Atilano vs.

Chua Ching Beng Facts: Chua Ching Beng and Pilar Atilano were married in Zamboanga after which they went to Manila and established their residence with Chuas parents. Afterwards, at Chuas initiative, they went to Zamboanga to visit Pilars parents. It seems that he was prevailed upon by the wifes parents to return to Manila leaving her behind, with the understanding that she would follow him later. She didnt. About two years later, Pilar filed with the Zamboanga CFI a complaint for support against her husband, alleging that theyve been living separately for two years, and that their marriage had been unharmonious. It appears that the wife is involved in a domestic controversy, being pitted against her husbands immediate relatives and making marital life difficult. She demanded for support. Defendant refuted the allegations and prayed that the complaint be dismissed. Meanwhile, the plaintiff files a petition for alimony pendente lite which defendant opposed. Based on a stipulation of facts agreed upon by the parties, the court rendered judgment granting the wifes allowance. The defendant filed a petition electing to fulfill his obligation as thus fixed by the court by receiving and maintaining plaintiff at his residence in Pasay, and that if the plaintiff refuses, the defendant will not be compelled to remit allowance to her in Zamboanga. This petition was denied and therefore, the defendant brought the case to the CA who certified the case to the SC.

Issue: WON a wife is entitled to receive support from her husband where she refused to live with him on account of some misunderstandings she had with the husbands immediate relatives. Held: Decision appealed from is modified by giving the defendant husband the option of supporting his wife at their conjugal dwelling apart from the home of the parents of the husband. Should the plaintiff refuse, then the defendant is relieved from the obligation of giving support. Ratio: The court found that while the wife strongly wanted to be separated from the husband, the husband was open to fix the problem, acknowledging his obligation to support her and even expressing his willingness to abide by her wishes to have a conjugal dwelling apart from his parents, although this might be financially taxing for him to sustain. The defendant acknowledges that the Art. 111, CC imposes on the husband the responsibility of maintaining and supporting his wide and family but he insists that under Art. 209, CC he is given the option to fulfill said duty either by paying the allowance as fixed by the Court or by receiving and maintaining the person entitled thereto in his house. He has thus elected to perform his obligation by the second means allowed by the law. The law affords moral and legal obstacle as a ground to compel husband to provide separate maintenance for the wife. However, misunderstanding with in-laws is not a valid moral and legal obstacle. Art. 110 does not preclude the husband from fixing the conjugal residence at the patriarchal home, nor is it against any recognized norm of morality.

Although the husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual respect and fidelity and render mutual help and assistance, and that the wife is entitled to be supported, our laws contain no provision compelling the wife to live with her husband where even without legal justification she establishes her residence apart from that provided for by the former. But there is no reason why she should be allowed any support from the husband. ARROYO vs. VASQUEZ (Matrimonial Home) Mariano Arroyo and Dolores Vazquez de Arroyo have been married for 10 years when Dolores decided to leave their domicile with the intention of living thenceforth separate from her husband. Mariano thus initiated an action to compel her to return to the matrimonial home and live with him as a dutiful wife. The defendant answered that she had been compelled to leave by cruel treatment on the part of the husband and thus she filed a cross complaint that asks for a decree of separation, a liquidation of conjugal partnership, and an allowance for counsel fees and permanent separate maintenance. The trial judge, upon consideration of the evidence, concluded that the continued ill-treatment of her furnished sufficient justification for her abandonment of the conjugal home and the permanent breaking off of marital relations with him. Thus, the judge gave judgment in favor of the defendant. The plaintiff appealed Issues: (1) Whether or not the abandonment by the wife of the marital home was with sufficient justification No. It has been held that the tales of cruelty on the part of the husband were not proven; (2) Whether or not cross complaint conclusively proves that the plaintiff has forfeited his right to the marital society of his wife. The obligation which the law imposes on the husband to maintain the wife is a duty universally recognized and is clearly expressed in articles 142 and 143, CC. Accordingly, where the wife is forced to leave the matrimonial abode and to live apart from her husband, she can, in this jurisdiction, compel him to make provision for her separate maintenance; and he may be required to pay the expenses, including attorneys fees, necessarily incurred in enforcing such obligation. Nevertheless, the interests of both parties as well as of society at large require that the courts should move with caution in enforcing the duty to provide for the separate maintenance of the wife, for this step involves a recognition of the de facto separation of

the spousesa state which is abnormal and fraught with grave danger to all concerned. From this consideration it follows that provision should not be made for separate maintenance in favor of the wife unless it appears that the continued cohabitation of the pair has become impossible and separation necessary from the fault of the husband. Facts of the case show that the plaintiff has done nothing to forfeit his right to the marital society of his wife and she is under a moral and legal obligation to return to the common home and cohabit with him. (3) Whether or not the husband is entitled to a permanent mandatory injunction to compel the wife to return to the matrimonial home and live with him as his dutiful wife Although the husband is entitled to a judicial declaration that his wife has absented herself without sufficient cause and that it is her duty to return, the Court is disinclined to sanction the doctrine that an order, enforcible by process of contempt, may be entered to compel the restitution of the purely personal right of consortium. Thus, that the plaintiff in this case is not entitled to the unconditional and absolute order for the return of the wife to the marital domicile, which is sought in the petitory part of the complaint. Held: judgment appealed from in respect both to the original complaint and the cross-bill, it is declared that Dolores has absented herself from the marital home without sufficient cause; and she is admonished that it is her duty to return. Plaintiff absolved from crosscomplaint. Ilusorio vs Bildner FACTS: Potenciano Ilusorio, a lawyer, 86 year old of age, possessed extensive property valued at millions of pesos. For many year, he was the Chairman of the Board and President of Baguio Country Club. He was married with Erlinda Ilusorio, herein petitioner, for 30 years and begotten 6 children namely Ramon, Lin Illusorio-Bildner (defendant), Maximo, Sylvia, Marietta and Shereen. They separated from bed and board in 1972. Potenciano lived at Makati every time he was in Manila and at Illusorio Penthouse, Baguio Country Club when he was in Baguio City. On the other hand, the petitioner lived in Antipolo City. In 1997, upon Potencianos arrival from US, he stayed with her wife for about 5 months in Antipolo city. The children, Sylvia and Lin, alleged that during this time their mother overdose Potenciano which caused the latters health to deteriorate. In February 1998, Erlinda filed with RTC petition for guardianship over the person and property

of Potenciano due to the latters advanced age, frail health, poor eyesight and impaired judgment. In May 1998, after attending a corporate meeting in Baguio, Potenciano did not return to Antipolo instead lived at Cleveland Condominium in Makati. In March 1999, petitioner filed with CA petition for habeas corpus to have the custody of his husband alleging that the respondents refused her demands to see and visit her husband and prohibited Potenciano from returning to Antipolo. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioned writ of habeas corpus should be issued. HELD: A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention, or by which the rightful custody of a person is withheld from the one entitled thereto. To justify the grant for such petition, the restraint of liberty must an illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom of action. The illegal restraint of liberty must be actual and effective not merely nominal or moral. Evidence showed that there was no actual and effective detention or deprivation of Potencianos liberty that would justify issuance of the writ. The fact that the latter was 86 years of age and under medication does not necessarily render him mentally incapacitated. He still has the capacity to discern his actions. With his full mental capacity having the right of choice, he may not be the subject of visitation rights against his free choice. Otherwise, he will be deprived of his right to privacy. The case at bar does not involve the right of a parent to visit a minor child but the right of a wife to visit a husband. In any event, that the husband refuses to see his wife for private reasons, he is at liberty to do so without threat or any penalty attached to the exercise of his right. Coverture, is a matter beyond judicial authority and cannot be enforced by compulsion of a writ of habeas corpus carried out by the sheriffs or by any other process. ABELLA vs. COMELEC Facts: Initially, Silvestre dela Cruz (Benjamin Abella was allowed to intervene) filed a petition with the COMELEC to disqualify petitioner Larrazabal from running as governor of Leyte on the ground that she misrepresented her residence in her certificate of candidacy as Kananga, Leyte. It was alleged that she was in fact a resident of Ormoc City like her

