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cat=4 On Compassion in the Vimalakirti Sutra

By Song Ren At first glance, there seems to be a problem illustrated by the conversation of the layman Vimalakirti and the bodhisattva Manjushri, when they discuss how the bodhisattva ought to regard living beings. When Manjushri poses the question, Vimalakirti's first answer is "'As a conjurer looks on the beings he conjures up - thus does the bodhisattva regard living beings.'" (Watson p. 83) He continues, listing several elegant analogies - the moon's reflection, something seen in a mirror, heat shimmers, and so on - all suggesting the impermanence and brevity of existence. Nothing seems immediately amiss with this answer, if one recalls the principles of anatta and anicca, that all phenomena are devoid of unchanging selfhood, and none are lasting. The problem, however, arises when Manjushri asks a follow-up question: "'If the bodhisattva looks on beings in this way, how can he treat them with compassion?'" (Watson p. 84) Though Manjushri seems satisfied with Vimalakirti's answer and the dialogue continues, one's mind is left caught on the apparent snag of Manjushri's question: if the bodhisattva regards living beings as selfless phantoms, how can he be compassionate toward them? Following Vimalakirti and Manjushri and the host of bodhisattvas and heavenly beings along the trail of the discussion, perhaps the question at the beginning will become clear. Let us, then, first treat Vimalakirti's immediate answer. The first part of his response is a little enigmatic given the question. "Vimalakirti replied, 'When the bodhisattva has finished regarding beings in this way, he thinks to himself. "For the sake of living beings I must preach this Law to them!" This is true compassion'" (Watson p. 84) Rather than directly explain why the bodhisattva is compassionate towards living beings, Vimalakirti launches into a lengthy description of the compassion of the bodhisattva. Indeed, even some of the numerous qualities of this compassion which he enumerates are perplexing. Vimalakirti tells us the bodhisattva understands that his compassion is causeless, and even exacerbates the quandary by asserting that the bodhisattva treats beings with "a compassion that never despairs," despite his "seeing that all is empty and without ego" (Watson p. 84). Yet, ending this brief discourse, Vimalakirti insists that the compassion of the bodhisattva "is unerring, innocent of falsity and sham" (Watson p. 85). Vimalakirti's answer at once seems not satisfactory, yet insists that it is correct. Manjushri, in any case, is at least satisfied enough to continue his questioning, and indeed, begins a rapid cross-examination of the layman. Initially asking Vimalakirti what he means when he speaks of the pity, joy, and indifference of the bodhisattva, Manjushri goes on to ask about how the bodhisattva should save living beings. As Manjushri inquires into the method of correct mindfulness, by which beings are to be thus freed from earthly desires, Vimalakirti states that its premise is "'no birth and no extinction.'" (Watson p. 86) He goes on to explain that "'The not good has no birth, the good has no extinction.'" Manjushri presses on in his questioning, asking the root of good and not good, and the root of

