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FREE WILL AND LIBERTARIANISM

Abstract Critics of libertarian freedom have claimed that free will is incompatible with indeterminism. I endeavor to argue that the argument that has been provided for this claim is not fully valid. The invalidity of this argument implies the invalidity of the standard consequence argument for the incompatibility of freedom and determinism. In this paper, I develop a new objection to this opponent argument that has several significant consequences for the metaphysics of freedom.

Libertarians believe that free will exists and is incompatible with determinism, and so are committed to

the compatibility of freedom and indeterminism. Perhaps the most pressing objection to libertarianism is the argument for the incompatibility of freedom and indeterminism. If free will is, as
many critics have suggested, incompatible with indeterminism then libertarianism is not true. This paper

presents a new criticism of this argument. In I, I introduce P, and provide some support for it. I then explain the strongest version of the Opponent argument, developed by Dana Nelkin. Here, I uncover a crucial fact overlooked by previous discussions of these argumentsviz., they all presuppose that P is true. In II-III, I develop a decisive and instructive objection to Nelkins argument. Finally, in IV I defend P against the best objections that have been brought to recent attention, thus bolstering a P-based case for nonreductive libertarianism.

After some preliminary arguments, I introduce a reasonable principle (P) that places a requirement on ones having a choice about an event whose causal history includes only other events. I then argue for these three claims:

1. The opponents argument presupposes that P is true, If P is true, then (i) the opponent argument fails and (ii) this benefits nonreductive

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libertarians, who hold that agents themselves can contribute causally to events.

2. If P is false, then (a) the opponent argument fails and (b) this benefits reductive libertarians, who hold that only events can contribute causally to events.

3. Conclusively, depending on Ps truth-value, the opponent argument fails in such a way that one or the other of the two main species of libertarianism is the best approach to the metaphysics of free will.

While my arguments for the three claims listed above constitute the most of this paper, I have another important point to make: I aim to build a case for the truth of P, and so for nonreductive libertarianism. I make this case by emphasizing Ps circumstantial plausibility, and by defending it from various objections.

Some terminology and assumptions: Reductionism is the view that only events can contribute causallyor, be causally relevantto an event. Non-reductionism, on the other hand, is the view that agents themselvesin addition to agentinvolving eventscan contribute causally to events, and figure in an events causal history. Non-reductive libertarianism is the conjunction of non-reductionism and libertarianism, 1

Proponents of this view include Roderick Chisholm, Human Freedom and the Self, reprinted in Free Will, ed. Gary Watson

(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983); Timothy OConnor, Persons and Causes (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000); and Richard Taylor, Action and Purpose (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1966).

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Reductive libertarianism combines libertarianism with reductionism. Reductive compatibilism, is the conjunction of reductionism and compatibilism (i.e., the view that freedom is compatible with determinism); Nonreductive compatibilism combines compatibilism with non-reductionism. These are the four main views of those who think that metaphysical freedom exists.

For the sake of readability, I use the term event quite broadly so that it applies to any nonsubstance plausibly thought capable of standing in the causal contribution relation. On my usage, then, event applies not only to changes, but also to processes, states, and so on.

Finally, I assume throughout this paper that some human agents are free. In other words, I assume that some human agent is such that there is an earliest or first event about which he had a choice. 2 This assumption can be put more precisely as follows:

Some human agent, S, is such that there is an event, e, such that S had a choice about e but did not have a choice about any event prior to e.

I assume most parties to the current debate about the metaphysics of freedom accept this assumption, and so I estimate it quite uncontroversial (not eminently feasible regardless of the fact that its widely accepted).
2Prominent arguments against the existence of freedom, see (e.g.) Richard Doubles The Non-Reality of Free Will (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991) and Metaphilosophy and Free Will (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996); Derk Perebooms Living without Free Will Van Inwagen (1983, pp. 67-8 and note 31, pp. 233-4)

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I. P AND THE OPPONENT ARGUMENT I begin with an example to introduce, and generate circumstantial support for, P. The example also serves to illustrate the concept of causal contribution,

A rock flies toward a window. A bystander, Adam, freely refrains from stopping the rocks flight. The rock then shatters the window. The windows shattering has a causal history: numerous events contributed causally to the windows shattering. Such events include the rocks traveling toward the window on a certain trajectory, and at a certain velocity; Adams freely refraining from stopping the rock; and, of course, the rocks striking the window. Let it be that speaking strictly and literallyonly events are causally relevant to the shattering, no non-events contributed causally to it. Now, suppose that another person, Eve, did not have a choice about any of the events in the shatterings causal history. Our intuitive reaction to that last piece of informationis that Eve also lacked a choice about the shattering itself. I want to ask rhetorically, Could Eve have had a choice about the shattering, seeing as how she did not have a choice about anything causally relevant to it?

