Bullets in The Alms Bowl

BULLETS IN THE ALMS BOWL
An Analysis of the Brutal SPDC Suppression

of the September 2007 Saffron Revolution
March 2008
This report is dedicated to the memory of all those who lost their
lives for their part in the September 2007 pro-democracy protests in
the struggle for justice and democracy in Burma.
May that memory not fade

May your death not be in vain
May our voices never be silenced
Bullets in the Alms Bowl
An Analysis of the Brutal SPDC Suppression of the September 2007 Saffron Revolution
Written, edited and published by the Human Rights Documentation Unit

March 2008
© Copyright March 2008 by the Human Rights Documentation Unit
The Human Rights Documentation Unit (HRDU) is indebted to all those who had the
courage to not only participate in the September protests, but also to share their stories
with us and in doing so made this report possible. The HRDU would like to thank those
individuals and organizations who provided us with information and helped to confirm
many of the reports that we received. Though we cannot mention many of you by
name, we are grateful for your support.
The HRDU would also like to thank the Irish Government who funded the publication
of this report through its Department of Foreign Affairs.
Front Cover: A procession of Buddhist monks marching through downtown Rangoon

on 27 September 2007. Despite the peaceful nature of the demonstrations, the SPDC
cracked down on protestors with disproportionate lethal force [© EPA].
Rear Cover (clockwise from top): An assembly of Buddhist monks stage a peaceful
protest before a police barricade near Shwedagon Pagoda in Rangoon on 26 September
2007 [© Reuters]; Security personnel stepped up security at key locations around
Rangoon on 28 September 2007 in preparation for further protests [© Reuters]; A
Buddhist monk holding a placard which carried the message on the minds of all
protestors, Sangha and civilian alike. [unknown].
Bullets in the Alms Bowl was published by HRDU; © HRDU March 2008. All contents
of this report may be freely reproduced or distributed for non-commercial purposes or
quoted for media and other related uses, provided that which is reproduced is properly
acknowledged. This report was produced on a non-profit basis and is not for
commercial sale. As a professional courtesy, HRDU would appreciate copies of any
materials in which excerpts from this report are used.
The Human Rights Documentation Unit (HRDU) is the research and documentation
department of the National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma (NCGUB).
This report, along with all other reports published by the HRDU may be viewed on the
NCGUB website at www.ncgub.net. Questions or comments can be submitted to the
HRDU by email at enquiries.hrdu@gmail.com.
Table of Contents
Table of Contents ……………………………………………………………….. 1
Acronyms and Abbreviations ………………………………………………… 3
Maps ………………………………………………………………………………. 6
Map of Burma Showing Protest Locations ………………………………….. 6
Map of Rangoon ………………………………………………………………. 7
I. Executive Summary ………………………………………………………….. 9
II. Government by Exploitation: The Burmese Way to Capitalism? ….... 15

Macroeconomic Policy ………………………………………………………... 17
Fiscal Policy …………………………………………………………………. 17
Monetary Policy …………………………………………………………….. 20
The Economic Cost of Militarization …………………………………………. 24
The Straw that Broke the Camel’s Back ……………………………………. 27
III. Growing Discontent: The Economic Protests ……..…………………... 31

Early Signs of Dissatisfaction ………………………………………………… 31
Protesting the Fuel Price Rise ……………………………………………….. 32
IV. The Saffron Revolution ………..…………………………………………… 37

The SPDC and the Sangha …………………………………………………... 37
Interdependence of the Monastic and Lay Communities …………………. 38
Pakokku and the Call of Excommunication ………………………………… 40
Nationwide Protests Declared ……………………………………………….. 43
V. Crackdown on the Streets ……...………………………………………….. 49

Wednesday, 26 September 2007 ……………………………………………. 49
Shwedagon Pagoda ………………………………………………………... 49
Downtown Rangoon ………………………………………………………... 54
Thakin Mya Park ……………………………………………………………. 56
Yankin Post Office ………………………………………………………….. 58
Thursday, 27 September 2007 ………………………………………………. 58
South Okkalapa Township ………………………………………………… 58
Sule Pagoda ………………………………………………………………… 62
Pansodan Road Bridge ……………………………………………………. 65
Thakin Mya Park ……………………………………………………………. 66
Tamwe Township State High School No.3 ………………………………. 67
Friday, 28 September 2007 …………………………………………………... 72
Pansodan Road ………………….…………………………………………. 74
Pazundaung Township …………………………………………………….. 74
Latha Township …………………………………………………………….. 75
Saturday, 29 September 2007, onwards ……………………………………. 75
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Human Rights Documentation Unit
VI. The Monastery Raids .……………………………………………………… 79

Invitations to ‘Breakfast’ ………………………………………………………. 81
Maggin Monastery …………………………………………………………….. 81
Ngwe Kyar Yan Monastery …………………………………………………… 83
Additional Raids in Okkalapa ………………………………………………… 86
Thaketa Township …………………………………………………………….. 88
Raids in Other Locations around the Country ……………………………… 89
Arakan State ………………………………………………………………… 89
Mandalay Division ………………………………………………………….. 89
Kachin State ………………………………………………………………… 90
Continued Raids ……………………………………………………………….. 92
VII. A Witch Hunt ……………….……………………………………………….. 93

Night Time Abductions ………………………………………………………... 95
Arrested for Harbouring ………………………………………………………. 99
Arrests in Lieu Of Others ……………………………………………………… 101
Collective Punishment of Entire Neighbourhoods …………………………. 103
Release of Detainees …………………………………………………………. 106
Continuing Arrest and Detention of Political Activists …………...………… 109
VIII. Judicial Procedure and Conditions of Detention ……………………. 111

Prolonged Detention without Charge ………………………………………... 112
Judicial Procedure …………………………………………………………….. 116
Conditions of Detention ……………………………………………………….. 119
Interrogation and Torture of Detainees ……………………………………… 123
Denial of Medical Care ………………………………………………………... 131
Deaths in Custody …………………………………………………………….. 133
Treatment of Monks ……………………………………………………………. 136
IX. Analysis of the Crackdown: Intent to Brutalise, Cover Up and Discredit 139
Hired Thugs ……………………………………………………………………. 143
Targeted and Intentional Killings …………………………………………….. 147
Removal of the Dead and Wounded ………………………………………… 149
Treatment of the Injured ………………………………………………………. 150
Secret Cremations …………………………………………………………….. 153
Suppression of Information …………………………………………………… 156
The Internet …………………………………………………………………. 156
Telephone Networks Severed …………………………………………….. 159
The National Press …………………………………………………………. 159
Deliberate Targeting of Journalists ……………………………………….. 161
Providing Information to the Media ……………………………………….. 164
Defamation of the Sangha ……………………………………………………. 165
The Pro-SPDC Rallies ………………………………………………………… 167
X. Conclusion ………………...………………………………………………….. 169
XI. Recommendations ………………………….…..…………………………… 175
2
Acronyms and Abbreviations

Acronyms
AAPPB Assistance Association for Political Prisoners in Burma
ABFSU All Burma Federation of Student Unions
ABMA All Burma Monks Alliance
ADB Asian Development Bank
AFP Agence France Presse
AHRC Asian Human Rights Commission
AI Amnesty International
AIDS Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
AP Associated Press
APPPB Asia Pacific Peoples Partnership on Burma
ASEAN Association of South East Asian Nations
BBC British Broadcasting Corporation
BCUK Burma Campaign UK
BEW Burma Economic Watch
BSI Bureau of Special Investigation
BSPP Burmese Socialist Program Party
CCSDPT Committee for the Coordination of Services for Displaced Persons in
Thailand
CID Criminal Investigation Department
CNG Compressed Natural Gas
CNN Cable News Network
DVB Democratic Voice of Burma
EPA European Pressphoto Agency
EU European Union
FIDH International Federation for Human Rights
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GTI Government Technical Institute
HIV Human Immunodeficiency Virus
HRC Human Rights Council
HRDP Human Rights Defenders and Promoters
HRDU Human Rights Documentation Unit
HRW Human Rights Watch
IB Infantry Battalion
ILO International Labour Organization
IMF International Monetary Fund
IMNA Independent Mon News Agency
INGO International Non-Government Organization
IPS Inter Press Service
ISP Internet Service Provider
ITUC International Trade Union Confederation
KHRG Karen Human Rights Group
KNG Kachin News Group
KNLA Karen National Liberation Army
KNU Karen National Union
3
LID Light Infantry Division

MDC Myanmar Development Committee
MEC Myanmar Economic Corporation
MIC Myanmar Investment Commission
NaSaKa Burma Border Security Force (Western border)
NCGUB National Coalition Government Of The Union Of Burma
NDD Network for Democracy and Development
NGO Non-Government Organization
NLD National League for Democracy
NLM New Light of Myanmar
NPED National Planning and Economic Development
OHCHR Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
PDC Political Defiance Committee
PSRD Press Scrutiny and Relations Department
RFA Radio Free Asia
RSF Reporters Sans Frontieres
SAS Swan Arr Shin; ‘masters of physical force’
SaYaPa Military Security Force military intelligence
SB Special Branch (of police)
SCUK Save the Children Foundation - UK
SEAPA South East Asian Press Alliance
SESG Special Envoy of the Secretary General
SHAN Shan Herald Agency for News
SMNC Sangha Maha Nayaka Committee
SPDC State Peace and Development Council
TPDC Township Peace and Development Council
UDHR Universal Declaration of Human Rights
UMEH Union of Myanmar Economic Holdings Ltd.
UN United Nations
UNDP United Nations Development Program
UNGA United Nations General Assembly
UNIC United Nations Information Centre
UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund
UNSC United Nations Security Council
UNSG United Nations Secretary General
USCB US Campaign for Burma
USDA Union Solidarity and Development Association
VOA Voice of America
WFP World Food Program
WHO World Health Organisation
WLB Women’s League of Burma
4
Abbreviations, Terms and Units of Measurements
a.k.a also known as

acre 1 acre = 4,840 sq. yards = 0.407 hectare
approx. approximately
baht Monetary unit of Thailand. US$1 = 30 baht
basket Unit of measurement equivalent to two tins or roughly 25 kg of rice
Brig. Brigadier (General)
Capt. Captain
Col. Colonel
Cpl. Corporal
Daw Burmese honorific used to address an adult female
ft foot/feet
Gen. General
kg kilogram
km kilometre
Ko Burmese form of address to a young male
kyat Monetary unit of Burma. US$1 = 1,200 kyat (6 kyat at official rate)
longyi Burmese sarong
Lt. Lieutenant
m metre
Maj. Major
Maung Burmese form of address to a young male
mm millimetre
n.a. not available
Sangha Buddhist monastic community
Sayadaw Presiding monk of a Buddhist monastery
Sen. Senior (General)
Sgt. Sergeant
U Burmese honorific used to address an adult male in Burma
viss 1 viss = 3.6 lbs / 1.63 kg
Spelling Conventions
The following report employs British (UK) English throughout.
Since there are no standardised rules for transliteration from Burmese or many
of the other languages spoken in Burma into in the Roman alphabet, words can
be spelt in a variety of different ways according to those who translate them. As
such, some of the spelling conventions employed by HRDU for this report may
differ slightly from those used in reports by other organizations.
5
6
Above: Map of central Rangoon (Yangon) showing the locations of several of

the demonstrations dealt with in detail in this report. Many other protests were
also staged in other parts of Rangoon not indicated on this map.
Opposite: Map of Burma showing the locations of all reported demonstrations

staged across the country throughout August and September 2007. During this
time, 227 separate protests were reported to have taken place in at least 66
separate towns and cities in all of Burma’s 14 states and divisions.
7
8
I. Executive Summary
Beginning in August and continuing into October 2007, the people of Burma
took to the streets in the hundreds of thousands, making a variety of demands,
all of which reflected their dissatisfaction with continued military rule, and the
policies of the ruling junta, the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC).
It has been reported that at least 227 distinct protests were staged during this
time in no fewer than 66 towns and cities throughout the country in each of
Burma’s seven states and seven divisions.1
Such open dissent is rare in the authoritarian country, where fundamental

freedoms, such as the rights of assembly, association and expression are
severely curtailed through a series of repressive and draconian laws. Those
who have opposed the regime have habitually found themselves arrested,
tortured or even killed. Consequently, demonstrations of this magnitude have
not taken place in Burma in almost two decades. The last time such large scale
protests were seen in the country, in 1988, the response of the military is widely
believed to have resulted in the deaths of an estimated 3,000 people.
This report is based upon the detailed testimonies of over 50 eyewitnesses to

the demonstrations and the SPDC’s brutal response. Human Rights
Documentation Unit (HRDU) researchers have interviewed monks, activists and
civilians who were involved in the protests, many of whom have subsequently
fled Burma out of fear for their safety, while a network of researchers working
clandestinely inside Burma have interviewed a number of those who have gone
into hiding but remained within the country. The information gathered from
these interviews has been supplemented by reports from various independent
organizations and credible news sources. Together, they provide insight into a
campaign of brutality, the intended design of which was antithetical to the very
foundations of international human rights and humanitarian law, and serve to
contextualize the protests and their suppression within the general practice of
SPDC governance.
The majority of those interviewed for this report by HRDU and our working
network inside were witnesses to the violence on the streets of Rangoon, and
though dozens of other locations around the country were also host to
demonstrations, HRDU has been unable to obtain eyewitness testimonies for
many of these other protests. As such, this report focuses primarily upon the
events that occurred in Rangoon. All other protests which were held in other
parts of the country are beyond the scope of this report and have not been
focussed on. Further investigation into the crackdowns on these protests is
required. Notwithstanding this, this report represents the most comprehensive
report detailing the events leading up to, during and following the protests thus
far produced to date.
1
Source: “Maroon Revolution in Numbers,” APPPB, October 2007.
9
This report begins with a detailed analysis of the structural violence which gave
rise to the protests, in terms of both the militarization of society and the
concurrent impoverishment of the general population. This section assesses
both fiscal and monetary policy – including budget allocation, monetary
expansion and inflation, state monopolies over natural resources, exchange rate
manipulation and corruption; as well as the more overt economic abuses
associated with militarization in Burma; such as forced labour, extortion and
land confiscation.
Following this is a series of detailed sections focusing on the protests and the
SPDC’s response. These begin with an examination of the initial signs of overt
economic discontent in early 2007, followed by an account of the August
protests and their suppression, including eyewitness accounts of assaults and
arrests conducted by military, police, USDA and SAS members. The entrance
of the monastic community into the protests is analyzed in terms of their
relationship with both the SPDC and the Buddhist lay community, before a
descriptive section on the growth of the protests leading up to 25 September.
The days of the crackdown, from 26 September to 2 October 2007, are then
reported using detailed eyewitness testimonies of brutality.
The raids conducted on monasteries during this time, both in Rangoon and in
other areas of the country, are also covered in a section including firsthand
accounts from Ngwe Kyar Yan Monastery and the killing of a civilian serving as
a night watchman for his local monastery in Thaketa Township, Rangoon
Division. The SPDC’s systematic campaign of arrest during and since the
crackdowns is also examined and supported by eyewitness testimonies which
attest to the arbitrary and systematic nature of these arrests, the lack of any
proper procedure, the arrest of family members in lieu of those they were
unable to apprehend and the collective punishment of entire neighbourhoods
where protests were conducted.
Following this, a section focusing on detention and judicial procedure includes

reports on over twenty deaths in custody. It also includes testimony on the
grossly substandard conditions, the treatment of monks, the use of varied
methods of torture during interrogation, and the denial of medical treatment.
A further section focussing on the days of the crackdown provides an analysis

of SPDC actions. It assesses SPDC intent through an investigation of tactics
used, including the use of civilian militias, the penning in of protest groups, the
use of live ammunition on unarmed civilians, apparent targeted killings, the
removal of the dead and injured, reports of secret cremations, the denial of
treatment to the injured, the suppression of information and targeting of
journalists, and the defamation of the Sangha.
On 15 August 2007, the SPDC suddenly and without any forewarning

announced sharp increases in domestic fuel prices. Overnight, the price of
diesel was doubled; the cost of petrol was increased by over 60 percent and the
price of compressed natural gas (CNG) was increased a staggering 500
percent. The effect of this unexpected rise in fuel prices on the general
10
population was immediate, and served to highlight the ever-worsening

economic plight of the populace. It was this fuel price rise, and its effects on
basic commodity prices that initially sparked the mass protests.
On 19 August 2007, over 500 activists demonstrated against the fuel price rises
in Rangoon (Yangon), including various leaders of the 88 Generation Students’
Group who had led the mass protests two decades earlier. A number of similar
demonstrations were also conducted on the days that followed.
At first the SPDC showed some degree of restraint, but responded by mobilizing
two hostile yet ostensibly civilian organizations under its command. Members of
the Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA), an SPDC-controlled
social welfare organization known for its involvement in political violence, and
members of the Swan Arr Shin (SAS; ‘masters of physical force’), a civilian
militia formed largely from the poor and unemployed, were armed with catapults
(slingshots) and sticks and deployed on the streets of Rangoon to counter any
further protests.
Through the violent disruption of demonstrations by USDA and SAS members,

and over 150 arrests made both during the protests and in night time raids on
activists’ homes, the protest movement in Rangoon was largely suppressed by
the end of August.
Nevertheless, the protests had spread throughout the country, and on 28

August 2007, despite heavy restrictions placed on the secular activities of
Buddhist monks in the country, members of the monastic community joined the
protests for the first time, when around 200 monks took to the streets in Sittwe,
the capital of Arakan (Rakhine) State. Burma's monastic community is reliant
upon the general population for their material survival, and many reports have
testified to the fact that since the fuel price rise, many civilians were no longer
able to support the monks in addition to their own families.
Then, on 5 September 2007, a significant catalyst to the subsequent growth of

the protests occurred in the town of Pakokku in Magwe Division when SPDC
army soldiers fired warning shots over the heads of a group of an estimated 500
monks, and alongside USDA and SAS members then assaulted a number of
the monks in the process of breaking up the demonstration. At least one monk
was tied to a lamppost and severely beaten by the soldiers with their rifle butts,
while other unconfirmed reports have claimed that one monk was killed during
the crackdown. In retaliation to the violence visited upon them, monks from the
Maha Visutarama Monastery in Pakokku took almost 20 SPDC officials hostage
the following day, and set fire to their vehicles.
Outraged over the events of the previous days, on 9 September, an

underground coalition of monastic organisations, known as the All Burma
Monks Alliance (ABMA), demanded that the SPDC issue a public apology for
the mistreatment of monks, reduce fuel and commodity prices, release all
political prisoners, and begin meaningful dialogue with democratic opposition
groups. The ABMA gave the SPDC a little over a week to respond to these
11
demands, at which time, in the absence of any resolution, they would call for the
boycott and excommunication of the SPDC and all of its agents and associates.
The SPDC failed to address any of the monk’s demands, so, on 17 September
2007, thousands of monks took to the streets across the country in protest
against the SPDC, at which point the excommunicative order was recited.
During the week from 18 to 24 September, tens of thousands of Buddhist

monks led massive anti-junta demonstrations throughout most of Burma’s 14
States and Divisions. Thousands of Burmese civilians quickly joined the rallies,
in the largest peaceful protests against the military regime in almost two
decades.
On the evening of the 24 September, Brigadier General Thura Myint Maung,

Minister of Religious Affairs, was quoted on state television as threatening that
action would be taken against the monks should they continue with their
protests. On the same evening, trucks mounted with loudspeakers toured
Rangoon’s streets, warning those who continued to participate in the protests
would be dealt with under Burmese law.
On 25 September 2007, despite such threats, tens of thousands of people once

again took to the streets of Rangoon in protest. That evening, the trucks
bearing loudspeakers yet again toured the streets, announcing the imposition of
a night time curfew and repeated the decree banning all assemblies of more
than five people. Monasteries across Rangoon were visited by security forces
who threatened the monks with arrest if they continued to participate in
demonstrations.
On the morning of the 26 September, and despite such overt threats, tens of
thousands of protestors once again took to the streets. SPDC army soldiers
and riot police had been stationed throughout the city, and numerous
monasteries were cordoned off by security forces, trapping the monks inside.
Beginning on 26 September and continuing over the next two days, combined
security forces made up of soldiers, riot police, USDA and SAS attacked
peaceful protestors on the streets of Rangoon, firing live rounds into crowds,
and beating monks and civilians, sometimes to death. Their systematic resort
to means far beyond that which was necessary revealed an intention to
brutalise and cow the protestors, who were treated as valid military targets.
Particularly violent crackdowns occurred on 27 September in South Okkalapa

and Tamwe Townships and in the vicinity of Sule Pagoda, and scores of
protestors are known to have been killed in these three events alone, both
through shooting and severe beatings. In several instances no warning was
given of an impending crackdown by security forces, and protestors were at
times deliberately penned in by the authorities, often immediately followed by
the firing of live rounds into the trapped crowds.
While in many cases shooting into crowds was conducted indiscriminately, in

other instances it is apparent that the security forces deliberately targeted
12
certain individuals, either due to their apparent leadership role, or simply

because they were brandishing a camera and could document the crackdowns.
For the majority of those persons killed during the protests, the SPDC has
denied any knowledge of the event, made no attempt to identify the dead,
investigate the cause of death, return the bodies to their families, or to give
them even the minimum Buddhist funerary rites. Instead, numerous testimonies
gathered from those present have revealed a strategy in which bodies were
removed from the scene of each crackdown to cover up the extent of the
violence. Persistent reports have also testified to the fact that Ye Way
Crematorium in North Okkalapa Township was operated throughout the night by
security forces beginning on 27 September through to 30 September, most
probably to dispose of the bodies of those who were killed.
To ebb the flow of information, the SPDC cut the majority of the country’s
Internet and telephone networks. Similarly, journalists, and those who spoke to
them, were attacked and arrested. Concurrent to this, the SPDC-controlled
media launched a smear campaign to defame those monks who had
participated in the demonstrations, while continuing to denounce internal and
external agitators “intent on destabilizing the union” as being the underlying
cause of the protests.
At the same time that they were conducting their violent crackdowns on
protestors on the streets of Rangoon, security forces took steps to remove the
monastic community from the protests during a series of night time raids.
Exploiting the cover of its curfew, SPDC security forces raided a number of
prominent monasteries around Rangoon, assaulting and arresting those monks
residing within. Many of these raids were especially violent. Monks were badly
beaten, shots were fired, and monastery property was either looted or
destroyed. Between 25 September and 6 October 2007 over 50 monasteries
were raided across the country. A steady stream of further raids has also been
reported to have occurred right through October and November 2007. Many
other monasteries were ordered to send their monks back to their home towns
and villages in other, more remote parts of the country so that they could not
continue to take part in the demonstrations.
The violence visited on protestors, the massive number of arrests both on the
streets and during night time raids, especially those which targeted the
monasteries, combined with a greater military presence on the streets of
Rangoon assured that by 28 September 2007, the scale of the protests had
dramatically decreased. Nevertheless, thousands continued in their attempts to
demonstrate, and the SPDC again responded by beating and arresting
protestors and firing live rounds into the crowds. By 2 October 2007, the large-
scale protests had been all but quashed.
It has been estimated that approximately 6,000 people, including as many as

1,400 monks, were arrested for their involvement in the protests. Of this
number, it was reported that, at the time of publication, over 700 remained in
detention.
13
Those detained in relation to the protests were subjected to conditions of

detention which fall far below any minimum international standards and
consistent reports have emerged of the use of torture to extract information
during repeated interrogation sessions. Numerous detainees who suffered
injuries during their initial apprehension or subsequently while in detention have
also reported that they were denied adequate medical care and that over 20
deaths had occurred in custody.
The response to the protests highlights the SPDC’s complete unwillingness to

either reform or govern in the interests of the people. The regime relied upon
violent repression to quell the demonstrations, has attempted to cover up the
extent of this violence, and refused to address any of the underlying causes
which initially sparked the protests. Nor has the SPDC shown any genuine
willingness to cooperate with international efforts to mediate reconciliation with
pro-democracy groups.
A column of monks marching in protest of the SPDC and their continued

oppression on 23 September 2007 following the announcement of the
excommunicative order and the declaration of nationwide protests. Monks
and lay persons alike turned out on the streets in their thousands despite
heavy rains and flooding in Rangoon at the time. [© Reuters].
14
II. Government by Exploitation: The Burmese

Way to Capitalism?
“[O]ver the last decade, opposite to virtually every other country in
Asia where slowly poverty is being gnawed away at and food
security is becoming more commonplace, in Myanmar there are
more people living below the poverty line and more people facing
food insecurity”.2
The recent demonstrations and their subsequent brutal suppression in Burma

brought the economic plight of the Burmese people to the attention of the world.
The protests had initially been sparked by a sudden and marked increase in fuel
prices, the impact of which was considerable on a population whose livelihoods
have long been compromised by decades of military rule.
While Burma is a resource rich country, the general population struggles daily to
survive at bare subsistence. In 2006, Burma’s per capita gross domestic
product (GDP) was only US$281, making it one of the ten poorest countries in
the world, and the poorest outside Africa.3 An estimated 95 percent of the
population live on less than US$1 a day, with 90 percent surviving on less than
65 cents.4 The Regional Director of the United Nations World Food Program
(WFP) has estimated that at least five million people within the country do not
have enough food to eat,5 with reported rates of malnutrition of more than 30
percent in children under the age of five.6
In early 2007, the United Nations (UN) calculated that the average proportion of
household expenditure spent on food was as much as 70 percent of the entire
family budget; a damning indictment of the very low income level of the
population.7 Furthermore, Burma is the only country in the world where beriberi,
a disease caused by a deficiency of thiamine (vitamin B1), is one of the leading
causes of infant mortality. Such a statistic is directly attributable to the inability
of families to diversify their food intake.8
2
Source: WFP official cited in: “The hardship that sparked Burma’s unrest,” BBC
News, 2 October 2007.
3
Source: Indicators on Income and Economic Activity, United Nations Statistic
Division, accessed at: http://unstats.un.org/unsd/demographic/products/socind/inc-
eco.htm on 5 December 2007.
4
Source: Results of a yet to be published UNDP survey, cited in: Burma’s ‘Saffron
Revolution’ is not over: Time for the International Community to Act, ITUC-FIDH,
December 2007.
5
Source: Ibid.
6
Source: Humanitarian Situation UPDATE April 2007, Office of the UN Humanitarian
Coordinator. for Myanmar, 2007.
7
Source: Ibid.
8
Source: Ibid.
15
In certain areas of the country the situation is even more acute. The UN has
identified more than 70 percent of the population of Chin State as living in
poverty, with 40 percent simply not having enough food with which to survive.9
The Karen Human Rights Group (KHRG) has reported that in some areas of
Thaton District of Karen State,10 less than a quarter of the population has
enough food to feed themselves.11 Meanwhile, in Arakan State, 60 percent of
those under five years old are reported as being moderately underweight.12
The endowment of the country with a wealth of natural resources has ironically
contributed to such impoverishment under military rule. The SPDC holds a
monopoly on the export of oil and natural gas, and the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) placed SPDC gas revenues at US$1,235.6 million in 2006. This
amount constitutes approximately 43 percent of Burma’s export earnings. The
bulk of other export earnings are provided by the sale of timber, gems, copper
and pulses.13 It is this extraction and export of energy, gems, copper and
timber, alongside other natural resources that enables the ruling Generals to
enrich themselves without concern for the general welfare of the economy, or
investment in human capital. By way of example, the Yadana natural gas fields
off the Arakan coast provide the SPDC with US$360 million in export earnings
per year, while only accounting for the employment of 270 Burmese staff.14
The SPDC’s pervasive military apparatus is also an important factor in

permitting the military oligarchs to exploit the country’s natural resources while
neglecting the economic situation of the civilian populace. As one Burmese
writer forced underground following the September crackdown has stated, “We
are the military’s slaves. We want democracy. We want to wait no longer. But
we are afraid of their guns”.15 Though it are these “guns” which suppress
opposition to the regime’s exploitative rule, the cost of sustaining such a military
force, itself, places a further and significant burden on the population’s ability to
survive.
9
Source: Ibid.
10
There are many disputes between the Karen and the SPDC regarding the delineation
of borders in Karen State. Thaton District is demarcated by the Karen as part of Karen
territory and under the patrol of the 1st Brigade of the KNLA. Thaton District falls
mostly in the SPDC demarcated area of Mon State, while the area to the east of the
Donthami River lies within SPDC demarcated Karen State.
11
Source: Hunger Wielded as a Weapon in Thaton District, KHRG, 20 September 2006.
12
Source: Humanitarian Situation UPDATE April 2007, Office of the UN Humanitarian
Coordinator for Myanmar, 2007.
13
Source: “Burma’s Poverty of Riches: Natural Gas and the Insatiable State”, Sean
Turnell, 2007.
14
Source: Burma’s Saffron Revolution is not over: Time for the International
Community to Act, ITUC-FIDH, December 2007.
15
Source: “In Myanmar, Fear Is a Constant Companion,” New York Times, 20 October
2007.
16
Rather than governing in the economic interests of the population, the SPDC
dictates and manipulates macroeconomic policy both for its own profit and to
support its armed forces. Such fiscal and monetary policy formulations are
made to the considerable detriment of the general state of the economy, private
enterprise and social welfare. Moreover, the SPDC sanctions the widespread
abuse and exploitation of local populations by the military, particularly in rural
and ethnic minority areas, so as to support their continued presence in those
areas.
The machinations of this exploitative system are given explicit evidence in the
increased militarization which invariably accompanies SPDC cash projects such
as hydroelectric dams, mining concessions and natural gas pipelines, and the
concomitant increase in abuse of local populations.
Macroeconomic Policy
“Macroeconomic policy-making in Burma is coloured by one
overwhelming fact – the irresistible demand of the state upon the
country’s real output”.16
At the core of economic dysfunction within the country is the fact that the SPDC
spending habitually exceeds its capacity for revenue generation. The resultant
demand placed upon the economy by the state has resulted in the crippling of
the financial sector and rampant levels of inflation. Moreover, the misallocation
of these resources, the majority of which are directed towards the military, has
resulted in the chronic neglect of other areas that would contribute to economic
development and social welfare, such as health, education and the supply of
electricity.
Fiscal Policy
The junta is widely estimated to spend upwards of 40 percent of its national
budget on defence.17 Human Rights Watch (HRW) report this figure to have
been as high as 50 percent in recent years,18 while Burmese economist, Mya
Maung, asserts that if all expenses related to defence and security functions
were included, they may be as high as 60 percent of the national budget. This
latter figure factors in defence spending made under the aegis of the Ministry for
Progress of Border Areas and National Races and Development Affairs, the
16
Source: Burma’s Economic Prospects; Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations
Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs, BEW, 29 March 2006.
17
Source: Burma: Security Council Should Impose Arms Embargo: Weapons Sales by
India, China and Russia Fuel Abuses, Strengthen Military Rule, HRW, 10 October
2007; The Gathering Storm: Infectious Diseases and Human Rights in Burma, John
Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health and the University of Berkeley, July 2007.
18
Source: Sold to be Soldiers: The Recruitment and Use of Child Soldiers in Burma,
HRW, October 2007.
17
Ministry of Home Affairs, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and even the Ministry of
Agriculture and Irrigation.19
In recent years, the SPDC has also spent large sums of money on unnecessary
and as yet unjustified projects, such as moving the site of its capital out of
Rangoon. In November 2005, the regime initiated this abrupt relocation to the
remote site of Naypyidaw in Mandalay Division, which included the forcible
transfer of thousands of civil servants. While the motives for this move remain
the subject of much speculation, the IMF has estimated that “about 1–2 percent
of GDP has been spent in the last few years by the government on the move”.20
Meanwhile, the health and education sectors have been grossly under-funded
for the entirety of the SPDC’s tenure. Even if official figures provided by the
regime are taken at face value, they serve to underscore this fact. According to
official figures, the budget for the Ministry of Health in the 2006/2007 fiscal year
accounted for just 0.8 percent of the total national budget, while allocations for
the Ministry of Education comprised 1.9 percent of SPDC expenditure.21
Keeping in mind the regime’s consistent overestimation of official figures, it is
quite likely that even these appallingly small budget allocations are an
exaggeration of the reality.
The effects of under-funding are readily evident in the standard of healthcare

throughout the country. In 2000, Burma’s healthcare system was ranked 190th
out of 191 surveyed nations by the World Health Organisation (WHO).22 The
funding of HIV/AIDS programs, in particular, serves as useful indicator with
which to judge the regimes spending priorities. Estimates by the United Nations
put the number of HIV/AIDS sufferers in Burma at anywhere up to 610,000
people, or approximately two percent of the population.23 In the face of such
statistics, the total national budget for HIV/AIDS in 2005 was a mere
US$137,000.24 To put this in perspective, the following year SPDC Chairperson
Senior General Than Shwe spent some 290 times this amount, when he
lavished an estimated US$40 million on his daughter’s wedding.
Similarly, Burma’s deteriorating education system is largely the result of

