QUALIFICATION 1. Romualdez-Marcos vs COMELEC TITLE: Romualdez-Marcos vs.

COMELEC CITATION: 248 SCRA 300 (domicile of choice and domicile of origin was established; animo revertendi or Intention of returning) FACTS: Imelda, a little over 8 years old, in or about 1938, established her domicile in Tacloban, Leyte where she studied and graduated high school in the Holy Infant Academy from 1938 to 1949. She then pursued her college degree, education, in St. Pauls College now Divine Word University also in Tacloban. Subsequently, she taught in Leyte Chinese School still in Tacloban. She went to manila during 1952 to work with her cousin, the late speaker Daniel Romualdez in his office in the House of Representatives. In 1954, she married late President Ferdinand Marcos when he was still a Congressman of Ilocos Norte and was registered there as a voter. When Pres. Marcos was elected as Senator in 1959, they lived together in San Juan, Rizal where she registered as a voter. In 1965, when Marcos won presidency, they lived in Malacanang Palace and registered as a voter in San Miguel Manila. She served as member of the Batasang Pambansa and Governor of Metro Manila during 1978. Imelda Romualdez-Marcos was running for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte for the 1995 Elections. Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the First District of Leyte and also a candidate for the same position, filed a Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification" with the Commission on Elections alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for residency. The petitioner, in an honest misrepresentation, wrote seven months under residency, which she sought to rectify by adding the words "since childhood" in her Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy filed on March 29, 1995 and that "she has always maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or residence. She arrived at the seven months residency due to the fact that she became a resident of the Municipality of Tolosa in said months. ISSUE: Whether petitioner has satisfied the 1year residency requirement to be eligible in running as representative of the First District of Leyte. HELD: Residence is used synonymously with domicile for election purposes. The court are in favor of a conclusion supporting petitoners claim of legal residence or domicile in the First District of Leyte despite her own declaration of 7 months residency in the district for the following reasons: 1. A minor follows domicile of her parents. Tacloban became Imeldas domicile of origin by operation of law when her father brought them to Leyte; 2. Domicile of origin is only lost when there is actual removal or change of domicile, a bona fide intention of abandoning the former residence and establishing a new one, and acts which correspond with the purpose. In the absence and concurrence of all these, domicile of origin should be deemed to continue.

3. A wife does not automatically gain the husbands domicile because the term residence in Civil Law does not mean the same thing in Political Law. When Imelda married late President Marcos in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a new home and not domicilium necessarium. 4. Assuming that Imelda gained a new domicile after her marriage and acquired right to choose a new one only after the death of Pres. Marcos, her actions upon returning to the country clearly indicated that she chose Tacloban, her domicile of origin, as her domicile of choice. To add, petitioner even obtained her residence certificate in 1992 in Tacloban, Leyte while living in her brothers house, an act, which supports the domiciliary intention clearly manifested. She even kept close ties by establishing residences in Tacloban, celebrating her birthdays and other important milestones. WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses the necessary residence qualifications to run for a seat in the House of Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC's questioned Resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May 11, and May 25, 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent COMELEC is hereby directed to order the Provincial Board of Canvassers to proclaim petitioner as the duly elected Representative of the First District of Leyte. 2.(only leased a condominium: DO, DC, is in Tarlac)

Aquino vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 120265, September 18, 1995

Sunday, January 25, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes Labels: Case Digests, Political Law F a c t s : Petitioner Agapito Aquino filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Representative for the Second District of Makati City. Private respondents Move Makati, a duly registered political party, and Mateo Bedon, Chairman of LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP of Brgy. Cembo, Makati City, filed a petition to disqualify petitioner on the ground that the latter lacked the residence qualification as a candidate for congressman which, under Sec. 6, Art. VI of the Constitution, should be for a period not less than 1 year immediately precedin g the elections. I s s u e : W hether or not the petitioner lacked the residence qualification as a candidate for congressman as mandated by Sec. 6, Art. VI of the Constitution H e l d : In order that petitioner could qualify as a candidate for Representative of the Second District of Makati City, he must prove that he has established not just residence but domicile of choice. Petitioner, in his certificate of candidacy for the 1992 elections, indicated not only that he was a resident of San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac in 1992 but that he was a resident of the same for 52 years immediately preceding that elections. At that time, his certificate indicated that he was also a registered voter of the same district. His birth certificate places Concepcion, Tarlac as the birthplace of his parents. What stands consistently clear and unassailable is that his domicile of origin of record up to the time of filing of his most recent certificate of candidacy for the 1995 elections was Concepcion, Tarlac. The intention not to establish a permanent home in Makati City is evident in his leasing a condominium unit instead of buying one. While a lease contract may

TEODULO M. COQUILLA, petitioner,vs. THE HON. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and MR. NEIL M. ALVAREZ, respondents. (Citizenship requirement: became a naturalized US Citizen, repatriated, but for 6 months only; and the material falsification he committed merits the cancellation of his COC.) FACTS: Coquilla was born on 1938 of Filipino parents in Oras, Eastern Samar. He grew up and resided there until 1965, when he was subsequently naturalized as a U.S. citizen after joining the US Navy. On 1998 he came to the Philippines and took out a residence certificate, although he continued making several trips to the United States. Coquilla eventually applied for repatriation under R.A. No. 8171 to the Special Committee on Naturalization which was approved on November 7, 2000, and, on November 10, 2000, he took his oath as a citizen of the Philippines. On November 21, 2000, he applied for registration as a voter of Butnga, Oras, Eastern Samar which was approved in 2001. On February 27, 2001, he filed his certificate of candidacy stating that he had been a resident of Oras, Eastern Samar for "two (2) years. Oras incumbent mayor, Neil Alvarez, who was running for reelection sought to cancel Coquillas certificate of candidacy on the ground that his statement as to the two year residency in Oras was a material representation as he only resided therein for six months after his oath as a citizen. Before the COMELEC could render a decision, elections commenced and Coquilla was proclaimed the winner. On July 19, 2001, the Second Division of the COMELEC granted Alvarez petition and ordered the cancellation of petitioners certificate of candidacy. ISSUE: Was COMELECs order of cancellation of the certificate of candidacy Teodulo M. Coquilla proper? RULING: COMELEC properly ordered the cancellation of CoquillaS COC. COMELEC still had jurisdiction over his case although he was already proclaimed because RA 6646 provides that the proceedings for disqualification of candidates or for the cancellation or denial of certificates of candidacy, which have been begun before the elections, should continue even after such elections and proclamation of the winners. In this case, the COC was correctly cancelled because Coquilla did not possess the legal qualification of at least 1 year residency. The term "residence" is to be understood as the "domicile" or legal residence. He has lost his domicile of origin in Oras by becoming a U.S. citizen and he has not re-established his claimed domicile in Oras by mere filing of taxes or by obtaining a voters registration as it only requires six-months residency. The material falsification he committed merits the cancellation of his COC.