(P) Suppose an event, e, has only events in its causal history. Then an agent, S, has a choice about e only if there is an event in es causal history about which S has a choice (Or: Then if S did not have a choice about anything in es causal history, then S did not have a choice about e).

Note two important facts about P. First, P easily explains our intuition, concerning Adam & Eve. E.g, Eve did not have a choice about the windows shattering. By stipulation, Eve did not have a choice about anything in the shatterings causal history, which comprised only events. Then P

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entails that Eve did not have a choice about the shattering, thus predicting and explaining the mentioned intuition. I deduce that reflection on the Adam & Eve example generates (at least) a fair amount of circumstantial support for P.
II. IF P IS TRUE?

Here, I would like to argue that P entails nonreductionismthe view that agents themselves (in addition to agent-involving events) can be causal contributorsand that this spells trouble for the opponent argument. Presumably, an agent has a choice about an event only if that event has a causal history, is such that something contributed causally to its occurrence. It is crucial to note that this is not identical to the claim that one has a choice only about causally produced events: an event that was not causally produced may nevertheless be such that something contributed causally to its occurrence. Thus, the assumption here is perfectly consistent with all the main approaches to metaphysics, including views labeled noncausalist. For noncausalists typically countenance events that contribute causally to ones about which an agent has a choice. To begin, recall P: (P) Suppose an event, e, has only events in its causal history. Then an agent, S, has a choice about e only if there is an event in es causal history about which S has a choice. Assume P for conditional proof. Suppose also, that reductionism is true, thatspeaking strictly and literallyonly events can be causal contributors. According to my assumption, some human agent, S, is such that there is an event, e, such that S had a choice about e but did not have a choice about any event prior to e. It follows both that S had a choice about e, and that e had a causal history, H3.
3 Presumably, an agent has a choice about an event only if that event has a causal history, is such that something contributed causally to its occurrence. It is crucial to note that this is not tantamount to the claim that one has a choice only about causally produced events: an event that was not causally produced may nevertheless be such that something contributed causally to its occurrence. Thus, my assumption here is perfectly consistent with all the main approaches to the metaphysics of human agency, including views labeled noncausalist. For noncausalists typically countenance
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events that contribute causally to ones about which an agent has a choice. Proponents of noncausalism include Carl Ginet, On Action (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); and Stewart Goetz, Libertarian Choice, Faith and Philosophy 14 (1997): pp.195-211.

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But, by reductionism, H comprises only other events. And by P, there is a member of H an event causally relevant to eabout which S had a choice. This contradicts our assumption that e is the earliest or first event about which S had a choice; reductionism has thus landed us in contradiction. Hence, if P is true, then reductionism is false and agents themselves can contribute causallyor, be causally relevantto events. You can now see why Ps truth spells trouble for the Opponent argument. It does so because the opponent argument presupposes reductionism. To see this, recall that the opponent arguments sample indeterministically caused action, R, has only events in its causal history (most prominently, Ss prior mental state, DB). Of course, the Opponent arguments conclusion incompatibilism about freedom and indeterminismis a generalization covering every indeterministically caused action. Assuming that the Opponent argument is valid, then, something prior to its conclusion must rule out the possibility of an indeterministically caused action having a causal history different in kind from Rs, history in which some non-events figure. Put differently, given that the Opponent argument is valid, something prior to its conclusion must entail only events can contribute causally to actions. Consequently, then, either the Opponent argument is invalid or it presupposes reductionism. So, assuming that the Opponent argument is valid, one of its key presuppositions is false if P is true. Accordingly, if P is true, the Opponent argument fails. Introducing agent causation into the picture at this point in the discussion would not serve to show how [N(DB R)] could be false. Rather, the successful introduction and defense of agent causation would show that the Opponent argument is not relevant to human freedom.

