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ROYAL MILITARY ACADEMY 123 Advanced Staff Course Division Academic year 2008 2009

The requirements for a combat capability of the Air Weapon in 2025

In light of the evolution of the geo-strategic framework, the changes of the threats and the advanced technology developments, what will be the future national and international missions of the Belgian Air Component and what will be the requirements for its combat capability in 2025.

Lieutenant Colonel Rudi VERRIJT

Research paper Chair Air Brussels, 2009

Table of Contents

Table of Contents
Table of Contents .............................................................................................................. 2 Disclaimer.......................................................................................................................... 5 Glossary .............................................................................................................................. 6 Acknowledgement ........................................................................................................... 10 Preface .............................................................................................................................. 11 Introduction..................................................................................................................... 12 1 The geo-political playing field in 2025................................................................... 14 1.1 1.2 1.3 Introduction .........................................................................................................14 How do relevant security actors see the situation in 2025? ...............................14 The United Nations (UN) and Organisation for Security and Co-operation in

Europe (OSCE)................................................................................................................17 1.4 1.5 Current Belgian defence policy ...........................................................................17 Intermediate conclusion ......................................................................................20

2 Relevant security actors and defence planning ................................................... 22 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 NATOs defence planning....................................................................................22 EU Defence planning ..........................................................................................24 NATO-EU cooperation on capability development.............................................27 Intermediate conclusions ....................................................................................27

3 What are the technological evolutions? ................................................................. 29 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 3.6 3.7 3.8 Evolution in space ..............................................................................................29 Evolution of fighter aircraft ...............................................................................29 Evolution of Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS)..................................................30 Evolution in the Information domain .................................................................31 Evolution in weapon technology .........................................................................31 Evolution in simulation capabilities ...................................................................32 Role of the (Belgian) industry in the technological evolution ............................33 Intermediate conclusions ....................................................................................34

4 National and International missions .................................................................... 36 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 Defining the missions ..........................................................................................36 Current Belgian (Air Component) Level of Ambition.........................................36 Analysis ...............................................................................................................38 Intermediate conclusions ....................................................................................39

5 Belgian defence specifics .......................................................................................... 41

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Table of Contents 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5 Evolution of the guidance documents ................................................................41 Budget evolution..................................................................................................41 Evolution of the personnel quorum.....................................................................41 Geographical dispersion of units throughout Belgian territory .........................42 Intermediate conclusion ......................................................................................42

6 Why Air Combat Power for Belgium ....................................................................... 43 6.1 6.2 6.3 6.4 Why is Air Power important ...............................................................................43 Integrated command ...........................................................................................43 Sizing the future Belgian Air Component fighter capability ............................44 Intermediate conclusions ....................................................................................44

7 Overall conclusions ................................................................................................... 45 7.1 7.2 7.3 7.4 7.5 Geo-political evolution.........................................................................................45 Threat evolution ..................................................................................................45 Technological evolution .......................................................................................45 Future National and International missions......................................................46 Requirement for a BAC future combat capability ..............................................47

Bibliography .................................................................................................................... 49

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Table of Contents List of Annexes................................................................................................................. 58 Annex A Belgian Defence 2007 spending ....................................................................58 Annex B ACT Multiple futures Project, list of drivers................................................59 Annex C NATO Level Of Ambition .............................................................................60 Annex D - Mission Task Analysis of the NATO Defence Requirements Review ..........61 Annex E MMR procedure used during NATO DRR 05 ..............................................67 Annex F DRR MMR analysis of aerospace capabilities ..............................................68 Annex G - Current NATOs LTCR list...........................................................................69 Annex H Comparison DRR ->LTCS ............................................................................70 Annex I NATOs future force generation process........................................................71 Annex J Capability Development Plan (CDP).............................................................72 Annex K D&S Planning Horizons in the EU and NATO ............................................76 Annex L - Space base weaponry .....................................................................................77 Annex M - Analysis of future platforms. ........................................................................80 Annex N US fighter modernization plans: near-term choices ...................................82 Annex O Combat fighter lead-time for acquisition .....................................................83 Annex P UAV Cost .......................................................................................................84 Annex Q U(C)AV evolution and considerations ..........................................................86 Annex R NATO C4ISR roadmap .................................................................................89 Annex S Non-lethal weapons ......................................................................................90 Annex T - Strategic orientation of the Belgian defence .................................................91 Annex U - Operational capacities and sub-capacities....................................................92 Annex V Possible engagement scenarios.....................................................................93 Annex W Level Of Ambition of the Belgian Air Component.......................................94 Annex X Doctrine & Requirements process at ACOS Ops & Trg ...............................97 Annex Y BE Strategic planning guidance documents ................................................98 Annex Z - Evolution BE MOD budget ............................................................................99 Annex AA BE MOD personnel quorum evolution.....................................................101 Annex AB Geographical dispersion of units in Belgium...........................................102 Annex AC Importance of Air Power ..........................................................................103 Annex AD Development Joint Armed Forces with inter agency coordination .........105 Annex AE F-16 MLU fleet size and pilot contingent calculation .............................106 Annex AF - Opportunities that could produce force multipliers or savings ................107

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The opinions and conclusions expressed in this document are those of the author. They do not reflect the official position of the Belgian Government, Ministry of Defence, the Belgian Defence Staff, Belgian Air Component, nor the Royal Military Academy.

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3D LO A&S AAR AC ACO ACT AD AE AG AGSR AH(L) AIV AJP ASFAO ATHS ATARES BAC C2 C4ISR C4ISTAR CAO CAOC CAS CCIP CDM CDP CoG COIN CRC CSAF CSAR CTSG D&R D&S DCA DEAD DOB Diplomacy, Defence, Development, Law and Order Air & Space Air to Air Refuelling Air Component Allied Command Operations Allied Command Transformation Air Defence Aero medical Evacuation Air to Ground Air Ground Surveillance & Reconnaissance Armed Helicopter (light) Armoured Infantry Vehicle Allied Joint Publication Anti Surface Force Air Operations Automatic Target Hand-off system Air Transport and Air to Air Refueling Exchange of Services Belgian Air Component Command & Control Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (NATO terminology) Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (EU terminology) Counter Air Operations Combined Air Operations Centre Close Air Support Common Configuration Improvement Program Capability Development Mechanism Capability Development Plan Centre of Gravity COunter INsurgency Control & Reporting Centre Chief of Staff of the Air Force (US) Combat Search And Rescue Capability Transformation Steering Group Doctrine & Requirements Defence and Security Dual Capable Aircraft Defensive Counter Air Destruction of Enemy Air Defence Deployed Operating Base
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Glossary DOTMLPFI Doctrine, Organisation, Training, Materiel, Leadership and education, Personnel, Facilities and Interoperability DRR Defence Requirements Review EBAO EDA EM EMP EOD EPAF EMP ESDP ESS EW FAC FGMT FOC GES GDP GPS HALE HNS HPM HRF IED ICC ICT ICGD IDPP IED IFC INS IO ISR JAT JFAC JISR JCOP JPS JSOW KT Effects Based Approach to Operations European Defence Agency Electro Magnetic Electro Magnetic Pulse Explosive Ordnance Disposal European Participating Air Forces Electro Magnetic Pulse European Security and Defence Policy EU Security Strategy Electronic Warfare Forward Air Controller Force Generation Management Tool Full Operational Capable Ground Exploitation System Gross Domestic Product Global Positioning System High Altitude Long Endurance Host Nation Support High Power Microwave High Readiness Forces Improvised Explosive Devise Interim CAOC Capability Integrated Capability Team Information Communication Technology Intercomponenten Gebruiksdoctrine Integrated Defence Planning Process Improvised Explosive Devise Intelligence Fusion Centre Inertial Navigation System International Organisation Intelligence Surveillance & Reconnaissance Joint Activity Trees Joint Forward Air Controller Joint Intelligence Surveillance & Reconnaissance Joint Common Operational Picture Joint Precision Strike Joint Stand-Off Weapon Key Tasks

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Los Alamos National Laboratory Land Component Life Cycle Cost LIght Detection And Ranging or Laser Imaging Detection And Ranging Low Observable Level of Ambition Low Probability of Detection Low Probability of Intercept Long Term Capability Requirement Long Term Capability Study Long Term Vision Multi-sensor Aerospace-Ground Joint ISR Interoperability Coalition Medium Altitude Long Endurance MAN Portable Air Defence System Mission Essential Components Minimum Force Package Major Joint Operations Multipurpose Light Vehicle Minimum Military Requirements Minister Of Defence Military Operations in Urban Terrain Multi Purpose Protected Vehicle Multi Role Helicopter Modular Recce Pod Multi Role Tanker Transport Multinational Space-based Imaging System North Atlantic Treaty Organisation Naval Component Net Centric Warfare Non-combatant Evacuation Operation NATO Frigate Helicopter Non Governmental Organisation NATO List of Required Capabilities NATO Network Enabled Capability NATO Response Force National Security Agency (US agency) Non Traditional Intelligence Surveillance & Reconnaissance Offensive Counter Air Organisation Conjointe de Coopration en matire d'ARmement Observation Helicopter (light) Ops Iraky Freedom Operational Objectives Operational Objectives Specifications Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe

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Private Financing Initiative Plan dInvestissement pour Dfense et Scurit Plan van Inverstering voor Defensie en Veiligheid Prioritised List of Capability Shortfalls Plan Minimum Urgent Peace Support Operations Quick Reaction Alert Research & Development Royal Air Force Recognised Air Picture Royal Higher Institute of Defence Rules Of Engagement Rocket Propelled Grenade Remote Operations Video Enhanced Receiver Rapid Reaction Force Reconnaissance, Surveillance and Target Acquisition Surface to Air Missile Search And Rescue Strategic Airlift Interim Solution Small Diameter Bomb Suppression of Enemy Air Defence Smaller Joint Operations Structure for Networking & Management of Tactical Information Squadron Tactical High Energy Laser Transformational Objectives Area Time Sensitive Targeting Tactical Transport Helicopter Unmanned Aerial System Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicle Utility Helicopter (light) Ultra High Frequency United Nations United States Air Force Video Down Link West European Union Weapons of Mass Destruction

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I would like to sincerely thank all those who have helped me to write this paper. Their candidness, sincere thoughts and useful ideas helped me in forming my mind and getting a feeling for the fog of decision making. Especially I would like to thank the general officers who graciously allowed me the time for an interview, as well as all senior officers and colleagues who gave me insight in their personal thinking as well as their official desk perspectives. At the same time I convey my gratitude to the instructors of the Air Department, for their availability and open door policy. But I can not ignore the one person I need to thank most, my wife Nadine for silently letting me go about my business while she was tending to the every day job of taking care of the family. She even found it to be just to encourage me in those times when ideas and inspiration were lacking or when morale support was required.

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How can the Belgian Air Component (BAC) of today adapt and transform to meet the challenges of tomorrow? First, the defence organisation will need a common roadmap for the Belgian military that applies the principle of interoperability with an expeditionary mindset. Secondly, the budget requirements must fit within the boundaries established by the government. Thirdly, the focus should be on core business and quality rather than quantity. The BAC should be a tool which the government can employ in a rapid, flexible way, without delays or restrictions. While making sure the soldier is provided with the best possible equipment, support and protection required to execute his job. A deeper analysis of the title of this research paper is necessary if we want to address these issues and establish the limits and boundaries of this research paper. The extent of this document is widely influenced by the interpretation of the question itself but even more so by the implicit questions that might be found within the context of the question analysis. Framing the question is nothing more than an effort to limit the scope of this research paper.

In light of the evolution of the geo-strategic framework, the changes of the threats and the advanced technology developments, what will be the future national and international missions of the BAC and what will be the requirements for its combat capability in 2025.

Analysis of this question reveals following areas that need to be researched: What is the evolution of the geo-strategic framework? Which threat changes can be anticipated compared to todays situation? o How do todays relevant security actors foresee change in their requirements to be able to cope with these changing threats or risks? What advanced technology developments can be expected? What future national and international commitments might Belgium face? What combat capability1 will the BAC require in 2025?

Definition by ACOS Ops & Trg - D&R, Transformation implementation capability is the combination of manpower, equipment, performance, sustainability, doctrine, deployability, training, interoperability and readiness, to 123 AStC Div - 3 Mar 2009

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This paper starts off with a look at how the international community perceives the geopolitical playing field in 2025. In chapter two, an analysis is made of how the international community and its relevant security actors view the impact geo-political changes will have on their requirements and capabilities, and how they will counter the security risks they perceive. In the third chapter, we analyse possible technological advances and their impact on future capabilities. In chapter four, the current national and international missions and the Level of Ambition (LoA) of the AC is analysed. While specific Belgian defence problems are highlighted in chapter five. Once the advantages of having air power in Belgium are explained in chapter six, the seventh and final chapter concludes this study by answering the two main questions that are put forward in this papers title. Furthermore, it is my believe that our armed forces have no God given right to exist. They are merely an instrument for the Belgian government to be used in the execution of long term ambitions. The determination of such ambitions is a task for the political authorities. The goals derived from these ambitions should be distilled out of an analysis of evolving threats and the role Belgium wants to play on the international stage. The desired LoA should be translated into a comprehensive approach2 to security. Hence the determination of the LoA is necessarily the joint responsibility of several different departments including Department of Foreign and Internal Affairs, Justice Department and the Department of both Economic Affairs and Development. Lately it has become clear that our defence organisation has to deal with some important challenges. Long standing re-organisations have led to hervormingsmoeheid amongst the soldiers3. Furthermore, the Belgian North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) contribution is far below the norm of 2%. 2007 figures show 1.13% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP)4 is budgeted for defence. If Belgium has the ambition to remain relevant in the international forum, it will have to adapt its size in accordance with the budget it is willing to spend, in order to provide relevant, credible and well trained forces for the tasks at hand. A coherent transformation of the Belgian defence will be needed, taking into account such aspects as combat / combat support / combat service support, in-country training
2 NATO: security challenges require a wide spectrum of civil and military instruments. This calls for regular coordination, consultation and interaction among all actors involved BE: 3D LO, Diplomacy, Defence, Development, Law and Order, Politieke Orintatienota Jun 2008, Page 9 3 Beleidsnota voor het Ministerie van Defensie (16) voor het begrotingsjaar 2008, Page 5 4 Annex A Belgian Defence spending 2007.

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Introduction requirements, and expeditionary operational requirements. All this should be done with the personnel that is, or will be, available and within the budget our country is willing to appropriate.

If our organisation is not willing or not allowed to transform, this statement of a United States Air Force (USAF) chief of staff becomes very true:

History is replete with examples of militaries that failed due to their inability to transform organisations and culture, adopt new operational concepts, or leverage breakthrough technologies. But militaries do not fail by themselves. Failure occurs in the context of an overall, national debacle, caused by systemic problems that fall into three distinct but related categories: failure to anticipate, failure to learn and failure to adapt. In contrast, victory comes to those who foresee, recognize and act on changes in the strategic environment. To succeedindeed, to avoid catastrophic failurewe must redefine the Air Force for the 21 Century.5

CSAF White Paper, The nations guardians Americas 21st century air force, 29 December 2007 , page 2.

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The geo-political playing field in 2025

1 The geo-political playing field in 2025

1.1 Introduction This first chapter will analyse the most relevant security organisations. These organisations will undoubtedly put political pressure on the Belgian government to take the steps and actions needed to contribute credible, relevant forces to enforce the will of the international community, now and in the future. 1.2 1.2.1 How do relevant security actors see the situation in 2025? NATO6

NATO has embarked on a quest to adapt to the changing security environment. The whole transformation strategy itself is based on anticipation of and preparation for change. With this change comes the challenge to focus on the long term, and the requirement to make an investment in building an organisational understanding of what the future may hold. Since uncertainty is high NATO identified multiple, possible futures. These visions of the future are developed through analysing drivers, drivers that in turn promote change. From this understanding, the organisation plans to deduce strategic-military implications. The implications will be used to develop the best possible military advice for the Alliance to better guide the defence planning processes. This project is intended to frame security matters from a long term perspective, and includes all natural, political, and social dimensions. The project is divided in different phases. Phase I concluded in July 2008, with the presentation of a list of drivers7. In the second phase, the team identified 4 possible (preliminary) futures8. Preliminary Future One: Equatorial Destabilization. By 2030, several factors have resulted in a future environment sharply divided between the highly globalized world and an extremely destabilized region surrounding the equator. The developed countries are primarily concerned with the North-South dynamic, as there is a major immigration outflow from the equatorial regions to the richer countries.

ACT, Multiple Futures Project - 10 Jan 2009 Annex B ACT Multiple Futures Project, list of drivers 8 ACT, Multiple Futures Project Explained Page 5
6 7

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The geo-political playing field in 2025 Preliminary Future Two: Bright Horizons. On the surface of things Bright Horizons is a well-ordered, low conflict global environment. It appears to diminish the strategic culture of the political class: security concerns are lulled into complacency. Preliminary Future Three: Rise of Technocracy. Technological and urban innovation has almost liberated the knowledge economy and corporate man (suits and uniforms) from the rest of the physical world. Rationalism has triumphed in this world. Technocracy is a political conglomerate that reaches soaring heights of innovation and culture, but struggles to keep outsiders on its periphery away from its wealth, governance and culture, and risks overdosing on a cocktail of surveillance and control. Preliminary Future Four: Return of Power Politics. Nation-state power politics is back. The network of global governance has weakened as a consequence both of absolute growth in state capacity and a relative diminishment of differences in economic power between states around the world. Although the process of predictive analysis is still ongoing, it serves as a basis for the Alliances discussion of a new strategic concept. It is fair to say that the future, especially with its unpredictability, will present NATO with unprecedented challenges, but also opportunities to positively influence ideas, values and events in a globalized world. 1.2.2 The European Union EU Security Strategy (ESS) 9 The ESS predicts the future will bring world wide challenges to the organisation and identifies the most important of these threats. As challenges, the ESS identifies the consequences of more open borders for internal and external security. The role of non state actors, such as multinational businesses, has become increasingly dominant. Many see this as a source of frustration and injustice due to unequal divisions of wealth. Also, worldwide many civilians have died in different conflicts and many more are displaced as a consequence of these conflicts. In a large number of third world countries, famine, poverty and diseases are the cause of a lot of suffering. In Africa, AIDS has become one of the most devastating pandemic diseases that undermine whole societies. Security is a condition required to allow for economic

Council of the European Union, Een veiliger Europa in een betere wereld; Europese veiligheidsstrategie 12 Dec 2003

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The geo-political playing field in 2025 growth, infrastructural and societal development. Conflicts and crime can stop this whole process. Many countries have become locked in a descending spiral, resulting in insecurity and poverty. Struggles for natural resources, especially water, will cause more unrest and might generate even bigger migration flows. The energy dependence of Europe will become a major concern in the next decennia. As threats, the document highlights terrorism, Weapon(s) of Mass Destruction (WMD) proliferation, regional conflicts, failed states and organized crime as most worrisome. Terrorism jeopardizes human life and generates enormously high costs. Globalisation has enhanced these terrorist organisations ability to network and the ready availability of technology has made for a substantial increase in their capabilities. WMD is perceived, however, to be the most important threat. Although non-proliferation treaties are in effect and have considerably slowed the process of proliferation, it is feared that increased access to technology and knowledge will spawn a new race, especially in the Middle East. The increased capability of weapon systems could permit a few people to wreak havoc at a scale which was previously only available to states. Regional conflicts, Kashmir or the Great Lakes area in Africa, for example, have a direct and indirect influence on Europe. These conflicts lead to unrest, terrorism and violation of human rights. Failed states leave a power vacuum that is swiftly filled by warring factions, which in turn increases regional instability. Finally, ESS sees Europe as the target of opportunity for organized crime, which often has ties with terrorist groups, and generates the financial means necessary for that operation. The European Defence Agency (EDA) EDAs Long Term Vision (LTV) 10 portrays a slightly different, gloomier world. Europe will be older, less prosperous and surrounded by regions that struggle to cope with the consequences of globalisation. Defence budgets will need to contend with pressure from a growing pension burden; defence personnel policies will face a shrinking recruitment pool; and, defence planners must deal with societies increasingly cautious about intervention operations. States will find themselves concerned with issues of legitimacy in the use of force, and inclined to favour security over defence spending. Defence will need to continue adapting in several ways: o The use of force will be intimately linked with political (and media) developments and will typically be applied in complex situations against an obscure enemy under tight rules of engagement and 24/7 media scrutiny.


