ON MARRIAGES CELEBRATED ABROAD

Garcia vs. Recio G.R. No. 138322, October 2, 2001

FACTS:
On May 18, 1989, a decree of divorce was issued by an Australian family
court dissolving the marriage of respondent Rederick Recio, then Filipino and
Editha Samson, an Australian citizen. He then married petitioner Grace
Garcia, a Filipina on January 12, 1994. On March 1998, petitioner filed a
complaint for declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of bigamy
that respondent had a subsisting marriage when he married her. In the
respondents answer, he contended that his first marriage to an Australian
citizen had been validly dissolved by a divorce decree obtained in Australia in
1989 thus, he was legally capacitated to marry petitioner in 1994. On July 7,
1998, while the suit for the declaration of nullity was pending, respondent
was able to secure a divorce decree from a family court in Sydney, Australia.
The trial court declared the marriage dissolved on the ground that the divorce
issued in Australia was valid and recognized in the Philippines. The Australian
divorce had ended the marriage; thus, there was no more martial union to
nullify or annul.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson was
proven and;
(2) Whether respondent was legally capacitated to marry petitioner
HELD:
A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction,
provided such decree is valid according to the national law of the foreigner.
However, the divorce decree and the governing personal law of the alien
spouse who obtained the divorce must be proven. Our courts do not take
judicial notice of foreign laws and judgment; hence, like any other facts, both
the divorce decree and the national law of the alien must be alleged and
proven according to our law on evidence.
The court a quo erred in finding that the divorce decree ipso facto clothed
respondent with the legal capacity to remarry without requiring him to
adduce sufficient evidence to show the Australian personal law governing his
status; or at the very least, to prove his legal capacity to contract the second
marriage. The legal capacity to contract marriage is determined by the
national law of the party concerned. A duly authenticated and admitted
certificate is prima facie evidence of legal capacity to marry on the part of
the alien applicant for a marriage license. The proof is absent here.

Roehr vs Rodriguez G.R. No. 142829 June 20, 2003

FACTS
Petitioner Wolfgang O. Roehr, a German citizen and resident of Germany,
married private respondent Carmen Rodriguez, a Filipina, on December 11,
1980 in Hamburg, Germany. On August 28, 1996, respondent filed a petition
for declaration of nullity of marriage. Pending trial, petitioner obtained a
decree of divorce from the Court of First Instance of Hamburg-Blankenese,
promulgated on December 16, 1997. Custody of the children was granted to
petitioner. On May 20, 1999, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the
ground that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
action as a decree of annulment has already been promulgated. Motion to
Dismiss was granted and respondent filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration
for the custody of the children and distribution of the properties. Petitioner
contended that there is nothing to be done anymore in the case as there is
already a decree of divorce promulgated by a German court.
ISSUES
Whether the legal effects of a divorce obtained from a foreign country such
as support and custody of the children, can be determined in our courts.
HELD
As a general rule, divorce decrees obtained by foreigners in other countries
are recognizable in our jurisdiction, but the legal effects thereof, e.g. on
custody, care and support of the children, must still be determined by our
courts. Before our courts can give the effect of res judicata to a foreign
judgment, such as the award of custody to petitioner by the German court, it
must be shown that the parties opposed to the judgment had been given
ample opportunity to do so on grounds allowed under Rule 39, Section 50 of
the Rules of Court. Accordingly, the respondent was not given the opportunity
to challenge the judgement of the German Court, therefore, legal effects of
divorce must be determined in our courts. The court held that the trial court
has jurisdiction over the issue between the parties as to who has parental
custody.

Llorente vs CA, GR No. 124371, November 23, 2000

FACTS
Lorenzo Llorente and petitioner Paula Llorente were married in Camarines Sur
in Feb 22, 1937. On November 30, 1943, Lorenzo became a naturalized US
citizen. Lorenzo discovered that petitioner had an adulterous relationship so
he filed for divorce with the Superior Court of the State of California and on
December 4, 1952, the divorce became final. On January 16, 1958, Lorenzo
married Alicia F. Llorente who had no knowledge of the first marriage and
they lived together until his death on June 11, 1985. Upon learning of
Lorenzos death, Paula filed a petition for the issuance of letters testamentary
in her favour contending that she is the surviving legitimate spouse.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether the foreign divorce between petitioner Paula and the late
Lorenzo is valid and if it capacitated him to remarry.
HELD:
Citing Van Dorn v Romillo, the Court ruled that aliens may obtain divorces
abroad, provided they are valid according to their national law. Also citing
Pilapil vs Ibay-Somera, divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the
Philippines in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the status of
persons.
The court held that the divorce obtained by Lorenzo Llorente from his wife
Paula is valid and recognized in this jurisdiction as a matter of comity.

