Facts:

Castro vs. CA April 28, 1989

Alejandra Austria, the widow of the deceased Antonio Ventenilla, applied for the registration of ten parcels of land. Soccoro Castro opposed alleging that the lands had been donated to her by Alejandra. The trial court ordered the registration in the name of Soccoro, subject only to the usufruct reserved by Alejandra in herself for the rest of her lifetime. Nephews and nieces, claiming to be heirs of Anton, appeared and filed a petition to set aside the decision. Meanwhile, Alejandra died and Socorro was substituted in her place. The trial court rejected both the claims without deciding the question of title for purposes of registration. Socorro appealed to the Court of Appeals. The appellees did not file a brief and the appellate court rendered its decision dismissing the appeal, and the case was thereafter elevated to us on petition for review. Arguments: Oppositors: The lands applied for were owned by Antonio Ventenilla; that when he died he left a will bequeathing them in usufruct to his wife Alejandra; and that upon his death they passed to the said oppositors as his heirs. Petitioner: Parcels No. 1, 2, 3, and 10 belong to Alejandra by virtue of the will left by the deceased Antonio Ventenilla and probated in Special Proceeding No. 237 while the rest were purchased by her. Issue: 1. Whether Alejandra was a mere life usufructuary thereof or a residuary legatee under the will 2. Whether the donation was mortis causa or inter vivos Held: 1. No. The contention of the oppositors below is that these parcels also belonged to the deceased Antonio Ventenilla. Even assuming this to be so, they would have passed to widow, Alejandra Austria, as the residuary heir under his will; and as stated by this Court in Case G.R. No. L10018, supra, "she had been in possession and on payment of said properties all these years in concept of owner, being the residuary legatee thereof." In any event whether, as purchaser or as residuary legatee, such possession in concept of owner constituted sufficient registrable title. 2. Inter vivos. It is quite clear from the terms of the donation that the donor intended to and did dispose of her properties irrevocably in favor of the donee, subject only to the conditions therein expressed, one of which was that the latter would have no right to the products during the donor's lifetime. This merely indicates a reservation in herself of the usufruct over said properties, which usufruct would be consolidated with the naked ownership of the donee upon the former's death. The use of the words "se consolidaran" implied transfer of the naked ownership, with which the beneficial title would be consolidated upon arrival of the term thus fixed.

Danguilan vs. IAC and Apolonia Melad 168 SCRA 22 Facts: Apolonia Melad filed a complaint against the Felix Danguilan in the CFI for recovery of a farm lot and a residential lot which she claimed she had purchased from Domingo Melad. Danguilan denied the allegation and averred that he was the owner of the said lots of which he had been in open, continuous and adverse possession, having acquired them from Domingo Melad. The CFI rendered judgment in favor of Danguilan. This was, however, reversed by the CA. Arguments: Danguilan: Domingo Melad signed a private instrument in which he gave the defendant the farm and another private instrument in which he also gave him the residential lot, on the understanding that the latter would take care of the grantor and would bury him upon his death. Apolonia: She purchased the land from Domingo. Danguilan approached her and asked permission to cultivate the land and to stay. CA: They were donations of real property and as such should have been effected through a public instrument. Issue: Whether there was a valid donation Held: Yes. It is our view, considering the language of the two instruments that Domingo Melad did intend to donate the properties to the petitioner, as the private respondent contends. We do not think, however, that the donee was moved by pure liberality. While truly donations, the conveyances were onerous donations as the properties were given to the petitioner in exchange for his obligation to take care of the donee for the rest of his life and provide for his burial. Hence, it was not covered by the rule in Article 749 of the Civil Code requiring donations of real properties to be effected through a public instrument. Both the trial court and the respondent court have affirmed the factual allegation that the petitioner did take care of Domingo Melad and later arranged for his burial in accordance with the condition imposed by the donor. It is alleged and not denied that he died when he was almost one hundred years old, which would mean that the petitioner farmed the land practically by himself and so provided for the donee (and his wife) during the latter part of Domingo Melad's life. We may assume that there was a fair exchange between the donor and the donee that made the transaction an onerous donation