.354 0.665 -0.063 0.721 -0.358 0.041 0.509 -0.343 0.590 0.635 -0.507 -0.129 0.228 -0.267 -0.116 -0.080 0.010 0.100 0.016 -0.325 0.273 0.073 -0.292 -0.371 0.486 0.848 -0.504 0.234 0.599 0.578 0.457 0.467 0.214 0.689 0.358 0.506 0.357 0.632 0.274 0.210 0.295 0.482 0.390 0.343 0.434 0.275 0.393

The affect structure revisited 53 Table4 Mplus: Varimax factor loadings estimated with ULS Mplus EFA 3F Items interested bored determined scared inspired worried pleased distressed cheerful sad peaceful irritable enthusiastic lethargic satisfied upset active dull serene jittery LP2bisVB: Varimax-rotation Factor loadings estimated by ULS (RMSR=0.0529) Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Uniqueness 0.017 0.148 0.469 0.926 -0.037 0.918 -0.582 0.858 -0.575 0.788 -0.634 0.728 -0.440 0.167 -0.573 0.844 0.243 -0.134 -0.520 0.806 0.778 -0.326 0.629 0.047 0.810 0.064 0.767 -0.172 0.742 -0.117 0.350 -0.176 0.793 -0.117 0.745 -0.244 0.655 -0.050 0.568 0.010 -0.305 0.449 0.016 -0.062 -0.116 0.031 -0.031 0.062 0.008 0.076 0.346 0.207 -0.051 0.839 0.023 0.106 -0.302 0.687 0.351 -0.195 0.301 0.670 0.385 0.137 0.329 0.153 0.072 0.231 0.119 0.360 0.355 0.396 0.176 0.255 0.116 0.217 0.420 0.507 0.284 0.312

The affect structure revisited 54 Table 5 Mplus: Varimax factor loadings estimated with ULS Mplus EFA 2F Variables interested afraid strong attentive determined scared inspired ashamed guilty proud distressed hostile irritable enthousiastic nervous upset active excited alert jittery LP2W: Varimax-rotation Factor loadings estimated by ULS (RMSR=0.0777). Factor 1 Factor 2 Uniqueness -0.131 0.829 -0.286 0.397 0.297 0.875 -0.201 0.654 0.510 -0.307 0.812 0.731 0.801 -0.555 0.829 0.897 0.122 0.657 0.385 0.804 0.803 0.371 -0.465 0.704 0.647 0.292 0.728 -0.102 -0.012 0.600 0.007 -0.093 -0.114 0.679 0.269 -0.099 0.770 0.404 0.673 0.271 0.338 0.175 0.702 0.347 0.493 0.149 0.430 0.562 0.740 0.546 0.340 0.457 0.346 0.231 0.241 0.185 0.392 0.405 0.398 0.280

The affect structure revisited 55 Figure Captions

Figure 1. Circumplex of semantic items according to valence and activation

The affect structure revisited 56 Figure 1

activation+ jittery alertactive excited upset elated enthousiastic nervous irritable hopeful hostile distressed ashamed scared afraid valence bored inattentive worried guilty sad resigned lethargic depressed cheerful proud inspired attentive interested valence+ strong determined confident pleased friendly peaceful relaxed satisfied dull calm sleepy serene activation-