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1. TATEL vs. VIRAC GR 40243 March 11, 1992 2. LIM vs. PACQUING GR 115044 January 27, 1995 3. LLDA vs. CA GR 120865-71 December 7, 1995 4. VILLACORTA VS BERNARDO, GR L-31249 August 19, 1986 5. CRUZ VS PARAS GR L-42571-72 July 25, 1983 6. QUEZON CITY VS ERICTA GR L-34915 June 24, 1983 7. ORTIGAS VS FEATI GR L-24670 December 14, 1979 8. BALACUIT VS CFI - AGUSAN DEL NORTE GR L-38429 June 30, 1988 9. SANGALANG VS CA GR 71169 August 25, 1989 10. PILAPIL VS CA GR 97619 November 26, 1992 11. MACASIANO VS DIOKNO GR 97764 August 10, 1992 12. CRUZ VS CA GR L-44178 August 21, 1987 13. ARDONA VS REYES GR L-60549 October 26, 1983 14.CHIONGBIAN vs. ORBOS GR 96754 June 22, 1995 15.MAGTAJAS vs. PRYCE GR 111097 July 20, 1994 16.ALVAREZ vs. GUINGONA, JR GR 118303 January 31, 1996 17.TY vs. TRAMPE GR 117577 December 1, 1995 18.JAVIER vs. CA GR 49065 June 1, 1994 19.MARIANO vs. COMELEC GR 118577 March 7, 1995 20.LIMBONA vs. MANGELIN GR 80391 February 28, 1989 21.TAN vs. COMELEC GR 73155 July 11, 1986 22.FLORES vs. DRILON GR 104732 June 22, 1993 23.VILLANUEVA vs. CASTAEDA, JR. GR L-61311 September 21, 1987 24.CITY OF MANILA vs. IAC GR 71159 November 15, 1989 25.CITY OF MANILA vs. TEOTICO GR L-23052 January 29,


71049 GR 61516 GR 127820 GR 103125 104786 97619 GR 120295

May 29, 1987 March 21, July 20, May 17, January 27, 1994 November 26, June 28,

125955 June 19, 1997 127116 April 8, 1997 GR 116763 April 19, 110216 September 10,

CHIONGBIAN v. ORBOS G.R. No. 96754 June 22, 1995 FACTS: Pursuant to Article X, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution, Congress passed R.A. 6734 (Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao). On November 16, 1989, in the plebiscite held, four provinces (Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu, and Tawi-tawi) voted in favor of creating an autonomous region which became ARMM. With respect to provinces and cities not voting in favor of the Autonomous Region, Article XIX, Section 13 of R.A. 6734 states that they shall remain in the existing administrative regions provided however, that the President may, by administrative determination, merge the existing regions. Executive Order No. 429 was issued by President Aquino Providing for the Reorganization of the Administrative Regions in Mindanao. petitioners contend that Article XIX, Section 13 of R.A. 6734 is unconstitutional because it unduly delegates legislative power to the President by authorizing him to merge (by administrative determination) the existing regions. For its part, the Solicitor General contended that the reorganization of regions in Mindanao was merely the exercise of a power traditionally lodged in the President and as a mere incident of his power of general supervision over local governments and control of executive departments, bureaus and offices under Article X, Section 16 and Article VIII, Section 17 of the Constitution. ISSUE: HELD: Whether or not Article XIX, Section 13 of R.A. 6734 is valid YES.

The creation and subsequent reorganization of administrative regions have been (made) by the Presiden As what the Supreme Court observed in Abbas, while the power which has traditionally provided for in the Constitution, it is a power which has traditionally been lodged with the President to facilitate the exercise of the power of general supervision over local governments. While Article XIX, Section 13 provides that the provinces and cities which do not vote for inclusion in the Autonomous Region shall remain in the existing administrative regions, this provision is subject to the qualification that the President may by administrative determination merge the existing regions. While non-assenting provinces and cities are to remain in the regions as designated upon the creation of the Autonomous Region, they may nevertheless be regrouped with contiguous provinces forming other regions as the exigency of administration may require. The regrouping involves no more than a redefinition or redrawing of the lines separating administrative regions for the purpose of facilitating the administrative supervision of local government units by the President and insuring the efficient delivery of essential services.

Administrative regions are mere groupings of contiguous provinces for administrative purposes, not for political representation. (They) are not territorial and political subdivisions like provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays.

MAGTAJAS v. PRYCE PROPERTIES G.R. No. 111097 July 20, 1994 FACTS: Mayor Pablo Magtajas and the city legislators denounced the establishment of PAGCOR within their city through an ordinance prohibiting the issuance of business permit and cancelling existing business permit to any establishment for using and allowing to be used in its premises or portion thereof for the operation of casinos. Also, an ordinance was passed prohibiting the operation of casinos and providing penalty for its violation. PAGCOR is a corporation created directly by P.D. 1869 to help centralize and regulate all games of chance, including casinos on land and sea within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines and is the third highest revenue-earner in the government. ISSUE: Whether or not the ordinances are valid as enacted by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City HELD: NO.

Petition is denied and the decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. TEST OF A VALID ORDINANCE: Must not contravene the Constitution or any statute Must not be unfair or oppressive Must not be partial or discriminatory Must not prohibit but may regulate trade Must not be unreasonable Must be general and consistent with public policy

The apparent flaw in the ordinances in question is that they contravene P.D. 1869 and the public policy embodied therein insofar as they prevent PAGCOR from exercising the power conferred on it to operate a casino in Cagayan de Oro City. Although LGC is permissible to modify P.D. 1869, there is no sufficient indication of an implied repeal by the former. LGUs may prevent and suppress all kinds of gambling within their territories except only those allowed by statutes like P.D. 1869. This decree has the statutes of a statute that cannot be amended or nullified by a mere ordinance.

ALVAREZ v. GUINGONA G.R. No. 118303 January 31, 1996 FACTS: Petitioners assail the validity of R.A. 7720, entitled An Act Converting the Municipality of Santiago, Isabela Into An Independent Component City To Be Known As The City Of Santiago, mainly because the Act allegedly did not originate exclusively in the House of Representatives as mandated by Section 24, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. Also, petitioners claim that the Municipality of Santiago has not met the minimum average annual income required under Section 450 of the Local Government Code of 1991 in order to be converted into a component city. ISSUE: Whether or not the Internal Revenue Allotments (IRAs) are to be included in the computation of the average annual income of a municipality for purposes of its conversion into an independent component city HELD: YES. The annual income of a local government unit includes the IRAs. It is true that for a municipality to be converted into a component city, it must, among others, have an average annual income of at least P20M for the last two consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices. Such income must be duly certified by the Department of Finance. A local government unit is a political subdivision of the State which is constituted by law and possessed of substantial control over its own affairs. Remaining to be an intra sovereign subdivision of one sovereign nation, but not intended, however to be an imperium in imperio, the local government unit is autonomous in the sense that it is given more powers, authority, responsibilities and resources. With its broadened powers and increased responsibilities, a LGU must now operate on a much wider scale. The vesting of duty, responsibility and accountability in every LGU is accompanied with a provision for reasonably adequate resources to discharge its powers and effectively carry out its functions. Availment of such resources is affectuated through the vesting in every LGU of: 1. The right to create and broaden its own source of revenue 2. The right to be allocated a just share in national taxes, such share being in the form of internal revenue allotments(IRAs), and 3. The right to be given its equitable share in the proceeds of the utilization and

development of the national wealth, if any, within its territorial boundaries. The funds generated from local taxes, IRAs and national wealth utilization proceeds accrue to the general fund of the local government and are used to finance its operations subject to specified modes of spending the same as provided for in the Local Government Code and its IRRs. The IRAs are items of income because they form part of the gross accretion of the funds of the LGU. The IRAs regularly and automatically assure to the local treasury without need of any further action on the part of the LGU. They thus constitute income which the local government can invariably rely upon as the source of much needed funds. Section 450 (c) of the Local Government Code provides that the average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special funds, transfers, and non-accruing income. Department Order No. 35-9313 correctly encapsulizes the full import of the above disquisition when it defined annual income to be revenues and receipts realized by provinces, cities and municipalities from regular sources of the Local General Fund including the internal revenue allotment and other shares provided for in Sections 284, 290, and 291 of the Code, but exclusive of non-recurring receipts, such as other national aids, grants, financial assistance, loan proceeds, sales of fixed assets, and similar others.

TY v. TRAMPE G.R. No. 117577 December 1, 1995 FACTS: Alejandro B. Ty is a resident of and registered owner of lands and buildings in the City of Pasig, while MVR Picture Tube, Inc. is a corporation duly organized and existing under Philippine laws and is likewise a registered owner of lands and buildings in said city. Aurelio C. Trampe is being sued in his capacity as presiding judge of Branch 163, RTC of National Capital Judicial Region. Respondent assessor sent a notice of assessment respecting certain real property of petitioners located in Pasig, Metro Manila. Petitioners, through a letter, requested the municipal assessor to reconsider the subject assessments. Not satisfied, petitioners filed with the RTC of National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 163, presided over by respondent judge a petition for prohibition. Respondent judge denied the petition for lack of merit, also the petitioners motion for reconsideration. The court a quo ruled that the schedule of market values and the assessments based thereon prepared solely by respondent assessor are valid and legal, they having been prepared in accordance with the provisions of the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. 7160). It also held that said Code had effectively repealed the previous law on the matter, P.D. 921, which required, in the preparation of said schedule, joint action by all the city and municipal assessors in the Metropolitan Manila area. In its September 30, 1994 Order denying the motion for reconsideration, the court a quo ruled that it is still inclined to sustain the view that P.D. 921 was impliedly repealed by R.A. 7160. ISSUE: Whether or not R.A. 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991 repealed the provisions of P.D. 921 HELD: YES. Section 9 of P.D. 921 states that: Sec. 9. Preparation of Schedule of Values for Real Property within the Metropolitan Area. The schedule of values that will serve as the basis for the appraisal and assessment for taxation purposes of real property located within

the Metropolitan area shall be prepared jointly by the city assessors of the districts created under Section 1 hereof, with the City Assessor of Manila acting as chairman in accordance with the pertinent provisions of P.D. 464, as amended, otherwise known as the Real property Tax Code, and the implementing rules and regulations thereof issued by the Secretary of Finance. On the other hand, Section 212 of R.A. 7160 states: Sec. 212. Preparation of Schedule of Fair Market Values. Before any general revision of property assessment is made pursuant to the provisions of this Title, there shall be prepared a schedule of fair market values by the provincial, city and municipal assessors of the municipalities within the Metropolitan Manila area for the different classes of real property situated un their respective local governments for enactment by ordinance of the sanggunian concerned. x x x R.A. 7160 has a repealing provision (section 534) and if the intention of the legislature was to abrogate P.D. 921, it would have included it in such repealing clause, as it did in expressly rendering of no force and effect several other presidential decrees. Any repeal or modification of P.D. 921 can only be possible under paragraph (f) of said Section 534. The two laws are no co-extensive and mutually inclusive in their scope and purpose. While R.A. 7160 covers almost all governmental functions delegated to local government units all over the country, P.D. 921 embraces only the Metropolitan Manila area and is limited to the administration of financial services therein especially the assessment and collection of real estate (and some other local) taxes. Section 9 of P.D. 921 requires that the schedule of values of real property in the Metropolitan manila area shall be prepared jointly by the city assessors in the districts therein, while Section 212 of R.A. 7160 states that the schedule shall be prepared by the provincial, city and municipal assessors of the municipalities within the Metropolitan Manila area for the different classes of real property situated un their respective local governments for enactment by ordinance of the sanggunian concerned. Harmony in these provisions is not only possible, but in fact desirable, necessary and consistent with the legislative intent and policy. By this harmonization, both the preamble of P.D. 921 decreeing that the real estate taxes shall not unduly burden the taxpayer and the operative principle of decentralization provided under Section 3 of R.A. 7160 encouraging local government units to consolidate or coordinate their efforts, services and resources shall be fulfilled. The schedule of values prepared solely by the respondent municipal assessor is illegal and void.