husband who was earlier disqualified from running for the same office. The COMELEC granted the petition. However, when the Commission granted the decision, Larrazabal was already proclaimed the Governor, hence, when she was disqualified, Abella, who gathered the second highest votes in the said area, sought to take his oath as governor of Kananga, Leyte. The petitioner, however, avers that the COMELEC decision is erroneous when it relied on the provisions of the Family Code to rule that the petitioner lacks the required residence to qualify her to run for the position of governor of Leyte. She opines that under "the Election Law, the matter of determination of the RESIDENCE is more on the principle ofINTE NTIO N, the animus revertendi rather than anything else." In this regard she states that ... "her subsequent physical transfer of residence to Ormoc City thereafter, did not necessarily erased (sic) or removed her Kananga residence, for as long as she had the ANIMUS REVERTENDI evidenced by her continuous and regular acts of returning there in the course of the years, although she had physically resided at Ormoc City." Issue: Whether or not the candidate who got the second highest vote may be proclaimed as governor when the candidate for such position was disqualified. Held: The Supreme Court held that while it is true that SPC No. 88-546 was originally a petition to deny due course to the certificate of candidacy of Larrazabal and was filed before Larrazabal could be proclaimed, the fact remains that the local elections of February 1, 1988 in the province of Leyte proceeded with Larrazabal considered as a bona fide candidate. The voters of the province voted for her in the sincere belief that she was a qualified candidate for the position of

governor. Her votes were counted and she obtained the highest number of votes. The net effect is that the petitioner lost in the election. He was repudiated by the electorate. SSS v. Delos Santos As found by both the SSC and the CA, the divorce obtained by respondent against the deceasedAntonio was not binding in this jurisdiction. Under Philippine law, only aliens may obtain divorces abroad, provided they are valid according to their national law. The divorce was obtained by respondent Gloria whileshe was still a Filipino citizen and thus covered by the policy against absolute divorces. It did not sever hermarriage ties with Antonio.H o w e v e r , a l t h o u g h r e s p o n d e n t w a s t h e l e g a l spouse of the deceased, We find that she is still disqualified to be his primary beneficiary under the SS Law. S h e f a i l s t o f u l f i l l t h e r e q u i r e m e n t o f dependency upon her deceased husband Antonio. Social Security System v. Aguas is instructive in determining the extent of the required dependencyunder the SS Law. In Aguas , the Court ruled that although a husband and wife are obliged to support eachother, whether one is actually dependent for support upon the other cannot be presumed from the fact of marriage alone.Further, Aguas pointed out that a wife who left her family until her husband died and lived with othermen, was not dependent upon her husband for support, financial or otherwise, during the entire period. Coverage (Section 9) SEC. 9-A. Compulsory Coverage of the Self-Employed. Coverage in the SSS shall also be compulsoryu p o n s u c h self-employed persons as may be determined by the C o m m i s s i o n u n d e r s u c h r u l e s a n d regulations as it may prescribe, including but not limited to the following:1. All selfemployed professionals;2. Partners and single proprietors of businesses;3. Actors and actresses, directors, scriptwriters and news correspondents who do not fall within thedefinition of the term employee in Section 8 (d) of this Act;4. Professional athletes, coaches, trainers and jockeys; and5. Individual farmers and fishermen. U n l e s s o t h e r w i s e s p e c i f i e d h e r e i n , a l l

p r o v i s i o n s o f this Act applicable to covered employees shall also be applicable to the covered self-employed persons. Matabuena v. Cervantes [GR L-28771, 31 March 1971] En Banc, Fernando (p): 9 concur, 1 took no part Facts: On 20 February 1956, Felix Matabuena executed a Deed of Donation inter vivos in favor of Petronila Cervantes during the time they were living as husband and wife in a common law relationship. They were later married on 28 March 1962. Felix died intestate on 13 September 1962. CorneliaMatabuena, being the sole sister and nearest and nearest relative to Felix, questioned the validity of the donation claiming that the ban on donation between spouses during a marriage applies to a common-law relationship. She had the land declared on her name and paid the estate and inheritance taxes thereon on virtue of an affidavit of self-adjudication executed by her in 1962. On 23 November 1965,the lower court upheld the validity of the donation as it was made before Cervantes marriage to thedonor. Hence, the appeal. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the 23 November 1965 decision of the lower court; (2) declared thequestioned donation void and recognized the rights of plaintiff and defendant as pro indiviso heirs tothe property; and (3) remanded the case to the lower court for its appropriate disposition in accordancewith the current decision; without pronouncement as to costs. 1. Prohibition of donation between spouses apply to common-law relationship While Article 133 of the Civil Code considers as void a donation between the spouses during themarriage, policy considerations of the most exigent character as well as the

dictates of morality requirethat the same prohibition should apply to a common-law relationship, as it is contrary to public policy (JBL Reyes, Buenaventura v. Bautista, 1954). The law prohibits donations in favor of the other consortand his descendants because of fear of undue and improper pressure and influence upon the donor, aprejudice deeply rooted in our ancient law; porque no se engaen despojandose el uno al otro poramor que han de consuno [according to] the Partidas (Part IV, Tit. XI, LAW IV), reiterating the rationale Ne mutuato amore invicem spoliarentur of the Pandects (Bk. 24, Tit. 1, De donat, inter virum etuxorem); then there is every reason to apply the same prohibitive policy to persons living together ashusband and wife without the benefit of nuptials. For it is not to be doubted that assent to suchirregular connection for thirty years bespeaks greater influence of one party over the other, so that the danger that the law seeks to avoid is correspondingly increased. Moreover, as already pointed out byUlpian (in his lib. 32 ad Sabinum, fr. 1), it would not be just that such donations should subsist, lest thecondition of those who incurred guilt should turn out to be better. So long as marriage remains thecornerstone of our family law, reason and morality alike demand that the disabilities attached to marriage should likewise attach to concubinage. 2. Spirit of the law Whatever omission may be apparent in an interpretation purely literal of the language used must beremedied by an adherence to its avowed objective. El espiritu que informa la ley debe ser la luz que hade guiar a los tribunales en la aplicacin de sus disposiciones.' It is a principle of statutory construction that what is within the spirit of the law is as much a part of it

as what is written. Otherwise the basicpurpose discernible in such codal provision would not be attained. 3. Lack of validity of donation does not result in exclusive right of plaintiff on property The lack of validity of the donation made by the deceased to Petronila Cervantes does not necessarily result in plaintiff having exclusive right to the disputed property. Prior to the death of Felix Matabuena, the relationship between him and the defendant was legitimated by their marriage. She is therefore his widow. As provided for in the Civil Code, she is entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the plaintiff, as the surviving sister, to the other half. NENITA BIENVENIDO vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, LUISITA CAMACHO and LUIS FAUSTINO C. CAMACHO

I. Facts: (Includes petitioner & respondents contention) Aurelio P. Camacho married Consejo Velasco in Manila on October 3, 1942. On February 6, 1962, without his marriage to Consejo Velasco being dissolved, Aurelio P. Camacho contracted another marriage with respondent Luisita C. Camacho (Luisita) with whom he had been living since 1953 and by whom he begot a child, respondent Aurelio Luis Faustino C. Camacho (Chito) born on May 22, 1961. The marriage was solemnized in Tokyo, Japan where Aurelio and Luisita had been living since 1958. There were instances during Luisita and Aurelios marriage when, because of their quarrels, one or the other left the dwelling place for long periods of time. In her case Luisita stayed on those occasions at various times in Davao City, Hongkong or Japan. In 1967 Aurelio met petitioner Nenita T. Bienvenido, who had been estranged from her husband, Luis Rivera. He lived with her from June 1968 until Aurelios death on May 28, 1988, he lived with her, the last time in a duplex apartment in Quezon City. Petitioners daughter, Nanette, stayed with them as did Aurelios son, Chito, who lived with them for about a year in 1976. On April 30, 1982, Aurelio bought the house and the lot on Delgado Street in which they were staying from the owners, Paz Lorenzo Infante and Suzette Infante-Moozca. In the deed of sale and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 288350 of the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City, issued in his name, Aurelio was described as single. On November 26, 1984, Aurelio executed a deed of sale of the property in favor of petitioner Nenita in consideration of the sum of P250,000.00, by virtue of which Transfer Certificate of Title No. 326681 was issued in petitioners name on January 11, 1985.