EDA, An initial long-term vision for European defence capability and capacity needs 3 Oct 2006

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The geo-political playing field in 2025 The technological revolution will provide modern armed forces with great advantages, but the adversary will work hard to adapt and asymmetrically exploit our own advances against us. European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) operations will be expeditionary, multinational and multi-instrument, directed at achieving security and stability more than victory. Information will be critical, to provide effective command decisions. Asymmetry will apply not merely to an opponents tactics, but also to his aims and values. In such circumstances, the military will be only one of a range of instruments applied to achieve campaign goals. Key future force and capability characteristics should be: o Synergy going beyond combinedarms warfare to coordination of effects with non military actors; o Agility implying speed of reaction and deployability, but also the capacity to reconfigure for optimum force size and balance, and adapt quickly at the tactical level; o Selectivity meaning a wide range of capabilities, and the means to ensure an informed and appropriate choice at each stage of the operation; o 1.3 Sustainability suggesting the right logistic support, but also theatre access.

The United Nations (UN) and Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Both these organisations play a crucial role as overarching bodies that govern or provide frameworks for security operations. They do not directly influence the combat capability requirements needed to effectively execute these operations. Hence, their vision of the future is not analysed. 1.4 Current Belgian defence policy Belgian defence policy11 is one of four pillars on which Belgian national security policy is founded. It is complementary to information, diplomatic and economic policy. National interests are concerned with stability and peace, together with population12 safety and territorial integrity. Governed by a democratic model, and based on our standards and values, the state ensures our quality of life. We want to contribute to a stable macroeconomic and monetary union, whilst preserving our own voice in a multilateral environment. The Belgian security and defence strategy13 is based on five axes:

11 Lt

Col Johan BREYNE ACOS Strat to NATO defence college, Belgian Defence Policy 06 May 2008, slide 14 Belgians abroad. 13 Internal memo ACOS Strat een analyse van de Belgische militair-strategische objectieven 26 Feb 2007, page 13
12 Including

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The geo-political playing field in 2025 European identity in the area of security; The Trans-Atlantic link = cornerstone of our military security; Increasing the role of the UN; Support to the OSCE; Bilateral engagements can be crucial

o o o o o

Furthermore, the Belgium defence policy relies upon three principles: responsibility sharing, burden sharing and risk sharing14. 1.4.1 Speech to the Royal Higher Institute of Defence by Belgian Minister of Defence15

In his 2008 speech, Minister De Crem calls for a reorientation of the policy laid down in previous strategic guidance16. This necessary change is founded on the results of several different studies (UN, EU and NATO, etc). The Minister laid out a security environment, which was very consistent with other sources. He highlighted weapon proliferation, terrorism, unequal distribution of resources, crime, pandemic outbreaks, and migration as key areas of concern. Following topics have specific implications for the Belgian defence; o The types of conflicts Although major combat operations are not on the near horizon, they should not be excluded in view of emerging new powers. The current existing asymmetric threat still requires a robust capability across the entire spectrum of conflict. For all types of conflicts, the minister identified situational awareness, in its broadest sense, as the key to understanding how to conduct operations. o Human security the focus has shifted from state-centred security to protection of the individual. Media coverage of human security violations influences local politics through public opinion. Solutions to the perceived responsibility to protect can only be found if all involved parties make their resources available in order to achieve common goals. o Type of adversary Today, opponents deploy more and more amongst the people. They employ methods that do not respect either human rights or internationally accepted rules of conduct our own forces must respect. o The media The struggle for international public support and the hearts and minds of the local population will be more and more influenced by the media in a

Belgian MOD, Politiek Orientatie Nota June 2008, page 35 Belgian Minister of Defence, Speech at the Royal Higher Institute of Defence 21 May 2008 16 Belgian Minister of Defence ,Strategisch Plan+ Feb 2003 and Defence Steering Plan Dec 2003
14 15

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The geo-political playing field in 2025 multitude of formats (press, television, radio, internet, etc.). Deployed soldiers face constant observation and scrutiny by the ever present media. o Internal and external security The line dividing internal and external security will become increasingly blurred. Migration and cyber incidents will be felt more and more directly by our own society although the origin of disturbance may be far from our national borders. The Minister of Defence (MOD) also identified two distinct roles for Belgiums defence apparatus. On the one hand the defence organisation is an extension of Belgiums diplomatic efforts, and on the other hand, the organisation must to take care of human security within the framework of our foreign affairs and security policy. Burden and risk sharing are an integral part of any employment strategy. Only in this way can Belgium assume its rightful place within the international community. According to the MOD, a major factor that will influence the future composition of our forces will be their integration into a European force. But for Mr. De Crem, both the EU and NATO remain compatible and complementary organisations. Furthermore, when preventive measures fail, quick reaction and intervention capabilities become crucial. The Belgian defence department needs to be capable of executing its tasks anywhere in the world. An expeditionary mindset should guide our transformation. He also stressed that a pure military approach to solve conflicts is no longer viable. Thorough interdepartmental coordination and cooperation is essential. As to the Belgian defences LoA, our minister indicates, integration and cooperation are of key importance, especially for such expensive assets as combat aircraft, ships and satellite equipment. We need to rationalize without lowering our ambition level by investing in our core capabilities and adhering to the principle of le minimum suffisant. Emphasis should be on the quality and capability of the personnel. Expeditionary and technologically advanced forces demand well-trained young men and women. The materiel in question must be interoperable with our partner nations although we only need what is essential to accomplish the mission. Finally, an adapted command structure should permit flexible responses in an ever changing security environment. 1.4.2 Existing Belgian policy

The political orientation memorandum, June 2008, is the guidance document that currently steers Belgian defence strategy. In its preface, the memorandum notes that although significant progress has been made in the last couple of decades, the fact that the world has become open, interconnected

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The geo-political playing field in 2025 and evolving generates numerous security risks. In order to counter these risks and to play a credible role in enforcing the international communitys will, our troops will need to be capable of participating in peace and security operations through a broad spectrum of conflict. The Belgian defence retains the ambition to be a reliable17 and credible partner18. To achieve these goals the MOD insists the focus of investment should continue to be on our Core Business19. To be consistent the Belgian department of defence will need to tailor its operations within the framework of Belgiums foreign policy. The documnent distinguishes three main missions that should be executed; o Collective defence20 In line with our international obligations to protect common interests and safeguard our democratic goals. o Efficient management of all phases of conflict solving21 - Through defence diplomacy22, peace keeping,23 and peace-enforcement24 operations as well as disaster relief, refugee aid and humanitarian relief. o Closer to the people Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO) operations, participation to homeland security and protection of the maritime accesses. 1.5 Intermediate conclusion Belgium strives for an effective security strategy and defence policy through multilateral cooperation. A partner amongst partners that is willing to realize broad, extensive integration and open for international cooperation. Therefore it fully subscribes to the futures projected by todays major security organisations: UN, NATO, EU and OSCE. From the perspective of the Belgian defence, these organisations portray a similar security environment from natural or man-made disaster through full spectrum war or large scale riots, organized crime, terrorism and ethnical conflicts. Also, the focus has shifted from state security to human security. Globalisation and the technological (r)evolution have spawned global economies and global threats. A visible imbalance of wealth and resources are often the cause of (still) regional conflicts. Solutions lie in a comprehensive global approach. Overall, we can conclude, the Belgian defence retains the ambition to be a reliable and credible partner by sharing responsibility, burdens and risk in international
Belgian MOD, Politiek Orientatie Nota June 2008, Voorwoord Page 2. Belgian MOD, Politiek Orientatie Nota June 2008, Veiligheids situatie Page 7 19 Belgian MOD, Politiek Orientatie Nota June 2008, Veiligheids situatie Page 8 20 On the bases of Art V of the Treaty of Brussels (WEU) and Art 5 of the Treaty of Washington (NATO) 21 Prevent, Solve, Reconstruct 22 Military assistance, participate in confidence building and security measures, the use of observer and control teams. 23 UN charter, chapter VI 24 UN charter, chapter VII
17 18

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The geo-political playing field in 2025 operations. The rapidly changing security environment, however, requires flexibility in response options and robustness in action throughout a broad spectrum of conflict. In the future (through 2025), multi-nationality and the comprehensive approach, will require network enabled architectures for situational awareness in de broadest sense. Accurate intelligence is needed for our interoperable forces equipped with compatible materiel. Our mindset must be expeditionary, joint, and combined. In order to achieve these goals the MOD insists the focus of investment should continue to be on our Core Business [Identified as Opdrachten in the intercomponenten gerbuiksdoctrine25 (ICGD)] and a reorganised, leaner command structure. We should rationalise without lowering the LoA and respect the principle of le minimum suffisant.


ACOT-SDP-ICOMDOC-CCSC-001_Ed2_-_SD2 (for official staffing - intranet) 1 Jan 2009

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Relevant security actors and defence planning

2 Relevant security actors and defence planning

In this paragraph we investigate how the defence planning process works for the relevant security actors and what capability requirements they identify. Defence planning methodologies have significantly evolved as a function of the complexity of the contemporary security environment. Furthermore, modern database management technology makes the migration from essentially quantitative to qualitative methods possible. 1. Threat-based planning The threat-based approach used during the Cold War involves identifying potential adversaries and evaluating their system requirements. The goal is to plan for a number of weapon systems that ensures out performance of the oppositions. 2. Scenario-based planning This approach utilizes a representative set of situations for the employment of forces. These situations are specified in terms of environmental and operational parameters and form the test bed for assessing system requirements against formulated mission objectives. While superiority in terms of firepower is still the aim throughout the planning period, the evolution from the threat-based method stems from the inclusion of humanitarian and other non-threat considerations in the scenario set. 3. Capability-based26 planning This method involves functional analysis of the expected future operations. Unlike the previous methods, the outcome is not expressed in concrete weapon system and manning levels, but as a description of the tasks that forces should be able to perform. Once the capability inventory is defined, the most cost-effective and efficient physical force unit options are determined. 2.1 NATOs defence planning Currently, NATO relies on a two year cycle27 defence planning process. The process is founded on the basis of Art 3 of the NATO charter, that states .maintain and develop their individual & collective capacity to resist armed attack. The aim of the process is to provide a framework within which national and NATO defence planners can harmonise

26 Defined 27

by ACT as the ability to produce an effect that users of assets or services need to achieve. This cycle will be changed to four years for DRR 11.

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Relevant security actors and defence planning their activities. This process looks at the Minimum Military Requirements28 (MMR), makes an overall assessment of the situation, and identifies shortfalls or surpluses. Actually, the whole process is designed to ascertain if NATO and its member nations, have the means available to execute its LoA29 which currently stands at 2 Major Joint Operations (MJO) and 6 Smaller Joint Operations (SJO)30. Defence planning within NATO has several disciplines. including force planning, armaments planning, logistic planning, C2 planning, and resource planning. It is within the resource planning that we find the capability packages, to complement shortfalls in existing NATO-owned capabilities. Two other planning disciplines are civil emergency planning and nuclear planning. 2.1.1 Defence Requirements Review (DRR)31 process

DRR is used to consult the member countries about their contributions and identify resulting shortfalls. The MMR are verified with the available forces32 and shortfalls are identified33. In these reviews, the focus of effort is concentrated around defence planning disciplines. Some conclusions of DRR 0734 force goals, for timeframe 20082018, concerning air combat power, shortfalls are clearly identified35. This latest DRR highlights shortfalls for combat air assets in: Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles (UCAV), Tactical Recce, Suppression of Enemy Air Defence (SEAD) and all weather assured Joint Precision Strike (JPS), with special attention for development of the nontraditional Intelligence, Surveillance & Reconnaissance (ISR) potential of advanced targeting systems36. 2.1.2 Long Term Capability Requirements (LTCR)37

NATO has a Long Term Capability Study (LTCS)38 program whose scope projects 30 years into the future. The latest LTCS report produced a list of objectives derived from the Transformational Objectives Area (TOA)39, combined with relevant assumptions and inputs from the multiple future project. Its aim is to validate current LTCRs, remove

2007 Bi-SC defence requirements review (DRR 07) final report. (NATO CONFIDENTIAL) page 39. Annex C NATO Level Of Ambition 30 2 MJO (Corps Size) and 6 SJO (Division or Brigade Size) of which one can be Air heavy and one Maritime heavy. 31 Annex D Mission task analysis of the NATO Defence Requirements Review. 32 Force offers out of DPQ 06. 33 Annex E MMR procedure used during NATO DRR 05 34 2007 bi-sc defence requirements review (DRR 07) final report (NATO CONFIDENTIAL) table 5 page 68. 35 Annex F DRR MMR analysis of aerospace capabilities 36 2007 bi-sc defence requirements review (DRR 07) final report (NATO CONFIDENTIAL) page 80, para 153.a. 37 Annex G Current NATOs LTCR list 38 Annex H Comparison DRR -> LTCS 39 (Ex: Expeditionary Ops Oriented, NATO NEC, Information Superiority,.)
28 29

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Relevant security actors and defence planning obsolete ones and add new ones as well as avoiding duplication and reprioritising, according to the TOA if needed. 2.1.3 Future NATO defence planning40

Although a trend towards a more comprehensive41 DRR planning effort was initiated in DRR 05, DRR 07 introduced the capability42-based methodology. NATO has established a database called the NATO List of Required Capabilities (NLoRC). These capabilities are a compilation of: UOR = MCR = (DRR) = TCSOR = LT(C)R = Urgent Ops Requirements Min CAP Req (MC noted) Def Req Review (NCA produced) Theatre CAP Statement of Req Long Term( CAP) Req

Together, planning assumptions and such methodology principles as Effects Based Approach to Operations (EBAO43), Comprehensive Approach or DIME44, and

anticipating on technology forecast & future systems, when combined with the database provide a clear overview of NATOs required capabilities. The process is completed by comparing the NLoRC to existing assets and capabilities. Out of this a Prioritised List of Capability Shortfalls (PLoCS) is compiled. In the future, however, Allied Command Operations (ACO) will manage the force generation through a Force Generation Management Tool (FGMT)45 and Allied Command Transformation (ACT) will manage the PLoCS which should create a new Integrated Defence Planning Process (IDPP). 2.2 2.2.1 EU Defence planning 46 The Global Context

The world of 2025, EU defence planners predict, is likely to be more diverse, more interdependent, and even more unequal. By 2025, the effective economic old age dependency ratio (retired over 65s as a percentage of the working population aged 15-64) will have risen from 37% to 48% and the average European will be 45 years old. Globalisation will make disparities between countries and regions ever more apparent. Thus the prognosis

Col Patrick WOUTERS Dep REP for BELGIUM to the MC Future NATO Defence Planning, interview Jan 2009 Same level of support to the Logistics, Consultation, C2, Resources and Armaments Planning as to Force Planning. 42 Capabilities are driven by tasks/effects, not by stovepipes (Air, Land, Maritime,..) 43 Definition of EBAO: the Effects Based Approach to Operations is the coherent and comprehensive application of the various instruments of the Alliance, combined with the practical cooperation along with involved non-NATO actors, to create effects necessary to achieve planned objectives and ultimately the NATO end state. 44 Effects-based thinking and terminology have been used to describe the challenge of Integrating Diplomatic, Informational, Military, and Economic (DIME) instruments of national power to create the conditions for success. 45 Annex I NATOs future force generation process 46 EDA, An initial long-term vision for European defence capability and capacity needs 3 Oct 2006
40 41

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Relevant security actors and defence planning is for tensions and strong migratory pressures in the regions around Europe. While Europe becomes more dependent on the wider world, the immediate neighbourhood becomes more problematic. 2.2.2 Challenges for Defence

Adapting to the changing role of force The operations for which European forces should primarily prepare, according to EU planners, will require force to be applied in complex situations, against an opponent who conceals himself amongst the civil population, with tight and constraining Rules Of Engagement (ROE) and 24/7 media scrutiny. Adapting to the technological revolution Most of the technologies which may be key determinants of the military capabilities needed in 2025, according to scientific consensus47, already exist. There is little doubt that continued advances in microelectronics, sensing and communication technologies, will support the increasingly dominant role knowledge has in military operations. Moores law48 shows no signs of slackening. Similarly, the precision, speed and safety of military operations should benefit from rapid progress in bio- and material sciences. 2.2.3 Implications for the military contribution to ESDP49 Operations

The increasing complexity of ESDP operations with the concurrent characteristics of being multi-national, expeditionary and asymmetric calls for an integrated and comprehensive approach to the planning and conduct of interventions. The role of the military will be determined within a wider campaign plan that includes close consultation with other civil instruments of power and influence. 2.2.4 Implications for capability development

In general, such future forces and their capabilities must be founded on comprehensive and effects-based planning; it is not just equipment, but encompasses strategic concepts, doctrine, training and organisations that will, in their combination, yield the desired effects. Six capability development areas were identified: Command - Inform - Engage Protect - Deploy - Sustain.

