Donnellan, Reference and Definite Descriptions Definite descriptions: Russell vs.

Strawson

Consider the following sentence: (1) The martini drinker is tall. Russell. (1) means there is at least one martini drinker and there is at most one martini drinker and every martini drinker is tall.

At the deep level of logical form, (1) expresses a general proposition.

the martini drinker disappears!

So, it doesnt refer. And it isnt the logical subject of (1).

(1) expresses a proposition regardless of whether there is, in fact, exactly one martini drinker.

So, (1) is not a proposition about any particular person. If there is not exactly one martini drinker, (1) is false.

Strawson. (1) means that some particular person (viz. the one martini drinker) is tall.

At the deep level of logical form, (1) expresses a singular proposition: its a proposition about a particular person.

The referent of the martini drinker is part of the proposition expressed.

the martini drinker refers (if there is one such a person). the martini drinker is the logical subject of (1).

(1) presupposes that there is exactly one martini drinker; and so it expresses a proposition only if there is.

If there is not exactly one martini drinker, (1) is neither true nor false.

Donnellan. Neither Russell nor Strawson are fully right. Definite descriptions have two different uses, referential and attributive.

Russell ignores the referential use, although he might be right about the attributive use. Strawson ignores the attributive use, and he doesnt get the referential use quite right either. (Some of what he says about the referential use is actually true only of the attributive use.)

PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE 16: Donnellan

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Referential vs. attributive

Consider the sentence: (2)

Smiths murderer is insane. Attributive. Whoever murdered Smith is insane. Referential. That guy there is insane.

Two different uses of (2):

What if theres no unique object satisfying the description?

Attributive. Assertion is defective.

Either its false (a la Russell) or it lacks truth value (a la Strawson).

Referential. Assertion might still be true. Attributive. There is a unique object satisfying the description. Referential. The object referred to satisfies the description. Attributive. Presupposition that there is a unique thing satisfying the description, because if there isnt the purpose of the speech act will be thwarted (particularly clear in the case of orders). Referential. Presupposition that the thing referred to satisfies the description, because if it didnt the speech act might be misleading (c.f. Grices maxim of Quality.)

Two uses carry different presuppositions.

Different reasons why the presupposition arises.

Consequences of the distinction

Donnellan concludes that this distinction shows that its hopeless to try to say what a definite description means independently of a particular occasion of use. Both Russell and Strawson get this wrong.

Russell because he doesnt talk about use at all. Strawson because he assumes that definite descriptions are always used referentially.

PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE 16: Donnellan

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