Transnational Journalism, Public Diplomacy, and Virtual States

Philip Seib Director, USC Center on Public Diplomacy University of Southern California
Journalism in the 21st Century: Between Globalization and National Identity University of Melbourne July 16-17, 2009

Abstract As a public diplomacy tool, transnational broadcasting has long had appeal to governments. It is a relatively efficient and inexpensive way to reach potentially vast audiences throughout the world with messages that presumably possess added credibility when wrapped in the trappings of journalism. Non-state actors, including media organizations themselves, may conduct their own versions of public diplomacy. New communication technologies have led to an expanded number of players in this field and to an even larger audience, which has gradually become more sophisticated and less credulous. Broadcasters are no longer just broadcasters. The most creative among them use Internet-based media to enhance their reach and influence. Today, Arabic- and English-speaking publics are the principal targeted recipients of these ventures, and this paper will examine the spectrum of these efforts, with particular emphasis on the Al Jazeera channels as exemplars of the marriage between journalism and

public diplomacy. These channels also may be paradigms of a public diplomacy that transcends specific national interests and instead serve supranational and cultural purposes.

Evolution of the craft Transnational broadcastings political effects first became noteworthy during the late 1930s, when Great Britain and Germany used radio in efforts to influence public opinion, particularly in the United States.1 By September 1940, the BBC was offering more than 70 news broadcasts each day -- more than 200,000 words -- to audiences outside the United Kingdom. Among the themes was that America had a stake in the wars outcome and that the British were a first line of defense for the other side of the Atlantic. BBC commentator J. B. Priestley criticized the U.S. isolationists, saying, All this patter about non-belligerence is like sitting down and doing crossword puzzles in front of a pack of ravening wolves.2 CBS London correspondent Edward R. Murrow knew that radio enhanced the impact of propaganda: If you believe that this war will be decided on the home front, then you must believe that radio used as an instrument of war is one of the most powerful weapons a nation possesses. If you believe, as I do, that this war is being fought for the control of mens minds, it is clear that radio will be a deciding factor.3 Murrow was shrewd enough to know, as a corollary to this, that news reports such as his, which praised Britains resilience while under German attack, were serving British diplomatic interests. In May 1940, the BBC began broadcasting Britain Speaks, which was designed for U.S. listeners, and in September a new and enlarged North American transmission lasting six

hours was inaugurated. The news, described as a really reliable word picture of the very latest world events, was read with an American accent.4 Americans were also hearing from Germany. A German radio service for North America had been started in 1933, and as Adolf Hitler embarked on his course toward war the broadcasts praised isolationism, criticized Britain, and portrayed the new Germany in the best light, claiming, for example, that Hitler was simply trying to straighten out some of the political and economic confusion with which Central and Eastern Europe were plagued.5 Once the war began in 1939, this radio service sent America more than 11 hours of programming each day, including nine news programs and five commentaries. Among the broadcasters was Iowa native Fred Kaltenbach, who each week delivered an open letter that began, Dear Harry and the folks back home in Iowa. . . . In one of these letters, he warned his listeners about British propaganda: The American people are to be led to believe that England and France are the last hopes of democracy, and that Germany is seeking to beat them only because they are democratic. Stuff and nonsense! On another occasion, Kaltenbach said, Let it be said, once and for all, a German victory in this war is no threat to democracy -- and certainly not to American democracy.6 The broadcasts attempted to justify German policy to Americans by comparing the seizure of the Polish Corridor with the U.S. annexation of Texas, and likened Hitlers concept of Lebensraum -- ensuring living space by controlling Central Europe -- to the Monroe Doctrine.7 On any given day in early 1941, the American audience for the German broadcasts was estimated at about 150,000, but there is no evidence that the German radio efforts accomplished anything beyond feeding the gospel according to Goebbels to the small number