4.

Pimentel vs. COMELEC GR 161658, Nov. 3, 2003

Facts: Congress passed RA 9165, Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, and makes it mandatory for candidates for public office, students of secondary and tertiary schools, officers and employees of public and private offices, and persons charged before the prosecutors office with certain offenses, among other personalities, to undergo a drug test. Hence, Senator Pimentel, who is a senatorial candidate for the 2004 synchronized elections, challenged Section 36(g) of the said law. Issue: is the mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office an unconstitutional imposition of additional qualification on candidates for Senator? Held: Yes. Section 36 (g) of RA 9165, requiring all candidates for public office whether appointed or elected both in the national or local government undergo a mandatory drug test is UNCONSTITUTIONAL( it confers no rights, imposes no duties, affords no protection, creates no office and in legal contemplation, inoperative as though it has never been passed). Under Sec.3, Art. VI of the Constitution, an aspiring candidate for Senator needs only to meet 5 qualifications: (1) citizenship, (2) voter registration, (3) literacy, (4) age, and (5) residency. The Congress cannot validly amend or otherwise modify these qualification standards, as it cannot disregard, evade, or weaken the force of a constitutional mandate, or alter or enlarge the Constitution. It is basic that if a law or an administrative rule violates any norm of the Constitution, that issuance is null and void and has no effect. In the discharge of their defined functions, the three departments of government have no choice but to yield obedience to the commands of the Constitution. Whatever limits it imposes must be observed.

Parliamentary Immunities Privilege from Arrest Privilege of Speech and Debate

5. Jimenez v. Cabangbang (Garcia) FACTS: Nicanor Jimenez, Carlos Albert and Jose Lukban they are the persons mentioned in the open letter of Cabangbang to the President. Bartolome Cabangbang member of the HOR and wrote the letter to the President. A civil action was originally instituted by the petitioners in the CFI of Rizal for recovery of several sums of money, by way of damages for the publication of an allegedly libelous letter of defendant Cabangbang. The letter contains information that: 1. There is an insidious plan or a massive political build up; 2. There is a planned coup dtat; 3. Modified #1, by trying to assuage the President and the public with a loyalty parade, in a effort to rally the officers and men of the AFP behind General Arellano. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the publication 2. Whether or not it is libelous. in question is a privileged communication.

HELD: 1. It was held that the letter is not considered a privilege communication because the publication: a. was an open letter, b. the Congress was not in session; c. it was not a discharge of an official function or duty. 2. It was held not libelous because the letter clearly implies that the plaintiffs were not the planners but merely tools, much less, unwittingly on their part. The order appealed is confirmed. Incompatible and Forbidden offices. Exception:

7.ADAZA VS PACANA Adaza was elected governor of the province of Misamis Oriental in the January 30, 1980 elections. He took his oath of office and started discharging his duties as provincial governor on March 3, 1980. Pacana was elected vice-governor for same province in the same elections. Under the law, their respective terms of office would expire on March 3, 1986. On March 27, 1984, Pacana filed his certificate of candidacy for the May 14, 1984 BP elections; petitioner Adaza followed suit on April 27, 1984. In the ensuing elections, petitioner won by placing first among the candidates, while Pacana lost. Adaza took his oath of office as Mambabatas Pambansa on July 19, 1984 and since then he has discharged the functions of said office. On July 23, 1984, Pacana took his oath of office as governor of Misamis Oriental before President Marcos, and started to perform the duties of governor on July 25, 1984. Claiming to be the lawful occupant of the governor's office, Adaza has brought this petition to exclude Pacana therefrom. He argues that he was elected to said office for a term of six years, that he remains to be the governor of the province until his term expires on March 3, 1986 as provided by law, and that within the context of the parliamentary system, as in France, Great Britain and New Zealand, a local elective official can hold the position to which he had been elected and simultaneously be an elected member of Parliament. ISSUE: Whether or not Adaza can serve as a member of the Batasan and as a governor of the province simultaneously. Whether or not a vice governor who ran for Congress and lost can assume his original position and as such can, by virtue of succession, take the vacated seat of the governor. HELD: Section 10, Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution provides as follows: "Section 10. A member of the National Assembly [now Batasan Pambansa] shall not hold any other office or employment in the government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations, during his tenure, except that of prime minister or member of the cabinet . . ." The Philippine Constitution is clear and unambiguous. Hence Adaza cannot invoke common law practices abroad. He cannot complain of any restrictions which public policy may dictate on his holding of more than one office. Adaza further contends that when Pacana filed his candidacy for the Batasan he became a private citizen because he vacated his office. Pacana, as a mere private citizen, had no right to assume the governorship left vacant by petitioner's election to the BP. This is not tenable and it runs afoul against BP. 697, the law governing the election of members of the BP on May 14, 1984, Section 13[2] of which specifically provides that "governors, mayors, members of the various sangguniang or barangay officials shall, upon filing a certificate of candidacy, be considered on forced leave of absence from office." Indubitably, respondent falls within the coverage of this provision, considering that at the time he filed his certificate of candidacy for the 1984 BP election he was a member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan as provided in Sections 204 and 205 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, 5 otherwise??? Inhibitions and Disqualifications) Puyat v. De Guzman Facts: The case is a suit for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction against the Order of SEC (De Guzman) granting Estanislao Fernandez leave to intervene in SEC case # 1747. Fernandez, on one of the conferences of the parties, represented the ACERO group but