EDA, An initial long-term vision for European defence capability and capacity needs 3 Oct 2006, page 11 Moore's law describes a long-term trend in the history of computing hardware. Since the invention of the integrated circuit in 1958, the number of transistors that can be placed inexpensively on an integrated circuit has increased exponentially, doubling approximately every two years 49 European Security and Defence Policy: Conclusions of the European Council LoA ESDP is subject to change on proposal of the French presidency 13 Feb 2009, 17271/1/08 Rev 1 CO_CL 5
47 48

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Relevant security actors and defence planning 2.2.5 The EU Capability Development Mechanism (CDM)

Following the mandate offered by the Helsinki Council50, the meeting in Nice produced the Achievement of the Headline Goal review mechanism for military capabilitiesframework, which specified the details of the EU CDM51 with a threefold aim: To enable the EU to monitor achievement of the overall goals in qualitative and quantitative terms, To enable the EU to evaluate and review its defined capability goals, To help achieve consistency between the pledges made in the EU framework and the force goals agreed to in the context of NEO planning. The process of developing EU military capabilities towards the Headline Goal of 2010 is a first step to identify strategic planning assumptions. Five illustrative scenarios, encompassing a wide range of military operations, were identified. From these scenarios, a list of detailed requirements was derived (RC05). Then the EU members were asked what forces they could offer to address these requirements, leading to a force catalogue (FC06). The shortfalls identified were grouped in a progress catalogue (PC07) which then let to a Capability Development Plan (CDP). In Jul 08 the EDA steering board approved the general conclusions and identified twelve out of twenty-four capabilities as priority. Like in NATO, the CDP identified that knowledge based operations supported by persistent intelligence in a comprehensive & coordinated action would become the key to success. A near real time targeting cycle will be fed by tactical information data links. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV), with their long endurance, will create persistence above the operating area and will need to interlink with fast air assets to exchange targeting data. Military Operations in Urban Terrain (MOUT) will increase and create a blurred frontline requiring operation in depth, comprised of deep, close and rear operations with an important role for helicopters to insert and escort ground forces while protected by air power. The key capability to conduct fire support will be a timely delivery of precision effects with an economy of effort, all orchestrated within a C4ISTAR infrastructure. In 2025, Air Interdiction (AI) and Suppression of Enemy Air Defence (SEAD) roles will remain largely unchanged and crucial as a prerequisite for success on the ground. Counter Air Operations (CAO) are likely to encompass counter ballistic and cruise missiles as well as UAV. It will remain crucial to gain and retain air superiority to guarantee freedom of movement on the ground.

50 51

European Council Helsinki, Presidency Conclusion: Military capabilities for Petersburg tasks See Annex J Requirements catalogue RC05, Force catalogue FC06 and Progress catalogue

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Relevant security actors and defence planning 2.3 NATO-EU cooperation on capability development The EU-NATO Capability Group52 was created to ensure the transparent and coherent development of capabilities. It will also harmonize the capability goals and facilitate the identification of overlapping aspects of the EUs Headline Goals with NATOs Force Goals. Both NATO and the EU have adopted the philosophy of capability based planning. They have moved away from suggesting solutions (DOTMLPFI53) too early in the process. The aim of delaying a decision of narrowing options is to encourage the development of more innovative alternatives and to help overcome simply replacing platforms and/or equipment with like-for-like. For example, it replaces questions such as what options are there for new artillery? with how can we provide fire support to land forces? Both EUs and NATOs defence planning tools have similar horizons54. 2.4 Intermediate conclusions NATO has embarked on a transformational process towards capabilities needed to create effects. Two documents, the DRR and LTCR, are regularly updated to reflect these changing needs. Requirements for amounts of combat aircraft show an overall reduction as a result of the new NATO LoA. This revision has increased the significance of smaller, counter-insurgency (COIN) operations of lower intensity. However, the LoA change introduces an increased requirement for assured precision strike capable aircraft and non-lethal capabilities, particularly in the Electronic Warfare and Aerospace Ground Surveillance and Reconnaissance (AGSR) domains, as well as Soft kill capabilities such as Escort/Support Jamming. The LoA used in DRR 07 also introduced a requirement for capability advances in persistent strike, for progress in ISR capability, for increases in intelligence processing speed, and for improved data fusion and exploitation. In addition, nations are encouraged to develop the nontraditional potential of advanced targeting systems to provide near real time reconnaissance to the NATO Joint Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (JISR) system. Europe emphasizes future military contributions to ESDP and also calls for an integrated and comprehensive approach to the planning and conduct of

52 Headline Goal 2010, approved by General Affairs and External Relations Council on 17 May 2004, endorsed by the European Council of 17 and 18 June 2004 53 DOTMLPFI stands for Doctrine, Organisation, Training, Materiel, Leadership and education, Personnel, Facilities and Interoperability. The US DoD predominantly uses the DOTMLPF acronym and NATO and international Ministries of Defence (MoDs) prefer the DOTMLPFI term, which includes the I for Interoperability. NATO has also transitioned to similar DOTMLPFI method of capability planning. BE describes the method in ACST-APG-CGEN-SXX-001. 54 Annex K D&S Planning horizons in the EU and NATO

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Relevant security actors and defence planning interventions. The role of the military must be determined within a wider campaign plan that includes close consultation with other civil instruments of power and influence. Future forces and their capabilities must be founded on comprehensive approach and effects-based planning; it is not just equipment, but encompasses strategic concepts, doctrine, training and organisations that will, in their combination, yield the desired effects. Persistent C4ISTAR, mainly by UAVs and satellites, will provide accurate intelligence to allow near real time targeting. Emphasis will be on MOUT, requiring helicopters for insertion and protection while it is covered by air power. Fire support to the operations will be crucial and should be coordinated trough integrated tactical networks. CAO and AI missions will remain crucial to create a suitable working environment for the forces on the ground.

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What are the technological evolutions?

3 What are the technological evolutions?

In this paragraph the technological evolution is examined for different relevant areas pertaining to combat systems. This will identify areas in which the Belgian defence will need to invest in order make sure it can continue to provide capable systems in the future and stay in line with the upgrades and modernisations done by partner nations. 3.1 Evolution in space 55 The so called Outer Space Treaty, signed in 1967 by more then 90 nations, including the US and Russia sought to avoid the weaponisation of outer space.

The exploration and the use of outer spaceshall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all countries, irrespective of their degree of economic or scientific development, and shall be the province of all mankind[and] shall be guided by the principle of cooperation and mutual assistance56
Since Belgium has ratified this treaty, it will only invest in those space based systems that increase C4ISR, networking and communications capabilities. 3.2 Evolution of fighter aircraft 57 Fifth generation fighters, such as the F-22 and F-35 which, due to their advances in stealth technology, data fusion, networking, open avionics architecture, and engine performance, are a generation ahead of what the European industry currently is producing. In the past, European aircraft requirements, with an Air Defence (AD) focus, produced a capability gap in the Air Ground (AG) role, which they are currently struggling to close58. Unfortunately, as net-centricity and data fusion were not in the initial design requirements, introducing this capability will cost much more than initially projected. These weapon platforms are comparable to F-16 Mid Life Update (MLU) / USAF Block 50-52 type aircraft, equipped with the latest avionics technology. The prices of aircraft59 vary significantly, but the market leader will ultimately become the cheapest platform throughout its lifetime because the Research & Development (R&D) effort for system evolution can be shared by the number of countries participating in the effort. Experience from DG MR Sys A/C clearly shows that purchasing or

Annex L Space based weaponry 57 Annex M Analysis of future platforms 58 Rafale (F2 version) is currently still being reworked to integrate a laser designator capability. Only the Typhoon (UK version of Eurofighter) has laser designation capability. Integration contract was awarded in July 2006 but todays RAF aircraft are not capable yet. 59 Annex N US fighter modernization plans: near-term choices
55 56

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What are the technological evolutions? integrating country unique weapon systems or capabilities push the price very high60. For this reason, Norway decided to opt for the F-35, heavily based on their experience within Multi National Fighter Program (MNFP) / European Participating Air Forces (EPAF)61, not withstanding heavy political pressure to select the Jas 39 Gripen. For Belgium, the F-16 MLU roadmap extends through 2025, and a discussion about replacing this aircraft has not yet begun. 2025 seems to be far in the future, but for these kinds of programs, a 5-10 year procurement lead time is normal. 62 3.3 Evolution of Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) There is no official agreement in NATO regarding the utilization of the terms UAS vs. Unmanned (Combat) Aerial Vehicle (U(C)AV)63, although a UAS is generally considered to encompass the UAV and its overarching network architecture. Apart from the different names, it is clear that UAS / U(C)AVs are here to stay. These systems have earned their place in the war fighting arena. During the 1990s, most studies predicted a much higher degree of development, R&D in UAS programs steadily progressed and has produced a number of sophisticated platforms. A first category of these UAS is the Reconnaissance, Surveillance and Target Acquisition (RSTA) platforms; and a second group is the High Altitude Long Endurance (HALE) / Medium Altitude Long Endurance (MALE) systems. The latter are being developed to serve as communication/network nodes, established above the area of operations (AOR) or to complement satellite type intelligence information. Although UAS Life Cycle Cost (LCC) appears to be cheaper than manned aircraft, it is uncertain how their acquisition costs will rise when their capabilities increase64. Today, the direction of UAS development is uncertain due to a lack of overarching doctrine and critical shortfalls in bandwidth / frequency availability. Furthermore, there is a lack of standard Combined Air Operations Centre (CAOC) procedures because of nationally developed stove-piped systems which are incompatible with each other and with NATO networks65. Development of high performance UCAVs, such as nEUROn or X-45, are in concept demonstration phases, and are being developed for first strike missions like SEAD/DEAD, electronic warfare (EW) and associated operations66. Therefore these systems will be not as versatile as manned fighters. The

R&D for integration of the CARAPACE system (French Radar Warning Receiver) had to be paid by Belgium alone. This self protection system is crucial for survival when threatened by radar guided missiles systems. 61 Prior 2008 Norway was inclined to select the Jas 39 Gripen but LCC predictions re-oriented the choice to the JSF. (source: Lt Col Brd VIKEN, RNoAF chairman working group best options for Norway), Chatham House Rule 62 Annex O Combat fighter lead time for acquisition Briefing MR Sys A/C1 Jan 2009, Slide 54. 63 UAS in NATO: Fostering Transformation, By LtCol Rafael Saiz & Col Daniel Lewandowski 2008, page 1 64 Annex P, UAV cost 65 JAPCC - Flight Plan for Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) in NATO, Pages 24-25 66

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What are the technological evolutions? costs of these high performance UCAVs will be difficult to determine and there will be major issues with technology transfer. Ethical and ROE issues67 are also of concern and make the acquisition of such a system for BE highly unlikely. 3.4 Evolution in the Information domain C4ISR68 is a strategic enabler for coherent, expedient decision making in order to permit rapid, target focused mission execution. If these missions can be executed within a network enabled alliance, the result will be decision superiority. A Joint Common Operational Picture (JCOP) will permit real time C2; fed by a shared situational awareness (SA) and fused intelligence69, target acquisition and identification will improve. Through such projects as Multi-sensor Aerospace-Ground Joint ISR Interoperability Coalition (MAJIIC), NATO is trying to identify gaps between current and future capabilities. Once these gaps are identified, recommendations for a coherent C4ISR vision will be forthcoming. One such recommendation is to embrace the NATO Network Enabled Capabilities (NNEC) principles. During the Bucharest Summit in Apr 2008, the need for NNEC was reiterated as well as the need for interoperability and for information sharing70. Unfortunately, contemporary operations indicate that information sharing has not been pro-active, largely due to national sensitivities. A first step to common intelligence sharing has been taken by installing the Intelligence Fusion Centre (IFC) in Northwood, United Kingdom. 3.5 3.5.1 Evolution in weapon technology Precision

Collateral damage has become a major feature of todays CNN effect. But augmenting the precision of a weapon is also driven by the consideration that fewer weapons will be required to destroy a specific target. Common techniques for weapon guidance include laser, Global Positioning System (GPS) and Inertial Navigation System (INS). Recent developments even combine guidance techniques so that pilots have options based on weather conditions in the target area. Artillery munitions are also being developed to use these same techniques71. Once this technology matures, it will certainly reduce Close

Annex Q U(C)AV evolution and considerations. NATO definition: Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance 69 Annex R NATO C4ISR roadmap. 70 Maj Gen G. Dhollander, General Manager NC3A. Briefing to Royal High Institute for Defence - 11 March 2009 71 The Armys laser guided Copperhead, proved difficult to employ and less than reliable. The GPS-aided Excalibur round, though roughly triple the price of a JDAM, promises to be far better suited to the needs of soldiers and marines for on-call fire support US fighter modernization plans: near-term choices by Steve Kosiak 2007, page 47
67 68

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What are the technological evolutions? Air Support (CAS) aircraft requirements. But artillery does not have the reach of aircraft, is not as deployable and is more vulnerable. Changing AOR within the same theatre is also much more cumbersome and slow. 3.5.2 Non-Lethal weapons

The US is researching several non-lethal weapon systems72. Currently, they are in the test / demonstration phases. Although the technology is ready to shift into the next phase, there seems to be a reluctance to shift major investment funds from traditional (legacy?) weapon research programs. Within NATO, there is no consensus on the use of this kind of weapon. The ethical and legal debate continues, along with corresponding arguments over rules of engagement and national caveats73. 3.5.3 Lethal weapons development

In the development of kinetic weapons, the emphasis will continue to be on reducing collateral damage by providing smaller and more precise weaponry. Small Diameter Bomb (SDB), is best example of how smaller yield and higher accuracy should mitigate the collateral damage issue. With smaller precision guided weapons becoming available, turbo prop aircraft like the Super Tucano, with state of the art cockpits are set to take up the counter narcotics role and COIN. 3.6 Evolution in simulation capabilities Advances in simulation technology will reduce the cost of air crew training requirements, both for manned and unmanned flight training. Display technologies and computer power now make it possible to generate better performance displays that are comparable to an actual flight view. If these simulators are linked together, real time mission simulations become possible. Available bandwidth remains a choke point, but advances in network speed and bandwidth will make-up for this short fall in the not too distant future. However, transfer of data becomes an almost unsurpassable hurtle, since most nations do not want sensitive data passing over (even encrypted) networks. With the ever increasing complexity of todays missions, more and more flight training is required. To mitigate the need for more real time flying (hours), tactical74 simulation should become more complementary to actual flight training. The tactical simulators

Annex S Non-Lethal weapons Reflection paper Maj Luc COLIN, 123 AStC Defence against Terrorism Dec 2008 74 The increased need for real flying Trg can only be mitigated by providing a comprehensive tactical simulation capability. Basic (emergency) training capability is not to be confused with this tactical simulation.
72 73

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What are the technological evolutions? should especially be used to train the less complex tactical systems and skills so more time become available to train high end performance in flight. 3.7 Role of the (Belgian) industry in the technological evolution Ever evolving technology brings complexity to the weapon systems but especially to all aspects of program management. When defence organisations want to acquire modern and versatile capabilities they are usually faced with the burden of acquiring very expensive systems. Improving efficiency of legacy systems and reducing cost for acquisition of new systems forces international cooperation and the development of new program management methods. Furthermore, system engineering has become so complex and expensive that prime contractors are compelled to trans-national and integrated development. Although US policy strives for multiple suppliers for the acquisition of complex systems the industrial base has been largely consolidated to a handful of major firms. Europe still has a diverse defence contractor landscape that mainly lives of national orders, although in the sector of aerial systems consolidation is ongoing. Belgian firms have adopted the strategy of excelling in sub-areas of bigger systems by offering superior quality and knowledge in key areas. Their expertise, initially acquired through defence contracts, has spawned opportunities in the civil world; creating profits as well as opportunities to keep up own R&D efforts. Although there is still a tendency to award contracts to own defence industry, EU legislation becomes a vehicle that is used more and more throughout acquisition programs. A healthy competition should result in a better product at a lower price and more competitive firms75. Currently Europe is facing problems with coordination of long term defence requirements. This coordination is needed to create stability for investments in expensive and complex systems. The notions of economical compensation, juste retour, or global balance might seem to have a negative influence on defence contracts, but they do ultimately provide incentives and opportunities to the industry. Job creation is still a major player when political approval for major investments is required. In the same time, participation to highly technical and innovative programs has advantages for expertise building and often creates profitable spin-off opportunities. In Europe, Organisation Conjointe de Coopration en matire d'ARmement (OCCAR) seems to be the organisation that is paving the way for future defence procurement.


DefenceNews Denmark wants lowest price for new combat aircraft 23 March 2009, page 6

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What are the technological evolutions? 3.8 Intermediate conclusions Belgium should continue to invest in those space based systems that will form the backbone of future C4ISR76 systems and networks and therefore create assured access to critical information. A JCOP will permit real time C2 fed by shared SA and fused intelligence. Currently clear and fast decision making is hampered by a lack of willingness to share intelligence but the IFC in Northwood might bring change. Countries are encouraged to embrace NNEC to facilitate C4ISR growth. Maintaining (fighter) combat capability in line with NATO and EU evolving capability requirements should be done through international partnerships (similar to the MNFP / EPAF model) or joint ventures in order to ensure synergy, cost savings and an affordable LCC. Future investment should go to market leader systems, since these will guarantee a larger client base in order to keep investment costs down. Current and future fighters must be capable of integrating newly developed capabilities like low collateral damage, higher precision weapons. UAS and its subsystems availability are increasing mainly due to national acquisition programs. The lack of overarching employment concepts, however, makes it difficult to predict which systems will become widely used. Furthermore, bandwidth, frequency and satellite availability are critical enablers NATO currently lacks. NATO has identified numerous shortfalls necessary to build a facilitating architecture, but individual nations are reluctant to commit to such an endeavour. It is clear, however, that in the (near) future RSTA systems will become the backbone of NATOs C4ISR capability. Tactical UAV or HALE / MALE systems will continue to evolve and become more capable and more versatile. They are, after all, THE answer to a requirement for a persistent presence over the battlefield. Indications are that by 2025, high performance UCAVs will not have matured to be as mission versatile or multi-role as manned fighter aircraft. But they will become an excellent complementary system to execute highly dangerous first strike missions. Hence, countries who replace their manned fighters with UCAVs will thus be limited to first strike type missions and no longer have capabilities to offer in other parts of the conflict spectrum. Issues like ethics, technology transfer problems, political sovereignty, and ROEs make a reliance on UCAV unlikely for a country like Belgium. Kinetic weapons will continue to seek greater precision with less explosive force, hence mitigating collateral damage. This phenomenon ultimately will mean that fewer

This to be consistent with the priorities set in Politieke Orinatienota, 2008, - page 52

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What are the technological evolutions? fighters are needed since missions can be executed with greater efficiency. Precision artillery will complement CAS on the battlefield and performant prop aircraft are being equipped with precision weapons for use in counter narcotics and COIN operations. Nonlethal weapons are not considered by European countries. Their use will continue to be hampered by debates over ROEs, legal issues, and the reluctance of US to shift R&D money away from classical, proven combat capabilities. Simulators will become more and more complementary to actual flight training. The development of simulation capabilities presents us with opportunities to reduce flight time requirements for basic tactical skills thus increasing the available flying time for advanced high end training or the training for newly inserted capabilities. Today, restrictions on transfer of classified data between linked simulators, severely hampers realistic networked training. In Europe, OCCAR seems to be paving the way for procurement of future expensive systems and capabilities. Defence contracts must be seen as simply one other way of doing business in which (Belgian) firms can build an expert reputation of knowledge and quality. European legislation promotes the open competition for awarding defence contracts but the diverse defence contractor landscape still needs to be consolidated.