On September 7, 1988, Luisita and her son Chito brought this case in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, seeking the annulment of the sale of the property to petitioner and the payment to them of damages. Luisita alleged that the deed of sale was a forgery and that in any event it was executed in fraud of her as the legitimate wife of Aurelio. In answer petitioner Nenita claimed that she and the late Aurelio had purchased the property in question using their joint funds which they had accumulated after living together for fourteen years, that the sale of the property by the late Aurelio to her was with respondent Luisitas consent; and that she was a purchaser in good faith. II. Issue/s: Whether the marriage of Aurelio and Luisita is valid. Whether the deed of sale between Aurelio and Nenita is valid. III. Ruling: RTC: (What is the RTCs basis for grant or denial of the appeal?) On August 29, 1989, the trial court rendered a decision upholding the sale of the property to petitioner and dismissing the complaint of Luisita. It found the deed of sale in favor of petitioner to be genuine and respondents Luisita and Chito to be in estoppel in not claiming the property until 1988 despite knowledge of the sale by the late Aurelio who had represented himself to be single. Respondents moved for a reconsideration but the trial court denied their motion. Court of Appeals: (What is the CAs basis for grant or denial of the appeal?) On appeal the respondents prevailed. On June 4, 1993, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court and declared respondents to be the owners of the house and lot in dispute. Although Luisita had admitted that as early as 1985 she knew that Nenita had been staying in the premises, the appellate court held that respondents action was not barred by laches because Luisita allegedly did not know that Nenita had obtained title to the property. On the merit, the Court of Appeals ruled that in the absence of proof to the contrary, Aurelios first wife must be presumed to have been absent for seven years without Aurelio having news of her being alive when Aurelio contracted a second marriage. On this premise, it held (1) that the property in dispute belonged to the conjugal partnership of Aurelio and Luisita and (2) that the sale of the property to Nenita was void for the same reason that donations between persons who are guilty of concubinage or adultery are declared void under Art. 739 of the Civil Code.

Supreme Court: (What is the SCs basis for grant or denial of the appeal?) The decision appealed from is REVERSED and another one is entered, DISMISSING the complaint against petitioner and DECLARING the deed of sale executed in her favor and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 326681 of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City issued in her name to be VALID. In the case at bar, the burden of proof was on respondents to show that Luisita and Aurelios marriage falls under any of these exceptions in order to be considered valid. They failed to discharge this burden. Instead the contrary appears. It has been held that the first exception refers to the subsequent marriage of the abandoned spouse and not the remarriage of the deserting spouse, after the period of seven years had lapsed. 6 This exception cannot be invoked in this case in order to sustain the validity of Aurelios marriage to Luisita because apparently it was Aurelio who had left his first wife. At the time of his second marriage to Luisita, he and Luisita had already been living together as husband and wife for five years. In fact the couple begot a child, in 1961, even before their marriage in 1962. Consequently, there is no basis for holding that the property in question was property of the conjugal partnership of Luisita and the late Aurelio because there was no such partnership in the first place. The sale to petitioner must be presumed. Petitioners ownership is evidenced by a deed of absolute sale 7 executed with all the solemnity of a public document and by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 326681 issued in due course in her name. Indeed, the property in question was acquired by Aurelio during a long period of cohabitation with petitioner which lasted for twenty years (1968-1988). While petitioner knew respondent Chito to be Aurelios son way back in 1976, there is nothing to show that she knew Aurelio to be married to Luisita. To the contrary, Aurelio represented himself to be single. As far as petitioner was concerned, Chito could have been Aurelios child by a woman not his wife. There was, therefore, no basis for the Court of Appeals ruling that Nenita was not a buyer in good faith of the property because she ought to have known that Aurelio was married to Luisita. SUMBAD v CA (1999) 308 SCRA 75 Agata Tait died in 1936. Afterwards, Agatas husband, George Tait, Sr., lived in a common-law marriage with Maria Tait. In 1974, he donated a certain parcel of unregistered land in Sitio Sum-at, Bontoc. George died in 1977. From 1982 to 1983, Maria Tait sold lots included within the Sum-at property in favor of the private

respondents who purchased the lots on the strength of a Tax Declaration over the Sum-at property showing the seller, Maria, to be the owner of the property in question. In 1989, petitioners Emilie Sumbad and Beatrice Tait brought an action for quieting of title, nullification of deeds of sale, and recovery of possession with damages against private respondents, alleging that they are the children and compulsory heirs of George and Agata. They claim that after the death of their mother, their father sold the Otucan property and used the proceeds thereof to purchase a residential lot in Sum-at, Bontoc and that from 1982 to 1983, Maria sold lots included within the Sum-at property to private respondents without their knowledge and consent. They further alleged that although the private respondents were warned that the Sum-at property did not belong to Maria they still purchased the lots from Maria and that Maria had no right to sell the Sum-at property so the deeds of sale are null and void and did not transfer title to private respondents. During the trial, petitioners and defense presented several witnesses.

notarized the deed of donation in this case was duly authorized by the clerk of court.

ISSUES: 1. WON the testimony of Shirley Eillenger with respect to the forgery of the deed of donation should be given credence. NO. The court agreed with the trial and appellate courts decision that Eillengers testimony is vague and incredible and incapable of impugning the validity of the public document. Forgery should be proven by clear and convincing evidence, and whoever alleges it has the burden of proving the same. Not only is Shirley Eillengers testimony difficult to believe, it shows is had been rehearsed as she anticipated the questions of petitioners counsel. Petitioners should have presented handwriting experts to support their claim that Georges signature on the deed of donation was indeed a forgery.

3. WON deed of donation contravenes Art 133, CC NO. Art 133 provides that every donation between spouses during the marriage shall be void. This prohibition does not apply when the donation takes effect after the death of the donor. Neither does this prohibition apply to moderate gifts which the spouses may give each other on the occasion of any family rejoicing. This prohibition extends to common-law relations (Matabuena v Cervantes). In fact, Art 87, FC provides that every donation or grant of gratuitous advantage, direct or indirect, between the spouses during the marriage shall be void, except moderate gifts which the spouses may give each other on the occasion of any family rejoicing. The prohibition shall also apply to persons living together as husband and wife without a valid marriage. However, this point is being raised for the first time in the SC. Litigants cannot raise an issue for the first time on appeal as this would contravene the basic rules of fair play and justice.

2. WON the deed of donation is invalid under Art 749 CC, which requires a public instrument as a requisite for the validity of donations of immovable property. NO. Petitioners contend that the person who notarized the deed had no authority to do so. However, the acknowledgment clause states that the person who notarized it was the deputy clerk of court who acted for and in the absence of the clerk of court who is authorized, under Sec. 21 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917, as amended by C.A. Nos. 270 and 641, to administer oaths. In accordance with the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed, it is to be presumed that the deputy clerk of court who

Even assuming that they are not thus precluded, petitioners were unable to present evidence in support of such a claim. The evidence on record does not show whether George was married to Maria and, if so, when the marriage took place. If Maria was not married to George, evidence should have been presented to show that at the time the deed of donation was executed, George and Maria were still maintaining common-law relations. Beatrice Taits (one of the witnesses presented) testimony is only to the effect that in 1941, Maria became their stepmother. There is no evidence on record that George and Maria continuously maintained common-law relations until the date when the donation was made (April 2, 1974).

* In short, the donation was valid because there was no evidence to support the allegation that George was married to Maria. There was also no evidence that the two were still living as common-law spouses at the time the donation was made. Arcaba vs Tabancura Vda de Batocael

FACTS: Francisco Comille and his wife Zosima Montallana became the registered owners of Lot No. 437-A located at Balintawak St. and Rizal Avenue in Dipolog City, Zamboanga del Norte in January 1956. Zosima died in 1980 hence Francisco and his mother in law executed a deed of extrajudicial partition with waiver of rights, where the latter waived her share consisting of of the property in favor of Francisco. Since Francisco do not have any children to take care of him after his retirement, he asked Leticia, his niece, Leticias cousin, Luzviminda and Cirila Arcaba, the petitioner, who was then a widow and took care of Franciscos house as well as the store inside. According to Leticia, Francisco and Cirila were lovers since they slept in the same room. On the other hand, Erlinda Tabancura, another niece of Francisco claimed that the latter told her that Cirila was his mistress. However, Cirila defensed herself that she was a mere helper who could enter the masters bedroom when Francisco asked her to and that Francisco was too old for her. She denied having sexual intercourse with Francisco. When the nieces got married, Cirila who was then 34 year-old widow started working for Francisco who was 75 year old widower. The latter did not pay him any wages as househelper though her family was provided with food and lodging. Franciscos health deteriorated and became bedridden. Tabancura testified that Franciscos only source of income was the rentals from his lot near the public streets. In January 1991, few months before Francisco died, he executed a Deed of Donation Inter Vivos where he ceded a portion of Lot 437-A composed of 150 sq m., together with his house to Cirila who accepted the same. The larger portion of 268 sq m. was left under his name. This was made in consideration of the 10 year of faithful services of the petitioner. Atty Lacaya notarized the deed and was later registered by Cirila as its absolute owner. In Octoer 1991, Francisco died and in 1993, the lot received by Cirila had a market value of P57,105 and assessed value of P28,550. The decedents nephews and nieces and his heirs by intestate succession alleged that Cirila was the common-law wife of Francisco. ISSUE: Whether or not the deed of donation inter vivos executed by Francisco in Arcabas favor was valid.

signature of Cirila Comille such as application for business permit, sanitary permit and the death certificate of Francisco. Also, the fact that Cirila did not demand her wages is an indication that she was not simply a caregiver employee. Cohabitation means more than sexual intercourse, especially when one of the parties is already old and may no longer be interested in sex at the very least, cohabitation is a public assumption of men and women holding themselves out to the public as such. Hence, the deed of donation by Francisco in favor of Cirila is void under Art. 87 of the Family Code. DELIZO
VS.

