Small Water Projects Can Do Big Things: Watershed Management in India

Sandy Bykowski, MPS and Ronald Fernandes Ph.D.

School of Public Service (SPS) DePaul University, Chicago 14. E. Jackson Blvd, Room 1602 Phone: (312) 362 8644 e-mail: rfernan7@depaul.edu
smbykowski@gmail.com

Paper presented at the ISTR conference in Istanbul, Turkey July 9, 2010 1

Small Water Projects Can Do Big Things: Watershed Management in India

Introduction As the idea of civil society has taken root and grown in developing countries, microinterventions in water management, carefully conceived and managed are beginning to show sustainable results that are superior to large or macro-interventions. They appear to be costeffective as well. India currently experiences severe water shortages and is expected to face more serious shortages in the future. The growing rate of extraction of fresh water from rivers and lakes is matched by increasing extraction of ground water, with many aquifers now seriously depleted. The volume of ground water withdrawal, primarily for irrigation but also for municipal and industrial use, exceeds long-term recharge rates.1 In many parts of India, the water table is sinking at the rate of one to two meters a year. Over the last several decades, big mega-dams (dams over 150 meters tall) have been the dominant practice of freshwater storage. But their success has been questionable, as these projects frequently suffer from community resistance and protests, and multiple controversies. We argue that micro projects to enhance freshwater storage in underground aquifers combined with soil conservation techniques provide advantages that often surpass the benefits of larger structures such as dams. We will analyze the case of the Watershed Organization Trust (WOTR) one of the largest organizations working in the fields of environmental management and participatory watershed development in India. According to the World Commission on dams, over the last 50 years, India has built more than 1500 large dams. India has, post-independence, been enamored with huge mega dams, building 4,525 large- and medium-sized dams, ranking third in the world, behind only China and the US (one-tenth of the 45,000 mega dams worldwide). In India, projects flooded over 11 million acres of forest land, each dam displacing an average of 31,240 people.2 Globally, major engineering projects such as mega dams and dam-related flooding have displaced 40 to 80 million people. As of 2004, 70% of the irrigation projects were still incomplete. Sixteen million Indian people have been relocated; 75% of these people were not rehabilitated. While the literature tends to frame the issue of large top-down water projects versus smaller bottom-up projects as alternatives to freshwater storage (Keller, Sakthivadivel and Seckler, 2000), we argue in this paper that such an approach creates an apples- to-oranges comparison which is both simplistic and ignores the social benefits that derive from smaller projects. 3 A large project versus small project approach focuses on the efficiency aspect of freshwater storage (what is the most cost-efficient way to collect and recycle water) but ignores crucial and

1 2

World Commission on Dams report, p 7 Agoramoorthy and Hsu, Small Size, Big Potential: Check Dams For Sustainable Development (Environment, July/August 2008) 3 Even in large scale dam projects, the cost-benefit analyses can be apples to oranges: the WCD points out that dams built for different purposes, whether for hydropower, water supply or flood control, have separate objectives, involve different components, respond to different markets and are operated in different ways. )World Commission on Dams report, p 38)