Republic vs Orbecido III G.R. No. 154380, October 5, 2005

FACTS:
Cipriano Orbecido III married then Filipina, Lady Myros Villanueva on May 24,
1981. Ciprianos wife left for the US and was naturalized as an American
citizen after a few years. He then learned that his wife obtained a divorce
decree and married a certain Stanley. Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial
court a petition for authority to remarry.
ISSUE:
Whether the petition for authority to remarry be granted?
HELD:
When Ciprianos wife was naturalized as an American citizen, there was still a
valid marriage that has been celebrated between her and Cipriano. The
naturalized alien wife subsequently obtained a valid divorce capacitating her
to remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites for the application of Paragraph 2 of
Article 26 are both present in this case. Thus Cipriano, the divorced Filipino
spouse, should be allowed to remarry.
Likewise, before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our own
courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and
demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it.] Furthermore,
respondent must also show that the divorce decree allows his former wife to
remarry as specifically required in Article 26. Otherwise, there would be no
evidence sufficient to declare that he is capacitated to enter into another
marriage.

Bayot vs CA G.R. Nos. 155635 & 163979, November 7, 2008

FACTS:
Vicente married Rebecca, an American Citizen on April 20, 1979, in
Mandaluyong City.
In 1996, Rebecca initiated divorce proceedings in the
Dominican Republic and on February 22, 1996, a decree dissolving their
marriage was issued by the Dominican court, leaving them to remarry after
completing the legal requirements. On March 21, 2001, Rebecca filed a
petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage on the ground of
Vicentes alleged psychological incapacity. Vicente filed a Motion to Dismiss
on the grounds of lack of cause of action and that the petition is barred by
the prior judgment of divorce. Rebecca opposed on the motion to dismiss
insisting on her Filipino citizenship, as affirmed by the DOJ and that, therefore,
there is no valid divorce to speak of. Vicente who had in the interim
contracted marriage, and Rebecca commenced several criminal complaints
against each other one of which is the charge of bigamy against Vicente. The
RTC denied Vicentes motion to dismiss and declared among other things,
that the divorce judgment invoked by Vicente is a matter of defense best
taken up during actual trial. CA granted Vicentes motion to dismiss that
Rebecca no longer had a legal right in this jurisdiction to have her marriage
with Vicente declared void, the union having been previously dissolved by
foreign divorce that Rebecca secured as an American citizen. Pursuant to the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family code, such divorce restored
Vicentes capacity to contract another marriage.
ISSUE:
Whether the divorce granted by the foreign court is valid.
HELD:
Citing Garcia vs Recio, a foreign divorce can be recognized here, provided the
divorce decree is proven as a fact and as valid under the national law of the
alien spouse. The fact that Rebecca was an American citizen when she

secured the divorce and that she presented a duly authenticated copy of the
decree are, sufficient proofs for the admission of their divorce in our courts..
As to Rebeccas citizenship, the court can assume that Rebecca is now a
Filipino citizen but she was not yet a recognized Filipino citizen when she
secured the judgment of divorce from the Dominican Republic. The court
pointed out that the reckoning point is not the citizenship of the divorcing
parties at birth or at the time of marriage, but their citizenship at the time a
valid divorce is obtained abroad
It is clear that Rebecca lacks a cause of action. With the valid foreign divorce
secured by Rebecca, there is no more marital tie binding her, thus there is no
more marriage to be annulled.

San Luis vs San Luis, GR Nos. 133743 & 134029, February 6, 2007.
FACTS
Felicisimo contracted three marriages in his lifetime. The first predeceased
him and the second, named Merry Lee, was an American citizen who was
issued a Decree granting Absolute Divorce. Felicisimo then married
respondent Felicidad Sagalongos-San Luis in California. He lived with her for
18 years until his death on December 18, 1992. Respondent sought the
dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and the settlement of
Felicisimos estate, alleging that she is widow. She prayed that the letters of
administration be issued to her. On February 4, 1994, petitioner Rodolfo San
Luis, one of the children by his first marriage filed a motion to dismiss
claiming that the respondent has no legal personality to file the petition
because she was only a mistress of Felicisimo since the latter, at the time of
his death was still married to Merry Lee. The trial court denied the motion to
dismiss. Unaware of the dismissal, respondent presented the decree of
absolute divorce issued by the State of Hawaii to prove that Felicisimos
marriage to Merry Lee had already been dissolved. She claimed that
Felicisimo had a legal capacity to marry following the decree of divorce.
ISSUE
Whether the divorce between Felicisimo and Merry Lee was valid, giving the
respondent the legal capacity to file a petition for letters of administration.
HELD
The records show that there is insufficient evidence to prove the validity of
the divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as the marriage of the respondent
and Felicisimo under the laws of the USA. The presentation solely of the