its root, the body, and so on. Vimalakirti adeptly demonstrates his knowledge of all the roots: the body is rooted in desire and greed, which arise from false and empty distinctions, which are made on account of topsy-turvy thinking, which is rooted in groundless assumptions. (Watson p. 86) Manjushri's final question gets to the end of this chain, however. Asked about the root of these assumptions, Vimalakirti replies, "'What is groundless can have no root. Manjushri, it is on the root of this groundlessness that all the other concepts are built up.'" (Watson p. 86) While this realization wonderfully neutralizes all the previous links in the chain with a splendid 'ah-ha,' in so doing it even further compounds our problem with the original question. This series of questions and its final negation amount to another big affirmation of the emptiness of living beings, and we are still left to wonder how the bodhisattva can be compassionate toward these bubbles on the water. However, we now receive some heavenly assistance: At that time there was a heavenly being, a goddess, in Vimalakirti's room who, seeing these great men and hearing them expound the Law, proceeded to make herself visible and, taking heavenly flowers, scattered them over the bodhisattvas and major disciples. When the flowers touched the bodhisattvas, they all fell to the floor at once, but when they touched the major disciples, they stuck to them and did not fall off. The disciples all tried to shake off the flowers through their supernatural powers, but they could not do so. (Watson p. 86-87) As usual, Shariputra serves as spokesperson for the not-quite enlightened disciples, and as rather hapless participant in the goddess' illustrations. He complains that the flowers which now inadvertently decorate him "'are not in accordance with the Law,'" as such ornamentation is forbidden to members of the order. The goddess has a quick comeback, saying "'the flowers make no such distinctions.'" She reprimands Shariputra "'You in your thinking have made up these distinctions, that's all.'" (Watson p. 87) "'Look at the bodhisattvas'", she continues, "'the flowers do not stick to them because they have already cut off all thought of distinctions.'" We already know the bodhisattva's compassion to be "boundless as the empty sky", and that it "has no gradation" (Watson p. 84), so inasmuch as it pertains to our question, the goddess' assertion of no distinctions is a reminder. Mollified, Shariputra relaxes, and asks the goddess how long she has been visiting Vimalakirti's room. She replies that her stay "'is about as long as [Shariputra's] attainment of emancipation.'" (Watson p. 87) Discussing how long this is, Shariputra becomes silent, and explains "'Emancipation cannot be spoken of in words. Therefore I do not know what I can say to you.'" (Watson p. 88) The goddess, however, turns this assertion on its head, insisting that words, like emancipation itself, "'are not internal, not external, and not in between. Therefore, Shariputra, you can speak of emancipation without putting words aside. Why? Because all things that exist are marks of emancipation.'" If this is so, and we are to make no distinctions, then as regards living beings, all are themselves marks of emancipation. Yet, this could simply mean that since all beings, and indeed all phenomena, without distinction between them, are impermanent, they are all marks of emancipation because their phantasmal nature points toward the realization of impermanence which is the beginning of emancipation. The place of the bodhisattva's compassion among such beings, empty, rotting signposts for each other, is still unclear. The goddess has another point to demonstrate. Assuming a male form to be preferable, Shariputra asks her, "'Why don't you change out of this female body?'" (Watson p. 90) "'What is there to change?'" she replies. She brings home her point that things have no fixed form by swapping her body for Shariputra's. In a comic moment, she prepares for her coming non-dual argument by taking this opportunity to assert the Buddha's teaching "'that all phenomena are neither male nor female.'" (Watson p. 91) Withdrawing her supernatural powers, they each take on their original forms, and the goddess asks, "'Where now is the form and shape of your female body?' Shariputra said, 'The form and shape of my female body does not exist, yet

does not not exist.'" Revealing what one might call a tenuously extant cosmos, the goddess tells Shariputra "'All things are just like that - they do not exist, yet do not not exist. And that [this is so] is exactly what the Buddha teaches.'" Looking on living beings in light of this realization, the bodhisattva's compassion begins to make more sense, at least inasmuch as beings do not not exist. At the same time, though, they also do not exist, and it would be confused to conclude that beings warrant compassion because they have some existence. The goddess, however, explains one last thing before bowing out of the dialogue. Shariputra asks "'How long will it be before you attainanuttarasamyak-sambodhi?' The goddess replied, 'Shariputra, when you revert to the state of a common unenlightened mortal, then I will succeed in gaining anuttara-samyak-sambodhi.'" (Watson p. 92) Shariputra, dismayed, insists "'It is unthinkable that I should become a common mortal again!'" To which the goddess replies that "'It is likewise unthinkable that I should attain anuttara-samyak-sambodhi. Why? Because bodhi is nothing to be thought about, hence nothing to be attained.'" She elaborates, noting how Shariputra has attained the way of the arhat because he realized there is nothing to be attained. "The goddess said, 'the Buddhas and bodhisattvas are that way too. They've realized there is nothing to attain, and so they've attained it.'" (Watson p. 92) The light of this dawn is reflected by part of Vimalakirti's first answer to Manjushri's question: living beings, he says, should be regarded as a reentering of the womb by one no longer subject to rebirth, as the three poisons of greed, anger, and ignorance in an arhat, as greed, anger, or violation of the precepts on the part of a bodhisattva who has accepted the birthless nature of all existence, as vestiges of earthly desire in a Buddha.... (Watson p. 83) There are no distinctions to be made, and all things are marks of emancipation, because in this nonexistent existence filled with phenomena that do not not exist, living beings have nothing to attain to attain Buddha-hood. Any unenlightened being is a greedy bodhisattva or a lustful Tathagata. Now the bodhisattva's compassion can perhaps be seen to make sense, in that he should naturally be utterly compassionate towards non-dual beings who have forgotten, as it were, that there are no distinctions or dualities, and that they themselves are quite beyond such things. This non-dualistic compassion is the "true compassion" Vimalakirti speaks of in his first answer to Manjushri's question. The problem in understanding it arises from thinking dualistically about it, that is thinking that living beings have no existence and thus cannot logically be the object of compassion. Thinking in such a way, it could not seem anything but "causeless."

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The translation referred to herein is that of Burton Watson.