Gulf War I. Lessons from Vietnam A. Weinburger-Powell doctrine. 1.

The United States should not commit forces to combat overseas unless the particular engagement or occasion is deemed vital to our national interest The commitment should only be made with the clear intention of winning It should be carried out with clearly defined political and military objectives Success and failure must be continually reassessed and adjusted if necessary It should have the support of the American People and their elected representatives in congress It should be a last resort.

2. 3. 4. 5. 6. B. C. D.

Getting Clausewitz right? Missing the indicator problem - that a big thing missing s from Clausewitz also Effects of W-P doctrine? 1. Makes deterrence almost impossible a) b) c) very difficult to generate a credible deterrent threat in the absence of actually deploying all the troops United States won act proactively, rather t reactively. Once all the troops are there, inevitability mindset falls into place though which leads to unintended consequence

2. 3.

More wars than we might end up in otherwise Frequent easy wins a) b) Grenada Panama

c) 4. II. A.

Iraq

Continual reassessment laid out, but not on what grounds.

How does it play out in Gulf War? Threat to national interest 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. B. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. C. Peace in the Middle East Nuclear Weapons / Chemical Weapons Instability in Mideast Economic threat from oil supply interruption Countering aggression Problem in Vietnam gradual escalation No a problem in Iraq, start with 200,000 deterrent force to protect SA 700,000 for the attack. No convoluted rules of engagement, safety zones, etc. Find it, cut it off, kill it.

Commitment to winning?

Clearly defined goals? Goals in Iraq vital to national interest? 1. Initial a) b) 2. a) b) c) Liberation of Kuwait Maintaining the Flow of Oil Remove Hussein Liberty (i.e. Family, Liberty, Freedom, etc.) Make Iraq incapable of threatening others (Destroy republican guard)

Subsequent after we see thing going well.

D.

Relationship between forces and their size will have to be continually reassessed

1.

Does this with size of force after Hussein does not back down in face of initial United States troop deployments to SA Bush also become vulnerable to charge that he is assembling offensive force. Eroding public support even by November, down to 50%...no deaths yet! Popular support for war was quite high when it was going on. Before war begins, support lukewarm. After war support minimal. Congress passes senate 52-47-1 Punitive containment a) as long as he stays in Kuwait, the Kuwaiti leave (1/3 on vacation, 1/3 left, last third would have been forced out Creates a Diaspora, big time problem for future still in effect today succeeded in destroying Iraq economy, but have s not been successful at removing Hussein might have been all that was necessary to deter future aggression. war became to be seen as inevitable so better to get it over with now, rather than waiting until next winter (couldn fight in coming heat wave). t

2. E.

Support of American people and Congress? 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

F.

Alternate strategies Last resort? 1.

b) 2. a) b) c) 3.

Continued economic sanctions

Situation created not unlike that at outset of WWI a)

III.

Success or failure: Indicators needed for each A. Hussein: Failure

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. B.

Originally not a goal Probably not a good idea regardless probably why Bush lose the election. convinced Americans that Hussein was huge part of the problem. in March, 56% felt war was a success, by late 1992, only 25% Moderate success, maybe. Israeli and Arabs come to table s little success until change in Israeli govt., which has since been changed again. Nukes not as big a threat as we originally thought. Chemical weapons defense. One Iraq still has biological weapons capacity Hard to argue that this is what the war was really fought over probably what the war will be remembered for Easy to judge True fact Interesting, no on cared about this Indicator? Hussein has been rearming Waging war internally Was war needed to do this? Lesson taught to others via sanctions?
4

Peace in Mid-East: Indicator? Talking? 1. 2. 3.

C.

Nuclear weapons, chemical weapons: Success, maybe. 1. 2. 3.

D.

Liberty: Indictor??? 1. 2.

E.

Liberation of Kuwait: Success 1. 2. 3.

F.

Counter aggression: success, in part 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

G.

Oil: Not an issue but was 1. 2. 3. 4. Indicator? a) Price of oil? Iraq and Kuwait combined control 20% of known world reserves but only 8% of production demonstrated vulnerability of Iraq, not vulnerability of west

H. I.

Contain Iraq for future: moderate success Destroy Iraq ability to threaten neighbors s 1. 2. Indicator MUST be KIA of republican guard unwilling to use this as a gauge of success, so problematic from outset

IV.

Unintended consequences A. Exacerbated recession 1. 2. higher oil prices failure to sell of strategic reserve (high prices helped maintain desire to go to war.

V.

Popular myths A. United States military huge success due to own initiative 1. B. Iraqi army much smaller than thought at time (250k vs. 540k) Iraqi will had been broken by war with Iran No one in Iraq wanted long war with anyone Biggest problem for Iraqi commanders was dissertion of troops and selves Do poll of how many killed

United States military broke the will of the Iraqi s 1. 2. 3.

C.

Murder and Mayhem prevailed 1.

2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.

United States killing much, much lower than might have been Latest best estimates put Iraqi military deaths at 3-4k Civilians deaths at 3k at most Highway of death was 600 yards long, news men didn t look at carefully. Kurds? Killed by Hussein? Far higher, leads to deaths... Deaths: a) b) c) Kuwaitis in initial invasion: 500-700 Americans killed during operations due to accidents: 108 American battle deaths: 148 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) d) e) f) g) h) i) Friendly fire: 35 unexploded allied ammo: 11 unexploded Iraqi ammo: 18 scud strike on Barracks: 28 Iraqi defenders: 56

Non-American battle deaths: 63 Iraqi battle deaths: few thousand Iraqi civilians: ~3000 Iraqi killed by Kuwaitis after war: several s hundred Iraqi killed during post-war rebellions: 10 of s s thousand Iraqi killed by sanitation and health facility s breakdown: 10 s-100 k s s

VI.

Conclusions A. B. Must match strategy to goals Indicators of success and failure critical as well.