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National and International missions

4 National and International missions

4.1 Defining the missions According Allied Joint Publication (AJP) 3.3 the missions defined for air forces can be broken down into four major types. Counter Air Operations (CAO), Defensive Counter Air (DCA) and Offensive Counter Air (OCA) Strategic Air Operations, all air operations for strategic effect and are likely shaped by political aims and constraints. Anti-Surface Force Air Operations (ASFAO), and is conducted to deprive the enemy of the military power he needs to occupy territory or exploit sea space. Supporting Air Operations, operations in which combat support aircraft are employed to support other aircraft or forces undertaking combat roles. 4.2 Current Belgian (Air Component) Level of Ambition In 2004, Belgium published its joint doctrine: ICGD77. Since then an updated draft78 has been prepared that reflects the requirements of the politieke orintatienota of 2008. In general, the missions of the Belgian armed forces are focused on three major themes: international commitments, defence of universal and democratic values, and

responsibilities towards Belgian nationals79. This document identifies capabilities at both the national strategic level and at the tactical level80. Furthermore, different scenarios are developed which permit the standardisation of detachments; these scenarios serve as a common language throughout the defence organisation81. 4.2.1 Capabilities82

Strategic support capabilities o Joint ISTAR Capabilities Strat level(ACOS-IS)83, Comd en Staff elements (Assessment)

Gebruiksdoctrine - 30 Aug 04, Nr 04-185171 ACOT-SDP-ICOMDOC-CCSC-001_Ed2_-_SD2 (for official staffing - intranet) 1 Jan 2009 79 Annex T Strategic Orientation of the Belgian Defence 80 Annex U Operational capacities and sub-capacities 81 Annex V Possible engagement scenarios 82 Annex W Level of Ambition of the Belgian Air Component, paragraph 1, (sub)Cap paraatgestel door AC 83 Helios II delivers imagery to the French military both night and day. France also has an agreement to exchange some of Helios IIs optical observing capacity for future radar observation capacity now under development in Germany and Italy. MUSIS will ensure continuity of services from the current French Helios II, German SAR LUPE and Italian CosmoSkymed and Pliades systems, from 2015-2017 onwards
77 Intercomponenten 78

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National and International missions Tactical level84 Operational Capabilities Air combat capability. (Tactical) Air transport capability. Multi Role Helicopter (MRH) capability, later Joint Support Helicopter (JSH). o Helicopter Maritime support capability. o UAV capability with real time surveillance, reconnaissance and observation. Other capabilities o o o o o Airport exploitation, installation protection. Deployable modules: Air Traffic Control (ATC), Fire and crash crew, Wing Operations, Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD), Active Close ground defence. Control & Reporting Centre (CRC) and Meteorological services.

o 4.2.2

Level of ambition85

F-16 MLU o 36 F16 distributed as follows: Xx (confidential) F-16 Dual Capable Aircraft (DCA), not mentioned86 and 02 F-16 In Place Force (IPF) Quick Reaction Alert (QRA) 24/7 and 34 F-16 deployable one shot or 18 F-16 Six months max or 12 F-16 for an indefinite period CRC for Air Policing.

o Air Tpt

8 C-130 and 2 A-310, 72 Hrs notice. Capable of transporting a light infantry battle group and its C2 requirement. (A-400M in 2018) o 1 ERJ Aero medical Evacuation (AE) JSH NH-90 - as of 2013 o 4 Tactical Transport Helicopter (TTH) in Sp of the Land Component (LC). 4 NATO Frigate Helicopter (NFH), 2 for Search And Rescue (SAR) on the national territory and 1 permanently available in Sp of the Naval Component (NC). MRH A-109BA o o o 12 A-109 MRH and 2 A-109 AE, in NATO and/or EU operations. o RC4 = 20 days UAV B-Hunter o o Tactical UAV for real time surveillance, reconnaissance and observation. RC6 = 40 Days

Within ACOS Ops&Trg and the components other ISTAR means are available: - Comd en Stafelements J2, G2, A3 Cbt Sp, N2, MEDINT + Intel sections withing the component units (S2, A2, ) - Sensors : Recce, BSR, UAV, MRP, TARGETTING POD, 85 Annex W Level of Ambition of the Belgian Air Component, paragraph 2 LoA van de lucht gevechtscapaciteit 86 The Strike (nuclear) commitment to NATO is not mentioned in the ICGD. Fleet analysis done by COA as reply on memo to DGHR ICGD F-16 capability, MITS 09-148215 - 3 Mar 2009 (CONFIDENTIAL), 7 Pages.

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National and International missions 4.3 4.3.1 Analysis Missions

With its combat aircraft, Belgium is well equipped to handle a key part of the CAO/ASFAO mission domain, during day / night in all weather conditions. The air defence missions, executed by land based Surface to Air Missiles (SAM), were discarded in the early 80s and the OCA missions of SEAD / DEAD are not available. Belgium is able to conduct these missions both nationally and internationally, because its training doctrine87 and fighter capability is compatible with Belgiums EU and NATO allies. For expeditionary operations, the BAC is quite capable thanks to its own Tpt fleet and possible co-operations like Strategic Airlift Interim Solution (SALIS)88 or / Air Transport and Air to Air Refueling Exchange of Services (ATARES)89. However assured access to AAR is not available. 4.3.2 Level of ambition

ISTAR assets (and the information generated by different sub-systems) are dispersed throughout the defence organisation, from ACOS-IS to the tactical units. This information is gathered and processed by the system users themselves and there is a very low level of joint information sharing. ACOS-IS has satellite imagery available. CRC makes a Recognized Air Picture (RAP). F-16 MLU SNIPER pod. A-109 HObn. 1 F-16 MLU Squadron processes information from the Modular Recce Pod (MRP). B-Hunter real time images, available to the analyst in the ground control station. (For LC, the new Multi Purpose Protected Vehicle (MPPV), PANDUR and Armoured Infantry Vehicles (AIV) are scheduled to have a Recce / Observation and FAC capability.) A generic NEC architecture is already available90, and mechanisms are in place to network all ISR capable platforms. Unfortunately, doctrine and guidance documents are lacking. Hence, shortfalls necessary to redirect and prioritise investment can not be identified. Therefore, opportunities to construct a national JCOP or build the capability

Mission Planning Manual 3-1 and basic employment manual 3-3, are standard throughout EPAF and USAF air forces. This multinational airlift consortium is chartering six Antonov An-124-100 transport aircraft 89 Technical Agreement (TA) for cash free exchange of services (currently air transport and AAR) between EAG member states to optimize the use of scarce transport and tanker resources 90 Briefing DG MR C&I Status Report, to 123 AStC 10 Mar 09
87 88

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National and International missions to contribute to a JCOP in expeditionary operations are being lost. Via Ops & Trg D&R the JISR ICT process91 should be started. Speed is everything, so all systems that cannot contribute to the completion on C4ISR capability should either be optimised or discarded. Therefore, coherent guidance of the Capability Transformation Steering Group (CTSG) is crucial. The use of the SNMTI board92 should be encouraged. Today the BAC F-16 MLU, is a high performance high readiness weapon platform capable of operating throughout the whole spectrum of conflict; it is network enabled,93 thus capable of interoperable-joint-combined operations. Furthermore, its logistical support has been re-engineered with an expeditionary mindset. One F-16 MLU Sqn can perform Tactical Recce with the Modular Recce Pod (MRP)94 and possesses image processing and interpretation capability, although current system technology and the extreme large amount of information files make exploitation a slow and cumbersome process. Processed information can be made available to a CAOC via secure Interim CAOC Capability (ICC) terminals if required. In order to accommodate for todays short decision cycle requirements, an airborne real time data link would be required. Furthermore, the F-16 MLU is equipped with ATHS95 and the SNIPER96 pod. The SNIPER targeting pod is equipped with a real time, continuous imagery data-link97. With these Video Down Link (VDL) systems the BAC is meeting NATOs request to develop inherent NTISR capabilities. The A-109 can be used in attack98 and AE role, but its limited engine performance seriously restricts its employability. The B-Hunter UAV system can provide real time TV video during day but can not provide position data. The system struggles with obsolescence99 requiring recurrent efforts to guarantee its operationality. 4.4 Intermediate conclusions While the Belgian defence organisation is reorienting towards expeditionary operations, it should not be forgotten that the BAC still has two important tasks to perform:

Annex X Doctrine & Requirement process Through a bottom-up approach (cfr Nota CHOD-200703740 van 29 mei 2007 Directives VCHOD suite au briefing NEC & ISTAR) integrate different information sources (C2 services en weapon systems) align investment needs and implement within a NEC context. 93 F16-MLU L-16 capability provides instant secure network plug-in capability in the theater of operations. 94 Limited to Day good weather Low and Med + Low Level IR 95 Allows coordinates generated by a (J)FAC element to be transmitted electronically into the weapon aiming systems of the F-16 MLU, drastically reducing the timing from Tgt identification to weapon employment. 96 The SNIPER advanced targeting systems is used to guide laser guided weapons to the target. It has day and night imagery capability at all altitudes. 97 ROVER provides cockpit video to the JFAC via a laptop. It is currently used in ISAF, also during convoy protection allowing the soldier to look around the corner and see what is happening in the streets around his convoy. 98 A-109 can be equipped with TOW 2A missile. 99 Briefing MR Sys A/O to 123 AStC Div on 6 Jan 2009
91 92

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National and International missions generating a RAP while safeguarding the integrity of the Belgian airspace honouring the nuclear role in the mutual deterrence strategy

Belgium has managed to establish a NEC architecture that can serve as the backbone for our C4ISR capability, but further guidance and doctrine are needed. Belgium should make sure that its weapon systems, current and future, are compatible with the NATO Network Enabled Capabilities (NNEC). Today contribution to a JCOP in expeditionary operations, apart from F-16 MLU, is not possible. The JISR ICT should be started under the guidance of the CTSG to identify priorities as well as opportunities through SNMTI. The BAC F-16 MLU is a leading performer, just as capable as its peers from the USAF or other EPAF countries. Maintaining our combat aircrafts operational capabilities, its interoperability with our coalition partners as well as the health of its structure is critical in order to remain relevant. However, a lack of assured access100 to the AAR support function makes Belgium vulnerable to meet its deployment timelines. Plans are in place to maintain F-16 MLU evolution within MNFP/EPAF until 2025. Replacement for the aging C-130 transport fleet is in place. The current A-109 helicopters limited engine performance seriously restricts deployability. The UAV reconnaissance capability is limited to day operations only and can not provide position data. Both the helicopter (RC4=20 days) and UAV (RC6=40 days) capabilities have slow response times; their sustainment periods are limited.

100 For expeditionary operations, the AAR capability needs to be coordinated with third parties whose commitment is not guaranteed.

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Belgian defence specifics

5 Belgian defence specifics

In this chapter specific issues and challenges of the Belgian defence organisation are analysed. Their understanding is critical to comprehend future recommendations for the transformation of the organisation. 5.1 Evolution of the guidance documents 101 Over the past decades, Belgiums armed forces have had to adapt to different plans and guidance documents issued by the political authorities. Sometimes these guidelines were translated into a Belgian strategic defence plan but the political commitment was not always honoured. The latest guideline (Politiek orientatienota) has not been translated into a new strategic plan while this is crucial to steer and prioritise all future activities. 5.2 Budget evolution Over the years, budgets were cut contradictory to what was laid out in the strategic plan, forced the Belgian defence to save on functioning and investment cost. The ideal budgetary division within the Belgian armed forces would be to spend 50% on personnel costs, 25% on functioning and 25% on investment costs respectively. Sadly, todays figures depict a defence organisation in peril102. This situation must be corrected, or we will not be able to maintain the ambitions of our government to be a reliable and trustworthy international partner103. Earlier investment commitments were based on financial situations prior to several budget cuts. This has produced a zero investment margin (vrije marge). Through 2013, estimates show this margin may become negative104. Together with past increase in personnel cost the situation has become critical. Today a Plan Minimum Urgent (PMU) identifies critical investments; and even this plan still awaits approval. 5.3 Evolution of the personnel quorum After the fall of the Berlin wall, it has become clear that the focus of our defence organisation no longer lies in safeguarding the integrity of our boundaries. This is especially true for Belgium given our geographical position. Most European defence organisations have restructured since the end of the Cold War; the result has been a

Annex Y BE Strategic planning guidance documents Annex Z Evolution of Belgian MOD Budget 103 Politieke Orintatienota Jun 08 page 2 104 Interview with MR-B/Inv. Actual numbers are classified and could not be used to substantiate this reflection.
101 102

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Belgian defence specifics downsizing of the European military105 since the challenge has become the aging civilian population. According to the Belgian MOD106, in the coming twelve years, the Belgian military will shrink by 30% while we must ensure that our organisation keeps rejuvenating. To succeed, we will need to shift our recruitment focus and become more attractive The MOD also states that our goal should be 37.725 by 2010107, although simulations show the personnel reduction will be much more profound. By 2025, the Belgian armed forces are predicted to fall below 27.000108 assuming that recruitment can be ramped up to 2000 per year, which may be an unrealistic assumption. 5.4 Geographical dispersion of units throughout Belgian territory We must consolidate the number of barracks spread throughout the country. More than 300 units, barracks or bases109 are still in use; the MOD recognizes this dilemma110. The units of the Belgian Defence are inadequately dispersed throughout Belgium and a lot of barracks date from the early 19th century. The installations are archaic and not adapted to todays efficiency standards nor energy or environmental standards. 5.5 Intermediate conclusion A new strategic plan should be issued that translates the latest political guidance. This should allow resetting priorities and refocusing the required transformation. The budget is stretched beyond its limits and investment has come to a halt. Rationalisation and optimalisation of the functioning budget has brought it to the goal of about 25 %. Since this should be maintained, the only opportunity left, in order to create room for investment, is to save on personnel as well as savings through the optimalisation in number and quality of buildings and bases/barracks while keeping an acceptable geographical dispersion in mind. It is clear that within 5 to 10 years, personnel issues will be THE challenge in the future. Action should be taken now to streamline an organisation that is prepared to function within this limited personnel and a reduced defence staff.

In 2008 President Sarkozy announced he would not replace 54.000 retiring troops or 15% of the force Speech by the Belgian Minister of Defence to the ACMP - 24-10-2008 (13:24) 107 Speech by the Belgian Minister of Defence to the assembled Generals during New Years reception - 12-01-2009 (14:19) 108 Annex AA BE MOD personnel quorum evolution 109 Annex AB Geographical dispersion of units in Belgium 110 Beleidsnota voor het Ministerie van Defensie (16) voor het begrotingsjaar 2008, page 4
105 106

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Why Air Combat Power for Belgium

6 Why Air Combat Power for Belgium

This chapter will highlight the advantages of having air combat power available as well as some aspects we will need to keep in mind when preparing the BAC for the future. 6.1 Why is Air Power important

Air Power is an essential element in all military operations. It can be employed over the full spectrum of military operations, at any level, in support of national, joint or multinational operations and objectives. It can be brought to bear on an adversarys political, military, economic, information or social system structures simultaneously or separately, and it can be coordinated with land and maritime surface and subsurface and space operations or employed independently
AJP 3.3 Para 201.

After the analysis of importance of air power111, it is clear that any armed force who wants to remain credible in the contemporary security environment must be able to perform throughout full spectrum conflict for which air power is ideal. The military of the future will need to deal with a wide variety of threats in diverse parts of the world. It will be faced with budgetary constraints that will dictate trade-offs favouring those military elements that offer utility over a wide spectrum of conflict, that increases ones ability to project power over long distances. The operations of the future will be executed in a social and political environment that will dictate the need to minimize both friendly casualties and collateral damage. A reinvigorated BAC can meet these requirements. The need for speed, flexibility and availability has been demonstrated more than once to the Belgian political authorities112. 6.2 Integrated command In order to employ air power in an effective way, swift coordination between the different forces is a prerequisite. If one understands that the solution to a conflict will require a comprehensive approach, close cooperation with non military actors such as Non Governmental Organisations (NGO)s and International Organisations (IO)s, integrated command and control systems113 will be necessary to allow for fluent and expeditious coordination.

Annex AC Importance of Air Power This was demonstrated several times, each time the kern cabinet took a decision on a Friday, the aircraft were in theatre over the weekend. Villa Franca, Amendola, Baltic States and Afghanistan (2 times) are proof of this readiness. 113 Annex AD Development of Joint Armed Forces combined with inter agency coordination
111 112

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Why Air Combat Power for Belgium Especially in expeditionary operations, joint is about Airmindedness114. It is three dimensional thinking that includes all the aspects of reach, speed, and precision. It is a way of thinking and culture. Real jointness and unity of effort can only be achieved if, from the start of the planning process, there is mutual respect and responsibility. The achieved effect is more important than strictly defining relationships like

supporting/supported commander. Air and land and sea should be considered as equal partners.115 This partnership will be forced with the introduction of NCW, currently well underway within the AC and NC but which has not really been initiated within the LC. 6.3 Sizing the future Belgian Air Component fighter capability 116 A combat fighter capability is a combination of pilot + aircraft + useful payload (including level of training and technical support) which is the qualitative aspect. While the number of pilots and aircraft determine the quantitative aspect. In view of the budget situation, maintaining quality and quantity until 2025 will be a challenge. However, we must make sure that quality is never sacrificed for quantity. 6.4 Intermediate conclusions It is clear that having air combat power is an absolute prerequisite in order for the Belgian government to remain relevant in its contributions to international operations. The BAC combat capability offers the government a flexible, expedient tool to contribute throughout the complete range of international tasks. At the same time the BAC delivers a maximum of (fire) fighting power with less risk to Belgian personnel compared to boots on the ground. Much care should be taken to embrace the integrated command capability for expeditionary operations. Only then can the true effectiveness and benefits of air power be achieved. Air, land and sea forces should seek to achieve unity of effort. If the BAC needs to be resized to compensate for costs, every effort should be made not to sacrifice quality for quantity. Currently our government can dispose of a highly flexible and agile tool with highly trained and capable aircrew, able to judge the fine line between right or wrong. Every effort should be taken not to deprive our government of this tool by substituting is with something than only can be used in specific situations but is much cheaper.