fundamental aspects involving the stewardship relationship surrounding the ownership of natural resources such as rainwater and the institutional mechanisms that support this relationship. The key question is: when a drop of rainwater falls upon the earth, who has primary ownership rights to it? Answering this question leads us to doubt the basic premise proponents of large dams often use when they claim big projects are the most cost-effective means of freshwater storage (Keller, Sakthivadivel and Seckler, 2000). We argue that the stewardship of rainwater is inherently the responsibility of those on whose lands it falls. If it falls on private property then the primary responsibility for its stewardship is on those who own the land. If it falls on public lands then the state is responsible. In reality, rainfall does not discriminate between public or private lands. Therefore micro projects must necessarily include creating and strengthening institutional mechanisms that bring the public and the private together to act in their common interests. Opposition to large dams is a consequence of inadequate answers to the question of ownership. Large dams essentially ignore the fundamental inequality of the ownership and benefits from rain by allocating the costs (in terms of land submergence, floods, damaged crops, water logging and displacement) on the upstream lands or the catchment area on which the rains fall and then allocating the benefits (in the form of irrigation, flood and drought mitigation) to downstream lands. Duflo and Pande (2007) find that large dams build in Indian districts benefit downstream populations but harm those who live in the catchment areas districts by causing increased volatility of agricultural production and no appreciable productivity gains. They also find a worsening of living standards in districts in which a dam is built. Smaller projects that ensure that the lands on which rain falls benefit directly from it reduce this inequality. At a micro level they also enable us to create institutional mechanisms for a more equitable distribution of access to rainwater which are perceived as such by the local population. In Kolhapur, in southwest state of Maharashtra in India, local protests stalled the Uchangi Dam project for 14 years. On the other hand, in the small village of Wankute, in western Maharashtra, villagers sought out the Watershed Organization Trust (WOTR) to come into their village and implement a watershed project. What accounted for the difference between the local reactions to these two types of projects? Is it the size of the projects? Is it that one was run by a small NGO and the other by a large government agency? Is there a difference in the ways the agencies treat the local communities that makes the villagers respond better to one than the other? We argue here that the most important factor in the success of a watershed project may be found in the difference between a large-scale top-down project and a bottom-up grassroots level approach. We also present an estimate of the costs involved in successful bottom-up approaches using the case of the Watershed Organization Trust (WOTR) one of the largest NGOs in India working in the field of rainwater harvesting and environmental management. A visit to the village of Wankute, Maharashtra, shows the impact a small scale watershed project can have on the economic and social well-being of a local community. Wankute completed their watershed development project in 2007 with the guidance of the Watershed Organization Trust (WOTR) and the Jai Malhar Village Watershed Committee. A watershed, technically speaking, is simply an area of land on which rainwater falls and from which it drains to its lowest point. Micro watersheds typically cover an area of 1000 hectares and in India may cover one to three

villages. Like large scale government projects, WOTR uses a top-down philosophy: however, for WOTR, top-down is a geological, not a political term: it means a ridge-to-valley approach; WOTR starts a project at the top of the watershed to slow the rush of water on its way down to the valley, planting vegetation and using contour trenches, check dams, and gullies to prevent the erosion of precious topsoil as well as conserve rainwater. A watershed is not only a geographical area, but also a living space4. This attitude shapes not only their technical approach, but their approach to the villagers whose lives are affected by the intervention.

Participation or Compromise True participatory research incorporates the villagers know-how and expertise with the local area, the land, and the people. Several studies accuse traditional government watershed programs of defining participation as convincing people to accept their predesigned project.5 In the example of the Uchangi dam project, villagers objections were based on unnecessary displacement, limited benefits from the project, and a lack of public disclosure of project details. Villagers argued that the land to be submerged was the most fertile land in their valley. The villagers also complained that the government lacked transparency. Villagers and NGOs had been denied crucial information about the dam. They argued that for villagers to make an informed decision about this project they needed the technical specifics.6 The government revised their original plans after conducting a participatory analysis: they increased the number of villages who benefited from the dam; submerged no homes (only low-quality farmland), and lowered the height of the dam by two meters, saving over 100 hectares from flooding. According to Roopali Phadkes study, this compromise represented a victory for the villagers. However, given the other proposals that the villagers and their partner NGOs suggested (which the government agency rejected), it seems that the villagers compromised more than the government agency did. One of these rejected proposals, for example, was to build three smaller dams rather than one large dam; the agency rejected it because the smaller dams would not generate as much electrical power as the large dam. Additionally, Phadke hints that other potential alternatives were simply omitted from consideration. For example, rather than focus on designing dams, engineers could have addressed water conservation by planting less water intensive crops. Yet the solution they chose still focused on dams. This was more palatable to the government agency, which was more likely to accept it because of its commitment to and expertise in building large-scale infrastructure. The pressure for large dam projects continues as well because large projects enable politicians and technocrats to maintain more control over resources. Major dams also generate large amounts of electricity, which is also attractive to government planners.
4