DELIZO

Nicolas Delizo contracted two marriages. The first was with Rosa Vilasfer, from 1891 until her death in 1909, a period of 18 years. The second with Dorotea de Ocampo, from 1911 until the death of Nicolas in 1957, or a period of 46 years.

The action for partition was instituted in 1957 by the 3 children and the heirs of the first marriage, all against their father, Nicolas Delizo, and his second wife, Dorotea de Ocampo, and their nine 9 children, the herein petitioners-appellants.

Involved are the properties acquired by Nicolas Delizo, among which are 66 hectares of agricultural lands in Caanawan, San Jose City, Nueva Ecija; 58 hectares of riceland in Muoz of the same province; and a lot in Manila.

It was found by both the TC and the CA that the Caanawan lands were acquired as homesteads during the existence of the first marriage of Nicolas Delizo to Rosa Villasfer and there being no affirmative showing that they belonged exclusively to said Nicolas Delizo, should therefore correspond to the first conjugal partnership of Nicolas Delizo and Rosa Villasfer.

HELD: The court in this case considered a sufficient proof of common law relationship wherein donation is not valid. The conclusion was based on the testimony of Tabancura and certain documents bearing the With regards to the other properties, the CA found that these were all acquired during the existence of the second marriage of Nicolas Delizo. However, since these properties were acquired from the

produce of the Caanawan properties although such produce is the result of the labor and industry of the spouses Nicolas Delizo and Dorotea de Ocampo, only eighty per cent (80%) of said properties acquired during the second marriage should appertain to the second conjugal partnership, while twenty per cent (20%) thereof adjudicated to the children of the first marriage. Whether the property acquired by homestead is conjugal property of the 1st or 2nd marriage? From the findings of the Appellate Court that 66 hectares of the Caanawan properties were acquired by Nicolas Delizo as homesteads during the period of the first marriage, it does not necessarily follow that they should be considered as properties of the first marriage, considering that being homesteads they were part of the public domain, and it was not shown that all the requirements of the Homestead Law to warrant the grant of a patent to the homesteader have been complied with prior to the death in 1909 of Delizo's first wife, Rosa Villasfer. Under Act 926, which was then the applicable law, the right of the homesteader to the patent does not become absolute until after he has complied with all the requirements of the law. The decisive factor, therefore, in the determination of whether a parcel of land acquired by way of homestead is conjugal property of the first or the second marriage, is not necessarily the time of the issuance of the homestead patent but the time of the fulfillment of the requirements of the public land law for the acquisition of such right to the patent. What was transferred to Nicolas Delizo were not rights of ownership, but inchoate rights as applicants for homesteads over portions of the public domain. Having received the homestead only in 1905, Nicolas Delizo could not have perfected his rights thereon by the completion of the five-year occupancy and cultivation requirement of the law, in 1909. The CA erred in, holding that the entire Caanawan properties belong to the conjugal partnership of the first marriage of Nicolas Delizo and Rosa Villasfer. Considering, however, that about twenty (20) hectares were cultivated and rendered productive during the period from 1905 to 1909, judgment and equity demand that the rights to said properties be apportioned to the parties in proportion to the extent to which the requirements of the public land laws had been complied with during the existence of each conjugal partnership. In connection with the other properties, the CA held that "there is no controversy that these were all acquired during the existence of the second marriage of Nicolas Delizo." Since these properties were acquired from the produce of the Caanawan

properties although such produce is the result of the labor and industry of the spouses Nicolas Delizo and Dorotea de Ocampo, only eighty per cent (80%) of said properties acquired during the second marriage should appertain to the second conjugal partnership, while twenty per cent (20%) thereof adjudicated to the children of the first marriage. It would have been facile to hold that those after-acquired properties belong to the second conjugal partnership in view of the statutory presumption enunciated in Article 1407 of the old Civil Code (now Article 160, New Civil Code). There are, however, important considerations which preclude Us from doing so. There is the established fact that the produce of the Caanawan lands contributed considerably to the acquisition. BARCILLES
VS.

GSIS

Judge Pascual Berciles died of cardiac arrest. His retirement benefits, unpaid salary, retirement premiums and terminal leave and representation and transportation allowances are being contested in this case by two families. Iluminada Ponce Berciles and her four children Ilona, Ellery, England and Ione (lawful heirs) allege that they are the lawful legal heirs of the deceased. Iluminada presents as proof, evidence of her marriage with the deceased which entitled her and their legitimate children to a share in the said benefits. On the other hand, Flor Fuentebella and her four children Pascual Voltaire, Maria Luisa, Mercy and Rhoda (contending claimants) also claim a share in the benefits.

The GSIS resolved to grant the benefits in the following proportion: 77/134 for Iluminada as surviving spouse; 10/134 each for the legitimate children Ilona, Ellery, England and Ione; 5/134 for Pascual Voltaire as acknowledged natural child; 4/134 each for the illegitimate children Maria Luisa, Mercy and Rhoda.

Both parties appealed. The lawful heirs contend that the GSIS ruling is erroneous, that they are the only legal heirs under the law. The

contending claimants also appealed claiming that they should be the only ones entitled to the benefits. Is the GSIS decision valid? NO The marriage between Iluminada and the deceased was sufficiently proved and ruled upon by this court, fully supported by appropriate evidence as certified by the civil registry therefore the four children begotten by said spouses during their marital union are all legitimate. They are entitled to their share in the benefits. The marriage between Flor and the deceased was not proved. She only presented a certification that their marriage records could not be found or located in the civil registry. As to Pascual Voltaire, his paternity cannot be sufficiently proved. His birth certificate was not signed by either the father or mother and under the law, if the alleged father did not intervene in the birth certificate, the putting of his name by the mother or doctor or registrar is null and void. Pascual Voltaire therefore cannot be considered as an acknowledged natural child. Under the law, illegitimate children are entitled to support and such successional rights so long as there is admission or recognition of paternity. As a result, the illegitimate children of Flor cannot share in the benefits as the marriage between Flor and the deceased was not sufficiently proved and paternity was not established. The retirement benefits and the terminal leave pay, unpaid salary and allowances accruing to the deceased shall be distributed equally to the 5 heirs: Iluminada, Ilona, Ellery, England and Ione. As to the retirement premiums, the same is presumed conjugal, there being no proof that the premiums were paid from the exclusive funds of the deceased. One half belongs to the wife as her property in the conjugal partnership and the other half shall go to the estate of the deceased to be distributed to his legal heirs. VELOSO
VS.

MARTINEZ. The record shows that the jewels were the sole and separate property of the wife, acquired from her mother, and in the absence of further proof, we must presume that they constituted a part of her paraphernal property. As such paraphernal property she exercised dominion over the same. (Article 1382, Civil Code.) She had the exclusive control and management of the same, until and unless she had delivered it to her husband, before a notary public, with the intent that the husband might administer it properly. (Article 1384, Civil Code.) There is no proof in the record that she had ever delivered the same to her husband, in any manner, or for any purpose. That being true, she could not be deprived of the same by any act of her husband, without her consent, and without compliance with the provisions of the Civil Code above cited. PLATA
VS.