JAVIER v. CA G.R. No. 49065 June 1, 1994 FACTS: Provincial engineer Maximiano Sentina and 40 officials and employees of the Office of the Provincial Engineer filed a petition for mandamus and damages against the entire Provincial Board of Antique. They contended that the abolition of the OPE was a circumvention of the constitutional mandate on security of tenure and intended only to weed out provincial officials and employees who opposed the Provincial Boards candidacy in the 1971 elections. Respondents insisted that the abolition of the OPE was motivated instead by a provision of P.D. 17 which lowered the internal revenue allotment to the road and bridge fund of the province from 50% to 17.5% thereby leaving an inadequate allotment for materials, salaries and operating expenses of the OPE. They averred that the power of the provincial board to create an office carried with it the power to abolish it. The lower court held that the drastic decrease in the amount available for appropriation was the principal consideration that impelled the Provincial Board to abolish the office. The Court of Appeals reversed the court a quos decision and held that the passage of Resolution No. 206 was prompted in the main by reasons other than those stated therein and that personal and political animosities on the part of Sentina and respondents caused the respondent Provincial Board to enact said resolution. ISSUE: Whether or not the Provincial Board had the authority under the then existing laws to enact the questioned resolution

HELD: YES. Section 9, Article XVII of the 1973 Constitution did convey an authority to carry out a valid reorganization in any branch or agency of the Government but this general provision could not have meant or envisioned an absolute proscription on local governments, if and when minded, from themselves creating or abolishing positions, an authority that they theretofore had under the then existing laws. One such law was Section 18 of R.A. 5185 (Local Autonomy Act), then still in force, which empowered provincial governments to create, among other positions, the office of a provincial engineer. While the law did not expressly vest on provincial governments the power ot abolish that office, absent, however, any contrary provision, that authority should be deemed embraced by implication from the power to create it. The power of the Province of Antique to abolish the office in question did exist at that time.

MARIANO, JR. v. COMELEC G.R. No. 118577 March 7, 1995 FACTS: Petitioners assail Sections 2, 51 and 52 of R.A. 7854 entitled An Act Converting the Municipality of Makati Into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Makati as unconstitutional on the following grounds: a. Section 2 did not properly identify the land or territorial jurisdiction of Makati by metes and bounds, with technical descriptions, in violation of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, in relation to Sections 7 and 450 of the Local Government Code. b. Section 51 attempts to alter or restart the three-consecutive term limit for local elective officials in violation of Section 8, Article X and Section 7, Article VI of the Constitution. c. Section 52 is unconstitutional for: 1. It increased the legislative district of Makati only by special law in violation of the constitutional provision requiring a general reapportionment law to be passed by Congress within three years following the return of every census. 2. The increase in legislative district was not expressed in the title of the bill 3. The addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in accord with Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution for as of the latest survey (1990 census), the property of Makati stands at only 450,000.


Whether or not the said provisions of R.A. 7854 are valid YES.

The boundaries must be clear for they define the limits of the territorial jurisdiction of a local government unit. It can legitimately exercise powers of government only within the limits of its territorial jurisdiction. Beyond these limits, its acts are ultra vires. Petitioners have not demonstrated that the delineation of the land area of the proposed City of Makati will cause confusion as to its boundaries. Section 2 did not add, subtract, divide or multiply the established land area of Makati, it merely stated that the citys land area shall comprise the present territory of the municipality. The existence of a boundary dispute does not per se present an insurmountable difficulty which will prevent Congress from defining with reasonable certitude the territorial jurisdiction of a local government unit. Congress maintained the existing boundaries of the proposed City of Makati but as an act of fairness, made them subject to the ultimate resolution by the courts. The Solicitor Generals submission was sustained. x x x the territorial jurisdiction of newly created or converted cities should be described by metes and bounds, with technical descriptions was made in order to provide a means by which the area of said cities may be reasonably ascertained. The requirement on metes and bounds was meant merely as a tool in the establishment of local government units. x x x So long as the territorial jurisdiction of a city may be reasonably ascertained, i.e. by referring to common boundaries with neighboring municipalities, then, it may be concluded that the legislative intent behind the law has been sufficiently served. Congress did not intend that laws creating new cities must contain therein detailed technical descriptions similar to those appearing in Torrens titles. x x x The manifest intent of the Code is to empower local government units and to give them their rightful due. It seeks to make local governments more responsive to the needs of their constituents while at the same time serving as a vital cog in national development. x x x

MACASIANO v. DIOKNO GR 97764 AUGUST 10, 1992 FACTS: Respondent municipality Paraaque passed Ordinance No. 86, series of 1990 which authorized the closure of J. Gabriel, G.G. Cruz, Bayanihan, Lt. Garcia Extension and Opena streets located at Baclaran, Paraaque, Metro Manila and the establishment of a flea market thereon. The said ordinance was approved by the municipal council pursuant to MMC Ordinance No. 2, Series of 19779, authorizing and regulating the use of certain city and /or municipal streets, roads, and open spaces within Metropolitan Manila as sites for flea markets and/or vending areas under certain terms and conditions. On June 20, 19990, the municipal council of Paraaque issued a resolution authorizing Paraaque Mayor Walfrido N. Ferrer to enter into contract with any service cooperative for the establishment, operation, maintenance and management of flea markets and/or vending areas. On July 20, 1990, the Metropolitan Manila Authority approved Ordinance No. 86 of the municipal council of respondent municipality subject to conditions. On August 8, 1990, respondent municipality and respondent Palanyag, a service cooperative, entered into an agreement whereby the latter shall operate, maintain and

manage the flea market in the aforementioned streets. Consequently, market stalls were put up by respondent Palanyag on the said streets. On September 13, 1990, petitioner Brig. Gen. Macasiano, PNP Superintendent of the Metropolitan Traffic Command, ordered the destruction and confiscation of stalls along G.G. Cruz and J. Gabriel St. in Baclaran. On December 17, 1990, the trial court issued an order upholding the validity of Ordinance No. 86 of the Municipality of Paraaque and enjoining petitioner Macasiano from enforcing his letter0order against respondent Palanyag. ISSUE: Whether or not an ordinance or resolution issued by the municipal council of Paraaque authorizing the lease and use of public streets or thoroughfares as sites for flea markets is valid HELD: NO. Properties of the local government which are devoted to public service are deemed public and are under the absolute control of Congress. Hence, local governments have no authority whatsoever to control or regulate the use of public property unless specific authority is vested upon them by Congress (e.g. Section 10, Chapter II, Local Government Code Closure of Roads) However, the afore-stated legal provision should be read and interpreted in accordance with basic principles already established by law. Article 424 of the Civil Code provides that property of public dominion devoted to public use and made available to the public in general are outside the commerce of man and cannot be disposed of or used by the local government unit to private persons. The closure of a road, street or park should be for the sole purpose of withdrawing the road or other public property from public use when circumstances show that such property is no longer intended or necessary for public use or public service. When it is already withdrawn from public use, the property then becomes patrimonial property of the local government unit concerned. It is only then that the respondent municipality can use or convey them for any purpose for which other real property belonging to the local unit concerned might be lawfully used or conveyed in accordance with the last sentence of Section 10, Chapter II of B.P. Blg. 337, known as the Local Government Code. Those roads and streets which are available to the pubic in general and ordinarily used for vehicular traffic are still considered public property devoted to public use. In such case, the local government has no power tom use it for another purpose or to dispose of or lease it to private persons. Even assuming, in gratia argument, that respondent municipality has the authority to pass the disputed ordinance, the same cannot be validly implemented because it cannot be considered approved by the MMA due to non-compliance by respondent municipality of the conditions imposed by the former for the approval of the ordinance. Respondent municipality has not shown any iota of proof that it has complied with the foregoing conditions precedent to the approval of the ordinance.

TATEL v. MUNICIPALITY OF VIRAC G.R. No. 40243 March 11, 1992 FACTS: Based from the complaints received from the residents of Barrio Sta. Elena against the disturbance caused by the operation of the abaca boiling machine inside the warehouse of the petitioner, the Municipal Council of Virac passed Resolution No. 29 declaring the warehouse a public nuisance within the purview of Article 694 of the New Civil Code. The said machine affects the peace and tranquility of the neighborhood due to the smoke, obnoxious odor and dust emitted by the machine. Respondent municipal officials contended that the petitioners warehouse was constructed in violation of Ordinance No. 13 which prohibits the construction of warehouses near a block of houses either in the poblacion or barrios without maintaining the necessary distance of 200 meters from said block of houses to avoid loss of lives and properties

by accidental fire. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not Ordinance No. 13 is a legitimate and valid exercise of police power of the municipal council 2. Whether or not the trial court gave Ordinance No. 13 a meaning other than what it says

HELD: 1. YES. Ordinance No. 13 passed by the Municipal Council of Virac in the exercise of its police power. It is a settled principle of law that municipal corporations are agencies of the State for the promotion and maintenance of local self-government and as such are endowed with police powers in order to effectively accomplish and carry out the declared objects of their creation. Its authority emanates from the general welfare clause under the Administrative Code. Also, the ordinance passed according to the procedure prescribed by law and in consonance with certain well-established and basic principles of a substantive nature. HELD: 2. NO. The trial court did not give the ordinance in question a meaning other than what it says. Basically, what is regulated by the ordinance is the construction of warehouses wherein inflammable materials are stored where such warehouses are located at a distance of 200m from a block of houses and not the construction per se of a warehouse. The purpose is to avoid the loss of life and property in case of fire which is one of the primordial obligations of the government. Clearly, it merely stated the purpose of the ordinance and what it intends to prohibit to accomplish its purpose.