Joshi, Lalita and Huirem, Ratna. Participatory Net Planning: Reflections and Learnings from the Field, WOTR Research Report, published by WOTR and German Agency for Technical Co-operation, Pune, India, September 2009 (p 12) 5 Phadke, Science in Action: The Politics of Protest and Knowledge Brokering in India (Society and Natural Resources, 2005 6 Phadke, Redesigning the Uchangi Dam: Participatory Resource Mapping in Action

Even WOTR, in its early stages, used what it called a gross planning method, which they describe as a macro-approach using surveying equipment for contour mapping of the watershed and use of standardized scientific and laboratory based technology and methods. The opinions of the farmers and other stakeholders was not sought and rarely considered. The primary stakeholder is presented with a fait accompli of measures that are determined in accordance with current scientific parameter and established technical norms and practices. His/her concurrence is not required, only his/her acquiescence.7 This approach creates friction as there is a profound mismatch between what is soughtand what the farmers or stakeholders think ought to be done.As a result, work is often stopped, disputes arise, the measures are badly done and more importantly, since there is no sense of involvement, ownership or personal stake, the structures and measures undertaken are rarely, if at all, maintained and continued post projectthis explains why most projects, despite substantial funding and rigorous planning, either fail or deliver disappointing outcomes.8 Phadke writes, by reducing the need for locals to routinely oppose and delay the construction of water projects, this form of collaborative technology development can go a long way toward actually delivering water to where and when it is needed, (p373). Assuaging protests is important because public opposition has created serious roadblocks to many major dam projects: as we mentioned, such as the protests that delayed construction on the Uchangi dam project for years. One gets the feeling that the sole motivation for getting buy-in from the local farmers is merely to pacify the threat of protest so that the project can go on as planned without interference. But protests against big dams may not be the problem: maybe big dams are the problem. The Alternative: Think Small Agoramoorthy and Hsu studied the political, social and environmental costs of mega dam projects, and advocate instead for smaller watershed management projects. Their proposal is to avoid large dams altogether and build smaller check dams (small barriers using stones, cement, or concrete used to harvest rainwater). Check dams do not have the same deleterious environmental effects as the larger dams. And they are less expensive to buildaround $1millionUS versus $1-$2billion for a mega dam. Moreover, the benefits of big dams are usually restricted to areas around the dams, while smaller dams can be built across many rivers covering vast areas. Some may argue that if 1000 small dams were required to capture the same amount of water as one mega dam, the cost would still end up being the same. However, this does not take into account the other costs associated with large damsthe displacement of villagers, for instance; nor does it factor in the benefits to the local communities in social and human capital improvement and in a more equitable distribution of these benefits. Mega dams create political issues as well as environmental onesstates end up fighting one another for access to the water, or diverting it to urban areas for industrial use. Simply building check dams is not the solution to fundamental technical and social challenges related to dealing
7 8

