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CASES FOR EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY BARRIOQUINTO et al. vs. FERNANDEZ et al.

Amnesty CASE: special action for Mandamus instituted by petitioners against respondents who composed the 14th Guerrilla Amnesty Commission, to compel the latter to act and decide WON petitioners are entitled to the benefits of amnesty FACTS: - Petitioners Jimenez and Barrioquinto were charged with the crime of murder. Only Jimenez was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment. - Before appeal, Jimenez became aware of Proclamation No. 8 (dated September 7, 1946) which grants amnesty in favour of all persons who may be charged with an act penalized under the RPC in furtherance of the resistance to the enemy or against persons aiding in the war efforts of the enemy - Petitioners (individually) submitted their case to the Guerrilla Amnesty Commission. - January 9, 1947: order returning the case to the CFI of Zamboanga, without deciding WON petitioners are entitled to amnesty, on the ground that neither of them admitted having committed the offense ISSUE: WON petitioners are entitled to amnesty YES RATIO: - Pardon distinguished from amnesty PARDON AMNESTY Granted by Chief Executive Granted by proclamation of the Chief Executive with the concurrence of Congress Private act which must be Public act which the courts pleaded and proved because should take judicial notice courts take no notice Granted after conviction Generally granted before or after institution of criminal prosecution and sometimes after conviction -

Looks forward and relieves offender from consequences of offense

Looks backward and abolishes and puts into oblivion the offense itself

In order to entitle a person to the benefits of the Amnesty Proclamation, it is not necessary that he should, as a condition precedent or sine qua non, admit having committed the criminal act or offense with which he is charged, and allege the amnesty as a defense; it is sufficient that the evidence shows that the offense committed comes within the concern of the Amnesty Proclamation. There is no necessity for an accused to admit his responsibility for the commission of a criminal act before a court or Amnesty Commission may investigate and extend or not to him the benefits of amnesty.

JUDGEMENT: Although petitioner Barrioquinto alleged that the victim was killed by one Agapito Hipolito, the petitioners are also responsible for the killing and they are entitled to the benefits of amnesty since they are members of the same group of guerrilleros who killed the victim in furtherance of the resistance to the enemy. Respondents are hereby ordered to immediately proceed to hear and decide the applications for amnesty of petitioners. DISSENT by J. TUASON: - Amnesty presupposes the commission of a crime. When an accused says that he has not committed a crime, he cannot have any use for amnesty. - A petition for amnesty is in the nature of a plea of confession and avoidance. The pleader has to confess the allegations against him before he is allowed to set out such fact as, if true, would defeat the action.

VERA vs. PEOPLE Amnesty FACTS: - Petitioners were charged with the complex crime of kidnapping with murder of Amadeo Lozanes

Upon motion, the invoked the benefits of a 1946 Amnesty Proclamation by the President The case was referred to and tried by the 8th Guerrilla Amnesty Commission None of the petitioners admitted having committed the crime charged. In fact, Vera even categorically denied it. January 12, 1956: decision saying that Commission could not take cognizance of the case on the ground that the Amnesty Proclamation benefits could only be invoked by defendants who, admitting the commission of a crime, plead that said commission was in pursuance of the resistance movement against persons who aided the enemy during Japanese occupation. Commission appreciated the rivalry between Veras Guerrilla Party and the Hunters ROTC Guerrilla organization (victim was member) as a motive for the kidnapping and killing.

CRISTOBAL vs. LABRADOR et al. Pardon CASE: Petition for a writ of certiorari to review the decision of Rizal CFI sustaining the right of Teofilo Santos to remain in the list of registered voters in precinct no. 11 of Malabon, Rizal FACTS: - 1930: Santos was found guilty of the crime of estafa - March August 1932: he was confined in the provincial jail of Pasig - 1934 1937: he continued to be a registered elector in the municipality and was seated as the municipal president - August 1938: approval of Commonwealth Act No. 357 (Election Code), section 94(b) of which disqualifies Santos from voting for having been declared by final judgment guilty of any crime against property. - 1939: Santos applied for absolute pardon, which was granted by the President, restoring the respondent to his full civil and political rights, except with respect to the right to hold public office or employment. - 1940: Cristobal filed petition for exclusion of Santos name from list of voters denied by lower court ISSUE/RULING/RATIO: a. WON the Presidents pardoning power can be restricted or controlled by legislative action NO - Art VII, Sec 11(6) of the 1935 Constitution gives the President the power to grant pardons, subject to only two limitations: (1) that the power be exercised after conviction; and (2) that such power does not extend to cases of impeachment. - The pardoning power cannot be restricted or controlled by legislative action. - It must remain where the sovereign authority has placed it and must be exercised by the highest authority to whom it is entrusted. b. WON pardon can still apply (still has an effect) when sentence (imprisonment) has been served YES

ISSUE: WON persons invoking the benefit of amnesty should first admit having committed the crime of which they were accused YES ARGUMENTS/RATIO: - P: Victim aided in the war efforts of the enemy; impliedly admitted participation in the killing - CA: Mere implied admission not sufficient. According to Administrative Order 144 (October 11, 1950), in order that the Amnesty Commission may take cognizance of the case, the accused must allege or claim verbally or in writing that he committed the acts charged against him - P: invoked Barrioquinto vs. Fernandez: admission not necessary; evidence showing that offense committed comes with the terms of said Amnesty Proclamation is sufficient SC: Barrioquinto case superseded and overruled by People v. Llanita and People v. Guillermo: Amnesty presupposes the commission of a crime, and when an accused maintains that he has not committed a crime, he cannot have any use for amnesty. At any rate, the facts established do not bring the case within the terms of the Amnesty Proclamation. The killing of the deceased was not in furtherance of the resistance movement but was due to rivalry

An absolute pardon not only blots out the crime committed, but removes all disabilities resulting from the conviction. When granted after the term of imprisonment has expired, absolute pardon removes all that is left of the consequences of conviction. It is absolute insofar as it restores full civil and political rights.

popular will; and the pardon was thus extended on the date mentioned hereinabove and before the date fixed in section 4 of the Election Code for assuming office. JUDGEMENT: Efficacy is given to the executive action.