disproportionately low investment by the regime. Despite SPDC assertions of
free education for all, under-funding means families are forced to shoulder the
financial burden of buying school supplies, as well as paying for the teachers’
19
Source: Burma Economic Review 2005-2006, The Burma Fund, June 2007.
20
Source: “As Myanmar’s new capital emerges, analysts question its true costs,” AFP,
6 April 2007.
21
Source: Burma Country Report on Human Rights Practices-2006, Bureau of Human
Rights, Democracy and Labor, U.S. Department of State, 6 March 2007.
22
Source: World health report 2000. Health system: improving performance, World
Health Organisation, 2000.
23
Source: “Burma to tackle sex education in schools,” Irrawaddy, 25 January 2006.
24
Source: The Gathering Storm: Infectious Diseases and Human Rights in Burma, John
Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health and the University of Berkeley, July 2007.
18
food and travel expenses. As tuition fees and associated costs rise, poor
families are forced out of the educational arena in increasing numbers. Though
the SPDC claims that 90 percent of the nation’s children are enrolled within the
education system, the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) places this
figure at closer to 55 percent.25 In a three township survey conducted in 2005
by the UK-registered Save the Children Foundation (SCUK), more than half of
out-of-school children reported “cannot afford schooling costs” as their reason
for leaving school.26 Burma historian Josef Silverstein has commented on the
status of the education system within the country in stating “[m]aybe that is what
the military really wanted, the elimination of an educated population. Whether it
was or not, that is what has occurred”.27
Funding for important infrastructure projects such as the power sector has also
been largely neglected by the regime. As a result, in 2006, Burma only
possessed a national electricity generating capacity of 1.8 million kilowatts.
This can be compared to its ASEAN neighbour, Vietnam, which had a national
generating capacity of 55,300 million kilowatts of electricity in 2006.28
Moreover, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) has reported that electricity
usage in Burma actually fell by 32.4 percent during the 2004-05 fiscal year.29
“The electricity always cuts out. In the summer, we are only given
electricity for some parts of the day. If the electricity comes at six
in the morning, it will go off at eleven in the morning. If the
electricity comes at eleven in the morning, it stops at six in the
evening. If it comes late at night, we have to work through the
night because we cannot do our work without the electricity. Even
during these times, it can cut out at any time”.30
“We only get electricity for about three days a week. They supply it
in rotation. At times when we have no electricity we have to use a
generator for power. Even when we do get electricity, it is a lower
voltage than it should be, so we often still have to use our
generator”.31
25
Source: “Barriers to Education for Poor Families in Southern Burma,” Kaowao News, 26
June 2006.
26
Source: Situation of the Children in Myanmar, SCUK, June 2005.
27
Source: “Chaos could come if Myanmar Junta Falls,” AP, 24 October 2007.
28
Source: “Fuel price hikes inflame Burmese people,” Altsean Burma, 14 September 2007.
29
Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Burma Economic Watch, 29 March 2006.
30
Source: HRDU Interview with “Ma Khin Oo”, 47-year-old female civilian, 30 October
2007. The names of all interviewees have been changed to protect them from repercussions
from the SPDC. All names cited in the footnotes for HRDU interviews are pseudonyms.
31
Source: HRDU Interview with “Ma Nay Lin Naing”, 43-year-old female civilian, 7
November 2007.
19
While the general population struggles with the acute shortage of electricity,
Naypyidaw and other large scale military installations are reported to receive an
almost constant supply of power – typically at the expense of the general
population.32
Monetary Policy
As a result of budgetary deficits, SPDC spending is largely financed through
Central Bank loans, as well as loans from private banks within the country. As a
consequence of such a heavy demand being placed upon them, the capacity of
these institutions to provide the private sector with credit is significantly
diminished.33 For instance, 80 percent of those working in the rural economy do
not have access to any form of formal credit.34 In a country where the
agricultural sector accounts for approximately 70 of the labour force,35 this
means that a mere 14 percent of the population has access to credit.
Furthermore, the junta has instituted strict limits on interest rates within the
country, as a means to minimise repayments on its own loans. As these rates
are far outstripped by rates of inflation, the prospect of depositing money in one
of the country’s banks guarantees a negative return, further negating the role of
the financial sector in the country’s economic development.36 In 2007, for
instance, the Central Bank directed all private banks to limit the amount of
deposits they could accept from their customers. This directive was issued
because SPDC interest rate limits meant no profit could be made on loaning
these deposits out again.37
When SPDC spending is funded through loans from the Central Bank, this
financing is largely provided for through the printing of more money. Such
‘running of the printing presses’ has been the major cause of monetary
expansion within the country. Evidently sharing this view, Allison Vicary of
Burma Economic Watch (BEW) has stated, in reference to printing more money,
that "[n]o one with a modicum of economic understanding, would recommend
this policy. … It is actually one of the stupidest policies imaginable – there is no
other outcome, than bigger problems".38 In 1988, there was 20 billion kyat
circulating inside Burma. By 1997, just under 10 years later, the amount of
money in circulation had reached almost 200 billion kyat. Since this time, the
32
Source: “Myanmar’s remote capital is still a work in progress,” New York Times, 5
October 2007.
33
Source: “Burma’s Economic Prospects; Testimony before the Senate Foreign
Relations Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs”, Burma Economic Watch,
29 March 2006.
34
Source: Ibid.
35
Source: Burma Human Rights Yearbook 2006, HRDU, 24 June 2007.
36
Source: Ibid.
37
Source: The Economic Follies and Fundamentals of Military Rule in Burma, Burma
Economic Watch Supplement, October 2007.
38
20
SPDC has not released any further statistics on the matter. Nevertheless,
economists, using sources such as the consumer price index, have been able to
estimate that the total amount of money in circulation is now 1.3 trillion kyat.39
Such monetary expansion has inevitably been accompanied by attendant high

levels of inflation. Widely accepted estimates claim the rate of inflation in
Burma to have already reached chronic levels of between 40-60 percent prior to
the rise in fuel prices, with the price of good quality rice reported to have
increased 100 percent through 2006.40
Chronic levels of inflation are further aggravated by periodic shocks, of which

the recent hike in fuel prices was only the latest example. In October 2005, the
SPDC cut fuel subsidies, leading to increases in fuel prices of almost 900
percent. The price of a gallon of fuel in November 2005 was 1,500 kyat, up
from 180 kyat the previous month.41
On 1 April 2006, the SPDC awarded a 10-fold salary increase for all estimated
one million civil servants throughout the country. The increase was reportedly
instituted through fears of discontent over the move of the capital to
Naypyidaw,42 and was largely financed through the running of the printing
presses.43 While middle and lower ranking civil servants were in desperate
need of such an increase, the SPDC then announced that 10 percent of their
incomes would be withheld on their behalf, though they were not provided with
the bankbooks or allowed to access this money.44 Fringe benefits, such as free
bus travel and subsidised electricity rates were also lost following the salary
increase.45 Meanwhile, the cost of basic goods such as rice and tea jumped by
up to 30 percent within days.46 Fuel prices also increased within days of the
pay rise, further affecting the already spiralling commodity prices.47 Then, on 1
May 2006, only a month after the salary hikes (and the abolition of subsidised
39
Source: “Burma struggles to make ends meet: Runaway inflation illustrates there is
nothing sustainable about the current economic situation,” Bangkok Post, 3 November
2007.
40
Source: “Food Prices Spark Open Dissidence,” Mizzima News, 28 February 2007.
41
Source: “Fuel price hikes inflame Burmese people,” Altsean Burma, 14 September
2007.
42
Source: “Paper Money: Burma Junta Confirms Salary Hike for Civil Servants,” DVB,
26 March 2006.
43
Source: “Burmese Kyat Hits All-Time Low,” Irrawaddy, 29 March 2006.
44
Source: “Burmese Civil Servants Forced to Save 10% of Their Salary”, DVB, 5 June
2006.
45
Source: “Paper Money: Burmese Civil Servants Still Facing Hardship Despite Salary
Hike”, DVB, 16 July 2006.
46
Sources: “SPDC’s Attempts to Control Commodities’ Prices”, IMNA, 4 April 2006;
“Myanmar Takes Measures in Stabilizing Commodity Prices”, Xinhua, 6 April 2006.
47
21
rates for those civil servants), the SPDC Ministry of Electric Power increased
electricity rates by 1,000 percent.48
“My salary with the ‘XXXX’ Ministry stands at 46,000 kyat a month,
which is about 40 US dollars. The lowest paid employee gets
15,000 kyat. Before the pay rises in 2006, my salary was around
10,000 kyat and the lowest salary was 7,000. But it didn’t make
much different for our lives as basic commodity prices came up
along with the pay rise. So, the money I make isn’t really enough
to survive on. Also, the pay rise we got is nothing compared to the
pay rise of senior officials such as Directors [and high ranking
military officers]. Their salary which stood around 50,000 kyat was
raised to more than 200,000 kyat. That’s the same thing with all
the government ministries”.49
The concomitant rise in commodity prices ultimately negated the benefits of the
salary increase for civil servants. Meanwhile, salaries for those who work in the
private sector remain appallingly low, averaging about 1,000 kyat a day. The
situation for pensioners is particularly illustrative of the situation. In 2007, one
72-year-old retiree pointed out that his pension of 700 kyat a month was “not
even enough for my tea”.50
While the SPDC’s own fiscal mismanagement has been the leading factor in
inflation, the regimes response has been targeted at regulating prices, and
fining and punishing those traders who charge more than the set price for
certain goods.51 Meanwhile, prices have continued to rise.
Such chronic levels of inflation have also led Burma’s unofficial or ‘black market’
exchange rate to increase exponentially over the past decade. On 15 October
2007, this rate stood at 1,325 kyat to the US dollar, having increased from 240
kyat to the US dollar over the past decade.52 While this rate is reflective of the
true value of the kyat, the official fixed exchange rate continues to tie the kyat to
the IMF ‘Special Drawing Rights’ at a rate roughly equivalent to 6 kyat to the
US dollar; over 200 times less than the unofficial, albeit more accurate, rate.53
48
Source: “Fuel price hikes inflame Burmese people,” Altsean Burma, 14 September
2007.
49
Source: HRDU Interview with “Ko Naing Than”, 27-year-old male civil servant, 19
October 2007.
50
2007.
51
Source: “Burmese Rice Merchants Told to Sell Their Goods at Half Price”, DVB, 12
August 2006.
52
Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Burma Economic Watch, 29 March
2006.
53
Source: Ibid.
22
These divergent and distorted exchange rates are maintained by the SPDC for
the purpose of short term economic benefit. The ability to purchase dollars at
the official rate (which, only those affiliated with the regime are permitted to do)
allows an immediate profit, through nothing more than a manipulation of
economic reality. Those able to access foreign exchange at the official rate can
make immediate and sizeable profits by immediately selling it back into the
unofficial market. In addition, foreign exchange can be used to buy goods from
abroad at prices far cheaper than anyone else can in Burma, vastly increasing
an importer’s profit, or simply providing the well connected with access to
distortedly cheap luxury goods.
The tremendous discrepancy between official and unofficial exchange rates

have directed the SPDC to institute other, ‘semi-official’, rates which fall
somewhere between the two. For instance, a rate of 450 kyat to the US dollar
applies for all funds brought into Burma by UN agencies and international non-
government organizations (INGOs), as well as in calculating excise paid by
many importers and exporters. Even these semi-official rates provide the regime
with a ready means of profit, as UN agencies and INGOs provide the SPDC
with foreign exchange at less than half the prevailing market price.54 As a
result, the SPDC is directly profiting from the efforts of these organizations
working to alleviate the humanitarian situation in the country.
The effect of distorted exchange rates on the broader economy are immense;
ranging from the extraordinary corruption incentives that they promote, to the
dramatic misallocation of resources to activities that do not match Burma’s
comparative advantage, but rather the channels carved out by the exchange
rate. The crippling effects that such a system has on the economy are in urgent
need of being addressed. However, as Sean Turnell of BEW states, “[s]uch a
reform program is unlikely from a regime that is clearly the existing system’s
leading beneficiary”.55
54
Source: Ibid.
55
Source: The Economic Follies and Fundamentals of Military Rule in Burma, Burma
Economic Watch Supplement, October 2007.
23
The Economic Cost of Militarization

Despite high levels of military spending, the SPDC has struggled to meet the
financial demands of maintaining its pervasive security apparatus while still
turning a profit for itself and its cronies. In response, it has provided military-run
companies with a monopoly in important sectors of the economy, and directed
all important foreign investment into establishing joint ventures with these
organizations.
Two of the most significant military-controlled conglomerates are the Union of

Myanmar Economic Holdings Ltd. (UMEH) and the Myanmar Economic
Corporation (MEC), who together dominate key sectors of the economy. Their
activities are largely directed towards building the military’s resource base,
further enabling privileged economic treatment of high ranking military
personnel. Moreover, the Myanmar Investment Commission (MIC), which is
comprised of many members of the SPDC cabinet and their cronies and thus
entirely controlled by the military, approves all foreign investments in Burma.
This enables the junta to direct foreign investment towards companies such as
UMEH and MEC, with all major foreign investors entering into joint ventures with
UMEH. In turn, these ‘State enterprises’ turn a significant profit for the ruling
Generals and direct finances towards the maintenance of its military machinery,
at the expense of other business interests.
In addition, the SPDC has allowed rampant corruption at all levels of the
military-controlled economy and private sector to go largely unchecked. In
2007, Transparency International, a global watchdog against corruption, ranked
Burma, alongside Somalia, as the most corrupt polity on the planet. In
producing its listings, Transparency International ranks countries according to
the abuse of public power for private benefit, such as the bribery of public
officials, kickbacks in public procurement, embezzlement of public funds and the
strength of anti-corruption policies. In allowing such unbridled corruption the
SPDC is indirectly providing an economic reward to its military cadres at no
direct cost to itself.
Even more drastically, the SPDC has sanctioned the systematic abuse and
exploitation of local populations by and for the benefit of its military units
stationed in those areas; including the systematic practices of forced labour,
extortion, and land confiscation.
Since 1997, frontline SPDC army battalions have been directed to “live off the
land” under the Self-Reliance Program. Under this program, SPDC army units
are not only permitted but also expected to obtain food and rations by their own
means from local communities. In March 2007, a leaked internal SPDC army
document contained implicit instructions for the continued sanctioning of such
abuses. It instructed SPDC army battalion commanders to continue to raise
funds through agriculture and the sale of seized goods, and accused those
24
commanders who failed to do so of “sucking oil” from the War Office.56 The
economic effects of such abuses on rural populations are crippling.
Arguably, the most pervasive of abuses which occurs as a result of the Self-
Reliance Program is the use of forced labour. In 1996, a year before the Self-
Reliance Program was introduced, the US Embassy in Rangoon estimated that
the annual market value of forced labour employed by the junta on public works
projects totalled 17.5 billion kyat, at that time equivalent to 3.7 percent of
Burma’s GDP.57 Since that time, and with the initiation of the Self-Reliance
Program, the practice has continued unabated despite strong and sustained
pressure from the International Labour Organization (ILO) on the issue.
Thousands of villagers and townsfolk across the country have testified to the
effects that forced labour has had on their lives.
“I cannot remember that we have ever experienced such bad

times. The NaSaKa (Burma Border Security Force) and the Army
joined together to suck all our energy and money. How will the
poor survive with so much forced labour? When will this end?
Soon we won’t be able to stay in Burma. Another famine is already
looming”.58
Any time spent performing forced labour for the military ultimately results with
less time in which to tend to one’s own livelihood. Those forced to perform the
labour have little choice other than to do as ordered and are rarely paid for their
effort. Furthermore, they are obliged to supply not only their own food and
tools, but also all necessary building materials, placing an even greater strain on
available resources.
The Self-Reliance Program also encourages widespread extortion and looting.

SPDC army battalions regularly issue demands to nearby communities for the
supply of food, cash, building materials, or just about any other item that they
are in need of. In many areas, this extortion is continuous, with some villages
being forced meet competing daily demands from numerous different sources.
Such demands naturally severely impact the day-to-day survival of local
populations.
Similarly, thousands of acres of farmland have been confiscated by the military

without any form of compensation. While much of this land confiscation has
been carried out to make way for new roads, army camps, or other
infrastructure or development projects, vast amounts have also been seized
under the Self-Reliance Program. In other instances, local SPDC army
commanders order the confiscation for their own profit, often in the absence of
any form of justification, and while this practice is most pervasive in ethnic
56
Source: “Myanmar Army Document Spotlights Low Morale,” Jane’s Defence
Weekly, 27 March 2007.
57
Source: Burma Economic Review 2005-2006, The Burma Fund, June 2007.
58
Source: No Rest from Forced Labour, The Arakan Project, 31 May 2006.
25
minority areas, farmers throughout the country have no security of land tenure.
Under existing laws in Burma, all farmland belongs to the state, and farmers are
only permitted cultivation rights over the land that they live and work on. As
such, the SPDC can confiscate any land that they choose without paying
compensation to the farmers for the loss of their land and livelihoods.
Prominent labour rights activist Daw Su Su Nway (centre) struggles with

plainclothes security officials in Hlaedan Township, Rangoon as they attempt
to apprehend one of her colleagues on 28 August 2007during the early
economic protests. [© DVB/Reuters].
26
The Straw that Broke the Camel’s Back

The SPDC maintains a monopoly over the sale of fuel in Burma. Without warning,
on 15 August 2007, the SPDC declared a five-fold increase in the price of
compressed natural gas (CNG), a doubling in the cost of diesel fuel and an increase
in the cost of petrol prices by two-thirds. The effect of this unexpected rise in the
price of rationed fuel on the general population was immediate. Compressed
Natural Gas, in which the steepest increase was introduced, had been widely
promoted by the SPDC for use in commercial vehicles, and the majority of public
buses in the cities of Burma are powered by it. As a result bus fares increased
sharply.
With discretionary income largely non existent, steep increases in transport costs
severely impacted people’s ability to feed themselves and their families. Many
Burmese workers, particularly those living in the poor suburbs and satellite towns of
Rangoon, earning around 1,000 kyat a day, now had to pay anywhere up to 800
kyat for transport, leaving only 200 kyat a day for food. This represents a virtual
reversal on their spending ratio prior to the hike.59
“I want to talk about a woman who lived in Hlaing Tharyar, on the

outskirts of Rangoon. She worked doing people’s laundry and
travelled to the downtown area by bus to work. Her daily income was
between 1,000 and 1,500 kyat. Before the fuel prices were increased,
she spent 400 kyat for her travel fees. Although, since the rise, she
must spend 800 kyat for her daily bus fare. I don’t know how she
survives”.60
“I live in North Okkalapa [Township] and to get to Sule [Pagoda] I now

have to spend 200 kyat on bus fare. If I want to go somewhere else
downtown I need to spend 100 kyat more. By the time I come home I
have spent 500 kyat on transport. It is too much. The ordinary worker
gets less then 30,000 kyat a month and they cannot manage their
income and daily expenditures. It is a big problem for the ordinary
people to survive”.61
“I gave up my job as a taxi driver after the fuel price was raised. By
driving a taxi I could not even get enough money to give back to the
owner of car. Some of my friends also gave up their jobs”.62
59
Source: “A People Running on Empty,” IPS, 24 August 2007; “Soaring petrol costs
deepen woes,” Bangkok Post, 20 August 2007; Burma Bulletin, Altsean Burma, August
2007.
60
Source: HRDU Interview with “Ko Shwe Naing”, 32-year-old male civilian, 1
November 2007.
61
Source: HRDU Interview with “Ko Lwin Soe”, 33-year-old male student activist, 18
October 2007.
62
Source: HRDU Interview with “U Thein Soe”, 45-year-old male civilian, 7
November 2007.
27
“After the price hike, each student had to spend at least 20,000 kyat
for monthly transport costs from his or her home to attend classes. If
a student’s home was farther from classes, it would rise to 30,000
kyat! Most of the students could no longer attend their classes after
the fuel price rise”.63
Prior to the fuel price hike, as much as 70 percent of household income was
dedicated to the purchase of food; strongly indicative of an impoverished
population. However, the apparent decrease in this figure is patently unreflective of
higher income levels. Rather, it is symptomatic of a rapidly deepening humanitarian
crisis throughout the country.
“Previously we couldn’t save any money as living costs for our whole
family under high commodity rates was at about 2,000 kyat per day.
After the fuel price hikes, bus fares jumped up about three-times
higher than before, bringing a greater struggle to the average person’s
life. We had to reduce the amount of food we ate daily. [The fuel
price hikes] also made my siblings’ education more difficult because it
made the prices of basic accessories, such as notebooks, increase”.64
“When the government increased the fuel prices some people could
no longer afford to eat rice so they had to eat rice soup. Others could
not even afford to eat rice soup so they just ate corn”.65
Increased transport cost have not only forced members of the population to allocate
fewer funds towards the purchase of food but the increase in fuel costs created an
associated change in the price of this food. The agricultural industry depends on
fuel for irrigation, processing, and transportation of crops, while shops and small
businesses must use diesel to run generators amid the frequent electricity
blackouts. All such increased costs are ultimately passed on to the consumer.
“Most of the civilians in Sittwe Township [in Arakan State] are workers
earning a basic living. Now, 90 percent are facing difficulties to travel
and maintain their livelihoods after the rise in fuel prices. They have to
buy commodities which have doubled in price from traders who have
come from other regions. Some of the poor families have to share
their rice to survive. The students are also faced with difficulties,
particularly those who must come from out of town each day, who
must spend 700 – 800 kyat on travelling costs. Most of the students
63
Source: HRDU Interview with “Ko Aye Maung”, 22-year-old male NLD Youth
member, 24 October 2007.
64
Source: HRDU Interview with “Ma Zin Aung”, 26-year-old female civilian, 1
November 2007.
65
Source: HRDU Interview with “U Thu Nyunt”, 37-year-old male political activist, 20
October 2007.
28
do not receive electricity and now they cannot even afford to buy the
candles so they can study at night”.66
“The electricity for the industrial zone where our factory is situated is
not supplied regularly. Sometimes the government would provide
[electricity for] 12 hours and sometimes there was no electricity for the
whole day. So normally, we would use 4 or 5 or 6 gallons of diesel per
day to run the generator. So, when the fuel prices were raised, the
daily expenses for our factory were increased significantly”.67
By the end of August 2007, the price of food, clothing, and other basic commodities
had increased significantly. The price of rice had jumped 10 percent, meat 15
percent, and a standard plate of noodles at a food stall had tripled.68 However,
prices continued to rise. According to Altsean Burma, by the end of September, the
price of a kilogram of rice had increased from around 300 kyat to 500 kyat, while a
dozen eggs had doubled in price from 600 kyat to 1,200 kyat.69
“I sold the best quality rice at my rice shop last year. In 2006, I
charged 15,000 kyat per basket. Since I have fled, my wife has
phoned me and told me that that it now costs 35,000 kyat per basket.
But then there is also the low quality rice. Almost all of the people
depend on that rice as their staple food. When I ran my rice shop, it
only cost 9,000 kyat per basket. After the fuel prices rose, it costs
nearly 30,000 kyat per basket”.70
In the absence of any real context, the price rise in fuel can be defended as an
unfortunate but necessary fiscal adjustment to bring the price in line with the
prevailing global markets. While, the price of fuel in Burma had previously been
kept artificially low through heavy SPDC subsidising, the ever-increasing global oil
prices have nearly doubled the SPDC’s expenses for importing fuel oil over the past
year. Meanwhile, according to a report released by the IMF, the budget deficit of
the regime has risen from five percent of GDP in 1998 to seven percent in 2007.71
It has even been reported that the IMF had actually advised the junta against such
66
Source: HRDU Interview with “Ko Naing Thaung”, 27-year-old male student, 5
October 2007.
67
Source: HRDU Interview with “Ko Min Zaw”, 30-year-old male civilian, 27 October
2007.
68
Sources: “Protests over commodity prices point to structural damage beyond a quick
political fix,” Mizzima News, 22 August 2007; “Soaring petrol costs deepen woes,”
Bangkok Post, 20 August 2007; “Food Prices Spark Open Dissidence,” Mizzima News,
28 February 2007.
69
Source: Burma Bulletin, Altsean Burma, September 2007.
70
November 2007.
71
Source: “Staff Report for 2006: Article IV Consultation Report on Myanmar,” IMF,
15 September 2006.
29
large scale subsidising of fuel, as a means to balance these deficits.72 However, an

understanding of the reasons behind these deficits and the root causes of
impoverishment within the country expose SPDC economic policy to be entirely
indefensible, and based upon a model of government by exploitation of the many
for the benefit of the few.
Member of the 88 Generation Student’s Group, Mie Mie (right) leads a

protest through Rangoon on 22 August 2007 in protest of the sudden and
dramatic increase in domestic fuel prices. Mie Mie was subsequently
arrested on 12 October for her role in the protests. [© DVB/AFP].
72
Source: “Protests over commodity prices point to structural damage beyond a quick
political fix,” Mizzima News, 22 August 2007; “The hardship that sparked Burma’s
unrest,” BBC, 2 October 2007; “Fuel price policy explodes in Myanmar,” Asia Times,
24 August 2007.
30
III. Growing Discontent: The Economic Protests

Early Signs of Dissatisfaction
Existing laws in Burma permit the state almost total control over the assembly of
the people. Following the nationwide demonstrations of 1988; Order #2/88 was
enacted on 18 September 1988 and prohibits the “gathering, walking or
marching in procession by a group of five or more people regardless of whether
the act is with the intention of creating a disturbance or of committing a crime”.
This order is stringently applied by the junta as a means to suppress any activity
that stands in opposition to its continued and absolute rule. Nevertheless, the
deteriorating state of the economy compelled rare occasions of open dissent to
the military regime, in early 2007, even before the hike in fuel prices.
On 22 February 2007, an estimated 25 people joined a peaceful demonstration

in Rangoon to protest against the increasing costs of living. The demonstration
was organized by a group calling themselves the Myanmar Development
Committee (MDC). Placards carried by the protestors read “Down with
consumer prices”, and “We want 24-hour electricity”. Nine persons were
arrested in relation to this protest. They were later released on 27 February
2007 without charge.73 The junta-controlled English language newspaper, the
New Light of Myanmar, portrayed the protest as a riot, stating:
“… members of the group, which incited a gathering crowd through

a protest violated the existing law, illegally formed a group with the
intention of rising against the government, got involved in an act of
lawlessness and walked in procession shouting along a busy road.
… [T]he attempt of the protesters, whose motive was only to win
popularity among the people and seek self-interest, caused public
annoyance and panic. … [S]uch a deliberate attempt was totally
against the law and action might be taken against the protesters”.74
In the same month, U Than Zein, a retired seaman, who later declared that he
had no interest in politics, was compelled to post some homemade satirical
posters on his fence, after his daughter had told him four eggs were selling for
300 kyat. He was arrested that day and charged with causing a public
disturbance, although the case was later closed and Than Zein was freed.75
73
Source: “The hardship that sparked Burma’s unrest,” BBC, 2 October 2007.
74
Source: “Political Prisoners News,” DVB, February 2007.
75
Source: “Politics and the price of eggs,” AHRC, 4 May 2007.
31
Similarly, on 19 June 2007, Maung Kyaw Naing was arrested, in Taungup

Township of Arakan State after staging a solo protest against high levels of
inflation and unemployment. His mother and sister were also arrested in
relation to the protest. All three were reported as having been later released.76
Protesting the Fuel Price Rise

On 17 August 2007, two days after the price of fuel was raised by the SPDC,
Htin Kyaw, of the Myanmar Development Committee (MDC), called for
nationwide protests before disappearing into hiding.77
Political activists in Rangoon responded over the following days by organizing

marches throughout the city, representing the largest protests held in Burma for
over a decade. Each march was peaceful, and initially did not even include any
overt demands; rather groups of people walked across the city in a symbolic act
of the people’s inability to afford the increased bus fares.78
On 19 August 2007, over 500 demonstrators marched through the streets of

Rangoon. Those who participated, including various leaders of the 88
Generation Students’ Group were photographed and videotaped by the
authorities, presumably so that they could later be arrested. That same day, U
Win Naing of the MDC was attacked in his car by members of the SPDC-
controlled paramilitary group Swan Arr Shin (‘the masters of physical force’)
while donating rice to poor communities on the outskirts of Rangoon.79
On 21 August 2007, following continued small-scale demonstrations on the

previous day, hundreds of people marched from Rangoon’s Tamwe Township
to the headquarters of the National League for Democracy (NLD) in Bahan
Township. They were followed by armed members of the Union Solidarity
Development Organization (USDA), another SPDC-controlled paramilitary force
known for its involvement in political violence. Members of the Swan Arr Shin
(SAS), also armed with slingshots and sticks, followed to shout abuse and
threats at the protestors. Others trying to join the protests were threatened by
these groups with violence.80
76
Source: “Mother and sister of solo protester also arrested,” Mizzima News, 20 June
2007.
77
Sources: “Summary of Events in Burma, August 19-25,” Asia Pacific Peoples
Partnership on Burma, 2007; “Contrary to Claims of Burma’s Junta, More than One
Hundred Activists Arrested in Five Days,” AAPPB, 27 August 2007; “Burma: 2007
Protests Against Fuel Prices,” AHRC, August 2007.
78
Source: Burma: 2007 Protests Against Fuel Prices, AHRC, August 2007.
79
Sources: Summary of Events in Burma, August 19-25,” Asia Pacific Peoples
Partnership on Burma, 2007; “Contrary to Claims of Burma’s Junta, More than One
Hundred Activists Arrested in Five Days,” AAPPB, 27 August 2007; “Burma: 2007
Protests Against Fuel Prices,” AHRC, August 2007.
80
Sources: Ibid.
32
“On 21 August we started our march from Tamwe [Township].

After a while, there was a small crowd who tried to harass us when
we were near to Tamwe Plaza. One of them who was maybe 45-
years-old or so, shouted to us that we were not allowed to walk,
and said if we continued walking, that they would beat us. The
man angrily said that we could be killed if they wished. Another
one of them angrily accused us of being beggars and that was why
we couldn’t take the bus. Our leaders argued that the roads are
public property that can be used by any citizen, and that as
citizens; we had the right to walk on them. There they tried to
block us by force to stop us from marching on. They were 100
strong and they began to arrest and put us into cars”.81
That night, the SPDC arrested 14 prominent leaders of the 88 Generation

Students’ Group. State-controlled media announced that they were accused of
attempting acts to disturb national security and stability and the implementation
of the National Convention and the Roadmap process, and would be dealt with
under Order #5/96, which provides for up to twenty years imprisonment.82 At
the time of publication, those who were arrested continued to be detained and
all will likely face trial. They include:
1. Min Ko Naing;
2. Ko Ko Gyi;
3. Htay Win Aung (a.k.a Pyone Cho);
4. Min Zeya;
5. Mya Aye;
6. Kyaw Min Yu (a.k.a Jimmy);
7. Zeya;
8. Kyaw Kyaw Htwe (a.k.a Marki);
9. Arnt Bwe Kyaw;
10. Panneik Tun;
11. Zaw Zaw Min;
12. Thet Zaw;
13. Nyan Lin Tun; and
14. Yin Tun.
On 22 August 2007, another major demonstration was held, beginning in

various sections of Rangoon and converging in Hlaedan Junction. Different
reports have estimated that anywhere from 200 up to and over 1,000 protestors
took part in the demonstration. However, security forces, including armed
police, USDA and SAS members, blocked the marchers and the crowd
dispersed. At least seven people were reported detained but later released. On
the same day, U Win Naing and 400 protesters marched toward Sule Pagoda in
Rangoon. USDA and SAS members beat demonstrators, snatched cameras,
81
82
Sources: Ibid.
33
and abducted many individuals from the group. Eyewitnesses interviewed by

HRDU have reported that several people were injured, including a number of
children and monks.83
“When we got to the Hlaedan Junction from [Myay Ni Gone], we

joined with the demonstrators led by Ma Nilar Thein, and then we
proceeded to [Tha Mine] Junction. At that time, we heard the report
that a group of thugs was now gathering near the ‘Eight-Mile’ Junction.
Hearing this, we went to see for ourselves. I estimate that there was
over 2,000 people there armed with sticks. Having seen that, we told
the protesters to turn around and not to march forward. However,
before the protesters could turn around, a group of thugs violently
attacked and detained them. This happened around midday. Some
men and women were taken away. Other protesters and people were
wounded but managed to flee”.84
“They [USDA and SAS] followed us and beat the people from behind.
Some people ran away. They caught some of the protesters from the
group so we rescued them and brought them back to our side. When
they managed to grab somebody from the crowd, four people dragged
them onto their truck. They continued to beat those people on the
back. Their sticks were wrapped with plastic sheets”.85
On 23 August 2007, the SAS physically attacked a group of approximately 200

protestors near the Shwegondine Junction in Rangoon who responded by forming a
human chain so that no one could be dragged away. Despite this, about 30
protestors were beaten and dragged away. Onlookers were ordered out of the area
and members of the media were also reported to have been assaulted.86 The
following day, plain clothes SPDC agents, believed to be members of the USDA
and SAS again attacked demonstrators outside city hall in downtown Rangoon,
reportedly abducting a further 20 individuals from the group.87
“When the protests reached Shwegondine Junction, three trucks full of

USDA forces blocked the road. Numbering about a hundred, these
forces were led by U Aung Maw Latt, Bahan Township Chairman and
Ye Kyaw Thu, USDA Township Secretary. U Aung Maw Latt and his
forces climbed down from the trucks and blocked the road. ‘The
marching is not allowed. Everyone knows about the hike of gas
83
Sources: Ibid.
84
Source: Report on Human Rights Violations in Burma, Human Rights for All,
December 2007.
85
Source: HRDU Interview with “Ma Khin Oo”, 47-year-old female civilian, 30
October 2007.
86
Source: “Burma activists protest over fuel,” BBC, 23 August 2007.
87
Sources: “Arrests Thwart New Myanmar Protests,” AP, 24 August 2007; “Myanmar
Arrests 20 More Protesters,” AFP, 24 August 2007; “USDA Members Bash, Arrest 30
activists,” DVB, 24 August 2007.
34
prices. You don’t need to shout about it on the street. Disperse the
crowd or you’ll face problems,’ threatened U Win Maw Latt and his
forces. The protesters replied that they were marching peacefully on
the pavements, that they were not creating disturbances, that they had
a right to express their own wishes and that they would continue to
march onward. Soon afterwards, the USDA members and other
government-hired thugs started to attack the demonstrators. Unable
to march forward, the protesters decided to initiate sit-ins. Then, the
thugs brutally clamped down on the protestors and took them to the
trucks nearby. Some girls were stripped of their longyis [sarongs] and
their clothes were torn apart too. Some men were not only physically
attacked, but their clothes were forcibly taken off to humiliate them. I
was taken into a car by six people, and stripped [of] my clothes. Along
with thirteen [others] I was taken to the [Kyaikkasan] interrogation
centre”.88
“When we confronted by the authorities on 23 August, we began to

debate with their leaders about our protest. At this time, agents of
the authorities began beating, punching and seizing us. Before
doing this, the authorities made one or two buses stop. The cars
had to stop, and because of the stoppage, people [onlookers] and
the media who were on the opposite side of the road could no
longer see us. It was at that moment that they cracked down on
us. When they began pulling some of us by our shirt collars we
joined hands to prevent them from being able to take us away.
Over 20 people were arrested. Young students who saw and
argued with them [about the treatment of the protestors] were also
beaten and arrested by the USDA”.89
“I joined a protest group marching to Shwegondine from Tamwe

[Township] on 23 August. It was all peaceful until Swan Arr Shin
members started beating up the protesters in Shwegondine.
Traffic police deliberately let a lot of big buses go onto the street
where the protest was being staged to block the scene from public
view. Then the Swan Arr Shin members came in beating up the
protesters. They pulled off the longyis of both male and female
protesters, shaming them and leaving them in only their underwear
while they arrested them”.90
88
Source: Report on Human Rights Violations in Burma, Human Rights for All,
December 2007.
89
90
October 2007.
35
Meanwhile, on 23 August, 58-year-old Ohn Than was arrested while staging a

solo protest outside the U.S. Embassy in Rangoon calling for UN intervention to
initiate the convening of a parliament in Burma.91
On 25 August, Ko Htin Kyaw, the leader of the MDC, was arrested with MDC
member Ko Zaw Nyunt minutes into a demonstration at the Theingyi Market in
downtown Rangoon.92
On 28 August 2007, an estimated 50 protestors demonstrated at Hlaedan

