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Title: The win-win-win papakonstantinidis models bargaining approach the Bayesian side Prof Papakonstantinidis

Abstract The paper deals with the win-win-win papakonstantinidis methodological model and i ts main application in rural tourism field The paper based on Nash win-win Model, focuses on the sensitization process , as an instant reaction to a given information which influence the socio-economic behaviour, through knowledge creation and knowledge transfer. It aims to converg e local people pure individual strategies in the bargain Ive imagined a NEW-in visible part in a bargain between 2 Ive called it the Intermediate Community in or der to show the dynamic relations between A, and B bargainers taking into accou nt that a C (= Community between A, and B bargainers taking into account that a C fa ctor (= Community, Nature, Ecological Systems etc) also participate in the same bargain, in terms of sensitizing A and B bargainers for mutual and the Communi ty profit In this paper public involvement concerned with Local Development is conducted. Involving local people in the development procedure round a local Flag Theme, is t herefore necessary. In particular the paper focuses on sensitization process as the reaction to given information, which influences the socio-economic behaviour in the bargain. The main hypothesis is that development may be sighted as the output of the bar gaining trends. Paper goals are three: Firstly, it aims to map past research on regional development, related with knowledge creation and individual strategies. Secondly, it offers a theoretical critique of the Nash win-win Model. Thirdly, it provides a behaviour approach for rural development (win-win-win) Key-words win-win-win papakonstantinidis model Sensitization, public involvement, flag them e, bargaining strategies-behaviour, integrated information, Bayesian Analysis 1. Introduction The paper focuses on sensitization process, as well as sensitization itself, under the form of a new-introducing mean, called The Intermediate Community as the li mit end of the process , through the bargain: There is an interaction between pe oples (involved in each of the bargains) behavior and the bargain itself. A dynam ic evolution characterizes the interaction which will pass in next generations b y the memes Rural Tourism, meeting environmental protection & ecology perspec tives, presupposes sensitization as a continuous process toward the limit (sens itization). From this point of view, sensitization, which is transferred from th e one generation to the other, due to cultural and biological evolution , may be concerned as a form of perfect information If it will be possible, then local community should have all the necessary conditions, for success in their commun ity development process especially, around the local theme incentive well known as flag theme at local level Paper suggests the win-win-win papakonstantinidis mod el, as Nash equilibrium extension, taking into account the Harsanyi-Selten refine ments of the Nash Theory (see, also at Trembling Hand Perfect Nash EquilibriumTHPNE ) as the appropriate methodological tool for the sensitization process Analysis So it is necessary to define and analyze sensitization in terms of information giv