the Puyat group objected because Fernandez is an assemblyman as prohibited by law (Section 11, Article 8 of the Constitution). Fernandez did not continue his appearance for respondent ACERO for the mean time. To circumvent the law, Fernandez purchased 10 shares of stock on May 15, 1979 and was notarized on May 30, 1979 and was sought to be registered on such date. Being an owner of shares of stock of IPI, Fernandez filed for an Urgent Motion for Intervention in the SEC case and it was granted by SEC. One the case, Reyes vs Excelsior et al, before a Court of First Instance, S.C. ruled that Fernandez cannot appear as counsel to the respondents because the court was one without appellate jurisdiction. SC also issued a TRO enjoining SEC from allowing the participation as intervenor of Fernandez at the proceedings in the SEC case. Solicitor General commented for the respondent commissioner of SEC supporting the latters stand in allowing intervention. Issue: Whether or not Assemblyman Fernandez may intervene in the SEC case. Held: The intervention of Fernandez is an indirect appearance as a counsel before an administrative body which is in contravention of the constitutional provisions (Section 11, Article 8): SEC. 11. No Member of the Batasang Pambansa shall appear as counsel before any court without appellate jurisdiction before any court in any civil case wherein the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof is the adverse party, or in any criminal case wherein any officer or employee of the Government is accused of an offense committed in relation to his office, or before any administrative body. Neither shall he, directly or indirectly be interested financially in any contract with, or in any franchise or special privilege granted by the Government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including any governmentowned or controlled corporation, during his term of office. He shall not accept employment to intervene in any cause or matter where he may be called to act on account of his office.

Journals Journal Conclusiveness of the Journals 11. US VS PONS FACTS : Pons and Gabino Beliso were trading partners. On 5 Apr 1914, the steamer Lopez y Lopez arrived at Manila from Spain and it contained 25 barrels of wine. The said barrels of wine were delivered to Beliso. Beliso subsequently delivered 5 barrels to Pons house. On the other hand, the customs authorities noticed that the said 25 barrels listed as wine on record were not delivered to any listed merchant (Beliso not being one). And so the customs officers conducted an investigation thereby discovering that the 25 barrels of wine actually contained tins of opium. Since the act of trading and dealing opium is against Act 2381, Pons and Beliso were charged for illegally and fraudulently importing and introducing such contraband material to the Philippines. Pons appealed the sentence arguing that Act 2381 was not approved while the Philippine Commission (Congress) was not in session. He said that his witnesses claim that the said law was passed/approved on 01 March 1914 while the special session of the Commission was adjourned at 12MN on 28 Feb 1914. Since this is the case, Act 2381 should be null and void.

ISSUE: Whether or not the SC must go beyond the recitals of the Journals to determine if Act 2381 was indeed made a as law on 28 Feb 1914. HELD: The SC looked into the Journals to ascertain the date of adjournment but the SC refused to go beyond the recitals in the legislative Journals. The said Journals are conclusive on the Court and to inquire into the veracity of the journals of the Philippine Legislature, when they are, as the SC have said, clear and explicit, would be to violate both the letter and the spirit of the organic laws by which the Philippine Government was brought into existence, to invade a coordinate and independent department of the Government, and to interfere with the legitimate powers and functions of the Legislature. Pons witnesses cannot be given due weight against the conclusiveness of the Journals which is an act of the legislature. The journals say that the Legislature adjourned at 12 midnight on February 28, 1914. This settles the question, and the court did not err in declining to go behind these journals. The SC passed upon the conclusiveness of the enrolled bill in this particular case. 12. Arroyo vs. De Venecia G.R. No. 127255, August 14, 1997 Sunday, January 25, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes Labels: Case Digests, Political Law Facts: A petition was filed challenging the validity of RA 8240, which amends certain provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code. Petitioners, who are members of the House of Representatives, charged that there is violation of the rules of the House which petitioners claim are constitutionally-mandated so that their violation is tantamount to a violation of the Constitution. The law originated in the House of Representatives. The Senate approved it with certain amendments. A bicameral conference committee was formed to reconcile the disagreeing provisions of the House and Senate versions of the bill. The bicameral committee submitted its report to the House. During the interpellations, Rep. Arroyo made an interruption and moved to adjourn for lack of quorum. But after a roll call, the Chair declared the presence of a quorum. The interpellation then proceeded. After Rep. Arroyos interpellation of the sponsor of the committee report, Majority Leader Albano moved for the approval and ratification of the conference committee report. The Chair called out for objections to the motion. Then the Chair declared: There being none, approved. At the same time the Chair was saying this, Rep. Arroyo was asking, What is thatMr. Speaker? The Chair and Rep. Arroyo were talking simultaneously. Thus, although Rep. Arroyo subsequently objected to the Majority Leaders motion, the approval of the conference committee report had by then already been declared by the Chair. On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the Senate and certified by the respective secretaries of both Houses of Congress. The enrolled bill was signed into law by President Ramos. Issue: Whether or not RA 8240 is null and void because it was passed in violation of the rules of the House Held: Rules of each House of Congress are hardly permanent in character. They are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them as they are primarily procedural. Courts ordinarily have no concern with their observance. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body. Consequently, mere failure to conform to them does not have the effect of nullifying the act taken if the requisite number of members has