of Nazi sympathizers in America.8 If the Nazis programs created any drag on the pro-British drift in American opinion, it didnt amount to much. Meanwhile, the British enhanced their own efforts with what might be called public diplomacy by proxy. From Prime Minister Winston Churchill on down through the ranks of government, courting of American journalists was relentless. The British had made a wise decision: despite the upgraded BBC efforts, American public opinion would most likely be shaped by Americans, and so influencing the content of U.S. news coverage emanating from Britain was crucial. Reports from Murrow and many other American journalists dovetailed nicely with President Franklin D. Roosevelts effort to chip away at isolationism. U.S. public opinion began to shift, and the British public diplomacy effort aimed at bringing America into the war finally proved successful. This bit of history is useful in considering todays media-based public diplomacy because it underscores the value of creative flexibility in designing public diplomacy undertakings. The alternative to this following a conventional formula might result in having an acceptable product, but it certainly does not ensure reaching a substantial audience.

The crowded field For major world players, international broadcasting can be an essential element of public diplomacy. But whether the results are worth the effort varies significantly from case to case.9

French journalist Ulysse Gosset, who helped develop Frances entry into this field, France 24, said: Today news channels are part of the global battle in the world. Its as important as traditional diplomacy and economic strength. He added, If we have a real desire to communicate around the world, we need to do it with the right medium, and thats English.10 Just about everywhere in the world, there are people -- particularly among the political and economic elite -- who speak English and are part of the far-flung audience for the American and British broadcasting giants. For governments that want to participate in the global conversation about important issues, English-language media are essential. France 24, born in 2006, is an example of this. France 24, referred to by some as CNN a la Franaise, was constructed as a joint venture between TF1, Frances largest independent network, and state-run France Tlvisions. News is presented in French, English, and Arabic. Its creation was spurred by the Iraq war. Alain de Pouzilhac, the French channels CEO, argued that CNNs coverage of the war was not objective, but reflected an American view that the invading forces were trying to bring freedom to Iraq. He said: This channel will not be anti-American. But this channel has to discover international news with French eyes, like CNN discovers international news with American eyes. The eyes that see the news before it is reported make a difference, he contended: Objectivity doesnt exist in the world. Honesty exists. Impartiality exists. But objectivity doesnt exist. France 24 devotes more airtime to French positions than other channels do. Mark Owen, an anchor who moved from Britains ITV to the French channel, said that during the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah war, the BBC paid little attention to French president

Jacques Chiracs calls for a halt to Israeli attacks within Lebanon, while instead highlighting British prime minister Tony Blairs support of the U.S. position of letting Israel proceed.11 Ensuring that the French/Chirac position received adequate international exposure in this case was the kind of task that is part of larger public diplomacy strategy. France 24 was designed to help spread what it defines as French political values: paying more attention to the less well-covered parts of the world, encouraging debate, and emphasizing cultural as well as economic development. De Pouzilhac said: Its the opposite of what the U.S. does. The vision from Washington tries to show that the world is unified, whereas we will try to demonstrate the opposite: that the world has a lot of diversity. Diversity of culture, diversity of religion, and diversity of opinion.12 Chiracs spokesman Jerome Bonnafont said that Chiracs interest in creating France 24 developed during the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. The president believed that France and other nations had to step forward to correct misunderstandings among cultures and had to do so with their individual voices, rather than succumbing to the trend toward uniformity created by globalization. Chirac was determined that French views would be heard. Bonnafont said: If you dont try to be present in the world in a dynamic way, then the world will ignore you. You have to show that you are somebody.13 In times past, showing that you are somebody often meant flexing your military muscle, so relying on television rather than armies can be considered progress. The significance of that change is clear when considering Russias effort to use the airwaves rather than its traditional means to assert itself. English-language channel Russia Today was created in 2005 to reshape Russias image. Critics immediately branded the channel a tool of the government.