YATCO

Amalia Plata while single, sold a parcel of land to Celso Saldaa. The latter again resold the property to Amalia Plata, married to Gaudencio Begosa. In consideration of a Php 3,000 loan, "Amalia Plata of legal age, Filipino, married to Gaudencio Begosa" mortgaged the identical property to Cesarea Villanueva, signed by Gaudencio Begosa as co-mortgagor. The mortgage was foreclosed extrajudicially and Villanueva obtained said property by being the highest bidder. Villanueva sued Begosa for illegal detainer and obtained judgment that became final. A writ of execution was issued but Plata resisted all efforts to eject her from her property and filed a claim averring ownership of the property. Is Plata bound by the detainer/judgment against Begosa? NO She had acquired the property while still single. Evidence before us against the marriage of petitioner Amalia Plata to Gaudencio Begosa is weak. The subsequent conveyance thereof to Celso Saldaa, and the reconveyance of her several months afterward of the same property, did not transform it from paraphernal to conjugal property, there being no proof that the money paid to Saldaa came from common or conjugal funds. The deed of mortgage in favor of respondents Villanueva actually recites that the petitioner was the owner of the tenement in question and so does the conveyance of it by Saldaa to her. Since the property was paraphernal, and the creditors and purchasers were aware of it, the fact being clearly

MARTINEZ

Lucia Martinez is the widow of Domingo Franco and administratrix of his estate. Before Domingo died, he borrowed Php 4,500 from Mariano Veloso secured by jewelry. Veloso claims the husband pawned the jewelry to him with full knowledge and consent of Martinez. Martinez claims that the jewelry in question was her own property, inherited from her mother.

Who is entitled to the jewelry?

spread on the land records, it is plain that Plata's possession, therefore, was not derived from Gaudencio Begosa. The illegal detainer judgment against the husband alone cannot bind nor affect the wife's possession of her paraphernal, which by law she holds and administers independently, and which she may even encumber or alienate without his knowledge or consent. LIM
VS.

GARCIA

Hilario Lim died intestate some time in the year 1903, leaving a widow (Isabela Garcia) and nine children and an interest in an estate valued at some 50,000 pesos EXCEPT: 1. A house and lot on Calle Magallanes, Zamboanga, and the sum of 10,000 pesos which, it was admitted, had been brought to the marriage by the said Hilario Lim 2. 700 pesos, the purchase price paid by said Lim for a certain lot which it was also admitted had been brought by him to his marriage, and which was sold in the course of the administration of his estate, together with improvements TC - the entire estate as shown in the inventory prepared by the administrator was conjugal property. Counsel for the administrator,surviving children - none of the said property should be treated as the property of the conjugal partnership, because, as they allege, the deceased Hilario Lim, brought to the marriage property worth more than double the amount of the intestate estate, and the defendant, his widow, brought nothing to the conjugal partnership, either at the time of the marriage or at any time thereafter. Should the property be considered conjugal? YES The TC was of opinion that the evidence offered in support of this contention was not sufficient to overcome the presumption established in article 1407 of the Civil Code, which provides that all the estate of the married couple will be considered as conjugal partnership property (bienes gananciales) unless and until it is proven that it is a part of the separate estate of the husband or the wife, and we think after a careful examination of the record that this finding must be sustained. The setting aside of 700 pesos (which appears to have been taken as the value of the lot sold during the administration) as the separate property of the husband who brought the lot to the marriage, and the treatment of the balance of the price received for this lot, together with the buildings thereon,

as conjugal partnership property, it appearing from the record that these buildings were constructed out of the conjugal partnership funds, was in entire accordance with the provisions of article 1404, which provides that "the buildings erected during coverture on land belonging to one of the married couple will be considered as conjugal partnership property, after allowing the owner of the land the value thereof." The foregoing disposes of all the errors assigned by counsel for the appellant, except the alleged error of the trial court in refusing to order the inclusion in the inventory of the estate of the deceased of three parcels of land, held in the name of the appellee and claimed as her separate estate. It is contended by the appellant that these parcels of land were conveyed to the appellee during the coverture (thats marriage, incase youre wondering) by the said Hilario Lim either as a gift or for valuable consideration, and that in either event such conveyance was void under the provisions of articles 1334 and 1458 of the Civil Code. It appears from the evidence, however, that these parcels of land were not acquired by the appellee by conveyance from her husband, and that they were in fact conveyed to her by third parties by way of exchange for certain property inherited by her from her father's estate during the coverture, and they are, therefore, her separate property under the provisions of paragraph 3 of article 1396, which provides that property acquired by exchange for other property belonging separately to one of the married couple is the separate property of the owner of the property for which it is exchanged. The trial court speaks of this property as dowry of the appellee, but there is nothing in the record which tends to prove that it was acquired as a part of her dowry, and indeed the evidence strongly supports the presumption that it was and continued to be a part of her separate estate (paraphernalia) which never acquired the "dotal" character. MANOTOK REALTY
VS.

COURT

OF

APPEALS

Felipe Madlangawa claims that he has been occupying a parcel of land in the Clara de Tambunting de Legarda Subdivision since 1949 upon permission being obtained from Andres Ladores, then an overseer of the subdivision, with the understanding that the respondent would eventually buy the lot.

Apr 2,50 - the owner of the lot, Clara Tambunting, died and her entire estate, including her paraphernal properties which covered the lot occupied by the private respondent were placed under custodia legis.

Apr 28,50 - Don Vicente Legarda was appointed as a special administrator of the estate. Meanwhile the private respondent remained in possession of the lot in question. Mar 13,20,59 - Manotok Raealty became the successful bidder and vendee of the Tambunting de Legarda Subdivision pursuant to the deeds of sale executed in its favor by the Philippine Trust Company, as administrator of the Testate Estate of Clara Tambunting de Legarda. The lot in dispute was one of those covered by the sale. The Deed of Sale, among others, provided for the following terms and conditions: The VENDEE renounces the right to warranty in case of eviction with the knowledge of the risks of eviction and assumes its consequences with respect not only to the lots subject-of the above mentioned cases and claims but also with respect to any other lots subject of contracts of sale or promises to sell that may have been executed by the deceased, Clara Tambunting de Legarda and/or Vicente L. Legarda, and it hereby relieves the estate of Clara Tambunting de Legarda and the Philippine Trust Company, in its capacity as Administrator thereof, of any and all liability with respect thereto in case of eviction. The VENDEE assumes the risk and expenses of ejecting the tenants or squatters on the said parcels of land if it decides to eject them

Vicente Legarda had no authority whatsoever to sell the said property to the private respondent on May 12, 1950 since the former was appointed as administrator of the estate of Clara Tambunting only on August 28, 1950. Therefore, the questioned sale could not have bound Clara Tambunting's estate because the vendor Vicente Legarda neither acted as the owner nor the administrator of the subject property when the alleged sale took place. Madlangawa - the provisions of the deed of sale are a declaration or admission against the interest of the petitioner, and shows that the acts of Vicente Legarda had been ratified by the Philippine Trust Company and approved by the probate court. The petitioner, therefore, is allegedly estopped from questioning the authority of Vicente Legarda in selling the property in dispute. Whether Don Vicente Legarda could vlidly dispose of the paraphernal property? NO There is nothing in the records that will show that Don Vicente Legarda was the administrator of the paraphernal properties of Dona Clara Tambunting during the lifetime of the latter. Thus, it cannot be said that the sale which was entered into by the private respondent and Don Vicente Legarda had its inception before the death of Dona Clara Tambunting and was entered into by the former for and on behalf of the latter, but was only consummated after her death. Don Vicente Legarda, therefore, could not have validly disposed of the lot in dispute as a continuing administrator of the paraphernal properties of Dona Clara Tambunting. Art. 136 NCC. The wife retains the ownership of the paraphernal property. Art. 137 NCC. The wife shall have the administration of the paraphernal property, unless she delivers the same to the husband by means of a public instrument empowering him to administer it. In this case, the public instrument shall be recorded in the Registry of Property. As for the movables, the husband shall give adequate security. We are, therefore, led to the inevitable conclusion that the sale between Don Vicente Legarda and the private respondent is void ab initio, the former being neither an owner nor administrator of the subject property. Such being the case,

In its effort to clear the Tambunting Subdivision of its squatters and occupants, the Manotok Realty caused the publication of several notices in the Manila Times and the Taliba advising the occupants to vacate their respective premises, otherwise, court action with damages would follow. Madlangawa was one of the many occupants who refused to vacate the lots they were occupying

TC dismissed the petitioner's action. CA ruled that the only right remaining to the petitioner is to enforce the collection of the balance because accordingly, it stepped into the shoes of its predecessor (Don Vicente Legarda). Manotok Realty - Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in holding that the sale by Don Vicente Legarda in favor of the private respondent is valid, binding, and enforceable against the petitioner. Since there is no dispute that the property in question was the paraphernal property of Clara Tambunting, who died on April 2, 1950,

the sale cannot be the subject of the ratification by the Philippine Trust Company or the probate court. Arsenal v. Intermediate Appellate Court (143 SCRA 40, 49) - Under the provisions of the Civil Code, a void contract is inexistent from the beginning. It cannot be ratified neither can the right to set up the defense of its illegality be waived. (Art. 1409, Civil Code). After the appointment of Don Vicente Legarda as administrator of the estate of Dona Clara Tambunting, he should have applied before the probate court for authority to sell the disputed property in favor of the private respondent. If the probate court approved the request, then Don Vicente Legarda would have been able to execute a valid deed of sale in favor of the respondent. Unfortunately, there was no effort on the part of the administrator to comply with the above-quoted rule of procedure nor on that of the respondent to protect his interests or to pay the balance of the installments to the court appointed administrator. TORELA
VS.