agreed to a particular measure. But this is subject to qualification. Where the construction to be given to a rule affects person other than members of the legislative body, the question presented is necessarily judicial in character. Even its validity is open to question in a case where private rights are involved. In the case, no rights of private individuals are involved but only those of a member who, instead of seeking redress in the House, chose to transfer the dispute to the Court. The matter complained of concerns a matter of internal procedure of the House with which the Court should not be concerned. The claim is not that there was no quorum but only that Rep. Arroyo was effectively prevented from questioning the presence of a quorum. Rep. Arroyos earlier motion to adjourn for lack of quorum had already been defeated, as the roll call established the existence of a quorum. The question of quorum cannot be raised repeatedly especially when the quorum is obviously present for the purpose of delaying the business of the House. 13. Mabanag vs Lopez Vito Petitioners include 3 senators and 8 representatives. The three senators were suspended by senate due to election irregularities. The 8 representatives were not allowed to take their seat in the lower House except in the election of the House Speaker. They argued that some senators and House Reps were not considered in determining the required vote (of each house) in order to pass the Resolution (proposing amendments to the Constitution) which has been considered as an enrolled bill by then. At the same time, the votes were already entered into the Journals of the respective House. As a result, the Resolution was passed but it could have been otherwise were they allowed to vote. If these members of Congress had been counted, the affirmative votes in favor of the proposed amendment would have been short of the necessary three-fourths vote in either branch of Congress. Petitioners filed or the prohibition of the furtherance of the said resolution amending the constitution. Respondents argued that the SC cannot take cognizance of the case because the Court is bound by the conclusiveness of the enrolled bill or resolution. ISSUE: Whether or not the Court can take cognizance of the issue at bar. Whether or not the said resolution was duly enacted by Congress. HELD: As far as looking into the Journals is concerned, even if both the journals from each House and an authenticated copy of the Act had been presented, the disposal of the issue by the Court on the basis of the journals does not imply rejection of the enrollment theory, for, as already stated, the due enactment of a law may be proved in either of the two ways specified in section 313 of Act No. 190 as amended. The SC found in the journals no signs of irregularity in the passage of the law and did not bother itself with considering the effects of an authenticated copy if one had been introduced. It did not do what the opponents of the rule of conclusiveness advocate, namely, look into the journals behind the enrolled copy in order to determine the correctness of the latter, and rule such copy out if the two, the journals and the copy, be found in conflict with each other. No discrepancy appears to have been noted between the two documents and the court did not say or so much as give to understand that if discrepancy existed it would give greater weight to the journals, disregarding the explicit provision that duly certified copies "shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of such Acts and of the due enactment thereof."

**Enrolled Bill that which has been duly introduced, finally passed by both houses, signed by the proper officers of each, approved by the president and filed by the secretary of state. Section 313 of the old Code of Civil Procedure (Act 190), as amended by Act No. 2210, provides: "Official documents may be proved as follows: . . . (2) the proceedings of the Philippine Commission, or of any legislatives body that may be provided for in the Philippine Islands, or of Congress, by the journals of those bodies or of either house thereof, or by published statutes or resolutions, or by copies certified by the clerk of secretary, or printed by their order; Provided, That in the case of Acts of the Philippine Commission or the Philippine Legislature, when there is an existence of a copy signed by the presiding officers and secretaries of said bodies, it shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of such Acts and of the due enactment thereof." The SC is bound by the contents of a duly authenticated resolution (enrolled bill) by the legislature. In case of conflict, the contents of an enrolled bill shall prevail over those of the journals. ENROLLED BILL 14. G.R. No. L-17931 February 28, 1963 CASCO PHILIPPINE CHEMICAL CO., INC., petitioner, vs. HON. PEDRO GIMENEZ, in his capacity as Auditor General of the Philippines, and HON. ISMAEL MATHAY, in his capacity as Auditor of the Central Bank, respondents. Jalandoni & Jamir for petitioner. Officer of the Solicitor General for respondents. CONCEPCION, J.: This is a petition for review of a decision of the Auditor General denying a claim for refund of petitioner Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc. The main facts are not disputed. Pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 2609, otherwise known as the Foreign Exchange Margin Fee Law, the Central Bank of the Philippines issued on July 1, 1959, its Circular No. 95. fixing a uniform margin fee of 25% on foreign exchange transactions. To supplement the circular, the Bank later promulgated a memorandum establishing the procedure for applications for exemption from the payment of said fee, as provided in said Republic Act No. 2609. Several times in November and December 1959, petitioner Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc. which is engaged in the manufacture of synthetic resin glues, used in bonding lumber and veneer by plywood and hardwood producers bought foreign exchange for the importation of urea and formaldehyde which are the main raw materials in the production of said glues and paid therefor the aforementioned margin fee aggregating P33,765.42. In May, 1960, petitioner made another purchase of foreign exchange and paid the sum of P6,345.72 as margin fee therefor. Prior thereto, petitioner had sought the refund of the first sum of P33,765.42, relying upon Resolution No. 1529 of the Monetary Board of said Bank, dated November 3, 1959, declaring that the separate importation of urea and formaldehyde is exempt from said fee. Soon after the last importation of these products, petitioner made a similar request for refund of the sum of P6,345.72 paid as margin fee therefor. Although the Central Bank issued the corresponding margin fee vouchers for the refund of said amounts, the Auditor of the Bank refused to pass in audit and approve said vouchers, upon the ground that the exemption granted by the

Monetary Board for petitioner's separate importations of urea and formaldehyde is not in accord with the provisions of section 2, paragraph XVIII of Republic Act No. 2609. On appeal taken by petitioner, the Auditor General subsequently affirmed said action of the Auditor of the Bank. Hence, this petition for review. The only question for determination in this case is whether or not "urea" and "formaldehyde" are exempt by law from the payment of the aforesaid margin fee. The pertinent portion of Section 2 of Republic Act No. 2609 reads: The margin established by the Monetary Board pursuant to the provision of section one hereof shall not be imposed upon the sale of foreign exchange for the importation of the following:. xxx xxx xxx

