CASE DIGESTS

De Villa v. CA G.R. No. 87416 (April 8, 1991)

FACTS: Petitioner was charged with a violation of BP 22 (Bouncing Checks Law) for issuing a worthless check. However, he contends that the check was drawn against a dollar account with a foreign bank, and is therefore, not covered by the said law. ISSUE: W/N the Makati Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the case in question. HELD: The Makati Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction. The determinative factor (in determining venue) is the place of the issuance of the check. The offense was committed in Makati and therefore, the same is controlling and sufficient to vest jurisdiction in the Makati Regional Trial Court. The Court acquires jurisdiction over the case and over the person of the accused upon the filing of a complaint or information in court which initiates a criminal action. With regard to Petitioners allegation that the check is not covered by BP 22, it will be noted that the law does not distinguish the currency involved in the case. Thus, the Court revealed that the records of Batasan, Vol. III unmistakably show that the intention of the lawmakers is to apply the law to whatever currency may be the subject thereof.

City of manila vs. Gomez

Facts: Section 4 of the special education fund ( RA 5447) provides that an annual additional tax of 1% on the assessed value of the real property in addition to the real property tax levied under existing laws may be imposed, but such tax shall not exceed a maximum of 3%. That maximum limit gave the municipal board of manila the idea of fixing the realty tax at 3% thru ordinance # 7125 that imposed an additional % realty tax. Esso Phil., inc. paid under protest the additional % tax for the third quarter of 1003 on its land and machineries then filed a complaint contending that such tax is void because it is not authorized by the city charter nor by law Issue: WON the imposition of additional % realty tax is void Held: No. The doctrine of implications in statcon sustains the city of manilas contention that the additional tax is sanctioned by sec. 4 of RA 5447 that the total realty tax shall not exceed a maximum of 3%. While the 1949 revised charter of manila fixed the realty tax at 1 %, on the other hand, the RA 5447 definitely fixed 3% as the maximum realty tax of which 1% would accrue to the SEF. The obvious implication is that an additional % to tax could be imposed by municipal corporations. Inferentially, that law fixed at 2% the realty tax that would accrue to a city or municipality.

People v. Manantan
GR L-14129, 31 July 1962 (5 SCRA 684) En Banc, Regala (p): 7 concur, 1 took no part, 1 on leave Facts: In an information filed by the Provincial Fiscal of Pangasinan in the Court of First Instance (CFI) of that Province, Guillermo Manantan was charged with a violation of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. A preliminary investigation conducted by said court resulted in the finding of a probable cause that the crime charged was committed by the defendant. Thereafter, the trial started upon defendants plea of not guilty, the defense moved to dismiss the information on the ground that as justice of the peace, the

defendant is not one of the officers enumerated in Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. The lower court denied the motion to dismiss, holding that a justice of the peace is within the purview of Section 54. A second motion was filed by defense counsel who cited in support thereof the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in People vs. Macaraeg, where it was held that a justice of the peace is excluded from the prohibition of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. Acting on various motions and pleadings, the lower court dismissed the information against the accused upon the authority of the ruling in the case cited by the defense. Hence, the appeal by the Solicitor General. Issue: Whether the justice of the peace was excluded from the coverage of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code Held: Under the rule of Casus omisus pro omisso habendus est, a person, object or thing omitted from an enumeration must be held to have been omitted intentionally. The maxim casus omisus can operate and apply only if and when the omission has been clearly established. The application of the rule of casus omisus does not proceed from the mere fact that a case is criminal in nature, but rather from a reasonable certainty that a particular person, object or thing has been omitted from a legislative enumeration. Substitution of terms is not omission. For in its most extensive sense the term judge includes all officers appointed to decide litigated questions while acting in that capacity, including justice of the peace, and even jurors, it is said, who are judges of facts. The intention of the Legislature did not exclude the justice of the peace from its operation. In Section 54, there is no necessity to include the justice of peace in the enumeration, as previously made in Section 449 of the Revised Administrative Code, as the legislature has availed itself of the more generic and broader term judge, including therein all kinds of judges, like judges of the courts of First Instance, judges of the courts of Agrarian Relations, judges of the courts of Industrial Relations, and justices of the peace. The Supreme Court set aside the dismissal order entered by the trial court and remanded the case for trial on the merits.

JM Tuason v Mariano
GR. No. L-33140 10.23.78 F: The case involves the question of validity of ownership of a land title of the petitioners filed by the respondents. A previous civil case was already decided upon by the court upholding the validity of said title owned by the petitioners. The petitioners herein filed a motion for certiorari and prohibition. I: WON the respondents may still question the validity of said land title. R: The court held they cannot question an issue that has already been decided by the court in finality. The validity of said title is no longer open for attack as it is against public policy that matters already decided on its merits be re-litigated once again.