TAN v. COMELEC G.R. No. 73155 July 11, 1986 FACTS: This case was prompted by the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 885, An Act Creating a New Province in the Island of Negros to be known as the Province of Negros del Norte, effective December 3, 1985 (Cities of Silay, Cadiz and San Carlos and the municipalities of Calatrava, Taboso, Escalante, Sagay, Manapla, Victorias, E.R. Magalona, and Salvador Benedicto). Pursuant to and in implementation of this law, the COMELEC scheduled a plebiscite in January 3, 1986. Petitioners opposed, filing a case for Prohibition and

contending that the B.P. Blg. 885 is unconstitutional and not in complete accord with the Local Government Code because: 1. The voters of the parent province of Negros Occidental, other than those living within the territory of the new province of Negros del Norte, were not included I the plebiscite. 2. The area which would comprise the new province of Negros del Norte would only be about 2,856.56 sq. km., which is lesser than the minimum area prescribed by the governing statute. The Supreme Court was in recess at the time so the petition was not timely considered. Consequently, petitioners filed a supplemental pleading on January 4, 1986, after the plebiscite sought to be restrained was held the previous day, January 3. ISSUE: Whether or not the plebiscite was legal and complied with the constitutional requisites under Article XI, Sec. 3 of the Constitution HELD: NO In interpreting the above provision, the Supreme Court held that whether a province is created, divided, or merged and there is substantial alteration of the boundaries, the approval of a majority of votes in the plebiscite in the unit or units affected must first be obtained. The creation of the proposed new province of Negros del Norte will necessarily result in the division and alteration of the existing boundaries of Negros Occidental. Plain and simple logic will demonstrate that two political units would be affected. The first would be the parent province of Negros Occidental because its boundaries would be substantially altered. The other affected entity would be composed of those in the area subtracted from the mother province to constitute the proposed province of Negros del Norte. The Supreme Court further held that the case of Governor Zosimo Paredes v. Hon. Executive Secretary to the President, et. al. (128 SCRA 6), which respondents used to support their case, should not be taken as a doctrinal or compelling precedent. Rather, it held that the dissenting view of Justice Abad Santos in the aforementioned case is the forerunner of the applicable ruling, quoting that: when the Constitution speaks of the unit or units affected, it means all of the people of the municipality if the municipality is to be divided such as in the case at bar or of the people of two or more municipalities if there be a merger. I see no ambiguity in the Constitutional provision. It appeared that when Parliamentary Bill No. 3644 which proposed the creation of the new province of Negros del Norte was passed for approval, it recited therein that the plebiscite shall be conducted in the areas affected within a period of one hundred and twenty days from the approval of this Act. However, when the bill was enacted into B.P. 885, there was an unexplained change from areas affected to the proposed new province, which are the areas affected. The Supreme Court held that it was a selfserving phrase to state that the new province constitutes the area affected.

Such additional statement serves no useful purpose for the same is misleading, erroneous, and far from truth. The remaining portion of the parent province is as much an area affected. The substantial alteration of the boundaries of the parent province, not to mention the adverse economic effects it might suffer, eloquently argue the points raised by the petitioners. Consequently, the Supreme Court pronounced that the plebiscite held on January 3, 1986 has no legal effect for being a patent nullity. Wherefore, Batas Pambansa Blg. 885 is hereby declared unconstitutional. The proclamation of the new province of Negros del Norte, as well as the appointment of the officials thereof are also declared null and void. SO ORDERED.

CRUZ v. PARAS GR L-42571-72 JULY 25, 1983 FACTS: The petitioners are operators of nightclubs in Bocaue, Bulacan. They filed prohibition suits to stop the municipality of Bocaue from enforcing an ordinance

prohibiting the operation of nightclubs, cabarets, and dance halls in that municipality or renewal of licenses to operate them. The CFI upheld the validity of the ordinance and dismissed the petition. Hence, this petition for certiorari. ISSUE: Whether or not a municipal corporation can prohibit the operation of nightclubs HELD: NO A municipal corporation cannot prohibit the operation of nightclubs. Nightclubs may be regulated but not prevented from carrying on their business. R.A. 938, as originally enacted, granted municipalities the power to regulate the establishment, maintenance and operation of nightclubs and the like. While it is true that on May, 21, 1954, the law was amended by R.A. 979 which purported to give municipalities the power not only to regulate but likewise to prohibit the operation of nightclubs, the fact is that the title of the law remained the same so that the power granted to municipalities remains that of regulation, not prohibition. To construe the amendatory act as granting municipal corporations the power to prohibit the operation of nightclubs would be to construe it in a way that it violates the constitutional provision that every bill shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof. Moreover, the recently-enacted LGC (B.P. 337) speaks simply of the power to regulate the establishment and operation of billiard pools, theatrical performances, circuses and other forms of entertainment.


Quezon City Council passed Ordinance No. 6118 where under Section 9 of which provides for regulation of private memorial type cemetery and providing penalties for non-compliance thereof. The said section ordered private cemeteries to allot at least six (6) percent of the total area for charity burial of deceased persons who are paupers and who have been resident of Quezon City for at least 5 years prior to their death. But respondent Himlayang Pilipino reacted and alleged the ordinance to be contrary to the Constitution, the Quezon City Charter, the Local Autonomy Act and the Revised Administrative Code. Petitioners argue that the taking of the respondents property is a valid and reasonable exercise of police lower and that land taken for a public use as it is intended for the burial ground of paupers. ISSUE: Whether Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118 is a valid exercise of police power HELD: NO.

Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118 is not a mere police regulation but an outright confiscation. It deprives a person of his private property without due process by law and even without just compensation. Police power usually exercised in the form of mere regulation or restriction in the use of liberty or property for the promotion of the general welfare. It does not involve the taking or confiscation of property with the exception of a few cases where there is a necessity to confiscate private property in order to destroy it for the purpose of protecting the peace and order and of promoting the general welfare as for instance, the confiscation of an illegally-possessed article such as opium and firearms.


GR L-24670 DECEMBER 14, 1979 FACTS: On March 4, 1952, Ortigas & Co., a partnership involved in real estate particularly the Highway Hills subdivision along EDSA in Mandaluyong entered into a contract of sale on installment over two parcels of land with Augusto and Natividad Angeles who later transferred their rights and interests to a certain Emma Chavez. Under the agreement, it was stipulated among others that: xxx this shall be used exclusively for residential purposes xxx. Eventually, defendant FEATI Bank and Trust Company acquired the lots and started the construction of a building on the said lot devoted to banking purposes. Ortigas then filed for a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain and enjoin the defendant from continuing with the construction of the commercial bank in violation of the restrictions set in the contract of sale that was imposed by the plaintiff as part of its general building scheme designed for the beautification and development of the Highway Hills Subdivision. Defendant maintains that the area in question has been declared as a commercial and industrial zone by the Zoning Regulation of Resolution No. 27 on February 4, 1980 of the Municipal Council of Mandaluyong, Rizal. The trial court ruled in favor of defendant bank FEATI holding that the restrictions set by plaintiff Ortigas were subordinate to Municipal Resolution No. 27 because of the Municipals valid exercise of police power. It stressed that the private interest should bow down to the general interest and welfare. Plaintiff appealed until it reached the Supreme Court. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not Resolution No. 27 is a valid exercise of police power 2. Whether or not the said resolution can nullify or supersede the contractual obligations assumed by defendants HELD: 1. YES Although the validity of the resolution was never questioned in the past proceedings, its validity was at lest impliedly admitted from the facts. Section 3 of R.A. 2264 (Local Autonomy Act) empowers a municipal council to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or regulations for the municipality. It gives more power to local governments in promoting the economic conditions, social welfare and material progress of the community. The only exceptions are a contract between a province, city or municipality on one hand and a third party on the other hand, in which case the original terms and provisions of the contract should govern. The exceptions, clearly, do not apply in the case. HELD: 2. YES The resolution as an exercise of police power can supersede contractual obligations assumed by defendants. While non-impairment of contracts is

constitutionally guaranteed, the rule is not absolute, since it has to be reconciled with the legitimate exercise of police power. Police power is the most essential, insistent, and illimitable power, the greatest and most illimitable of powers. It is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety, and general welfare of the people. Its exercise may be judicially inquired into and corrected only if it is capricious, whimsical, unjust or unreasonable, there having been a denial of due process or a violation of any other applicable constitutional guarantee. Resolution No. 27, in declaring that the western part of EDSA is an industrial and commercial zone, was obviously passed by the Municipal Council of Mandaluyong, Rizal in the exercise of police power to safeguard or promote the health, safety, peace, good order and general welfare of the people in the locality. Judicial notice may be taken of the conditions prevailing in the area. Industrial and commercial complexes have flourished about the place. EDSA, a main traffic artery which runs through several cities and municipalities in the Metro Manila area, supports an endless stream of traffic and the resulting activity, noise and pollution are hardly conducive to the health, safety or welfare of the residents in its route. Having been expressly granted the power to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances and regulations, the municipality of Mandaluyong, through its Municipal Council, was reasonably justified under the circumstances, in passing the subject resolution.

BALACUIT v. CFI OF AGUSAN DEL NORTE & BUTUAN CITY G.R. No. L-38429 June 30, 1988 FACTS: The municipal board of the City of Butuan passed Ordinance No. 640 which penalized any person, entity, or corporation engaged in the business of selling tickets to any movie or other public exhibitions, who shall require to pay full payment of tickets intended for adults but should charge only one-half of said ticket. The ordinance also provides for a penalty by fine and imprisonment. Petitioners are the aggrieved party by the effect of the ordinance as they were the managers of the different theaters in the city. ISSUE: Whether or not the police power to regulate include the authority to interfere in the fixing of prices of admission to these places of exhibition and amusement HELD: NO.

While it is true that a business may be regulated, it is equally true that such regulation must be within the bounds of reason, that is, the regulatory ordinance must be reasonable and its provisions cannot be oppressive amounting to an arbitrary interference with the business or calling subject of regulation. A lawful business or calling may not, under the guise of regulation, be unreasonably interfered with even by the exercise of police power. A police measure for the regulation of the conduct, control and operation of a business should not encroach upon the legitimate and lawful exercise by the citizens of their property rights. Hence, the proprietors of a theater have a right to manage their property in their own way, to fix what prices of admission they think most for their own advantage, and that any person who did not approve could stay away.

FRIVALDO v. COMELEC G.R. No. 120295 June 28, 1996 FACTS: Juan G. Frivaldo filed for candidacy for governorship. This was contested by Raul Lee who filed a petition with the COMELEC praying that Frivaldo be disqualified because he was not a Filipino citizen. COMELEC granted the petition. Frivaldo filed for Motion for Reconsideration but was unacted upon until after the elections. His candidacy continued and he was voted. Three days after election, the COMELEC affirmed the previous resolution. The Board of Canvassers completed the canvass of the election and determined that Frivaldo garnered the largest number of votes, followed by Lee. But Lee filed another petition praying for his proclamation as Governor. Petition was granted. Lee was declared Governor. Frivaldo filed a new petition alleging that he already took his oath of allegiance or in the alternative, he averred that pursuant to the case of Labo v. COMELEC, the Vice-Governor should occupy said position of governor. On December 19, 1995, the COMELEC First Division annulled the proclamation of Lee and proclaimed Frivaldo as rightful governor. Lee filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the COMELEC. ISSUE: Whether or not Frivaldos repatriation is enough to qualify him to be proclaimed governor? Stated in the alternative, whether or not citizenship requirement must exist the date of election or filing of candidacy? HELD: NO. Section 39 of the Local Government Code does not specify any particular date or time when the candidate must possess citizenship. Purpose of the citizenship qualification is so that no person owing allegiance to another nation shall govern our people. Impediment no longer existed. It should be noted that Section 39 of the Local Government Code speaks of qualifications of officials, not of candidates. Citizenship is necessary at the time he is proclaimed and at the start of his term.