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This completes my argument supposing that P is true. In the next section, I intend to complete a critical evaluation of the Opponent argument by arguing for the following claim: if P is false, then the standard justification for a certain premise of the Opponent argument is weakened.

III. WHAT IF P IS FALSE?

Suppose P is false. Then it is possible that an agent, S, has a choice about an event, e, the causal history of which includes only events, where S does not have a choice about any of the events in es causal history. To begin, recall the Opponent argument:

(1) N{DB & (DB R)} Obviously, ones having a choice about either DB or (DB R) suffices for ones having a choice about {DB & (DB R)}. Proponents of the Opponent argument, then, should provide some reason to believe N(DB). And as I pointed out earlier, the standard justification offered for N(DB) involves an appeal to P. Since we are presently supposing that P is false, it immediately follows that the standard justification for N(DB) is undermined, thus damaging the standard justification for (1).

One might attempt to argue that P is not an essential part of the justification of N(DB), and so, the standard justification of (1) is not undermined if P is false.

This reply, though informative, is ultimately mistaken. At best, it shows that P need not be offered in direct support of the particular proposition that S had no choice about DB. The reply

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fails to show, however, that P does not play a critical role in justifying van Inwagens claim that its harmless to assume S had no choice about DB. Clearly, P does play such a role and its acceptable to assume that S had no choice about DB. At this point, a proponent of the Opponent argument might rightly point out that an event such as would need to be an indeterministic causal consequence of DB in order to be of use to a libertarian.
I sympathize to the fairly widespread view that an agents being nonderivately causally relevant to an event is somewhat mysterious, obscure or opaque in a way that an events being so causally relevant is not. I am thus willing to believe that nonreductionism should be embraced only if there are good reasons to do so. Earlier, I argued that if P is true, then there is indeed good reason to accept nonreductionism. I am now, however, supposing that P is false, that it is possible for there to be nonP events. It follows from this supposition that an agent can have a choice about an event even though that agent does not make a non-derivative causal contribution to the event. (Remember that non-P events have only events as causal contributors.) Given the falsity of P, then, having a choice about an event does not require non-derivative agent causal contribution. But again, nonreductionism should not be accepted in the absence of good reasons to do so.

This sections argument and my case against Nelkins improved Opponent argument are now complete. Far from being detrimental to libertarianism, the Opponent argument actually serves to advance the libertarian front. I hence conclude by turning to the tentative objective of strengthening the P-based case for nonreductive libertarianism.

IV. DEFENDING P

Let us begin by noting that the arguments provide a unique entry point into the debate between reductive and non-reductive libertarians. For if the arguments of those sections are

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sound, then the intrinsic dispute between nonreductive and reductive libertarians bases on Ps truth-value. Specifically, a counterexample to P will serve to establish reductive libertarianism. Obviously, the inability to provide a clear counterexample to P does not prove that it is true; however, the lack of clear counterexamples should increase its initial credibility, thereby strengthening the case for nonreductive libertarianism. I have attempted to defend P against some alleged counterexamples.

Counter Example: Suppose at t1, John remains freely seated. At t2, a baseball is shot toward a bottle, where this is a random occurrence, a matter of chance. Suppose also that if John had at t1 stood up, the indicated baseball would not have been shot toward the bottle at t2. (Suppose Johns friend Jack would have pressed a button thus disarming the device that randomly shoots baseballs if John had stood.) Finally, suppose the baseball shatters the bottle at t3.

Now, John has no choice about any event in the causal history of the bottles shattering since the baseballs being shot toward the bottle at t2 is a random occurrence. Moreover, there is an unrealized chain of events the realization of which would have prevented the bottle shattering, i.e., that chain of events that would have resulted if John had refrained from sitting at t1. Furthermore, John was able to initiate that chain of events since he was free to stand at t1. And so, John had a choice about the shattering of the bottle at t3 in spite of the fact that he had no choice about any event in the causal history of the shattering. Hence, P is false.