divorce decree is insufficient and that proof of its authenticity and due
execution must be presented. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing
or document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country
by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the
officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the
Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the
proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service
stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b)
authenticated by the seal of his office.
Nevertheless, we find that the latter has the legal personality to file the
subject petition for letters of administration, as she may be considered the
co-owner of Felicisimo as regards the properties that were acquired through
their joint efforts during their cohabitation.

ON CONSEQUENCES OF A VALID OR INVALID MARRIAGE

On Legal Separation
De la Cruz vs de la Cruz G.R. No., L-19565, January 30, 1968
FACTS
The plaintiff, Estrella de la Cruz and the defendant, Severino de la Cruz, were
married in Bacolod City on February 1, 1938. The defendant started living in
Manila in 1955, although he occasionally returned to Bacolod City, sleeping in
his office instead of sleeping in the conjugal dwelling although in the said
year, he paid short visits during which they engaged in brief conversations.
After 1955 up to the time of the trial (complaint was filed on July 22, 1958),
the defendant had never visited the conjugal abode. In 1949, she began to
suspect the existence of illicit relations between defendant and Nenita
Hernandez. The defendant denied that he abandoned his wife and family,
averring that he has never failed, even for a single month, to give them
financial support. The defendant denied that he had a mistress.
ISSUE
Did the separation of the defendant from the plaintiff constitute
abandonment in law that would justify a separation of the conjugal
partnership properties?
HELD

The word abandon, in its ordinary sense, means to forsake entirely. When
referring to desertion of a wife by a husband, the word has been defined as
the act of a husband in voluntarily leaving his wife with intention to forsake
her entirely, never to return to her and never to resume his marital duties
towards her, or to claim his marital rights.
In the case at bar, the court believes that the defendant did not intend to
leave his wife and children permanently. The record conclusively shows that
he continued to give support to his family despite his absence from the
conjugal home.
If there is only physical separation between the spouses (and nothing more),
engendered by the husband's leaving the conjugal abode, but the husband
continues to manage the conjugal properties with the same zeal, industry,
and efficiency as he did prior to the separation, and religiously gives support
to his wife and children, as in the case at bar, we are not disposed to grant
the wife's petition for separation of property. This decision may appear to
condone the husband's separation from his wife; however, the remedies
granted to the wife by articles 167 and 178 are not to be construed as
condonation of the husband's act but are designed to protect the conjugal
partnership from waste and shield the wife from want. Therefore, a denial of
the wife's prayer does not imply a condonation of the husband's act but
merely points up the insufficiency or absence of a cause of action.
Lapuz-Sy vs Eufemio GR. No. L-30977 January 31, 1972

FACTS:
On August 18, 1953, Carmen Lapuz filed a petition for legal separation
against Eufemio S. Eufemio alleging that she discovered her husband
cohabiting with a Chinese woman. She prayed among others, that Eufemio
should be deprived of his share of the conjugal partnership profits. In
Eufemios answer to the petition, he counter-claimed a declaration of nullity
ab initio of his marriage with petitioner on the ground of a prior subsisting
marriage with Go Hiok. Before the trial could be completed, petitioner died in
a vehicular accident. Eufemio moved to dismiss the petition for legal
separation on two grounds namely: that the petition for legal separation was
filed beyond the one-year period provided for in Article 102 of the Civil Code;
and that the death of Carmen abated the action for legal separation. On 26
June 1969, counsel for deceased petitioner moved to substitute the deceased
Carmen by her father, Macario Lapuz. Counsel for Eufemio opposed the
motion.
ISSUES:

Does the death of the plaintiff before final decree in an action for legal
separation, abate the action?
HELD:
The Civil Code of the Philippines recognizes this in its Article 100, by allowing
only the innocent spouse (and no one else) to claim legal separation; and in
its Article 108, by providing that the spouses can, by their reconciliation, stop
or abate the proceedings and even rescind a decree of legal separation
already rendered. Being personal in character, it follows that the death of one
party to the action causes the death of the action itself -actio personalis
moritur cum persona.
When one of the spouses is dead, there is no need for divorce, because the
marriage is dissolved. The heirs cannot even continue the suit, if the death of
the spouse takes place during the course of the suit (Article 244, Section 3).
The action is absolutely dead.
As to the petition of respondent-appellee Eufemio for a declaration of nullity
ab initio of his marriage to Carmen Lapuz, it is apparent that such action
became moot and academic upon the death of the latter, and there could be
no further interest in continuing the same after her demise, that
automatically dissolved the questioned union. Any property rights acquired
by either party as a result of Article 144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines 6
could be resolved and determined in a proper action for partition by either
the appellee or by the heirs of the appellant

Benjamin Bugayong vs Leonila Ginez, GR No. L-10033, January 31,

1972

FACTS:
Benjamin Bugayong, a serviceman in the United States Navy, was married to
defendant Leonila Ginez on August 27, 1949, at Asingan, Pangasinan, while
on furlough leave. Immediately after their marriage, the couple lived with
their sisters who later moved to Sampaloc, Manila. After some time, or about
July, 1951, Leonila Ginez left the dwelling of her sister-in-law and informed
her husband by letter that she had gone to reside with her mother in Asingan,
Pangasinan, from which place she later moved to Dagupan City to study in a
local college there. Benjamin soon began receiving letters alleging acs of
infidelity of his wife.

On August 1952, he went to Asingan to meet with his wife and stayed with a
cousin for 2 nights and 1 day as husbad and wife. The next day, Bugayong
tried to verify the truth of the information he received but instead of
answering his query, his wife merely packed up and left, which he took as a
confirmation of acts of infidelity imputed on her.
On November 18, 1952, Bugayong filed a complaint for legel separation
against his wife, Ginez, who in an answer, denied the averments of the
complaint. The lower court dismissed the action alleging condonation of the
charges of adultery.
ISSUE:
Assuming arguendo that truth of the allegations of the commission of acts of
rank infidelity amounting to adultery, has the act charged been condoned by
the plaintiff?
HELD:
The act of the plaintiff in persuading her to come along with him, and the fact
that she went with him and consented to be brought to the house of his
cousin Pedro Bugayong and together they slept there as husband and wife for
one day and one night, and the further fact that in the second night they
again slept together in their house likewise as husband and wife all these
facts have no other meaning in the opinion of this court than that a
reconciliation between them was effected and that there was a condonation
of the wife by the husband. The reconciliation occurred almost ten months
after he came to know of the acts of infidelity amounting to adultery.
The legal separation may be claimed only by the innocent spouse, provided
there has been no condonation of or consent to the adultery or concubinage.

Pacete vs Carriaga, Jr. GR No. L-53880, March 17, 1994

FACTS:
On October 29, 1979, Concepcion Alanis filed a complaint for the declaration
of nullity of her marriage with Enrico Pacete as well as legal separation of
their property. She alleged that Pacete subsequently contracted a second
marriage with Clarita de la Concepcion in North Cotabato which she learned
of only on Aug 1, 1979, and that Pacete fraudulently placed several pieces of
property acquired during their marriage to Clarita and other dummies. The

defendants were served summons but they failed to file a timely Answer. The
court declared the defendants in default and ordered the issuance of a decree
of legal separation and declared numerous amounts of property as part of the
conjugal properties.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC gravely abused its discretion in issuing the decree of
legal separation.
HELD:
The default order unquestionably is not legally sanctioned. The Civil Code
provides:
Art. 101. No decree of legal separation shall be promulgated upon a
stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment.
In case of non-appearance of the defendant, the court shall order the
prosecuting attorney to inquire whether or not collusion between the parties
exists. If there is no collusion, the prosecuting attorney shall intervene for the
State in order to take care that the evidence for the plaintiff is not fabricated
The special prescriptions on actions that can put the integrity of marriage to
possible jeopardy are impelled by no less than the State's interest in the
marriage relation and its avowed intention not to leave the matter within the
exclusive domain and the vagaries of the parties to alone dictate.
It is clear that the petitioner did, in fact, specifically pray for legal separation.
That other remedies, whether principal or incidental, have likewise been
sought in the same action cannot dispense, nor excuse compliance, with any
of the statutory requirements aforequoted.