Political commentator Boris Kagarlitsky said: Russia Today is very much a continuation of the old Soviet propaganda services. They want good news and they want a positive vision of Russia. But Svetlana Mironyuk, general director of the news agency Novosti, said this was not the case: It is almost impossible to impose your own point of view among other opinions because the information space is too huge. There are literally scores of alternatives. But the idea is to provide an international audience with an understanding of what is going on in Russia from Russias point of view.14 The truth lies somewhere between the critics and the defenders. There was more behind the creation of Russia Today than counteracting obsolete images of the frigid and bellicose Soviet Union. President Vladimir Putin was reportedly angry about the consistently negative tone of international coverage of Russian policies, such as allegations about human rights abuses by Russian forces during the fighting in Chechnya, a conflict that Putin considered to be part of the global war on terror.15 Mironyuk was correct, however, when she pointed out that heavy-handed propaganda will be quickly and frequently challenged today. Because the information marketplace is crowded with everything from large news organizations to individual bloggers, Soviet-style information management cannot work, at least not for long. Like Jacques Chirac, Putin recognizes the new levels of competition for world opinion. Like France 24, Russia Today provides news with a spin that favors the interests of its proprietors. Many news consumers presumably recognize how the game is played and judge the information they receive accordingly. Such alertness is important because the Englishlanguage news arena is becoming even more crowded. CNN was created in 1980, BBC World

arrived in 1991, Deutsche Welle began its television broadcasts in English in 1992, Chinas CCTV International was launched in 2000, and the list goes on, with further additions in the works. The fate of emerging channels depends largely on the economic model they adopt. The CNN startup approach of a privately funded corporation has not been copied by todays major satellite channels. Most rely heavily on government subsidies, which are sometimes accompanied by a full government partnership in the channels operation. For all the prestige and influence that these channels may have, the market is too crowded for profits to be likely. The best-known channel, Al Jazeera, has always required large amounts of money from Qatars emir. BBC World, the BBCs commercially funded international venue, claims a weekly audience of 65 million viewers and reported in 2006 that its advertising revenues had grown 20 percent every year since 2001. Nevertheless, channel executives conceded that it would not break even until 2010.16 Despite the financial challenges, English-language broadcasting will continue to grow. Deutsche Welle is a good example of a channel that has established a foothold in the market. Its television broadcasts are primarily in English and German, with Spanish and Arabic programs, as well, and -- as of 2002 -- some Dari and Pashto programming that is provided for broadcast by RTA, Afghanistans television service. The channels managing director, Cristoph Lanz, said: There are more viewers watching it in the English language than German. And that doesnt have to do with a small amount of Germans watching. It just has to do with the fact that the world is six billion people and there are just 80 million Germans and there are maybe 150 million German speakers. If you have a mission statement to reach out to the world, then you have to reach across the language gap.17

Deutsche Welle is funded by the German government and its statutory mandate is to make Germany understood as a European-grown cultural nation and democratic constitutional state founded on the rule of law. The companys mission statement adds that its broadcasts are designed partly to enhance Germanys external media image and their most important target groups are international opinion leaders with an interest in Germany and Europe. The television channels daily audience is estimated at 28 million people.18 Since its first Germanlanguage radio broadcasts in 1953, Deutsche Welle has developed as a model for broadcasting enterprises that are created primarily to serve governments international political purposes. The other principal model is CNNs global arm, CNN International. It is private and forprofit, and although free from formal connections to government still plays a significant de facto political role in the world. Born in 1985 as CNN Europe, CNN International competed primarily with BBC World News during the 1990s and over the years has seen its reach extend into more than 200 countries. An aging star, the entire CNN enterprise has lost some of its luster; in the United States, it trails the acerbic and conservative Fox News Channel and the resolutely liberal MSNBC. Internationally it is overshadowed by younger, zippier channels such as Al Jazeera. Nevertheless, the CNN product continues to reach audiences throughout the world, and despite its insistence that it is truly an international channel, it is an American product and through its content it sometimes plays a de facto role in U.S. public diplomacy. France 24, Russia Today, Deutsche Welle, and CCTV are more clearly part of their home nations public diplomacy. How effective they are is open to question. All have tried to build a Middle East constituency by broadcasting in Arabic. Although reliable audience research in the region is spotty, available evidence suggests that their audiences are small. This makes sense;