Joshi and Huirem, p 13 Ibid, p 13

with a watershed as a complete eco-system. Check dams built without adequate preparation of the upstream land including the use of wide absorption trenches (WATs), continuous contour trenches (CCTs) and gully plugs to slow down the flowing water get silted over and rendered ineffective in a fairly short time. All these studies show that a key to success is local investment: but who is best equipped to execute these projects? Phadke encourages governments to partner with NGOs, since NGOs tend to be more flexible in their methodologies and are not as restricted by fixed models, and villagers may not have the same cynicism towards these organizations that they often have towards government agencies. NGOs staffed with professional social workers and engineers are best suited to take on this kind of participatory approach. An International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI)9 study concludes that successful watershed programs have the following characteristics: They devote time and resources to social organization They build the groups interests into the project, recognizing the heterogeneity of each community They work with farmers on interventions and technologies They choose the village, not the watershed, as the unit of social intervention and planning (geographical watersheds often span several villages, making the political coordination of a project more complex). Watersheds remain the focus of technical intervention. They screen the villages to determine its ability to work collectively One reason NGOs work so well is that they take a long time to develop relationships and build trust in the community. WOTR insists on strong village participation as part of their mission. In Wankute, a village of only 1500, we spoke with members of almost a dozen different village committees, including the village watershed committee, eight womens self help groups, a dairy cooperative, and a credit cooperative, among others. The social organization work can take a full year of talking to villagers before entering into a project with them, as the organizations work closely with the Gram Panchayat (local village council) to get community buy-in. Unlike a large central government project, WOTR will not impose its will on the community. If the community is not actively involved, neither is WOTR. WOTR ultimately realized that village involvement was crucial to a water projects success. They developed a methodology called Participatory Net Planning (PNP), and designed an accompanying capacity building pedagogy, called the POP (Participatory Operational Pedagogy).10 All watershed projects WOTR implements goes through 2 phases the Capacity Building Phase (CBP) and the Development Phase (DP). Only when a project meets the qualifying criteria and is deemed to have successfully completed the CBP (usually lasting between 6-12 months since initiation and including one rainy season), it moves into the Development Phase (DP) where work on a large scale across the entire watershed is begun11.
9

A study by the International Food Policy Research Institute, Watershed Development Projects in India: an Evaluation, discusses integrating social organization with technical fixes. 10 Joshi and Huirem, p 14 11 Ibid, p 17

The following are the steps involved in WOTRs participatory net planning process: first they create a team comprised of technically qualified person and minimum of 2-3 VWC members. 1) The farmer couple (or all adult members) must be present. The team discusses details of the land such as, the slope of the land, erosion status, soil texture, land use, types of crops taken, etc, and it is physically measured together with whatever soil and waters conservation measures exist. 2) The land is then classified and the most suitable land use and treatments are proposed. If the farmer does not agree to the proposed treatments, then his/her opinion is accepted provided it doesnt adversely affect the neighbors nor cause damage. 3) Once a consensus is arrived at, the farmer is given a sheet of paper which contains the diagram of his land, details of current and proposed treatments and land use, overall costs and his contribution. 4) An agreement is then signed by the farmer which formalizes the consent of both husband and wife to implement the treatment as planned and maintain the same. Using this process, the team can survey 10-15 hectares a day. 12 The villagers themselves build WOTRs projectsby hand. Villagers donate their own time and labor, digging contour trenches and constructing check dams. This is a deliberate strategy, called shramdan (or voluntary labor) to encourage village buy-in. This method generates income for the villagers (WOTR pays 100 rupees a day). It is true, they tell the villagers, a machine could do the work much more quickly, but then, the owner of the machine gets the money, and not the community. Villagers discuss, and agree in writing the proposed treatments, cost estimate and own contribution.13 The risk in this approach is that villagers may accept projects they dont really want in order to get employment or government subsidies. The IFPRI study suggests that subsidized programs dont last as long as unsubsidized ones: for the subsidies to work, employment must be substantial enough to compensate for lost income, and it needs to be sustained for several years14. More commitment to cost sharing would help ensure that farmers only accepted land improvement measures that they truly want. 15 An important component of the thinking small approach is the creation of institutions of local self-governance at the village level. As a condition for village participation in a project WOTR requires the creation of a Village Watershed Committee (VWC) in which the representation of minorities (tribal and lower castes), women, and the landless is required. This is important because of the risk in small projects of reinforcing existing social and economic inequalities. Another mechanism to avoid this outcome is the creation of women self-help groups (SHGs) in villages. Participation in these SHGs provide women with the opportunity to come together to conduct saving and lending activities, to address and express their common concerns. WOTRs