GREGO v. COMELEC G.R. No. 125955 June 19, 1997 FACTS: On October 31, 1981, Basco was removed from his position as Deputy Sheriff by the Court upon a finding of serious misconduct in an administrative complaint lodged by Nena Tordesillas. Subsequently, Basco ran as a candidate for Councilor in the Second District of the City of Manila during the 1988, local elections. He won and, accordingly, assumed office. After his term, he sought reelection in the 1992 election. He again won. However, a case for quo warranto was filed by Cenon Ronquillo (Candidate for councilor), who alleged Basco's ineligibility to be elected councilor on the basis of the Tordesillas ruling. Other complaints were filed before the Office of the Ombudsman and in the DILG. In 1995, Basco ran again for councilor. William Grego, claiming to be a registered voter of Precinct No. 966, District II, City of Manila, filed with the COMELEC a petition for disqualification, praying for Basco's disqualification, for the suspension of his proclamation, and for the declaration of Romualdo S. Maranan as the sixth duly elected Councilor of Manila's Second District. The Manila BOC however proclaimed Basco as a duly elected councilor of the Second District of Manila. In view of the proclamation, Grego filed an urgent motion seeking to annul the illegal proclamation. The COMELEC dismissed the petition for disqualification ruling that the administrative penalty imposed by the SC on Basco was wiped away and condoned by the electorate who elected him. ISSUE: Whether or not Section 40 (b) of Republic Act No. 7160 apply retroactively to those removed from office before it took effect on January 1, 1992 HELD: NO Petitioner submits that although the Code took effect only on January 1, 1992, Section 40 (b) must nonetheless be given retroactive effect and applied to Basco's dismissal from office which took place in 1981. It is stressed that the provision of the law as worded does not mention or even qualify the date of removal from office of the candidate in order for disqualification thereunder to attach. Hence, petitioner

impresses upon the Court that as long as a candidate was once removed from office due to an administrative case, regardless of whether it took place during or prior to the effectivity of the Code, the disqualification applies. We do not, however, subscribe to petitioner's view. Our refusal to give retroactive application to the provision of Section 40 (b) is already a settled issue and there exist no compelling reasons for us to depart therefrom. Well-settled is the principle that while the Legislature has the power to pass retroactive laws which do not impair the obligation of contracts, or affect injuriously vested rights, it is equally true that statutes are not to be construed as intended to have a retroactive effect so as to affect pending proceedings, unless such intent is expressly declared or clearly and necessarily implied from the language of the enactment. There is no provision in the statute which would clearly indicate that the same operates retroactively. It, therefore, follows that [Section] 40 (b) of the Local Government Code is not applicable to the present case."

DAVID v. COMELEC G.R. No. 127116 April 8, 1997 FACTS: In his capacity as Barangay Chairman of Barangay 77, Zone 7, Kalookan City and as President of the Liga ng mga Barangay sa Pilipinas, Alex L. David filed a petition for prohibition to prohibit the holding of the barangay election scheduled on the second Monday of May 1997. Petitioner Liga ng mga Barangay Quezon City Chapter represented by its president Bonifacio M. Rillon filed a petition "to seek a judicial review by certiorari to declare as unconstitutional: 1. Section 43(c) of R.A. 7160 which reads as follows: (c) The term of office of barangay officials and members of the sangguniang kabataan shall be for three (3) years, which shall begin after the regular election of barangay officials on the second Monday of May 1994; 2. COMELEC Resolution Nos. 2880 and 2887 fixing the date of the holding of the barangay elections on May 12, 1997 and other activities related thereto; 3. The budgetary appropriation of P400 million contained in Republic Act No. 8250 otherwise known as the General Appropriations Act of 1997 intended to defray the costs and expenses in holding the 1997 barangay elections Both petitions though worded differently raise the same ultimate issue: How long is the term of office of barangay officials? Petitioners contend that under Sec. 2 of RA 6653 "(t)he term of office of barangay officials shall be for five (5) years . . ." This is reiterated in RA 6679. Petitioners further aver that although Sec. 43 of RA 7160 reduced the term of office of all local elective officials to three years, such reduction does not apply to barangay officials because (1) RA 6679 is a special law applicable only to barangays while RA 7160 is a general law which applies to all other local

government units; (2) RA 7160 does not expressly or impliedly repeal RA 6679 insofar as the term of barangay officials is concerned; (3) while Sec. 8 of Article X of the 1987 constitution fixes the term of elective local officials at three years, the same provision states that the term of barangay officials "shall be determined by law"; and (4) thus, it follows that the constitutional intention is to grant barangay officials any term, except three years; otherwise, "there would be no rhyme or reason for the framers of the Constitution to except barangay officials from the three year term found in Sec. 8 (of) Article X of the Constitution." COMELEC maintains that RA 7160 repealed all other special laws relied upon by the petitioner. ISSUE: Whether or not the term of the barangay officials should be limited only to three years HELD: YES. In light of the brief historical background, the intent and design of the legislature to limit the term of barangay officials to only three (3) years as provided under the Local Government Code emerges as bright as the sunlight. The cardinal rule in the interpretation of all laws is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the law. And three years is the obvious intent. RA 7160, the Local Government Code, was enacted later than RA 6679. It is basic that in case of an irreconciliable conflict between two laws of different vintages, the later enactment prevails. Legis posteriores priores contrarias abrogant. The rationale is simple: a later law repeals an earlier one because it is the later legislative will. It is to be presumed that the lawmakers knew the older law and intended to change it. In enacting the older law, the legislators could not have known the newer one and hence could not have intended to change what they did not know. Under the Civil Code, laws are repealed only by subsequent ones and not the other way around. Under Sec. 43-c of RA 7160, the term of office of barangay officials was fixed at "three (3) years which shall begin after the regular election of barangay officials on the second Monday of May 1994." RA. 7160 is a codified set of laws that specifically applies to local government units. It specifically and definitively provides in its Sec. 43-c that "the term of office of barangay officials . . . shall be for three years." It is a special provision that applies only to the term of barangay officials who were elected on the second Monday of May 1994. With such particularity, the provision cannot be deemed a general law. Petitioner may be correct in alleging that RA 6679 is a special law, but they are incorrect in stating (without however giving the reasons therefor) that RA 7160 is necessarily a general law. It is a special law insofar as it governs the term of office of barangay officials. In its repealing clause, RA 7160 states that "all general and special laws . . . which are inconsistent with any of the provisions of this Code are hereby repealed or modified accordingly." There being a clear repugnance and incompatibility between the two specific provisions, they cannot stand together. The later law, RA 7160, should thus prevail in accordance with its repealing clause. When a subsequent law encompasses entirely the subject matter of the former

enactments, the latter is deemed repealed.

BUNYE v. ESCARREAL G.R. No. 127116 April 8, 1997 FACTS: The petitioners sought a reconsideration of the order of suspension by the Sandiganbayan. The suspension rooted from the enactment of Kapasiyahan Bilang 45 by herein petitioners, which forcibly took possession of the New Public Market in Alabang, Muntinlupa despite of a valid and subsisting lease contract for a term of 25 years between the municipality of Muntinlupa represented by former Mayor Santiago Carlos, Jr. and the Kilusang Magtitinda. Petitioners main argument against the preventive suspension is that nothing can possibly be compromised or hampered by their remaining in office, since the said proceedings will no longer be for the purpose of receiving evidence on factual issues but only to hear arguments, position papers on memoranda, on the purely legal issue of whether the rescission of the Cooperatives market contract is a valid exercise of police power by the municipality. Another point asserted by the petitioners is that their preventive suspension will paralyzed the local government and the Sangguniang Bayan will be without a quorum to perform its functions.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan abused its discretion in ordering the preventive suspension of the petitioners HELD: NO.

The Sandiganbayan did not abuse its discretion in ordering the preventive suspension of the petitioners. On the first argument, citing the comment of the Solicitor General, that the prosecution must be given the opportunity to gather and prepare the facts for trial under conditions which would ensure non-intervention and noninterference for 90 straight days from petitioners camp. On the second assertion by the petitioners, there will still remain eight (8) councilors who can meet as the Sangguniang Bayan. The President or his alter ego, the DILG Secretary, will surely know how to deal with the problem of filling up the temporarily vacant positions in accordance with the provisions of the Local Government Code.

FLORES v. DRILON G.R. No. 104732 June 22, 1993 FACTS: The constitutionality of Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227, otherwise known as the "Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992," under which Mayor Richard J. Gordon of Olongapo City was appointed Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA). Under said provision, for the first year of its operations from the effectivity of this Act, the mayor of the City of Olongapo shall be appointed as the chairman and chief executive officer of the Subic Authority. Petitioners, as taxpayers, contend that said provision is unconstitutional as under the following constitutional and statutory provisions: (a) Sec. 7, first par., Art. IX-B, of the Constitution, which states that "[n]o elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any public officer or position during his tenure," because the City Mayor of Olongapo City is an elective official and the subject posts are public offices; (b) Sec. 16, Art. VII, of the Constitution, which provides that "[t]he President shall appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may

be authorized by law to appoint", since it was Congress through the questioned proviso and not the President who appointed the Mayor to the subject posts; and, (c) Sec. 261, par. (g), of the Omnibus Election Code. ISSUE: Whether or not the proviso in Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227 violates the constitutional proscription against appointment or designation of elective officials to other government posts HELD: YES. The rule expresses the policy against the concentration of several public positions in one person, so that a public officer or employee may serve full-time with dedication and thus be efficient in the delivery of public services. It is an affirmation that a public office is a full-time job. Hence, a public officer or employee, like the head of an executive department described in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, and Anti-Graft League of the Philippines, Inc. v. Philip Ella C. Juico, as Secretary of Agrarian Reform should be allowed to attend to his duties and responsibilities without the distraction of other governmental duties or employment. He should be precluded from dissipating his efforts, attention and energy among too many positions of responsibility, which may result in haphazardness and inefficiency. In this case, the subject proviso directs the President to appoint an elective official, i.e., the Mayor of Olongapo City, to other government posts (as Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of SBMA). In any case, the view that an elective official may be appointed to another post if allowed by law or by the primary functions of his office ignores the clear-cut difference in the wording of the two (2) paragraphs of Sec. 7, Art. IX-B, of the Constitution. While the second paragraph authorizes holding of multiple offices by an appointive official when allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, the first paragraph appears to be more stringent by not providing any exception to the rule against appointment or designation of an elective official to the government post, except as are particularly recognized in the Constitution itself, e.g., the President as head of the economic and planning agency; the Vice-President, who may be appointed Member of the Cabinet; and, a member of Congress who may be designated ex officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council. It is further argued that the SBMA posts are merely ex officio to the position of Mayor of Olongapo City, hence, an excepted circumstance, citing Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary. However, the court held that the Congress did not contemplate making the subject SBMA posts as ex officio or automatically attached to the Office of the Mayor of Olongapo City without need of appointment. The phrase "shall be appointed" unquestionably shows the intent to make the SBMA posts appointive and not merely adjunct to the post of Mayor of Olongapo City. Had it been the legislative intent to make the subject positions ex officio, Congress would have, at least, avoided the word "appointed" and, instead, "ex officio" would have been used. Even in the Senate deliberations, the Senators were fully aware that subject proviso may contravene Sec. 7, first par., Art. IX-B, but they nevertheless passed the bill and decided to have the controversy resolved by the courts.