Felimon Torela, married to Marciana Gepanto which is the actual civil status of the movant, upon payment of the required fees. Felimon executed a definite deed of sale, whereby, for and in consideration of P3,000.00, he sold said lot to Marcos and Maria Luna Mahilum, He also stated in the deed of sale that he was a widower by first marriage to Graciana Gallego, and now married to Marcina Gepango, that he is the registered owner of lot, having acquired it by inheritance from his parents before his marriage to Graciana Gallego, deceased. The document was acknowledged before Notary Public. Upon its registration, Transfer Certificate was issued to spouses. According, however, to the plaintiffs while in their youth they had seen their father Felimon and their mother Graciana clean the lot in question, and when their mother died, their father married Marcina Gepango. In other words, the plaintiffs want us to believe that the parcel of land is a status and in conveying the land to another, they now assert their right to the estate appertaining to their mother. Alleging that they were deprived of their corresponding share from the property thus sold. Whether or not the parcel of land herein involved is a conjugal property of the spouses Felimon Torela and Graciana Gallego (plaintiffs mother). The property question is one of those documented in Article 1401 of the Old Civil Code. On the other hand, as it was inherited by Felimon from his parents and brought to the marriage with his first wife, the same is deemed his separate property (Art, 1396, Old Civil Code). For these reasons, defendant Felimon had lawfully disposed of his property to the exclusion of his children by his first marriage. Accordingly, plaintiffs complaint was correctly dismissed by the court below. Petitioners claim that since the lot in questions was registered in the name of Felimon Torela, married to Graciana Gallego, it must be presumed to be the conjugal property of Felimon and Graciana so that one-half thereof should be adjudicated to them as their inheritance from their mother. While it is rule that all property of the marriage is presumed to be conjugal, as above stated, nonetheless the party who invoke the presumption must first prove that the property was acquired during the marriage. This proof is a condition sine qua not for the application of the presumption. In the instant case there in is nothing in the record to show that the lot in question was acquired during the marriage of Felimon Torela and Graciana gallego. On the contrary, the factual finding of the CA is to the effect that Felimon acquired the land through inheritance and this conclusion is bolstered by that fact that no one of the petitioners

TORELA

Decree 440157 was issued by the CFI of Negros Occidental in favor of Felimon Torela, married to Gallego, decreeing that he is the owner of a parcel of land (Lot 3770), and ordering that the same be registered. Consequently, OCT 29257 covering lot was issued in favor of Felimon. As the certificate of title was either lost or destroyed during the last world war, he filed a verified petition for reconstitution praying that after due publication in the Official Gazette, an order be issued setting the petition for hearing. Thereafter the court, orders the Register of Deeds to reconstitute the original as well as the owners duplicate of OCT 29257. Thus, OCT 6898 was in favor of Felimon, in lieu of the lost and/or destroyed one. Torela, filed a Motion Ex-Parte alleging that Lot. 3770 having been acquired by him by way of inheritance prior to his marriage to his first wife, Graciana Galeego, the Cadastral court ordered that land be registered in the name of Torela, married to Graciana Galeego, that his first wife died many years ago; and that he is married by second nuptial to Marciana Gepanago. He, therefore, prayed that the court order the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental to change his (movants) civil status, appearing on the face of OCT, from Felimon, married to Graciana Gallego to Felimon Torella married to Marciana Gepango. The court, finding no opposition thereto and with the conformity of Clara Torela, daughter of Felimon by First marriage, granted the motion and ordered the Register of Deeds to change the civil status of the movant from

herein, Clara Torela, gave her conformity to her fathers Ex-Parte Motion, wherein it was recited, inter alia, that Felimon had acquired the property by way of inheritance prior to his marriage to his first wife, Graciana Gallego. The circumstances that Decree 440157 of the CFI of Negros Occidental which confirmed the ownership of Felimon over the land in question described him as married to Graciana Gallego was merely descriptive of his civil status at that time and cannot be taken as proof that the land was acquired during their coverture. The further circumstances that the land was registered during their marriage cannot in itself constitute proof that it was acquired during their marriage for land registration under Act. 496 does not confer title; it confirms a title already existing and which is registerable. MAGALLON
VS.

MARTIN LACERNA married to Epifania Magallon," the latter being the present petitioner.

After the confirmative Decision of the IAC had become final and executory, the respondent Judge, on motion of the plaintiffs issued an alias writ of execution commanding the Provincial Sheriff to order the defendant Martin to divide and partition the property, of which is the share of Eustaquia in the conjugal property, and plaintiffs being Pichan's children are also entitled thereto; and deliver portion of 5 hectares of the lot to the plaintiffs as their share to satisfy the said judgment and your fees thereon.

MONTEJO Apparently, said writ was served on both Martin and petitioner, the latter filed with the Trial Court a "Motion for Intervention and to Stay Execution" alleging that the land subject of the writ was conjugal property of herself and Martin under a certificate of title issued way back 1978 without legal impediments, and now incontestable," as well as valid, binding and legal unless declared otherwise in an independent proceedings, and praying that the property of herein intervenor be excluded from the enforcement of the writ of execution." Said motion was denied.

The petition seeks the annulment of a writ of execution issued by the respondent Judge. Case was instituted by the plaintiffs (private respondents herein) against Martin Lacerna to compel partition of parcel of land in Magsaysay, Davao del Sur, to which defendant had perfected a claim by homestead. The plaintiffs, claiming to be the common children of Martin and his wife, Eustaquia Pichan, asserted a right to one-half of the land as their mother's share in her conjugal partnership with Martin. While said defendant denied having contracted marriage with Eustaquia although he admitted living with her without benefit of marriage until she allegedly abandoned him as well as paternity of two of the plaintiffs who, he claimed, were fathered by other men, the Trial Court gave his denials no credence. The Trial Court further found that Martin had begun working the homestead, and his right to a patent to the land accrued, during his coverture with Eustaquia. The plaintiffs were declared entitled to the half of the land claimed by them. The IAC affirmed.

It appears that at the time the case was brought, no certificate of title to the land had yet been issued to Martin Lacerna, although he had already complied with all the conditions necessary to a grant thereof. OCT P-11 568 was issued only while Lacerna's appeal was pending in the IAC. While it is not disputed that said certificate of title refers to the same land homesteaded by Lacerna during his coverture with Eustaquia, for reasons to which the record before the Court offers no clear clue, it states on its face that it is issued in the name of " ...

The facts found by the lower courts which, in view of the finality of the latter's decisions, are binding upon this Court and can no longer be controverted, as when as the pertinent allegations of the petition, leave no doubt that the land, which rightfully pertained to the conjugal partnership of Martin and Eustaquia, the plaintiff's mother, and should have been titled in the names of said spouses, was, through fraud or mistaken, registered in the names of Martin and petitioner Epifania. In such a situation, the property should be regarded as impressed with an implied, or a constructive, trust for the party rightfully entitled thereto.

If property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property comes. Clearly, the petitioner, as the trustee of a constructive trust, has an obligation to convey to the private respondents that part of the land to which she

now claims an ostensible title, said portion rightfully pertaining to the respondents' deceased mother as her share in the conjugal partnership with Martin. Is petitioner bound by final judgment rendered in an action to which she was not made a party? YES

This ruling presumes that petitioner is the legal wife of Lacerna though no marriage contract was presented by Lacerna to prove his marriage to the petitioner either before or after the death of Eustaquia. Indeed, it is clear that the petitioner cannot assert any claim to the land other than by virtue of her supposed marriage to Lacerna. As a mere mistress, she cannot pretend to any right to it.