12 13 14 15

Ibid, p 18 Ibid, p 16 IFPRI study, p 53 Ibid, p 72

support of microfinance to these SHGs provides women with the opportunity to undertake economic projects. Finally, WOTRs Ridge-to-Valley approach also leads to a leveling of income inequalities in small projects. By beginning land treatment in the upper regions (ridges) of a watershed and then working downwards towards the valleys, WOTR ensures that the poorer people, who tend to own less fertile land in the upper ridges, obtain the benefits from the watershed development work before the relatively richer villagers, who own more fertile land in the valleys. Another important outcome of creating local institutions of self-governance and empowering them is the stronger collaboration between public and private interests: a critical component to the stewardship argument for the benefits of small projects. By fostering close links between the VWC and other local institutions such as the Village Council (Panchayat), and local units of state departments such as the department of forests, irrigation, agriculture, soil and water conservation, tribal welfare, and health during the project. For watershed programs, WOTR pioneered this approach referred to as the Sangamner pattern (named after the Sangamner region in the Ahmednagar district in Maharashtra, India); this approach requires the involvement and goodwill of all the key stakeholders in a watershed project in order to develop a genuine partnership. This approach is critical for successful watershed programs in India particularly because the land in the upper ridges which needed to be treated first to ensure success are usually forest land, which belong to the state and are governed by the Forest Conservation Act. WOTRs stakeholder approach enabled it to obtain permission to treat degraded forest lands in the upper ridges. As might be expected, the strong links between the villagers and government and political entities forged during the watershed project creates opportunities for continued development in the village even after the project is completed. Sustaining a project for that long is something NGOs are typically better equipped to deal with. On the whole, NGOs devote more time to each village than do government projects, and work on activities that go beyond watershed management: performing social work that can include everything from family planning to bans on tree-cutting. Wankutes Village Watershed Committee (VWC) even imposed a ban on alcoholism. We asked if this wasnt outside the scope of the committee charged with managing the watershed, but they felt that it was all part of the social discipline crucial to maintaining the villagers commitment to the project. The IFPRI study additionally questioned whether villages actually enforced all these social regulations. For instance, every watershed project in the study imposes a ban on free-grazing, including Wankute. However, twice on our tours of the area, we encountered goatherds walking their goats: once on a government preserve, and once on private farmland. The goatherd on the farmland even joined us on our tour. This is an example of the local institutional mechanisms that villagers create to ensure a more equitable distribution of the outcomes of sustainable watershed development. Since it is typically the landless who keep small ruminants to make a living, each VDC has the capacity to work out informal agreements with the landless to ensure that the bans on free grazing and tree felling on public lands during the duration of the project (which hits the landless who raise both large and small ruminants the most) allows them to survive. Once the project is completed and the grasses and trees are replenished making the ban unnecessary, the VDC then develops other rules for the utilization of fodder from public lands.

In the use of the water stocks obtained by rainwater harvesting, water budgeting practices are followed. The villagers meet to discuss matters of equitable distribution, crop selection (waterintensive or not), and number of crops taken. Here too, the advantages of thinking small loom large. Smaller groups enable an easier resolution of disagreement and conflict. By empowering the villagers to resolve these problems but within the institutional mechanisms created by the funding agency, quicker resolutions of conflicts occur and which are equitable as well. The Need for Partnerships NGOs do have their limitations. The same quality that makes these NGO programs so successful is also what constrains them: they spend far more staff time on each village than do the government projects and they often operate on a shoestring budget. Their scope may not be as broad, but it goes much deeper. This intensive time-commitment cannot easily be done on a large scale. Government projects have huge budgets, and can reach thousands of villages. WOTR has implemented 112 watershed projects to date in Maharashtra and Andhra Pradesh covering nearly 80,000 hectares. While this seems impressive, India has over 600 thousand villages. There must be more and larger partnerships if organizations like WOTR are to spread their work to the scale necessary to impact Indias water problems. Ultimately, though, this reliance on NGOs does not relieve government of its responsibility to provide infrastructure development. It takes a multi-pronged approach to raise up a village, and a partnership that utilizes the villagers collective knowledge and history, NGOs skill in social organization, and government organizations skills in technical work. 16 An alliance between government agencies with the resources and the scope to take projects on a large scale and NGOs who have greater flexibility and can develop deeper social relationships with villagers, seems an ideal recipe for a more grassroots, holistic approach to Indias water issues. But the most critical ingredient in any successful project has to be the villagers themselves. They are the ones that not only have to implement and live with whatever is done to their land, but they are the ones who must ensure the maintenance and viability of the watershed once the NGO or the government agency leaves.