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why, on a day-to-day basis, would an Arab viewer care about the French, Russian, German, or Chinese view of the world, particularly now that several far-reaching Arab channels are trusted and popular? As instruments of public diplomacy in the Middle East, the European and Chinese channels (and the American Al Hurra) may not be worth the money and effort that go into them. The Cold War model that assumes an intellectually needy audience should now be recognized as largely obsolete. During the Cold War, American radio broadcasts in particular were successful because the target audience welcomed them. Many listeners, primarily in Eastern Europe, desperately wanted an alternative to Radio Moscow and the like. They did not trust what they were receiving from the Soviets and certainly did not consider the viewpoints being presented to be their own. This is a crucial element in understanding transnational broadcasting today. Arab audiences do not need or want to get their news from outsiders. The issue is not whether a broadcaster meets Western standards of objectivity (which is more elusive than most Western broadcasters would admit). Rather, the key is credibility presenting our news through our eyes. People today take an ownership interest in the providers of news. And that leads us to Al Jazeera.

Al Jazeeras channels Al Jazeera was born in 1996. The details of its founding are available elsewhere and do not much matter here, except one important element: a principal reason for the channels

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creation was that it is to serve as a public diplomacy vehicle for the ruler of Qatar, Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani. He wanted a signature asset that would help his emirate stand out from the other countries in the Persian Gulf region and within the greater Arab world. He certainly succeeded. Al Jazeeras public diplomacy success is particularly significant because a case can be made that the channel represents not just Qatar, but also serves as a pan-Arab and perhaps pan-Islamist public diplomacy tool. Al Jazeeras popularity took hold during its coverage in 2000 of the second intifada, when its intensive reporting from a clearly Arab perspective distinguished it from Western broadcasters and the staid channels mostly state-run that had long dominated television in the Middle East. In 2001, as the sole broadcaster allowed by the Taliban to remain in Afghanistan during the American invasion, Al Jazeera further burnished its reputation as a dominant news source. Its coverage from Afghanistan was also noteworthy for the ire it caused within the U.S. government, an attitude that has persisted. Beyond its coverage of any single event, Al Jazeera has been a forceful Arab voice while Arab countries (and their broadcast outlets) have been plagued by disunity. Mohamed Zayani has observed that Al Jazeera has reinvigorated a sense of common destiny in the Arab world and is even encouraging Arab unity, so much so that pan-Arabism is being reinvented on this channel.19 As such, Al Jazeera has become a political actor. Shawn Powers and Eytan Gilboa have noted that a transnational news organization playing this role does not fit neatly into any of the categories of nontraditional actors identified by international relations scholars.20 Regardless of categorization, Al Jazeeras impact on political discourse is undeniable. Its

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criticism of Arab governments for matters ranging from corruption to inadequate support of the Palestinians has often provoked angry responses. Hugh Miles reported that Arab ambassadors in Doha said they spent so much time complaining about Al Jazeera that they felt more like ambassadors to a TV channel than ambassadors to a country.21 When an Al Jazeera reporter asked Egypts president Hosni Mubarak during the second intifada if Egypt would go to war against Israel, Mubarak responded, Let Al Jazeera go to war. We are not going.22 In 2001, during a Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) meeting, Saudi Arabias Crown Prince Abdullah accused Al Jazeera of being a disgrace to the GCC countries, of defaming the members of the Saudi royal family, of threatening the stability of the Arab world, and of encouraging terrorism.23 Al Jazeera endures public criticism and periodically being expelled from various countries. The publicity on such occasions doesnt do the channel any harm. News organizations are supposed to be provocative, but given the inchoate nature of many elements of political systems in the Middle East, Al Jazeeras coverage has special bite. After years of enjoying soft news reporting, many political figures have been slow to determine how best to deal with a media company that is not docile. Although some political leaders react angrily and their governments threaten Qatar with reprisals (which the Emir mostly ignores), others respond more temperately, recognizing that Al Jazeera may serve a safety valve function, allowing viewers to vicariously work out their frustrations while watching the channels newscasts and talk shows. Al Jazeeras coverage of certain events illustrates its role as a pan-Arab political force. During the Gaza conflict of late 2008 and early 2009, Al Jazeera delivered vivid reporting.