JUANITO C. PILAR vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 115245/ 245 SCRA 759 July 11, 1995 FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari assailing the Resolution of the COMELEC in UND No. 94-040. Petitioner Pilar filed his COC for the position of member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Isabela. 3 days after, petitioner withdrew his certificate of candidacy. The COMELEC imposed upon petitioner the fine of P10,000.00 for failure to file his statement of

contributions and expenditures pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. 2348, in turn implementing R.A. No. 7166 which provides that: Statement of Contributions and Expenditures: Effect of Failure to File Statement. Every candidate and treasurer of the political party shall, within thirty (30) days after the day of the election, file in duplicate with the offices of the Commission the full, true and itemized statement of all contributions and expenditures in connection with the election. Petitioner argues that he cannot be held liable for failure to file a statement of contributions and expenditures because he was a "non-candidate," having withdrawn his certificates of candidacy three days after its filing. Petitioner posits that "it is . . . clear from the law that candidate must have entered the political contest, and should have either won or lost" COMELEC denied the motion for reconsideration of petitioner and deemed final its first decision. Petitioner went to the COMELEC En Banc (UND No. 94-040), which denied the petition. Hence, this petition for certiorari. ISSUE: Did Petitioner's withdrawal of his candidacy extinguish his liability for the administrative fine. HELD: The petition is DISMISSED. Section 14 of R.A. No. 7166 states that "every candidate" has the obligation to file his statement of contributions and expenditures. Well-recognized is the rule that where the law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish. In the case at bench, as the law makes no distinction or qualification as to whether the candidate pursued his candidacy or withdrew the same, the term "every candidate" must be deemed to refer not only to a candidate who pursued his campaign, but also to one who withdrew his candidacy. Furthermore, Section 14 of the law uses the word "shall." As a general rule, the use of the word "shall" in a statute implies that the statute is mandatory, and imposes a duty which may be enforced , particularly if public policy is in favor of this meaning or where public interest is involved. We apply the general rule. Also, Section 13 of Resolution No. 2348 categorically refers to "all candidates who filed their certificates of candidacy. It is not improbable that a candidate who withdrew his candidacy has accepted contributions and incurred expenditures, even in the short span of his campaign. The evil sought to be prevented by the law is not all too remote. Lastly, we note that under the fourth paragraph of Section 73 of the B.P. Blg. 881 or the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines, it is provided that "[t]he filing or withdrawal of certificate of candidacy shall not affect whatever civil, criminal or administrative liabilities which a candidate may have incurred."
NOTES: - Admittedly, contributions and expenditures are made for the purpose of influencing the results of the elections. The state has an interest in seeing that the electoral process is clean, and ultimately expressive of the true will of the electorate. One way of attaining such objective is to pass legislation regulating contributions and expenditures of candidates, and compelling the publication of the same. - It is noteworthy that Resolution No. 2348 even contemplates the situation where a candidate may not have received any contribution or made any expenditure. Such a candidate is not excused from filing a statement, and is in fact required to file a statement to that effect. Under Section 15 of Resolution No. 2348, it is provided that "[i]f a candidate or treasurer of the party has received no contribution, made no expenditure, or has no pending obligation, the statement shall reflect such fact."

Colgate-Palmolive Phil, Inc v. Gimenez

Case No. 67 G.R. No. L-14787 (January 28, 1961) FACTS: Petitioner Corporation engages in manufacturing toilet preparations and household remedies. Importation of materials including stabilizers and flavors is among those Petitioner imports. For every importation, Petitioner pays the Central Bank of the Philippines 17% special excise tax on the foreign exchange used for the payment of the cost, transportation and other charges pursuant to RA 601, the Exchange Tax Law. Under such law, it was also provided that: Foreign exchanged used for the payment of cost, transportation and/or other charges incident to the importation into the Philippines of stabilizer and flavors shall be refunded to any importer making application therefore. The petitioner therefore seeks a refund of the 17% special excise tax ISSUE: W/N the imports of dental cream stabilizers and flavors are subject to a 17% transportation tax exemption under the Exchange Tax Law. HELD: No. The refusal to deny refund was based on the following argument: All the items enumerated for the tax exemption fall under one specific class, namely: food products, books supplies/ materials and medical supplies. The stabilizers and flavors the petitions refer to are items which must fall under the category of food products. Because such items will be used for toothpaste, it is not a food product and therefore not subject to exemption Petitioners arguments effected the grant of the refund: RA 601 does not categorize the exceptions as stated above. Though stabilizers and flavors are preceded by items that might fall under food products, the following which were included are hardly such: fertilizer, poultry feed, vitamin concentrate, cattle, and industrial starch. Therefore, the law must be seen in its entire context, not the parts and categorizations posited by the respondent.