Junction in Rangoon. Security forces alongside plain clothes militia set upon
the group, assaulting and arresting around 20 of them, the majority of whom
were NLD members. Prominent activist, Su Su Nway, who had led the group,
managed to evade arrest at the time, and went into hiding.93
By the beginning of September, over 150 activists had been arrested. Almost
the entire leadership of the 88 Generation Students’ Group were included in this
number. The remaining leaders were forced underground into hiding, as the
authorities’ search for key persons still at large intensified with severe pressure
applied to the activists’ families, and midnight searches conducted on many
homes. Buses were stopped and searched on roads leading to Thailand, and
photographs of well known activists were distributed to hotels and guesthouses.
Arrests and searches were carried out by members of the police, USDA and
SAS.94
This campaign of arrests and intimidation largely quelled protests in the former
capital. Nevertheless, the protest movement had spread and continued to
propagate in many other parts of the country, including Magwe, Mandalay,
Sittwe, and Irrawaddy Divisions. In Taungup, Arakan State, 250 miles
northwest of Rangoon, around 1,000 people marched in protest of the earlier
arrest of two men for demonstrating against fuel price rises.95
91
Source: “Despite over 100 arrests, protests continue; still no action by UN,” AHRC,
29 August 2007.
92
Source: “At least 65 persons reported arrested over protests against fuel prices,”
AHRC, 26 August 2007.
93
Sources: “Dozens detained over new protest in Myanmar,” AFP, 28 August 2007;
“Burmese Authorities Arrest Two Prominent Dissidents: Roundup Continues in Wake
of Protests,” Washington Post, 14 November 2007.
94
Sources: “Myanmar Opposition Calls for Dialogue as Charter Talks Near End,” AFP,
1 September 2007; “Burma: Constitutional Convention Reinforces Military Rule,”
HRW, 5 September 2007; “Summary of Events in Burma, August 19-25,” APPPB,
2007; “Contrary to Claims of Burma’s Junta, More than One Hundred Activists
Arrested in Five Days,” AAPPB, 27 August 2007; “Burma: 2007 Protests Against Fuel
Prices,” AHRC, August 2007; “Location of arrested activists remains unknown,”
Irrawaddy, 4 September 2007; “Myanmar protest march attracts 1,000 people,” Reuters,
4 September 2007.
95
Sources: “Summary of Events in Burma, August 19-25,” APPPB, 2007; “Contrary to
Claims of Burma’s Junta, More than One Hundred Activists Arrested in Five Days,”
36
IV. The Saffron Revolution

On 28 August 2007, members of Burma’s monastic community joined the
protests for the first time, when around 200 monks took to the streets in Sittwe,
Arakan State. Though the monks were not prevented from conducting their
protest, five monks were arrested as a result.96
The introduction of the monks into the protest movement was significant, given
the high regard in which they are held in predominately-Buddhist Burma. Their
introduction served to legitimize and reinvigorate the protest movement, at a
time when much of the leadership of the initial protests had been either arrested
or forced into hiding.
The SPDC and the Sangha

The SPDC has itself routinely manipulated the pervasive and popular nature of
Buddhism to further its political agenda and garner legitimacy in the eyes of not
only the resident population, but also of the international community. State-run
media not only frequently promotes Buddhist teaching and scripture, but
habitually reports on SPDC officials paying homage to members of the Sangha
(Buddhist monastic community), making donations at pagodas, and organising
alleged voluntary donations and labour for the construction and maintenance of
Buddhist sites.97
In promoting and legitimizing itself through the sponsorship of an already widely

respected institution, the Burmese junta has always been acutely aware that it is
offering its support to a religion which represents one of the largest potential
threats to its own grasp on power.
The recent events of September 2007 do not represent the first time that
Burma’s monastic community has stood against the regime. In 1990, monks in
Mandalay organised a boycott of alms donated by the military. The boycott was
introduced following an attack on a group of monks who had been
commemorating the 1988 popular uprising. According to Buddhist practice, the
refusal of alms is considered the most extreme sanction that the religious
community can impose upon laypersons. In response, the military raided over a
hundred monasteries and thousands of monks were detained. The junta
justified its actions by asserting that those who were arrested were not ‘genuine
monks’.
AAPPB, 27 August 2007; “Burma: 2007 Protests Against Fuel Prices,” AHRC, August
2007.; “Myanmar protest march attracts 1,000 people,” Reuters, 4 September 2007.
96
Sources: “Monks and students demonstrate in Arakan State,” Kaladan News, 29
August 2007; “Myanmar monks locked up,” Reuters, 17 September 2007.
97
Source: International Religious Freedom Report 2006: Burma, Bureau of Democracy,
Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of State, 15 September 2006.
37
The regime also introduced the 1990 Sangha Organisation Law which
criminalised all independent monastic orders. The nine remaining legal orders
were placed under the central control of the SPDC-sponsored Sangha Maha
Nayaka Committee (SMNC).
A second diktat, Order #7/90, prohibited monks from participating in non-

religious activities. Following the imposition of this order, monks have been
banned from preaching political sermons or criticising SPDC policies. In
addition, monks are not permitted to join political parties, and since 1995 the
junta has prohibited any opposition political party member from being ordained
as a monk or religious leader.
In this way, the SPDC has attempted to guarantee that the Sangha serves to
legitimize rather than challenge its own grip on power.
Interdependence of the Monastic and Lay Communities

Despite tight control on their activities, the very nature of Buddhist practice
ensures interdependence between the layperson and the monk, and it was this
reciprocal relationship which proved to be beyond the SPDC’s control in
catalysing the Sangha into joining the protests.
The act of the giving of alms to members of the monastic community is central
to this interdependence. It is common Buddhist practice for the general
population to provide alms to monks in order to nurture virtue and gain merit
through their charity. It serves to connect the layperson to the monk and what
he represents. Various Buddhist texts speak of the custom of alms giving. The
following excerpt is one such text from The Group of Fours (Itivuttaka 4.8):
“Householders and the homeless [monastic community]

in mutual dependence
both reach the true Dhamma:
the unsurpassed safety from bondage.
From householders, the homeless
receive requisites: robes, lodgings,
protection from inclemencies”.98
In practice, this means that the Sangha within Burma is reliant upon the general
population to sustain their way of life. Though, in recent years, economic
hardship and increases in the cost of living has meant that the lay community
has found it increasingly difficult to maintain this level of contribution.
98
Source: The Group of Fours (Itivuttaka 4), Thanissaro Bhikkhu (trans.), 2001,
accessed at: http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/kn/iti/iti.4.100-112.than.html.
38
“Over the past year, we monks have been facing increasing

difficulties when we went out to collect food. Only three families
out of every thirty can afford to donate food because the civilians
are also facing great difficulties for their livelihoods”.99
“As monks, we see everything. When we beg for our food we see
how the rich live and the poor. … We see how everything is getting
worse and worse. More and more people struggle to give us rice.
They want to, but they have to spare it for their own mouths”.100
Members of Rangoon’s lay community showed their support and shielded

the monks from attack by forming human chains around processions of
thousands of monks as they marched through the streets of Rangoon on
24 September 2007. [© Reuters].
The situation deteriorated further following the August 2007 hike in fuel prices.
Nearly 400 monks from the Mahabawdi Monastery in Irrawaddy Division’s
Maubin Township reported that they had been forced to skip meals because the
local population were no longer able to adequately support them.
99
Source: HRDU Interview with “U Shwe Min”, 31-year-old Buddhist monk, 14
October 2007.
100
Source: An unnamed monk from Mandalay, cited in: “Burma monks not ready to
forgive,” BBC, 14 November 2007.
39
“We are skipping breakfast now since we don’t have enough

money for rice for all of us. The people here are also struggling
and they can’t donate much to us, we are no longer able to cook
for ourselves as we don’t have enough food supplies”.101
The relationship between the monastic and lay communities, however, is not all
one-sided. The monks do not only rely on the lay population for their survival,
but they also have a role in ensuring the well being of the population.
“After the fuel prices were raised, the people struggled in their lives
even more than before. Some people didn’t have enough food
because a large portion of their income was used for transportation
costs. They couldn’t support their families as well as making
donations to the monks. Basically, the livelihoods of the monks
rely on the people of Burma. When most of the people of Burma
are extremely poor, it is also very difficult for us monks to do our
work. Just as importantly, we don’t want to ignore their poverty.
So we made our demonstration peacefully by marching and
praying”.102
“We can’t sit back and watch the people who sponsor us sink into
poverty. Their poverty is our poverty as well”.103
Pakokku and the Call for Excommunication

On 5 September 2007, SPDC army troops, in action for the first time in
suppressing demonstrations, fired warning shots over the heads of an estimated
500 monks demonstrating peacefully in Pakokku, Magwe Division. Soldiers,
alongside USDA and SAS members then assaulted a number of monks in the
process of breaking up the demonstration. At least one monk was reported as
having been tied to a lamppost and severely beaten by the soldiers with the
butts of their rifles. Unconfirmed reports claim one monk was killed during the
crackdown. Three of the monks arrested at this time continued to be detained
at the time of publication.104 In retaliation to the mistreatment of their monastic
brothers, the following day, monks from Maha Visutarama Monastery, the
101
Source: U Paneida, abbot of Mahawdi Monastery, cited in “Ma-ubin monks go
hungry as commodity crisis continues,” DVB, 12 September 2007.
102
Source: HRDU Interview with “U Hlaing Soe”, 24-year-old Buddhist monk, 22
October 2007.
103
Source: An unnamed monk from Pakokku, cited in Summary of Demonstrations and
Related Events in Burma, September 2-8 2007, APPPB, September 2007.
104
Source: Detailed List of Detainees since peaceful Protests began on August 19,
AAPPB, accessed at: http://www.aappb.org/list_arrest_aug_sep_07.html on 6 January
2008.
40
largest monastery in Pakokku took between 10 and 20 SPDC officials hostage

and set fire to their vehicles. They were released six hours later.105
On 7 September 2007, two days after the events at Pakokku, the SPDC
predictably attempted to lay the blame for the situation on unnamed opposition
groups operating in exile, accusing them of “giving directives and providing
various sorts of assistance to internal anti-government groups to stir up mass
demonstrations and instability”.106
On 9 September 2007, an underground organization of monks calling

themselves the All Burma Monks Alliance (ABMA), who had formed despite the
ban against it, issued four demands upon the SPDC:
1. To issue a public apology for the brutal crackdown on the peaceful

demonstration of monks in Pakokku;
2. To immediately reduce all basic commodity prices, fuel prices, and
rice and cooking oil prices;
3. To release all political prisoners, including Daw Aung San Suu Kyi
and all detainees arrested in the ongoing demonstrations over the
fuel price hike; and
4. To immediately enter into dialogue with democratic opposition groups
to seek national reconciliation and to resolve the crises and difficulties
suffered by the populace.
The ABMA issued the deadline of 17 September 2007 for their four demands to
be met, at which point it would call upon all monks across the country to boycott
any religious activities, including the acceptance of alms, involving the regime
and its associates.
“The military regime thought they could do whatever they wanted

all over the country and to all of the people. They thought that they
could control the people very well because they have many, many
weapons; that they can resort to lawless treatment. So [in view of
this] the government ignored [the monk’s demands]”.107
The junta responded by reasserting its established influence over all monastic
authorities. The SPDC held discussions with senior monks to control the
movement of monks in monasteries throughout the country. In some parts of
the country, monks were even prohibited from going out on their morning alms
rounds. In other areas, restrictions were placed on the times at which alms
105
Sources: Summary of Demonstrations and Related Events in Burma, September 2-8
2007, APPPB, September 2007; “Myanmar monks seize govt officials, burn cars,”
Reuters, 6 September 2007; “Protesting Myanmar monks free hostages,” AP, 6
September 2007.
106
Source: “Myanmar junta blames exiles for unrest,” Reuters, 7 September 2007.
107
Source: HRDU Interview with “U Thu Nyunt”, 37-year-old male political activist,
20 October 2007.
41
could be collected. In addition, security forces were stationed outside numerous

monasteries in key religious centres such as Rangoon, Mandalay and
Pakokku.108
Military officials across the country also increased their donations to

monasteries, which some refused to accept. Fifteen senior monks from four
monasteries in Pakokku were called to a meeting with senior-level SPDC
officials where they were offered 30,000 kyat as compensation for the SPDC’s
brutality. However, the monks in attendance at that meeting expressed their
dissatisfaction at being offered money in the place of an apology.109
A Buddhist monk holds his alms bowl aloft in the symbolic Patam
nikkujjana kamma or the “overturning of the alms bowl”. This gesture
represents a boycott on all religious activities, including the acceptance of
alms from the military junta and its associates. The boycott was enacted
following a failure by the SPDC to respond to the monks’ demands for
reform. [© Reuters].
108
Source: Summary of Events in Burma, September 9-15, 2007, APPPB, September
2007.
109
Source: Ibid.
42
Nationwide Protests Declared

On 14 September 2007, the ABMA issued a second statement declaring that “the
SPDC leaders failed to reply” to their demands and as a result they would initiate
their boycott effective 17 September.110 The statement also called for the
resumption of peaceful protests. On the same day, the front page of every SPDC-
controlled newspaper carried stories of the generals giving offerings to
monasteries.111
On 17 September, thousands of monks took to the streets in protest in cities across

the country, including, but not limited to, Rangoon, Mandalay, Pegu, Sittwe, Kale,
Pakokku, Kyauk Padaung, Tharrawaddy, Aunglan and Chauk. During the
demonstrations, the following excommunicative boycott decree was recited:
“Reverend clergy, may you listen to my words. The violent, mean,

cruel, ruthless, pitiless kings [military leaders] - the great thieves who
live by stealing from the national treasury - have killed a monk at
Pakkoku, and also arrested reverend clergymen by trussing them up
with rope. They beat and tortured, verbally abused and threatened
them. The clergy who are replete with the Four Attributes [worthy of
offerings, hospitality, gifts and salutation] must boycott the violent,
mean, cruel, ruthless, pitiless soldier kings, the great thieves who live
by stealing from the national treasury. The clergy also must refuse
donations (of four types) and preaching. This is to inform, advise and
propose.
“Reverend clergy, may you listen to my words. The violent, mean,

cruel, ruthless, pitiless soldier kings - the great thieves who live by
stealing from the national treasury - have killed a monk at Pakkoku,
and also arrested reverend clergymen by trussing them up with rope.
They beat and tortured, verbally abused and threatened them. Clergy
replete with the Four Attributes - boycott the violent, mean, cruel,
ruthless, pitiless kings, the great thieves who live by stealing from the
national treasury. Clergy - also refuse donations and preaching. If the
reverends consent and are pleased at the boycott and refusal of
donations and preaching, please stay silent; if not in consent and
displeased, please voice objections.”
[Silence]
“The clergy boycotts the violent, mean, cruel, ruthless, pitiless kings,
the great thieves who live by stealing from the national treasury. The
clergy hereby also refuses donations and preaching”.112
110
Source: “Appeal to All Allied Forces, Monks and Abbots,” ABMA, 14 September 2007.
111
Source: “During one month of protests, military government steps up propaganda,
censorship and violence against journalists,” RSF, 20 September 2007.
112
Source: “AHRC appeals for global Buddhist boycott of Burma regime,” AHRC, 20
September 2007.
43
The widespread popularity and respect for the monastic community in Burma
placed the SPDC in a difficult situation. Further brutality would only risk
exacerbating the situation. However, a failure to react would mean allowing
protests to go unchecked and potentially emboldening the population to come
out in support of the monks.
In the isolated northern western city of Sittwe in Arakan State, far from the eyes
of not only the international community but also the rest of the Burmese
population, protests were broken up by authorities with the first display of the
use of force on 18 September. Security forces fired rubber bullets and tear gas
into the crowds, and monks and civilians alike were beaten.
“On 18 September 2007, the authorities called Lon Htein [riot

police] tried to stop the monks leading the protests by shooting
them with rubber bullets. I witnessed them beating the monks and
people and using tear gas to split the protests group up. Many
monks and people were injured. Four monks were arrested after
they had been injured. The monks were released in the evening at
4:00 pm after they signed a vow not to protest again. On 19
September, the authorities continued to beat the monks and
people, using tear gas to disperse the protests. Mostly it was the
monks and people who led the protests who were among the worst
wounded”.113
By and large, however, the junta refrained from using direct violence against the
protestors. Utilizing similar methods to those employed during the 1990 protests,
they instead opted to publicly discredit those monks taking part in nationwide
protests. The SPDC asserted that those monks taking part in the protests
represented only a tiny proportion of the monk population in Burma and as such
were not representative of the whole. They also alleged that these monks were
failing to act in accordance with Buddhist principles, and went so far as to accuse
that some were not genuine monks by labelling them as “bogus” monks. By way
of example, on 19 September 2007, the junta-controlled New Light of Myanmar
reported that “[d]ue to exaggerations, tricks and instigation and the perpetration to
organize the members of the Sangha by planting bogus monks, there broke out
violent demonstrations in Pakkoku on 5 and 6 September in which cars were
burnt down”.114
113
October 2007.
114
Source: “Destructive elements inciting instigation to grab power through short cut
Foreign radio stations airing exaggerated news, trying to instigate public, launching
propaganda campaigns Due to exaggerations, tricks and instigation by bogus monks,
violent demonstrations break out in Pakokku, some monks stage protest walk in Sittway
Some Buddhist monks also march in procession in Yangon People oppose any attempt
to destroy peace and stability, wish Sayadaws to guide monks to follow Vinaya rules in
interest of people”, New Light of Myanmar, 18 September 2007.
44
Attempts to discredit the protest movement proved ineffectual, as the

interdependence of the Buddhist lay community and the monastic community was
further illustrated by the way in which the demonstrations continued to grow in
size. While the monks initially urged civilians not to join their protests out of
concern for their safety, civilians demonstrated their support by turning out in
increasing numbers, clapping, cheering, giving offerings and forming human
chains around processions of monks. The reasons given by people for joining the
protests stemmed not only out of a concern for their own situation, but also out of
a high regard for the moral authority of the monks, an ingrained sense of duty
towards the monks, and a felt obligation to support those who were supporting
them.
“I joined the protests on 25 September mainly because of the

commodity price hikes, but also because monks who eat only one
meal a day were protesting for us. It made me think that we
laypersons, who eat twice a day, should at least join in and support
their movement”.115
“At first, the monks were not willing to let the public participate in
their movement because they didn’t want the public to be hurt by the
SPDC. However, the people were also worried about the monks
and became increasingly involved in the protests”.116
“I was became very sad when I saw the monks marching every day.
I realised then that it [the protests] was the duty of all civilians and
not just of monks”.117
“I remembered that an old lady who was over 70 years of age joined
with us as we marched through Botataung Township. When people
appealed to her not to take part in the demonstration because of her
old age, she ignored them and walked with us. The monks gave her
sweets and soft drinks. Even though she was very tired, she told
everyone that she was OK. I could see in her eyes that she wanted
to sacrifice to make the people free from the one-sided rule of the
military junta”.118
115
November 2007.
116
November 2007.
117
Source: HRDU Interview with “Ko Maung Maung”, 24-year-old male civilian, 9
November 2007.
118
November 2007.
45
In contrast to the testimony of the eyewitnesses, on 3 October 2007, the New

Light of Myanmar proffered its own assessment of the situation:
“Later, the walks were joined by artless people demanding release of

Daw Suu Kyi and political prisoners, and dialogue. Making a human
chain around the group of protesters was intended to prevent the
protesters from getting out of the group, like the stage in the 8-8-
1988 unrest. Besides, they asked onlookers to clap the protesters
for forced support for the protest. These patterns are the same as
the ones designed by CIA and BCP in the 8-8-1988 unrest”.119
While the SPDC made its accusations of “bogus” monks inciting the protests,
several independent sources have reported that it was in fact SPDC agents
including members of the USDA who were impersonating monks to infiltrate the
protests.120 Rather than intending to prevent protestors “getting out”, it was
largely as a result of these reports that civilians formed a human chain around
the columns of monks; in order to protect them and to stop infiltrators getting in.
“On 19 September, some monks marched into the square of the

Shwedagon Pagoda. We protected them hand in hand from the
SPDC-backed thugs who would have disturbed the protests”.121
On 22 September, a procession of monks marching through Rangoon was

mysteriously permitted to pass through security barriers to continue their march
past the home of detained Nobel Peace Prize laureate and NLD leader, Daw
Aung San Suu Kyi. She was able to greet the monks from behind the gate of
her residence. The monks responded by reciting prayers for Suu Kyi, who
reportedly wept at the sight of them. The moment was seen as symbolic and
acted to provide momentum to the already burgeoning protests. It remains
unclear why the SPDC permitted this meeting to take place, knowing that such
a meeting would serve as a spark to ignite full scale protests.
“I saw Daw Aung San Su Kyi come out from her house, with eyes
full of tears. She prayed for monks at the gate of her house. We
stopped there for about ten minutes. Even one of the army
officer’s eye’s filled with tears. The world saw her again due to our
protest and it gave moral support to the Burmese people”.122
119
Source: “Foreigners want to see unrest the Myanmar people dislike,” New Light of
Myanmar, 3 October 2007.
120
Sources: “Summary of Events in Burma, September 9-15, 2007,” APPPB, September
2007; “Burma regime planning to infiltrate demonstrations to spark violence,” Burma
Campaign UK, 24 September 2007.
121
Source: HRDU Interview with “Ko Ne Lin”, 30-year-old male civilian, 3 November
2007.
122
Source: HRDU Interview with “U Zeya Aung”, 47-year-old male civilian protest
leader, 20 October 2007.
46
By 24 September, some monk leaders had openly called on sympathisers to

join their marches for the first time which resulted in an estimated 100,000
protesters taking to the streets in Rangoon. That morning, popular public
figures such as comedian Zagarnar and film star Kyaw Thu publicly offered
alms to the monks in open support for the protests. At one point, thousands of
members of Rangoon’s Muslim community came out and marched side-by-side
with the Buddhist monks. One Burmese Muslim later commented on the
protests: “For the first time in our life we felt a sense of solidarity with the
Buddhist Burmese”.123
On this day, the demonstrations became more openly political, with MP-elects,
NLD members, and students overtly participating for the first time in their role as
politically motivated and affiliated persons (many had previously taken part but
only as individual civilians). The fighting peacock flag, the traditional symbol of
the Burmese democratic movement, was also displayed by protestors for the
first time.
Similarly, in Sittwe, Arakan State, crowds of up to 100,000 were reported to

have joined the protests. Demonstrations also took place in at least 25 other
cities and towns across the country, including in Pegu, Mandalay, Sagaing and
Magwe, and Tenasserim Divisions, as well as Mon, Arakan and Kachin
States.124
In response, to the growing civil unrest, Directive #93 was issued by the SPDC-
controlled Sangha Maha Nayaka Committee. The directive called for state,
division, township, and ward Sangha Nayaka Committees to supervise the
Buddhist monks and novices so that they were only practicing Pariyatti and
Patipatti (the theory and practice of the Buddha’s teachings) and were refraining
from participation in secular affairs.125
On the evening of the 24 September, SPDC Minister for Religious Affairs,

Brigadier General Thura Myint Maung, was quoted on state television as
promising action against any and all protesting monks in stating that, “[t]he
monks who are walking [in protest] now represent only two percent of the
nationwide monk population. … If they do not operate according to Buddhist
rules then they will be faced with the law”.126
123
Source: “Deceptively Calm” Irrawaddy, 1 December 2007.
124
Source: “Summary of Events in Burma, September 9-15, 2007,” APPPB, September
2007.
125
Source: “State Sangha Maha Nayaka Committee has duty to reinforce and observe
basic principles and rules and regulations and implement religious matters; the
directives state all the rules and regulations for the monks prohibiting them from
participating in secular affairs,” New Light of Myanmar, 25 September 2007.
126
Source: Statement by Minister for Religious Affairs, Brigadier General Thura Myint
Maung, shown on state television, 24 September 2007.
47
That same evening, trucks mounted with loudspeakers toured Rangoon’s

streets, reminding everyone of the imposition of Order #2/88, banning
gatherings of more than five people and issuing a warning that anyone who
continued to participate in the demonstrations would be dealt with under Section
#144 of the Burmese Penal Code, which states that:
“Whoever, being armed with any deadly weapon, or with anything

which used as a weapon of offence, is likely to cause death, [and]
is a member of an unlawful assembly, shall be punished with
imprisonment … for a term which may extend to two years, or with
a fine, or with both”.127
Nevertheless, the following day, 25 September 2007, tens of thousands of

people, monks and laypersons alike, again took to the streets of Rangoon in
defiance of these orders and of the SPDC itself. That evening, the loudspeaker-
bearing trucks once again toured the streets, this time announcing the
imposition of a curfew barring people from going out of their houses between
the hours of 9:00 pm and 5:00 am. Announcements also reiterated the ban of
gatherings of more than five people.128 Security forces visited religious
compounds throughout the city warning the monks that they would be arrested
and punished if they continued to join the demonstrations, and had maintained
that they had obtained approval for such actions from the Chairman of the
Sangha Maya Nayaka Committee.129
127
Source: Section #144, Chapter VIII, Myanmar Penal Code, accessed at:
http://www.blc-burma.org/html/Myanmar%20Penal%20Code/mpc.html.
128
October 2007.
129
Sources: HRDU Interview with “U Shwe Min”, 31-year-old Buddhist monk, 14
October 2007; HRDU Interview with “U Ko Ko Win”, 34-year-old Buddhist monk, 16
November 2007.
48
V. Crackdown on the Streets

Wednesday, 26 September 2007
On the morning of the 26 September, troops and riot police were stationed at key
locations throughout Rangoon, and had sealed off numerous monasteries around
the city, locking the monk population inside. In the face of such increased
security, tens of thousands again turned out on the streets to continue their
peaceful protests.
Shwedagon Pagoda
By 8:00 am, monks and some civilians had already begun to assemble at
Shwedagon Pagoda for the day’s protests. At this time, SPDC army soldiers and
riot police could already seen taking up positions around the monastery. Shortly
afterwards, security forces began to block all gates leading into the pagoda. Three
additional truckloads of police officers then arrived and rushed into the pagoda
compound, forcing those inside towards the eastern stairway.
By 10:00 am, approximately one thousand monk and civilian protestors found
themselves trapped on the road leading down from the east gate of Shwedagon,
between Ar Zar Ni Street and Old Yae Tar Shae Road.130
The monks were then ordered into waiting military trucks to be taken back to their
respective monasteries. The monks were informed that the Sangha Maya Nayaka
Committee had already provided the Minister for Religious Affairs, Brigadier
General Thura Myint Maung with consent to initiate a crackdown on those monks
who persisted in their protests. In response to this, the monks agreed to disperse,
but wary of the security forces, insisted on making their own arrangements for
returning to their monasteries. This request, however, was flatly refused by the
security forces on location.131
At 11:30 am, a senior monk, believed to be over 80 years of age, again approached
the riot police to discuss the situation. This time, however, the response was
violent.
“An old monk who was over 80-years-old, came out to talk with the
authorities but was pushed to the ground by a member of the riot
police. When the old monk fell over, a soldier went to beat him with
the butt of his gun so some younger monks ran over to assist the old
130
Sources: HRDU Interview with “Ko Khin Soe”, 21-year-old male student, 26 October
2007; HRDU Interview with “Ko Ne Lin”, 30-year-old male civilian, 3 November 2007;
HRDU Interview with “Maung Nay Min”, 29-year-old male civilian, 5 November 2007.
131
Sources: HRDU Interview with “Ko Ne Lin”, 30-year-old male civilian, 3 November
2007; HRDU Interview with “U Hlaing Soe”, 24-year-old Buddhist monk, 22 October
2007.
49
monk and confront the security personnel. One of these [younger]

monks was beaten with a bamboo stick by a riot police officer, causing
his head to bleed”.132
By this time, a large group of protestors had gathered behind the security barriers,
outside the eastern gate, and were incensed by what they witnessed.
“People were getting angry. They had never witnessed a monk being
beaten by the police before. The people took some bricks in their
hands but the monks stopped them from using them. We really
wanted to attack the authorities but one of the monks implored us to
remain peaceful”.133
The crowd trapped inside the security perimeter was likewise placated through the
appeals of monks to remain calm and not to resort to violence. Many monks,
leading by example sat down and began to recite the ‘metta sutta’ (the Buddha’s
words of loving kindness). Despite this, within minutes of the elderly monk being
assaulted, the security forces initiated their crackdown upon the trapped group. The
riot police initially beat their shields with their batons in order to intimidate the
protestors. This frightened a number of young novices who broke from the group
and tried to escape by climbing the walls lining the street. However, the riot police
took this as their cue to begin their assault, beating and arresting whoever they
could. They were joined in their attack by members of SAS. Those persons
arrested were loaded en masse into military trucks and driven away from the
scene.134
“One of the young monks stood up and ran to the wall beside the
road. When he tried to climb over the high wall, some monks and
civilians followed him even though we told them not to flee like that.
The riot police chased and beat them. Some monks were beaten until
they fell to the ground and many were beaten on their heads. I even
saw them stomp on one of the monks while he was on the ground.
They then loaded these people onto their trucks”.135
“They beat any part of the body as much as they could. Some monks
were beaten until they fell to the ground or became unconscious. I
myself witnessed at least eight people, including monks, who were
beaten and kicked. Before I fled, a ‘Dyna’ car [small flatbed truck] full
132
Source: HRDU Interview with “Ko Khin Soe”, 21-year-old male student, 26 October
2007.
133
Source: Ibid.
134
Sources: HRDU Interview with “Ko Htet Kyaw Win”, 29-year-old male civilian, 9
November 2007; HRDU Interview with “U Hlaing Soe”, 24-year-old Buddhist monk, 22
October 2007; HRDU Interview with “Ma Khin Oo”, 47-year-old female civilian, 30
October 2007.
135
Source: HRDU Interview with “U Hlaing Soe”, 24-year-old Buddhist monk, 22 October
2007.
50
of Swan Arr Shin members arrived and began arresting monks and
people and loading them onto their truck”.136
“We never expected the security forces to act so harshly. The riot
police beat up everyone including the monks and women, before
dragging them onto their trucks. The scene was chaotic. We were
trapped. Some people tried to escape the beating by running through
the pagoda gates but they were locked and a lot of soldiers were
stationed there. So we all started climbing over the walls of a
monastery. I got hit once on the back of my head when I was climbing
the wall, but managed to escape”.137
The large crowd gathered outside the security perimeter responded to the attacks
on the monks, venting their anger by throwing projectiles gathered from the street at
the security forces. Riot police responded to this by launching tear gas canisters
into the crowd. Gunshots were reported to have followed. One monk who had fled
the initial crackdown and managed to join the crowd outside described these events
to HRDU:
“Even though people knew that the demonstrators inside the blockade
were being beaten, they were unable to get past the barriers to help.
So, some were shouting violent words to the riot police. Others threw
stones at them. They couldn’t control their anger. In response, the
security forces fired tear gas shells into the crowd and fired their guns
in the air. We wet our robes and used them to cover our faces from
the tear gas. Although the crowd initially dispersed, they quickly re-
gathered, and again threw stones at the riot police. The situation went
on like this for at least an hour. We persuaded the demonstrators that
if the situation continued like this the riot police would increase their
use of violence. So we reorganized the protestors to go Sule
Pagoda”.138
Another monk who witnessed demonstrators fleeing from the scene of the
crackdown reported on the extent of their injuries.
“The monks were beaten badly on their heads. It seemed that the riot
police were deliberately targeting the monk’s heads. There was so
much blood coming from some of them that it was hard to find where
they were bleeding from”.139
136
Source: HRDU Interview with “Ko Htet Kyaw Win”, 29-year-old male civilian, 9
November 2007.
137
Source: HRDU Interview with “Maung Nay Min”, 29-year-old male civilian, 5
November 2007.
138
Source: HRDU Interview with “U Hlaing Soe”, 24-year-old Buddhist monk, 22 October
2007.
139
October 2007.
51
Clouds of smoke and tear gas rise over the site of the Shwedagon Pagoda
in Rangoon on 26 September 2007. Clearly visible in the background are
a series of police and military barricades set up across the road in
preparation to suppress further protests and to prevent access to the holy
site. [© Reuters].
52
Many eyewitnesses have testified to protestors lying motionless on the ground after
being beaten by security forces, and then being dragged onto trucks and driven away
by the authorities. During the height of the confrontation, at roughly 11:45 am, one
solitary monk, carrying the Buddhist flag, approached the scene along Old Yae Tar
Shae Road. He was separated from the main body of protestors by a security
perimeter, who could only watch as he was set upon by three members of the riot
police.
“I saw a lone monk marching along the Bahan Road towards the
military roadblock, carrying a Sasana [Buddhist] flag, to where the
beating was going on in front of the Shwedagon Pagoda. He was the
monk who was beaten to death during the event. Three riot policemen
approached him and started beating him on his legs. He fell onto
ground but attempted to stand back up by using the flag pole as a
support but one of the riot police tried to snatch it from his hand. He
didn’t let the pole out of his hand and it broke during the struggle. The
other two policemen bashed the monk on his head and he collapsed
onto his back. He vomited blood and died after the policeman who tried
to snatch the flag pole hit him hard on his neck with a baton. They
dumped his body in a truck like a piece of trash”.140
Another monk was also reported to have been beaten to death in Kyethun Pagoda, at
the junction of Old Yae Tar Shae Road and Kyar Taw Ya Street (the main scene of
the crackdown). A crowd of monks and students had already gathered inside the
pagoda earlier that morning, and though they were not trapped, they were separated
from the rest of the protestors by a blockade that the riot police had set up in front of
the pagoda. After an hour-long standoff between these monks and the riot police, at
approximately 11:30 am, the security forces attacked. An eyewitness to the event
has described to HRDU what he believed to be the killing of one of the monks:
“On 26 September, I arrived at the east gate of Shwedagon [Pagoda] at

roughly 10:30 am. I could see from where I was standing that a group
of around 400 monks and students were inside the Kyethun Pagoda
compound and wanted to exit through the east gate of Shwedagon
Pagoda. The authorities were blocking this entrance and ordered the
group to disperse. They were told that they had orders to shoot, if the
group refused their order. The standoff continued for almost an hour.
At this time, the riot police fired tear gas into the compound, and moved
towards the crowd in formation. They heavily beat everyone that they
caught. I saw many monks with bloody heads running away. One
monk continued to sit in his spot. I think he was in his forties. He was
facing Shwedagon [Pagoda] and praying, with the Buddhist flag held up
in one hand. He was heavily beaten twice on his head. After that, he
did not move, he just lay on the ground lifeless. About ten minutes later,
they [security forces] removed his robes and redressed him in a t-shirt
140
November 2007.
53
and longyi [sarong]. Two members of the riot police then picked up his
body; one took the legs and the other the arms and they threw him onto
their truck”.141
Though it was somewhat difficult for eyewitnesses to ascertain if persons were

killed or merely rendered unconscious by the beatings that they received, the
AFP news agency confirmed the deaths of three monks in the vicinity of
Shwedagon Pagoda on 26 September, after speaking with two senior SPDC
officials. Two monks were reportedly beaten to death, and a third was shot
while trying to wrestle a rifle away from a soldier.142
It is exceedingly difficult to estimate how many persons were arrested at this

time, but according to the testimony of eyewitnesses at the scene, it is likely to
have been in the hundreds. Many eyewitnesses interviewed by HRDU have
testified as seeing several trucks loaded with protestors being driven from the
scene of the crackdown: “The riot police were beating and arresting everyone,
including bystanders on my side of the roadblock. I saw around four or five
military trucks loaded full of the people and monks who were arrested.
However, these were only the people who were outside the siege [those not
inside the pagoda]”.143
Nevertheless, large numbers managed to escape the security forces, many of

whom regrouped and reassembled to continue their protests in utter defiance of
the violence that they had just managed to escape.
Downtown Rangoon
Numerous separate columns of protestors marched through downtown
Rangoon, on the afternoon of 26 September, many of whom had come together
following the violent crackdown at Shwedagon Pagoda.
In the two hours between 1:00 and 3:00 pm, security forces around Sule
Pagoda fired a series of warning shots and tear gas canisters in an attempt to
disperse the large crowd which had gathered along Sule Pagoda Road. As
more columns of protestors began to arrive in the downtown area, the security
forces commenced a more proactive and systematic crackdown, firing their
weapons while moving into the crowd, and beating and arresting each
demonstrator they managed to apprehend.
141
Source: HRDU Interview with “U Zin Oo”, 45-year-old male civilian, 26 November
2007.
142
Source: “Four killed in Myanmar protest crackdown,” AFP, 26 September 2007.
143
October 2007.
54
“When I arrived at Mahabandoola Road I heard the blast of a tear

gas shell and the gunfire from the Anawrahta Road. The sound of
gunfire lasted for about ten minutes, and then I saw the riot police
marching along the road followed by trucks carrying more troops
and members of the Swan Arr Shin. They fired at everything they
saw. When local residents looked out of their houses to see what
was going on, the soldiers would point their guns at them”.144
”As we approached 37th Street, we heard the gunfire and people

became afraid. I heard six or seven shots fired. It was so
crowded that we could not see anything except for the people in
front of us. Many people ran into side streets and many ran into
the buildings”.145
Members of the Swan Arr Shin were centrally involved in this part of the
crackdown, working alongside the riot police and the military, who together
arrested and beat a large number of protestors as well as onlookers.
“The members of the Swan Arr Shin followed behind the security
forces carrying bamboo batons. I saw one of the members of
Swan Arr Shin shooting his catapult [slingshot] at local residents in
a nearby apartment”.146
“The security forces searched for the protestors one street after
another. I witnessed about 20 troops moving from 35th Street to
Maha Bandoola Road. The people ran into the nearby building to
hide from these troops, but they found them and took out of the
building one by one. I watched as those people were beaten by
the security forces after they were ordered to kneel down on the
road. I remember that there were four young women, a man, a
couple and an older woman who was about 50-years-old. The
security forces searched for other people in other nearby buildings
and arrested about 20 people. They were also beaten with batons
and kicked when they were ordered to kneel down on the road.
They were loaded onto a truck and taken away”.147
144
November 2007.
145
Source: HRDU Interview with “Ko Min Win”, 27-year-old male civilian, 6
November 2007.
146
November 2007.
147
Source: Ibid.
55
Another group of protestors which had visited Botataung Pagoda after fleeing the
events at Shwedagon Pagoda, encountered security forces as they marched west
along Maha Bandoola Road, at the junction of 50th Street at approximately 5:00 pm.
At this point the authorities indiscriminately opened fire on the crowd without any
warning, though it remains unclear whether live rounds or rubber bullets were used.
“The soldiers immediately opened fired on us on sight while the riot

police started beating us with their batons. The soldiers shot straight
into the crowd; not into the air. Some people marching in the front row
were hit and fell to the ground. I am not sure if they were dead or
alive. I also saw some students getting arrested. We ran into small
lanes in the direction of Yay Kyaw Ward [to the north]. Our protest
ended for the day as we were not able to regroup”.148
Thakin Mya Park