The Costs of Thinking Small When examining the costs of large-scale dams, multiple factors need to be taken into the equation: including the cost overruns frequently incurred by large dams (estimated from as low as a 22% overrun up to 180%, according to the WCD), loss of crop yield, loss of efficiency in water use, economic loss, which all too often failed to deliver on promised financial and economic profitability even when defined narrowly in terms of direct project costs and benefits,17 and displacement of millions of people. Additionally, even the benefits cited by large dam supporters, such as economic and energy improvements, are distributed primarily to those living downstream of the dam, and not enjoyed by villagers upstream.

16 17

IFPRI, p15 World Commission on Dams report, p47

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One approach that small projects which seek to include concepts of stewardship and ownership in building a participatory method can use is the five capitals approach to sustainable development. 18 In this approach, in addition to the technical interventions of working with and enhancing natural capital (land, trees) and manufactured capital (check dams, trenches), there is an important emphasis on building three other forms of capitals that are central to sustainable development. They include; 1. Social capital through building local institutional mechanisms 2. Human capital through exposure visits and training 3. Financial capital by creating a Maintenance fund which serves as an endowment or corpus for continued maintenance once the project is completed Table 1 below describes the detailed activities conducted by WOTR during a Watershed and Livelihoods project. Although the first two items are the typical interventions in harvesting rainwater, a substantial amount (around 30% of the total budget) is allocated to activities that involve strengthening the institutions of self-governance including setting up women self-help groups, livelihood promotion, and human capital acquisition. Table 1: Cost Estimates for a Watershed and Livelihoods Project (covering a gross area of 650 ha.) (All figures in Indian Rupees) Description of Activity Total Cost External Support Local Contribution through volunteer work 548,500

1. Area treatment: including Afforestation, Development of cultivated land, Horticulture and gully stabilization work. (Rs. 6297/ ha) 2. Drainage line treatment: (around 15% cost of area treatment) 3. Agricultural Production System: demonstration plot, introduction of new crops, organic farming etc) 4. Women's promotion activities: Quality of life enhancement/Social development activities (drinking water, sanitation, health (5% of item 1 & 2) 5. Livelihoods promotion: support systems for vulnerable sections (5% of items 1 & 2) 6. Human resource development/Social capital formation: trainings, self help promotion, exposures.

3,148,500

2,600,000

450,000 100,000

400,000 100,000

50,000 -

179,925

134,944

44,981

179,925 75,000

134,944 75,000

44,981 -

18

Forum for the Future http://www.forumforthefuture.org/

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7. Experience sharing workshops, net working workshops/melawas (cross group meetings) 8. Maintenance fund 9. Micro-finance activity in project villages Total implementation cost Contingencies Wage increase, price escalation, preparation of project Feasibility Study Report, etc.(5% of the grant component of items 1 to 5) Project administration cost: Salary for watershed development team, running cost and capital cost (20% of the grant component of items 1 to 5) Programme support cost: Monitoring, extension support hand holding, experience sharing workshops, publication of success stories, action research, information dissemination, training material preparation etc (10 % of the grant component of items 1 to 5 and B) GRAND TOTAL FOR 1 PROJECT