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Civilian casualties were highlighted graphically and the channel forcefully pointed out that Arab governments were failing to support the Palestinian residents of Gaza. Demonstrations in the region supporting the Palestinians and protesting Arab regimes inaction were fueled by the Al Jazeera reports. For the global news audience, the work of Al Jazeera English was particularly significant, as its two news crews in Gaza provided the only on-scene reporting from an English-language channel. (These reporters had already been in Gaza when Israel began restricting journalists access.) Al Jazeera English can be seen in more than 100 countries worldwide, although a notable exception is the United States, where most cable and satellite carriers have apparently decided it would be politically unwise to offer the channel. This has begun to change (in mid2009) as MHz Worldview, a noncommercial broadcaster, announced it would begin carry Al Jazeera English in its Washington, D.C. and other markets. The Gaza coverage was a breakthrough occasion for Al Jazeera English in that it had unique reporting and was able to deliver to a non-Arabic-speaking audience the news as seen through an Arab stations eyes. This was a significant new perspective and it challenged the hegemony long enjoyed by Western broadcasters, which in this instance reported events in Gaza with far less passion and far fewer graphic visuals than were seen on the Qatar-based channel. To reach the largest possible audience, including viewers in the United States, Al Jazeera posted Gaza-related video material through Creative Commons, a nonprofit corporation that licenses material for easy public access on line. Through this service, Al Jazeera made all its Gaza coverage available free of charge to anyone from individual bloggers to rival broadcasters with the only condition that Al Jazeera be credited.24

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Al Jazeera English has relied on the Internet in other ways, as well, particularly as a means of reaching the American audience. It uses YouTube, Livestation, Twitter, and its own Web site. The channel reported that during the first two weeks of the Gaza war its number of Livestation viewers increased by 500 percent and views of its videos on YouTube increased more than 150 percent.25 This is an important lesson about the potential pervasiveness that public diplomacy efforts might aspire to. Through all these venues, Al Jazeera has become truly global in its reach, presenting on its Arab channel its distinctively Arab view of events, and on its English channel delivering reporting that might not be categorized as pro-Arab, but that emanates from an Arab news organization and champions those who rarely receive sympathetic coverage. For the Arabic channel, among its most important audiences are diasporic populations of Arabic-speakers around the world. Mohamed Zayani has observed that Al Jazeera helps nurture a sense of community among the Arab diaspora, and has enhanced the cultural connection between its Arab viewers overseas and Arab culture.26 For Al Jazeera English, English-speaking Muslims, in their home countries or elsewhere, who may be sympathetic to the fellow Muslims whose often unhappy circumstances are depicted in the channels coverage. This is an often overlooked facet of public diplomacy. This leads to the issue of Al Jazeeras pan-Islamic public diplomacy. This topic requires more speculation than does the pan-Arab role, which the channels executives publicly embrace. Mohammed El Oifi has written that the channels Arab nationalism has in some ways become the basis of a sharp critique of Arab rulers who have come to favor the fragmentation of the Arab public sphere, sacrificing thereby the ideal of Arab unity.27 Al