One group of protestors, believed to number around 3,000 fled the attack at
Shwedagon Pagoda and headed west to Ahlone Township. A second group
comprised of approximately 400 monks followed this group, and were directed by
bystanders as to which way the larger group had gone. The two groups came
together on Ahlone Road, whereupon they continued their march.149
Upon reaching Thakin Mya Park at approximately 3:00 pm, the group was blocked
by members of the military and SAS and ordered to disperse. Following a brief
discussion among themselves, all of the women and children left the group out of a
concern for their safety. The remaining men turned around to continue their march
in the other direction, but were pursued by the military and Swan Arr Shin. Those
that they were able to apprehend were beaten. Many local residents came out to
defend the retreating protestors. One eyewitness told HRDU that it was at this point
that the soldiers began firing indiscriminately into the crowd with live rounds: “As we
were retreating we saw the soldiers dragging three or four people, covered in blood,
off the road. They were using real bullets”.150
As the crowd attempted to flee the shooting, they encountered a second roadblock,
trapping them between the two groups of soldiers, both of which fired upon them,
killing at least one of the protestors.
“We linked hands and made a human shield in front of the monks but
we had no idea what to do next. We all just sat down on the ground.
The troops advancing from the railway crossing approached us and
148
November 2007.
149
October 2007.
150
October 2007.
56
fired four shots into the crowd. A 20-year-old man from our group took
a hit on his back and he fell down covered in blood”.151
Some of the protest leaders then approached the troops to plead with them,
managing to secure the release of the monks. However, the authorities announced
their intention to arrest all of the civilians, prompting many to attempt to flee:
“The other protest leaders and I approached the troops at the

roadblock and tried to negotiate with them for our way out. They
finally agreed to let the monks go. However, the troops said they were
going to arrest the laypeople. They pointed their guns at us and told
us to stand still. We immediately stood up and ran away in all
directions in fear. About 100, people including myself, managed to
escape, though around 500 people were arrested by the soldiers. The
boy who was shot was still lying on ground when I last looked at
him”.152
A tense standoff as protestors anxiously watch a nearby security barricade

for movement or signs of an imminent attack. Clouds of tear gas hover in
the air beyond the barricade as the protestor on the right is shown holding
his shoes in preparation to flee. [© AFP/Getty Images].
151
Source: Ibid.
152
Source: Ibid.
57
Yankin Post Office

Another column of protestors, reported to number around 10,000, marching
from Moe Kaung Road towards Sule Pagoda was confronted by security forces
in front of the Yankin Post Office in Yankin Township, around midday. As the
protestors neared the roadblock they were warned not to proceed. The
protestors ignored the warning, and the military fired shots and tear gas into the
air. Riot police and Swan Arr Shin members brandishing bamboo staves and
rubber batons then set upon the group. Those injured during the assault were
reportedly loaded onto trucks and driven away from the scene. Unconfirmed
reports claim that shots were also fired into the crowd.153
Thursday, 27 September 2007

Despite the heavy presence of security forces on the streets and the use of
lethal force the previous day, the demonstrations continued in Rangoon. The
number of monks participating in the protests, however, was much smaller than
the previous day, largely due to the night time raids on a number of monasteries
throughout Rangoon, and ongoing security presence at others. (For more
information, please see Section VI: “The Monastery Raids”).
South Okkalapa Township

The scale and number of protests held throughout Rangoon on 26 September
showed the SPDC that the protestors would not so easily be cowed into
suppression. In response, security officials stormed numerous monasteries
across Rangoon, arresting hundreds in a vain attempt to quash the protest
movement. (For more information, please see Section VI: “The Monastery
Raids”). Ngwe Kyar Yan Monastery was one of the monasteries raided in South
Okkalapa Township. Following this violent night time raid, local residents in
South Okkalapa Township began to gather in the streets on the morning of 27
September to remonstrate with security officials over what had happened the
night before.
During the ensuing argument, an unknown individual in the crowd fired a

catapult (slingshot) at the security forces before fleeing the scene. In search of
the person, members of the Swan Arr Shin raided three homes along Kyaw Thu
Street, physically assaulting the occupants in the process. The occupants were
beaten, taken into custody and detained at an unknown location. The six
occupants were identified as Daw Myin Myin Khaing, and her two sons: Maung
Lwin Ko Oo, 18, and, Maung Aung Paing Oo, 14; Daw Myint Myint Aye, and her
15-year-old son, Maung Zaw Htet Kyaw and 50-year-old U Tin San. While the
153
Sources: HRDU Interview with “U Win Aung”, 48-year-old Buddhist monk, 20
October 2007; HRDU Interview with “U Ne Aung Thein”, 39-year-old Buddhist monk,
20 October 2007.
58
majority of this group were subsequently released on 15 October 2007, at the

time of publication, HRDU was still unable to ascertain the condition or
whereabouts of Maung Zaw Htet Kyaw.154
“The people couldn’t control their anger when they saw the
Burmese soldiers pointing their weapons at the citizens. So, many
of the people, including me, threw stones at the soldiers. The
women collected stones and gave them to us”.155
As the day progressed, the crowds gathered in the area had begun to swell in
size, now numbering many thousands, effectively surrounding the security
forces stationed at the junction of Thit Sar and Waiza Yan Tar Roads and Kone
Baung Street. Of the various groups assembled, the largest was that located on
Thit Sar Road.
Just after midday, SPDC army soldiers assembled a two-row defensive

formation approximately 200 metres from the crowd on Thit Sar Road. The first
row of troops knelt in front of a second row of standing soldiers, all of them
training their weapons on the crowd of protestors. An eyewitness from the
crowd described to HRDU what happened next:
“A Hilux truck stopped at the junction and, through its loudspeaker,

ordered the crowd to disperse immediately or be fired upon. There
were approximately 20,000 people on the street at this time. The
crowd did not disperse. We carried lamp posts and tree trunks into
the street to make a barricade at the corner of Innwa Street and
Thit Sar Road. When the soldiers saw what we were doing, they
fired three tear gas bombs into the crowd. As soon as the final
tears gas bomb exploded, the soldiers crossed our barriers and
attacked the crowd. … I witnessed two people beaten to death
near our barrier. They were both men, aged between 25 and 30.
These men were beaten on their backs and their waists as they
tried to escape the attack. When they fell to the ground, the
soldiers beat them as a group. The soldiers dragged their bodies
by the legs back to the junction where many people could see their
dead bodies lying beside the military trucks”.156
Despite the violence that they had just witnessed, the crowd quickly
reassembled a short distance further along Thit Sar Road between Bonname
and Baho Market Bus Stops, on Thit Sar Road. There they were joined by
154
Sources: “Complaints to DVB,” DVB, 1 October 2007, translation by HRDU;
AAPPB List of Releases, AAPPB, accessed at:
http://www.aappb.org/list_released_aug_sep_07.html on 6 January 2008.
155
Source: HRDU Interview with “U Htun Win”, 56-year-old male civilian, 10
November 2007.
156
November 2007.
59
students from State High School No. 2, which had been ordered to close early
because of the protests. At 3:30 pm, the security forces again initiated an
assault on this group of demonstrators. This time, however, the launching of
tear gas canisters was immediately followed by the firing of live rounds directly
into the assembled crowd.
“A few seconds after the last tear gas bomb exploded, I heard
gunshots and saw three protestors fall down on the spot. Two men
had been shot in the head and one was hit in the hip. I then heard
two more gunshots and again two more protestors fell down. One
was shot in the forehead and the other in the chest. Most of the
people who were shot in the protest were grown men, but the
person who was hit in the chest was a student from the High
School. He was around 14 years old. After the men were shot in
the head I saw big holes in the back of their heads. The entry
wounds were small but its exit wounds were large”.157
Eyewitnesses have also testified to have witnessed numerous beatings, some

of which would seem to have resulted in death:
“There was an old lady who was about 60 years old, she did not
seem to be afraid, and she was shouting that two of her children
were in the army and that they should not treat the people like this.
She was hit with a bamboo pole over the head, and then she was
struck with a bamboo pole by another soldier, and fell to the
ground. I could see that she was bleeding heavily. Two members
of the Swan Arr Shin picked her up from the ground and hit her
again before dragging her to their truck. … I also saw a young girl
who was no more than 15 years old. She was struck heavily three
times by different soldiers, and was punched by Swan Arr Shin
members. I saw her fall to the ground. She lay there completely
still. Lots of blood was pouring from her head and body. I am sure
she was dead. After that, two members of the Swan Arr Shin
dragged her body by her hands to their truck”.158
The evidence obtained through eyewitness testimonies strongly suggests that a

large number of people were killed during events in South Okkalapa Township
on 27 September. Evidence collected by Human Rights Watch (HRW) would
seem to support such a theory. In their report, Crackdown: Repression of the
2007 Popular Protests in Burma, HRW was able to confirm the deaths of at
least eight civilians from South Okkalapa Township alone (listed below),
although it is highly likely that this list is far from complete:
157
November 2007.
158
2007.
60
1. Myo Min Htun, 22, rickshaw driver, shot in the head;

2. Tun Tun Lwin, 31, rickshaw driver, beaten heavily. Four days later
his family was informed he had died in custody;
3. Aung San Oo, 18, student, shot in the head;
4. Yan Lynn Aung, 17, student, shot in the head;
5. Ko Soe Than, 42, shot in the chest;
6. Zyar Naing, 16, student, shot in the chest. His body was taken to his
parents’ home by local residents but later removed by soldiers at 8:00
pm that same night;
7. Naing Myo Aung, 20, university student; and
8. Than Aung, 43, beaten to death while en route to collect his children
from school.159
Hundreds of shoes abandoned by protestors in Rangoon as they fled

attacking SPDC army soldiers. Scenes such as this were a common sight
in Rangoon during the days of the crackdowns as the protestors kicked off
their shoes in their haste to escape. [© AFP/Getty Images].
159
Source: Crackdown: Repression of the 2007 Popular Protests in Burma, HRW,
December 2007.
61
Sule Pagoda
Crowds began to gather at the junction of Anawratha and Sule Pagoda Roads
in front of the Sule Pagoda from 11:00 am on the 27 September. By noon the
number of demonstrators had grown significantly, and it has been estimated
that the crowd numbered in the tens of thousands. There were no more than
ten monks included within this number, and almost the entire crowd consisted of
laypersons. A joint force of SPDC army soldiers and riot police had been
stationed opposite Sule Pagoda since the early morning and now stood
between the protestors and the pagoda. At 12:30 pm, a line of riot police then
began to move towards the protestors, but stopped just short of where they
were seated on the ground. Soon afterwards, three military trucks replete with
soldiers as well as a smaller truck carrying Swan Arr Shin members approached
the group from behind. Immediately and without warning the soldiers in these
trucks opened fire into the protestors with live rounds.
“All of the protesters were sitting on the road. Soon, about 10 riot
police, armed with shields and rubber batons, came up Sule
Pagoda Road. People shouted at the riot police, saying they were
only staging a peaceful protest. Some protesters started to flee
from the scene when they saw the policemen coming forward. The
monks and students who were sitting in the front row told everyone
to sit still and not to confront the police. They stopped advancing
when they were only a short distance from the protesters. …
Around one or two minutes after the army truck came they started
to shoot continuously, firing more than ten times. I heard shouting
from the crowd: ‘the people are dying; they are killing the people,
run away, run away’. Others were saying ‘don’t run, don’t run’,
because when the people sit down they beat them and when they
run they shoot. When I looked back I saw two boys and one girl
lying still on the ground. I do not know if they were alive or
dead”.160
“It was between 1:30 pm and 2:00 pm. When the second military
truck arrived, I heard three gunshots. At that time, the protestors
didn’t respond to the gunfire because they thought they were only
warning shots. Then the soldiers shot their automatic guns
continuously. At that time, the crowd fled and I heard crying that
people had died”.161
“The soldiers just fired right into the crowd and I saw a woman in
front me was hit by a bullet. There were another four or five people
who were hit by bullets. I saw some monks and some of my
160
November 2007.
161
2007.
62
friends being beaten up by the riot police who dragged them onto
trucks. Until now, I have not heard anything about those friends of
mine. The riot police beat people with batons while the military
was shooting. There were also Swan Arr Shin members who also
beat [people]. They were the worst. They did the most of the
arresting. Some people who defended themselves got beaten up
so badly by them that they could not even walk”.162
Security forces pursued the fleeing demonstrators into side streets and even the
buildings they were taking shelter in, beating those who they were able to catch:
“We ran down a side street and up the stairs into a building. Many
other people were also hiding upstairs. The soldiers came onto the
road, shouting ‘come down, come down, or I will shoot at you’. But
we stayed. Many people from the apartments helped us; they gave
us water and slippers [many protestors kicked their slippers off as
they fled so they could run faster] and checked whether the
soldiers were still there. They wanted to help us but they didn’t
dare to demonstrate”.163
As some protestors began to reassemble outside the Traders Hotel, additional

troops arrived on the scene and the military announced a ten minute warning to
disperse or face “extreme action”.
“I arrived in front of the Traders Hotel after the first round of

shooting. There were still many people crowded in that area. I did
not see the first round of shooting but I heard from some people
that many injured people and dead bodies were taken away in the
military trucks. The soldiers then said that they would give us ten
minutes to disperse”.164
“When I was hiding in an apartment, I kept hearing the gunshots for

about another five minutes and some bullets even hit the doors of
the apartment I was hiding in. The apartment owners left the back
door open for us in case the soldiers came into the building and
started shooting at us. Then I heard the military ordering the
protesters with loudspeakers to disperse within ten minutes. They
said they would start shooting again if the protesters do not heed
their warning”.165
162
November 2007.
163
Source: Ibid.
164
November 2007.
165
November 2007.
63
Once the ten minute ultimatum had elapsed, the soldiers charged the crowd
firing their weapons.166 Just as with the earlier crackdown in front of Sule
Pagoda, the shooting was accompanied by the severe beating and arrest of
demonstrators. The bodies of those who had been shot were also taken away
by the security forces.
“I managed to escape into the grounds of the Traders Hotel so I

was not in the soldiers’ sight. When I looked back, I saw people
getting shot. I heard a lot of gunfire. When they shot, they fired in
five or six round bursts, not continuously. Then they would stop
shooting for a few seconds and start shooting again in the same
way. This continued for around five minutes. … The soldiers
caught the people who had fallen on the ground and could not run
away. They also caught everyone who had been shot. They
dragged their bodies by their hands and feet. The soldiers were
beating the arrested people on their heads and upper bodies using
very green and strong bamboo sticks. As one soldier was beating
an arrested protestor, another soldier would come and join in.
Then another would come and kick him. I did not see any of the
arrested people try to fight back”.167
“The riot police seized whoever they could and loaded them onto
their trucks. Meanwhile, I saw a young 25-year-old man who had
been shot while running towards me. When I opened his shirt I
saw he had been hit in his chest. There was a lot of blood flowing
from his wound. I saw other soldiers dragging a wounded man
away by his legs”.168
“I saw a young girl hiding under the ladder of nearby house

dragged out and beaten by the riot police. About seven or eight
riot police beat her as the neighbours shouted at them to stop and
that she was an innocent street vendor. We were a short distance
away so we threw stones at them [police]. Finally they stopped
beating her, searched through her bag and stole her money before
taking her away. After that they started to breaking down the doors
of the nearby homes to take the occupants away. They beat them
in front of their homes and took them away. Many of the nearby
shops which had not closed before the crackdown were damaged
and ordered by the riot police to close immediately. They searched
for the demonstrators street by street. Sometimes they shot at the
166
Sources: HRDU Interview with “Ma Zin Aung”, 26-year-old female civilian, 1
November 2007; HRDU Interview with “Ko Min Win”, 27-year-old male civilian, 6
November 2007.
167
November 2007.
168
Source: HRDU Interview with “U Win Aung”, 48-year-old Buddhist monk, 20
October 2007.
64
windows of the houses with catapults [slingshots] and shouted

vicious words”.169
The severity of these beatings was so harsh, that at least one person is known
to have died as a result. Ko Ko Win, a 22-year-old NLD member, died a month
later as a result of his injuries. An NLD representative from the South Okkalapa
branch office stated that Ko Ko Win “was brutally beaten on his body and head
by [SPDC] security forces at Sule [Pagoda] on 27 September. He was left
unconscious on [a] sidewalk until someone who knew him woke him up and
took him home”.170
It remains unclear how many died as a result of being shot or beaten in the
vicinity of Sule Pagoda on 27 September. Though, it was during this initial
crackdown that the well-reported shooting of Japanese photojournalist Kenji
Nagai took place. He was initially shot in the back at near-point blank range.
After falling to the ground, he was shot once more by a soldier who stood
directly over him and fired. He was carrying a camera at the time, and was
easily identifiable as a member of the international media.171
“Apart from the foreign journalist, I saw three more people fall to
the ground during the shooting. They did not move afterwards. I
believe that they were dead”.172
Pansodan Road Bridge

Immediately following the crackdown outside Sule Pagoda, a group of
protestors congregated on the Pansodan Road Bridge, two blocks away from
the well known Traders Hotel. One student carrying the fighting peacock flag
led the group. At approximately 2:00 pm, he was shot in the head and killed
instantly. More shots were fired into the crowd, although it has been difficult to
confirm if any other protestors were killed. Various reports have suggested that
the shots were fired from some distance away, some reporting that the shots
came from the rooftops above. One of these reports, has named the victim as
Ko Thet Naing from an undisclosed location in upper Burma, who had come to
Rangoon to join the demonstrations:
169
170
Source: “NLD youth member dies from protest injuries,” DVB, 7 November 2007.
171
Sources: “Japanese photographer killed, another foreign journalist injured”, RSF, 27
September 2007; “Japan inquiry into reporter death”, BBC News, 28 September
2007; “New footage of journalist shot in Burma shows soldier leaving scene with
camera”, Japan News Review, 9 October 2007; “Video shows Japanese journalist 'being
shot deliberately',” Times Online, 28 September 2007.
172
Source: HRDU Interview with “U Zaw Oo”, 40-year-old male civilian, 11 December
2007.
65
“As soon as I heard the gunfire, I saw a man dressed in a white shirt
and holding a flag get shot in the head. It was a sight I will never
forget. He had a brown complexion and was wearing an NLD badge
on his breast. His name was Thet Naing, a young NLD supporter who
had come from upper Burma to join the monks’ demonstrations in
Rangoon. He had been marching at the front of the demonstration
and chanting at the top of his lungs when he was hit by a sniper from
the rooftop opposite. The sound of gunfire kept coming from
Pansodan Road. I didn’t want to imagine how many students had
been killed. Crowds were running back and forth on the streets. I
stopped a man and asked him where the body of the dead man [Thet
Naing] was. He told me four soldiers had taken the body away”.173
The soldiers continued to fire on the protestors. Another eyewitness at the scene
has reported to HRDU that the victim’s body was trampled as the crowd
desperately tried to flee to safety. It is unclear how many other persons were shot,
but one 24-year-old monk from a monastery in Thaketa Township, is known to have
been shot in the shoulder at this time.174 Another eyewitness interviewed by HRDU
saw a young woman shot on Pansodan Road Bridge during the crackdown. The
woman reportedly fell to the ground after being shot and lay motionless. The
eyewitness was unsure of whether she was unconscious or dead.175
Thakin Mya Park

Another group of protestors had marched west from Sule Pagoda, beginning at
around midday, and heading through Lanmadaw and Latha Townships. As had
happened to a protest group the previous day, the passage of this crowd was
blocked by the security forces outside Thakin Mya Park in Ahlone Township.
Without warning or provocation, the military opened fire directly into the crowd,
hitting some of the demonstrators. One protestor described the events at that time:
“When we arrived at [Thakin Mya] Park we were blocked by military

trucks. It was about 1:00 pm. Three military trucks and two riot police
trucks stopped in front of us and started shooting. I saw three of the
protesters fall to the ground where they were standing. Some military
trucks blocked us at the back. The soldiers who blocked from behind
were firing at the sky. We were running back and forth on the road.
Some people who fell to the ground were beaten by riot police and the
Swan Arr Shin. At last, I crossed the fences of the park and ran to
Bogyoke Aung San Road”.176
173
Source: “Eyewitness Account of Bloody September 27,” Irrawaddy, 2 November 2007.
174
Source: HRDU Interview with “U Na Thein”, Buddhist monk, 13 December 2007.
175
Source: HRDU Interview with “Ko Maung Maung”, 24-year-old male civilian, 9
November 2007.
176
November 2007.
66
SPDC army soldiers firing tear gas canisters at protestors to break up

demonstrations in Rangoon on 27 September 2007. The use of tear gas was
employed on many occasions to break up the protests. This was often
immediately followed with shots fired into the air over the heads of the
protestors; however, in a number of cases, live rounds were fired directly into
the crowds, wounding and killing many protestors. [© Reuters].
Tamwe Township State High School No.3

Tamwe Township State High School No.3 was the site of two further
crackdowns on two separate columns of protestors who approached the area
from different directions within half an hour of one another.
At 2:00 pm the first of these groups of protestors marched south from

Kyaikkasan Pagoda. About half an hour later they encountered a roadblock just
outside Tamwe Township State High School No.3. The protestors, fearing
confrontation with the authorities, turned around and began their retreat when
they were set upon by the security forces. One of the protest leaders recounted
to HRDU what happened next:
“I took the lead because most of the demonstrators in our column

were my students and friends. I held the flag and turned the
column back. At this time they fired tear gas bombs at us. It was
about 2:30 [pm]. Riot police then began to beat the protestors, and
the soldiers opened fire. The monks who had been at the front of
the group were closest to the riot police; unfortunately they were
67
severely beaten. I was very sorry to see that. As soon as I

realised the monks were being left behind, I turned back again
holding the flag, and I saw ten to fifteen monks lying helplessly on
the ground after being beaten. People rushed to wrestle the
injured monks away from the security forces, but they were beaten
too”.177
Two military trucks were loaded with the protestors who had been arrested,
though meanwhile an estimated 500 demonstrators, including approximately 30
monks, reassembled some distance away, near the Thuwuna Bridge. At this
point three trucks loaded with soldiers again approached the crowd, who, once
again began to assault those in the group as soon as they arrived. While many
persons were arrested, including parents who were in the area to collect their
children from a local primary school, others managed to escape by fleeing into
the surrounding buildings.178
No more than half an hour after this group of demonstrators were attacked just
outside Tamwe Township State High School No.3, another group of protestors
approached the same roadblock from the south. This column had been
assembled by those who had fled the crackdowns at Sule Pagoda, and
marched away from the scene through Pazundaung Township. The crowd grew
significantly as they marched until several thousand had joined. According to
eyewitnesses, the majority of this group was made up of young students and
adolescents.179 Many parents were also in the area to pick up their children
from the school.
At the roadblock, some of the protestors sat down on the road as the crowd
continued to chant slogans and sing the national anthem. Minutes later they
were ambushed when SPDC army trucks approached from behind. One truck
drove directly into the crowd, and eyewitnesses have testified to the fact that it
drove into and killed at least two people.180 The other trucks blocked the road
from behind, and soldiers began firing into the crowd even before they had
dismounted from their vehicles.
“We were looking at the riot police wondering what they would do.
They didn’t take any action right away. Those police were just
making records or doing nothing. But then, three or four TE-11
trucks drove out. There was no warning from the army. No
announcement at all. We were talking with the soldiers at the
177
Source: HRDU Interview with “Ko Soe Win”, 35-year-old male civilian, 19 October
2007.
178
Source: Ibid.
179
Source: HRDU Interview with “Ko Lwin Soe”, 33-year-old male student activist, 18
October 2007.
180
Sources: HRDU Interview with “Ma Win Tha”, 33-year-old female civilian, 25
October 2007; HRDU Interview with “Ko Khin Soe”, 21-year-old male student, 26
October 2007.
68
barriers in front of us, saying things like, ‘We are going ahead.
Please remove your soldiers’, but then the trucks came and shot at
us from the rear. They must have had a plan to crackdown on us
after they got information of where we were. That was why they
suddenly came with the trucks to shoot at us. They didn’t even
come down from the trucks and they started shooting from the
trucks. They shot from behind us as the people were looking to the
front, so a lot of them got shot”.181
“After 15 minutes, the soldiers and riot police stationed behind the
barricade gradually came forward. When we looked back, we saw that
four or five army trucks had blocked the road behind us. This was
between 3:30 and 4:00 pm. There were a great number in our group,
but we had no way to escape, except through a small lane. As soon as
the army trucks arrived, they started shooting. They did not give us
any warning. It was not only the soldiers from behind but also the
soldiers in front. Soldiers shot at us from both sides: from the east and
the west. I heard a lot of gunshots. I could not count the number of
gunshots I heard”.182
A number of people were killed as a result of the indiscriminate firing into the crowd,
and, according to eyewitness accounts, their bodies were removed from the scene
by security forces.
“A lot of people died on the spot. When we were hiding, the dead
bodies and injured people were dragged by their legs and thrown onto
the trucks and driven away”.183
“Some of those who were shot fell into the large open drains at the
side of the road. A lot of people died as a result of these shootings. A
lot of people tried to climb the walls at the side of the road, but they
were very high”.184
Those attempting to flee the scene were not spared either. Eyewitnesses have
testified to a young male being shot from behind as he tried to climb the wall of the
High School grounds.
“Many people climbed over the wall to hide in the buildings [in the
school]. Some people just hid behind the brick wall. The people were
181
Source: HRDU Interview with “Ko Zaw Aung”, 32-year-old male student activist, 18
October 2007.
181
November 2007.
182
Source: HRDU Interview with “Ko Min Win”, 27-year-old male civilian, 6 November
2007.
183
Source: Ibid.
184
October 2007.
69
so scared. People even hid inside the open drains. We climbed the
brick wall into Tamwe [Township] High School No.3. People were
climbing the wall to escape. I watched a young man get shot in the
back. He did not move or make any sound after he fell. He was
bleeding a lot”.185
Of those who have been confirmed to have been killed, Maung Tun Lynn Kyaw, a
student from the high school was shot in the head in front of his mother. Another
student from the school, 16-year-old Maung Thet Paing Soe, who at the time was
wearing a t-shirt with the words “Free Aung San Suu Kyi” written on it, was also shot
dead from close range. After being permitted to see the body of their dead son, his
parents had later told the media that, “[t]here was a big hole on the back of his head
and the brain was gone”.186
As soon as the shooting stopped, the riot police ran into the crowd and began
arresting and beating the protestors. Those persons who managed to escape
into nearby buildings were hunted down. Eyewitnesses have reported security
forces shooting civilians in cold blood as they were trying to hide from the
troops. They even shot those who had surrendered to them.
“Some ran into the buildings. They [the soldiers] ordered the
people to come down or they would shoot. Those who came down
were arrested and beaten. Local residents in the buildings were
ordered not to watch or they would be shot”.187
“The crackdown went on for a long time. From where I was hiding I
saw a soldier shoot a person hiding in the drain. The soldier just
stood above the drain, and fired down into it. The soldiers then
entered the building complex where I was hiding. They shouted
’Mother fuckers, come down from the building or else we will shoot
to kill you all’. One man was hiding inside a small round water
tank. The soldiers could find him easily, because he was shivering
so much that the tank made a rhythmic noise. They told him to
climb out, and told him that if he didn’t they would shoot. He didn’t
dare to go out. ‘Bang!’ The soldier shot him and the bullet went
through the tank. No sound came out of the tank after that”.188
185
2007.
186
Sources: “Dead boy’s family not allowed to conduct funeral rituals,” Mizzima News,
1 October 2007; “Family members speak about teen protestor’s death,” DVB, 19
October 2007.
187
November 2007.
188
2007.
70
Eventually all those who were captured were rounded up and forced to lie face
down on the ground.
“The people who could not run away lay down on the ground. I ran
into a small space between two buildings. Soldiers tried to shoot
and catch the people who ran into the buildings. I was caught by
the soldiers. They ordered me to not look around but go over to
the other people who had already arrested. They said they would
beat me if I looked around. Some people looked around so the
soldiers beat and kicked them. They beat the heads of some of the
people who moved. I could not count the number but there were a
lot of people lying on the ground. The soldiers were walking
among the people who were lying on the ground. They had a list of
names of university students. There were about 12 [on the list].
They called them out from the others and took them away in a
truck. Anyone who was wearing a headband was also taken
away”.189
“When we were rounded up, they ordered us to put our hands on

our heads and beat with sticks. They ordered people to come
down [from the surrounding buildings] quickly. Some were afraid to
go down and they were beaten. They told us to lie down on our
stomachs on the ground. ‘Nobody raise their heads!’, they shouted
as they were beating us. No one dared to put their head up
because they would have been beaten. There were about 500
people on the ground. A girl was ordered to sit down and her head
was bashed with a stick because she was slow in doing so. She
was only in her twenties. She was a good-looking girl. She was
bleeding. As we were lying on the ground, I think they took the
injured people and dead bodies away in the trucks. I could not see
any dead bodies or wounded protesters when we were allowed to
get up again”.190
Though a number of dead bodies were promptly removed from the scene,
others who did not die on the spot would later die as a result of their injuries:
“I saw five or six people die. One of my friends named ‘Tayok Kyi’
[Big Chinese] - I don’t know his real name - died after he was taken
home. He was shot, so his friends carried him back home.
Though, he died soon after he arrived home. He didn’t die on the
189
November 2007.
190
2007.
71
spot from the gunshot, but he died at home. There were a number
of people like this”.191
“As we left, I saw several people with serious injuries. One man
had been shot in the stomach and was bleeding a lot. I have never
seen bleeding like it. His sarong was wet with blood. I did not dare
to touch him but I told him to cover the wound with his hand. He
could barely even talk. He and his friend were put in a car to go a
hospital or clinic. Another man had been shot in the thigh. Another
was injured on his head after he was hit with the butt of a gun”.192
Friday, 28 September 2007

By 28 September 2007, the violence of the previous two days, the large number
of arrests both on the streets and during night time raids, particularly on
monasteries (for more information, please Section VI: “The Monastery Raids”),
coupled with a more established security presence in strategic areas throughout
Rangoon, assured that protestors were not taking to the streets in the same
numbers as they had in the days prior.
Throughout the day, those who persisted in the protests were generally only
able to organize and coordinate their activities for a few moments before being
immediately set upon by security forces. For each separate protest, the
authorities would catch and arrest a number of the protestors, assaulting those
that they were able to apprehend.
“We had just a few minutes in which to organize our group. Then
the group would scatter at the sound of gunfire. When we reached
the 15-Foot Hill in front of Taung Lone Pyan, riot police opened
fired on us, so the group quickly dispersed. Our plan was to go to
Tamwe Township, but they blocked the road and shot at us, so the
people ran into the small lanes [to escape]. We couldn’t organize
to gather the people again because the group had been
separated”.193
“Around 12:30 pm on 28 [September], we demonstrated in

downtown Rangoon near the Sule Pagoda for a moment. We
wanted to carry on the movement but we didn’t get enough time.
We had no more than ten minutes. We could not demonstrate for
long because the police would inform the soldiers through their
191
October 2007.
192
November 2007.
193
2007.
72
walkie-talkies and the soldiers would arrive very quickly. There

were maybe 500 of us. We demonstrated for only ten minutes
before the soldiers’ trucks blocked the road. They climbed out of
their trucks and started to attack the crowd. I ran to the nearest
apartment, and asked them to help and they let me in. I was
beaten many many times in the prison in the past so I was careful
not to let them arrest me again”.194
“There were not a lot of protests on 28 [September] as Rangoon

was under heavy security with military troops on every street
corner. A very small number of students and civilians staged
small-scale protests in the vicinity of Sule Pagoda. They would
appear here and there randomly, shout some slogans and then
disappear when the security forces showed up. The riot police
would come charging down with their batons wherever they saw
people gathering in that area on that day. There were about five
small-scale protests on Anawratha and Maha Bandoola Roads.
There was a game of chase-and-run between the protesters and
the riot police all through the day in which several people were
beaten up and arrested”.195
Bystanders on the streets, and even those persons remaining inside, in

downtown Rangoon also risked being arrested on this day as the security forces
asserted their control.
“Some military trucks came to the area where we were protesting