CITY OF MANILA v. IAC G.R. No. 71159 November 15, 1989 FACTS: Vivencio Sto. Domingo, Sr. died and was buried in North Cemetery which lot was leased by the city to Irene Sto. Domingo for the period from June 6, 1971 to June 6, 2021. The wife paid the full amount of the lease. Apart, however from the receipt, no other document embodied such lease over the lot. Believing that the lease was only for five years, the city certified the lot as ready for exhumation. On the basis of the certification, Joseph Helmuth authorized the exhumation and removal of the remains of Vicencio. His bones were placed in a bag and kept in the bodega of the cemetery. The

lot was also leased to another lessee. During the next all souls day, the private respondents were shocked to find out that Vicencios remains were removed. The cemetery told Irene to look for the bones of the husband in the bodega. Aggrieved, the widow and the children brought an action for damages against the City of Manila; Evangeline Suva of the City Health Office; Sergio Mallari, officer-in-charge of the North Cemetery; and Joseph Helmuth, the latter's predecessor as officer-in-charge of the said burial grounds owned and operated by the City Government of Manila. The court ordered defendants to give plaintiffs the right to make use of another lot. The CA affirmed and included the award of damages in favor of the private respondents. ISSUE: Whether or not the operations and functions of a public cemetery are a governmental, or a corporate or proprietary function of the City of Manila HELD: It is under the proprietary functions of the City of Manila Petitioners alleged in their petition that the North Cemetery is exclusively devoted for public use or purpose as stated in Sec. 316 of the Compilation of the Ordinances of the City of Manila. They conclude that since the City is a political subdivision in the performance of its governmental function, it is immune from tort liability which may be caused by its public officers and subordinate employees. Private respondents maintain that the City of Manila entered into a contract of lease which involves the exercise of proprietary functions with Irene Sto. Domingo. The city and its officers therefore can be sued for any-violation of the contract of lease. The City of Manila is a political body corporate and as such endowed with the faculties of municipal corporations to be exercised by and through its city government in conformity with law, and in its proper corporate name. It may sue and be sued, and contract and be contracted with. Its powers are twofold in character-public, governmental or political on the one hand, and corporate, private and proprietary on the other. Governmental powers are those exercised in administering the powers of the state and promoting the public welfare and they include the legislative, judicial, public and political. Municipal powers on the one hand are exercised for the special benefit and advantage of the community and include those which are ministerial, private and corporate. In connection with the powers of a municipal corporation, it may acquire property in its public or governmental capacity, and private or proprietary capacity. The New Civil Code divides such properties into property for public use and patrimonial properties (Article 423), and further enumerates the properties for public use as provincial roads, city streets, municipal streets, the squares, fountains, public waters, promenades, and public works for public service paid for by said provisions, cities or municipalities, all other property is patrimonial without prejudice to the provisions of special laws. Thus in Torio v. Fontanilla, the Court declared that with respect to proprietary functions the settled rule is that a municipal corporation can be held liable to third persons ex contractu. Under the foregoing considerations and in the absence of a special law, the North Cemetery is a patrimonial property of the City of Manila. The administration and government of the cemetery are under the City Health Officer, the order and police of the cemetery, the opening of graves, niches, or tombs, the exhuming of remains, and

the purification of the same are under the charge and responsibility of the superintendent of the cemetery. With the acts of dominion, there is no doubt that the North Cemetery is within the class of property which the City of Manila owns in its proprietary or private character. Furthermore, there is no dispute that the burial lot was leased in favor of the private respondents. Hence, obligations arising from contracts have the force of law between the contracting parties. Thus a lease contract executed by the lessor and lessee remains as the law between them. Therefore, a breach of contractual provision entitles the other party to damages even if no penalty for such breach is prescribed in the contract.

VILLANUEVA v. CASTAEDA G.R. No. L-61311 September 21, 1987 FACTS: On November 7, 1961, the municipal council of San Fernando adopted

Resolution No. 218 authorizing some 24 members of the Fernandino United Merchants and Traders Association to construct permanent stags and sell in the said place. A protest was filed and the CFI decided that the land occupied by the petitioners, being public in nature, was beyond the commerce of man and therefore could not be the subject of private occupancy. This decision was not enforced for the petitioners were not evicted. In fact, the petitioners paid daily fees to the municipal government. On January 12, 1982, the Association of Concerned Citizens and Consumers of San Fernando filed a petition for the immediate implementation of Resolution No. 29, to restore the subject property "to its original and customary use as a public plaza. Vicente Macalino (officer in charge in the office of the mayor) required the municipal treasurer and engineer to demolish the stalls. Petitioners filed a prohibition with the CFI claiming that the disputed area was leased to them by the municipal government. The CFI denied the petition ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners have a right to the said land HELD: NO There is no question that the place occupied by the petitioners and from which they are sought to be evicted is a public plaza pursuant to the previous case. It does not appear that the decision in this case was appealed or has been reversed. A public plaza is beyond the commerce of man and so cannot be the subject of lease or any other contractual undertaking. This is elementary. Indeed, this point was settled as early as in Municipality of Cavite vs. Rojas, where the Court declared as null and void the lease of a public plaza of the said municipality in favor of a private person. In Muyot vs. de la Fuente, it was held that the City of Manila could not lease a portion of a public sidewalk on Plaza Sta. Cruz, being likewise beyond the commerce of man. We rule that the petitioners had no right in the first place to occupy the disputed premises and cannot insist in remaining there now on the strength of their alleged lease contracts. They should have realized and accepted this earlier, considering that even before case was decided, the municipal council already adopted Resolution No. 29, declaring the area as the parking place and public plaza of the municipality. It is the decision in Civil Case No. 2040 and the said resolution of the municipal council of San Fernando that respondent Macalino was seeking to enforce when he ordered the demolition of the stags constructed in the disputed area. As officer-incharge of the office of the mayor, he had the duty to clear the area and restore it to its intended use as a parking place and public plaza of the municipality of San Fernando, conformably to the orders from the court and the council. It is, therefore, not correct to say that he had acted without authority or taken the law into his hands in issuing his order. Neither can it be said that he acted whimsically in exercising his authority for it has been established that he directed the demolition of the stalls only after, upon his instructions, the municipal attorney had conducted an investigation, to look into the complaint filed by the Association of Concerned Citizens and Consumers of San Fernando. There is evidence that the petitioners were notified of this hearing, which they chose to disregard. Photographs of the disputed area, which does look congested

and ugly, show that the complaint was valid and that the area really needed to be cleared, as recommended by the municipal attorney. Since the occupation of the place in question, it has deteriorated increasingly to the great prejudice of the community in general. The proliferation of stags therein, most of them makeshift and of flammable materials, has converted it into a veritable fire trap, which, added to the fact that it obstructs access to and from the public market itself, has seriously endangered public safety. The filthy condition of the talipapa, where fish and other wet items are sold, has aggravated health and sanitation problems, besides pervading the place with a foul odor that has spread into the surrounding areas. The entire place is unsightly, to the dismay and embarrassment of the inhabitants, who want it converted into a showcase of the town of which they can all be proud. The vendors in the talipapa have also spilled into the street and obstruct the flow of traffic, thereby impairing the convenience of motorists and pedestrians alike. The regular stallholders in the public market, who pay substantial rentals to the municipality, are deprived of a sizable volume of business from prospective customers who are intercepted by the talipapa vendors before they can reach the market proper. On top of all these, the people are denied the proper use of the place as a public plaza, where they may spend their leisure in a relaxed and even beautiful environment and civic and other communal activities of the town can be held. The problems caused by the usurpation of the place by the petitioners are covered by the police power as delegated to the municipality under the general welfare clause. This authorizes the municipal council "to enact such ordinances and make such regulations, not repugnant to law, as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred upon it by law and such as shall seem necessary and proper to provide for the health and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort, and convenience of the municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of property therein." This authority was validly exercised in this case through the adoption of Resolution No. 29, by the municipal council of San Fernando. Even assuming a valid lease of the property in dispute, the resolution could have effectively terminated the agreement for it is settled that the police power cannot be surrendered or bargained away through the medium of a contract. In fact, every contract affecting the public interest suffers a congenital infirmity in that it contains an implied reservation of the police power as a postulate of the existing legal order. This power can be activated at any time to change the provisions of the contract, or even abrogate it entirely, for the promotion or protection of the general welfare. Such an act will not militate against the impairment clause, which is subject to and limited by the paramount police power.

CITY OF MANILA v. TEOTICO G.R. No. L-23052 January 29, 1968 FACTS: Genaro N. Teotico was at the corner of a "loading and unloading" zone, waiting for a jeepney to take him down town. After waiting for about five minutes, he managed to hail a jeepney that came along to a stop. As he stepped down from the curb to board the jeepney, and took a few steps, he fell inside an uncovered and unlighted catch basin or manhole on P. Burgos Avenue. Due to the fall, his head hit the rim of the manhole breaking his eyeglasses and causing broken pieces thereof to pierce his left eyelid. As blood flowed therefrom, impairing his vision, several persons came to his assistance and pulled him out of the manhole. One of them brought Teotico to the PGH. In addition to the lacerated wound in his left upper eyelid, Teotico suffered contusions on the left thigh, the left upper arm, the right leg and the upper lip apart from an abrasion on the right infra-patella region. Teotico filed a complaint for damages against the City of Manila, its mayor, city engineer, city health officer, city treasurer and chief of police. The trial court dismissed the complaint. The CA affirmed, except insofar as the City of Manila is concerned, which was sentenced to pay damages in the aggregate sum of P6,750.00. ISSUE: Whether or not RA 409 should prevail over Art 2189 of the Civil Code HELD: NO RA 409: The city shall not be liable or held for damages or injuries to persons or property arising from the failure of the Mayor, the Municipal Board, or any other city officer, to enforce the provisions of this chapter, or any other law or ordinance, or from negligence of said Mayor, Municipal Board, or other officers while enforcing or attempting to enforce said provisions. Art 2189 CC: Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death of, or injuries suffered by, any person by reason of defective conditions of road, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other public works under their control or supervision. It is true that, insofar as its territorial application is concerned, Republic Act No. 409 is a special law and the Civil Code a general legislation; but, as regards the subject-matter of the provisions above quoted, Section 4 of Republic Act 409 establishes a general rule regulating the liability of the City of Manila for: "damages or injury to persons or property arising from the failure of" city officers "to enforce the provisions of" said Act "or any other law or ordinance, or from negligence" of the city "Mayor, Municipal Board, or other officers while enforcing or attempting to enforce said

provisions." Upon the other hand, Article 2189 of the Civil Code constitutes a particular prescription making "provinces, cities and municipalities . . . liable for damages for the death of, or injury suffered by any person by reason "specifically" of the defective condition of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other-public works under their control or supervision." In other words, said section 4 refers to liability arising from negligence, in general, regardless of the object thereof, whereas Article 2189 governs liability due to "defective streets," in particular. Since the present action is based upon the alleged defective condition of a road, said Article 2189 is decisive thereon. It is urged that the City of Manila cannot be held liable to Teotico for damages: 1) because the accident involving him took place in a national highway; and 2) because the City of Manila has not been negligent in connection therewith. As regards the first issue, we note that it is based upon an allegation of fact not made in the answer of the City. Moreover, Teotico alleged in his complaint, as well as in his amended complaint, that his injuries were due to the defective condition of a street which is "under the supervision and control" of the City. In its answer to the amended complaint, the City, in turn, alleged that "the streets aforementioned were and have been constantly kept in good condition and regularly inspected and the storm drains and manholes thereof covered by the defendant City and the officers concerned" who "have been ever vigilant and zealous in the performance of their respective functions and duties as imposed upon them by law." Thus, the City had, in effect, admitted that P. Burgos Avenue was and is under its control and supervision. Moreover, the assertion to the effect that said Avenue is a national highway was made, for the first time, in its motion for reconsideration of the decision of the Court of Appeals. Such assertion raised, therefore, a question of fact, which had not been put in issue in the trial court, and cannot be set up, for the first time, on appeal, much less after the rendition of the decision of the appellate court, in a motion for the reconsideration thereof. At any rate, under Article 2189 of the Civil Code, it is not necessary for the liability therein established to attach that the defective roads or streets belong to the province, city or municipality from which responsibility is exacted. What said article requires is that the province, city or municipality have either "control or supervision" over said street or road. Even if P. Burgos Avenue were, therefore, a national highway, this circumstance would not necessarily detract from its "control or supervision" by the City of Manila, under Republic Act 409. This authority has been neither withdrawn nor restricted by Republic Act No. 917 and Executive Order No. 113, dated May 2, 1955, upon which the City relies. Said Act governs the disposition or appropriation of the highway funds and the giving of aid to provinces, chartered cities and municipalities in the construction of roads and streets within their respective boundaries, and Executive Order No. 113 merely implements the provisions of said Republic Act No. 917, concerning the disposition and appropriation of the highway funds. Moreover, it provides that "the construction, maintenance and improvement of national primary, national secondary and national aid provincial and city roads shall be accomplished by the Highway District Engineers and Highway City Engineers under the supervision of the Commissioner of Public

Highways and shall be financed from such appropriations as may be authorized by the Republic of the Philippines in annual or special appropriation Acts."