6,000

6,000

200,000 150,000 4,489,350 168,494

200,000 150,000 3,800,888 168,494 688,463

673,978

673,978

404,386

404,386

5,736,208

5,047,745

688,463

If we assume that this project conservatively benefits two villages located on the watershed and each village has a population of around 1000 people, the total project cost per person is around Rs. 2800. The benefits on the other hand surpass our expectations. As in the case of large dams, crop productivity increases and the water needs of the villagers and their livestock are better met. However the benefits of a watershed project also include greater social capital creation, human capital creation, and effective institutional building at a local level. Arguably, even from an efficiency perspective, our use of resources appears to be more efficient for a small project once the true costs of displacement are included. In addition, from an equity perspective, small projects appear to be vastly superior to large dams. They are able, through the approaches elaborated above, to ensure that the fruits of development are more evenly distributed among the wealthy and the poor, especially the landless. This is in contrast to large dam projects that enhance disparities between the upstream and downstream villages and between the landed and the landless.

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Summary While large dam projects account for the costs of the building and technological improvements of their projects, they often do not account in their calculations the costs to the communities impacted. The fact that countries like India are still facing enormous water shortages even after huge sums of money have been invested in large dam projects should be sufficient to doubt the efficacy of such projects. The costs of large dams do not often include the capacity building that small projects incur. As the World Commission on Dams explains, dam supporters exaggerate the irrigation and power benefits of large dams and neglect their social, environmental and economic costs. These costs and benefits are rarely spread equitablydownstream residents typically incur the benefits of increased water and electric supply, while upstream inhabitants often incur the costs of flooding, displacement, poor crops, and diverted rainwater. Small watershed projects such as those implemented by the Watershed Organization Trust hope to offset these inequities by bringing all stakeholders to the table and forging partnerships between local, state and nonprofit groups, and empowering traditionally disenfranchised stakeholders (women, tribal groups, the landless). Small watershed development looks beyond mere technical fixes to incorporate the social, environmental economic and human element of watershed issues. Gaining the participation and cooperation of the villagers takes considerable more time, cost and effort, but in the long run, the satisfaction is greater, as is the long-term sustainability and maintenance of the watershed. These efforts go a long way to bringing the ownership of that drop of rainwater closer to where it falls.

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Resources: Agoramoorthy, Govindasamy & Hsu, Minna J., Small Size, Big Potential: Check Dams For Sustainable Development, Environment, Volume 50, #4, July/August 2008 Bacher, Hermann 1998. Developing Working Partnerships: The Indo-German Watershed Development Programme (IGWDP) Available at http://srdis.ciesin.org/cases/india-028.html Carroll, Bridgette and Raquel Pinderhughs, PowerPoint presentation, The Narmada Dam in India, Race, Poverty and the Environment, Urban Studies & Environmental Studies Programs, San Francisco State University, Spring 2004 Duflo, Ester and Rohini Pande. 2007. Dams The Quarterly Journal of Economics. pp:601-646 Joshi, Lalita and Huirem, Ratna, Participatory Net Planning: Reflections and Learnings from the Field, WOTR Research Report, published by WOTR and German Agency for Technical Cooperation, Pune, India, September 2009 Keller, Andrew, R. Sakthivadivel and David Seckler. 2006. Water Scarcity and the Role of Storage in Development. International Water Management Institute, Research Report 39 Kerr, John, in collaboration with Ganesh Pangare and Vasudha Lokur Pangare. 2002. Watershed Development Projects in India: an Evaluation, the International Food Policy Research Institute. Phadke, Roopali, Peoples Science in Action: The Politics of Protest and Knowledge Brokering in India, Society and Natural Resources, Vol. 18; Taylor & Francis Ltd. 2005 Phadke, Redesigning the Uchangi Dam: Participatory Resource Mapping in Action, Department of Env. Studies, Univ. of California, Santa Cruz, Friend of the River Narmada website: http://www.narmada.org/sandrp/mar2002.2.html Watershed Organization Trust: site visit to Pune and Wankute, Maharashtra, India (March 2009) www.wotr.org World Commission on Dams/International Rivers website: www.internationalrivers.org Dams and Development: A New Framework For Decision-Making: The Report of the World Commission on Dams, Earthscan Publications Ltd, London and Sterling, VA, November, 2000

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