[at Block 28 in downtown Rangoon]. Someone shot one of the
trucks with a catapult [slingshot] and broke the windscreen. An
SPDC army officer climbed down from the truck and told the
soldiers and riot police to find the person responsible. Four
bystanders who were standing at the [nearby] Maung Htoo
Restaurant fled. I don’t think they were responsible but they were
afraid of soldiers. The soldiers went into the restaurant to search
for them. The owner of the restaurant tried to explain that those
people [who fired at the soldiers] were part of the protest, and that
they were not in his restaurant. Then they tried to arrest the
restaurant owner. When he tried to get away, they beat him
heavily. They hit him with their batons at least ten times, until
finally, his head fell forward as though his neck was broken. They
held his body up, and dragged him to their truck; otherwise he
would have fallen to the ground. The security forces also searched
a nearby building where a computer network game shop was on
the fourth or fifth floor. They arrested about fourteen youths from
194
20 October 2007.
195
November 2007.
73
the shop, all of whom were aged between 15 and 25 years. They
were only there to play computer games”.196
“A young woman working in her mother’s shop on 35th Street was

asked to go and buy some baking powder. She went to 38th Street
but was arrested by security forces on her way back to her
mother’s shop. She cried out to her mother as the truck took her
past the shop”.197
Pansodan Road
Despite the inability of protestors to organize on any sort of scale, three more
fatal shootings were reported to have taken place on the corner of Anawratha
and Pansodan Roads at 2:00 pm on 28 September 2007.198 According to one
eyewitness who was hiding under a car when the shooting began; the
demonstrators had been blocked in on Pansodan Road between Anawratha
and Maha Bandoola Roads. After shots were fired, dozens of protestors were
arrested and beaten.199
Pazundaung Township
At 12:30 pm, a column of protestors, reported to number in their thousands,
were fired upon by SPDC army soldiers as they crossed a road bridge over the
railway line in Pazundaung Township. According to one eyewitness interviewed
by HRDU, SPDC army trucks approached the group from either side of the
bridge, effectively cutting off all means of escape before opening fire into the
crowd.
“They came as us from the right [Thaketa Road] and from the left
[Mingala Market]. The military coming from Mingala Market started
shooting at us while they were still in their trucks. The military also
came from the ABC bus stop [on the Pazundaung Highway; in the
opposite direction]. The military fired both rubber bullets and live
rounds. Some people tried to climb up on the overpass; some ran
towards the train station, and some to a [nearby] monastery. I hid
in the monastery. The shooting continued intermittently for around
196
November 2007.
197
November 2007.
198
Sources: HRDU Interview with “U Shwe Min”, 31-year-old Buddhist monk, 14
October 2007; Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in
Myanmar, Human Rights Council, 6th Session, Agenda Item 4, 7 December 2007.
199
Source: “Two Shot in Clash with Troops; People with Cameras Singled Out,”
Irrawaddy, 28 September 2007.
74
20 minutes. I think there were around ten gunshots during this

time. Three students fell to the ground during the shooting. After
hiding for an hour, I returned to the bridge. I could see a lot of
blood. Some of it had formed into small pools and streams; some
was smeared across the ground as if coming from a body that had
been dragged along the road surface. There were military
footprints in some patches of blood and it looked as though they
had tried to rub away the traces of blood with their boots”.200
Latha Township
Yet another group of protestors, also reported to number in the thousands,
managed to congregate near the Sanpya Cinema in Latha Township at around
4:00 pm. When the crowd attempted to initiate a march along Strand Road,
they were promptly set upon by a combined force of SPDC army soldiers,
USDA and SAS members. Advancing directly into the crowd beating protestors
as they went, the security forces managed to divide the group into two.
Ongoing assaults upon members of the group by the security forces led to many
arrests, and the crowd had largely dispersed by 5:00 pm. Two individuals
interviewed by HRDU have reported hearing news of a shooting at the Sanpya
Cinema at 6:00 pm, as a small group of protestors refused to disperse for the
evening, however, at the time of publication HRDU remained unable to confirm
these reports.201
Saturday, 29 September 2007, onwards

By the end of September, the prospect of organizing demonstrations had
become even more untenable. Security forces patrolled the streets
accompanied by truckloads of Swan Arr Shin members, whose members also
kept a close watch on events from the street. These SAS members worked with
the military to identify persons who took part demonstrations and who should be
arrested. Nevertheless, many people, particularly high school students,
persisted in their attempts to organize protests.
“The security forces in the trucks used members of the Swan Arr
Shin to identify who was involved in the protests on previous days.
When the members of the Swan Arr Shin pointed out and accused
a person of being a protestor, the riot police chased and arrested
him. If they couldn’t do that, the soldiers shot at him. When the
200
2007.
201
Sources: HRDU Interview with “Ko Lwin Soe”, 33-year-old male student activist, 18
October 2007; HRDU Interview with “Ma Khin Oo”, 47-year-old female civilian, 30
October 2007.
75
military trucks moved into an area, all the young and middle-aged
people fled because their fate depended on the members of the
Swan Arr Shin. I witnessed many people walking on the street
being arrested, put on the trucks and taken away on that day [1
October]. On that day, I witnessed at least three or four military
trucks full of the arrested people being driven away from downtown
Rangoon. Every military truck was followed by the Swan Arr Shin
car”.202
“I came out to check the situation on 29 September but we couldn’t

do this anymore. The soldiers were deployed everywhere. All
around Sule Pagoda were soldiers with batons and guns. Most of
them were under the trees sitting on platforms. The cars and
trucks were standing by on the street corners. The Swan Arr Shin
were there also”.203
“From 30 September, the authorities patrolled the city in their

trucks, especially in the downtown area. They pursued any
protestors that they saw. When we met with soldiers, they would
open fire and chase us. When they caught a protestor, they beat
them a lot and arrested them. When people from our group were
hiding, SAS and USDA members would point people out to the
military. They would say, ‘That man over there!’ Then the soldiers
and police would climb down from their trucks and chase that
person. For example, on 1 October, between Latha and
[Kyauktada] Townships, we spotted the authorities coming towards
us, so our group, just five men, tried to hide. Three men from our
group, all around 20-years-old, hid in a shop down a side street,
but the SAS told the soldiers where they were. The soldiers
jumped off their truck, chased them and caught them. They would
shoot their guns among the public as they chased them”.204
At this time, it became dangerous to even be seen out on the streets. Many
civilians clearly not involved in the demonstrations were arrested by security
forces.
“At 11:00 am on 1 October, I went to downtown Rangoon to see

what was happening there. As soon as I arrived at Sule Pagoda, I
saw a military truck full of arrested men and soldiers leaving the
area. Then I saw a Dyna [small flatbed] truck full of Swan Arr Shin
members holding bamboo sticks following the military truck. I
202
Source: HRDU Interview with “Ko Maung Kyaw”, 21-year-old civilian, 5
November 2007.
203
October 2007.
204
November 2007.
76
didn’t see any protest on that day, but I did see people who were
working in the streets being arrested”.205
“Everyone who was walking in the street could be arrested,

regardless of whether they were involved in the protests or not.
Many times I witnessed local people begging for the release their
family members, explaining that they were not involved in the
protests. Their requests were mostly ignored. The riot police
primarily arrested men, so the men did not dare to approach them.
Though women were typically not arrested by the riot police, they
were beaten when requesting the release of their relatives. When I
arrived at the 45th Street on 1 October, I witnessed that parents
and neighbours were begging the riot police for the release of their
innocent sons. In response, they were beaten with batons and
bamboo sticks”.206
A protestor being carried away to waiting trucks by members of the Saw Arr
Shin and USDA following the violent crackdown on a demonstration in
Rangoon on 28 September 2007. [© DVB/Reuters].
205
November 2007.
206
Source: Ibid.
77
78
VI. The Monastery Raids

Concurrent to the violent crackdown on the streets of Rangoon, the SPDC
initiated efforts to remove the monks, and the numbers, fortitude and legitimacy
they provided to the protests, during a series of night time raids.
Some sources have reported that Senior General Than Shwe gave orders to
Brigadier General Hla Htay Win, commanding officer of Rangoon Regional
Command to ensure that the monastic community received no further food or
support from the lay community.207 Such an order is akin to the ‘Four Cuts
Policy’ which has been employed by successive Burmese regimes under the
rubric of counter insurgency against ethnic minority groups.
The way in which the SPDC set about removing the monks from the protests
bore many resemblances to the way in which it has dealt with ethnic minority
villagers in areas of armed conflict for decades.
Initially, the presence of security personnel guarding monasteries and the

barring of monks from leaving was increased significantly with ‘no go’ zones
declared around five major monasteries.208 Then, utilising the cover provided by
the curfew imposed the day before, SPDC army units raided a number of
prominent monasteries around Rangoon on the night of 26 September 2007,
assaulting and arresting a large number of monks in the process. Many of
these raids were particularly violent. Monks were severely beaten, shots were
fired, and property was either looted or destroyed. The demonstrations on 27
September were thus marked by the conspicuous absence of the monastic
community.
By the evening of 27 September, word had spread through Rangoon over the
midnight raids being conducted on monasteries throughout the city. Local
residents responded by organising night watchmen, who were instructed to alert
the residents upon sighting security forces. While this strategy succeeding in
repelling some raids, security forces continued to violently attack monasteries
nationwide, and there were reported cases of civilians being fired upon and
killed as they tried to protect the monasteries in their communities.209
By 4 October 2007, Shari Villarosa, the U.S. Charge d’Affaires in Burma,

reported that her staff had visited 15 monasteries throughout Rangoon, all of
which by that stage were empty.210 While thousands of monks had been
207
Source: “UPDATE (Burma): Thousands of monks and protestors in Rangoon defy
threats from regime,” AHRC, 25 September 2007.
208
Source: “Myanmar junta declares no-go zones at Buddhist monasteries seen as
flashpoints of protests,” AP, 28 September 2007.
209
See Section on Thaketa Township raids for more information.
210
Sources: Monks Flee Crackdown as Reports of Brutality Emerge,” The Guardian, 4
October 2007.
79
arrested, others were ordered to return to their hometowns.211 Those who

remained in Rangoon were prevented from venturing out on their morning alms
rounds.212 All Rangoon monasteries were ordered not to accept guests,
including other monks and persons travelling to Rangoon to receive medical
treatment.213
“On 3 October, an Arakanese monk who usually visited my house

arrived and appealed to my wife to donate some money. That
monk told my wife that the monastery he in lived [in Rangoon] had
been raided by security forces and he had escaped only by
jumping out of a window. He went around the city without any
money to return to his hometown, so my wife gave him 5,000 kyat.
He was very grateful. He said that most other people were now
afraid to donate or even be seen with monks”.214
“Monks are now a very rare sight to see in the downtown area of
Rangoon. Thousands of monks were detained and forced to
change their robes to civilian clothing. Some monks fled and they
changed their lifestyle to that of common people so that they could
escape from the authorities. I don’t dare to think what Buddhism in
Burma would be like if there were no monks in the country”.215
“We received information that all monasteries had been barred

from allowing any visiting monks to stay, and that any guests who
visited those monasteries were to be carefully checked. So, we
bought bus tickets to travel to the [Thai-Burma] border area. We
could not afford the bus fare, but they gave us out tickets for free
when we told them we were being hunted by the authorities. There
were nearly 300 monks in the bus terminal”.216
Similar raids and restrictions on monasteries were conducted throughout the

country. According to the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners in
Burma (AAPPB), 52 monasteries across the country were raided by the
authorities between 25 September and 6 October 2007. A steady stream of
further raids was also reported right through October and November. A number
of these raids are addressed in greater detail below.
211
Source: “Soldiers Hunt Dissidents in Myanmar,” AP, 4 October 2007.
212
Source: “Overnight Arrests of Monks Continue in Rangoon,” Irrawaddy, 4 October
2007.
213
Source: “Monasteries in Rangoon ordered not to accommodate guests,” IMNA, 5
October 2007.
214
November 2007.
215
October 2007.
216
Source: HRDU Interview with “U Win Aung”, 48-year-old Buddhist monk, 20
October 2007.
80
Invitations to ‘Breakfast’
At approximately 3:00 am on the night of 26 September, the Pinnya Ramika
Monastery, on Thein Phyu Road, Botataung Township was also raided by a military
force. Troops reportedly surrounded the monastery, woke up the abbot and
ordered him to beat the brass gong to assemble the monks in the mess hall. Here
they were invited to breakfast at the Kaba Aye Pagoda. In all, nearly 400 monks
were reportedly loaded onto the trucks. However, the trucks drove straight past
Kaba Aye Pagoda and continued to Mingladon military prison on the outskirts of
Rangoon, where they were locked in crowded cells. According to one of those who
was detained, “There were … over 1,000 detainees, including 600 monks”.217
That same night, SPDC army soldiers raided the Mingala Rama Pali University
Monastery, also located on Thein Phyu Road. Close to 100 monks were reportedly
taken away, also under the guise of being invited to breakfast. This group,
however, was taken to the temporary detention centre set up at the Rangoon
Government Technical Institute (GTI) located in Insein Township. One monk who
managed to evade capture reported that the monks were beaten before being
taken away. The following morning, specks of blood could be seen and the
monastery had been ransacked.218
“The soldiers invited us to come and have breakfast with them. We

knew it was not breakfast, but we did not fight them like they did at
Ngwe Kyar Yan [Monastery]”.219
Maggin Monastery
Maggin Monastery in Thingangyun Township of Rangoon is noted for the care and
board it provides to those suffering with HIV/AIDS. In the absence of sufficient
government provisions, the SPDC has long viewed the treatment of HIV/AIDS
patients with suspicion, especially as much work is done in this field by the NLD. It
is apparent that the regime is wary of political capital being built upon such welfare
activities.
Maggin Monastery was raided by a military force on the night of 26 September

2007. One HIV patient staying at the monastery reported waking up at midnight to
the sound of whistling. He then witnessed soldiers armed with rifles and batons
kicking the novice monks awake: “None of us dared to speak out; they looked as if
they would kill anyone who spoke out. I was afraid and didn’t dare to move. They
looked evil and ready to kill”.220 The patients also were initially manhandled by the
217
Source: “Hundreds of Shan monks pinched in crackdown,” SHAN, 10 October 2007.
218
December 2007.
219
Source: “Untold story: How Burma brutalised its monks,” Sydney Morning Herald, 8
October 2007.
220
Source: “They Came in the Night, Ready to Kill,” Irrawaddy, 27 September 2007.
81
soldiers but were released after presenting documents confirming they were at the
monastery to receive treatment.221
The abbot of the monastery was arrested along with four senior monks, (two of
whom were over 80) and four other persons found at the monastery.222 The
monastery’s abbot, U Eindaka (a.k.a U Panama), a former political prisoner,
continued to be detained in Insein Prison at the time of publication, and is likely to
face trial and sentencing.223
Maggin Monastery was raided for a second time on 3 October, at which point the
entire monastery was emptied and locked by the security forces. At the time of the
second raid, only nine novices and a few HIV/AIDS patients remained in the
compound. The novices were sent to another nearby monastery.224 Photos were
taken of patients, who were questioned about speaking to a foreign radio station,
before being transferred to SPDC-administered hospitals.225 When the monastery
was later reopened, only two monks were permitted to return to act as
caretakers.226
The monastery was raided yet again on 29 November, and those monks and
laypersons who had returned were summarily evicted from the compound. They
were given no warning concerning the eviction and no responsibility was taken for
their resettlement. Furthermore, local residents were actively restricted from
assisting the monks in moving their belongings, and were threatened with arrest if
they did so.227
Following the raid, the abbot’s 80-year-old father, U Nandiya was placed under
guard at Myayadana Monastery, Hlaingthaya Township of Rangoon Division.228
The authorities had planned to force him to return home, but cancelled these plans
after discovering people were planning to greet him upon his arrival. At the time of
publication, U Nandiya still remained under guard at the monastery.229
221
Source: Ibid.
222
Source: Ibid.
223
2008.
224
Source: “Monasteries again targeted in raids,” DVB, 5 October 2007.
225
Source: “Overnight Arrests of Monks Continue in Rangoon,” Irrawaddy, 4 October
2007.
226
Source: Source: Article 2, Vol. 6 No. 5-6, AHRC, December 2007.
227
Source: “Maggin abbot pressured to leave Rangoon,” DVB, 3 December 2007.
228
Source: “Burmese Buddhist Monks Outcasts in their Own Country,” Irrawaddy, 3
December 2007.
229
Sources: “Maggin abbot pressured to leave Rangoon,” DVB, 3 December 2007;
Detailed List of Detainees since peaceful Protests began on August 19, AAPPB,
accessed at: http://www.aappb.org/list_arrest_aug_sep_07.html on 6 January 2008.
82
Ngwe Kyar Yan Monastery

On the night of 26 September 2007, the Ngwe Kyar Yan Monastery in South
Okkalapa Township, Rangoon was raided by armed SPDC army soldiers. The
previous night, the monastery had been placed under guard by riot police who had
blockaded all entrances, prohibiting all access or egress to or from the compound.
The roadblocks were later removed upon request of the abbot, although riot police
continued to be stationed outside the monastery.230
Shortly after midnight, military forces drove a truck right through the gate of the
monastery. A local resident interviewed by HRDU reported hearing the monastery
bell ringing at 12:30 am. Throughout the duration of the raid he estimates that 50-
70 gunshots were fired inside the monastery, and also reported hearing cries of
“Help Sayadaw [abbot], help Sayadaw!” immediately preceding a volley of gunfire.
It would seem that the soldiers were firing rubber bullets. The following morning
eyewitnesses reported finding 35-40 blue-green hard plastic bullets scattered on the
ground throughout the monastery compound.231
The monks inside the compound were heavily assaulted. Eyewitnesses have
reported that monks were beaten across the legs with bamboo sticks, ordered to sit
down and then kicked in the head by the soldiers. Women and children were also
reported to have been beaten, as were soldiers who refused to participate.232
A local resident, who hid with the abbot and some novices amongst Buddha images
on the third storey, was able to view the events of the night as they unfolded.
“First the military used tear gas, and then they started shooting with
their guns. Monks and laypersons reacted by throwing stones at the
soldiers, so then the military started to beat them with bamboo sticks.
Both the monks and laypersons were told to crawl on all fours like
dogs, but the monks refused and only went on their knees with arms
out on both sides. They were kicked and beaten on their backs and
heads. One very fat monk was beaten the most severely and told by
the military that he looked like a dog. Around 60-70 people, including
monks, were beaten and taken away [by the soldiers]. Before leaving,
the military told them that ‘your faces are not the same as they were
last night’ [meaning that the military now viewed them differently]”.233
230
Source: HRDU Interview with “U Maung Myo”, 42-year-old male civilian, 29
November 2007.
231
Source: Ibid.
232
Sources: “Burmese soldiers raid monastery and beat monks,” The Nation, 27
September 2007; “Burma Protests,” Irrawaddy, 27 September 2007.
233
November 2007.
83
Ma Ohnmar, an NLD member who had been arrested during the raid later
reported the story of an elderly woman named Daw Khin Pyone Yi who had
been detained alongside her.
“She was there when the monastery was raided, and the Buddhist
flag fell as the pole broke. So she held it up to prevent it from
touching the ground. Immediately, she was surrounded by riot
police and [members of the] Swan Arr Shin who tied her hands
behind her back, and beat her up non-stop as they dragged her
away. … We saw her back; it was criss-crossed with black bruises.
Her back had not even healed on the day she was released”.234
The aftermath of the raid on the Ngwe Kyar Yan Monastery in South
Okkalapa Township, Rangoon. On the night of 26 September 2007,
SPDC army soldiers stormed the monastery compound, assaulting the
resident monks, destroying and looting monastery property and arresting
an estimated 100 persons, the majority of whom were monks. The
following morning (when this photo was taken), windows were found
smashed, monks’ quarters ransacked, and dozens of rubber bullets and
large patches of blood littered the ground, [© AFP].
234
Source: “Junta Coerces Detained Women to Confess to Sexual Relations With
Leaders of the Saffron Revolution,” DVB, 27 October 2007.
84
Around 100 persons are believed to have been arrested during the raid, the
majority of whom were monks, including Sayadaw U Uttama, the second most
senior monk in the monastery, as well U Dhammadainna, another senior
monk,235
Unconfirmed reports have claimed that one of the monks named U Sandima
died early the next morning from injuries sustained during the raid.236 In
addition, the Asian Human Rights Commission reported that Maung Kyaw
Kyaw, a 33-year-old civilian from South Okkalapa Township was also killed
during the raid.237
The following morning, large patches of blood were visible in the ransacked
monastery and smashed glass and torn monks robes littered the floor.
“At the entrance of the monastery, I saw sticks on the ground that
were covered in blood. I saw that some of the windows and
bookshelves were broken in the monastery. There were a lot of
pieces of glass on the floor”.238
“The furniture in the monks’ quarters had been destroyed and

Buddha images were scattered on the ground. It was a sight
incompatible with the tranquillity and reverence of a Buddhist
temple. I couldn’t help but think that the spray of blood on the wall
in front of me came from the head of a monk. I kept imagining a
rifle butt crashing down on a monk’s skull. I couldn’t get the image
out of my mind”.239
Resident monks, who had escaped arrest, complained that money, electrical
equipment and Buddha statues had been looted from the compound. A
photograph taken after the raid shows a Buddha statue with its head missing.
The head had been embedded with gemstones, and it is assumed that the
soldiers cut it off and stole it during the raid.240 One local resident recognised
the ripped t-shirt of U Kalama, a monk he had known well.241
235
236
237
Source: Article 2, Vol. 6 No. 5-6, AHRC, December 2007.
238
November 2007.
239
Source: “Eyewitness Account of Bloody September 27,” Irrawaddy, 2 November
2007.
240
Source: “UPDATE (Burma): Protests continue despite heavy security; more people
and monks taken away; townsfolk defend monasteries with slingshots,” AHRC, 30
September 2007.
241
November 2007.
85
At 8:00 am the following morning, U Ant Maung, the former Minister for
Religious Affairs, now an SPDC consultant for religious matters arrived at the
monastery along with a workman who took measurements of broken windows
and fittings.242 By 29 September 2007, the day on which UN Special Envoy
Ibrahim Gambari arrived in the country, the monastery compound was fully
repaired and refitted to hide the evidence of what had taken place there.243
On the evening of 28 September, the head abbot of the monastery, U Yevada,

along with five other monks and one local layperson were arrested during
further night time raids and transferred to Kaba Aye detention centre.244
Additional Raids in Okkalapa

On the night of 3 October 2007, five further monasteries were raided in North
and South Okkalapa Townships. Specifically, these monasteries were
Shwetaungpaw, Dhammazaya and Sandilayama Monasteries in South
Okkalapa Township and Zayawaddy and Pannitayama Monasteries in North
Okkalapa Township. The soldiers used photographs taken during the protests
to search for monks on their targeted list.. If one monk on their list was found in
the monastery, all the resident monks were arrested. Monks were reported to
have been beaten despite requesting that the soldiers refrain from violence in
carrying out their task. One resident who witnessed events at Shwetaungpaw
Monastery reported;
“[The soldiers] looked as if they were raiding a terrorist camp, they

approached the monastery from Nga Moe Yeik creek in darkness,
like a covert operation. And they carried out the raid on the
monastery so discreetly that people didn’t even realise. All the
monks were arrested during the raid and the monastery has been
left empty. They also arrested all the laypeople who were staying
at the monastery, including women with toddlers”.245
Thirty monks were reportedly arrested from this monastery alone. Computers
and other property was also reportedly seized from the monastery by the
soldiers.246
242
November 2007.
243
September 2007.
244
November 2007.
245
Source: “Monasteries again targeted in raids,” DVB, 5 October 2007.
246
Source: Ibid.
86
Following the raids, U Zantila, the abbot of Zantila Yama Monastery, wrote to
Brigadier General Thura Myint Maung, the Minister of Religious Affairs, to file a
formal complaint about the theft of money and property from the monastery. He
was subsequently arrested, charged with defamation and sentenced to two
years imprisonment.247
A Buddhist monk receiving treatment for injuries sustained during

protests near the Shwedagon Pagoda on 26 September 2007. [© AFP].
247
Source: “Abbot jailed for government defamation,” DVB, 17 December 2007
87
Thaketa Township
On the night of 29 September 2007, SPDC army troops coordinated raids on at
least five different monasteries in Thaketa Township. A number of these
monasteries were raided by land assault as well as by naval boats from
Pazundaung Creek which some of the monastery compound backed onto.
Local residents actively attempted to prevent these raids, and it would appear
that this two-fronted assault was designed to circumvent local resistance.
At least 100 monks were reported arrested and taken away during these raids
and numerous reports have attested to at least one civilian being killed by
gunfire while trying to protect the Zaetawon Monastery.248 Eyewitnesses have
further claimed that at least three monks were killed during the night of raids in
Thaketa Township.249
“They were not only approaching the monastery by land but also
via the creek running behind the monastery. A man who was on
guard duty alerted the neighbourhood and the soldiers shot and
killed him on spot for doing so. They also beat his wife who was
weeping over her husband’s dead body before they left. I heard
the authorities ordered the body buried that same night”.250
“On 29 October, the military came in two trucks to raid our

monastery. The windscreens on the trucks were broken where
local residents had fired catapults [slingshots] at them. The
soldiers responded by shooting at them. I heard around nine shots
fired. One middle-aged man was shot, and they took his body
away. His wife ran out to try and stop them. They tried to arrest
her as well but she managed to get away”.251
248
Source: “Rangoon Quiet but Raids on Monasteries Continue,” Irrawaddy, 1 October
2007.
249
Source: “How Many Monks were killed in the Pro-democracy Uprising?” Irrawaddy,
19 November 2007.
250
November 2007.
251
88
Raids in Other Locations around the Country

Arakan State
In Sittwe (Akyab), the capital of Arakan State, local authorities issued official
letters to the monks to return home. Some of these monks were then reportedly
arrested on their journey. On 6 October 2007, a monk was seen being arrested
outside a pagoda after security forces informed him that he was not supposed
to be there.252
By 7 October, residents of Sittwe reported that most of city’s monasteries were

empty, and only a limited number of monks could be seen on their morning alms
rounds: “There used to be 28 monks who would come to my house for alms.
Now there are only [three]”. On the night of 10 October, SPDC troops raided
Hla Rwa Win Monastery and evicted all monks who remained in the
compound.253
Mandalay Division
Numerous monasteries were sealed off in Mandalay, with security forces
placing coils of barbed wire around many monastic compounds. Similar to the
tactics employed in Myitkyina described above, monks were prohibited from
receiving alms from the local lay community, and given their boycott of alms
from the military, this left many with a shortage of food.254 Security forces
threatened that monks would be arrested if they remained in their monasteries
so their abbots permitted them to travel, despite the prohibition on travel during
the period of Buddhist lent. It was reported that in one of the largest
monasteries in Mandalay, by November, only 200 monks remained of the
original 2,800.255
At 7:00 pm on 27 September, SPDC army troops raided Pauk Myaing

Monastery in Chan Mya Tharsi (Northwest Mandalay) Township. Fifty monks
were praying at the time when they were kicked and beaten with batons. Many
monks were reported to have been bleeding when they were taken away by
security forces.256
252
Source: “Monasteries in Sittwe Empty,” DVB, 7 October 2007.
253
Source: “Restrictions on worship imposed in monastery in Sittwe,” Kaladan News,
11 October 2007.
254
Source: “Rangoon Quiet but Raids on Monasteries Continue,” Irrawaddy, 1 October
2007.
255
Source: “Burma monks not ready to forgive,” BBC News, 14 November 2007.
256
Source: “Local residents thwart monastery raids,” DVB, 28 September 2007;
“Irrawaddy Updates,” Irrawaddy, 29 September 2007.
89
The USDA visited monasteries in Meikhtila on 3 October and instructed the

abbots to send student and novice monks home. The two largest monasteries
in Meikhtila, alone, housed a combined total of 800 student monks. Many faced
real difficulties travelling home with no money with which to pay the costs of
transport. Nevertheless, the USDA threatened that those who stayed would be
arrested.257
Kachin State
Prior to the protests reaching their height, by 18 September 2007, authorities in
Myitkyina, the capital of Kachin State, had locked down a number of
monasteries, barring the monks from leaving their rooms or receiving alms from
the local community.258
On the night of the 25 September, a combined security force comprised of riot

police, SPDC army soldiers, USDA and members of the auxiliary fire brigade
(all of whom must also be join the USDA) raided several monasteries in
Myitkyina. According to a report by the Kachin News Group (KNG), these raids
were carried out under the command of Major General Ohn Myint, commanding
officer of the SPDC Northern Regional Command.259
According to the KNG, those monasteries that were raided were Tatkone
Monastery in Tatkone Quarter, Du Kahtawng Monastery in Du Mare Quarter,
Yuzana Kyaungthai Monastery in Yuzana Quarter, Myo Oo Monastery in Yangyi
Aung Quarter and Khemartiwun Monastery in Khemartiri Quarter.260
Monks’ hands were reportedly bound with rope, and many were heavily
assaulted by the security forces. Over 200 monks were detained at Myitkyina’s
No.1 and No.2 police stations, as well as at Thitant Prison. A number of other
monks were also reportedly sent to a prison in the nearby town of
Waingmaw. The senior monks of these monasteries were sent to Northern
Regional Command Headquarters in Myitkyina where they underwent
interrogation by the military.261 One monk from Yuzana Kyaunghtai Monastery
recounted the night’s events:
“The authorities cut the phone lines at about five in the afternoon.
At ten past nine that night, they crashed open the main gate of the
monastery with their military trucks, they started beating the monks
257
Source: “Monks in Meikhtila sent home to prevent protests,” Mizzima News, 5
October 2007.
258
Source: “Monks in Myitkyina under virtual house arrest in monasteries,” KNG, 18
September 2007.
259
Source: “Four monks killed in Tuesday night's raid in Myitkyina,” KNG, 27
September 2007.
260
Source: Ibid.
261
Source: Ibid.
90
as soon as they came in. They kicked open the main door of the
monastery after they crashed open the gate. They beat us
indiscriminately as soon as they got inside the building. It was a
preventive strike so that the monks could not resist the attack.
They ordered us to stand against the wall and hit the monks who
did not obey their orders with sticks. … We only dared go back into
the monastery in the morning. The whole building looked fairly
messed up with doors that had been kicked open. We saw red
stains on the floor … and solid red blobs that appeared to be
blood”.262
At least three monks are reported to have been killed during these raids.263
During the raid on the Yuzana Kyaunghtai Monastery, the deputy abbot was
beaten severely about the head. He was again assaulted while in detention,
and died the following day as a result of his injuries. The pathologist was forced
to declare his cause of death as a pre-existing heart condition.264
Despite the subsequent release of the majority of those monks arrested during
these raids, local residents reported that the monasteries remained empty and
that no monks could be seen conducting their alms rounds throughout the
city.265 By 31 October, only eleven out of a previous 142 monks remained in the
Yuzana Kyaunghtai Monastery.266
Monasteries were also raided in Bhamo, Kachin State’s second largest city, on
25 September. In other parts of Kachin State, monasteries were completely
locked down. On 18 October, one monk from Lweje, near the border with
China, reported that if the military continued to surround the monasteries, the
monks would face a serious shortage of food.267
262
Source: “The Monk's Tale: Death in detention,” AI, 9 November 2007.
263
Source: “Four monks killed in Tuesday night's raid in Myitkyina,” KNG, 27
September 2007; HRDU Interview with “Ma Win Ko Khin”, 22-year-old female
civilian, 20 November 2007.
264
265
Source: “Burma Update 241,” PDC, 18 October 2007.
266
267
Source: “Burma Update 241,” PDC, 18 October 2007.
91
Continued Raids
At the time of publication, numerous monasteries in Rangoon remained empty,
under surveillance or occupied by security forces.268
Raids on monasteries nationwide were also ongoing, often in an attempt to hunt

down those whom the SPDC had identified as the leaders of the monk-led
protests. On 15 November, authorities raided Tayzar Rama Kaman Htan
Monastery on the outskirts of Sittwe, and arrested U Than Rama, wanted for his
involvement in the protests. He was reportedly beaten during the raid and his
whereabouts after his arrest remain unknown.269
Also on 15 November, an estimated 150 USDA members, Township Peace and

Development Council (TPDC) officials, and police officers, raided Aung
Dhamma Pala Monastery in Dagon Myothit East Township, Rangoon.
According to a report by the Democratic Voice of Burma (DVB), the monastery
was ransacked and looted. One monk, U Sanda Wara, was assaulted before
being taken away by his assailants. The monastery has reportedly been
embroiled in a land dispute with the USDA, and the SPDC has now decreed
that the monastery, along with numerous others in the area, must vacate the
premises, presumably to make way for the USDA.270
On the night of 25 November, security forces raided the Weikzawtaryone

Monastery in Mayangone Township in Rangoon. They checked the monks at
the monastery against photos taken during the days of the protests and
identified five monks who they sought for arrest. The soldiers left the monastery
without having detained the monks following the strong objections of the abbot
and a growing crowd of angered local residents outside the monastery. This
gave those five monks a chance to flee Rangoon and escape arrest.271
268
December 2007; Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in
Myanmar, Human Rights Council, 6th Session, Agenda item 4, 7 December 2007
269
Source: “Monk Arrested in Police Raid,” Narinjara News, 26 November 2007;
Detailed List of Detainees since peaceful Protests began on August 19, AAPPB,
accessed at: http://www.aappb.org/list_arrest_aug_sep_07.html on 6 January 2008.
270
Source: “Monk held after monastery raid,” DVB, 16 November 2007.
271
Source: Confidential HRDU source. HRDU was provided with information from a
number of different confidential sources who have requested anonymity out of fear for
their safety.
92
VII. A Witch Hunt272

After the military quashed the demonstrations in the streets, the authorities
stepped up their search for those suspected of participating in or supporting the
peaceful protests. By the first week of October it was widely estimated that up
to 6,000 people, including at least 1,400 monks, had been arrested since the
protests had begun.273
The campaign of arrests conducted by the SPDC both during and in the
aftermath of the protests was systematic, to the point that numerous persons
were arrested for merely applauding or offering water to monks. It has been
reported that the names of these persons had been recorded by the USDA, the
SAS, and other plainclothes officials during the demonstrations.274
“On 30 September I heard an announcement that everyone who

was photographed in the protests would be approached by the
government. Moreover, people who donated food and drinking
water to the monks would also have action taken against them. So
I didn’t dare to sleep at my house”.275
"Now the soldiers only come at night. They take anyone they can
identify from their videos; people who clapped, who offered water
to the monks, who knelt and prayed as they passed, people who
happened to turn and watch as they passed by and their faces
were caught on film".276
“When the monks were blocked at the upper east gate of