en to local people, thus influencing their behavior to other people during among other- the development process ; this information must be based on added knowled ge creation and transformation, during the sensitization process, From this poin t of view, the interaction behavior-bargain as well as the bargain influences on behaviors during the bargain and behavior influence on the bargain itself defi nition is necessary, for the reasons that: 1. A flag-theme could motivate local community in a spiral sensitization pr ocess, as well as, sensitization process should lead to rural tourism, individua l-community activity 2. Development, - especially, Rural- Local Development may be sighted as the output of the bargaining trends, 3. At any case, rural tourism contributes in social capital formulation bas ed on social interactions behavior 4. Social interactions regularly lead to mutually beneficial transactions t hat are sometimes puzzling 5. Sensitization is a kind of information, making the given information compl ete Papakonstantinidis, 2002) 6. Each player, in a bargain, has a subjective probability distribution ov er the alternative possibilities - Harsanyi 7. The basic idea is to define a way that a conflict-competitive behavior a mong people involved in a bargain, should have a solution at local level around the flag theme (rural tourism, in the case). This is necessary in the bottom-up de velopment process, as it facilitates local people and local management to find s olutions at local issues, at least 8. Coming from above reasoning, a new, virtual part (the , we call it the Int ermediate Community, or the C factor) is suggested from this paper, to be introduce d in a bargain between 2 thus transforming probabilities distribution from bino mial [p1,p2] (see at Nash equilibrium, win-win in a conditional (Bayes) tri nomial one, (p1, p2, 1-p1-p2), thus defining a new equilibrium point, so that, e ach of the 3 bargainers, including the Community, to win (win-win-win) 9. Sensitization process may be the result of introducing the term Community as the third part in a bargain between 2, thus transforming a competitive behavi or to cooperative one, around the flag theme. (local development) Conversely the Intermediate Community based on bargainers beliefs may be the result of the con tinuous sensitization process, going on its limit-end (the absolute cooperation) , 10. Coming from the above, the win-win-win papakonstantinidis model is a usefu l methodological tool for conflict resolution locally, at least- as an extension of Nash equilibrium (win-win) taking into consideration the Harsanyi-Selten refinem ents of the Nash Theory (see, also at Trembling Hand Perfect Nash EquilibriumTHPNE) as the appropriate methodological tool for the sensitization process 11. For this, the Harsanyi contribution is crucial in this paper, toward fo rming the win-win-win papakonstantinidis model: Harsanyi utilitarian theorem stat es that the social welfare function is the weighted sum of individuals utility fu nctions if: (i) society maximizes expected social welfare; (ii) individuals maxi mize expected utility; (iii) society is indifferent between two probability dist ributions over social states whenever all individuals are. (Bayesian approach) Especially, Complete information requires that every player know the strategies a nd payoffs available to the other players but not necessarily the actions taken. Games of incomplete information can be reduced, however, to games of imperfect information by introducing "moves by nature Building the suggested model, is base d on Nash-Harsanyi (conditional probabilities/ Bayes distributions sub-game) sy nthesis 12. Finally, we borrow some elements of knowledge creation from the Modern Innovation Theory (M.I.T) : A synthesis of theme leads to corresponding behavi oral types, thus strengthening the above scientific approach: Sensitization, as a behavioral type is introduced in any bargain at the local, at least, level, u nder the form of the Intermediate Community (a reference point, at the local lev el, around rural tourism as a flag theme) Table 1

Knowledge Creation/ Information/ Types of Behavior Type of Knowledge-1 Type of Knowledge-2 Synthesis r tacit tacit Sympathetic Socialization tacit codified Conceptual Externalization codified tacit Procedural Internalization codified codified Systemic Networking sympathetic systemic Conceptual Sensitization systemic systemic Procedural Strategic

Resulted Behavio

Papakonstantinidis, 2003 Proposal the math side of behavioural convergence Based on synthesis Nash-Harsanyi equilibrium, papers proposal is focused on the i nnovative idea of introducing the intermediate community (Community, C factor, Natur e, Environment, ecological systems protection etc) as the third part in a bargai n between 2, as the result of their sensitized behavior Reversing previous reas oning, sensitization process presupposes, the intermediate communitys acceptance, thus transforming conflict / competitive behavior in any bargain between 2, int o the absolute cooperation (an ideal situation). We could summarize our approach , in a math type in : lim Pi(&) Qi(&) Ri(&) = max Pi Qi Ri = max Ua* Ub *Uc i or, how to transform a competitive behavior in the bargain, into the absolute co operation, taking into consideration the integrated information, coming from kno wledge transfer AND the sensitization process in the community, thus optimum max imizing bargainers and the Community s utility functions Pi (&) : individual instant reflection winning strategy corresponding to probab ility distribution Pi Ui : Utility function, of i player Of course, the presented equation shows the ideal bargaining-behavioral situatio n We should reduce the above equation in a form of inequalities, putting the ex ex ponential function (the math constant of growth and renewal) as the Intermediate Community approach, thus converging it, to its limit (sensitization) Finally, = 3,333 Papakonstantinidis approach, 2011 Finally, For a given finite game there is , at any time, a mobility constant of dynamic reaction (each-other): Each player (A,B and C) influences but also influenced by other two players strategies at any time (even the minimum), with changing proba bilities distributions. These probabilities follow according the concept- the Bay esian Rule Also, their strategies shape, step by step a new bargaining behavior, by the memes mechanism. The limit of this continuous process is proved to be und er the condition of a perfect information- the absolute players sensitization, l eading to the absolute cooperation, which is the best strategy for all the invol ved players in the bargain It is obvious, that a pure capitalist operation as th e bargain, may be transformed in a pure socialization Memes presuppose that a n ew information , i.e sensitization, in the form of knowledge creation and knowle dge transfer, leading to new behavior is necessary REFERENCES Blackmore Susan (1999) The Meme Machine, Interview of by Denis Failly(1999) Jour nal of Memetics

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