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Jazeera pits its influence and commitment to pan-Arabism against the every country for itself approach that has become common in the Arab world. A pan-Islamic public diplomacy is an outgrowth of Al Jazeeras transnational identity and its ability to supersede conventional Arab politics. Al Jazeeras influence in this regard may be enhanced by the dissatisfaction some Muslims feel toward secular leadership in their home countries. Olivier Roy asked, What is a true Muslim land in a time when many radical Muslims consider that all the regimes ruling Muslim countries are illegitimate?28 The channel in some ways fills the vacuum created by secular politics. Al Jazeeras approach to certain news stories illustrates how globalized journalism can affect globalized Islam. Sam Cherribi wrote that Al Jazeera used its coverage of the banning of the hijab, a veil, from French schools to build a global Muslim identity *and+ mobilize a shared public opinion. According to Cherribi, Al Jazeera framed the veil story in its reporting from 2002-2005 as not only a problem for girls and women in public schools in France; it is a problem for Muslim women and men around the world. The veil coverage, he wrote, was part of a civilization message delivered by Al Jazeera, in this case because the veil gives the immediate recognition of otherness: non-Muslims do not wear it.29 Cherribi also argued that Al Jazeera is a religious channel, more CBN (Christian Broadcasting Network) than CNN, with an agenda that focuses on Islam even above panArabism. Al Jazeera certainly does not shy away from providing substantial religious content. The influential Muslim cleric Yusuf Al-Qaradawi appears frequently on the channel and has proved adept at shaping his message to meet the demands of television. As Jon W. Anderson noted, he is wholly orthodox in theology but expressing it in a more modern idiom that

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attracts a transnational audience among professional middle classes.30 Modern does not mean moderate. Al-Qaradawi has endorsed suicide bombing attacks on Israeli civilians as a legitimate tactic in the effort to reclaim Muslim territory.31 He also, however, issued a fatwa that defends democracy not as a form of unbelief but as a system that properly gives people the right to choose their leaders without compulsion and to question and remove them. On another occasion, he denounced Abu Musab al Zarqawi, leader of al Qaeda in Iraq, as a murderer.32 Despite the appearances of Al-Qaradawi and other religious figures on Al Jazeera, some observers contend that the channels content is relatively balanced when it addresses religious topics, reflecting the intricate spider web of Islamism and pan-Arabism that is part of the mindset of many of the people who live in the Arab world and watch that channel. Beyond the Arab world, if Al Jazeera English were to adopt a more pronounced emphasis on Islam, its effects could transcend those of its parent channel. In the worldwide Islamic population, more Muslims speak English than Arabic. In many areas where watching Al Jazeera Arabic is not feasible because of the language barrier, Al Jazeera English can play an important political role. Muslims of South Asian descent living in the United Kingdom, for example, might watch the channel because they know its religious roots. On a larger scale, the combined Al Jazeera channels, along with Internet sources (discussed below) could contribute to unprecedented intellectual cohesion among the 1.4 billion Muslims of the ummah. It is clear that the Al Jazeera channels have become more than public diplomacy avenues for Qatar. The organizations assertive journalism has found a strong audience in much of the Arab world, and its English-language channel has brought non-Western viewpoints

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to a global audience. If one function of the public diplomacy of non-state as well as state actors is to reach international publics with convincing messages, the Al Jazeera channels are significant actors in this political realm. To take this a step further, a case can be made that Al Jazeera should be regarded as a virtual state in itself and Arab and perhaps Islamic state that cannot be found on conventional maps but that is nonetheless real in a virtual sense. If that is accepted, even tentatively, it adds a new dimension to the consideration of political effects of transnational broadcasting. Further, the Al Jazeera channels Arabic and English today, perhaps Urdu, Turkish, and more in the future could be a platform for fostering a virtual ummah by providing an unprecedented level of connectivity among Muslims worldwide. The conventional wisdom has always been that the Muslim in Djakarta, the Muslim in Cairo, the Muslim in Dakar, the Muslim in Islamabad, and the Muslim in Melbourne have nothing to say to each other because they are separated not just by geography but also by politics, culture, language, and other factors that collectively outweighed religious commonality. But transnational media might change that. This is also very speculative, but it raises intriguing possibilities for public diplomacy. When Barack Obama spoke in Cairo in June 2009, the world watched. More specifically, the Muslim world watched an audience pulled together by the topic of the speech. The technology exists to reach out in additional ways to this virtual community, and the challenge for public diplomats will be to decide what to do with this opportunity.