Shwedagon Pagoda on 26 September, we all donated food and
drinking water to the monks, as well as treating the injured monks.
When we donated food and water to the monks, the authorities
photographed us secretly. I escaped arrest but [my friend] was
accused of taking part in political activities and detained in Insein
Prison”.277
272
The title of this section of the report has been taken from a quote made by the former
UN Resident Humanitarian Affairs Coordinator, Charles Petrie, who referred to the
systematic campaign of arrests as a “witch hunt”, CCSDPT Open Session, Bangkok, 10
October 2007.
273
Source: Saffron Revolution: Update, Altsean Burma, 15 October 2007.
274
Source: “Burma Update 263,” PDC, 10 November 2007.
275
November 2007.
276
Source: “Only now, the full horror of Burmese junta's repression of monks emerges,”
The Independent, 11 October 2007.
277
2007.
93
“My friend was taken away for clapping during the demonstrations.
She had not marched. She came out of her house as the
marchers went by and, for perhaps 30 seconds, smiled and
clapped as the monks chanted. Her face was recorded on a
military intelligence camera. She was taken and beaten. Now she
is so scared she won't even leave her room to come and talk to
me, [or] to anyone”.278
While the majority of those persons arrested for such acts have since been
released, in other instances charges have been brought against them. For
instance, a group of nine Muslims from Rangoon, arrested after offering water to
protesting monks, have subsequently been charged with inciting public unrest.
These persons have been identified as:
1. Myot Thant;
2. Nyi Nyi Zaw;
3. Myo Win;
4. Naing Min;
5. Htun Htun Naing;
6. Kyaw Kyaw Satt;
7. Htun Myint Aung;
8. Han Zaw Min Aung; and
9. Thaung Htut.279
It has also been reported that an arrest warrant was issued for an SPDC army
officer who donated water to monks during the protests in Mandalay.
Lieutenant Win Tun Aung of Infantry Battalion (IB) #3 reportedly went into hiding
after the order was issued for his arrest.280
Two persons were also reported to have been arrested for the possession of old
banknotes which bear the picture of independence hero, General Aung San.281
Though the notes are old they remain legal tender and have not been taken out
of circulation.
Though most of those persons arrested have since been released, the
systematic and undiscriminating nature of their initial arrests provided the SPDC
with a means to reassert its control over the populace, providing a clear
deterrent against any form of support for potential demonstrations in the future.
278
279
Source: “Muslims detained for giving water to monks,” DVB, 7 November 2007.
280
Sources: “Burma Update 263,” PDC, 10 November 2007; “Army officer flees under
threat of arrest,” DVB, 8 November 2007.
281
Sources: HRDU Interview with “Ko Shwe Naing”, 32-year-old male civilian, 1
November 2007; “Yangon: Man Detained for Possessing Currency with General Aung
San's Picture,” DVB, 1 October 2007.
94
Night Time Abductions

Many of those arrested in relation to the protests were abducted during raids on
their homes, most of which were conducted late at night. These raids became
evermore systematic following the imposition of the curfew on 25 September,
coming to their height in the weeks following the suppression of the
demonstrations. The introduction of the curfew was an important factor in
facilitating these raids by restricting the movement of targets and enabling
arrests to be conducted covertly under cover of darkness. Whole
neighbourhoods were swept for suspects, with Township Peace and
Development Council (TPDC) officials, the USDA and the Swan Arr Shin (SAS),
working alongside the police and military intelligence, checking photos and
names gathered during the demonstrations against house registration
documents.
“That night I slept with my friends at the hostel where we receive

private tuition. The next day, I went back home and my mother told
me that the local TPDC chairman, two people in plainclothes and
two police officers came to our home and asked about me.
According to my mother, they asked how she was related to me,
and where I had gone. My mother had replied that I was her son
and wasn’t at home the previous night. They told my mother that I
had to come to the local TPDC office when I arrived back home as
they wanted to ask me some questions”.282
“On the evening of 28 September, a local Swan Arr Shin member

and USDA member showed up at my house searching for me.
They knew that I had been involved in the protests. My family told
them that I was not at home. I had gone to sleep at my relatives’
house that night. But they were scared to let me stay with them for
long as they knew it would get them into trouble too. I could not go
back and sleep at my house either. Eventually, I had to leave the
country”.283
“At night, around 1:00 am, local police and SPDC quarter headmen
[TPDC] raided our hostel. We already knew one day they would
come and arrest us. My two friends and I ran out of the backdoor.
We went through the compound of the house at the back of the
hostel. We hid in my friend’s house in this quarter. He also
participated in the demonstrations. The next day, we did not go
back the hostel. The authorities told the owner of the hostel to
inform them when I returned. Later, when I phoned my friend’s
house near the hostel to enquire about the situation, he told me not
282
Source: HRDU Interview with “Ko Maung Tint”, 21-year-old male civilian, 15
November 2007.
283
November 2007.
95
to come back because the authorities were still looking for us. We
decided not to go back and left for Moulmein”.284
“After the curfew was introduced, the authorities would begin their
arrests at 12:00 am. That way the people couldn’t see what was
happening, or help each other. The authorities prefer to arrest
people at night because it is difficult for people to document these
events. People couldn’t defend the monasteries in Rangoon
because of the curfew so the authorities could do what they
wanted. Even though they announced that they were reducing the
curfew, they would still have enough time. I think they will lift the
curfew soon because they have already done what they wanted to
do [The curfew was lifted on 20 October; the day after this
interview was conducted]”.285
“That night I slept at my friend’s house because the local

authorities had arrived at our house looking for me. [His friend’s
mother] told me not to go back home, and sleep at their house that
night instead. The next day [after they had left,] we called my
friend’s mother and she told us not to come back. The elder sister
of my friend came to us with money and some clothes. She
advised us to go Moulmein Township for our safety. According to
her, the local authorities and police were searching for the
protestors house by house. Two local authorities’ [TPDC] men and
three police had come to enquire about us and asked where we
had gone”.286
The SPDC was facilitated in their manhunt by the fact that households are
forced to maintain an up-to-date register of all persons residing in their house.
A copy of the register is submitted with to the local TPDC office. In some areas,
households must even hang photographs of family members outside their
homes so that the authorities can more easily keep watch on the activities of the
population. These lists and photographs were checked against those which had
been gathered by the security forces during the demonstrations. SPDC army
trucks mounted with loudspeakers reportedly drove through the streets of
Rangoon announcing “You must stay inside. Don't come out. We have
photographs of the people we're looking for. We will arrest them”.287
284
November 2007.
285
20 October 2007.
286
Source: HRDU Interview with “Khin Maung”, 17-year-old male student, 15
November 2007.
287
Source: “Monks flee crackdown as reports of brutality emerge,” The Guardian, 4
October 2007
96
“If they want to check a house, they enter and ask for the family
registration list. If anyone on the list is missing, they ask about the
missing person. They ask about where this person is and where
he or she had gone”.288
“The wife of my friend called me and told me that her husband was
arrested at midnight from their home. When they came to arrest
him, they showed them some photos and asked if they recognised
anyone from the photos. She saw me in the photos and warned
me that they were going to arrest me too. After that, I returned
home, took some money and went to hide at one friend’s home
after another”.289
The authorities rarely provided any legitimate explanation for the arrests, any
legal documentation, or any information regarding where the person was to be
taken or imprisoned, either to the individuals involved, or to their family
members.
“I was sleeping in the front room when I woke up at the sound of

someone shouting ’Him! Him!’ One soldier poked his gun under
the mosquito net and pointed it at me. I was handcuffed while I
was still under the net and then told to stand up. I was taken
outside in front of the house, where I saw around 70 soldiers on the
street. When I asked why I had been arrested, they replied: ‘You
know why. You know who you are’”.290
“My aunt said about twenty officials and government supporters

raided our house at midnight around ten days ago and captured
[my brother]. Our grandmother was with him at the time and she
was threatened by an official who told her to keep her mouth shut if
she did not want to get arrested too. My brother had been
politically active since well before the recent protests. He has very
close ties with the monks as well. I have no information on his
whereabouts now. I am very worried for him as he is only a tenth
standard high school student”.291
“They asked me where my wife was. I replied that she had left
home after we had had a quarrel with one other. Then they told
me they wanted her passport. I asked them who they were, but the
288
2007.
289
Source: HRDU Interview with “U Shwe Htet”, 52-year-old male civilian, 2
November 2007.
290
2007.
291
November 2007.
97
three strangers replied that they didn’t have permission to talk

about which group they were from. They came here according to
the order of one of their superiors. I told them I would give it [the
passport] to them tomorrow but they didn’t accept that. They said
that if I didn’t give it to them that night they would use force to
search for it”.292
This lack of accountability was further reinforced by the fact that those carrying
out the raids often refused to identify themselves or the organization that they
represented. The experience of Par Par Lay, a popular comedian from
Mandalay who is no stranger to harassment and detention, was also typical:
“My wife asked them, ‘Which organisation are you from? Tell me, why are you
taking him? What are your names?’ ‘You don’t need to know,’ they said’.293
Such conditions of arrest are clearly contrary to the standards of international

law, and would be more accurately described as abductions or enforced
disappearances rather than arrest. According to the Declaration on the
Protection of all Persons from Enforced Disappearance, adopted by the UN
General Assembly in 1992, enforced disappearances occur when:
“Persons are arrested, detained or abducted against their will or

otherwise deprived of their liberty by officials of different branches
or levels of Government, … followed by a refusal to disclose the
fate or whereabouts of the persons concerned or a refusal to
acknowledge the deprivation of their liberty, which places such
persons outside the protection of the law”.294
By 2 October 2007, the Asian Human Rights Commission (AHRC) had

estimated that at least 700 monks and 500 civilians had been detained at
unknown locations around the country.295 In the majority of these cases, it was
at least known that they had been taken by security forces, and exile
organizations, such as the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners in
Burma (AAPPB), have since been able to establish the whereabouts of many of
those who continue to be detained.
The AAPPB has also confirmed the names of 84 persons who remained
missing at the time of publication.296 In these cases, the SPDC has not only
refused to account for the whereabouts of these individuals, but has not even
292
2007.
293
294
Source: Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance,
G.A. res. 47/133, 47 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 49) at 207, U.N. Doc. A/47/49 (1992).
295
Source: “BURMA: U.N. Human Rights Council’s credibility is at stake in Burma,”
AHRC, 3 October 2007.
296
Source: AAPPB List of the Disappeared, AAPPB, accessed at:
http://www.aappb.org/disap_sept_07.htm on 6 January 2008.
98
acknowledged that they have been arrested. As a result, a great deal of

concern remains for the condition of those persons, particularly given that many
went missing on the days of the crackdown and the SPDC’s reticence in
providing a true account of the number of dead.
Arrested for Harbouring

In Burma, not only must households register all inhabitants with their local
authority, but they must also obtain the permission of the TPDC for any
overnight guests, enabling the SPDC to both monitor and restrict the movement
of all persons within the country. In the weeks following the protests, with many
protestors fearful to stay in their own homes, the SPDC reaffirmed and enforced
this order, to deter others from providing them with sanctuary during the night.
“Many people were arrested at night. In the morning I would hear

who was arrested and which monasteries were raided. I called my
hometown, and I was told that the soldiers were looking for me, so
I shouldn’t come home. I stayed in Rangoon for nine days and had
to move around to stay in many different places. I was worried for
the families I was staying with. I did not want them to get in to
trouble. On 6 October I decided to leave Rangoon and go to the
[Thai-Burma] border”.297
Security forces were heard patrolling the streets of Rangoon, declaring that any
occupant who permitted somebody not on their registration list to stay in their
home would themselves be liable for arrest. Some announcements had even
warned that the entire family residing in a house found to be sheltering a fugitive
would be arrested.
“On the night of the 26 September, security forces announced with

loudspeakers that everyone had to stay in their own homes and
that no guests were allowed at night. If they found a guest who
was not on the house registration, they would take action towards
the guest as well as the family living in the household. They also
announced that they would check the family member lists day and
night”.298
“The authorities came with loudspeakers and made an

announcement in the quarter where I was hiding. They said that
people should not shelter those who were involved in the protest,
and that any house owner who sheltered protesters would be
arrested. I stayed in three different places during this time. The
297
20 October 2007.
298
November 2007.
99
first house owner could not sleep at night, as he worried someone

would knock on the front door. He was like this for three or four
days so I could not stay there anymore and moved to another
place. At the other place they helped me because they shared the
same [political] ideals as me. However, when they heard the
sounds of cars in the night time, they came to wake me up but did
not know where to send me as there was a curfew. I moved again
to a third place, but I could not stay there for long either. I don’t
blame them though”.299
“It became more and more difficult for me to hide. They [the
authorities] could easily track me. In every ward, there were Swan
Arr Shin and USDA and they always watched every house and its
guests. When a guest visits a house, they would come and ask
who the visitor was and where he came from. So I could hide at a
house only for a day or two”.300
“All of my comrades have gone into hiding at night. At night the

soldiers and security forces made announcements through
loudspeakers, warning people not to accept strangers or persons
not in their own family into their homes. They said that if they
found strangers in their houses they would arrest the whole
family”.301
Several reports have emerged of the authorities stringently enforcing this diktat.
For instance, on 9 October 2007, after security forces discovered three leaders
of the All Burma Federation of Student Unions (ABFSU) during a raid on a
house in South Okkalapa Township, the house owner was taken into custody
along with the suspects.302 Similarly, in the early hours of 13 October, a house
owner sheltering six activists, including 88 Generation Students’ Group leader
Ko Htay Kywe, was arrested together with the activists he was sheltering.303
299
October 2007.
300
2007.
301
20 October 2007.
302
Source: “Authorities Root Out Fugitive Student Leaders,” Irrawaddy, 10 October
2007.
303
Source: “88 Student Leader Ko Htay Kywe arrested,” AAPPB, 13 October 2007
100
Arrests in Lieu Of Others

On several occasions, when the SPDC was unable to apprehend its intended
targets, its security forces resorted to arresting family members in lieu of them.
By arresting the family members of those in hiding, the authorities were not only
applying a form of collective punishment, but were utilising these persons as
leverage in their hunt for suspects. In some cases, the authorities made explicit
this intent, by stating that the ‘hostage’ would be released only when their target
is apprehended. Moreover, such assertions were at times reneged upon once
their initial target had been arrested. It is important to note that this is not
unusual practice for the SPDC, commonly utilised in both political and criminal
cases.
“The junta has not only continued to conduct thorough searches for
suspects involved in the protests and detain them, it has also taken
family members of the suspects if they cannot find who they are
looking for. They are doing it without any regard for age or
conditions of the family members they are taking. The remaining
family members are told that the detainees will be released only
when the political suspects they are looking for or on the run turn
themselves in. The government itself is behaving itself as if they
are a kidnapping gang. It is clearly evident that these abuses show
no regard at all for human dignity or sympathy”.304
“The leaders of the demonstrations cannot stay in their homes so

they had to hide in the homes of friends and relatives. The homes
of those suspected of sheltering these people get raided at night by
police and soldiers. If the security forces couldn’t find the person
they are looking for then they take away somebody else from the
house”.305
“On the evening of 29 September [2007], my two sisters were

taken from our house in the evening. But since they were both
females and were government employees, they were sent back
home the next morning. The authorities took them from our house
after failing to arrest me there. They [his sisters] told me on phone
they were asked about my whereabouts, and scolded me for
getting them arrested”.306
304
Source: “Audio testimony of 'witch hunt' and brutal repression in Myanmar,” AI,
October 2007
305
2007.
306
2007.
101
In the case of Thet Thet Aung, who had gone into hiding on 8 October 2007,
after narrowly avoiding arrest, both her mother and mother-in-law were arrested
in her stead.
“My husband and I were in a hair saloon on the 8th. A few men
came in and locked the door, saying they wanted to ask us
questions. I told them they could ask me at home, and I forced my
way through. My husband followed me out, but they stopped him
and took him away. The next day, they searched my home and my
aunt's home, and confiscated my documents. When they couldn't
find me, they told my family that I was wanted for questioning. The
day after, on the 10th, they arrested my mother (54 years old) and
my mother-in-law (70 years old). I heard that they'll only be
released when I turn myself in”.307
The families of monks who had participated in the demonstrations were also
targeted. One monk, who has since fled the country told HRDU how his
stepmother came to be arrested:
“We didn’t dare to go outside for a few days. At that time, the
security forces were searching for us with photos taken during the
demonstrations. On 12 October, my stepmother’s sister arrived at
our hiding place and told me that my stepmother’s house had been
raided at 3:00 am the previous night and she was taken away by
the authorities. She told us to leave the hiding place and flee.
According to her sister, the securities forces had threatened my
stepmother that they would detain her if she didn’t tell them where
we were hiding. Her car and the driver were also taken away by
the authorities. Nobody knew where they had been taken. Even
though her relatives asked about her at the police station, they
didn’t get any information about her. She disappeared after she
was arrested. She has some health problems, and left three
children: a 5-year-old boy, a 7-year-old girl and a 9-year-old girl”.308
In October almost the entire immediate family of U Gambira, a leader of the All
Burmese Monks Alliance (ABMA) and one of the organizers of the September
protests, were arrested. Unable to arrest U Gambira himself, authorities
detained and interrogated his mother, sister and two brothers. The authorities
openly declared that one of his brothers, Aung Kyaw Kyaw, would be held until
the time that U Gambira was taken into custody. U Gambira was eventually
apprehended on 4 November. His brother Aung Kyaw Kyaw nevertheless
continues to be detained. Moreover, U Gambira’s 70-year-old father, U Min
Lwin, was also arrested at the time and detained for almost a month before
307
Sources: “Junta arrests mother and In-Law of Protestor,” DVB, 11 October 2007;
“Arrests Continue in Burma,” Irrawaddy, 11 October 2007.
308
October 2007.
102
being released on 3 December. U Gambira has since been charged with high
treason, carrying a term of life imprisonment or death.309
In addition, on 2 October 2007, the abbot of Thitsar Mandai Monastery in

Mingaladon Township of Rangoon was arrested when the monastery was
raided by SPDC army troops. Villagers, who enquired about the abbot at the
military headquarters, were informed that he would not be released until they
had detained his younger brother, also a monk, who was wanted for
involvement in the protests.310
Collective Punishment of Entire Neighbourhoods

During the months following the protests, the residents in the vicinity of the east
gate of the Shwedagon Pagoda were confronted with a particularly systematic
campaign of recrimination. As many monks were being heavily beaten in this area
on 26 September 2007, many local residents responded by hurling abuse, throwing
stones and firing catapults (slingshots) at the security forces responsible. In the
following weeks, the SPDC not only took the inhabitants of entire streets into
custody, leaving only small children and the elderly behind, but phone lines were cut
off, restrictions were placed on the movement of residents and shops were ordered
to close throughout October.
“On the night of 1 October, many households in Bahan Township

were raided. I was arrested at 3:00 am that night. Every household
along Sabaechan Street was raided. The local authorities [TPDC] and
soldiers carried out the raids. They knocked on the door and asked
how many people were living in the house. After I answered their
question, they ordered me to go with them for more questions. I was
put on a truck together with 17 other men and women and taken to
Insein GTI [Government Technological Institute] which was temporally
used as detention centre. … I saw that they arrested three or four
people from each house. Only old people and children were left in the
houses. When we were at the detention centre, I heard a soldier
inform the officer that the list of the arrested in Bahan Township that
night was 105 males and 98 females. There was a rumour that one of
the police officers was seriously injured when civilians threw stones at
riot police on 26 September, so they were particularly violent in that
area. They targeted people who live on Oak Street, and in each
household three or more people were arrested. In custody, a woman
309
Source: “More details of deaths during protests emerge, AHRC, 24 October 200;
“Leading Monk Charged with Treason,” Irrawaddy, 15 November 2007; Detailed List
of Detainees since peaceful Protests began on August 19, AAPPB, accessed at:
http://www.aappb.org/list_arrest_aug_sep_07.html on 6 January 2008.
310
Source: “Head monk held in exchange for brother,” DVB, 18 October 2007.
103
told me that she was arrested even though she was a USDA
organizer”.311
“They came at about 2:00 am and woke everyone up. Only the old
people were allowed to stay. They told each of them to bring 3 sets of
clothes. We don't know where they have been taken to. They were
made to lower their heads and put their hands on their heads. Then
they took them away”.312
There have been several unconfirmed reports that the SPDC intends to forcibly
relocate entire wards in this area, in response to their involvement in the
protests:
“On 27 September, the authorities switched off the electricity for

the quarter in the area near the eastern gate of Shwedagon
Pagoda. Around 4:00 am, approximately 200 people in Shwe
Nanthar Street were arrested, accused of fighting the attackers
[security forces] by using stones and catapults [slingshots] and
damaging Buddha images. They raided 50 homes, and most of my
friends were arrested. Later that morning at about 10:00 am,
soldiers and police came back to this area, and arrested people off
the streets. Some of the people had not been involved in the
protests and some were only visiting. Later, the authorities took
photos of this area. I thought the houses in the area may be
moved to another place. The authorities also ordered the residents
in the area to close their shops for an indefinite period of time. If
the residents did not obey the order, they were to be sentenced to
six months imprisonment”.313
“My wife told me that throughout October all the shops along Oak
Street were ordered to close and the houses along the road were
surveyed by municipal men. The people who lived along Oak
Street were worried that they would be forced to move at any time.
One rumour maintained that the block along Oak Street would be
requisitioned and replaced with a park because the security forces
were attacked on that street during the protests. Even though the
Mayor of Rangoon announced on Myanmar Television that they
have no plans to confiscate that block, the people who live there
don’t believe him. Everything that happened in that area was
watched by the security forces. Even on the full moon day of
Thadingyut [26 October 2007], the shops along Oak Street were
311
November 2007.
312
Source: “Estates Near Shwedagon Being Investigated and Relocated,” RFA, 6
October 2007
313
2007.
104
not allowed to open. The street itself was only partly open in order
to control the situation if the protests took placed again on the full
moon day”.314
Residents watch and cheer from their balconies and windows as protestors
file past their homes on 24 September 2007. During the crackdowns,
many protestors sought shelter in the surrounding buildings. Such
neighbourhoods were later punished collectively for their kindness, with
unconfirmed reports stating that entire neighbourhoods would be forcibly
relocated. [© DVB/EPA].
314
November 2007.
105
On 3 December, a monk, speaking to the Mizzima News Agency, also asserted

that the residents in this area would be relocated after aiding the monk-led
protests on 26 September.315 Though the article presents this information as
fact, it is unclear how the monk came by this news; if he was repeating rumour,
or merely proffering an opinion. Nevertheless, the concern of families in the
vicinity of Shwedagon’s east gate is real, and warrants continued attention.
When the SPDC has relocated communities in the past, it has rarely provided
any form of compensation, and frequently failed to offer the relocated
communities any viable alternatives.
Release of Detainees
By 7 November, the SPDC claimed that only 91 persons arrested in connection
with the demonstrations remained in detention.316 The AAPPB, however, has
meanwhile been able to confirm the continued detention of over 700 persons.317
This figure is itself likely to be a conservative estimate of the true number of
persons detained given that AAPPB have only included those cases it has been
able to verify. Nevertheless, the significant divergence in these two figures
highlight the SPDC’s intent to misrepresent the true number of those detained.
Despite such a distortion of reality, the majority of those persons initially

detained have since been released. This is particularly true of those who had
no history of political activism or affiliation to any opposition and dissident
groups.
When persons have been released from custody it has been upon condition that
they sign a statement of assurance declaring that they will not be involved in
any future political activities. For instance, Khin Mar Lar, arrested following a
peaceful protest in Mandalay on 25 September 2007 was subsequently
released a month later. At the time, she was forced to sign a statement
declaring that if she was involved in any further demonstrations she would be
imprisoned, fined 500,000 kyat (US$377), and have all her household
possessions confiscated.318
“I arrived at the Bahan Township office at 5:45 p.m. The chairman

of the Bahan Township Peace and Development Council, U Aung
Maw Latt, said that he would release me, but I had to sign a bond.
315
Source: “Junta to confiscate houses at eastern gate of Shwedagon,” Mizzima News, 3
December.
316
Source: “Clarification on Myanmar’s situation to UNSG Special Envoy Mt [sic]
Ibrahim Agboola Gambari,” New Light of Myanmar, 7 November 2007.
317
2008.
318
Source: “Women Recall Life in Prisons, Interrogation Centers,” Irrawaddy, 25
October 2007.
106
He also told me that I was not the only person to sign such a bond.
Everyone who was released before me had to sign a bond. I
asked what kind of that bond was and he told me that I had
jeopardized the peace and stability of the state, and so I was guilty.
If I were ever involved in any similar destructive activities in the
future, stern actions would be taken against me. Now, out of
sympathy by the head of state, I would be released, but I had to
report to them whenever necessary”.319
“First we were sent to the KaWaTa office [Mandalay District Peace

and Development Council]. There, U Khin Maung Than, the
secretary, warned us not to cause any political unrest. We had to
sign an indenture with two witnesses. If we are ever summoned by
the court, we must go, yet if we fail to do so, we will be fined
500,000 kyat”.320
In many cases, relatives, and even teachers, have been called upon to sign
statements as guarantors and thus taking responsibility for the future actions of
that person. A number of schoolteachers in Sittwe were forced to sign such
guarantees ensuring that their students would not take part in any future
demonstrations.321 It is to be assumed that should the students become
involved in politics again in the future, the teachers will be the ones held
accountable.
“Before I was released, I had to sign a pledge saying that I wouldn’t

take part in demonstrations in the future and that I wouldn’t hesitate
to follow them [the SPDC and its policies] whenever I was ordered
to. At about 3:00 am I was taken to the TPDC office in Bahan
Township along with five other people who also lived in Bahan
Township. They took a group photo of the five of us, and we had
to sign again there. After that the USDA members of Bahan
Township took us back to our homes”.322
“To secure my release I had to sign a letter saying that I

understand that I can be subjected to questioning at any time in the
future. But what really bothers me is that in that document, there
was a statement that said that I understood that I have been
released only due to the compassion of the nation. This is
319
Source: Testimony of “U T---”, provided to HRDU by a confidential source.
320
Source: “Interview with Ko Myo Naing,” DVB, 31 October 2007, translation by
HRDU.
321
October 2007.
322
November 2007.
107
something I absolutely cannot accept. If they were so

compassionate, why did they detain us in the first place?” 323
Similarly, many monks have also been obliged to return to their home villages
rather than back to their monasteries as a precondition of their release.324
One of thousands of protestors arrested during the crackdown on the

peaceful protests by members of the Swan Arr Shin. Though the vast
majority have since been released, 84 individuals still remained missing at
the time of publication. [© Reuters].
323
324
Source: “Burmese monk speaks of interrogation horror,” The Sunday Telegraph, 7
October 2007.
108
Continuing Arrest and Detention of Political Activists

Despite the fact that the majority of those persons arrested in relation to the
demonstrations have subsequently been released, a significant number of
persons, particularly political activists, protest leaders, and those who played
key roles in the demonstrations, remain in custody.
Over 280 NLD members were arrested in relation to the protests, including 13
elected MPs, Executive Committee members and several chairpersons.325 At
least 239 remained in detention at the time of publication, including five elected
MPs. Similarly, 28 members of the 88 Generation Students’ Group also
continued to be detained in relation to the protests, as did 16 members of the
Human Rights Defenders and Promoters (HRDP) network, and five members of
the All Burma Federation of Student Unions (ABFSU).326
From these figures, quite a few commentators have inferred the SPDC to be
manipulating the protests as a means to target its political enemies.
Justification is provided under accusation of terrorist acts while cover is
provided in the heralding of a large number of releases and an under-
representation of the numbers who continue to be detained.
“It wasn’t only NLD members who protested. In fact, there were
even some of us who did not join the protests but were arrested
later anyway. I think this is the [regime’s] attempt to prevent the
NLD from carrying out their activities”.327
“We did not break any law to get arrested. This is the
government's plan to crackdown [on] the NLD. We joined the
protests as normal civilians, not as NLD members. We did not
incite any riot during the protests”.328
“They [SPDC] came on 10 October. They asked about my

daughter and arrested her. They then asked other family members
to inform them when I arrived back home. They told my family to
prepare two sets of her clothing. That’s all. They never tell the
truth. My eldest sister asked how long they were taking her away
for, but they didn’t give an exact reply. As far as I know, NLD
members or students who study at the American Center [in the US
Embassy in Rangoon] are their targets. I think she was detained
because she was studying at the [American] Center, and also
325
Source: “Families concerned about detained opposition leaders,” DVB, 11 October
2007.
326
2008.
327
Source: “NLD Members face two years’ imprisonment,” DVB, 3 October 2007.
328
Source: “Arakan NLD members sentenced but released,” DVB, 26 October, 2007
109
because she is a member of the NLD. They may release her or

they may put her in prison. If she was an ordinary person she
might have been released but since she is a member of those
targeted groups it will be difficult. Only if she is lucky, will she be
released”.329
Moreover and despite SPDC assurances to the contrary, the arrest of activists
continued right through November and December.
On 16 December, three members of the 88 Generation Students’ Group, Min

Min Soe, Htun Htun Win and Myo Yan Naung Thein were arrested in their
homes in Rangoon.330 Two days later, three more members of the 88
Generation Students’ Group, Khin Moe Aye, Kyaw Soe and Zaw Min (a.k.a
Bound Bound), were also arrested.331 Also on 18 December, Aung Gyi, a
member of HRDP was arrested from his home in North Okkalapa Township,
Rangoon.332
329
October 2007.
330
Source: “Situation in Burma, Update: Four More Activists Arrested,” US Campaign
for Burma, 20 December 2007
331
Source: Ibid.
332
Source: Ibid.
110
VIII. Judicial Procedure and Conditions of

Detention
Given that an estimated 6,000 persons were detained in relation to the peaceful
protests, existing detention facilities, particularly those in Rangoon, such as
Insein Prison, the Mingaladon military detention facility, Police Battalion #8 in
Mingaladon Township, Aung Tha Paye in Mayangone Township, Riot Police
Battalion #5 in Hmawbe Township, and Police Battalion #7 in Kyauktan
Township, all quickly became overcrowded. As a result, over 1,000 detainees
were reportedly interned in crowded conditions at the Mingaladon military prison
outside Rangoon,333 with another 900 detainees held in the Riot Police Battalion
in Hmawbe Township.334
Consequently, the authorities resorted to using of a number of large public

buildings as temporary detention centres. The Government Technical Institute
(GTI), the Sasana University in Kaba Aye and the Kyaikkasan Racecourse were
three such facilities employed for this purpose. The GTI, a disused college in
Insein Township was the largest of these ad hoc facilities. By the first week of
October, approximately 2,000 persons were being held within the GTI
compound, including students, civilians, nuns and monks.335 During the days of
the crackdown, the City Hall building in downtown Rangoon was also used as
an interim detention facility, temporarily holding those arrested until they could
be transferred to another facility.
Monks, nuns, novices, women, some of whom were pregnant, students and
young children were interned at these facilities alongside the men. The majority
were held incommunicado for periods ranging from a few days up to two months
without charge. Conditions of detention were substandard to the point of
qualifying as being cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment. Torture was
prevalent particularly during interrogation, ranging from sleep deprivation to
beatings and various forms of torture, including, but not limited to water torture.
Such conditions and treatment, coupled with the injuries sustained during the
crackdown and a lack of adequate healthcare have been reported to have
resulted in upwards of 20 deaths in detention (For more information, please see
the subsequent section on “Deaths in Custody”).
333
334
Source: “Myanmar captives ‘kept in squalor’,” CNN, 13 October 2007.
335
Source: “Myanmar holding 1,000 people at Yangon campus – officials,” AFP, 2
October 2007; “Burma - Fear Over the Country,” IPS, 4 October 2007; “Detained
monks could be sent to hard labour camps,” DVB, 2 October 2007; “No 3 Basic
Education High School, Tamwe Township, Crack Down,” DVB, 5 October 2007,
translation by HRDU; “UPDATE (Burma): Protests continue despite heavy security;
more people and monks taken away; townsfolk defend monasteries with slingshots,”
AHRC, 30 September 2007.
111
As of 30 January 2008, and according to the Assistance Association for Political

Prisoners in Burma (AAPPB), 706 persons were known to remain in detention in
relation to the protests. However, this figure is likely to be quite conservative,
as the list only contains those persons whom the AAPPB have been able to
name and confirm as remaining in incarceration.336
The SPDC has already brought charges against at least 28 of these persons
and declared its intent to do so for many of the remainder.337 Trials have been
perfunctory, held in closed session, with the right to legal representation denied
and witnesses pressured to testify against the accused.
Prolonged Detention without Charge

Many of those arrested in relation to the protests were detained for days, weeks
or even months without being charged. Such extended periods of detention
without charge not only run contrary to international law, but also Burma’s own
Criminal Procedure Code which dictates that it is mandatory to obtain a court
order in order to prolong detention beyond a period of 24 hours.
“I was arrested without being given any explanation. Then I was

detained for 25 days without being charged. I was released from
Insein Prison together with a group of 80 others, but we were not
even given any reason as to why we were released”.338
On 12 December, the mother of 17-year-old student Maung Ye Myat Hein

reported that her son had been detained for over two months in Insein Prison, in
the absence of any formal charges being brought against him:
“My son was taken from home by government officials on October

10. They said they needed to ask him some questions and that it
would only take two or three days. But now it has been two
months that he’s been in detention in Insein [Prison]. They still
haven’t charged my son with anything. He is only 17 years old so
he is still a minor. It’s illegal to do that to a minor.” 339
336
2008.
337
2008.
338
2007.
339
Source: “Detained student beaten in custody,” DVB, 12 December 2007.
112
For the most part, the families of those who were detained have not received
any information on their whereabouts or state of health, despite some of them
visiting the prisons to try and discover what had happened to them.340
“I have no idea where my daughter is being held. I haven’t heard

anything yet. They never tell us”.341
“Two of my friends, Kyaw San Win and Ko Phyoe, were beaten up

and dragged onto a truck during the crackdown on 27 [September].
Their families did not know where they were being held. They
looked for them at hospitals, fearing that they had died, but they
could not find them anywhere. They did not get any information
from the police stations about their detention”.342
NLD spokesperson, U Myint Thein, was known to have been arrested by