Department of the Air Force, Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 2, Operations and organisation, 03Apr07,, visited 01Mar08 115 JOHNSON David E., Learning Large Lessons. The Evolving Roles of Ground Power and Air Power in the Post-Cold War Era, RAND Corporation, Project Air Force, Santa Monica, CA, USA, 2007, p191 116 Annex AE F-16 fleet size and pilot contingent calculation

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Overall conclusions

7 Overall conclusions
7.1 Geo-political evolution The analysis of the geo-political situation, in chapter one, demonstrated that we will require our armed forces to be flexible and capable of a swift response. International expeditionary operations will require us to operate with NATO, EU or other partner nations in a coalition framework. Our expeditionary forces will need to work in a networked environment; they will require quick decisions and fast, accurate intelligence updates. The Belgian government has clearly stated that it wants to be a reliable and credible partner who takes his share of burdens and risks. This will require that we transform and only invest in equipment related to the core business and adhere to the minimum suffisant principle. 7.2 Threat evolution NATO and the EU have developed complementary analytical tools to identify the capabilities required to counter the threats with the required effects. Expeditionary forces should be able to work in a comprehensive framework. Precision strike, non-lethal, AGSR capabilities and an improved persistence above the battle field, should be the main focus of future investments. To maintain control of quickly changing and complex conflicts, decision superiority is a pre-requisite requiring near-real-time JISR. The prediction of more MOUT operations increases the requirement for insertion capability of ground troops. Air combat power will remain crucial, in all its aspects, to create the required environment. 7.3 Technological evolution Technological advances have spawned a wide range of air breathing or space based RSTA systems. (armed) UAVs or HALE / MALE systems will specifically address the requirement for more persistency above the battlefield. They should become the backbone of a C4ISR structure that is built on a NNEC compatible network. Bandwidth and frequency availability, plus the supporting (satellite) networks, are critical enablers which do not suffice today. NATO is working on employment guidance and doctrine but the member nations seem to be reluctant to participate. Transfer of intelligence information remains a major stumbling block. By 2025, UCAVs will not be as versatile and flexible as manned combat aircraft. They will become an excellent complementary system to execute highly dangerous first strike

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Overall conclusions missions. The debate about ethics, political sovereignty and ROEs is still ongoing. Due to their nature, it is unlikely for Belgium to acquire such systems. For existing fighter aircraft, the challenge is to keep up with the rapidly evolving capability requirements. When upgrades are no longer possible and the acquisition of new weapon platforms is required, business models like MNFP and EPAF are the preferred option. International venture will create synergy, reduce acquisition cost and keep LCC under control. Newly acquired system should be market leaders with a large client base in order to reduce R&D required throughout the life span of the system. Greater precision and less explosive force remain the strategy to mitigate collateral damage while non-lethal weapons development struggles with legal issues and ROEs. High performance simulators will become more and more complementary to life flying. Evolutions in simulation capabilities will allow to train basic tactical skills by which more real flying time becomes available to train advanced high end tactics or to absorb newly inserted technologies. EU defence industries will need to consolidate and develop trans-national alliances to be able to cope with the challenges of producing expensive and complex military capabilities. These high end technology contracts provide firms opportunities to build expert reputation of knowledge and quality. European legislation promotes the open competition for awarding defence contracts but a stable, unified EU defence requirement is still lacking. 7.4 Future National and International missions Future national and international missions will not vary substantially from what is required today. Missions identified in todays AJP-3.3 will still cover all that is required by 2025 both in the domain of Belgian airspace integrity as expeditionary operations. Although the Belgian defence organisation has succeeded in establishing a NEC structure in support of its C4ISR assets, doctrine and guidance documents are lacking. Many assets with ISR capability lack the tools required to become a capable contributor an eventual JCOP. Here, the Transformation Implementation started by ACOS Ops & Trg, with the ICT, could identify valuable opportunities to produce force enablers which could serve in Belgium or in international missions. With its combat fighter capability and accessory roadmap, the BAC will continue to meet all challenges through 2025. This capability offers the Belgian government a wide range of options with its global reach and robust contribution through a broad spectrum of conflict, and it is relative safe for the soldier. All combat fighter requirements,

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Overall conclusions identified in chapter two, are met and support the Belgian government in its claim of being a reliable and credible partner. The BACs strategic and tactical transport means are sufficient and a replacement plan for the aging fleet is in place. With the A-109, a variety of helicopter operations are possible albeit with restricted performance, leading to limited deployability. Current UAV capability can provide day, real time video over a limited range, but has currently no built-in (N)NEC nor can it provide coordinates for possible targets. Both the A-109 and the B-Hunter have a relatively slow reaction time before being able to put to good use in theatre, and the sustainment periods are limited. 7.5 Requirement for a BAC future combat capability It will be a daunting task for the Belgian defence to keep up with ever changing capability requirements. The financial situation is dire and by 2025 a drastically reduced personnel force will necessitate a redesign of the institution. While the organisation strives for a healthy cost structure, current, personnel costs are above 65% of the budget and neither a short term nor long term investment plan seems sure. Tough choices will have to be made when deciding which capabilities should be maintained. When making these choices, fighter combat capability needs to be safeguarded as an integral capability within our defence organisation, since it is the only tool immediately available to the government to demonstrate their reliability as a, burden and risk sharing partner. No other combat capability within the Belgian defence generates the same level of contribution to combat operations, with the same (low) level of danger for the participating troops, and an acceptable logistical footprint. Savings should be found in rejecting non core business tasks and in those capabilities that, after screening by the ICT process, reveal critical shortfalls in one of the 9 areas117 that make up a capability. When the need comes to replace the F-16 MLU, careful consideration should be made before giving up this versatile capability for other, cheaper, solutions which have a too limited mission profile, and are less adaptable and less flexible in their employability. Paving the way to replacement should not only be done by considering operational aspects, but also with a well founded business plan. A comprehensive plan that involves Belgian industry, and which gives them the opportunity to stay ahead in their respective

117 Briefing by ACOS Ops & Trg - D&R, Transformation implementation capability is the combination of manpower, equipment, performance, sustainability, doctrine, deployability, training, interoperability and readiness, to 123 AStC Div - 3 Mar 2009

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Overall conclusions fields of expertise. The technological challenges put forward when participating in these programs will allow the Belgian industry to keep a competitive edge. 7.5.1 Recommendations118

The current BAC force structure should be redesigned to be able to function with the personnel, predicted to be available in the future. Locations spread out through the country should be consolidated to reduce costs. (This should be done within the bigger Belgian defence framework). The inherent personnel reduction will create financial opportunities to increase the investment levels creating breathing room required to replace the current combat fighter fleet. Since international cooperation is the future for large projects, here also opportunities can be found to keep costs under control. Guidelines like investment in core capability and le minimum suffisant can not be ignored nor should they be questioned or challenged. A pragmatic approach should be chosen when spending money on investment or the sustainment of weapon systems. To be able to correctly prioritise future investments, a new strategic plan that guides the transformation of our defence organisation is necessary. Once this has been approved, the pragmatic approach would be to activate the integrated capability teams at ACOS Ops & Trg under the guidance of the CTSG. It could design a roadmap for future short and long term materiel acquisition founded on inputs from all ACOSes, DGs and Component Commanders. For materiel currently in the inventory, this tool can also identify: Opportunities which could yield big returns on investment at relatively small cost. Identify systems that are not sustainable for a reasonable period in an expeditionary environment or those that are not interoperable119 in operations, either due to problems with communications or support. Capabilities which do not cover a wide range of missions or are too limited in overall performance which, for the outside world creates the perception we have equipment that can rarely be engaged.


Annex AF Opportunities that could produce force multipliers or savings 2005/0016 NATO policy for interoperability dated 2nd March 2005

119 CM

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Interviews Lt Gen Jacques De Winter DGMR 2 Feb 2009 Lt Gen Jean-Paul Buyse Ops & Trg - 11 Feb 2009 Maj Gen Eddy Testelmans Land Component Commander 4 mar 2009 Maj Gen Pierre Hougardy ACOS Strat - 8 Apr 09 Maj Gen Albert Husniaux, ir Director General of Royal Higher Institute of Defence 15 Jan 2009 Col Patrick Wouters - Dep REP for BELGIUM to the MC 4 Dec 2008 Col Michel Ocula DGMR Sys / Air Col Johan Andries ACOS Strat, 20 Mar 2009 Lt Col Laurent Donnet ACOS Strat, Defence Transformation Advice / Capabilities AIR 4 March 2009 MR Syn B/Inv Interview to clarify the current budget situation Feb 2009 Mr. Michael Ogg - Regional Customer Relationships Manager, Lockheed Martin Global Inc., Brussels Headquarters, Belgium, 30 Jan 2009 Brig Gen (Ret) Dany Van de Ven Director Belgian Security & Defence Industry (BSDI), 10 Apr 2009

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Bibliography Defence Transformation Defence Is Back, but HAS to Change!, By Stephan De Spiegeleire 13 Mar 2008, 10 pages

o US

DoD o Advanced Systems & Concepts (AS&C) 14 Oct 2006 Joint War fighting Center o Refining How We Think about Joint Operations, By Teresa M. Pumphrey 1ste quarter 2007, 6 pages Headquarters, United States Air Force Washington DC o Lead Turning The Future: The 2008 Strategy for United States Air Force Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance - 4 July 2008 Air Force Research Laboratories o Effect based Operations: an overview by Dr. Maris Buster McCrabb Strategic Forum o Insurgency: Modern Warfare Evolves into a Fourth Generation by Thomas X. Hammes Jan 2005 Air & Space Power Journal o The Strategic Role of Airpower - Fall 2008 o Offensive Airpower with Chinese Characteristics - Fall 2007 o Dominant Air, Space, and Cyberspace Operations, by Lt Col Paul D. Berg, USAF Spring 2007 o Uninhabited combat aerial vehicles: remove the pilot?, Winter 1997 Air university Maxwell air force base, Alabama o UCAV The next generation air-superiority fighter? By Maj William K. Lewis - June 2002 o Combat aerial vehicles : air power by the people, for the people, but not with the people, By CLARK R.M - 2000, 89 pages o UCAV The next generation air superiority fighter? By Maj William K. Lewis - 2002, 102 pages RAND Corporation, Project Air Force o Shaping the Future Air Force, by: David A. Shlapak 2006, 45 pages. o United States air and space power in the 21st century, by Khalilzad Z - 2002, 495 pages. Stratfor o The U.S. Air Force and the Next War, by George Friedman, 11 Jun 2008, 6 pages Vistas o future attack capabilities, 24 Jun 1996, 98 pages Strategic Studies Institute United States Army War College o The 21st Century Security Environment and the Future of War by Dr. Colin S. Gray Winter 2008-09,14 pages. o Fallacies about air power by Dr. Colin S. Gray Winter 2008, 41 pages. Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments o US fighter modernization plans: near-term choices by Steve Kosiak and Barry Watts 2007, 66 pages Strikestar 2025, Col (Sel) Bruce W. Carmichael Aug 1996, 80 pages UK MOD o Future command joint capability by Cdr David J. Bewick MA, RN DCBM/J6, Jun 2004

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Bibliography Internetsites (visited between Nov 08 and Mar 09) BELGIUM Federaal Plan Bureau KHID, DOD Defensie, het standpunt van de politieke partijen Egmont, Koninklijk Instituut voor Internationale Betrekkingen EU NATO Intranet Documents/18ColMarin/file /_WFS/20MarinelliClosing.ppt US DoD USAF Other _god_help.html

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Bibliography Speeches and lectures Belgian MOD Minister of Defence, Speech to the RHID 21 May 2008. To the ACMP - 24-10-2008 (13:24) Hash=41aef91bea&L=0 New years reception with the Belgian Generals - 12-01-2009 (14:19).[tt_news]=207&tx_t tnews[backPid]=34&cHash=c1ea9d68cd NATO MGen F. HEY, BE Army, SACTREPEUR: Demystifying Transformation Kijkduin, The Netherlands, 14 Dec 05 US MOSELEY Michael T., US Air Force Chieff of Staff, The US Air Force: our mission is to fly and fight,, speech 08Feb07.

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List of Annexes

List of Annexes
Annex A Belgian Defence 2007 spending120


Defence Expenditures as % of GDP


Other Gov't Expenses as % of GDP






05 04 03 02 01 00


Weighed Avg NATO

Defence expenditures as % of GDP (Target = 2%)

Weighed Avg ESDP+DNK


Of the 34 represented countries, Belgium is ranked 30th only to be in front of Austria, Luxemburg, Malta and Ireland. (For NATO this includes pension payments)

Ref: Brief DG BF BFB Briefing to 123 AStC Div on 16 Mar 2009


Percentage of GDB (without pension payments included)

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Annex B ACT Multiple futures Project, list of drivers Driver Changing State Capacity national and international governance Focus of Driver The distribution and management of power at both system and state level. The main components include different polarities, state versus non-state actors, the degree of functional interdependence, and the degree of homogeneity or friction in problem-solving and norm construction in the international system. The popular support for particular worldviews or ideologies with a specific focus on competing ideologies/worldviews within civil society that have emerged as competitors to liberal democracy, such as authoritarianism and religious fundamentalism. The problem of infinite human needs and wants in a world of finite resources. It covers renewable and nonrenewable resources including energy, food, and water; and the conflicts that arise as a result of competition over these scarce resources. Long-term significant changes in regional and global weather, with particular attention to global warming, environmental degradation and extreme weather. Driver examines stresses on economic development, resource scarcity, and world population and demographics. The change in availability, access, and sophistication of human, electronic, and other means of collaboration and information distribution and dissemination. The ageing of the population in many developed countries, the youth bulge of many developing countries, and the inherent migration pressure. The driver also addresses, in particular, increase of urbanization in developing countries and their governments inability to provide basic public services. The widening, intensifying, speeding up, and growing impact of worldwide interconnectedness. The enabling or inhibiting role of technology in relation to other drivers, and the strong uncertainty and unpredictability of the driver.

Competing ideology / worldviews

Resource Scarcity

Climate Change

Networks & Communication

Population (Demographics + Urbanization + Migration)

Globalization and Increasing Interdependence Technology

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List of Annexes

Annex C NATO Level Of Ambition 121

Level of Ambition Evolution of MG 03 > MG 06

MG 03
Size 3 MJO (Corps)

MG 06
2 MJO (Corps size - Air=1000 sorties - Mar=Task Force) 6 SJO (4 Div/Bde size - Air=350 sorties - Mar=Task Gp) including 1 Air heavy and 1 Maritime heavy MJO > MJO = 6 months MJO > SJO = 2 months SJO > SJO = 2 months 50 % High Intensity (war-fighting) (war50 % Low Intensity Adjacent area; 5.000 km from Brussels Strategic distance; 15.000 km from Brussels (low scale)


2 months between initial phase of MJOs


Not addressed


Not addressed


Not addressed

50 % austere, underdeveloped infrastructure and no Host Nation Support (HNS)

Evolving, but still full spectrum of conflict incl Art 5 and larger than MJO ops


The 2007 Bi-SC defence requirements review (DRR 07) final report (NATO CONFIDENTIAL)

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List of Annexes

Annex D - Mission Task Analysis of the NATO Defence Requirements Review 122 This paper gives a general outline of the NATO Defence Requirements Review (DRR) and how mission analysis has been used to provide a consistent and detailed approach to the decomposition of complex military missions. The Mission Task Analysis methodology is described and illustrated with two examples using generic planning situations (a Peace Support Operation and a Article V operation.) Introduction The primary challenge for NATO Defence Planning is to maintain the military means for all missions; from Peace Support Operations to Collective Defence (Article V). To meet this challenge a balance needs to be struck between: high readiness deployable forces for collective defence and crisis response; and lower readiness forces for collective defence and rotation, longer term build-up and augmentation. NATO defence planning covers the following principal planning disciplines: Logistics Planning CIS Planning Nuclear Planning Civil Emergency Planning Resources Planning Armament Planning Force Planning This paper details the process followed by NATO in conducting force planning, in particular it details the Defence Requirements Review and the methodology developed. Defence Requirements Review The Defence Requirements Review (DRR) is one step in the Force planning process:

122 (Intranet)

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List of Annexes

The DRR is developed directly from the mission statement(s) and details the required capability necessary to fulfil the stated mission. Once the DRR process is complete, the requirements are proposed to the member nations and force goals negotiated. Each of the member Nations responds with its national contribution and a comparison is made with the requirements, followed by a risk assessment if the national contributions do not match the requirements. The DRR itself follows a number of steps, from top level strategic command missions through security assessment reviews, to the analysis of the requirements and estimation of the future force requirements. The process is shown in the following figure:

The remainder of this paper focuses on the method used for determining the force requirements for each planning situation.

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List of Annexes Mission Task Analysis Methodology This methodology was originally developed by the Operations Research Division of the NATO C3 Agency and involves an analytical method that identifies the joint mission tasks and associated force allocation rules. The task decomposition approach attempts to identify all required and implied tasks for an operation. The current structure is a hierarchy with components as follows: Mandate Mission Essential Components Operational Objectives Operational Objective Specifications Key Tasks Joint Activity Trees Force Allocation Rules

Where each level in the hierarchy has a specific definition: 1) Mandate The political purpose for the use of military force. The political/military mission. 2) Mission Essential Components (MEC) MECs are high level essential military tasks and includes all mandated and implied tasks. Failure of a MEC implies likely failure of the mission. The MEC are the highest level complete set of required tasks. Both the Mandate and MECs are high level (i.e. strategic), global (i.e. not time dependent) statements which are not dependent on a chosen course of action. To decompose the mission into the lower elements a course of action needs to be chosen. The course of action details how the MEC are to be achieved in time. 3) Operational Objectives (OO) Operational Objectives are the temporal decomposition of the Mission Essential Components into higher level operational level tasks. Changes in the set of Operational Objectives will define Phases for the mission. 4) Operational Objective Specifications (OOS) Specifications are an amplification of an Operational Objective within a phase. 5) Key Tasks (KT) Key Tasks are related to the physical means by which the force can successfully accomplish the Operational Objective (or OOS). Key tasks represent the lowest level of non-service specific, required tasks. Each key task represents a separate low-level problem which can be analysed and forces (both numbers and types) associated with. The final two levels of the decomposition contain the analysis and assumptions for each of the key tasks:

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List of Annexes 6) Joint Activity Trees (JAT) - A JAT is a description of the low-level tasks or activities. Each JAT represents joint tactical solutions to the problems posed by key tasks. 7) Force Allocation Rules - The force allocation rules detail the logic behind associating forces to JAT task requirements, including assumptions and timings. By comparing timings of certain JATs within the mission it is easy to see where forces assigned to complete one particular activity can be re-used for sequential tasks. Mission Task Analysis Examples you call it Mission Task Analysis methodology in the previous section, please decide which the best description is The above methodology has been successfully applied across a wide range of situations (including both Peace Support Operations and Mutual Defence). To illustrate the methodology two examples are given here: Peace Enforcement and Collective Defence (Article V). It should be noted that the two examples are not complete task decompositions. Example 1: Peace Enforcement to Restore Order Mandate The force is to provide sufficient security within the region to allow political and diplomatic activity to occur which could lead to the establishment of a recognised civil authority. Mission Essential Components In support of the above mandate: i) Provide a secure environment by establishing the military dominance of the Peace Force. ii) Assure continued and uninterrupted provision of essential services and the protection of strategic national assets. iii) Assist in the protection of civilian agencies in restoring the economic infrastructure and the provision of aid. iv) Deter, and if necessary prevent, adverse external intervention. v) Ensure continued political support for the mission. vi) Conduct operations in accordance with the principles of PSO. vii) Provide Standard Military Requirements. Operational Objectives in support of MEC (iv) Conduct enabling operations for own force Operational Objective Specifications in support of the above OO Ensure Safe and timely arrival of forces Key Tasks In support of the above OOS: i) Transport forces to theatre

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List of Annexes ii) Gain control of theatre reception/transit centres iii) Extend reception/transit centre capacities iv) Operate theatre reception/transit centres v) Ensure security of reception/transit centres Joint Activity Trees In support of the second key task:

Force Allocation Rules Contains rules and assumptions for the above JAT:

Example 2: Collective Defence Article V Mandate Establish sufficient military forces, within the theatre of operations, to prevent sustained violation of NATO territorial integrity. Prevention should take the form of deterrence, defence and, if necessary, restoration operations. Mission Essential Components In support of the above mandate: i) Prevent Violation of NATO territorial integrity.
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List of Annexes ii) Maintain Alliance Solidarity & Cohesion. iii) Standard Military Requirements. Operational Objectives In support of MEC (i) i) Conduct Deterrence Operations ii) Conduct Defensive Operations iii) Conduct Restoration Operations Operational Objective Specifications In support of OO (i) i) Show of Force ii) Defend Vital Locations iii) Enforce Sanctions iv) Provide a Defensive Deterrence Key Tasks In support of OOS (iv) i) Provide a deterrent force for threats ii) Deter Interference from third parties Conclusion The methodology detailed above provides a consistent approach for the decomposition of complex military missions. The methodology has demonstrated its suitability across the range of military missions and has been successfully applied to: Peace Enforcement, Conflict Prevention, Extraction, Peace Keeping and Article 5. As well as providing the basis for determining force requirements the methodology also provides self-documentation of the planning situations and a scenario framework for supporting other work.