XVIII. Urea formaldehyde for the manufacture of plywood and hardboard when imported by and for the exclusive use of end-users. Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to prove their case not covered by this stipulation of facts.1wph1.t Petitioner maintains that the term "urea formaldehyde" appearing in this provision should be construed as "urea and formaldehyde" (emphasis supplied) and that respondents herein, the Auditor General and the Auditor of the Central Bank, have erred in holding otherwise. In this connection, it should be noted that, whereas "urea" and "formaldehyde" are the principal raw materials in the manufacture of synthetic resin glues, the National Institute of Science and Technology has expressed, through its Commissioner, the view that: Urea formaldehyde is not a chemical solution. It is the synthetic resin formed as a condensation product from definite proportions of urea and formaldehyde under certain conditions relating to temperature, acidity, and time of reaction. This produce when applied in water solution and extended with inexpensive fillers constitutes a fairly low cost adhesive for use in the manufacture of plywood. Hence, "urea formaldehyde" is clearly a finished product, which is patently distinct and different from urea" and "formaldehyde", as separate articles used in the manufacture of the synthetic resin known as "urea formaldehyde". Petitioner contends, however, that the bill approved in Congress contained the copulative conjunction "and" between the terms "urea" and "formaldehyde", and that the members of Congress intended to exempt "urea" and "formaldehyde" separately as essential elements in the manufacture of the synthetic resin glue called "urea" formaldehyde", not the latter as a finished product, citing in support of this view the statements made on the floor of the Senate, during the consideration of the bill before said House, by members thereof. But, said individual statements do not necessarily reflect the view of the Senate. Much less do they indicate the intent of the House of Representatives (see Song Kiat Chocolate Factory vs. Central Bank, 54 Off. Gaz., 615; Mayon Motors Inc. vs. Acting Commissioner of Internal Revenue, L-15000 [March 29, 1961]; Manila Jockey Club, Inc. vs. Games & Amusement Board, L-12727 [February 29, 1960]). Furthermore, it is well settled that the enrolled bill which uses the term "urea formaldehyde" instead of "urea and formaldehyde" is conclusive upon the courts as regards the tenor of the measure passed by Congress and approved by the President (Primicias vs. Paredes, 61 Phil. 118, 120; Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito,

78 Phil. 1; Macias vs. Comm. on Elections, L-18684, September 14, 1961). If there has been any mistake in the printing ofthe bill before it was certified by the officers of Congress and approved by the Executive on which we cannot speculate, without jeopardizing the principle of separation of powers and undermining one of the cornerstones of our democratic system the remedy is by amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial decree. WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against the petitioner. It is so ordered. Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur. 15. Tolentino vs Secretary Tolentino et al is questioning the constitutionality of RA 7716 otherwise known as the EVAT Law. Tolentino averred that this revenue bill did not exclusively originate from the HoR as required by Sec 24, Art 6 of the CONST. Even though RA 7716 originated as HB 11197 and that it passed the 3 readings in the HoR, the same did not complete the 3 readings in Senate for after the 1st reading it was referred to the SW&M Committee thereafter Senate passed its own version known as SB 1630. Tolentino averred that what Senate could have done is amend HB11197 by striking out its text and substituting it w/ the text of SB 1630 in that way the bill remains a HB and the Senate version just becomes the text (only the text) of the HB. Tolentino and co-petitioner Roco even signed the said SB. ISSUE: Whether or not EVAT originated in the HoR. HELD: By a 9-6 vote, the SC rejected the challenge, holding that such consolidation was consistent with the power of the Senate to propose or concur with amendments to the version originated in the HoR. What the Constitution simply means, according to the 9 justices, is that the initiative must come from the HoR. Note also that there were several instances before where Senate passed its own version rather than having the HoR version as far as revenue and other such bills are concerned. This practice of amendment by substitution has always been accepted. The proposition of Tolentino concerns a mere matter of form. There is no showing that it would make a significant difference if Senate were to adopt his over what has been done. 16. PJA VS PRADO Philippine Judges Association et al vs DOTC Secretary Pete Prado et al Equal Protection Franking Privilege of the Judiciary A report came in showing that available data from the Postal Service Office show that from January 1988 to June 1992, the total volume of frank mails amounted to P90,424,175.00. of this amount, frank mails from the Judiciary and other agencies whose functions include the service of judicial processes, such as the intervenor, the Department of Justice and the Office of the Ombudsman, amounted to P86,481,759. Frank mails coming from the Judiciary amounted to P73,574,864.00, and those coming from the petitioners reached the total amount of P60,991,431.00. The postmasters conclusion is that because of this considerable volume of mail from the Judiciary, the franking privilege must be withdrawn from it. Acting from this, Prado implemented Circ. No. 9228 as the IRR for the said law. PJA assailed the said law complaining that the law would adversely impair the communication within the judiciary as it may impair the sending of judicial notices. PJA averred that the law is discriminatory as it

disallowed the franking privilege of the Judiciary but has not disallowed the franking privilege of others such as the executive, former executives and their widows among others. ISSUE: Whether or not there has been a violation of equal protection before the law. HELD: The SC ruled that there is a violation of the equal protection clause. The judiciary needs the franking privilege so badly as it is vital to its operation. Evident to that need is the high expense allotted to the judiciarys franking needs. The Postmaster cannot be sustained in contending that the removal of the franking privilege from the judiciary is in order to cut expenditure. This is untenable for if the Postmaster would intend to cut expenditure by removing the franking privilege of the judiciary, then they should have removed the franking privilege all at once from all the other departments. If the problem of the respondents is the loss of revenues from the franking privilege, the remedy is to withdraw it altogether from all agencies of the government, including those who do not need it. The problem is not solved by retaining it for some and withdrawing it from others, especially where there is no substantial distinction between those favored, which may or may not need it at all, and the Judiciary, which definitely needs it. The problem is not solved by violating the Constitution. The equal protection clause does not require the universal application of the laws on all persons or things without distinction. This might in fact sometimes result in unequal protection, as where, for example, a law prohibiting mature books to all persons, regardless of age, would benefit the morals of the youth but violate the liberty of adults. What the clause requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. By classification is meant the grouping of persons or things similar to each other in certain particulars and different from all others in these same particulars. In lumping the Judiciary with the other offices from which the franking privilege has been withdrawn, Sec 35 has placed the courts of justice in a category to which it does not belong. If it recognizes the need of the President of the Philippines and the members of Congress for the franking privilege, there is no reason why it should not recognize a similar and in fact greater need on the part of the Judiciary for such privilege.