Special Branch police force. However, when his wife, Daw Swe Swe Thein,
went to the police Special Branch office at 8 Mile Junction with some medicine
for her husband, officials told her they knew nothing about his detention.
"I went to the Special Branch office to take some medicine and
enquire about my husband's situation as they are the people who
arrested my husband. But officials there asked me to provide them
with detailed information on which department [of the Special
Branch] made the arrest and who my husband was. … I told them
that I was the wife of NLD spokesperson U Myint Thein and that
news of his arrest had been broadcast by government media. …
But they said they couldn’t tell me anything”.343
Similarly, Pu Chin Sian Thang, an ethnic leader of Zomi National Congress and
elected member of the parliament, was arrested on 26 September and was
believed to be held at Aung Tha Paye interrogation centre. However, when his
son, Tant Inn Byaik Thang, went to visit his father at the interrogation centre to
provide him with essential medicines, he was told that his father was not there.
"They didn't even let me past the gates. The guards there only told
me my father was not there. … He needs to take medication
regularly for his asthma and he will probably be out of medicine by
now".344
340
Source: “Public Statement by AAPP One Month after the Commencement of
Peaceful Demonstrations across Burma,” AAPPB, 18 September 2007.
341
October 2007.
342
November 2007.
343
Source: “Families concerned about detained opposition leaders,” DVB, 11 October
2007.
344
Source: Ibid.
113
This situation has been complicated by the frequent transfer of prisoners

between different detention facilities. Many individuals have been transferred
between as many as three different facilities, and often interrogated at each
one.345 One released detainee has testified about his experience during
transfer from Police Battalion #8 to Insein Prison on 9 October 2007:
“At 3:00 pm on 9 October [2007], a police captain and 15

policemen came to us with two trucks and told us that we were
going to be transferred to Insein Prison. They tied our hands
behind our backs. We had to squat in pairs on the trucks. The
policemen stepped on our shoulders and heads. The Captain told
us to bow our heads and not to turn our heads. He also told us
that he had been given permission to shoot and kill anyone who
tried to flee. We arrived at the annex of Insein Prison at about 6:00
pm. The number of prisoners transferred was 27 and it was
difficult to breathe on the trucks. U Kyi Shein, Chairman of the
Dawbon Township NLD, appeared to be dead on the truck but the
police did not pay any attention to him. They threatened to kill us
all. We had to stay on the trucks for about one hour at the gate of
the attached prison. We were all having difficulty breathing and our
hands were painful and could not move”.346
More disturbingly, several reports have emerged of groups of detainees being

covertly transferred to unknown locations. According to a Swan Arr Shin
member working inside the GTI compound, the SPDC had plans to send monks
detained at the GTI to a hard labour prison camp in Sagaing Township in
Sagaing Division.347 One eyewitness has reported witnessing detainees being
taken from the GTI compound aboard eight military trucks on the night of 3
October. Another eyewitness reported seeing four army trucks loaded with
monks leaving the GTI compound on the evening of 5 October.348 Sources in
the Rangoon prison administration system have reported that the number of
detainees held in interrogation centres had exceeded capacity, and that the
transfers were conducted in response to this.349
Even those families who were aware of the location where their relatives were
being detained, it has proven difficult to secure visitation rights. The authorities
have frequently denied permission without any form of explanation or
justification. Those affiliated with political organizations or who took an active
role in the protests have faced particularly strong restrictions. On 14 December,
345
Sources: HRDU Interview with “U Zaw Oo”, 40-year-old male civilian, 11
December 2007; “Songwriter Ko Ye Lwin released,” DVB, 23 October 2007.
346
Source: Testimony of “U A---”, provided to HRDU by a confidential source.
347
Source: “Detained monks could be sent to hard labour camps,” DVB, 2 October
2007.
348
Source: “Detainees transferred to unknown locations,” DVB, 8 October 2007.
349
Source: “Detainees transferred due to prison overcrowding,” DVB, 11 October 2007.
114
the mother of Min Aung, an organizer of the Taungup Township branch of the
NLD, reported that she had been unable to meet with her son for two months.
“It is more than two months now, and I have not been able to meet
[my son]. He is said to be kept at Thandwe Jail [in Arakan State].
And with winter approaching it is becoming cold, so I want to give
him some clothes and [food]. He is in poor health and it is really
worrying me”.350
Similarly, those members of the NLD detained in Ohnbo Prison in Mandalay

Division, have been refused permission to meet with their families. The elder
sister of Daw Win Mya Mya, who was arrested at the end of September,
expressed concern over the health of her younger sister:
“We are worried about her health because come winter, her old
wounds that she sustained during the Depayin attack, [will] give her
problems. All we want to know is whether she will be released or
would be tried in court and be sentenced”.351
In order to be granted permission for a prison visit, family members of political

prisoners must produce their household registration forms as well as their
national identity cards to the authorities. This system, however, discriminates
against members of the monastic community who continue to be detained, as
monks reside in monasteries and are thus not listed on their families’ household
registration forms. As a result, it could potentially take as long as six months to
gain permission for a prison visit once the application has passed from local
authorities right through to the SPDC Director General of Department of
Prisons.
350
Source: “Detained opposition members barred from meeting families,” Mizzima
News, 14 December 2007.
351
Source: Ibid.
115
Judicial Procedure
Meanwhile, the SPDC has announced its intent to bring charges against certain
detainees for their involvement in the peaceful protests. At the beginning of
October, the SPDC-controlled New Light of Myanmar reported that nearly 1,000
people being held over the protests could face jail sentences, stating that
“[a]nyone who is detained for his violation of the law must be charged and serve
prison terms if he is found guilty”.352 By November, the authorities announced
that 91 people arrested in connection with the demonstrations would be charged
with being involved in “violent and terrorist acts”.353
According to the AAPPB, by early December, at least 28 individuals arrested in

relation to the popular protests since August had already been sentenced to
prison terms of up to 20 years.354 Many of these individuals are known to have
been tried in grossly flawed and closed proceedings. It is common practice in
Burma that persons charged are denied access to legal counsel, tried
summarily and often sentenced to maximum prison terms. This continued to be
the case for persons charged for their involvement in the September protests.
The often archaic laws enacted by the SPDC in charging and convicting
protestors are defined broadly enough, that in the absence of any rule of law or
an independent judiciary, they can be manipulated to include conduct such as
peaceful political resistance.
In the wake of the protests, several detainees have been charged under Section
505 (b) of the Burmese Criminal Code, a law which has been increasingly used
by the SPDC to condemn those who act against its own interests.355 This law
allows for the imprisonment of up to two years under the charge of making
statements conducive to public mischief with intent to either cause public alarm
or disturb public tranquillity. Other laws enacted include Section 143 of the
Penal Code allowing for six months imprisonment under charges of unlawful
assembly, as well as charges of sedition and treason which can carry sentences
of up to life imprisonment.
The elasticity of these laws was demonstrated on 8 October, when Ko Thiha, a

street vendor in the Bassein Market, was sentenced to two years imprisonment
by Bassein Township Court under Section 505 (b) for informing monks of
rumours he had heard of their impending arrest.356
352
Source: “Myanmar opposition cautiously welcomes Suu Kyi dialogue move,” AFP, 9
October 2007
353
Source: “Myanmar to ‘take action’ against 91 protesters,” AFP, 7 November 2007
354
2008.
355
For more details see “BURMA: Two men jailed for allegedly possessing video of
army wedding,” AHRC, 7 May 2007.
356
Source: “Burma Update 227,” PDC,” 11 October 2007.
116
During those trials which have been conducted in relation to the protests, scant
regard has been paid to any form of correct judicial procedure. Many of these
trials have been conducted behind closed doors, without access to legal
counsel, and while denying family members of those on trial to attend. Reports
have also testified to the prosecution’s use of unknown or partisan witnesses,
as well as forcing persons to testify against the accused.
Ko Kyauk Khe, an NLD member from Aunglan Township, Magwe Division, was
sentenced to two years imprisonment under Section 505 (b) of the Penal Code
after shouting “Long live the Buddhist religion”, in a local video store, while
watching footage of the crackdown on foreign media. During his trial the
prosecution alleged that he had also shouted “Down with Than Shwe” and other
anti-SPDC slogans, accusing him of supporting the monk-led protests in the
township. Ko Kyauk Khe said in his defence that he had shouted in support of
Buddhism because he felt that the SPDC’s actions were undermining the
religion. He was refused the right to legal council after local attorneys were
warned by military officials not to represent him.357
On 11 September, HRDP member Ko Soe Win, of Sar Pyin village outside

Taunggok, Arakan State, was charged with insulting the Buddhist religion and
creating a public disturbance and sentenced to four years in prison. He was
sentenced on the same day of his arrest after staging a solo protest carrying a
placard calling for the release of political activists and the excommunication of
Senior General Than Shwe from the Buddhist faith. He was denied the right to
meet with either his relatives or a lawyer. It would seem that such an appeal is
deemed as an insult to Buddhism.358
Ko Thet Oo and Ko Zaw Htun, both of Prome (Pyay) Township, Pegu Division,
were arrested on 15 September, and subsequently charged with distributing
illegal materials under Section 5 (j) of the 1950 Emergency Provisions Act.
During their trial, local police detained witnesses and threatened that they would
be included on prosecution lists unless they testified against the accused.359
On 12 October, Naw Ohn Hla was placed under a “restriction order” in

accordance with the 1961 Restriction and Bond Act, for her involvement in the
August demonstrations. Under the terms of the order, she he cannot leave the
township for the next year without seeking a permit, or reside in another part of
the country, and must report to the local police station once every seven days.
At the trial in Hmawbe, Rangoon Division, she was denied her right to legal
357
Source: “Man arrested for shouting religious slogan,” DVB, 3 October 2007; “Man
given two-year sentence for shouting religious slogan,” DVB, 11 October 2007;
“UPDATE (Burma): Two years’ jail for praising Buddhism; four years for solo protest,”
AHRC, 12 October 2007.
358
Source: Irrawaddy, 12 September 2007; “UPDATE (Burma): Two years’ jail for
praising Buddhism; four years for solo protest,” AHRC, 12 October 2007.
359
Source: “BURMA: 19 members of a single human rights group detained, imprisoned
or missing,” AHRC, 11 October 2007.
117
council and the only witnesses called were the township police chief, her village
tract council chairman and one of his assistants.360
On 9 November, Kachin State NLD member Nay Win, and Bhamo Township
NLD member Ba Myint, were both jailed for two years after being tried in closed
prison courts in Myitkyina and Bhamo prisons respectively. They were
sentenced under section 505 (b) of the Penal Code. Neither of their families
were informed that they were due to be tried, and the two men were not
permitted to hire lawyers to defend them.361
There have also been several unconfirmed reports of monks arrested in

Rangoon being tried and sentenced in closed tribunals. On 29 September, a
senior monk, who visited Insein Prison at the request of the authorities, reported
that some monks had already been sentenced to six years imprisonment by a
specially convened court.362 Similarly, on 11 October 2007, 16 monks were
reportedly brought before a specially convened tribunal inside Thayet Prison,
although HRDU has been unable to ascertain whether or not the monks
detained there have been sentenced or what charges they faced.363
In other cases, the sentencing of monks has been corroborated. For instance,
Eik Darea, a 26-year-old monk, was sentenced to seven and a half years
imprisonment in a Sittwe Court under charges of inciting public unrest and
illegal association. He had been disrobed and was tried in a closed court.364
360
Source: “BURMA: A country not in accordance with law--the case of Naw Ohn
Hla,” AHRC, 14 November 2007
361
Source: “NLD charges continue despite moves towards dialogue,” DVB, 13
November 2007
362
Source: “Monks sentenced to six years imprisonment,” Irrawaddy, 29 September
2007.
363
Source: “Special tribunal for protestors convened in Thayet Prison,” DVB, 12
October 2007.
364
Source: “Myanmar protest monk jailed for seven years,” Reuters, 17 October 2007.
118
Conditions of Detention
Detention facilities suffered from problems of overcrowding, a lack of clean water,
food, basic supplies such as blankets, and appalling standards of sanitation. Such
conditions fall far below international standards and patently qualify as being
defined as cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment. Moreover, the deliberate
aggravation of, and suffering caused by, such conditions amount to a form of torture
in themselves.
Released detainees have reported that large groups of people were kept in small
cells; with space so limited that many were unable to even lie down. Furthermore,
some of the detention centres lacked proper toilet and sanitation facilities, forcing
detainees to urinate and defecate on the floor in their overcrowded cells. Such
conditions are conducive to the spread of disease, and as a result, many detainees
became ill.
The well-known Burmese musician, U Ye Lwin, who was detained at the GTI
compound for 12 days, reported sleeping in a room with as many as 600 other
detainees. According to his testimony, there was not enough space to lie down on
the concrete floor, and so had to sleep sitting up. The detainees were provided with
little water and were only allowed out to go to the toilet once a day. He was not
allowed to bathe once during the 12 days that he was detained there. The
detainees were also not provided with water with which to wash their hands prior to
meals, and were thus forced to wipe their hands on their own clothes.365 This is a
particularly unsanitary situation. In Burma, food is customarily eaten with the
hands, typically the right hand, while the left hand is used to wash oneself after
using the bathroom. In the absence of water with which to wash their hands, the
potential for the spread of life-threatening diseases such as dysentery increases
dramatically.
Ma Hla Hla Mon, another released detainee, described a similar situation to DVB for
women who were detained at the GTI detention centre
“We were kept in [the] GTI for [four] days. There were 156 persons in
one room. All were women, including the elderly and children. That
room was not good for health. There was a room [adjacent to] the
room where we were. We used it as the toilet. They didn't allow us to
wash our faces. When we told to them about the foul smell in the
room, they moved us to another room. They called the Municipal
Servicemen to clean that room. They made a toilet for us, but the
toilet was only a ditch. There was no water. They didn’t allow the girls
to have a bath. Our bodies had a foul smell”.366
365
Source: “Songwriter Ko Ye Lwin released,” DVB, 23 October 2007.
366
Source: Source: “Interview with Hla Hla Mon,” New Era Journal, 3 October 2007,
translation by HRDU.
119
Another female detainee, who was also detained at the GTI detention facility
similarly recalled:
“At [the] GTI we were not allowed to shower. We had to sleep on the
cement floor. The rooms were awkward and smelly as we didn’t have
access to toilets and were [told] to urinate in the rooms. Some women
were over seventy years old and there were some children as young
as five or six as well. The children [were] getting sick at night. We
embarrassingly [asked] the guard to move us to another ward then ’No
more ward here. All filled with people. Stay where you are with the
discipline!’, he replied. Due to the overcrowding it was difficult to stay
there. Therefore, they moved us to another ward on the next night. At
that ward also we don’t have enough space even on the cement
therefore we were in sitting posture while they [cleaned] the old ward
then [moved] us back”.367
The appalling lack of sanitary facilities was particularly difficult for female detainees.
Some of whom were unable to wash themselves even when menstruating.
“We were given no right to bathe for all those days [that they were
detained]. As for the women, they couldn’t clean their body when their
period came. We were not provided with pillows or blankets. We
slept on the wooden shields [used by the riot police during the
crackdowns] which covered the concrete floor. They closed all of the
windows and banned us from washing, so our room was quite hot and
smelled very bad”.368
The situation was no better for the monks or young novices, who were also kept in
cramped and unsanitary conditions. A 24-year-old monk, who was incarcerated at
the GTI detention centre for ten days, reported:
“There were about 400 of us in one room. No toilets, no buckets, no

water for washing. No beds, no blankets, no soap, Nothing. The
room was too small for everyone to lie down at once. We took it in
turns to sleep. Every night at 8:00 o'clock we were given a small bowl
of rice and a cup of water. But after a few days many of us just
couldn't eat. The smell was so bad. Some of the novice monks were
under ten years old, the youngest was just seven. They were stripped
of their robes and given prison sarongs. Some were beaten, leaving
open, untreated wounds, but no doctors came”.369
367
Source: Testimony provided to HRDU by a confidential source.
368
November 2007.
369
120
Another young monk has also testified to the substandard conditions of detention.
He had seen numerous detainees pass out as they sat in their holding cell.
“We weren’t allowed to move it all, not even to go to the lavatory – we

had to just do it where we were sitting. Once in the morning, and once
in the afternoon, the guards would come and give us water, but it
would be only one or two bottles for 50 people or more”.370
Numerous reports have also testified to an insufficient supply of food and drinking
water in the detention centres, which in many cases, has led to a deterioration of
the health of the detainees. Khin Mar Lar, who was detained at Ohnbo Prison in
Mandalay, described how what little food she was given consisted of nothing more
than a thin foul smelling rice soup, strewn with gravel and dirt, and as something
that “even dogs wouldn’t eat”.371 Another released detainee has recalled the food
he was given in Insein Prison, stating how he was “given food only after 9:00 pm,
but the food was not fresh. It had a bad smell”.372 It is highly likely that the “bad
smell” that many detainees have reported derived from being fed rotten food.
After her release, Ma Ohn Mar expressed her concern about one pregnant detainee
who was not receiving a sufficiently nutritious diet in detention, stating that, “May
Mee Oo is four months pregnant. She has been detained for a month. For the
sake of her unborn baby, she is trying to get a nutritious diet, but it is really difficult in
prison”.373
Many other detainees have reported the lack of any clean water at various
detention facilities:
“The drinking water we were given was not suitable for drinking. The
colour of the water was yellowish. We were given four gallons of
water for washing dishes, taking a bath, for toilet, and washing
clothes. The water had a bad smell, so we only had a shower once
every three days. Since the drinking water was not hygienic, our
health deteriorated. Some were swollen all over their bodies. Some
had cardiac problems. Most of us developed skin diseases. Although
we asked the authorities for proper medical treatment, we did not
receive any”.374
370
October 2007.
371
Source: “UPDATE (Burma): More details of deaths during protests emerge,” AHRC,
24 October 2007.
372
2007.
373
374
121
“When I got there I realized they had not even finished building toilets
for the detainees. They only provided us with muddy water to drink
there. My body and stomach became bloated after a few days of
detention in the Police Brigade #3. I got very sick and I could not have
any food for about eight days. I became malnourished”.375
At Insein Prison, a number of detainees were interned in a special punishment

area that has been commonly referred to as the “dog cells”. This area is a
compound of nine tiny isolation cells which each measure only two metres
square and are under the constant guard of a pack of 30 dogs. The cells lack
adequate ventilation and detainees have to sleep on a thin mat on the concrete
floor. There are no toilets and prisoners are only allowed to bathe with cold
water once every three days for no longer than five minutes.376
Clean water was also reportedly unavailable at Police Battalion #7 in Kyauktan

Township, leading to a significant deterioration in the health of those detainees
interned there.
“At that time, the water we drunk was not clean and [had a] reddish
colour. It was not good enough to be used as drinking water.
When we had a bath, the water had a very bad smell. … It was for
25 persons. As a result we were infected with scabies. Our faces
became puffy. Saw Wai Moe from Insein is now preparing to go to
the hospital. San Win and Nwe Aung, who still remain there, also
have puffy faces. I think the main cause of their condition is the
unclean water. They gave us some treatment but it was not
enough. The authorities there need permission from [their
superiors] to give treatment”.377
Furthermore, some reports have maintained that no mosquito nets were

provided to detainees at Police Battalion #7, despite there being many
mosquitoes and endemic levels of malaria in the area.378
Reports have also emerged of the floors of cells, where detainees had to sleep,
being deliberately soaked with water by security officials. One monk reported
that the security officials at the GTI detention centre poured wet sand onto the
floors of rooms where detainees had to sleep, leading to persons rapidly
becoming ill.379 A 30-year-old man who was released from the Kyaikkasan
detention centre reported a similar experience.
375
Source: “Women’s group chair ill-treated in detention,” DVB, 14 December 2007.
376
Source: Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in
377
Source: “30 persons released from Police Battalion from Kyauktan, but 15 persons
still remained,” DVB, 2 November 2007.
378
Source: “Conditions of Detention in Police Battalion #7, Rangoon,” AAPPB, 21
September 2007.
379
Source: “Monks in hell,” Irrawaddy, 11 October 2007.
122
“At midnight on 28 September, the authorities cut off the electricity

in the 20 ft by 40 ft room, where about 200 people, including me,
were detained. Suddenly, they started pumping water into the
room while we were sleeping. We panicked. Then the police
came running into the room and started beating us. Wearing wet
clothes, we are all taken from the room one by one and
interrogated three times - by the police, the Special Branch and the
Military Intelligence”.380
Objections made to such treatment were typically met with harsh punishment
and further beatings. On 24 December it was reported that three detainees held
in Insein Prison: Htin Kyaw, Myo Thant and Zin Lin Aung were placed in solitary
confinement after commencing a hunger strike over the conditions that they
were being subjected to. In another instance, NLD member, Ko Pauk, was
placed in solitary confinement after protesting detainees being forced to do
manual labour at Insein Prison. He had made the complaint after the warden
had informed the detainees they were free to claim their rights.381
Interrogation and Torture of Detainees

Many of those persons who have since been released from detention have
reported intense levels of interrogation, conducted in turn by several different
branches of security personnel. For instance, one person reported being
interrogated for 18 straight days, at three different detention facilities, during
which time he was questioned by four different groups: Special Branch (SB), the
Criminal Investigation Department (CID), the Bureau of Special Investigation
(BSI), and military intelligence (SaYaPa).382 These interrogation sessions
typically started late in the evening, and lasted for several hours, often
continuing right through the night.
“Nobody could sleep well at night because they took the detainees
out group by group for interrogations. Each group consisted of four
or five people. They were taken to a room and interrogated one by
one”.383
“On 27 September, [my friends] and I were taken to Police

Battalion #8. We were interrogated for the whole two days by the
Special Branch, Bureau of Special Investigation and District Police
Force. We were continuously interrogated from the night we had
380
Source: Ibid.
381
Sources: Testimonies of “U A---” and “U H---”, provided to HRDU by a
confidential source.
382
2007.
383
November 2007.
123
arrived to Insein Prison and until yesterday [30 October 2007]. It

could be defined as psychological torture, [b]ecause they called us
to be interrogated at 1:00 am or 2:00 am. [W]e couldn't sleep very
well. They sent us back and called again for the next time. We
were unable to sleep because they called us in turns. Some
monks were interrogated for the whole day”.384
“After 8:00 pm, I was interrogated by one group after another. I

could not sleep for a week”.385
“My friends who lived in Wingabar were interrogated in the GTI by

five groups such as the military security branch [SaYaPa] and
Special Branch. They had to answer the same questions to the
five interrogators one by one. Many of them were punched and
beaten during these interrogations at the GTI”.386
“I was interrogated 15 times. If the interrogation team gets

information from us, they send that data to the Ministry of Home
Affairs. If the Home Affairs thinks the data is not complete, they
send back the points they need. So we had to go through many
interrogation sessions. Some monks were interrogated 30 times.
The 88 Generation Students' Group leaders were also interrogated
20 or 30 times”.387
During these interrogation sessions, the lines of questioning were repetitive.

Not only were detainees pressured to admit their own guilt, but they were
presented with photographs taken during the demonstrations and pressed to
identify the people in the photographs. Questioning was also geared towards
extracting ‘confessions’ testifying that the protests had been organised by the
NLD and “external influences”. Answers from interrogation sessions were cross
checked with those from other sessions as well as information gathered by local
intelligence officials in their neighbourhoods. If their claims corroborated, they
would be freed, however, if they did not, the detainees would be held for further
questioning.388
“They interrogated us one by one. First they asked me if I had

been involved in the protests and if I knew who had led the
protests. I answered that I hadn’t been involved, and that I had
been helping my wife at her shop when the protests started.
384
Source: “Interview with U Htaung Ko Htan,” DVB, October 31, 2007, translation by
HRDU.
385
Source: Testimony of “U H---”, provided to HRDU by a confidential source.
386
2007.
387
Source: Testimony of “H---”, provided to HRDU by a confidential source.
388
October 2007.
124
Sometimes they showed me photos and asked me if I knew

anyone in the photos. I replied that I didn’t know anyone even if I
knew someone in the photo. During the protests two motorbikes
were burned at Yae Tar Shae Road, near my block. So they asked
me if I knew about the burning of the motorbikes. I told them that I
didn’t see it happen. They also asked whether I knew any of the
people who had thrown stones at the riot police. I answered that I
didn’t know anything about that either”.389
“[On 23 August 2007, I was one of] 13 arrested people were taken
to the Kyaikkasan interrogation centre. Two hours after arriving at
the interrogation centre, I was interrogated by people who I
presumed were Special Branch police. During the interrogation, I
was questioned about who led the protests, what the goal was,
what we did during the march, and if we are members of the NLD
or not. I answered that I took part in the protests due to the fuel
price hike, that no one led these protests, that no one instructed
me to participate in the protests, that I took part on my own
conscience, that I had a right to free expression that would not
infringe upon my political ideals, and that the freedom of
expression was lawful according to the UN Declaration of Human
Rights”.390
“They would wake us up in the middle of the night. As I'm a

volunteer with the HIV patients, they asked me about the funds,
how we use it, if I got any of the money for personal use. They
also asked me if I knew any of the 88 Generation Students’ [Group]
leaders. As I was also involved in the march past Daw Aung San
Su Kyi's house on 22 September, they asked me who planned this
route, if it was the NLD leaders”.391
“They asked me who ordered us to participate. And who ordered

us to do the praying for Daw Aung San Suu Kyi at the pagoda. I
answered that no one had ordered us to take part in those events;
we did it out of our own will. They didn't accept that explanation.
They wanted me to answer that someone had ordered us to
participate”.392
389
November 2007.
390
391
Leaders of the Saffron Revolution,” DVB, 27 October 2007
392
Source: “Interview with Daw Kyi Kyi Nyunt, member of NLD, who was seriously
tortured during detention,” DVB, 28 October 2007, translation by HRDU.
125
If the interrogators did not get the answers they wanted they would respond by
beating the detainees. Through such continual and brutal interrogation, the
authorities were eventually able to extract their desired answers from many
individuals, regardless of whether they reflected the truth or not.
“They asked many questions, for example, ‘Who do you know?

Which monks were involved in the protests? Who supports your
ideas? Did your NLD leader encourage you to join the protests?
Do you have connections abroad? Do you receive funding from
abroad?’ They also asked questions about the photos taken during
the protests. The same questions were repeated in each
interrogation session. If I did not answer the questions
satisfactorily I was beaten. For example I was beaten when I said I
didn’t know a person in the protest photos”.393
“They asked me if I had participated in the recent demonstrations,

and I said no. But they asked me that same question again and
again and forced me to say ‘yes’. When I asserted that I really did
not participate in the demonstration, one of the members of the
Special Branch punched me in the stomach. Then, they beat my
back, chest and head with their palms and said that they arrested
me because of my participation”.394
"There were 85 others in my police cell [at Police Battalion #14],

mostly young people. Some were only 15 or 16 years old. One
boy told me he was arrested for wearing an American flag on his
head. Some of the students had broken bones and head wounds.
At the end of three days I still hadn't confessed so they gave up
and put me back in the cell and left me alone. Some of the others
confessed under the pressure but they weren't real confessions. I
don't blame them. There were people in my cell who were
interrogated non-stop for 15 days".395
“I was sitting on the floor of the interrogation room. There were five
of them asking questions. The first day I was beaten very hard and
they asked: ‘Who organised the monks?’ I told them we were
following the monks, respecting the Buddha, they weren't following
us. I was interrogated all night for three nights. They kicked and
punched me on the side of my head with their fists. They asked
me the same question over and over. I told them: ‘You can ask
393
2007.
394
Source: Testimony of “U H---”, provided to HRDU by a confidential source.
395
Source: “Spies, suspicion and empty monasteries - Burma today,” The Guardian, 15
December 2007.
126
anything, my answer will always be the same. I don't know who

organised the monks’. They didn't like that answer”.396
No one was spared from the beatings. The authorities beat everyone they
interrogated whenever the answers they received were not the ones that they
sought. Children, expectant mothers and the mentally ill also suffered harsh
treatment and torture during detention. Some of the beatings continued to the
point where the detainees had to be carried out of the interrogation room by
medical personnel. One female detainee described some of what she
witnessed during her five days interned at the GTI detention facility:
"They beat everyone, including women and girls. I was beaten

myself. Monks were targeted and they were not only beaten but
also verbally abused by security officers. I heard people shouting
and crying from the interrogation room and then, I saw an army
medical surgeon carrying people away”.397
One man who was detained at temporary detention facility set up at Kyaikkasan
Racecourse, testified to witnessing the beating of a six-year-old child.
"There was a family who stayed near the Pagoda. The whole
family was arrested, including a little boy, about 6 years old. In the
detention centre, when they started beating the small boy up,
people tried to stop them, and shield him from the blows. So they
kept on beating these people the whole night. The little boy is still
there. He's bound to be traumatised by the experience. He's so
young, only in kindergarten”.398
Nyut Nyut Tin, an NLD member from Pegu, was released on 20 October 2007
after being detained in Police Interrogation Centre #2 in Toungoo for three days.
During her interrogation, security officials pulled her hair, and beat and kicked
her. She was forced to crouch in a one foot square space for 36 hours and
received food only twice during the entire three days that she was detained. On
25 October, when she was interviewed, she still suffered back pain after being
kicked many times and found it difficult to work.399
Another woman who had been released from Insein Prison reported how a
woman who was seven month’s pregnant was punched in the stomach during
interrogation, and only released when it appeared that the unborn baby had
died:
396
Source: Ibid.
397
Source: “Group accuses Myanmar of beating, killing detainees,” AP, 10 October
2007.
398
Source: “Rangoon Residents: We'll Never Forget,” DVB, 14 October 2007,
399
Source: “Women Recall Life in Prisons, Interrogation Centers,” Irrawaddy, 25
October 2007.
127
“The pregnant woman Ma Thandar Nwe Oo was released on 18

October because the foetus did not move on 17 October due to the
hitting to the belly by the interrogators as well as malnutrition and no
medical treatment in prison”.400
Another released detainee described to HRDU how a mentally handicapped

individual was severely beaten in detention after answering unsatisfactorily during
interrogation.
“Even the mentally ill and alcoholics were arrested in their operation.
When we were interrogated, we knew to give them the answers that
they wanted. When they asked who burnt the motorcycles we would
say that we didn’t see it. When one of the mentally ill men was
interrogated about the burning of motorcycles, he answered that the
destroyers were the police. They [security officials] punched his face
from both sides at the same time”.401
Indians and Muslims arrested during the demonstrations suffered particularly harsh
treatment. Habitually discriminated against by the security forces, they were
accused of being involved in something that was not their business to be involved
in, and beaten severely as a result.
“We were interrogated at No. 1 Special Hostel. During the

interrogation, Soe Myint from [Pazundaung] Township was beaten
and kicked. … He suffered severe pains in his ribs and had difficulty
breathing. They told him ’You are an Indian. Why did you participate
in the demonstration? It is not your job.’ And saying these words, they
beat and kicked him”.402
“I heard that they were severely tortured just because they are
foreigners. They would also swear vulgarities at them. They said
these Muslims should mind their own business instead of getting
involved in the protests. One of the youths was made to kneel down
on rocks. After an hour, when he told them he couldn't bear it any
longer, they slapped him till his cheeks were swollen, and they forced
him to ’ride the motorbike’ [a form of torture where one is forced to
assume a squat position for long periods of time as though they were
riding a motorcycle] for [two] hours. I was in the same bus with him
after our release, and he told me about it”.403
400
Source: Testimony of “U N---”, provided to HRDU by a confidential source.
401
November 2007.
402
Source: “Over 70 people released,” DVB, 26 October 2007, translation by HRDU.
403
128
“They sent him to another place [detention centre]. When he came

back, his head was numb and he looked pale like he was very ill. He
had a medical check up at the hospital and when I went to see him he
had an [intravenous] drip with a bottle of medicine hanging up above
him. When I was there, no results had come out yet. They were
worried that his brain was affected by the beating. His parents told me
that they would only know about his fate when the results came out.
He remembered everything but he was too weak and couldn’t speak
well. They were all beaten up by the soldiers. He couldn’t stand; he
could only lie on his back. He said he was dizzy all the time. When
he tried to stand up, he toppled over”.404
Similarly, nine Burmese Muslims who remain in custody at Pabedan Police Station
have been beaten continuously. A family member who was able to visit them
reported their situation to DVB.
“They have bruises all over their bodies and said they were beaten up
nearly every day during interrogation. They could not even eat
properly. The Pabedan Police Chief told us they were beaten up, not
by police officers from the station, but by the military security
department officers who are conducting their daily interrogations”.405
Other forms of torture endured by detainees included water torture, solitary

confinement, the denial of food, and sleep deprivation. U Than Pe, the vice
chairperson of the Taunggup branch of the NLD was subjected to a form of water
torture during his interrogation at the Ann detention centre in Arakan State. This
particular form of torture is quite common throughout Burma. The victims head is
covered with a soaked cloth. The water clogs the pores in the fabric and the victim
is unable to breathe until the cloth dries up sufficiently or is removed. One of his
family members reported what he had been subjected to:
“While they were being interrogated in Ann, they were tortured by

having their faces covered with wet cloths. A health worker stood
nearby measuring their blood pressure. When the reading dropped to
90 over 60, the worker said the detainees could still take more torture
and were not about to die yet”.406
After being released, U Than Pe reported that he was deprived of sleep for eight of
the thirteen days he was detained, and given little food.407 Similarly, upon her
release from Insein Prison, Ma Ohn Mar, also reported that she had been withheld
food as punishment after interrogation.
404
November 2007.
405
Source: “Muslims detained for giving water to monks,” DVB, 7 November 2007.
406
Source: “NLD members allege torture during interrogation,” DVB, 22 October 2007.
407
Source: “Arakan NLD members sentenced but released,” DVB, 26 October 2007.
129
“They did not physically assault me, but they withheld food and water.
I was in ill health, but they denied me any treatment saying there was
no medication or doctors to attend to me. Finally, late at night, they
gave me some water, but the water was very dirty. There were hairs,
leaves, and even dead ants in it”.408
On numerous other occasions, detainees were forced to remain in stress positions

for long periods of time. The ’motorbike‘ is one such stress position frequently used
during interrogations in Burma, whereby the detainee is forced to assume a position
resembling riding a motorcycle for hours at a time.
“I was beaten altogether eight times during the seven days of that I
was interrogated for. I was beaten on the back of the head, mostly
with the fist or the [open] hand, and one night with a hard fibre ruler. …
Other detainees told me they suffered other types of punishment
during interrogation. They had to sit or stand in awkward positions;
like standing on their toes with bent knees and their arms held up in
the air, or kneeling with their arms up in the air”.409
“Khin Maung Aye from Latha Township [in Rangoon] was kicked on
his legs with heels. They said: ’Tell us who you are’. They ordered
him to ‘drive the motorbike’. He was also ordered to stand on the tip-
toes and to stretch his hands out to the front”.410
“As my eyes are not good I use glasses. They removed my glasses.
They told to me that there was no need for eyes, but only ears. Then
they beat me again. They said that we had no hearts, no compassion.
Sitting on the small chair, my legs were stretched out and my hands
were put on my knees, in [the] ’ponzan’ position [various stress
positions that detainees are forced to assume for long periods of time].
If I didn't sit with my back straight, they kicked me from the back. I
was interrogated the whole night; from 7:00 pm on October 17 until
8:00 am the next day. I sat on the small chair the whole time. My
health was not good. My whole body, such as my back, and arms had
got the blue and black bruises. My whole back is also inflamed and in
pain. I could not walk normally because of sitting in that position for
two nights and being kicked by their boots. They didn't beat on my
face, but I was beaten on the head and they pulled my hair. They also
swore at me. From 8:00 pm of October 18 to 3:00 am of October 19,
they interrogated me again. It finished at 3:00 am”.411
408
409
2007.
410
411
Source: “Interview with Daw Kyi Kyi Nyunt, member of NLD, who was seriously
tortured during detention,” DVB, 28 October 2007, translation by HRDU.
130
Denial of Medical Care

