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Recent Jurisprudence Political Law Dean Candelaria October 3, 2011 Magallona v.

. Secretary Ermita Re: National Territory July 16, 2011 Facts: RA 9522 amended our baselines law.

HISTORY: Old law before UNCLOS were RA 3046 amended by RA 5446. UNCLOS ratified 1984. When the Phil ratified UNCLOS we were bound, so RA 9522 was attempt to make baselines conform to the UNCLOS. Under UNCLOS, baselines cannot be drawn from the outermost points of the archipelago, because it will exceed the limitation of nautical miles.

RA 9522 was questioned by Prof Harry Roque and UP law students. Petitioners contended that RA 9522 weakened the Phils claim over the Kalayaan Island Group and the Scarborough Shoal. Petitioners claim that RA 9522 discards the previous definitions of the Philippine territory under the Treaty of Paris and the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. W/N have standing SC said petitioners have standing, because of the constitutionally sufficient interest in the resolution of the case, issues of national significance, transcendental importance etc. SC said they had standing despite the fact that petitioners raised standing as taxpayers which was improper because the petition did not pertain to public funds etc.

W/N ?? SC said under international law, territory is acquired by occupation, accretion, cession and prescription, not by executing treaties on the regulation of the use of the sea. When a state draws its national territory, it is not the same as complying with a treaty commitment. The UNCLOS is a commitment by the national government. UNCLOS does not say anything about the validity of territorial claims of the state, that is to be determined by the principles of general international law. SC said UNCLOS is maritime in character, unlike the principles of general international principles which refer to land principles.

W/N RA 9522 makes internal waters archipelagic waters and therefore allowing vessels access through right of innocent passage NO. Philippines may still pass legislation regulating routes within the archipelagic waters to regulate innocent passage. SC said innocent passage is a matter of customary international law. If a state delimits its baselines it should not exclude other states who traditionally used the water. Innocent passage principle was identified as part of the generally accepted principals of international law Espina v. Zamora Sept 21, 2010 FACTS: Case pertains to RA 8762, the law that amended the old Retail Nationalization Law. The Retail Trade Liberalization Law of 2000 allows foreigners to engage in retail trade in this country. Petitioners in this case questioned the law claiming that 1) that it violates under Art 2 of the Consti w/ regard to preferences of the Phil (particularly re: Sec 16) and because will kill sari-sari stores b/c of entry of big chains from the US such as Wal-Mart and 2) will promote monopoly.

W/N petitioners had standing Yes, because transcendental importance. Discussed grant of privileges, concessions etc. W/N violates Art 2 of Consti No. The Consti does not really impose a Filipino monopoly in an economic environment. It was not meant to exclude participation by other enterprises outside the country W/N there was a violation of right to property of Filipinos HELD: No violation. It guaranteed the Filipino petitioners that there will be no control by the foreigners because the safeguards in the law are sufficient. CREBA v. Executive Secretary March 9, 2010 FACTS:
History: Companies used accounting techniques to avoid paying income tax by claiming that they were not profitable. The govnt imposed a tax (MCIT) to ensure that these companies would still be subject to tax.

Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Associations, Inc. (CREBA) is an association of real estate developers and builders in the Philippines. It questioned RA8424. CREBA argues that the MCIT violates the due process clause because it levies income tax even if there is no realized gain. W/N tax imposed is constitutional YES. SC found the tax reasonable because it would not be imposed for the first 3 years of the corporations life. Petitioners claimed MCIT imposed tax on capital, which is not allowed. SC no, the tax is not a directly a tax on the capital. MCIT is imposed on gross income which is determined by deducting capital spent by a corporation from the sale of its goods. Southern Hemisphere vs. Anti-Terrorism Council Art 3 Sec 1 (substantive due process) October 5, 2010 FACTS: Southern Hemisphere questioned the Anti-Terrorism Law (human security act)
History: The Human Security Act was enacted as a result of the decision in David v. Arroyo (PD1017). One of the issues in this case was the exercise by the President of her commander-in-chief powers when she adopted General Order 5 in which the military and police were ordered to go after terrorists. The perceived terrorists at that time were the communist rebels. When the General Order was issued, there was no existing Anti-Terrorism law. The SC said the President cannot issue a General Order in the absence of a law, as there would be no law to guide implementation.