PROVINCE OF CAMARINES SUR v. CA G.R. No. 103125 May 17, 1993

FACTS: In January 1, 1960 - private respondent Dato was appointed as Private Agent by the then Gov. of Camarines Sur, Apolonio Maleniza. October 12, 1972 - Dato was promoted and appointed Assistant Provincial Warden by then Gov. Felix Alfelor, Sr. Dato had no civil service eligibility for the position he was appointed to, thus, he could not be legally extended a permanent appointment. He was extended a temporary appointment, which was renewed annually. January 1, 1974 Gov. Alfelor approved the change in Dato's employment status from temporary to permanent upon the latter's representation that he passed the civil service examination for supervising security guards. Said change of status however, was not favorably acted upon by the Civil Service Commission (CSC) reasoning that Dato did not possess the necessary civil service eligibility for the office he was appointed to. His appointment remained temporary and no other appointment was extended to him. March 16, 1976 Dato was indefinitely suspended by Gov. Alfelor after criminal charges were filed against him and a prison guard for allegedly conniving and/or consenting to evasion of sentence of some detention prisoners who escaped from confinement. Two years after the request for change of status was made, Mr. Lope B. Rama, head of the Camarines Sur Unit of the Civil Service Commission, wrote the Gov. a letter informing him that the status of private respondent Dato has been changed from temporary to permanent, the latter having passed the examination for Supervising Security Guard. The change of status was to be made retroactive to June 11, 1974, the date of release of said examination.

Sangguniang Panlalawigan, suppressed the appropriation for the position of Assistant Provincial Warden and deleted private respondent's name from the petitioner's plantilla. Dato was subsequently acquitted of the charges against him. Consequently, he requested the Gov. for reinstatement and backwages. His request was not heeded. Dato filed an action before the RTC. RTC ordered the payment of backwages of Dato equivalent to five years. Province of Camarines Sur appealed the decision to the CA. Caffirmed RTCs decision. Hence the present petition.

I S S U E : WON Dato was a permanent employee of petitioner Province of Camarines Sur at the time he was suspended on March 16, 1976. H E L D : NO

Dato, being merely a temporary employee, is not entitled to his claim for backwages for the entire period of his suspension. At the time Dato was appointed Assistant Provincial Warden on January 1, 1974, he had not yet qualified in an appropriate examination for the aforementioned position. Such lack of a civil service eligibility made his appointment temporary and without a fixed and definite term and is dependent entirely upon the pleasure of the appointing power. The fact that private respondent obtained civil service eligibility later on is of no moment as his having passed the supervising security guard examination, did not ipso facto convert his temporary appointment into a permanent one. What is required is a new appointment since a permanent appointment is not a continuation of the temporary appointment these are two distinct acts of the appointing authority The letter communicated by Mr. Lope Rama to the Gov. of Camarines Sur is a clear arrogation of power properly belonging to the appointing authority. CSC has the power to approve or disapprove an appointment set before it. It does not have the power to make the appointment itself or to direct the appointing authority to change the employment status of an employee. CSC should have ended its participation in the appointment of private respondent on January 1, 1974 when it confirmed the temporary status of the latter who lacked the proper civil service eligibility. When it issued the foregoing communication on March 19, 1976, it stepped on the toes of the appointing authority, thereby encroaching on the discretion vested solely upon the latter.

JIMENEZ v. CITY OF MANILA G.R. No. 71049 May 29, 1987

FACTS: Bernardino Jimenez fell in an uncovered opening o the ground located within the premises of the Sta. Ana public market. At that time, the market was flooded with ankle-deep rainwater which prevented the opening form being seen. Jimenez, for his part, went to that market to buy bagoong despite the rains. He sustained an injury due to a rusty 4-inch nail which pierced his left leg. Jimenez sued the Asiatic Integrated Corporation (AIC) and the City of Manila for his misfortune. The Sta. Ana Market at that time was under the administration of the AIC by virtue of a management and Operating Contract it had with the City of Manila. The trial court held the AIC responsible but absolved the City of Manila.

ISSUE: WON the City of Manila is indeed not liable? HELD: NO

The City of Manila is liable. Reasons:

1) building.

Again, Art. 2189 comes into play, since the injury took place in a public

2) Also, Art. 2189 requires that the LGU must retain supervision and control over the public work in question for it to be held liable. The evidence showed that the Management and Operating Contract explicitly stated that the City of Manila retained supervision and control over the Sta. Ana Market. Also, in a letter to Finance Secretary Cesar Virata, Mayor Raymond Bagatsing admitted this fact of supervision and control. Moreover, Sec. 30(g) of the Local Tax Code says that public markets shall be under the immediate supervision, administration and control of the City Treasurer. 3) Jimenez could not be held for negligence. A customer in a store has every right to presume that the owner will comply with his duty to keep his premises safe for customers. The owner of the market, on the other hand, was proven to have been negligent in not providing a cover for the said opening. The negligence of the City of Manila is the proximate cause of the injury suffered. It is not necessary for the LGU to have ownership over the public work in question; mere control and supervision is sufficient.

GUILATCO v. CITY OF DAGUPAN G.R. No. 61516 March 21, 1989 FACTS: Florentina Guilatco, a court interpreter, was about to board a tricycle at a sidewalk located at Perez Boulevard when she accidentally fell into a manhole located in said side walk, causing her right leg to be fractured. She was hospitalized and also as a result, suffered loss of income and moral damages. Guilatco sued the City of Dagupan. The City replied that Perez Boulevard, where the deadly manhole was located, is a national road not under the control and supervision of Dagupan. It is submitted that it is actually the Ministry of Public Highways that has control and supervision thru the Highway Engineer, who by mere coincidence, is also the City Engineer of Dagupan (malas naman namin, City Engineer).


WON the City of Dagupan is liable?


Reasons: 1) We again apply Art. 2189. But the bigger question is , does the City of Dagupan have control and supervision over Perez Boulevard in order for it to be held liable? The answer is yes. Why? Read on. 2) The City of Dagupan argued that the supervision and control over Perez Boulevard belongs more to his function as ex-officio Highway Engineer, thus the Ministry of Public Highways should be held liable. However, the court gave this arguments: Alfredo G. Tangco, in his official capacity as City Engineer of Dagupan, as Ex-Officio Highway Engineer, as Ex-Officio City Engineer of the Bureau of Public Works, and, last but not the least, as Building Official for Dagupan City, receives the following monthly compensation: P1,810.66 from Dagupan City, P200.00 from the Ministry of Public Highways, P100.00 from the Bureau of Public Works and P500.00 by virtue of P>D 1096, respectively. This function of supervision over streets, public buildings, and other public works pertaining to the City Engineer is coursed through Maintenance Foeman and a Maintenance Engineer. Although these last two officials are employees of the National Government, they are detailed with the City of Dagupan and hence receive instruction and supervision from the city through the City Engineer. There is , therefore, no doubt that the City Engineer exercises control or supervision over the public works in question. Hence, the liability of the city to the petitioner under article 2198 of the City Code is clear.

PILAPIL v. CA G.R. No. 97619 November 26, 1992

FACTS: Spouses Pilapil own a parcel of land in Bahak, Poblacion, Liloan, Cebu. Spouses Colomida, on the other hand, bought a parcel of land located also in Bahak. Now this land owned by the Colomidas has for its ingress and egress to the National Road a camino vecinal (barrio road). However, this camino vecinal transverses the property of the Pilapil, which was the root of all their problems. The Pilapil denied the existence of the camino vecinal. Socrates Pilapil, the husband, presented himself as witness (which was lousy) as well as Engineer Epifanio Jordan, Municipal Planning and Development Coordinator of Liloan. The engineer said that while that zoning map of Poblacion, Liloan made reference to a camino vecinal, said reference was but a mere proposal of its existence to the Sangguniang Bayan of

Liloan. The Colomidas, on the other hand, relied on old-timers as witnesses witnesses such as Florentino Pepito, who attested to the existence of the Camino vecinal and its availability to the general public since practically time immemorial. The trial court ruled in favor of the Colomidas because the zoning map used as evidence by the Pilapil did not specifically indicate that the amino vecinal was indeed merely proposed since other roads and streets were classified as such. The CA upheld that trial court, basically because it said that findings of facts by the trial court, as a general rule, should be undisturbed.

ISSUE: WON the zoning plan must give way to the claims of the adversaries? HELD: NO

In its infinite wisdom, the SC said that it didnt matter what opinion the Colomidas or the engineer gave regarding the existence of the camino vecinal. What really mattered is the zoning plan (the Urban Land Use Plan) as finally approved by the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Liloan. The zoning plan showed that the camino vecinal was declared closed. And its beyond dispute that the abandonment, closure or establishment of the camino vecinal is the sole prerogative of the Municipality of Liloan under the LGU of 1983. The SC rebuked the parties for not having resorted to a pre-trial conference which would have prevented the dragging of a trivial case for six years.

LIM v. PACQUING G.R. No. 115044 January 27, 1995 FACTS: The issuance of the permit/license to operate the jai-alai in favor of Associated Development Corporation (ADC) within the territorial boundaries of the City of Manila was the focus of this full blown litigation that question, among others, P.D. 771 which revoked all existing Jai-Alai franchisers issued by local governments as of 20 August 1975.

ISSUE: WON P.D. 771 is unconstitutional. HELD: NO. Presidential Decree No. 771 valid and constitutional.

The time-honored doctrine is that all laws (PD No. 771 included) are presumed valid and constitutional until or unless otherwise ruled by this Court. Not only this; Article XVIII Section 3 of the Constitution states: Sec. 3. All existing laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, letters of instructions and other executive issuances not inconsistent with this Constitution shall remain operative until amended, repealed or revoked. There is nothing on record to show or even suggest that PD No. 771 has been repealed, altered or amended by any subsequent law or presidential issuance (when the executive still exercised legislative powers). Neither can it be tenably stated that the issue of the continued existence of ADC's franchise by reason of the unconstitutionality of PD No. 771 was settled in G.R. No. 115044, for the decision of the Court's First Division in said case, aside from not being final, cannot have the effect of nullifying PD No. 771 as unconstitutional, since only the Court En Banc has that power under Article VIII, Section 4(2) of the Constitution.