17. Astorga vs. Villegas G.R. No. L-23475, April 30, 1974

Enrolled Bill Doctrine: As the President has no authority to approve a bill not passed by Congress, an enrolled Act in the custody of the Secretary of State, and having the official attestations of the Speaker of the House of Representatives, of the President of the Senate, and of the Chief Executive, carries, on its face, a solemn assurance by the legislative and executive departments of the government, charged, respectively, with the duty of enacting and executing the laws, that it was passed by Congress. Approval of Congress, not signatures of the officers, is essential When courts may turn to the journal: Absent such attestation as a result of the disclaimer, and consequently there being no enrolled bill to speak of, the entries in the journal should be consulted.

FACTS: House Bill No. 9266, a bill of local application, was filed in the House of Representatives and then sent to the Senate for reading. During discussion at the Senate, Senator Tolentino and Senator Roxas recommended amendments thereto. Despite the fact that it was the Tolentino amendment that was approved and the Roxas amendment not even appearing in the journal, when Senate sent its certification of amendment to the House, only the Roxas amendment was included, not the Tolentino amendment. Nevertheless, the House approved the same. Printed copies were then certified and attested by the Secretary of the House of Reps, the Speaker, the Secretary of the Senate and the Senate President, and sent to the President of the Philippines who thereby approved the same. The Bill thus was passed as RA 4065. However, when the error was discovered, both the Senate President and the Chief Executive withdrew their signatures. ISSUES:

Whether or not RA 4065 was passed into law Whether or not the entries in the journal should prevail over the enrolled bill

RULING: Rationale of the Enrolled Bill Theory

The rationale of the enrolled bill theory is set forth in the said case of Field vs. Clark as follows: The signing by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and, by the President of the Senate, in open session, of an enrolled bill, is an official attestation by the two houses of such bill as one that has passed Congress. It is a declaration by the two houses, through their presiding officers, to the President, that a bill, thus attested, has received, in due form, the sanction of the legislative branch of the government, and that it is delivered to him in obedience to the constitutional requirement that all bills which pass Congress shall be presented to him. And when a bill, thus attested, receives his approval, and is deposited in the public archives, its authentication as a bill that has passed Congress should be deemed complete and unimpeachable. As the President has no authority to approve a bill not passed by Congress, an enrolled Act in the custody of the Secretary of State, and having the official attestations of the Speaker of the House of Representatives, of the President of the Senate, and of the President of the United States, carries, on its face, a solemn assurance by the legislative and executive departments of the government, charged, respectively, with the duty of enacting and executing the laws, that it was passed by Congress. The respect due to coequal and independent departments requires the judicial department to act upon that assurance, and to accept, as having passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner stated; leaving the courts to determine, when the question properly arises, whether the Act, so authenticated, is in conformity with the Constitution. It may be noted that the enrolled bill theory is based mainly on "the respect due to coequal and independent departments," which requires the judicial department "to accept, as having passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner stated." Thus it has also been stated in other cases that if the attestation is absent and the same is not required for the validity of a statute, the courts may resort to the journals and other records of Congress for

proof of its due enactment. This was the logical conclusion reached in a number of decisions, although they are silent as to whether the journals may still be resorted to if the attestation of the presiding officers is present.

Approval of Congress, not signatures of the officers, is essential

As far as Congress itself is concerned, there is nothing sacrosanct in the certification made by the presiding officers. It is merely a mode of authentication. The lawmaking process in Congress ends when the bill is approved by both Houses, and the certification does not add to the validity of the bill or cure any defect already present upon its passage. In other words it is the approval by Congress and not the signatures of the presiding officers that is essential. When courts may turn to the journal

Absent such attestation as a result of the disclaimer, and consequently there being no enrolled bill to speak of, what evidence is there to determine whether or not the bill had been duly enacted? In such a case the entries in the journal should be consulted. The journal of the proceedings of each House of Congress is no ordinary record. The Constitution requires it. While it is true that the journal is not authenticated and is subject to the risks of misprinting and other errors, the point is irrelevant in this case. This Court is merely asked to inquire whether the text of House Bill No. 9266 signed by the Chief Executive was the same text passed by both Houses of Congress. Under the specific facts and circumstances of this case, this Court can do this and resort to the Senate journal for the purpose. The journal discloses that substantial and lengthy amendments were introduced on the floor and approved by the Senate but were not incorporated in the printed text sent to the President and signed by him. This Court is not asked to incorporate such amendments into the alleged law, which admittedly is a risky undertaking, but to declare that the bill was not duly enacted and therefore did not become law. This We do, as indeed both the President of the Senate and the Chief Executive did, when they withdrew their signatures therein. In the face of the manifest error committed and subsequently rectified by the President of the Senate and by the Chief Executive, for this Court to perpetuate that error by disregarding such rectification and holding that the erroneous bill has become law would be to sacrifice truth to fiction and bring about mischievous consequences not intended by the law-making body.