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List of Annexes

Annex E MMR procedure used during NATO DRR 05 123

Given that the overall shortfall does not always provide a full explanation with respect to shortfalls or areas of concern, a more detailed breakdown of the MMR for such cases is given in the format shown in Figure 11.


The 2007 Bi-SC defence requirements review (DRR 07) final report. (NATO CONFIDENTIAL) page 45

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Annex F DRR MMR analysis of aerospace capabilities124

Shortfall Areas and Areas of Concern Shortfall Areas and Areas of Concern Aerospace Support Air Aerospace Support Air
Fulfilled Requirement New Capabilities Existing/Planned Capabilities Non-Apportioned Shortfalls

Number of Platforms

Capability only provided by one nation

Some AEW shortfalls could be mitigated by employment of ground-based early warning sensors








Long standing Support air shortfalls have been aggravated by the new LOA Significant non-apportioned shortfalls remain in some critical enabling capabilities

Figures are removed from the graphs due to their confidentiality.


2007 Bi-SC defence requirements review (DRR 07) final report (NATO CONFIDENTIAL) page 47

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Annex G - Current NATOs LTCR list125 1. Active Ballistic Missile Defence 2. Area Access Control 3. Assured Precision Strike* 4. Battlefield Medical Attention 5. Battle Management System 6. Beyond Line of Sight (BLOS) Communications Capability 7. Communications Services for Networking and Information Infrastructure 8. Counter Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) 9. Counter Improvised Explosive Device (C-IED) 10. Counter Low Signature Airborne Targets 11. Counter Naval Mines 12. Counter Rocket, Artillery and Mortar 13. Counter Threat to Low Altitude Air Vehicles 14. Counter Underwater Threats 15. Cyber Warfare Capability 16. Deployment and Mobility of Forces 17. Distributed Training and Exercise 18. Electro-magnetic (EM) Spectrum Denial 19. Enhanced Human Performance 20. Improved Modelling and Simulation 21. Increased Self-Sustainment 22. Information and Integration Services 23. Information Assurance Services 24. Integrated Personal Protection 25. Intelligence Surveillance & Reconnaissance (ISR) Collection Capability 26. Intelligence Surveillance & Reconnaissance (ISR) Processing, Fusion & Exploitation 27. Land Engagement Capability 28. Language Translation 29. Network Enabled Capability 30. Non-Lethal Capability 31. Planning and Decision Support 32. Service Management and Control Services 33. Soldier Situational Awareness 34. Space Capability Preservation 35. Support Chain Management 36. Support to Insertion, Extraction and Re-supply of Special Operations 37. Systems Analysis and Knowledge Development 38. Vehicle Mobility and Survivability * Bold Implies combat capability contribution form Air Component. ** Underlined implies areas where compliance is crucial if investing in the Bold capabilities.


Source :SACTs 2008 Long Term Capability Study, Annex A-2

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Annex H Comparison DRR ->LTCS126

The DRR process has to deal with constraints due to agreed strategic concepts, LOA and intelligence while LTCS has no time constraints since it forecast future strategic environment and available technologies than can be used in conceptual developments


/_WFS/20MarinelliClosing.ppt, visited Oct 08

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List of Annexes

Annex I NATOs future force generation process127

UORs CJSORs TCSORs OTHER Identified Requirements

Min CAP Requirements identified

Requirements analytical tool


Lessons learned

Planning Assumptions Guiding Principles Planning Situations Mission Types




NATO list of shortfalls


Briefing of Dep REP of Belgium to the NATO MC, to 122 Div AStC May 2009

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Annex J Capability Development Plan (CDP)128 Headline Goal 2010 Following the adoption of the European Security Strategy in December 2003, the EU decided to set a new Headline Goal 20102. Based on the Headline Goal 2003, it envisages that the Member States will "be able by 2010 to respond with rapid and decisive action applying a fully coherent approach to the whole spectrum of crisis management operations covered by the Treaty on European Union". The process of developing EU military capabilities towards the Headline Goal of 2010 is a thorough one. The first step was to identify strategic planning assumptions. Five illustrative scenarios, encompassing a wide range of military operations, were prepared: Separation of parties by force Stabilisation, reconstruction and military advice to third countries Conflict prevention Evacuation operation Assistance to humanitarian operations. Requirements Catalogue From these scenarios, focused military options were developed for how best to deal with the relevant crises. These options led to a planning framework from which was derived a detailed list of the capabilities that the EU would need. Generic force packages were compiled, which identified the type of force groupings that the EU would require to solve the crises. These in turn resulted in a list of reference units. All this information was fed into a Requirements Catalogue, which detailed the actual types of units, resources and assets that were required in order to deal with the scenarios envisaged. Force Catalogue It was now the task of the EU to ask Member States to what extent they could offer assets and resources to meet the total force requirement. A Headline Goal questionnaire was accordingly distributed to the Member States. In addition, a scrutinising methodology was developed and the scrutinising handbook produced, which enabled Member States to conduct self-assessments of their contributions. A

clarification dialogue was held in order to obtain a clearer picture of the

capabilities being offered and the assessments of them. This process resulted in the compilation of the EU Force Catalogue, which describes, in qualitative and quantitative

128, Development of European Military Capabilities update Sept 2008

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List of Annexes terms, the military capabilities which the Member States could make available to the EU. The Force Catalogue details military capabilities available by 2010. It underwent a first revision in February 2007 to incorporate the contributions of the two new Member States, Bulgaria and Romania. New voluntary contributions made by ten Member States in the light of the initial analysis of contributions led to a second revision of the Force Catalogue in October 2007. Additional contributions from non-EU European NATO members and from other candidate countries have been collected in a supplement to the Force Catalogue. Those contributions do not count towards the identification of capability shortfalls; they are, however, taken into account in the subsequent work on managing those shortfalls. Progress Catalogue The Force Catalogue provided the basis for identifying the EU's shortfalls and the potential operational risks arising from them. This analysis resulted in the Progress Catalogue, approved by the Council in November 2007, which sets out recommendations to the Member States on managing shortfalls. The Progress Catalogue, together with the EUMC's subsequent work on prioritising the shortfalls, is a key contribution to the Capability Development Plan drawn up by the Member States via the EDA and the EUMC.

EDA role within EU Military Capability Development Process



HLG2010 RC05

ESDP political guidance HLG process


FC06 & 07 PC07

MS EDA PG Member States



Individual Member States


European Defence Agency 2009

CAPABILITY DEVELOPMENT PLAN A method and a roadmap for the Capability Development Plan (CDP) were endorsed at the EDA Steering Board meeting on 28 June 2007.

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List of Annexes The aim of the CDP, worked out in close cooperation between the EDA, the EUMC and the Member States, is to provide the latter with information which could facilitate their decision-making in the context of national capability choices, stimulate their cooperation and facilitate the launching of new joint programmes which overcome present and future EU shortfalls. It aims at providing guidelines for future work in the fields of research and technology, armament and industry and will form the cornerstone of the EDA's activities. However, it will not under any circumstances be a supranational plan: it is created by and for the Member States. When the CDP was worked out, the following were taken into consideration: the consequences of Headline Goal 2010, based in particular on the conclusions of the 2007 Progress Catalogue and other information that is useful for decisionmaking concerning the management of shortfalls, such as the capability analysed in the framework of Civilian Headline Goal 2008, proceedings conducted in the context of other pillars of the European Union or additional capability or assets that could be made available to the EU in an operation calling upon common NATO capabilities and assets; an estimate of the capability required in 2025, on the basis of research into foreseeable developments of the global strategic contact, available technology and potential threats; current plans and programmes announced by the Member States; lessons learned from operations with regard to capabilities.

This plan is moreover one of the components of a longer-term objective: ensuring convergence of Member States' capability scenarios. An initial version of the CDP was submitted in July 2008 to the EDA Steering Board, which brought together the Member States' Capabilities Directors. The Board approved the general conclusions and initiated work on a initial group of twelve capability areas out of the twenty-four identified in the CDP: The initial tranche of 12 selected actions: Measures to counter man-portable air defence systems Computer network operations Mine counter-measures in littoral sea areas Comprehensive approach - military implications Military human intelligence and cultural/language training Intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance architecture Medical support Chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear defence Third party logistic support
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List of Annexes Measures to counter improvised explosive devices Increased availability of helicopters Network-enabled capability (NEC)

In cooperation with the Member States, the EUMC, the European Union Military Staff (EUMS) and the Council General Secretariat, the EDA initiated the next stages, consisting in particular of defining the players involved in each area and the body which will ensure coordination, drawing up a timetable of work and estimating the costs involved. Emphasis was laid on the need to ensure the best possible coordination with similar work carried out by NATO. Other actions resulting from the CDP could be initiated at a later stage. In cooperation with the EUMS, the EDA will also draw up a programme of bilateral or multilateral meetings with Member States to make the CDP known outside the circle of Defence Ministries, by presenting it to other national bodies such as national armament or research and technology agencies. Cooperation between the EUMC and the EDA will also take place within integrated development and EDA project teams intended to support Member States in their efforts to make good the shortfalls identified.

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List of Annexes

Annex K D&S Planning Horizons in the EU and NATO129

Planning Horizon Long Term Long Term Vision Capability Development Mechanism and Plan 130 Crisis Management procedures Long Term Capability Requirements Defence Planning Process 131

Medium Term Short Term 132

Operational Planning Force Planning C Planning Logistics Planning Armaments Planning Resource Planning Nuclear Planning Civil Emergency Planning Prague Capability Commitment

Continuous 133

Progress Catalogue European Capability Action Plan


Helsinki Headline Goals

Courtesy of Kol Patrick Wouters, Dep REP from Belgium to NATO MC. Not cyclical , evaluated through periodic reports or reviews of the Progress Catalogue, such as the Single Process report at the end of each Presidency, 131 Cyclical, in principle a 4 year cycle, of which sub-activities can be bi-annual. 132 In principle only for the next operation or crisis. 133 Sub-activities that prepare Medium Term Planning events
129 130

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Annex L - Space base weaponry134 LOS ALAMOS, New Mexico -- There is a new breed of weaponry fast approachingand at the speed of light no less. They are labeled "directedenergy weapons" and may well signal a revolution in military hardwareperhaps more so than the atomic bomb. Directed-energy weapons take the form of lasers, high-powered microwaves, and particle beams. Their adoption for ground, air, sea, and space warfare depends not only on using the electromagnetic spectrum, but also upon favourable political and budgetary wavelengths too. Thats the outlook of J. Douglas Beason, author of the recently published book: The E-Bomb: How Americas New Directed Energy Weapons Will Change the Way Wars Will Be Fought in the Future (Da Capo Press, October 2005).Beason previously served on the White House staff working for the Presidents Science Advisor (Office of Science and Technology Policy) under both the Bush and Clinton Administrations. After more than two decades of research, the United States is on the verge of deploying a new generation of weapons that discharge beams of energy, such as the Airborne Laser, the Active Denial System, as well as the Tactical High Energy Laser (THEL). "History has shown that, without investment in high-technology, fighting the next war will be done using the last war type of technique," Beason told Putting money into basic and long-range research is critical, Beason said, adding: "You cant always schedule breakthroughs." A leading expert in directed-energy research for some 26 years, Beason is also Director of Threat Reduction here at the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) noting that his views are his own and do not represent LANL, the Department of the Defence, nor the Department of Energy. Ripe for transformation? Though considerable work has been done in lasers, high-power microwaves, and other directed-energy technologies, weaponization is still an ongoing process. For example, work is on-going in the militarys Airborne Laser program. It utilizes a megawatt-class, high-energy chemical oxygen iodine laser toted skyward aboard a modified Boeing 747-400 aircraft. Purpose of the program is to enable the detection, tracking and destruction of ballistic missiles in the boost phase, or powered part of their flight. Similarly, testing of the U.S. Armys Tactical High Energy Laser (THEL) in White Sands, New Mexico has shown the ability of heating high-flying rocket warheads, blasting them with enough energy that causes them to self-detonate. THEL uses a high-


As explained in the research paper of Maj Frederic GIVRON The future of air/space power - 2007

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List of Annexes energy, deuterium fluoride chemical laser. A mobile THEL also demonstrated the ability to kill multiple mortar rounds. Then theres Active Denial Technologya non-lethal way to use millimeter-wave electromagnetic energy to stop, deter, and turn back an advancing adversary. This technology, supported by the U.S. Marines, uses a beam of millimeter waves to heat a foes skin, causing severe pain without damage, and making the adversary flee the scene. Beason also pointed to new exciting research areas underway at the Los Alamos National Laboratory: Free-electron laser work with the Navy and a new type of directedenergy that operates in the terahertz region. Niche for new technology While progress in directed-energy is appreciable, Beason sees two upfront problems in moving the technology forward. First of all, "convincing the warfighter that theres a niche for this new type of weapon," and secondly making sure these new systems are not viewed as a panacea to solve all problems. "They are only another tool," he added. Looming even larger is the role of those that acquire new weapons. "The U.S. could put ourselves in a very disastrous position if we allow our acquisition officials to be nontechnically competent," Beason explained. Over the decades, Beason said that the field of directed-energy has had its share of "snakeoil salesmen", as well as those advocates that over-promised. "It wasnt ready for prime time." At present, directed-energy systems "are barely limping along with enough money just to prove that they can work," Beason pointed out. Meanwhile, huge slugs of money are being put into legacy-type systems to keep them going. "Its a matter of priority," Beason said. The time is now to identify high-payoff, directed-energy projects for the smallest amounts of money, he said. Unknown unknowns In Beasons view, Active Denial Technology, the Airborne Laser program, the THEL, as well as supporting technologies, such as relay mirrorsare all works in progress that give reason for added support and priority funding. "I truly believe that as the airborne laser goes, so goes the rest of the nations directedenergy programs. Right now, its working on the margin. I believe that there are still unknown unknowns out there that are going to occur in science and technology. We think we have the physics defined. We think we have the engineering defined. But something always goes wrongand were working too close at the margin," Beason said. Step-wise, demonstration programs that spotlight directed-energy weapon systems are needed, Beason noted. Such in-the-field displays could show off greater beam distanceto-target runs, mobility of hardware, ease-of-operation, battlefield utility, and other
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List of Annexes attributes. Directed-energy technologies can offer a range of applications, from botching up an enemys electronics to performing "dial up" surgical, destructive strikes at the speed of light with little or no collateral damage. Beason said that one blue sky idea of his own he tagged "the voice from heaven". By tuning the resonance of a laser onto the Earths ionosphere, you can create audible frequencies. Like some boom box in the sky, the laser-produced voice could bellow from above down to the target below: "Put down your weapons." Relay mirrors Regarding use of directed-energy space weapons, Beason advised that "well eventually see it." However, present-day systems are far too messy. Most high-powered chemical lasers -- in the megawatt-class -- require onboard fuels and oxidizers to crank out the amount of energy useful for strategic applications. Stability of such a laser system rooted in space is also wanting. On the other hand, look to advances in more efficient lasersespecially solid state laser systemsBeason advised. "What breakthroughs are neededIm not sure. But, eventually, I think its going to happen, but it is going to be a generation after the battlefield lasers." Yet, having the directed-energy source "in space" contrasted to shooting beams "through space" is another matter, Beason quickly added. Space-based relay mirrorseven highaltitude airships equipped with relay mirrorscan direct ground-based or air-based laser beams nearly around the world, he said. "So youre using spaceexploiting it. But you are going through space to attack anywhere on Earth," Beason said. History lesson Late last year, speaking before the Heritage Foundation in Washington, D.C., Beason told his audience that laser energy, the power sources, beam control, as well as knowledge about how laser beams interact with Earths atmosphere are quite mature. The technology is ready to shift into front line warfare status. "The good news is that directed-energy exists. Directed-energy is being tested and within a few years directed-energy is going to be deployed upon the battlefield," Beason reported. "But the bad news is that acquisition policies right now in this nation are one more gear toward evolutionary practices rather than revolutionary practices." "Visionaries win warsand not bureaucrats. Weve seen this through history," Beason observed

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Annex M - Analysis of future platforms. Today aircraft are catalogued according the generation they belong to. With the introduction of the F-22 and F-35 the fifth generation was born. In Europe, the Rafale (Dassault Industries, France), the Grippen (SAAB-BAE, Sweden) and the Eurofighter Typhoon (EADS, Germany / Italy / Spain / UK) were conceived in the same era. While todays F-16 belongs to the fourth generation, you could put the new European products in between the fourth and fifth generation since they lack the innovation and technology leap of the US platforms. It is generally accepted these machines are of a vision of the F-16 MLU generation with new technologies and possibilities applied in its conception. The main reason can be found in the fact there is less funding available and design requirements were oriented towards air defence, but surely the converging requirements and vision between the nations make for a lack of synergy, resulting in waste of effort and energy during the development process. Without a doubt, the F-22 can be considered the nec plus ultra in the combat aircraft world. This fighter, initially conceived in the scope of the cold war, possesses unseen and unmatched capabilities by any other platform existing today. The resulting price, 339 million USD, has increased from the initial 86 million USD estimate, mainly due to its reduction in numbers, from 339 to 183135. The other current fighter prices vary in function of different parameters between 50 to 80 million Euro. For the F-22 it is not only the price that will limit sales across the globe but certainly the reluctance of the US to sell this technology abroad. On the other hand his conceptual basis, in view of its extreme capabilities in the symmetric arena, make this aircraft not cost effective to be used in asymmetric conflicts. The other aircraft on the market however will do fine in the whole range of possible conflicts. Although it must be noted both Eurofighter and Rafale currently still struggle to enter the Air to Ground arena. As said, both also having been conceived as air defence fighters, need to be retrofitted to be able to carry targeting pods and laser guided or GPS guided weapons. For sure in the near future these machines will perform fine across the spectrum. Platform costs, mainly influenced by orders from other countries put the F-35 far ahead of the competition. Currently Lockheed Martin has around 3000 aircraft on order and their market prediction ranges to 4000136. The Typhoon has been ordered in much smaller orders (#18 for Austria, #72 for Saudi Arabia), Grippen was sold to Czech

F-22 Raptor Costs ,, visited 2 Feb 2009 Interview with Mr. Michael Ogg, Regional Customer Relationships Manager, Lockheed Martin Global Inc., Brussels Headquarters, Belgium, 30 Jan 2009
135 136

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List of Annexes Republic and South Africa and Dassault has not been able to close any deals yet although Libya has some aspirations. This is one of the major aspects to keep in mind when purchasing an aircraft. The LCC will be heavily influenced by the number of countries that operate these machines, not only for initial acquisition price but especially during the evolution of the aircraft. All design changes and R&D money spend will be shared by the common base customers. For this reason, Norway recently decided to opt for the F-35 to the detriment of Grippen. The EPAF cooperation, a part of the larger MNFP contract with the USAF was the strategic vector allowing small countries to keep up with the evolution of technology. Today the EPAF MLU M5 aircraft is of the same standard as the USAF Block 50/52 Common Configuration Improvement Program (CCIP) F-16s and therefore a leader in offering capabilities on todays battlefields.