Both the lower courts appear to have overlooked the fact that the surviving spouse is the legal and compulsory heir of the deceased husband or wife; otherwise, consistent with the finding that the half portion of the land sued for pertained to the late Eustaquia as her share in the conjugal partnership with Martin, they should have ruled that Martin concurred with the three private respondents in the succession to said portion, each of them taking an equal share. Unfortunately, said error is beyond review because Martin allowed the judgment to become final and executory without raising that point of law, even on appeal.

The writ of execution is set aside. Instead of enforcing said writ, the respondent Trial Court is ordered to effect the partition of the land in accordance with the terms of its now final and executory decision and the provisions of Rule 69. CUENCA
VS.

The petitioner relies mainly, if not solely, on the fact that the certificate of title to the land carries her name as the "wife" of the owner Martin. Such entry on the certificate of title has been established by evidence no longer disputable as resulting from a mistake if, indeed, it was not procured through fraud. Moreover, the phrase "married to Epifania written after the name of Martin in said certificate of title is merely descriptive of the civil status of Martin and does not necessarily prove that the land is "conjugal" property. Neither can petitioner invoke the presumption established in Article 160 that property acquired during the marriage belongs to the conjugal partnership, there being no proof of her alleged marriage to Martin except that which arises by implication from the entry in the certificate of title and for the far more compelling reason that the homestead claim on the land was shown to have been perfected during Martin's marriage to Eustaquia, mother of the private respondents.

CUENCA

Private respondents Restituto and Meladora Cuenca filed a complaint for recovery of real property and damages against the petitioners before the then CFI of Davao del Norte. The lower court rendered a decision in favor of the petitioners. The lower court dismissed the complaint. The appellate court reversed the decision of the lower court. It rendered a decision in favor of the private respondents.

The writ of execution, however, must be set aside, though not for the reasons urged in the petition. The judgment of the respondent Trial Court merely declared the private respondents entitled to one-half of the land, without specifically ordering partition and delivery to them the same. A writ of execution cannot vary the terms of the judgment it is issued to satisfy, or afford relief different from, or not clearly included in, what is awarded by judgment.

This Case involves parcels of land which were claimed by two sets of families. Private respondents Restituto and Meladora Cuenca claimed ownership on the ground that they are the legitimate children of Agripino Cuenca and Maria Bangahon, both deceased. They alleged that some of the parcels are paraphernal property of Maria while all the others are conjugal properties of Maria and Agripino. They also alleged that Agripino and Engracia Basadre were not legally married because at the time they lived together Agripino was married to a certain Jesusa Pagar.

The petitioners (defendants below) denied the legitimacy of the marriage between Agripino and Maria as well as the legitimacy of the plaintiffs as children. They claimed that Agripino and their mother Engracia were legally married and that they are the legitimate

children of the couple. They contend that the subject parcels of lands are conjugal properties of Agripino and Engracia.

entitled to inherit from Agripino Cuenca together with the latter's legitimate children by Maria, the private respondents herein. The appellate court declared Engracia Basadre as surviving spouse. There was, therefore no need to prove the legality of marriage between petitioners Engracia and Agripino much less to prove the legitimacy of the other petitioners who are undoubtedly the children of Agripino and Engracia. The petitioners also alleged the finding of newly discovered evidence to prove that the lands were conjugal properties of Agripino and petitioner Engracia. The petitioners alleged that these parcels were surveyed for Agripino and approved when Agripino was already married to Engracia as indicated in the documents, hence, there is the presumption that these are conjugal properties and therefore petitioners have hereditary rights over these properties.

The documents presented are proofs that the properties belong exclusively to Maria as her paraphernal property, a fact declared by the husband in a declaration against his interest. It was error for the trial court to brush aside the importance of the declaration in the extrajudicial settlement of the estate of Maria. These public documents carry sufficient evidentiary weight to prove the origin of the properties and the nature of their ownership as properties brought into the marriage by Maria to Agripino as against the bare testimony of the defendants and their witnesses. These, and other, pieces of evidence established that the plaintiffs are the forced heirs of Maria and Agripino, who by law should succeed to the possession and ownership. On the other hand, defendants' evidence consist only of the oral testimonies which proved nothing concrete as they merely are inferences conveniently tailored to support their claim.

Agripino and Maria were legally married with Restituto and Meladora Cuenca as their issues; that Maria Bangahon brought properties into her marriage; that the couple acquired properties during the marriage; that by virtue of the extrajudicial settlement executed by Agripino Cuenca and his children, Restituto is the absolute owner of the land; that one half of the land belongs to Agripino and the other half to Maria the same having been acquired by them during their marriage-conjugal partnership property. Upon the dissolution of the conjugal relationship by the death of spouses, one half goes to Agripino which portion after the death of Agripino goes to his alleged third wife, Engracia Basadre-Cuenca together with the plaintiffs as forced heirs of Agripino.

Article 160: "All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife," this Court ruled that the presumption refers only to the property acquired during marriage and does not operate when there is no showing as to when property alleged to be conjugal was acquired. The documents sought to be presented as newly discovered evidence do not show that the claims to the parcels were perfected during the marriage of Agripino and petitioner Engracia. The perfection of the homestead claims is considered the time of acquisition of the properties. The fact that these parcels were surveyed for Agripino and approved during their marriage is not determinative of the issue as to whether or not the parcels were conjugal properties. Moreover, the documents show that 5 of the 8 parcels are titled in the name of either respondent Meladora or Restituto. The presumption cannot prevail "when the title is in the name of only one spouse and the rights of innocent third parties are involved. The non-applicablility of the presumption should also be upheld. The petition DISMISSED. The resolutions of the appellate court are AFFIRMED. ZULUETA
VS.

The petitioners attached to their motion an alleged newly discovered evidence consisting of a certified true copy of the Register of Birth of petitioner first child of Agripino and petitioner Engracia which discloses that he is a legitimate child of the couple and a notarized public document which discloses that Jesusa Pagar was married to someone disproving the respondents' evidence. The dispositive portion of the CA decision states that petitioner Engracia Basadre was

PAN-AM

In an action for damage against Pan-am, plaintiff, his wife and their daughter were awarded moral and exemplary damage as well as attorneys fee. Said action was based on a breach of contract of carriage coupled with quasi-delict. Pending appeal, Mrs. Zulueta

separated from the case insofar into compromise agreement with Pan-am wherein she settled for P50,000.00. A motion to dismiss the case insofar as Mrs. Zulueta is concerned was filed, but was denied in the ground that a wife cannot bind conjugal partnership without the husband consent, except in cases provided by law. Hence this motion for reconsideration. Whether or not the damages involved in the present case are among those forming the part of the conjugal partnership. The damages in question arose from a breach of plaintiffs contract of carriage with defendant, for which plaintiff paid their fare with funds presumably belonging to the conjugal property. Said damages, therere fall under Article 153(1), the right thereto having been acquired by onerous title during the marriage. The damages in the case at bar do not come also under any of the provisions of Article 148 NCC or other provisions forming part of Chapter 3, Title IV of Book I NCC, which chapter is entitled Paraphernal Property. What is more if that which is acquired by right of redemption or by exchange with other property belonging to only one of the spouses and that which is purchased with the exclusive money of the wife or of the husband: belonging exclusively to such wife or husband, it follows necessarily that which is acquired with money of conjugal partnership belongs thereto or forms part thereof. Motion denied. MENDOZA
VS.

Whether the properties are the conjugal properties of the spouses?

YES The applicable provision of law is Article 153 of the Civil Code which provides: The following are conjugal partnership property: That which is acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the expense of the common fund, whether the acquisition be for the partnership, or for only one of the spouses;

REYES

This case originated with the filing of a complaint by Ponciano S. Reyes with the CFI of Rizal, for the annulment of a deed of sale of 2 parcels of land with their improvements, executed by his wife, Julia R. De Reyes as vendor and the spouses Efren V. Mendoza and Inocencia R. De Mendoza, as vendees. Ponciano S. Reyes averred that said properties were conjugal properties of himself and his wife and that she had sold them to petitioners "all by herself" and without his knowledge or consent. Petitioners Efren V. Mendoza and Inocencia R. De Mendoza alleged in their answer that the properties were paraphernal properties of Julia R. de Reyes and that they had purchased the same in good faith and for adequate consideration. In a separate answer, petitioner Julia R. De Reyes, supported the spouses Mendozas' contentions. CFI dismissed the complaint and declared the properties in question exclusive and paraphernal properties of petitioner Julia R. De Reyes. It ruled that she could validly dispose of the same without the consent of her husband and that the Mendozas are innocent purchasers. CA reversed the decision. Hence, this petition.