Bondoc vs. Pineda, 201 SCRA 792, G.R. No. 97710, 26 Sept 1991Facts: In the elections held on May 11, 1987, Marciano Pineda of the LDP and EmigdioBondocof the NP were candidates for the position of Representative for the Fourth District of Pampanga. Pineda was proclaimed winner.Bondoc filed a protest in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET), which is composed of 9 members,3 of whom are Justices of the SC and the remaining 6 are members of the House of Representatives (5 members belong to the LDP and 1 member is from the NP). Thereafter, a decision had been reached in which Bondoc won over Pineda. Congressman Camasura of the LDP voted with the SC Justices and Congressman Cerilles of the NP toproclaim Bondoc the winner of the contest.On the eve of the promulgation of the Bondoc decision, Congressman Camasura received a letter informing him thathe was already expelled from the LDP for allegedly helping to organize the Partido Pilipino

of Eduardo Cojuangco and for allegedly inviting LDP members in Davao Del Sur to join said political party. On the day of the promulgation of the decision, the Chairman of HRET received a letter informing the Tribunal that on the basis of the letter from the LDP, the House of Representatives decided to withdraw the nomination and rescind the election of Congressman Camasura to the HRET. Issue: Whether or not the House of Representatives, at the request of the dominant political party therein, may change that partys representation in the HRET to thwart the promulgation of a decision freely reached by the tribunalin an election contest pending therein Held: The purpose of the constitutional convention creating the Electoral Commission was to provide an independent and impartial tribunal for the determination of contests to legislative office, devoid of partisan consideration. As judges, the members of the tribunal must be non-partisan. They must discharge their functions with completed attachment, impartiality and independence even independence from the political party to which they belong. Hence, disloyalty to party and breach of party discipline are not valid grounds for the expulsion of a member of the tribunal. In expelling Congressman Camasura from the HRET for having cast a conscience vote in favor of Bondoc, based strictly on the result of the examination and appreciation of the ballots and the recount of the votes by the tribunal, the House of Representatives committed a grave abuse of discretion, an injustice and a violation of the Constitution. Itsresolution of expulsion against Congressman Camasura is, therefore, null and void. Another reason for the nullity of the expulsion resolution of the House of Representatives is that it violates Congressman Camasuras right to security of tenure. Members of the HRET, as sole judge of congressional election contests, are entitled to security of tenure just as members of the Judiciary enjoy security of tenure under the Constitution. Therefore, membership in the HRET may not be terminated except for a just cause, such as, the expiration of the members congressional term of office, his death, permanent disability, resignation from the political party he represents in the tribunal, formal affiliation with another political party or removal for other valid cause. A member may not be expelled by the House of Representatives for party disloyalty, short of proof that he has formally affiliated with another

G.R. No. 97710, Sept. 26, 1991 HRET has sole and exclusive jurisdiction to judge election contests and qualifications concerning members of Congress For HRET to exercise its exclusive jurisdiction, it must be independent and impartial, a separate body from the legislative HRET members are entitled to security of tenure regardless of any change in their political affiliations HRET members cannot be removed for disloyalty to a party FACTS: Pineda and Bondoc were rival candidates as Representatives of the 4th district. Pineda won in the elections,prompting Bondoc to file a protest with the HRET, which decided in favor of the latter. However, before promulgationof the decision, Congressman Camasuras membership with the HRET was withdrawn on the ground that he was expelled from the LDP. As such, the

decision could not be promulgated since without Congressman Camasuras vote, the decision lacks the concurrence of 5 members as required by the Rules of the Tribunal. ISSUES: Whether or not the House of Representatives can issue a resolution compelling HRET not to promulgate its decision Whether or not the composition of the HRET may be affected by a change in the political alliance of its members RULING: HRET is a non-political body The use of the word "sole" in both Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution and Section 11 of the 1935 Constitution underscores the exclusive jurisdiction of the House Electoral Tribunal as judge of contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives (Robles vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 86647, February 5, 1990). The tribunal was created to function as a nonpartisan court although two-thirds of its members are politicians. It is a non-political body in a sea of politicians. What this Court hadearlier said about the Electoral Commission applies as well to the electoral tribunals of the Senate and House of Representatives: Electoral tribunals are independent and impartialThe purpose of the constitutional convention creating the Electoral Commission was to provide an independent andimpartial tribunal for the determination of contests to legislative office, devoid of partisan consideration, and to transfer to that tribunal all the powers previously exercised by the legislature in matters pertaining to contested elections of itsmembers.The power granted to the electoral Commission to judge contests relating to the election and qualification of membersof the National Assembly is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained in the legislature.Electoral tribunals as sole judge of all contests relating to election returns and qualifications of members of thelegislative housesThe Electoral Tribunals of the Senate and the House were created by the Constitution as special tribunals to be thesole judge of all contests relating to election returns and qualifications of members of the legislative houses, and, assuch, are independent bodies which must be permitted to select their own employees, and to supervise and controlthem, without any legislative interference. (Suanes vs. Chief Accountant of the Senate, 81 Phil. 818.)To be able to exercise exclusive jurisdiction, the House Electoral Tribunal must be independent. Its jurisdiction to hear and decide congressional election contests is not to be shared by it with the Legislature nor with the Courts.The Electoral Commission is a body separate from and independent of the legislature and though not a power in thetripartite scheme of government, it is to all intents and purposes, when acting within the limits of its authority, anindependent organ; while composed of a majority of members of the legislature it is a body separate from andindependent of the legislature.xxxxxxxxxThe Electoral Commission, a constitutional organ created for the specific purpose of determining contests relating toelection returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly may not be interfered with by the judiciarywhen and while acting within the limits of its authority, but the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the Electoral