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Annex N US fighter modernization plans: near-term choices 137

Ref page 12

Ref page 47

137 Centre for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments - US fighter modernization plans: near-term choices by Steve

Kosiak and Barry Watts 2007, 66 pages

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Annex O Combat fighter lead-time for acquisition138

Investment Planning

Mx Commonality and Interoperability Consolidation Programs

Future fighter aircraft roadmap F-16 users





Next Gen Ftr

F16 remaining Period of Performance

A lot of F16 users have a requirement for M-series evolution beyond M6

Sustainability, Interoperability Improvement of capabilities introduced with MLU -> M6

Working group at MNFP level to discuss

Scope and cooperation M7 and follow-on

138 Briefing MR Sys A/C

F-16 Weapon System Evolution, to 123 AStC Jan 09

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Annex P UAV Cost139 Unit Cost140

RQ-5 Hunter

MQ-1 Predator

MQ-9 Reaper

RQ-4 Hawk


(ter illustratie) Aircraft Cost (no sensor) System Cost (4 a/c + sensors) 26.5 mio $ 47 mio $ 57 mio $ 1.2 mio $ 141 2.4 mio $ 6 mio $ 20 mio $

Foreign Military Sales dossiers to acquire RQ-9 Reaper

WASHINGTON, January 3, 2008 On December 19, the Defence Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to the United Kingdom of MQ-9 Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Aircraft as well as associated equipment and services. The total value, if all options are exercised, could be as high as $1.071 billion.

The Government of the United Kingdom has requested a possible sale of 10 MQ-9 Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) aircraft, 5 Ground Control Stations, 9 Multi-Spectral Targeting Systems (MTS-B), 9 AN/APY-8 Lynx Synthetic Aperture Radar/Ground Moving Target Indicator (SAR/GMTI) systems, 3 Satellite Earth Terminal Sub Stations (SETSS), 30 H764 Embedded Global Positioning System Inertial Navigation Systems, Lynx SAR and MTS-B spares, engineering support, test equipment, ground support, operational flight test support, communications equipment, technical assistance, personnel training/equipment, spare and repair parts, and other related elements of logistics support. The estimated cost is $1.071 billion142. WASHINGTON, August 1, 2008 The Defence Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Germany of five MQ-9 Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Aircraft as well as associated equipment and services. The total value, if all

Reference, reflection paper Maj Luc COLIN Defence against Terrorism (DAT) - Jan 2009 DOT/FAA/AM-04/24, Dec 2004 141 Dit komt overeen met de kostprijs van het Belgische B-Hunter systeem van 2.5 mio voor n airframe met sensor (60% van de kostprijs komt voor rekening van de sensor) 142 DSCA (Defence Security Cooperation Agency) Transmittal 08-27
139 140

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List of Annexes options are exercised, could be as high as $205 million.

The Government of Germany has requested a possible sale of 5 MQ-9 Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV), 4 Mobile Ground Control Stations, one year of maintenance support, engineering support, test equipment, ground support, operational flight test support, communications equipment, technical assistance, personnel training/equipment, spare and repair parts, and other related elements of logistics support. The estimated cost is $205 million143. WASHINGTON, August 1, 2008 The Defence Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Italy of four MQ-9 Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Aircraft as well as associated equipment and services. The total value, if all options are exercised, could be as high as $330 million.

The Government of Italy has requested a possible sale of 4 MQ-9 Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV), 3 Mobile Ground Control Stations, five years of maintenance support, engineering support, test equipment, ground support, operational flight test support, communications equipment, technical assistance, personnel training/equipment, spare and repair parts, and other related elements of logistics support. The estimated cost is $330 million144.

143 144

DSCA Transmittal 08-59 DSCA Transmittal 08-60

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Annex Q U(C)AV evolution and considerations The evolution It is clear that with technological evolution we will see these machines mature and become more capable. The RSTA systems will clearly evolve into an autonomous role since this type of missions can be easily programmed. Their profile parameters are known well in advance. UAS / UAV will need to be supplemented by a mission control center to take care of tracking, identification, targeting and when needed weapon consent and damage assessment. Especially for Time Sensitive Targeting (TST) operations these centres will need to be in permanent contact with the rest of the C2 chain via secure, high bandwidth networks. When UCAVs can dominate manned fighter aircraft in all realms of mission execution they will no longer be merely an alternative but an imperative. It is unlikely this shift of dominance will occur by the year 2025. Until fully autonomous machines can reason like humans and make moral judgments, and until data transfer latency rates approach zero, there will be a role for humans in the cockpit145. It is clear however that replacing manned aircraft throughout the complete range of combat missions will only be possible for those, where human ingenuity and insight are not required.146 + 147 Zero casualties Removing the pilot from the vehicle provides for the ultimate stand-off. Loss of life is no longer an issue and the CSAR capability, required to recover downed aircrew, could ultimately be discarded. The evolution is however, stand-off weapons are put on the manned platforms (like JSOW) or improvements are made to increase the accuracy of existing platforms (like TOMAKAWK). The research and development efforts, for the U(C)AV capability expansion, therefore concentrate more on those mission that create enormous risks for the aircrew like SEAD, DEAD or the penetration into heavily defended areas to attack fixed targets. These are typically mission labelled as first strike. The ethics For UCAVs the ethics involved will become a difficult hurtle to take. Who will be responsible when a weapon misses its target and inflicts collateral damage? Is it the country that provided the satellite/data link capability? Is it the country that provided the UCAV? Or is it the country whose operator provided weapon consent. In a manned
145 UCAV 146

The next generation air-superiority fighter? By Maj William K. LEWIS, June 2002 Reflection paper by. Lt Col R VERRIJT, 123 Div AStC Assessment and decision making capability in the cockpit of the future 147 Fallacies about air power by Dr. Colin S. Gray Winter 2008,.page 79

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List of Annexes fighter this remains clear. Introduction of UCAVs might reduce the national and sovereign authority to such a level that it becomes politically no longer acceptable. A small country, like Belgium, in a multinational context, will see its autonomy in handling very limited. Political control and responsibility will be sharply reduced. These types of operations do not add to the risk-sharing factor, therefore reducing this kind of contributions to a pure financial one. Undoubtedly, U(C)AVs will certainly have their place on the future battlefield. Especially, in the interest of saving human life. If one day technology would allow for completely autonomous machines to fight our wars, ethical restrictions will seriously hamper their use. Technology transfer Next to the question whether a UCAV is a good option from a Belgian politico-military point of view there is the problem of technology transfer. Especially for US developed and operated systems, stealth technology can be implemented in UCAV without any restrictions, since no foreign pilot or maintainer will have access. Any possible form of artificial intelligence or directed energy weapon on board will no doubt be subject to stringent export regulations. Even today, F-35 development is hampered due to releasibility issues, sometimes to the point that they spark the debate in the home country to opt out of the program. A second problem with these machines is that the user will need to get access to the overarching operational infrastructure that commands these machines. This

infrastructure is build to prevent anyone from getting remote control. The anti tampering hardware and the firewalls protecting the software will be considered as sensitive no foreign. NSA will never allow giving allies access to this type of technology. Even today F-16 nations while having acquired JDAM capability, are not allowed access to the Red Keys of the GPS satellite system148. All this will make an off the shelf purchase of these machines highly unlikely for Belgium. ROEs and International Laws of Armed Conflict The inevitable introduction of UCAVs in theatres around the world will have its impact on current International Law of Armed Conflict and spark a debate after the first engagement fails or mistakes have happened. The threshold to use these machines will become much lower since their capabilities and flexibility will overshadow todays cruise


For the F-16-MLU M3 software upgrade that would introduce all weather (JDAM) strike capability, EPAF nations had

to develop the On Wing Acquisition process based on regular GPS keys.

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List of Annexes missiles. The outcome of this debate will even become more unpredictable once directed energy weapon are mature enough to be installed on these machines. More fundamental is the universal right to defend oneself. During operation Provide Comfort (Northern/Southern watch) in Iraq, the air defence systems of Sadam were attacked since they were a direct threat to the pilots patrolling. Even though the missions, to shut down Iraqi air defence systems, were not covered or blessed by any mandate, nobody challenged their legality. Price It is a common misunderstanding that a U(C)AV would be much cheaper than a manned aircraft, possibly by a factor of 50%. The order of magnitude for an X47-B would be around 30 to 50 Mio$, while an F-35 ranges anywhere from 50 to 100 Mio$. The comparison is not correct however, since on one hand we talk about a specialized weapon system fitted to a typical task (like SEAD, DEAD or stand-off jamming) while the manned multi-role fighter generation is flexible enough to handle the full range of missions. Once UCAV will be to that technological level, their price will not be far of that of a manned aircraft. It is especially in the training environment that these unmanned aircraft will be cheaper. The operator can fulfil its training requirement in a virtual environment although many of those that still interact with the unmanned vehicle like C2 chain and Forward Air Controllers (FAC) or JTACs will still require physical presence of the vehicle.

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Annex R NATO C4ISR roadmap149

Ground environment evolution

Air environment evolution

149 JAPCC roadmap for Air C4ISR in NATO - Version 1.0 dated Nov 2007, Annex C

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Annex S Non-lethal weapons 150 NATO Research and Technology Organization (RTO) distinguishes following non-lethal weapons: Electromagnetic Directed energy Electromuscular Incapacitation Optical disruption Electromagnetic pulses Advanced Materials Anti-traction materials Encapsulating foams Riot control agents Obscurants Thermobarics Combustion modifiers/inhibitors Mechanical/kinetic Weapons/munitions Barriers Entanglements Acoustic Focused and omni-directional devices and weapons applying sound at

audible and ultrasonic frequencies Ancillary Payload delivery systems


"NATO and the challenge of non-lethal weapons", C M. Coops; NATO Def Col Research Paper 39, September 2008

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Annex T - Strategic orientation of the Belgian defence151

Strategische orintaties van Defensie 1. 2. De voornaamste doelstelling van het Belgische Veiligheids- en Defensiebeleid is bijdragen tot vrede en veiligheid in de wereld. De VIJF pijlers van dat beleid zijn : - versteviging van de Europese identiteit inzake veiligheid - behoud van de trans-Atlantische band - versterking van de rol van de Verenigde Naties - steun aan de Organisatie voor Veiligheid en Samenwerking in Europa - samenwerking met de landen van Europa en Afrika

3. De opdrachten152 en taken153 van Defensie die door de Regering gedefinieerd werden, situeren zich rond drie grote themas154 : Internationale verplichtingen - collectieve verdediging (Art V WEU, Art 5 NAVO) Verdedigen van democratische en universele waarden - defensiediplomatie - crisis response (crisispreventie, vredesondersteunende en opleggende operaties buiten collectieve verdediging) - humanitaire hulp (disaster relief, refugee aid, humanitarian relief) Ten dienste van de burger zijn - evacuatie van onderdanen - militaire steun aan de Natie (bij natuur of menselijke rampen) deelnemen aan de strijd tegen het terrorisme, de verspreiding van massavernietigingswapens of wapens met massa-effect en de georganiseerd misdaad - bescherming van de maritieme toegangen

ACOT-SDP-ICOMDOC-CCSC-001_Ed2_-_SD2 (for official staffing - intranet) 1 Jan 2009, page 18 Para 5.a.(1) Opdrachten zijn de core business van de Krijgsmacht; Defensie investeert hiervoor in capaciteiten die getraind personeel, gepast materieel en een geschikte infrastructuur omvatten. 153 De middelen die Defensie in stand houdt met het oog op de uitvoering van haar opdrachten, kunnen ten dienste worden gesteld van de nationale of internationale gemeenschap, voor taken die a priori NIET behoren tot de bevoegdheden van Defensie, maar die zij in sommige extreme gevallen, NIET op permanente basis en in functie van de beschikbaarheid van deze middelen in de bijzondere toestand van het ogenblik, kan vervullen. 154 Zie Politieke Orintatienota van juni 2008.
151 152

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Annex U - Operational capacities and sub-capacities155

Systematiek van operationele capaciteiten en sub-capaciteiten

Op het operationele niveau :

een sub-capaciteit commando een sub-capaciteit inlichtingen

Op het tactisch niveau : een projecteerbare tactische landcapaciteit een projecteerbare tactische luchtcapaciteit

een maritieme mijnenbestrijdingscapaciteit een maritieme escortecapaciteit

een subcapaciteit strategisch / tactisch luchttransport

een strategische zeetransportcapaciteit

Tekst in Italic identifies the proposed changes in this draft compared to the official version of 2004


ACOT-SDP-ICOMDOC-CCSC-001_Ed2_-_SD2 (for official staffing - intranet) 1 Jan 2009, page 19 Para 5.a.(2)

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Annex V Possible engagement scenarios156

Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4 Scenario 5 Scenario 6 Scenario 7 Scenario 8

Homeland safety operation International safety operation Security operation

Evacuatie van landgenoten uit crisisgebieden Defensiediplomatie

Vredesbewarende operaties Vredesopleggende operaties en Counter-insurgency campaign Collectieve verdediging

Tekst in Italic identifies the proposed changes in this draft compared to the official version of 2004


ACOT-SDP-ICOMDOC-CCSC-001_Ed2_-_SD2 (for official staffing - intranet) 1 Jan 2009, page 22 Para 5.b.(2)

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Annex W Level Of Ambition of the Belgian Air Component 1. (Sub)Cap paraatgesteld door Air Component157 a. De Air component stelt volgende capaciteiten paraat :
(1) De luchtgevechtscapaciteit gebaseerd op het multirole jachtvliegtuig F-16 dat verder wordt gemoderniseerd, maar waarvan de vloot teruggebracht werd tot 60 toestellen in 2008.,De luchttransportcapaciteit die blijft bestaan uit elf tactische C-130 transportvliegtuigen, die vanaf 2018 geleidelijk vervangen zullen worden door zeven A400M toestellen (die in totaal een vergelijkbare transportcapaciteit bieden). Daarnaast wordt deze capaciteit vervolledigd door toestellen van diverse commercile types158 voor hoofdzakelijk vervoer van passagiers, die zullen vervangen worden op het einde van hun levensduur, (2) 26 A109-BA Multirole Helicopters of MRH-capaciteit, (3) 3 Alouette III helicopters in Maritime Support voor steunverlening aan de Marine fregatten De Multirole Helikopter sub-capaciteit met verschillende specifieke versies van de helikopter van het A109, (4) Een Search and Rescue capaciteit met 4 Sea King helicopters Vanaf 2012 zal de Joint Support Helicopter (JSH) capaciteit worden ingevoerd159 met ACHT helikopters van het type NH-90 waarvan VIER in de versie NFH en VIER in de versie TTH. De JSH (NFH) zal zowel de SAR als de steunopdracht voor de Marine overnemen, (5) Een UAV-capaciteit voor real-time aerial surveillance, reconnaissance and observation met UAV van het type B-Hunter;

b. Naast deze (sub-)capaciteiten stelt Luchtcomponent nog de volgende modules paraat voor
bewaking van het luchtruim (CRC), Air Traffic Control (ATC), Crash and Fire Rescue, Wing Operations, EOD, Active Close Ground Defence, Luchthavenuitbating, bewaking van installaties, Meteo.

2. Level of Ambition van de luchtgevechtscapaciteit160

a. De luchtgevechtscapaciteit (1) De Air Combat Capaciteit wordt gerealiseerd door 60 multirole F-16 gevechtsvliegtuigen, waarvan 34 ontplooibaar. (2) Behalve een vermogen tot paraatstelling, de deelneming aan ontrading, aan de permanente bewaking en de bescherming van het NAVO-luchtruim161, moet de luchtcomponent in staat zijn om opdrachten van luchtverdediging, lucht-grondsteun en luchtverkenning uit te voeren, bij dag en bij nacht en bij elk weertype, in conflicten van de hoogste tot de laagste intensiteit. Alle toestellen kunnen worden ingezet in lucht-grond (FBX) en lucht-lucht(ADX) gevechtsoperaties en zijn Air-to-Air (AAR) refueling capable. (3) De maximale inspanning moet tegelijkertijd toelaten om gedurende maximum drie maanden, op twee verschillende operatietonelen (DOBs), twee formaties multirole

ACOT-SDP-ICOMDOC-CCSC-001_Ed2_-_SD2 (for official staffing - intranet) 1 Jan 2009. Annex C Sub-capaciteiten Airbus A310 (2), ERJ-135 (2) en ERJ-145 (2), Dassault Falcon DA-900 (1) en DA-20 (2) 159 See also ACOT-COD-TTH_NFH-001 160 ACOT-SDP-ICOMDOC-CCSC-001_Ed2_-_SD2 (for official staffing - intranet) 1 Jan 2009. Annex D Ambitieniveau 161 CRC Glons and TWO F-16 in Quick Reaction Alert (QRA) on the MOB.
157 158

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gevechtsvliegtuigen (Max 34 F-16s) en een totaal van orde van grootte van 1250 man te ontplooien. Minstens n DOB dient te voldoen aan HNS High condities. Het totaal van 34 ontplooibare F-16 gevechtsvliegtuigen dekt de globale behoefte voor NAVO (HRF en NRF) en EU (RRF) operaties aan de overeenstemmende reactietermijnen. De inzet voor een langere duur of voor onbepaalde tijd vergt een vermindering van het aantal F-16s, evenals aflossingen. (a) Max 12 F-16 gedurende een onbeperkte periode (b) Max 18 F-16 gedurende 6 maanden; indien verderzetting voor langere duur : af te bouwen naar Max 12 F-16. (c) Indien mr dan 18 F-16 simultaan deployed = One Shot Capability, beperkt in duur door variabele limieten in de domeinen van bewapening, piloten en/of airframes 6 ontplooibare F-16 zijn steeds voorbehouden voor NRF deelname. 2 F-16 staan permanent in Quick Reaction Alert (QRA) samen met het Control & Reporting Center te Glons voor de continu bewaking en de verdediging van het nationale en NAVO-luchtruim en voor eventuele Air Police opdrachten. Max 6 F-16 kunnen worden uitgerust met een Modular Recce Pod (MRP) die E/O en IR sensoren bevat voor Tac Air Recce opdrachten. Luchtgevechtsoperaties in scenarios 3, 6 en 7 moeten steeds gelijktijdig kunnen uitgevoerd worden en bijgevolg zijn deze 3 scenarios dimensionerend voor de luchtgevechtscapaciteit.