JUDGEMENT: Petition denied.

IN RE LONTOK Pardon CASE: Attorney-General asks that an order issue the removal of Marcelino Lontok from his office of lawyer because of having been convicted of the crime of bigamy. Lontok prays for the dismissal of charges, given the issuance of a pardon by former Governor-General Harrison. FACTS: - Lontok was convicted of the crime of bigamy - 1921: Harrison issued a conditional pardon he shall not again be guilty of any misconduct. ISSUE: WON pardon can be considered as a bar to any disbarment proceeding NO ARGUMENTS: - Atty-Gen: Under Sec. 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure, a member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his office of lawyer by the SC by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. Bigamy involves moral turpitude. o While pardon removes the legal infamy of the crime, it cannot wash out the moral stain - SC cited case law: o In re Emmons: Where proceedings to strike an attorneys name from the rolls are founded on, and depends alone, on a statue making the fact of a conviction for a felony ground for disbarment, a pardon operates as a bar to any proceeding for the disbarment of the attorney after the pardon has been granted. o Garland case: A pardon reaches both the punishment prescribed for the offense and the guilt of the offender;

PELOBELLO vs. PALATINO (1941) Pardon FACTS: - Pelobello instituted quo warranto proceedings against Palatino, the mayor-elect of Torrijos, Marinduque, pursuant to section 167, in relation to section 94(a) of the Election Code, Palatino having been convicted by final judgement in 1912, and therefore should be disqualified from voting and being voted upon for the contested municipal office. - Admitted facts: conviction and election and proclamation of Palatino for the office of th municipal mayor - 1915: Palatino was granted by the Governor-General a conditional pardon - 1940: the President granted Palatino absolute pardon and restored him to the enjoyment of full civil and political rights ISSUE: WON the absolute pardon had the effect of removing the disqualification incident to criminal conviction, the pardon having been granted after the election but before the date fixed by law for assuming office YES RATIO: - Applying the ruling in the case of Cristobal v. Labrador, the pardoning power cannot be restricted or controlled by legislative action; and absolute pardon not only blots out the crime committed but removes all disabilities resulting from conviction. - It is evident that the purpose in granting Palatino absolute pardon was to enable him to assume the position in deference to the

and when the pardon is full, it releases the punishment and blots out the existence of guilt, so that in the eye of the law the offender is as innocent as if he had never committed the offense. LIMITATION only on: restoration of forfeited offices, restoration of vested property or interest, condition given by President (in the case of Marcelino, if he should again be guilty of any misconduct, he would then be subject to disbarment)

Petitioner impugns validity of the Order claiming that he did not violate the pardon since he has not been convicted by final judgment (of estafa nor sedition)

ISSUE: WON conviction of a crime by final judgment of a court is necessary before the petitioner can be validly rearrested and recommitted for violation of the terms of his conditional pardon NO RATIO: - The Court cited cases which has the following propositions: 1. The grant of pardon and the determination of the terms and conditions of a conditional pardon are purely executive acts which are not subject to judicial scrutiny 2. The determination of a breach of a condition of a pardon may be either (a) a purely executive act, not subject to judicial scrutiny under section 64(i) of the Revised Administrative Code; or (b) a judicial act consisting of trial for and conviction of violation of a conditional pardon under Article 159, RPC. o Where the President opts to make use of option (a), no judicial determination of guilt of a subsequent crime is necessary. 3. Section 64(i) of the RAC is not afflicted with a constitutional vice (against due process). JUDGMENT: Petition dismissed. DISSENT by J. CRUZ: - Mere accusation is not synonymous with guilt - The authority of the President to determine whether the condition of the pardon has been violated is validly conferred as long as the condition does not involve the commission of a crime. But insofar as it allows the President to determine in his judgment WON a crime has been committed is an encroachment on judicial functions.

JUDGEMENT: Proceedings dismissed.

TORRES vs. GONZALES Pardon CASE: original petition for habeas corpus filed on behalf of petitioner Wilfredo Torres, who was confined at the National Penitentiary in Muntinlupa FACTS: - Before 1979: Torres was convicted of the crime of estafa and was sentenced to imprisonment - April 1979: conditional pardon was granted by the President on condition that Torres would not again violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines. Should this condition be violated, he will be proceeded in the manner prescribed by law. Torres accepted conditional pardon and was released from confinement. - May 1986: Board of Pardons and Parole recommended to the President the cancellation of the conditional pardon on the ground that petitioner Torres has under his name a long list of charges brought against him during the last 20 years for a wide assortment of crimes. (some charges dismissed, some on appeal according to dissent) - Sept 1986: President cancelled conditional pardon - October 1986: respondent Minister of Justice issued by authority of the President an Order of Arrest and Recommitment against petitioner.

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