Commission for the purpose of determining the character, scope and extent of the constitutional grant to thecommission as sole judge of all contests relating to the election and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly. (Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139.)Can the House of Representatives compel the HRET not to promulgate its decision?The independence of the House Electoral Tribunal so zealously guarded by the framers of our Constitution, would,however, by a myth and its proceedings a farce if the House of Representatives, or the majority party therein, mayshuffle and manipulate the political (as distinguished from the judicial) component of the electoral tribunal, to serve theinterests of the party in power.Removal of HRET member for disloyalty to a party impairs HRET constitutional prerogativeThe resolution of the House of Representatives removing Congressman Camasura from the House Electoral Tribunalfor disloyalty to the LDP, because he cast his vote in favor of the Nacionalista Party's candidate, Bondoc, is a clear impairment of the constitutional prerogative of the House Electoral Tribunal to be the sole judge of the election contestbetween Pineda and Bondoc.To sanction such interference by the House of Representatives in the work of the House Electoral Tribunal wouldreduce the tribunal to a mere tool for the aggrandizement of the party in power (LDP) which the three justices of theSupreme Court and the lone NP member would be powerless to stop. A minority party candidate may as wellabandon all hope at the threshold of the tribunal.Is disloyalty to a party a valid cause for termination of membership in the HRET? As judges, the members of the tribunal must be non-partisan. They must discharge their functions with completedetachment, impartiality, and independence even independence from the political party to which they belong. Hence,"disloyalty to party" and "breach of party discipline," are not valid grounds for the expulsion of a member of thetribunal. In expelling Congressman Camasura from the HRET for having cast a conscience vote" in favor of Bondoc,based strictly on the result of the examination and appreciation of the ballots and the recount of the votes by thetribunal, the House of Representatives committed a grave abuse of discretion, an injustice, and a violation of theConstitution. Its resolution of expulsion against Congressman Camasura is, therefore, null and void.HRET members enjoy security of tenure Another reason for the nullity of the expulsion resolution of the House of Representatives is that it violatesCongressman Camasura's right to security of tenure. Members of the HRET as "sole judge" of congressional electioncontests, are entitled to security of tenure just as members of the judiciary enjoy security of tenure under our Constitution (Sec. 2, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution). Therefore, membership in the House Electoral Tribunal may not beterminated except for a just cause, such as, the expiration of the member's congressional term of office, his death,permanent disability, resignation from the political party he represents in the tribunal, formal affiliation with another political party, or removal for other valid cause. A member may not be expelled by the House of Representatives for "party disloyalty" short of proof that he has formally affiliated with another political group. As the records of this casefail to show that Congressman Camasura has become a registered member of another political party, his expulsionfrom the LDP and from the HRET was not for a valid cause, hence, it violated his right to security of tenure. http://www.scribd.com/doc/59498556/Bondoc-vs-Pineda-201-SCRA-792-Digest

EFFECT OF POLITICAL REALIGNMENT Daza vs. Singson, G.R. No. 86344, Dec. 21, 1989 FACTS: Petitioner Daza, a Liberal Party member, was given a seat in the Commission on Appointments. However, after the reorganization of the LDP, which resulted in a political realignment in the House. 24 members of the Liberal Party formally resigned and joined the LDP, thereby welling its number to 159 and correspondingly reducing their former party to only 17 members. On the basis of this development, the House revised its representation in the Commission by withdrawing the seat occupied by petitioner and giving this to the newly-formed LDP, who was represented by Respondent Singson. ISSUES:

Whether or not the reorganization of the House representation in the Commission is based on a permanent political realignment as to warrant petitioners removal therein

RULING: In the case of Cunanan v. Tan, the Court noted that the Allied Majority was a merely temporary combination as the Nacionalista defectors had not disaffiliated from their party and permanently joined the new political group. Officially, they were still members of the Nacionalista Party. The reorganization of the Commission on Appointments was invalid because it was not based on the proportional representation of the political parties in the House of Representatives as required by the Constitution. The Court held: ... In other words, a shifting of votes at a given time, even if du to arrangements of a more or less temporary nature, like the one that has led to the formation of the so-called "Allied Majority," does not suffice to authorize a reorganization of the membership of the Commission for said House. Otherwise the Commission on Appointments may have to be reorganized as often as votes shift from one side to another in the House. The framers of our Constitution could not have intended to thus place a constitutional organ, like the Commission on Appointments, at the mercy of each House of Congress. The petitioner's contention that, even if registered, the party must still pass the test of time to prove its permanence is not acceptable. Under this theory, a registered party obtaining the majority of the seats in the House of Representatives (or the Senate) would still not be entitled to representation in the Commission on Appointments as long as it was organized only recently and has not yet "aged." The Liberal Party itself would fall in such a category. That party was created in December 1945 by a faction of the Nacionalista Party that seceded therefrom to support Manuel A. Roxas's bid for the Presidency of the Philippines in the election held on April 23, 1946. The Liberal Party won. At that time it was only four months old. Yet no question was raised as to its right to be represented in the Commission on Appointments and in the Electoral Tribunals by virtue of its status as the majority party in both chambers of the Congress. The LDP has been in existence for more than one year now. It now has 157 members in the House of

Representatives and 6 members in the Senate. Its titular head is no less than the President of the Philippines and its President is Senator Neptali A. Gonzales, who took over recently from Speaker Ramon V. Mitra. It is true that there have been, and there still are, some internal disagreements among its members, but these are to be expected in any political organization, especially if it is democratic in structure. In fact even the monolithic Communist Party in a number of socialist states has undergone similar dissension, and even upheavals. But it surely cannot be considered still temporary because of such discord. If the petitioner's argument were to be pursued, the 157 members of the LDP in the House of Representatives would have to be denied representation in the Commission on Appointments and, for that matter, also the Electoral Tribunal. By the same token, the KBL, which the petitioner says is now "history only," should also be written off. The independents also cannot be represented because they belong to no political party. That would virtually leave the Liberal Party only with all of its seventeen members to claim all the twelve seats of the House of Representatives in the Commission on Appointments and the six legislative seats in the House Electoral Tribunal. It is noteworthy that when with 41 members the Liberal Party was allotted two of the seats in the Commission on Appointments, it did not express any objection. Inconsistently, the petitioner is now opposed to the withdrawal from it of one seat although its original number has been cut by more than half. As for the other condition suggested by the petitioner, to wit, that the party must survive in a general congressional election, the LDP has doubtless also passed that test, if only vicariously. It may even be said that as it now commands the biggest following in the House of Representatives, the party has not only survived but in fact prevailed. At any rate, that test was never laid down in Cunanan. Order No. 2, canceling such midnight or last-minute appointments