Reply:

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A crucial claim in the example is that John had a choice about the shattering because he was able to initiate a chain of events that would have prevented the bottle from shattering. But Johns being able to initiate a sequence of events that would have prevented the shattering implies that he was also able to initiate a sequence of events that would have prevented the baseball from being shot toward the bottle. The baseballs having been shot toward the bottle, however, was clearly causally relevant to the shattering. It follows that John did have a choice about something in the causal history of the bottle shattering and so, the alleged counterexample fails. One might try to get around this reply by modifying the first example in such a way that John didnt have a choice about events prior to the shattering as in the next counter example.

Second Example: Suppose a baseball is shot toward a bottle as described in the first example. Also suppose John was stationed too far from the chain of events to intervene by, say, snatching the baseball mid-trajectory or grabbing the bottle before it was shattered. But suppose John was within reach of a button the depression of which would have prevented the shattering in the following peculiar but perfectly possible way: If the button had been depressed just as the baseball struck the bottle, then the bottle would have been instantaneously endowed with the power to resist the force of the strike; the bottle would have stiffened up so to speak and wouldnt have shattered when struck. Depressing the button at any other time, however, would have done nothing to protect the bottle. In fact, John doesnt press the button; having undergone relevant training, though, he was able to depress it at just the right time. John had no choice about any event in the causal history of the bottles shattering. For, as is stipulated, he wasnt able to grab the baseball and he wasnt able to grab the bottle. So, he

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wasnt able to initiate a chain of events that would have prevented the baseball from being shot toward the bottle. (But he can depress the button, you say. Yes, but having depressed the button before or after the baseball struck the bottle would have done nothing to protect the bottle.) Now, theres an unrealized chain of events that the bottle would have survived, viz., that chain of events that would have resulted if John had depressed the button at just the right time. Furthermore, hypothetically, John was able to so depress the button and initiate this chain of events. So, John had a choice about the bottles shattering in spite of the fact that he had no choice about any event in the causal history of the shattering. Hence, P is false.

Reply: The proponent of the second example is thinking along these lines: John was able to do something about the shattering only at the moment at which the baseball struck the bottle; but by then, every event in the causal history of the shattering had occurred and he had no choice about any of those events.

I think the objector overlooks a pertinent event about which John clearly had a choice. In the example, John was able (by virtue of being able to depress the button at just the right time) to prevent the shattering of the bottle. John, though, refrains from taking this action. Consequently John freely refrains from depressing the button, that John had a choice about refraining from depressing the button. Clearly, though, Johns refraining from depressing the button contributes causally to the shattering. Hence, John did have a choice about something causally relevant to the shattering. Hence, the alleged counterexample fails. I can think of no other counterexamples that differ significantly from those considered above. This could of course be a failure of imagination on my part. At any rate, I leave it as a challenge

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for the interested reader to construct his or her own potential counterexample that cannot be handled as Ive handled those discussed above.

In light of the results of this section, it seems to me that the circumstantial case for P has strengthened towards a strong case for nonreductive libertarianism. I pre-emptively would like to oppose the reader, however, that regardless of Ps truth-valueand so regardless of how the dispute between reductive and nonreductive libertarians is to be arbitratedthe Opponent argument (in its strongest form) fails, and does so in a way that has interesting consequences for the metaphysics of freedom.

References
Fischer, John 1994: The Metaphysics of Free Will. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Gallois, Andre 1977: Van Inwagen on Free Will and Determinism. Philosophical Studies, 32, pp. 99105. OConnor, T. (1995A). "Agent Causation." In O'Connor, 1995, 173-200. Randolph Clarke, Libertarian Accounts of Free Will (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003). Alicia Finch and Ted Warfield, The Mind Argument and Libertarianism, Mind 127 (July 1998): 516 Dana Nelkin, The Consequence Argument and the Mind Argument, Analysis 61 (April 2001): 107-115 Randolph Clarke, Libertarian Accounts of Free Will (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003) Finch and Warfield (1998), Nelkin (2001), and Clarke (2003). Proponents of noncausalism include Carl Ginet, On Action (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); and Stewart Goetz, Libertarian Choice, Faith and Philosophy 14 (1997): pp.195-211.