Petitioners contend that the Anti-Terrorism law violates human rights. The law is contested because it enumerates offenses and couples them with phrases such as widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the populace intended by the perpetrator and to coerce the government to give into a govnt demand acts which cannot stand without predicate crimes (sorry I didnt really understand the facts). Petitioners also asked the Court to take judicial notice of the fact that they were tagged as militant organizations fronting for the CPP and NPA, saying that this is tantamount to proscription without following procedure under the law. W/N petitioners have standing HELD: NO. Petitioners do not have a direct and personal interest. Petitioners do not show that they are in any immediate danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of the law. None of the petitioners are facing any charge under the assailed law. The SC applied a strict test of standing and said Southern Hemisphere could not initiate a petition for certiorari. Another group (Abu Sayaf) was being charged under the law, but petitioners did not claim to be part of this group.

SC said a penal law assailed through a facial challenge. A facial challenge is different from an as-applied challenge. Facial challenges are applicable to cases involving the freedom of speech, not to those pertaining to prohibited conduct (as in this case)
Facial challenge: examine entire law, point out flaws and defects on assumption/prediction that its existence may cause others not parties to the case to refrain from constitutionally protected speech and challenge.

Questioning the law on the ground that it is void for vagueness is applicable only in actual criminal cases as a matter of defense b/c an accused cannot be charged if he/she has not been informed of the nature of the offense, and a vague law does not adequately inform the accused of the offense charged. This standard cannot be applied here because no one is being criminally charged. In reference to the case where Erap questioned the definition of plunder on the grounds of vagueness, the SC said in that case what was used was an as-applied challenge and not a facial challenge. Further, petitioners did not have standing as taxpayers because there was no appropriation made by the government for the implementation of the law. Roxas v. Macapagal-Arroyo Art Sec 1 (right to life liberty and security) & Writ of Amparo + Habeas Data. Roxas is an Filipino-American who applied for immersion of Bayan USA somewhere in Central Luzon where she was researching health issues. Roxas and some companions were abducted, allegedly from by the military. Roxas claims that she and her companions were abducted and taken to a house somewhere in Tarlac. The 2 male companions were released but Roxas was not. Roxas alleged that she was blindfolded and tortured (punched) that she was brought to a place which she claimed was a military camp. She was able to identify one of her abductors who told her that a special operations group of the military abducted and tortured her. After 5 days, she was released and delivered to her uncles place in Manila. She was warned not to report the incident. Roxas petitioned for the Writs of Habeas Data and Amparo asking:

1. That her abductors be prevented from approaching her and family and be prevented from inflicting
harm on her. 2. Roxas also sought the issuance of an inspection order of the detention areas. 3. Roxas also sought production of documents and reports that pertaining to the incident.

4. Roxas prayed that a video be expunged. The video showed her participating in NPA training
exercises. She claimed that these violated her right to privacy 5. Roxas prayed for the return of her property journals laptop etc HELD: 1. CA correct, she should be protected

2. Request for inspection of detention areas denied because if allowed, the inspection may turn into a
fishing expedition. SC said there was not enough evidence to identifying the specific areas to be inspected. Petitioner did not present direct evidence supporting her testimony that she was brought to certain places. She claimed she was brought to a military camp because of the sounds she heard but her testimony was not otherwise corroborated.

3. Request for production and inspection of documents was denied. Petitioner did not present substantial
evidence to support her claim.

4. Request to have video expunged denied. Petitioner did not show an actual or threatened violation of
privacy, she was not able to comply w/ burden of proof.