LLDA v. CA G.R. Nos. 120865-71 December 7, 1995 FACTS: The Chief Executive of Laguna Lake Development Agency issued Executive Order No. 927 further defined and enlarged the functions and powers of the Authority and named and enumerated the towns, cities and provinces encompassed by the term "Laguna de Bay Region". Also, pertinent to the issues in this case are provisions which include in particular the sharing of fees, prompting the local executives of affected political subdivisions to question the constitutionality of the LLDA in view of the approval of the Republic Act No. 7160, the Local Government Code of 1991. The municipalities in the Laguna Lake Region interpreted the provisions

of this law to mean that the newly passed law gave municipal governments the exclusive jurisdiction to issue fishing privileges within their municipal waters because R.A. 7160 provides their exclusive authority to grant fishery privileges in the municipal waters and impose rental fees. Emboldened by RA 7160, municipal governments thereupon assumed the authority to issue fishing privileges and fishpen permits. Big fishpen operators took advantage of the occasion to establish fishpens and fishcages to the consternation of the Authority. Unregulated fishpens and fishcages, as of July, 1995, occupied almost one-third of the entire lake water surface area, increasing the occupation drastically from 7,000 hectares in 1990 to almost 21,000 hectares in 1995. The Mayor's permit to construct fishpens and fishcages were all undertaken in violation of the policies adopted by the Authority on fishpen zoning and the Laguna Lake carrying capacity. The implementation by the lakeshore municipalities of separate independent policies in the operation of fishpens and fishcages within their claimed territorial municipal waters in the lake and their indiscriminate grant of fishpen permits have already saturated the lake area with fishpens, thereby aggravating the current environmental problems and ecological stress of Laguna Lake.

ISSUE: Which agency of the Government should exercise jurisdiction over the Laguna Lake and its environs insofar as the issuance of permits for fishery privileges is concerned? HELD: It is the LLDA

We hold that the provisions of Republic Act No. 7160 do not necessarily repeal the laws creating the Laguna Lake Development Authority and granting the latter water rights authority over Laguna de Bay and the lake region. The Local Government Code of 1991 does not contain any express provision which categorically expressly repeal the charter of the Authority. It has to be conceded that there was no intent on the part of the legislature to repeal Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendments. The repeal of laws should be made clear and expressed. It has to be conceded that the charter of the Laguna Lake Development Authority constitutes a special law. Republic Act No. 7160, the Local Government Code of 1991, is a general law. It is basic in statutory construction that the enactment of a later legislation which is a general law cannot be construed to have repealed a special law. It is a well-settled rule in this jurisdiction that "a special statute, provided for a particular case or class of cases, is not repealed by a subsequent statute, general in its terms, provisions and application, unless the intent to repeal or alter is manifest, although the terms of the general law are broad enough to include the cases embraced in the special law." Where there is a conflict between a general law and a special statute, the special statute should prevail since it evinces the legislative intent more clearly than the general statute. The special law is to be taken as an exception to the general law in the absence of special circumstances forcing a contrary conclusion. This is because implied repeals are not favored and

as much as possible, effect must be given to all enactments of the legislature. A special law cannot be repealed, amended or altered by a subsequent general law by mere implication. Thus, it has to be concluded that the charter of the Authority should prevail over the Local Government Code of 1991.

VILLACORTA v. BERNARDO GR L-31249 AUGUST 19, 1986 FACTS: A petition for certiorari was raised against a decision of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan annulling an ordinance adopted by the municipal board of Dagupan City. Ordinance 22, that sought to regulate subdivision plans in Dagupan City, ordained that every proposed subdivision plan over any lot in the City of Dagupan, shall before the same is submitted for approval and/or verification by the Bureau of Lands and/or the Land Registration Commission, be previously submitted to the City Engineer of the City who shall see to it that no encroachment is made on any portion of the public domain, that the zoning ordinance and all other pertinent rules and regulations are observed, and that subsequent fees be imposed thereafter.

ISSUE: WON Ordinance 22 is a valid exercise of police power. HELD : NO In declaring the said ordinance null and void, the court a quo, and affirmed by the Supreme Court, declared: From the above-recited requirements, there is no showing that would justify the enactment of the questioned ordinance. Section 1 of said ordinance clearly conflicts with Section 44 of Act 496, because the latter law does not require subdivision plans to be submitted to the City Engineer before the same is submitted for approval to and verification by the General Land Registration Office or by the Director of Lands as provided for in Section 58 of said Act. Section 2 of the same ordinance also contravenes the provisions of Section 44 of Act 496, the latter being silent on a service fee of PO.03 per square meter of every lot subject of such subdivision application; Section 3 of the ordinance in question also conflicts with Section 44 of Act 496, because the latter law does not mention of a certification to be made by the City Engineer before the Register of Deeds allows registration of the subdivision plan; and the last section of said ordinance imposes a penalty for its violation, which Section 44 of Act 496 does not impose. In other words, Ordinance 22 of the City of Dagupan imposes upon a subdivision owner additional conditions. The Court takes note of the laudable purpose of the ordinance in bringing to a halt the surreptitious registration of lands belonging to the government. But as already intimidated above, the powers of the board in enacting such a laudable ordinance cannot be held valid when it shall impede the exercise of rights granted in a general law and/or make a general law subordinated to a local ordinance. To sustain the ordinance would be to open the floodgates to other ordinances amending and so violating national laws in the guise of implementing them. Thus, ordinances could be passed imposing additional requirements for the issuance of marriage licenses, to prevent bigamy; the registration of vehicles, to minimize carnaping; the execution of contracts, to forestall fraud; the validation of passports, to deter imposture; the exercise of freedom of speech, to reduce disorder; and so on. The list is endless, but the means, even if the end be valid, would be ultra vires. We therefore urge that proper care attend the exercise of the police power lest it deteriorate into an unreasonable intrusion into the purely private affairs of the individual. The so-called "general welfare" is too amorphous and convenient an excuse for official arbitrariness. Let it always be remembered that in the truly democratic state, protecting the rights of the individual is as important as, if not more so than, protecting the rights of the public. This advice is especially addressed to the local governments which exercise the police power only by virtue of a valid delegation from the national legislature under the general welfare clause. In the instant case, Ordinance No. 22 suffers from the additional defect of violating this authority for legislation in contravention of the national law by adding to its requirements.

ARDONA v. REYES GR L-60549 OCTOBER 26, 1983 FACTS: The Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA) filed 4 complaints with the CFI of Cebu City for the expropriation of some 282 hectares of rolling land situated in Barangays Malubog and Babag, Cebu City, under PTAs express authority, as mandated in its Charter, to acquire by purchase, by negotiation or by condemnation proceedings any private land within and without the tourist zones for the development into integrated resort and sport complexes of selected and well- defined geographic areas with potential tourism value. The defendants, numbering 40, filed motions to dismiss on the ground that the taking was not for public use, specifically that the there is no constitutional provision authorizing the taking of private property for tourism purposes. Moreover, the defendants claimed that the land they own subject of the expropriation is actually covered by certificate of land transfer (CLT) and emancipation patents thereby making the lands expropriated within the coverage of the land reform area under P.D No.2. The

defendants argue that the agrarian reform program occupies a higher level in the order of priorities than other state policies like those relating to the health and physical wellbeing of the people.

ISSUE : WON the position of the so-called Ardona Forty is tenable HELD : NO The petition should be dismissed. Reasons: 1. The concept of public use is not limited to traditional purposes like the construction of roads, bridges, parks and the like. Public use is not use by the public. It also mean, public well-fare and such a concept are broad, and inclusive. The values it represents are spiritual, as well as physical, aesthetic as well as monetary. It is within the power of the legislature to determine that the community should be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious, as well as clean, well balanced as well as carefully patrolled. Once the object is within the authority of Congress, the right to realize it through the exercise of Eminent Domain is clear. As a general rule then, as long as the taking is public, the power of eminent domain comes into pay. 3. The records show that the only 2 of the 40 defendants have CLTs or emancipation patents. And those CLTs in their possession covers only less than 1 hectare of the 282 hectares intended fore expropriation. Moreover, the lessthan 10-hectare portion of land is not even part of the resort and sports complex proper but is part of the 32 hectare resettlement are for all persons affected by the expropriation. Certainly, the human settlement needs of the many beneficiaries of the 32 hectare resettlement area should prevail over the property rights of two of their compatriots.

SANGALANG v. CA GR 71169 FACTS: As far back in 1977, Makati, Metro Manila has always been plagued by traffic. For this reason, during that time, Mayor Nemesio Yabut of Makati ordered that studies be made on ways on how to alleviate the traffic problem, particularly in the areas along the public streets adjacent to Bel-Air Village. The studies revealed that the subdivision plan of Bel-Air was approved by the Court of First Instance of Rizal on the condition, among others, that its major thoroughfares connecting to public streets and highways shall be opened to public traffic. Accordingly, it was deemed necessary by the AUGUST 25, 1989

Municipality of Makati in the interest of the general public to open to traffic Amapola, Mercedes, Zodiac, Jupiter, Neptune, Orbit and Paseo de Roxas Streets. As a result, the gates owned by BAVA at Jupiter and Orbit were ordered demolished. Mayor Yabut justified the opening of the streets on the following grounds: 1) Some time ago, Ayala Corporation donated Jupiter and Orbit Streets to Bel-Air on the condition that, under certain reasonable conditions and restrictions, the general public shall always be open to the general public. These conditions were evidenced by a deed of donation executed between Ayala and Bel-Air. 2) The opening of the streets was justified by public necessity and the exercise of the police power. 3) Bel-Air Village Associations (BAVA) articles of incorporation recognized Jupiter Street as a mere boundary to the southwest thus it cannot be said to be for the exclusive benefit of Bel-Air residents. 4) BAVA cannot hide behind the non-impairment clause on the ground that is constitutionally guaranteed. The reason is that it is not absolute, since it has to be reconciled with the legitimate exercise of police power.

BAVA, on the other hand, contended: 1) Rufino Santos, president of BAVA, never agreed to the opening of the said streets 2) BAVA has always kept the streets voluntarily open anyway Moreover, BAVA claims the demolition of the gates abovementioned was a deprivation of property without process of law or expropriation without just compensation.

ISSUE: WON the City Mayor was correct in ordering the opening of Bel-Air Villages street to the public HELD: YES The Mayor is correct, for the reasons mentioned above. Also, the demolition of the gates is justified under Art. 436 of the Civil Code. When any property is condemned or seized by competent authority in the interest of health, safety or security, the owner thereof shall not be entitled to compensation, unless he can show that such condemnation or seizure is unjustified. In this case, BAVA has the burden unjustified because police power can compensation. The Court is of the opinion was the opening of the gates unjustified. of showing that the seizure of the gates is be exercised without provision for just that the Mayor did not act unreasonably nor In fact, the gates could even be considered

public nuisances, of which summary abatement, as decreed under Art. 701 of the Civil Code, may be carried out by the Mayor.