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The digital imperative Hardly a day goes by without a news story about how the Internet is supplementing or superseding some element of traditional media. This transition is also occurring in public diplomacy as broadcasting is nudged aside by Internet-based communication. Al Jazeera English offers a good example of how this works. It relies on its own Web site, plus YouTube, Livestation, and other Web video providers to reach people who do not have access to the channel through regular television offerings. The channel used a Twitter feed titled War on Gaza that provided short messages about the latest material on the Web site. The site also has a Your Media section where citizen journalists can offer comments and submit their own video and reports to the channel.33 For the Internet to be a truly effective public diplomacy tool, the digital divide must be narrowed. That is happening, but only slowly in many parts of the world. Already, however, governments, news organizations, and others promoting political positions use the Web to extend their reach to global audiences. But the Internet, like all other media, can sometimes be a mixed blessing. Thomas Friedman wrote that at its best, the Internet can educate more people faster than any media tool weve ever had. At its worst, it can make people dumber than any media tool weve ever had. The lie that four thousand Jews were warned not to go into the World Trade Center on September 11 was spread entirely over the Internet and is now thoroughly believed in the Muslim world. Because the Internet has the aura of technology surrounding it, the uneducated believe information from it even more. They dont realize that the Internet, at its ugliest, is just an open sewer: an electronic conduit for untreated, unfiltered information.34

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Governments and others conducting public diplomacy must recognize that much greater communication parity exists in the world today. A disseminated message can instantly be met by a counter-message. The viral nature of online communication can be difficult to deal with, and the Danish cartoon controversy of 2006 illustrated how the Internet can be a rage enabler. For public diplomacy practitioners, the speed and pervasiveness of online media pose challenges that are probably best met by using those same media. As is the case with broadcasting, online media from Middle Eastern state and non-state actors may feature pan-Arab or pan-Islamic content. To some extent, the communities these media serve are abstract or, to use Benedict Andersons term, imagined communities. While satellite television is transterritorial, the Internet may be considered supraterritorial because boundaries within and among states are not merely inconsequential, they need not, in the cyberworld, be acknowledged at all.35 An example of how this theory takes shape in practice can be seen in the success of Islam Online (www.islamonline.net), which provides news, general information about Islam, shariah corner featuring live fatwa, and much more, all available in Arabic and English. (The Arabic and English sites have different staff members, content, and audiences, and one rarely translates material from the other.) The site lists among its goals: To strengthen the ties of unity and affiliation between the members of the Islamic community and support informational and cultural exchange. To expand awareness of important events in the Arab, Islamic and larger worlds. To build confidence and a spirit of hope among Muslims.36 Policy makers should consider the influence wielded by such non-state public diplomacy ventures that exist solely on the Internet. To some extent, this requires recognizing an expanded definition of public diplomacy to include not just conventional non-state actors but

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also non-state virtual actors. Although Islam Online, for example has a staff of about 300 persons working in Cairo, the product itself exists solely on the Web. It reported 159 million page views in 2006. These virtual entities are part of geopolitical reality. Their essence is connectivity rather than conventional physical presence. The non-state actors taking advantage of the virtual world range from the benign, such as most of the religious outreach organizations, to the malignant, such as al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations. A case can be made, for instance, that through the Internet al Qaeda conducts its own public diplomacy.

Conclusions Emerging from the consideration of the issues discussed above is recognition that a broad definition is appropriate for exponents of public diplomacy. The non-state actors include not only conventional players, ranging from NGOs to religious proselytizers to terrorist organizations, but also transnational media organizations. (Along these lines, although outside the scope of this paper, it might be argued that Rupert Murdoch has his own public diplomacy.) The media are no longer just the media. At least in some cases, they are not only the tools of public diplomacy but also political forces in their own right with their own points of view that they present to international publics. Scholars, government officials, and others might contemplate this broadened media role when defining the evolving craft of public diplomacy and when devising public diplomacy strategies.