5. Request to have property returned was denied. Writs of Amparo and Habeas Data pertain to life,
liberty, security, nothing to do with property. It covers extrajudicial killings. Raising property rights in this case is remote. NOTE: issue of command responsibility. Amparo extend protection from both state AND non-state agents. Roxas impleaded GMA and other leaders of the AFP on the basis of command responsibility. When command responsibility was invoked, SC said it will NOT apply in cases of the writ of amparo because it is a form of INTERIM RELIEF. Amparo does not go as far as a determination of LIABILITY of these officers, it paves the way towards gathering evidence against certain persons implicated in extrajudicial killings. SC said command responsibility can be raised in criminal or admin cases (military justice). SC said there is a law RA 9851 which can be used as a basis to impute responsibility to superiors. However, SC said there was a failure of investigative powers in this case. SC noted there was no proper investigation conducted including the military. SC called on the CHR to continue the investigation and directed PNP + AFP to cooperate. SC said there was an inability to exercise extraordinary diligence in PNP and AFP leadership. Meralco v. Lim October 5, 2010 An employee (Lim) of Meralco petitioned for a writ of habeas data. Officers of Meralco investigated Lim and transferred her to another area because a note that was written. Lim claims that she was not informed of the basis of the investigation and filed for a WHD w/ RTC to obtain information regarding her transfer. W/N issuance of writ of habeas data is proper NO. WHD can be issued against public officials or employees, or private individuals or entities engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding an aggrieved partys person, family or home Meralco does not fall under these. SC said WHD will not cover matters of property or commercial interest. It will only cover life, liberty and security issues. IBP v. Zamora Art 3 Sec 4 Feb 24, 2010 A group of lawyers (through the IBP) sought a permit from the City of Manila. The permit requested the foot of Mendiola Bridge as the venue for their rally. The mayors office transferred the venue to Plaza Miranda. This transfer of venue was done w/o allowing the other party the opportunity to be heard/respond. The rally pushed through and a criminal case (violation of public assembly act) was filed against IBP President Cadiz (now SolGen). HELD: Revisted Public Assembly Act Sec 6 pgrphs C E F. The law requires clear and present danger to be established by the City of Mayor in denying the petition. The denial and reasons should be and conveyed to the applicant. Absent these, there is a violation of due process. If the mayor denies the application, applicant should be allowed to contest the denial. Applicant should be allowed to go to court immediately. The mayor failed comply with his duty because he issued a blank denial. Blank denials are not allowed under the Public Assembly Act b/c the applicant must be allowed to contest. Further, the Court held that the opportunity to be heard precedes the action on the permit. This allows the applicant the opportunity to go to court right away. NPC v. Pinatubo March 26, 2010 NPC opened bidding for the purchase of scrap aluminum conductor (???) but placed limitations on those

who were allowed to participate in the bidding. NPC only allowed partnerships using the product as raw material (those in manufacturing) to bid. Petitioner was a trader and claimed that there was a violation of the equal protection clause because there was so need to distinguish between manufacturers and traders. W/N the classification was valid YES. NPC wanted to monitor how stolen wires were being circulated in the industry and said manufacturers would be a better sector to be monitored because when manufacturer uses the product it will form part of the finished product, unlike traders who can sell it to others, thus increasing the probability of fencing. The SC this is a reasonable classification. Biraogo v. Phil Truth Commission Dec 7, 2010 (Sorry, noisy people behind me kept talking; I could barely hear the lecture) EO 1 created the Truth Commission which was intended to investigate reports of graft and corruption during the previous administration. EO attacked on non-delegability of power. If you look at older cases, the President was allowed to re-organize. SC said the creation of the PTC could not be considered as a re-organization because the PTC was NOT an existing office in the Office of the President, it was a newly created body. The older decisions do not apply because in this case there was no existing office that was re-organized. However, the SC justification may be found under the other clause which states the President must faithfully execute the laws is a principle that can be the basis to convene an ad-hoc body or an investigative commission SC went back to Marcos v. Manglapus President has express powers, but none of the previously mentioned powers would be sufficient basis, so SC cited residual powers (faithfully execute the laws) that might be used as legal justification

Petitioners claimed that the powers of the PTC duplicated those of the OB and DOJ o o SC: NO duplication but a reinforcement of the OB and the DOJ not an exclusive power of the OB to initiate investigation, can be done by other ad hoc bodies SC recognized complimentary character of PTC w/ OB and DOJ

SC ruled on nature of the PTC as distinguished from other Truth Commissions in other parts of the world

o Other places truth commissions are generally conciliatory in character. They are usually found
in countries transitioning from authoritarian to democratic regime. This is unlike the PTC which is clearly judicial retribution as it expressly targets the previous administration.

SC also ruled on equal protection Although there might be occasions where inadvertent classifications are made in a law or in an act of government in this case, the classification was not a mere inadvertence, this was deliberate. The previous administration was singled out. As such, previous cases of classification due to inadvertence cannot be applied. Although the SolGen argued that the President may in the future include other cases not limited to previous administration. SC said not enough because this is merely discretionary since the President may or may not apply this to other administrations, so there is arbitrariness. Truth Commission was declared unconstitutional because it violates the equal protection clause.

o Final Note: PCGG was also created by an EO but was not declared unconstitutional. Virata v.
Sandiganbayan (upholding the formation of the PCGG) simply declared was that there was no violation of equal protection clause but didnt really explain why so the SC could not use this as

basis to uphold the creation of the PTC

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