THE LAW ON PROPERTY

On Possession

CIR vs Solidbank Corporation G.R. No. 148191. November 25, 2003

FACTS:
On January 30, 1996, [the Court of Tax Appeals] rendered a decision in CTA
Case No. 4720 entitled Asian Bank Corporation vs. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, wherein it was held that the 20% final withholding tax on banks
interest income should not form part of its taxable gross receipts for purposes
of computing the gross receipts tax. Since there is no actual receipt, the FWT
is not to be included in the tax base for computing the GRT. There is
supposedly no pecuniary benefit or advantage accruing to the bank from the
FWT, because the income is subjected to a tax burden immediately upon
receipt through the withholding process.
Respondent argues that only items of income actually received should be
included in its gross receipts. It claims that since the amount had already
been withheld at source, it did not have actual receipt thereof.
ISSUE:
Whether the 20% FWT forms part of the taxable gross receipts in computing
the 5% gross receipts tax.
HELD:
The court applied the rules on actual and constructive possession provided in
Articles 531 and 532 of our Civil Code. Under Art 531: Possession is
acquired by the material occupation of a thing or the exercise of a right, or by
the fact that it is subject to the action of our will, or by the proper acts and
legal formalities established for acquiring such right.
Article 532 states: Possession may be acquired by the same person who is to
enjoy it, by his legal representative, by his agent, or by any person without
any power whatever; but in the last case, the possession shall not be
considered as acquired until the person in whose name the act of possession
was executed has ratified the same, without prejudice to the juridical
consequences of negotiorum gestio in a proper case.
Article 531 of the Civil Code clearly provides that the acquisition of the right
of possession is through the proper acts and legal formalities established
therefor. The withholding process is one such act. There may not be actual
receipt of the income withheld; however, as provided for in Article 532,
possession by any person without any power whatsoever shall be considered
as acquired when ratified by the person in whose name the act of possession
is executed.
In our withholding tax system, possession is acquired by the payor as the
withholding agent of the government, because the taxpayer ratifies the very
act of possession for the government. There is thus constructive receipt. The

processes of bookkeeping and accounting for interest on deposits and yield

on deposit substitutes that are subjected to FWT are indeed -- for legal
purposes -- tantamount to delivery, receipt or remittance.
Besides,
respondent itself admits that its income is subjected to a tax burden
immediately upon receipt, although it claims that it derives no pecuniary
benefit or advantage through the withholding process.
There being
constructive receipt of such income -- part of which is withheld -- RR 17-84
applies, and that income is included as part of the tax base upon which the
GRT is imposed.

RP vs Jerry David GR No. 155634, August 16, 2004

FACTS
Jerry David is an employee of SSS and pursuant to its Employees Housing
Loan Program, SSS awarded David a house and lot located at North Fairview,
Quezon City. In an investigation conducted by SSS, it was revealed that David
committed two violations of his deed of conditional sale. SSS then sent a
letter to David formally revoking, terminating or rescinding the deed of
conditional sale. However, the latter refused to vacate and surrender
possession of the subject property, prompting SSS to file a complaint. David
denied the allegations, stating that Buenaventura Penus was a caretaker until
renovations and modifications on the house were made. The lower court
dismissed the complaint. CA affirmed the decision ruling that while person
had been found occupying the subject property, no proof was adduced by
petitioner to prove that they had take possession of it on their own behalf and
not merely as respondent caretakers.
ISSUE
Whether the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in affirming the
Decision of the trial court holding that respondent did not violate the terms
and conditions of the Deed of Conditional Sale.
HELD:
The court ruled that the respondent did not comply with two concurring
conditions actual occupancy and possession at all times.
Actual possession consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over
property of such a nature as a party would naturally exercise over his own as when respondent himself is physically in occupation of the property, or

even when another person who recognizes the formers rights as owner is in
occupancy. In short, possession can be either actual or merely constructive.
On the other hand, actual occupancy connotes something real, or actually
existing, as opposed to something merely possible, or to something which is
presumptive or constructive. Unlike possession, it can only be actual or real,
not constructive.
Under the terms of the subject Contract, actual possession cannot be
equated with actual occupancy. Inasmuch as the housing unit was physically
occupied by parties other than those intended to be benefited by the housing
program of the Social Security System, there was a clear violation of the
Contract. Since respondent did not comply with his obligations, rescission is
proper.
The Petition was granted and the assailed Decision set aside.