FACTS: Petitioner, Sultan Alimbusar Limbona, was elected Speaker of the Regional

Legislative Assembly or Batasang Pampook of Central Mindanao (Assembly). On October 21, 1987 Congressman Datu Guimid Matalam, Chairman of the Committee on Muslim Affairs of the House of Representatives, invited petitioner in his capacity as Speaker of the Assembly of Region XII in a consultation/dialogue with local government officials. Petitioner accepted the invitation and informed the Assembly members through the Assembly Secretary that there shall be no session in November as his presence was needed in the house committee hearing of Congress. However, on November 2, 1987, the Assembly held a session in defiance of the Limbona's advice, where he was unseated from his position. Petitioner prays that the session's proceedings be declared null and void and be it declared that he was still the Speaker of the Assembly. Pending further proceedings of the case, the SC received a resolution from the Assembly expressly expelling petitioner's membership therefrom. Respondents argue that petitioner had "filed a case before the Supreme Court against some members of the Assembly on a question which should have been resolved within the confines of the Assembly," for which the respondents now submit that the petition had become "moot and academic" because its resolution. ISSUE: WON the courts of law have jurisdiction over the autonomous governments or regions. What is the extent of self-government given to the autonomous governments of Region XII? HELD: YES Autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power. There is decentralization of administration when the central government delegates administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government power and in the process to make local governments "more responsive and accountable". At the same time, it relieves the central government of the burden of managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate on national concerns. The President exercises "general supervision" over them, but only to "ensure that local affairs are administered according to law." He has no control over their acts in the sense that he can substitute their judgments with his own. Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of political power in the favor of local governments units declared to be autonomous. In that case, the autonomous government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its future with minimum intervention from central authorities. An autonomous government that enjoys autonomy of the latter category [CONST. (1987), Art. X, Sec. 15.] is subject alone to the decree of the organic act creating it and accepted principles on the effects and limits of "autonomy." On the other hand, an autonomous government of the former class is, as we noted, under the supervision of the national government acting through the President (and the Department of Local Government). If the Sangguniang Pampook (of Region XII), then, is autonomous in the latter sense, its acts are, debatably beyond the domain of this Court in perhaps the same way that the internal acts, say, of the Congress of the Philippines are beyond our jurisdiction. But if it is autonomous in the former category only, it comes unarguably under our jurisdiction. An examination of the very Presidential

Decree creating the autonomous governments of Mindanao persuades us that they were never meant to exercise autonomy in the second sense (decentralization of power). PD No. 1618, in the first place, mandates that "[t]he President shall have the power of general supervision and control over Autonomous Regions." Hence, we assume jurisdiction. And if we can make an inquiry in the validity of the expulsion in question, with more reason can we review the petitioner's removal as Speaker. This case involves the application of a most important constitutional policy and principle, that of local autonomy. We have to obey the clear mandate on local autonomy. Upon the facts presented, we hold that the November 2 and 5, 1987 sessions were invalid. It is true that under Section 31 of the Region XII Sanggunian Rules, "[s]essions shall not be suspended or adjourned except by direction of the Sangguniang Pampook". But while this opinion is in accord with the respondents' own, we still invalidate the twin sessions in question, since at the time the petitioner called the "recess," it was not a settled matter whether or not he could do so. In the second place, the invitation tendered by the Committee on Muslim Affairs of the House of Representatives provided a plausible reason for the intermission sought. Also, assuming that a valid recess could not be called, it does not appear that the respondents called his attention to this mistake. What appears is that instead, they opened the sessions themselves behind his back in an apparent act of mutiny. Under the circumstances, we find equity on his side. For this reason, we uphold the "recess" called on the ground of good faith.

CRUZ v. CA GR L-44178 AUGUST 21, 1987

FACTS: The private respondents instituted a class suit before the then Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch VIII in behalf of the vendors and regular stall holders in Padre Rada Market for annulment with preliminary injunction against the then Manila Mayor Antonio J. Villegas, petitioner Cruz, and other persons whose names were unknown to them after the decision of the City Mayor to withdraw Padre Rada Market as a public market. ISSUE: WON the Mayor of Manila can withdraw Padre Rada Market from government supervision HELD: NO By the very nature of a market, its location, opening, operations, and closure must be regulated by government. It is not a question of the petitioner's right to run his market as he pleases but what agency or office should supervise its operations. We agree with the Court of Appeals that the Mayor had no legal authority to, by himself, allow the petitioner to withdraw the major portion of Padre Rada Market from its use as a public market, thereby also withdrawing it from the city's constant supervision. The establishment and maintenance of public markets is by law among the legislative powers of the City of Manila. Since the operation of Padre Rada Market was authorized by a municipal board resolution and approved by the City Mayor, as provided by law, it follows that a withdrawal of the whole or any portion from use as a public market must be subject to the same joint action of the Board and the Mayor. The Mayor of Manila, by himself, cannot provide for the opening, operations, and closure of a public market. There is no question that the Padre Rada Market is a public market as it was authorized to operate and it operates as such. The Padre Rada Market is, therefore, a public market which happens to be privately-owned and privately operated. The Padre Rada Market is a public market and as such should be subject to the local government's supervision and control. Its conversion into a private market or its closure must follow the procedures laid down by law.

PATALINGHUG v. CA GR 104786 January 27, 1994 FACTS: On November 17, 1982, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Davao City enacted Ordinance No. 363, series of 1982 otherwise known as the "Expanded Zoning Ordinance of Davao City," declaring AC-2 District to be dominantly a commercial area compatible for industrial use. Said Ordinance likewise required that funeral or memorial homes must have adequate parking space and that they shall be established not less than 50 meters from any residential structures, churches and other institutional buildings. Thereafter, upon prior approval and certification of zoning compliance by Zoning Administrator issued on February 10, 1987 Building Permit No. 870254, petitioner constructed a funeral parlor named Metropolitan Funeral Parlor at Cabaguio Avenue, Agdao, Davao City, which was followed by complaints from residents of the area. The complainants attacked the validity of the zoning ordinance that was deemed the funeral parlors go signal to establish its business in the residential area occupied by the complainants; ISSUE : WON the City of Davao can declare a residential area as a commercial zone HELD : YES The declaration of the said area as a commercial zone thru a municipal ordinance is an exercise of police power to promote the good order and general welfare of the people in the locality. Corollary thereto, the state, in order to promote the general welfare, may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with business and occupations. Thus, persons may be subjected to certain kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the general welfare of the state and to this fundamental aim of government, the rights of the individual may be subordinated. The ordinance which regulates the location of funeral homes has been adopted as part of comprehensive zoning plans for the orderly development of the area covered thereunder.

FARIAS v. BARBA G.R. No. 116763 April 19, 1996 FACTS: Carlito B. Domingo was a member of the Sangguniang Bayan of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte. On March 24, 1994, he resigned after going without leave to the United States. To fill the vacancy created by his resignation, the mayor, respondent Angelo M. Barba, recommended to the Governor of the province, respondent Rodolfo C. Farias, the appointment of respondent Edward Palafox. A similar recommendation for the appointment of Edward Palafox was made by the Sangguniang Bayan of San Nicolas but the recommendation was made to Mayor Barba. The resolution, containing the recommendation, was submitted to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Ilocos Norte in compliance with Section 56 of the Local Government Code (R.A. No. 7160). The Sangguniang Panlalawigan disapproved the resolution "for the reason that the authority and power to appoint Sangguniang Bayan members are lodged in the Governor, and therefore, the Resolution should be addressed to the Provincial Governor." Accordingly, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan recommended to the Governor the appointment of petitioner Al Nacino, vice Carlito Domingo, as member of the Sangguniang Bayan of San Nicolas. On June 8, 1994, petitioner Governor appointed petitioner Nacino and swore him in office that same day. On the other hand, respondent Mayor Barba appointed respondent Edward Palafox to the same position on June 8, 1994. The next day, June 9, 1994, respondent Palafox took his oath as member of the Sangguniang Bayan.

ISSUE: WON a Governor can appoint a replacement for a Municipal Councilor who left permanently vacant his elected position HELD: NO On July 8, 1994 the trial court rendered its decision, upholding the appointment of respondent Palafox by respondent Mayor Barba. It held: Under the facts and circumstances as shown clearly in the case, there is no doubt the law that is applicable is sub-section "C" of Section 45 of Republic Act No. 7160 otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991 which provides: In case the permanent vacancy is caused by a Sanggunian Member who does not belong to any political party, the Local Chief Executive shall upon the recommendation of the Sanggunian concerned, appoint a qualified person to fill the vacancy. . . . Inasmuch as the permanent vacancy is in the Sanggunian Bayan of San Nicolas,

Ilocos Norte, it is the Sanggunian concerned referred to in the law which recommends the appointment to fill the vacancy. . . This being so, the Local Chief Executive referred to in sub-section "C" of Section 45 of Republic Act No. 7160 is the Municipal Mayor of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte. Since the vacancy in this case was created by a Sanggunian member who did not belong to any political party, the specific provision involved is par. (c), to wit: (c) In case the permanent vacancy is caused by a sanggunian member who does not belong to any political party, the local chief executive shall, upon recommendation of the sanggunian concerned, appoint a qualified person to fill the vacancy. We think that the phrase "sanggunian concerned" in Section 45(c) should more properly be understood as referring to the Sanggunian in which the vacancy is created. This is in keeping with the policy implicit in Section 45(a).


G.R. No. 127820 July 20, 1998

FACTS: Pursuant to Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 93-95, Series of 1993, the Municipality of Paraaque filed on September 20, 1993, a Complaint for expropriation against Private Respondent V.M. Realty Corporation over two parcels of land (Lots 2-A-2 and 2-B-1 of Subdivision Plan Psd17917), with a combined area of about 10,000 square meters, located at Wakas, San Dionisio, Paraaque, Metro Manila, and covered by Torrens Certificate of Title No. 48700. Allegedly, the complaint was filed "for the purpose of alleviating the living conditions of the underprivileged by providing homes for the homeless through a socialized housing project." Parenthetically, it was also for this stated purpose that petitioner, pursuant to its Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 577, Series of 1991, previously made an offer to enter into a negotiated sale of the property with private respondent, which the latter did not accept. ISSUE: WON a local government unit can exercise the power of eminent domain armed only with a Council Resolution HELD: NO A local government unit (LGU), like the Municipality of Paraaque, cannot authorize an expropriation of private property through a mere resolution of its lawmaking body. The Local Government Code expressly and clearly requires an ordinance or a local law for the purpose. A resolution that merely expresses the sentiment or opinion of the Municipal Council will not suffice. The right of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain is not disputed. However, such right may be exercised only pursuant to an Ordinance (Sec. 19, R.A No. 7160). In the instant case, there is no such ordinance passed by the Municipal Council of Paraaque enabling the Municipality, thru its Chief Executive, to exercise the power of eminent domain. We are not convinced by petitioner's insistence that the terms "resolution" and "ordinance" are synonymous. A municipal ordinance is different from a resolution. An ordinance is a law, but a resolution is merely a declaration of the sentiment or opinion of a lawmaking body on a specific matter. An ordinance possesses a general and permanent character, but a resolution is temporary in nature. Additionally, the two are enacted differently a third reading is necessary for an ordinance, but not for a resolution, unless decided otherwise by a majority of all the Sanggunian members.