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Philip Seib, Broadcasts from the Blitz: How Edward R. Murrow Helped Lead America into War (Dulles, VA: Potomac, 2006), 7-47. 2 Harold N. Graves, Jr., Propaganda by Short Wave: London Calling America, Public Opinion Quarterly, 5, No. 1, 38, 45, 47. 3 Edward R. Murrow, This Is London (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1941), 76. 4 Harold N. Graves, Jr., European Radio and the War, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, vol. 213, January 1941, 79. 5 Graves, European Radio and the War, 80. 6 Harold N. Graves, Jr., Propaganda by Short Wave: Berlin Calling America, The Public Opinion Quarterly, vol. 4, no. 4 (December 1940), 601, 602, 605, 606. 7 Charles J. Rolo, Radio Goes to War (New York: G. P. Putnams Sons, 1942), 112. 8 Rolo, Radio Goes to War, 121. 9 Philip Seib, The Al Jazeera Effect (Dulles, VA: Potomac, 2008), 34-41. 10 Doreen Carvajal, All-News Television Spreading Its Wings, International Herald Tribune, January 8, 2006. 11 Everybody Wants One Now, Economist, November 30, 2006; John Ward Anderson, All News All the Time, and Now in French, Washington Post, December 7, 2006, C 7. 12 Caroline Wyatt, World News To Get a French Flavor, BBC News, December 6, 2006. 13 Anderson, All the News All the Time. 14 Journalism Mixes with Spin on Russia Today: Critics, Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, March 10, 2006; Kim Murphy, Russia Will Air Its View of the World, Los Angeles Times, June 8, 2005. 15 Murphy, Russia Will Air Its View of the World. 16 News of the World, Economist, November 1, 2006. 17 Carvajal, All-News Television Spreading Its Wings. 18 www.dw-world.de. 19 Mohamed Zayani, Introduction Al Jazeera and the Vicissitudes of the New Arab Mediascape, in Mohamed Zayani (ed.), The Al Jazeera Phenomenon (Boulder, CO: Paradigm, 2005), 8. 20 Shawn Powers and Eytan Gilboa, The Public Diplomacy of Al Jazeera, in Philip Seib (ed.), New Media and the New Middle East (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 63. 21 Hugh Miles, Al-Jazeera (New York: Grove, 2005), 57. 22 Miles, Al-Jazeera, 81. 23 Olivier Da Lage, The Politics of Al Jazeera or the Diplomacy of Doha, in Zayani, The Al Jazeera Phenomenon, 56. 24 Noam Cohen, Few in U.S. See Jazeeras Coverage of Gaza War, New York Times, January 12, 2009. 25 Cohen, Few in U.S. 26 Zayani, Introduction, 8. 27 Mohammed El Oifi, Influence Without Power: Al Jazeera and the Arab Public Sphere, in Zayani, The Al Jazeera Phenomenon, 72. 28 Olivier Roy, Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004), 112. 29 Sam Cherribi, From Baghdad to Paris: Al Jazeera and the Veil, Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics, vol. 11, no. 2, Spring 2006, 122, 124, 128. 30 Jon W. Anderson, New Media, New Publics: Reconfiguring the Public Sphere of Islam, Social Research, vol. 70, no. 3 (Fall 2003), 898. 31 Gilles Kepel, The War for Muslim Minds (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006), 19. 32 Anthony Shadid, Legacy of the Prophet: Despots, Democrats, and the New Politics of Islam (Boulder, CO: Westview, 2002), 68; Marc Lynch, Al Qaedas Media Strategies, The National Interest, Spring 2006. 33 Cohen, Few in U.S. 34 Thomas L. Friedman, Longitudes and Attitudes (New York: Anchor, 2003), 169. 35 Philip Seib, The Al Jazeera Effect, 80. 36 www.islamonline.net/english/aboutus.