(5) (6)

(7) (8)

b. De luchttransportcapaciteit (1) De luchtcomponent moet in staat zijn, met ACHT C-130 en TWEE A310 en op een preadvies van 72 uren, in n beweging de projectie te waarborgen van een formatie gelijkwaarwaardig aan een Light Infantry BattleGroup en een C capaciteit voor de beginfase van de NEO-opdracht. Scenario 4 is dimensionerend voor de luchttransportcapaciteit. (2) De C-130s moeten capabel zijn om op permanente basis tactische luchttransportopdrachten en humanitaire missies te kunnen uitvoeren, zowel d.m.v. Airland als Airdrop. Zij moeten simultaan en onbeperkt kunnen ontplooien naar en opereren vanop 2 DOBs wereldwijd. (3) Overigens kunnen de luchttransportmiddelen ingezet worden in rechtstreekse steun voor alle andere operaties, inclusief deze ten voordele van NAVO, EU en VN. (4) 1 ERJ in AE (Aeromed Evac) versie wordt tevens aangeboden aan NAVO, EU en UN. c. De Joint Support Helicopter (JSH) capaciteit De JSH zal vanaf 2013 inzetbaar zijn met ACHT helikopters van het type NH-90 in twee versies op MAX TWEE DOBs: (1) VIER in de versie TTH ten voordele van de LC (IOC 2013 FOC 2015) De TTH zal kunnen ingezet worden in rechtstreekse steun van alle operaties. Dit behelst onder meer het transport van Pers en Mat evenals CASEVAC/Aeromedevac ten behoeve van de opdrachten van de BEL Mediane capaciteit, de NAVO, de EU en/of de VN (dimensionerend zijn Sc 6 en 7). (2) VIER in de versie NFH (IOC 2013 FOC 2014) voor de NC als boordhelikopter op de M-fregatten, ter vervanging van de Al III die uit omloop wordt genomen vanaf 2015, EN voor SAR ter vervanging van de Seaking vanaf 2013. Dit houdt in :

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(a) TWEE permanent beschikbare NFH helikopters voor SAR in het kader van de Homeland Safety Operations, met een reactietermijn van respectievelijk 15 minuten en 1 uur. (b) EEN permanent beschikbare NFH voor de Sp aan de M-FF voor een periode van ZES maanden of een One Shot operatie van EEN jaar onafhankelijk van het scenario. d. Multirole helicopter capaciteit (1) De Multirole Helicopter (MRH) A109-BA capaciteit kan naargelang het scenario in DRIE typedetachementen ingezet worden op Max TWEE DOB. Deze kunnen binnen dit kader modulair worden ingezet aan de hand van Minimum Force Packages (MFP). (2) Multirole helikopters kunnen ontplooid worden in rechtstreekse steun voor alle operaties voor NAVO, EU en/of UN in volgende rollen : (a) Recce en Surveillance met de Observation Helicopter (Light) [OH(L)] (b) Support met Utility Helicopter (Light) [UH(L)] ten voordele van Combat Support en Combat Service Support (Tpt, Aeromedevac, ) (c) Support met Armed Helicopter (Light) [AH(L)] ten voordele van Combat Support (vuursteun) met TOW2A Vanaf 2012 zal het ambitieniveau MRH aangepast worden aan de invoering van en de samenwerking met de Joint Support Helicopter. Behoudens het transport van troepen zullen de huidige opdrachten voor de A109 in principe behouden worden. (3) Bij ontplooiing in scenarios 4, 6 en 7 (deze zijn dimensionerend) behelst dit respectievelijk Max 6, 6 en 14 MRH. Gelijktijdig ingezette MFP dienen steeds binnen het maximaal totaal aantal inzetbare MRH van 19 te vallen. (4) Een Sc 6 operatie kan doorlopend gehandhaafd blijven, terwijl een Sc 7 inzet een ONE shot inzet van 6 maanden betreft. e. UAV Real-time aerial surveillance, reconnaissance and observation capaciteit (1) Onbemande vliegtuigen van het type B-Hunter UAV kunnen ontplooid worden in rechtstreekse steun voor alle operaties. (2) Het projecteerbare B-HUNTER UAV Sqn is in staat tot het uitvoeren van een jaarlijks recurrente opdracht (duur 6 8 maanden) voor real-time surveillance, reconnaissance en observation vanaf een DOB in steun van multinationale operaties van het type CRO, PSO en preventieve ontplooiingen in scenarios van type 1, 3, 4, 6 en 7. (3) Tegelijkertijd kan een tweede Ops site worden geactiveerd in Belgi, voor de eventuele nationale behoeften. Deze site verzekert eveneens de voortgezette vorming en training van alle operationele bemanningen.

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Annex X Doctrine & Requirements process at ACOS Ops & Trg162 This process shows the different LCC phases of a material. It is a structured approach toward identification of requirements and the weighing against impacts in the different domains. Coordination & Synchronization of the actions conducted by the different ACOS/DG in their respective functional fields will yield a good assessment on the impact a new requirement will have on the whole of the Belgian defence.
Management of the Transformation

Supported / Supporting ACOS/DG by phase


Management of the Transformation




















Management of the Transformation

ACOS/DGs Actions versus LOD
















Currently the LC is in the process of acquiring: Multi Purpose Protected Vehicle (MPPV), PANDUR and Armoured Infantry Vehicles (AIV) which are scheduled to have a Recce / Observation and FAC capability. The introduction of these performant vehicles with ISR capabilities + target coordinate generation as well as illumination, can be big force multipliers if the joint aspects are exploited and get the necessary priority for investment.


Briefing by ACOS Ops & Trg D&R to the 123 AStC on 11 Mar 2008

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Annex Y BE Strategic planning guidance documents

BEL Strat Planning

Strategic Planning Overview legislative Cycle







Strategic Plan 2015

OUTLOOK (1) 2030

May 2000 Feb 2003

New Strat Plan
Political (2) Steering plan Orientation note


Steering Plan
Dec 2003

Steering plans


Continuous: Rolling Strategic Planning

(1) Ref. Speech MOD Open en Secure (Royal High Institute Defence, 22 Mai 08) ACOS Strat (2) Ref. Political orientation note of MOD (June 2008)

Briefing ACOS Strat to 123 AStC, 13 Nov 2008

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Annex Z - Evolution BE MOD budget

Evolutie Middelen
Mio EUR 2004

Strategisch Plan 2000 Stuurplan 2003 Enveloppe zonder ontvangsten Enveloppe met middelen uit verkoop 100 Mia 2000 BEF

Strategisch plan : Bg 2000 = 100 Mia BEF 1 Stuurplan: Bg 2004 = Bg 2003 x Infl 2




2,450 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

Ref: Briefing DGBF to MOD on 7 Jan 2008

4000 3500 3000 2500 2000 1500 1000 500 0

2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

actieplan dette paye avec des recettes de vente dette PIDS Mat et Infra PMU petits Inv Mat et Infra personnel fonctionnement non MR fonctionnement MR Stuurplan 2003 Normale kredieten

Ref: Briefing DG MR to 123 AStC on 10 Mar 2009

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% Bg Def
100% 80% 60% 40% 20% 0%
00 01 03 04 05 06 07 20 20 02 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 08

Investissement Fonctionnement Personnel

Ref Briefing HRP-Pers 16 Jan 09 to 123 Div AStC

Ref Briefing HRP-Pers 16 Jan 09 to 123 Div AStC

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Annex AA BE MOD personnel quorum evolution

39000 37000 Effectieven / Effectifs 35000 33000 2000 31000 1500 29000 27000 25000 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020 2022 2024 2026 2028 Toestand / Situation 01 Jan
Totaal Militairen Recruit Bg Ini 09 Plan Directeur - Mil linaire

4000 3500 3000 2500 Wervingen / Recrutements

2.500 2.000 1.500 1.000 500 0 SVP et Recrutement (UTP)

1000 500 0

Ref Briefing HRP-Pers 16 Jan 09 to 123 Div AStC

Evolution des effectifs et besoins en recrutement Hyp : 28.000 Mil & Civ terme



35.000 Effectifs (UTP)





25.000 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 Mil - SVP

Mil - FTE enveloppe 01 Jan

Civils - FTE enveloppe 01 Jan

Mil - Recrutement

Civils - recrutement


DG BudFin - BFB - mars 2009

Ref Briefing DG BF BFB to 123 AStC, 16 mar 2009

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Annex AB Geographical dispersion of units in Belgium

Le dfi
Arty Bn 1 (BE) Bde Naval base Bn AA Para commado Bn Para commado Bn Fighter Wing Air Force 1 (BE) Bde (-)

Heli Wing Inf Bn 7 (BE) Bde

Para commado Bn Fighter Wing Air Force

7 (BE) Bde (-) Arty Bn 7 (BE) Bde

Location of the major combat units


Ref: Briefing HRP-Pers 16 Jan 09 to 123 Div AStC

Aperu global patrimoine immobilier

! 13% ! 50%

Optimale geografische spreiding Analyse sleutelfactoren

Staat van de bestaande infrastructuur
9 Kw in concessie gegeven 29 Kw overgedragen

+300 Quartier 203 domaines 26.122 ha 4.621.355 m surface plancher 10,5 Mio m routes Infra BEMIL(SAT)COM Pipelines Cimetires militaires

63 Grote Kw

42 CIS sites


122 Diverse Kw

31 Mil kerkhoven

12 Kw in huur of concessie

308 Kw

Ref: Briefing DG MR C&I to 123 Div AStC on 10 Mar 09

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Annex AC Importance of Air Power If there is one attitude more dangerous than to assume that a future war will be just like the last one, it is to assume that it will be so utterly different that we can ignore all the lessons learned from the last one. RAF Air Marshall Sir John Slessor Although one might say this is an old statement, it remains valid today. A current conflict should not be used as a benchmark to shape the future of your forces and the lessons from the past should not be thrown away because the future will be so different. The advantage of air power is speed and precision. This can not only neutralize and enemy but also destroy him. It will shape the battlefield so friendly troops can move freely. Like Gen MOSELEY said Air Superiority First163. The air weapon is also characterized by a strong tradition of intelligence gathering and analysis or in the domain of electronic warfare to jam opponents C2 structures and robust network structures. In short, airpower can shape the battle field on an strategic an operational level, it can provide fire support, ISR and Tpt of the ground forces or stabilization operations in general. US armed forces FM 3-24164, calls for extreme caution with assistance from the air. Exercise exceptional care when using airpower in the strike role. Bombing, even with the most precise weapons, can cause unintended civilian casualties. Effective leaders weigh the benefits of every air strike against its risks. An air strike can cause collateral damage that turns people against the host-nation government and provides insurgents with a major propaganda victory. Even when justified under the law of war, bombings that result in civilian casualties can bring media coverage that works to the insurgents benefit. Indeed it must be said that with current media the collateral damage effect might lead to disastrous interpretations by the general public, thus hurting the overall outcome of the conflict. This should be minimized by acting faster with more precision and by aligning the intervention with the most ideal time. Enormous efforts are underway to mitigate the blast effect by designing smaller precision weapons and more intelligent fuses. A major advantage of air power is the fact that almost no friendly soldiers are present on the battlefield. Airplanes can refuel and operate from remote safe locations, not

163 MOSELEY Michael T., US Air Force Chieff of Staff, The US Air Force: our mission is to fly and fight, speech 08Feb07,, 06 Jan 2009. 164 Headquarters Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency, 15Dec06, Appendix E, pE-5.

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List of Annexes interwoven with the fight and from airfields that can be easily defended. The airplanes operate from a safe altitude far above any Gnd-air threat and unaffected by IEDs. HUMINT is often opted as the reason for Boots on the ground but this source of information is not crucial for the success of a conflict165. It is more important to build a joint intelligence database where the different sources are complementary. Also, pilots are highly trained officers who will not get involved emotionally; the cockpit offers all necessary situational awareness. They are in constant contact with the highest authorities, if needed. On-board sensors can generate additional, instant information. Together with their flexibility in armament employment they can intervene from a safe distance, swift and adequate. The inherently always fast evolving air machine can perfectly respond to changing threats by adapting airplane, sensors and weapons. Collateral damage should not be seen as a byproduct from air power. During OIF, there were more civilian casualties through ground troops then air support166. The emotional attachment of ground forces can even further increase the difficulties in incidents like ABU GRAIB. The strategic CoG, win the harts and minds might be severely jeopardized by these incidents. Even your own CoG tolerance for body bags at the home front will be more challenged by engaging ground forces compared to air forces. Sustainability, a key capability of air power, is usually less under pressure then for land forces167. Operating within a network environment In order for a fighter to be able to work in a network it needs to keep up with the ever evolving world of network generating technology. When replacing the F-16 MLU, one of the major concerns should be that this new fighter should have a plug and play function with the networks in place at that moment. The knowledge these platforms generate needs to be available for the whole C2 structure. Success will no longer depend on the individual aircraft, tank or ship but lies in speed of exploitation of this knowledge and execute a game plan with the best suitable tool. Key to success lies within the information domain and the speed of decision. C4ISR as a concept will be the overarching structure in which all individual platforms will generate their piece of the information puzzle.

KEEGAN John, Intelligence in War: Knowledge of the Enemy from Napoleon to Al-Qaeda, Knopf, USA, 2003, p332 ARKIN, William M., Shock and Awe Worked, God help us, Washington Post, 19Mar07, 15 Jan 2009 en Human Right watch, Off target: The Conduct of War and Civilian Casualties, December 2003, 20 Jan 2009. 167 The US Military Index, February 2008, visited 25 Feb 2009.
165 166

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Annex AD Development Joint Armed Forces with inter agency coordination168





Marine Landmacht Luchtmacht

Marine Landmacht Luchtmacht

Marine Landmacht Luchtmacht

Gedeelde Doelstelling GOs IOs NGOs

Joint krijgsmacht






168 Source: Clingendael Centrum voor Strategische Studies (CCSS), Samenwerken moet maar is het mogelijk?, zesde essay over de toekomst van de luchtmacht, juli 2006, p7.

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Annex AE F-16 MLU fleet size and pilot contingent calculation 169

Pilots overview
(IP & Trainees not included)

100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0

36 36 36 36 36 26

0 18 18 18 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 26 35 35 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40

62 62 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 9 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 9 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 9 0 0 0 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9

Recup QRA Trg - Cat B Trg - Cat A Preparation Foreign Ops


-3 -1

8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 32 34

169 Fleet analysis done by COA in support of memo to DGHR ICGD F-16 capability, MITS 09-148215 - 3 Mar 2009 (CONFIDENTIAL), 7 Pages.

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Annex AF - Opportunities that could produce force multipliers or savings The Belgian defence must make sure that coherent economical governance of material and resources, via efficient management and support structures creates sufficient resources in order to produce modern, performant capabilities with a high operational availability. These capabilities should fit in the context of the requirements identified both in chapter one and two. Hence, all capabilities which do not satisfy this framework are not to be considered core business and should be screened for continued funding. Related to capabilities o F-16 MLU Recce capability: Can only be used during day good weather low & medium or night med level. Data analysis is cumbersome. Furthermore, the system is not capable to provide (near) real time photo/video information. Today, delays in producing usable (interpreted) data does no longer meet requirements. o SAR: Since political guidance requires the organisation to concentrate on core business, serious thoughts should be given to outsourcing this capability170. o AAR: Today the F-16 deployments can be severely hampered by the lack of available AAR capability. Since our defence organisation is looking to replace the A-310, an opportunity for synergy could be found in buying /leasing aircraft that can be transformed to be AAR capable171. Although initially a bigger investment is needed, return will surely be possible by offering the capability to other partners and saving on costs for todays F16 pilot training requirement. o A-109 Agusta: the current helicopter capability has limited engine performance, severely hampering expeditionary operations outside of central European region. It could be considered to retire this capability early and use the saved money in the NH-90 capability. o UAV: The system has limited range, can not generate performant data and need to be made compatible with (N)NEC to allow for expedient data availability. If this is judged to be too expensive, opportunities to transfer it to the department of internal affairs or have them pay for the services should be investigated.
170 Defence News: UK SAR Bidders Pick Helos, Deal will privatize Search-And-Rescue Service Edition March 16, 2009. 171 Reflection paper Maj Peter STAMS Beyond any political considerations is there a need or an interest for BE to replace his A310 by MRTT? - Jan 2009.

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List of Annexes Related to optimalisation o Reduction of barracks: Close those where upgrading to todays energy and environmental standards is economically not viable. Barracks that are not required for new military structure can still be used by other governmental agencies. They should be given back to the Regie der gebouwen and could be used as prison, youth detention sites, immigration services or other governmental activities. Of those infrastructures retained for military use, a geographical repartition that accommodates adequate job offers throughout the country, training fields for our forces and a balanced effect on workforce flow should be studied. o Partnerships and international cooperation172: For those systems where partner nations have the same compatible equipment, synergies should be identified that allow cost savings in training, maintenance and even combining units by sharing each others bases. Commonality in systems opens opportunities for common maintenance. o Leasing and Private Financing Initiatives (PFI) initiatives: is more and more used by different nations and the BAC is currently investigating this option for replacement of A-310. Leasing equipment (with options to buy) should allow for a more equal budget spending. While in regime the exploitation costs of the system might be higher compared to a self owned system, it will allow to considerable reduce initial investment for buying the equipment. Obviously, mechanisms need to be put in place to keep control of contract cost over the life cycle of the leased system. More and more defence organisations seek partnerships with civil companies. Canadian armed forces are currently buying UAV173 flying time over Iraq and Afghanistan. UK MOD signed a contract for the new Royal Air Force (RAF) future strategic tanker aircraft174, based on PFI like it did with the SAR contract mentioned before. Why does the defence organisation need to own the buildings of headquarters? Much more functionality can be gained if office space is leased according the needs of the moment further allowing rationalization of the building assets as future restructuring calls for other office numbers and types.

Research paper Maj Peter STAMS Welke partner voor Belgische Luchtcomponent in het kader van bilaterale samenwerking of synergie, April 2009 173 Watchkeeper Tactical UAV Program 174 Janes International Defence Review AAR: Loitering with intent volume 42, march 2009

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List of Annexes Outsourcing: Outsourcing is an option that is already well know but should be further exploited and expanded to all systems and services that do not need to be deployable in order to support combat systems like: general education and training, catering, CIS needs for in country support, maintenance of buildings,. It is well understood these ideas and thoughts are not the golden solution to our problems but it should be possible to at least explore the options and retain viable solutions. We should strive to offer flexible and usable tools to our government. Tools that do not have caveats but which are expeditionary, sustainable, tailored and sized to do the job.

In the end everything is politics Carl von Clausewitz

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Today, in Afghanistan, the BAC proved, once again175 to be capable of operating within a multinational environment. Our equipment is compatible and network oriented. Within 5 days the deployed detachment was ready to execute tasking. They seamlessly integrated into existing command structures, connected to tasking agencies and networks and were able to provide (non)lethal force as required according the standing ROEs. Synergies with other nations are in place, reducing cost and personnel requirement. Pilots and maintenance personnel needed no lead-in Trg time and Final Operational Capability (FOC) was obtained without delay.

Rudi VERRIJT Lt Col Belgian Air Force


Deliberate Forge, Allied Force, QRA Baltic States, ISAF 2005.

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