The presumption found in Article 160 of the Civil Code must also be overcome by one who contends that the disputed property is paraphernal Article 160 provides: All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife. There is no question that the disputed property was acquired by onerous title during the marriage. But were the funds used to buy the lot and build the improvements at the expense of the common fund? The records show that the funds came from loans obtained by the spouses from the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation. Under Article 161 of the Civil Code, all debts and obligations contracted by the husband and the wife for the benefit of the conjugal partnership are liabilities of the partnership. If the fact that property acquired during marriage was registered in the name of the husband alone does not affect its conjugal nature, neither does registration in the name of the wife. Any person who buys land registered in the married name of the wife is put on notice about its conjugal nature. Furthermore, the consent of the Ponciano Reyes to the mere lease of the properties was demanded by the Mendozas allegedly for their own protection, yet when it came to the deed of sale which entailed a greater transfer of rights such consent was not required. CA ruling affirmed that properties are conjugal properties. LUZON SURETY
VS.

DE GARCIA

Ladislao Chavez, as principal, and Luzon Surety Co. executed a surety bond in favor of the PNB to guaranty a crop loan of P9k to Chavez. Vicente Garcia, together with Chavez and Ramon Lacson, as guarantors, signed an indemnity agreement binding themselves solidarily for any and all damages and other burdens Luzon Surety Co. may at any time sustain. The PNB sued Chavez and Luzon Surety Co.

to recover the amount of P4,577.95. Luzon Surety Co. filed a thirdparty complaint against Chavez, Lacson and Garcia, based on the indemnity agreement. CFI ORDERED Chavez and Luzon Surety Co. to pay and likewise ordered Chavez, Garcia, and Lacson, to pay Luzon Surety Co. the total amount to be paid by it to PNB. Then, it issued a writ of execution against Garcia for the satisfaction of the claim of Luzon Surety Co. Thereafter, the sugar quedans of the Sps. Garcia were levied and garnished from their sugar plantation. The Sps. Garcia filed for preliminary injunction, which was made permanent CA AFFIRMED the permanent preliminary injunction. Whether the CPG, in the absence of any showing of benefits received, could be held liable on an indemnity agreement executed by the husband to accommodate a third party in favor of a surety company? NO The husband, as such administrator, the only obligations incurred by him that are chargeable against the CPG are those incurred in the legitimate pursuit of his career, profession or business with the honest belief that he is doing right for the benefit of the family. The husband in acting as guarantor or surety for another in an indemnity agreement did not act for the benefit of the CPG. There must be the requisite showing then of some advantage which clearly accrued to the welfare of the spouses. There is no proof that Vicente Garcia in acting as surety or guarantor received consideration therefor, which may redound to the benefit of the CPG. Nor could there be, considering that the benefit was clearly intended for a third party, Ladislao Chavez. While the husband by thus signing the indemnity agreement may be said to have added to his reputation or esteem and to have earned the confidence of the business community, such benefit, even if hypothetically accepted, is too remote and fanciful to come within the express terms of the provision. To make the CPG respond for a liability that should appertain to the husband alone is to defeat and frustrate the avowed objective --- solidarity and well-being of the family as a unit.

the husband's transactions; but that it suffices that the transaction should be one that normally would produce such benefit for the partnership. Obligations incurred by the husband in the practice of his profession are collectible from the CPG. CARLOS
VS.

ABELARDO

Honorio Garcia claims that Maria Theresa Carlos-Abelardo approached him and requested him to advance $25k for the purchase of a house and lot. To enable and assist the spouses conduct their married life independently and on their own, Carlos issued a check in the name of Pura Vallejo, seller of the property, who acknowledged its receipt. When Carlos inquired the status of the loan, the spouses acknowledged their obligation but pleaded they were not yet in a position to make a definite settlement. He made a formal demand but they failed to comply, hence the collection suit. Since the spouses were separated in fact for more than 1 yr. prior to the filing of the complaint, they filed separate answers. The wife admitted securing a loan together with her husband, however, it was payable on a staggered basis. The husband claimed that the money was not a loan since he offered his services for Carlos construction company and such was his share of the profits from the contracts he obtained for Carlos.

RTC ORDERED the spouses to pay $25k, plus legal interest thereon and P100k AF and the husband to pay P500k as MD and P50k ED.

CA REVERSED and DISMISSED the complaint for insufficiency of evidence to show that the subject amount was indeed loaned to the spouses because there was evidence that the $25k was the husbands share in the profits of H.L. Carlos Construction.

Carlos: To prove his claim, he showed an instrument executed by the wife acknowledging her and her husbands accountability.

REYES, concurring: I concur in the result, but the words "all debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the CPG" in describing the charges and obligations for which the CPG is liable, do not require that actual profit or benefit must accrue to the CPG from

Manuel Abelardo: To prove his claim, he presented 10 BPI checks allegedly given to him by Carlos and argued that if indeed, he and his

wife were indebted to him, the latter could have easily deducted the amount of the said loan from his share of the profits. Whether a written instrument by the wife, acknowledging the loan for the conjugal home, without the signature of the husband can bind both? YES According to the records: (1) there was a check in the amount of US$25k issued by Carlos; (2) the spouses received it and gave it to Vallejo as full payment of a house and lot; (3) this house and lot became the spouses conjugal dwelling; and (4) only the wife executed an instrument acknowledging the loan but which the husband did not sign.

The heirs of the victim, sued Froilan Lagrimas for murder and subsequently, moved for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment on his property, which was granted.

LC GUILTY of MURDER and ordered to indemnify the heirs P6k plus P10k as damages, AF and burial expenses.

A levy was had on 11 parcels of land under the name of the accused. The sale thereof at public auction was scheduled, but before which, the wife of the accused, Mercedes, moved to quash the writ of attachment and execution because the property belonged to the CPG which cannot be held liable for the pecuniary indemnity of the husband.

All the checks of the husband were all in the account of H.L. Carlos Construction. On the other hand, the $25k check was drawn from the personal account of Carlos. Assuming to be true that the checks presented were his profits from the corporation, then all the more does this prove that the $25k was not part of such profits because it was issued by Carlos from his own account. Moreover, the husband failed to substantiate his claim that he is entitled to the profits and income of the corporation. The payment of personal debts contracted by the husband or the wife before or during the marriage shall not be charged to the CPG except insofar as they redounded to the benefit of the family. The spouses never denied the money was used to purchase the conjugal dwelling. Hence, the acknowledgment of the loan by the wife binds the CPG since its proceeds redounded to the benefit of the family so both are solidarily bound to pay the loan. While the husband refused to sign the acknowledgment executed and signed by his wife, undoubtedly, the loan redounded to the benefit of the family because it was used to purchase the conjugal home. Notwithstanding the alleged lack of consent of the husband, under Art. 21, FC, he shall be solidarily liable for such loan together with his wife.

LC GRANTED MTQ under Art. 161, NCC. What practical effect would be given this particular liability of the CPG for the payment of fines and indemnities imposed upon either husband or wife? Fines and indemnities imposed upon either husband or wife may be enforced against the partnership assets after the responsibilities enumerated in Art. 161 have been covered, if the spouse who is bound should have no exclusive property or if it should be insufficient. The period during which such a liability may be enforced presupposes that the conjugal partnership is still existing. Partnership assets contemplates that the responsibilities to which enumerated in Art. 161 chargeable against such assets, must be complied with first. The termination of the CPG is not a prerequisite.

PEOPLE

VS.

LAGRIMAS

Considering that the obligations mentioned in Art. 161 are peculiarly within the knowledge of the husband or of the wife whose conjugal partnership is made liable, the proof required of the beneficiaries of the indemnity should not be of the most exacting kind, ordinary credibility sufficing. Otherwise, the husband or the wife, as the case may be, representing the CPG may find the temptation to magnify its obligation irresistible so as to defeat the right of recovery of the

family of the offended party. The case was remanded for the proper receipt of evidence for recovery.