Many detainees suffered from injuries sustained both during their arrests and as a
result of being assaulted during interrogation. Poor sanitary conditions coupled with
a lack of adequate food and clean drinking water also led to serious health
complications for many detainees. Nevertheless, the right to proper medical
treatment was either denied or grossly insufficient. The inability of families to visit
their detained relatives was also significant in this regard, as they were unable to
deliver much-needed medicines that were not available from the authorities.
“I was sent to the Police Battalion #8. … We were tortured both

physically and mentally. During the interrogation, I fell off the stool
and had a severe back pain. I still have that back pain and have to
receive medical treatment. I did not get medical treatment at the
interrogation centre”.412
“The persons who had been shot and those with severe injuries were
provided with treatment in Insein Prison, but the persons who have
gastric ulcer, headache other small illnesses didn't get any
treatment”.413
Daw San San Myint, the chairperson of the Burmese Housewives’ Association, was
beaten and arrested during protests on 24 August in Rangoon, before being taken
to the Kyaikkasan interrogation centre. Despite suffering from the effects of the
beatings, she was not provided any medical treatment. After being released, she
told DVB that, “[o]n the third day of my detention, my body and limbs started to get
swollen but I was given no treatment”.414
According to the report of the UN Special Rapporteur on Burma, only five doctors
and 15 nurses were made available to care for a reported 488 sick detainees held
at the GTI detention facility.415 One novice monk released from the GTI facility
reported on 7 October that some of the prisoners had sustained severe wounds
during their arrest, some of whom had cuts and gashes on their arms and legs that
had gone right through to the bone. Despite such serious injuries, however, they
had not been given any medical treatment. Furthermore, he claimed three persons
had died from complications arising from their untreated injuries.416
Several released detainees have expressed their concern about the health of Mya
Than Htike, an NLD Youth member, who was shot in the thigh during the protests.
He was subsequently arrested from hospital and taken to the GTI compound,
412
413
414
415
416
October 2007.
131
where he reportedly has not received any medical care.417 He was later transferred
to Insein Prison where he received limited but ultimately insufficient treatment.
“Mya Than Htike has a gunshot wound in his hip. He was only given
Burmeton and Kimose [painkillers] for the inflammation. They didn't
give any other medicines. They only used to clean the wound with
spirit [but did not suture or treat the wound otherwise], so the
treatment was not sufficient. His wound was still open. And his hip
was [inflamed] and brownish. When he showed the wound to the
authorities for treatment, they gave him nothing. Now, he is still at the
upstairs of No. 1 special hostel [Insein Prison]. He was in so much
pain that he couldn't eat any food”.418
Not only was medical treatment characteristically withheld, but on those occasions
when it was provided, that which was given was grossly insufficient. On some
occasions, the medical care that was provided was so negligent that it actually
endangered the detainees’ health even further. Released prisoner Zaw Myint
reported that a physician in Insein Prison used the same hypodermic needle to treat
multiple detainees, exposing all of them to the risk of contracting HIV/AIDS.419
Paracetemol was the principal medication administered, seemingly being relied
upon as a panacea to cure all ills and injuries.
“We were taken to the detention centre under control of the [Police
Battalion] #8. I received no pillow, no blanket. We were only fed twice
a day [with] cabbage and fish-paste. We were told this was 70 [kyat]
worth of food per day. No medicine was provided for those who were
ill, only one Paracetemol [tablet] each or ’smelling powder’ to clear
[the] sinuses”.420
“When we got sick, we asked for a medical check up. They gave us
only Burmeton and Paracetamol [painkillers] tablets. U Han Zaw, a
member of parliament, had had open heart surgery. He urgently
needed medicines. When he asked for the medicines, they didn't
accept his request. Now, he is in the jail without medicines, so we are
very worried about his condition”.421
417
Source: “NLD Youth Member lack of Medical Treatment,” Yoma 3, 11 October
2007.
418
419
Sources: “Monks in hell,” Irrawaddy, 11 October 2007; “Myanmar opposition
endorses UN push for talks with govt,” AP, 12 October 2007; “Myanmar Rejects UN
Call for Negotiations,” AP, 12 October 2007.
420
Sources: Testimony provided to HRDU by a confidential source; HRDU Interview
with “U Zaw Oo”, 40-year-old male civilian, 11 December 2007.
421
132
Furthermore, there have been reported instances of security forces preventing

persons who have been released from receiving treatment. When Daw San San
Myint was released from Police Battalion #3 at Hmawbe on 3 October 2007, she
attempted to seek treatment for her illness, but was stopped by the authorities.
“The local special police officer who has been watching me closely
pressured the physician to stop giving me treatment. He got scared
and is not coming to see me now. This is a serious violation of human
rights and it is happening everywhere – both inside and outside of
prison”.422
Deaths in Custody
“A young warder said that when a political prisoner died, they
needed to make a report only four or five sentences long, but when
an animal raised inside the prison died, they had to make a report
three pages long. The pain we felt was worse than death when
heard that a caring politician was not valued as much as an animal
inside the prison”.423
As a result of the grossly substandard conditions, the torture visited upon

detainees during interrogation, and a severe lack of medical treatment, many
reports have emerged of detainees dying while in detention.
Two separate reports from persons released from detention on 5 October 2007
have detailed the deaths of several persons at the GTI detention facility as a
direct result of the dismal conditions and a lack of medical care. One civilian
has claimed that more than a dozen people including monks had died during
their detention at the compound: “I could do nothing for a young novice who was
dying beside me. We asked for help from the security guards, but they didn't do
anything until they came to take away his dead body”.424
Similarly, a monk released on the same day reported that around 14 individuals
had died during his time at the GTI facility. Included in this number were eight
monks, as well as a young boy who had died on 27 September. He attributed
the deaths to the dire conditions of detention rather than injuries sustained
during the crackdown.425 Another detainee from the GTI detention centre
reported three deaths brought about by the aggravation of detainees’ health
through the harsh conditions:
422
423
424
425
133
“There were three people who died at the GTI interrogation centre
because all of the prisoners were forced to sleep on the concrete
floor. After the day of these deaths the authorities gave us
plywood to sleep on”.426
The identity of at least one person who died at the GTI compound has been
confirmed. U Than Aung, 48, was severely injured during the protests on 27
September but denied medical treatment in detention. He subsequently
succumbed to his injuries, as a result of being refused medical care.427
Two further reports have testified to the killings of four young men following their
arrests in two separate incidents at Rangoon City Hall. Two of the young men
were taken there on 27 September and beaten to death by a civil official
working in city hall:
“On 27 September at around 4:00 pm, two arrested young men at

the age of students were taken to City Hall. Their bodies were
bloody and the riot police dragged them from each side. Ko Kyaw
Thein, a staff member with the Budget Department, took a bamboo
stick from the police and shouted at youths, ’Who the hell are you?’
He beat them again so that the blood came out from those boys’
mouths. Both of them died on the scene. The two boys had
arrived before any other detainees. I do not know where they took
the bodies”.428
The following day, on 28 September, two more young men were also reportedly
beaten to death at City Hall, after being severely assaulted by SPDC army
soldiers from Light Infantry Division (LID) #66. According to reports, all articles
of worth were looted from their bodies by soldiers: "Their valuables, such as
watches and necklaces, were removed from their bodies by soldiers after the
youths died. Their bodies were seen being taken away in trucks at around
11:00 pm that night".429
There have also been three separate reports from Kyaikkasan Racecourse
regarding the death of four individuals. According to one report, an unidentified
youth reportedly died at the hands of SPDC army soldiers at Kyaikkasan
Racecourse on the 29 September. Eyewitness reports maintained that his body
was taken away by SPDC army soldiers from LID #66.430 Yet another report
has asserted that U Toke Lone Gyi (a.k.a U Han Tint Lin) of Shwe Pyi Thar
Township, who was arrested near Sule Pagoda on 29 September was heavily
beaten during his detention at Kyaikkasan Racecourse, and subsequently died
426
427
Source: “News Updates from Democratic Voice of Burma,” DVB, 11 October 2007.
428
429
Source: “Detained Youths Die from Injuries,” DVB, 7 October 2007.
430
Source: Ibid.
134
at Rangoon Hospital.431 Two unnamed Rangoon University zoology students

were also reported to have died following interrogation at Kyaikkasan
Racecourse. It has been reported that they drowned while being tortured during
their interrogation.432
Two persons arrested in relation to the protests outside of Rangoon are also
known to have died as a result of their treatment during detention. In both
cases the SPDC has obstructed any investigation into the cause of the deaths.
On 7 October, the family of NLD Youth member Ko Win Shwe was informed
that he had died while detained at Police Battalion #13 in the town of Palate,
Mandalay Division. He had been arrested along with five other colleagues on
the night of 26 September in Kyaukpadaung in Mandalay Division. The family
was informed that his body had already been cremated at the detention centre,
thus preventing any investigation into the cause of death. Reports testify to the
fact that he died as a result of the treatment received while under
interrogation.433 Similarly, Venerable U Thilavantha, Deputy Abbot of the
Yuzana Kyaungthai Monastery in Myitkyina, was allegedly beaten to death in
detention on 26 September, having also been beaten the night before when his
monastery was raided. The pathologist was ordered to declare the cause of
death to be a pre-existing heart condition.434
431
432
Source: “Detainees Dying Under Interrogation, Say Burmese Sources,” Irrawaddy,
10 October 2007.
433
Sources: “Only now, the full horror of Burmese junta's repression of monks
emerges,” The Independent, 11 October 2007; “UPDATE (Burma): More details of
deaths during protests emerge,” AHRC, 24 October 2007; “Detainees Dying Under
Interrogation, Say Burmese Sources,” Irrawaddy, 10 October 2007.
434
Source: “Those who died during the protest in Burma,” AAPPB, accessed at:
http://www.aappb.org/died_sept_07.html on 6 January 2008; “No return to Normalcy,”
AI, 9 November 2007.
135
Treatment of Monks
The authorities took steps to disrobe all monks and nuns arrested in relation to the
protests. This act of disrobing is in itself a significant form of debasement for
Buddhist monks. Moreover, it created a more enabling environment for the
mistreatment of these monks by the authorities who could now proceed as if dealing
with civilian laypersons. In reality, however, the SPDC possesses no mandate in
which to disrobe any member of the monastic community. The act of disrobing is
illegitimate if not done willingly, and as such, the monks continued to be monks
albeit in civilian clothing. Further reports have testified that monks were only fed in
the afternoon or during the evening, at a time when their Buddhist practice dictates
they are forbidden from eating.435
In a number of cases, the act of disrobing was conducted by senior members of the
Sangha and members of the Sangha Maya Nayaka Committee who remain under
the control of the SPDC. According to some reports, this was the case at the
Mingaladon military detention facility where it was reported that over 600 monks
were amongst the detainees. Following their disrobing the authorities proceeded
with their interrogations.
“Day and night, one monk after another was taken out of the cells to
be interrogated. Some returned with swollen heads and bruised
bodies, others with bent backs or limps. ‘You are no longer monks’,
the guards liked to tell us, ‘You are just bald-heads now’”.436
Similar reports emerged from Insein Prison where security forces asserted that they
would no longer use traditional Pali terms of respect when addressing the monks:
“The authorities had changed the monks' robes with the ordinary
clothes. They wore the Longyi [Burmese men’s sarong], the same as
ordinary people. The abbot of Maggin Monastery was not good in
health. There were many monks there. The authorities told the
monks: ‘You are not monks, you are ordinary people. So, you should
reply to us by using ‘yes’, and not use the language of the Buddha's
dispensation. You are wearing ordinary clothes.’ The authorities used
language like ‘you’ and ‘I’ when they spoke to the monks”.437
One member of the Sangha Maya Nayaka Committee called upon to disrobe
monks detained in the GTI compound reportedly refused the request once he had
arrived at the facility and witnessed the conditions that his fellow monks were
subjected to.
435
436
437
136
“An abbot from the Insein Sangha Maya Nayaka [Committee] was
called upon to carry out the task of defrocking these monks. However,
even before the arrested monks began to repeat the chants which
would result in them denouncing their monkhood, the [abbot] declined
to continue, citing Sangha regulations”.438
In instances where the security forces were unable to disrobe the detained monks
through their control of the Sangha, they simply resorted to removing the robes
themselves through the use of physical force.
“I was defrocked at [Kyaikkasan] Racecourse. They brought some

monks from the Sangha Council. But I told them they cannot defrock
me without my will so they left. Later though, I was forced to change
into civilian clothes by the Ministry of Religious Affairs. The police
stood by with batons. I had no choice. But I still comported myself as
a [member of the] Sangha”.439
“The arrested monks were kept inside the GTI compound. The
soldiers told one monk, ‘Hey guy, you’re not a monk. You’re just a
man. So you must wear normal clothes. Here come and eat.’ When
the monks refused, they hit the monks’ heads with their rifle butts, beat
them with sticks and punched them. The authorities asked the monks
to give their [Burmese] birth names instead of their ordained [Pali]
names. If someone’s birth name was Maung Pyu, they were told to
shout ‘Maung Pyu’ for one or two hours or they would be beaten.
After an hour or two, the authorities would ask, ‘Do you remember
now? If you do, you are not a monk. You are a normal man. Take off
your robe.’ Then they pulled off the monks’ robes”.440
Once the robes had been removed, the authorities at the detention facilities showed
no deference to the monks and proceeded to interrogate and brutalise them as they
did with civilian detainees. As described by one detainee, “The monks were also
tortured at [the] GTI. Their backs had blue and black bruises”.441
“I was handcuffed from the back and then tied with the shackles.
They sent me from the GTI to Pa Lae [Myothit Township}. There I
slept with the handcuffs and shackles. It was very bad, as I was bitten
by many mosquitoes. We were provided with no blankets [and] no
mats”.442
438
Source: “Detained monks being forcefully defrocked,” DVB, 30 September 2007.
439
Source: “Interview with U Tayzawbawtha, a Former Detainee,” DVB, 28 October
2007.
440
441
442
Source: “Interview with U Tayzawbawtha, a Former Detainee,” DVB, 27 October
2007.
137
“Monks and laypersons were interrogated day and night inside the
prison. There were countless numbers of interrogators. We were
severely beaten several times when we were interrogated. However,
the worst thing that I had felt was to see the monks beaten and the
monks being forced to take off their saffron robes. The monks were
also forced to confess to actions that they did not commit. When I
heard the monks being rudely sworn and called ‘You, guy’, I became
doubtful that Burma is a Buddhist nation”.443
One 18-year-old novice monk, released after seven days at the GTI detention
facility, suffered severe bruising on his face and arms. Following his release, he
reported that, “[d]ay and night, we had to sit in crowded rows with our heads bowed
down. If we spoke, looked up or fell asleep, we would be hit”.444 An elderly monk,
also detained at the GTI facility reported that soldiers had ripped the robes from the
monks’ bodies, beat them and made them “jump like frogs”.445
443
444
October 2007.
445
2007.
138
IX. Analysis of the Crackdown: Intent to

Brutalise, Cover Up and Discredit
Throughout the violent crackdowns on columns of peaceful demonstrators,
numerous trends can be discerned which belie any claims that SPDC security
forces were operating under methods designed to placate and control violent
mobs, or to disperse these crowds. While their tactics undoubtedly achieved
the aims of control and dispersion, they went far beyond any accepted
standards of necessity and proportionality, and reveal a deeper intent to
brutalise and intimidate the protestors, who were treated as legitimate military
targets during their peaceful protests.
As stated by Professor Paolo Sergio Pinheiro, the UN Special Rapporteur on

Human Rights in Burma, in his assessment of the crackdown, “the decision by
the security forces to shoot to kill and to severely beat protesters causing death
constitutes an arbitrary deprivation of life and violates the right to life, as the
lethal force used was unnecessary and disproportionate”.446
Not only did security forces frequently fire live rounds directly at demonstrators,
but their use of rubber bullets can also be taken as a statement of intent.
Reports from demonstrators and photographs of spent cartridges carried in the
media suggest that the rubber bullets used were not the large ‘baton round’
type, but metal ball bearings coated with a layer of rubber, capable of inflicting
fatal injuries, particularly at short range (less than 40 metres).447
“The soldiers did not give any warning or announcement [at

Tamwe Township State High School No.3 on 27 September].
When they fired, we ran away. Many people ran into a small lane.
People who could not run away lay down on the ground. I ran into
the small space between buildings. Soldiers tried to shoot the
people who ran into buildings. One of my girlfriends ran up the
stairs of a building. Once she got to the top, she could not run any
more. At that time, a soldier shot at her, and she was hit near the
eye. She said it was rubber bullet but a lot of blood came out from
the wound”.448
446
Source: Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in
Myanmar, Human Rights Council, 6th Session, Agenda item 4, 7 December 2007.
447
Source: Ibid.
448
November 2007.
139
Moreover, despite the presence of fire trucks at the scene of certain

crackdowns, these were never used as a non-lethal method of crowd control.
For instance, there were seven fire trucks present at Sule Pagoda on 27
September, when the military opened fire with live rounds and killed a number
of demonstrators.449
The events at Tamwe Township State High School No.3 on 27 September as

well as those beside Thakin Mya Park on the same day, when the authorities
fired indiscriminately into the groups of protestors, also make clear that their
intent went beyond that of merely dispersing the crowd. Significantly, no
warning was given of an impending crackdown on either occasion, just as no
warning was given before the initial crackdown at Sule Pagoda on 27
September.
Furthermore, these groups of protestors were deliberately blocked in, where,

upon reaching a roadblock, security forces would quickly take up a position
behind the group as well, followed by the firing of live rounds into the trapped
masses. Perversely, those attempting to flee the scene were not spared. As
has been documented, one student in the process of climbing the wall away
from the protest at Tamwe Township State High School No.3 was shot in the
back of the head.
In general, SPDC security forces actually became more emboldened and

aggressive when persons fled from their attack, and calls were often made from
the leaders of demonstrations for the people to continue to sit or to walk away
slowly rather than run.
“Around one or two minutes after the army truck came they started
to shoot continuously, firing more than ten times. I heard shouting
from the crowd, ‘the people are dying, they are killing the people,
run away, run away’. Others were saying, ‘don’t run, don’t run’
because when the people sit down they beat them and when they
ran they would shoot them. When I looked back I saw two boys
and one girl lying still on the floor. I do not know if they were
dead”.450
The SPDC typically provided its own assessment of the actions of its security
forces, accusing protestors of violence for which they were forced to respond:
“Because of the difficult situation, the security forces opened fire to

disperse the crowd, using just a little force against the violent
protesters. Because they opened fire, the protesters dispersed”.451
449
December 2007.
450
November 2007.
451
140
It is evident that protestors did use aggressive tactics at times, throwing stones
and firing catapults (slingshots) at security forces. However, at each and every
site of a crackdown, it was SPDC aggression and violence which sparked this
response, not the opposite. At times, this aggression was aimed at monks, who
civilians felt compelled to defend, despite calls from other monks to continue to
march peacefully. Even in South Okkalapa Township, where angry crowds
aggressively and angrily confronted security forces, it was the violence of the
night before, perpetrated by agents of the SPDC against the monks of Ngwe
Kyar Yan Monastery, which initiated this confrontation. As one protestor
testified concerning the crackdown at Shwedagon Pagoda on 26 September:
“People were getting angry. They had never witnessed a monk

being beaten by the police before. The people took some bricks in
their hands but the monks stopped them from using them. We
really wanted to attack the authorities but one of the monks
implored us to remain peaceful”.452
In his December 2007 report to the UN Human Rights Council, Professor Paolo
Sergio Pinheiro was clear in his assessment of the chain of events:
“The view that the peaceful demonstrations of last August and

September are at the origin of the unrest is difficult to accept in the
light of the sequence of events. It seems more accurate to say that
a state of violent disturbance and disorder erupted as the result of
the use of excessive force by the State and its agents”.453
Many reports have also claimed that the SPDC planted members of its security
apparatus within crowds in order to stir up trouble and thus justify a violent
response. However, given the covert nature of such operations these claims
have proved difficult to verify.
“Some of the demonstrators who took part in the protest were the
member of USDA and the Swan Arr Shin. We couldn’t identify
them at first, but I noticed that some demonstrators changed their
character on 27 and 28 September. They taunted the security
forces before the protest started, and damaged a nearby store.
They later helped to arrest the demonstrators when the security
forces cracked down on the protest”.454
452
2007.
453
454
141
Two student activists shot dead by SPDC army soldiers during protests in
Rangoon on 27 September 2007. [© Reuters].
142
Hired Thugs
It is with a brand of perverse irony of which the SPDC has become a specialist
that the cause of the demonstrations, the economic plight of the population, was
also an enabling factor in their suppression.
Civilian gangs, known locally as the Swan Arr Shin, or in English the “masters of
physical force”, were mobilized to suppress demonstrations in August and
September. Members of the Swan Arr Shin (SAS) have typically been recruited
from the poor underclass of Burmese society, or from those who owe a
monetary debt to the SPDC. They are reportedly paid between 3,000 and 5,000
kyat per day, far more than they could hope to earn working a regular job.455
Alternatively, those persons who rely upon SPDC permits to conduct their
businesses are often forced to join this group.
“People join the Swan Arr Shin because they are very poor, and
can get money if they provide information about the NLD members
and activists. The firemen and USDA members are always asked
to monitor the activity of the NLD. If they can arrest persons from
information obtained by the Swan Arr Shin, they don’t need to
watch that person anymore”.456
“The people who join the Swan Arr Shin are jobless. At first they
were paid 3,000 kyat a day. When the demonstrations began, this
increased to 5,000 kyat a day”.457
During the crackdown, members of the SAS conducted their tasks alongside
members so of the Union Solidarity Development Association (USDA). While
the USDA is ostensibly a social welfare organization, it lacks any independence
from the SPDC, and is well known for its acts of political violence.458 Various
reports have placed the USDA at the centre of the recruitment and command of
the SAS, effectively making the SAS a mercenary wing of this organization.459
455
Sources: “Junta frees prisoners for anti-protest mobs,” The Independent, 29 August
2007; “If You Can't Beat Them, Beat Them Up,” AHRC, 26 July 2007; “Worrying
Resurgence of Government-Backed Goon Squads,” AHRC, 15 June 2007; “Contrary to
AAPPB, 27 August 2007.
456
October 2007.
457
20 October 2007.
458
For further information on the USDA and their role in political violence see Burma
Human Rights Yearbook 2006, HRDU, June 2007 and The White Shirts: How the USDA
will become the new face of Burma’s Dictatorship, Network for Democracy and
Development, May 2006.
459
Sources: “Junta frees prisoners for anti-protest mobs,” The Independent, 29 August
2007; “If You Can't Beat Them, Beat Them Up,” AHRC, 26 July 2007; “Worrying
143
USDA secretary U Aung Thaung, along with riot police chief Colonel Than Han
have been reported to have been responsible for the operations of the militia.460
While less ostensibly a mercenary force, the USDA also relies heavily upon
economic incentives for its recruitment, as well as the simple act of forcing
persons to join.
“I know many of the USDA members in my neighbourhood. They

were provided with loans at low interest rates once they joined”.461
“Some people are forced to join [the USDA], especially vendors.

They have to join or they will face trouble in their daily lives. If they
refuse, their shops on the road can be removed”.462
“I’m not a political activist; just a normal civilian. I joined the

protests as I, like other people in villages, have grown impatient
with the local authorities and the USDA using their power to harass
the civilians. The USDA is the worst. For example, they steal our
fishing territories, they make deals with cow and buffalo thieves
and make money out of it, and they cut money from basically every
business we make”.463
“When we were in the 8th Standard [Grade] in high school we were

given a USDA membership card. At first we were asked by our
teachers to give them our photos. After a few days, we were
delivered the USDA membership cards”.464
Members of the USDA and SAS receive numerous trainings given by the
military, in such things as the use of bamboo sticks which were heavily and
brutally used by their members during the crackdown. These groups have been
increasingly empowered by the SPDC to fulfil the security function of the
State.465 In April 2007, Human Rights Watch (HRW) explained the current
division of labour for repression in Burma:
Resurgence of Government-Backed Goon Squads,” AHRC, 15 June 2007; “Contrary to

AAPPB, 27 August 2007.
460
Source: “Burma: 2007 Protests Against Fuel Prices,” AHRC, August 2007
461
November 2007.
462
2007.
463
November 2007.
464
465
Sources: “Burma: Violent Attacks on Rights Activists- Government Militias Beat
and Harass Opponents, HRW, 24 April 2007; Development by Decree: the Politics of
144
“In the countryside the military attacks civilians, burns villages and
uses people as slave labour, while in the cities government-backed
groups beat opponents and force thousands to attend staged mass
rallies in a fake display of loyalty to Burma’s ruling council”.466
Early in 2007, police sources in Rangoon confirmed to the opposition media that
members of USDA have increasingly taken over their role in “maintaining law
and order”.467
This increased role was evident during the August and September
demonstrations. During this time, the USDA and SAS arrested and assaulted
what remains an unknown number of people from the streets and their homes.
While Article 128 of the Burmese Code of Criminal Procedure provides for the
use of civil forces to disperse assemblies, Article 130 provides for the use of as
little force as is consistent with dispersing an assembly, in order to avoid “injury
to person and property”. The callous beating of demonstrators went far beyond
this limit. Furthermore, these groups lack any legal mandate to arrest
individuals from their homes, and such arrests can be more accurately
described as abductions, in contravention of the most basic tenets of
international law.
While the USDA and SAS are entirely controlled by the SPDC, the junta, and
even some foreign media, continue to portray these organisations as “pro-
government groups”. Two days after the events at Pakokku, on 7 September
2007, the SPDC commented on the event, stating that “the people will not
accept any acts to destabilise the nation and harm their interests and are willing
to prevent such destructive acts”.468 Implicit in this statement, is the assertion
that the members of the USDA and SAS, who violently attacked monks in
Pakokku, are “the people”, and as such are ostensibly representative of the
larger population. The USDA and SAS are agents of the SPDC, and to try and
represent those persons who assaulted members of the monastic community as
“the people” is an attempt to not only legitimise its own views as having popular
support, but to also exonerate itself from blame for its own actions.
Poverty and Control in Karen, KHRG, 24 April 2007; “Burmese Authorities Give
Military Trainings to USDA Members,” DVB News, 7 May 2007.
466
Source: “Burma: Violent Attacks on Rights Activists - Government Militias Beat and
Harass Opponents, HRW, 24 April 2007.
467
Source: “What Is The Burmese Junta's Next Political Move?” Mizzima News, 22
June 2007.
468
Source: “Myanmar junta blames exiles for unrest,” Reuters, 7 September 2007.
145
Interview with Former Swan Arr Shin Member

“I live in [Mayangone] Township in Rangoon Division. I work in a brokerage
house as a porter. I was arrested and convicted for committing theft in 2005/06.
But I’m now working and living decently.
“Recently, on 23 September 2007, my old acquaintance Pho Suu a.k.a.

Kemmendine a.k.a. Thein Zaw came to me and said that he would give me a
net wage of 3,000 kyat per day, with free meals if I could not earn that much
[where I was] and wanted to work with him. When I asked him what [the work
involved], he replied that we have to work with the police force in raiding and
arresting the bootleggers and prostitutes in Insein and North Okkalapa
Townships. He added that he would give me a 'Swan Arr Shin' armband to
avoid mistaken identity during raids. Then I agreed to work with him, believing
that this was legal work, working in tandem with the police force, raiding and
arresting bootleggers and prostitutes, and could earn 3,000 kyat per day.
“Then Pho Suu told me to visit him that night on 23 September at 10:00 pm. I
followed him with a glad heart, expecting a daily wage of 3,000 kyat. I found
many other people like me when we reached Riot Police Battalion No.1. We
had no work at all from 23 September to 25 September. We were given meals
on time and given liquor every evening. Then on 26 September, at about 8:00
am, the police officer ordered about 100 of us to fall in and gave us a briefing.
He said that we were now going to attack and assault the enemy together with
the police force and ordered us to perform our duty well with full loyalty. Then
we were taken away after boarding the waiting trucks.
“On the trucks, we were given a bamboo stick each. We left Riot Police
Battalion No.1 at about 8:30 am and reached [downtown] Rangoon at about
10:00 am. At that time, I saw an unprecedented scene of many monks, nuns,
students and the people marching in procession peacefully and chanting
prayers and the Metta Sutta near the eastern gate of Shwedagon Pagoda and
Kyethun Buddha Image. I will never forget this scene. At about 11:00 am I
heard a volley of gunfire.
“The army started firing their guns and the police followed suit. Pho Suu told
me that I could beat indiscriminately anyone in front of me and he would take
full responsibility for it.
“Then he started beating monks himself. I did not dare to beat the monks, nuns,
people and students. Yes, I was once a convicted thief, but I'll never do such a
cowardly act. It's impossible for me to beat the monks whom I worship
everyday. If I haven't got money, I would probably commit theft again, but will
never do such a wicked act as killing monks, nuns, students and the people. So
I didn't join them in beating the monks and the people on that day”.469
469
Source: “Burma Update 274,” PDC, 29 November 2007.
146
Targeted and Intentional Killings

While in many cases shooting into crowds was conducted indiscriminately, in other
instances it is apparent that the security forces deliberately targeted specific
individuals.
Kenji Nagai, the Japanese photojournalist killed at Sule Pagoda on the 27

September, is a case in point. An examination into his death by the Japanese police
force has found that he was initially shot in the back from less than a metre away, as
he was brandishing a camera.470 He was then shot again while lying on the ground
by a soldier standing directly over him. Though his body has been returned to the
Japanese Government, his camera has not.471
It is clear from statements and policy before, during, and after the crackdown that the
prospect of media coverage of events such as those in Sule Pagoda was something
that the SPDC was determined to prevent. As one witness testified of events on the
29 September in Rangoon, “[t]he troops pursued fleeing people into buildings,
singling out people with cameras. If they were captured, the troops beat them while
shouting, ‘Is it you who sends those pictures out?’” 472
Similarly, in the mindset of the SPDC and when methods of crowd control are
transposed with tactics employed in a military assault, it is possible to discern that a
student wearing an NLD Youth badge and brandishing a fighting peacock flag, while
chanting loudly and leading a group of protestors, might be seen to be a legitimate
military target. On the 27 September on Pansodan Road, such a young man was
killed with a single shot to the head. The military had fired directly at him and from a
significant distance.473
In another instance, one eyewitness told HRDU how his friend was shot while being
carried on someone’s shoulders wearing an Aung San Suu Kyi t-shirt and shouting
political slogans, near Sule Pagoda on 27 September.
“He was intentionally shot by a soldier. He told me later that he had

seen the soldier pointing his gun directly at him. He also said he had
seen the Japanese journalist take a photo of him before he fell down.
Both he and the man holding him fell down, and then tried to run away.
When they got to the 33rd Street Junction two people helped them hide
between the cars. They took of his Aung San Suu Kyi t-shirt and threw
470
Source: “Tokyo: Police says Nagai Shot at Point-blank Range,” The Asahi Shimbun, 27
November 2007.
471
Source: “Tokyo to Yangon: Hand over Nagai’s Camera,” The Japan Times, 2 October
2007.
472
Source: “Two Shot in Clash with Troops; People with Cameras Singled Out,” Irrawaddy,
28 September 2007.
473
Source: “Eyewitness Account of Bloody September 27,” Irrawaddy, 2 November 2007;
Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, Human
Rights Council, 6th Session, Agenda item 4, 7 December 2007.
147
it away, as they feared it could get him shot if he was seen wearing it.
One of the men took off his longyi [sarong] to cover the injury on his
thigh”.474
Evidence of a violent crackdown. Hundreds of shoes lay strewn in the

streets of Rangoon after their owners discarded them so that they could
run faster to escape the violence witnessed upon them by SPDC army
soldiers and their agents on 27 September 2007. Sadly, the owner of
these blood-soaked shoes was not so lucky and managed to escape only
after sustaining what appears to have been a severe injury. [© Reuters].
474
2007.
148
Removal of the Dead and Wounded

Numerous testimonies gathered from those present reveals a predetermined
policy to remove bodies from the scene of each crackdown as a means to cover
up the extent of killing and brutality.
Reports from Tamwe Township State High School No.3 suggest the bodies of at
least five high school students, who were killed during the crackdown on the 27
September, were removed from the scene. The injured were also rounded up
onto trucks and taken away.475 Similar reports were received from Shwedagon
Pagoda, Sule Pagoda, Pazundaung, and Pansodan Road.
”They told us to lie down on our stomachs on the ground. ‘Nobody

raise their heads!’, they shouted as they were beating us. No one
dared to put their head up because they would have been beaten.
There were about 500 people on the ground. A girl was ordered to
sit down and her head was bashed with a stick because she was
slow in doing so. She was only in her twenties. She was a good-
looking girl. She was bleeding. I think they took the injured people
and dead bodies away in the trucks as we were lying on the
ground. I could not see any dead bodies or wounded protesters
when we were allowed to get up again”.476
“I witnessed two people beaten to death near our barrier. They

were both men, aged between 25 and 30. These men were beaten
on their backs and their waists as they tried to escape the attack.
When they fell to the ground, the soldiers beat them collectively.
The soldiers dragged their bodies by the legs back to the junction
where many people could see their dead bodies lying beside the
military trucks”.477
The fate of a monk presumed dead during the crackdown at Shwedagon

Pagoda on 26 September reveals the lengths that security forces resorted to in
order to cover up the evidence:
“He was heavily beaten twice on his head. After that time, he did
not move, he just lay on the ground lifeless. About ten minutes
later, they removed his robes and redressed him in a t-shirt and
longyi [sarong]. Two members of the riot police then picked up his
475
September 2007.
476
2007.
477
November 2007.
149
body; one took the legs and the other the arms and they threw him
onto their truck”.478
In the event that security forces were unable to claim the bodies at the time,
they returned later so as to demand the bodies from their relatives. The Asian
Human Rights Commission reported that, in South Okkalapa Township, eight
corpses remained on the street by the evening following the crackdown on the
27 September. Some of these persons were known to local residents and were
taken back to their houses. It was reported that soon after, security forces
conducted searches of houses in the area, and took the bodies away.479
Another report has claimed that the bodies of two men in their 30’s who were
shot during the crackdown in South Okkalapa Township were taken by the
military the following day, at which time they paid the families 20,000 kyat each
before removing the corpses.480
Treatment of the Injured

Armed security forces patrolled hospitals in Rangoon during the days of the
crackdown, and hospital staff were ordered to inform the authorities of all
persons admitted with injuries.481 SPDC army soldiers guarding the entrance to
the emergency treatment department of Rangoon General Hospital checked all
the injuries of those brought to the hospital during this time.482
An injured monk seeking treatment at Rangoon General Hospital for wounds on

his leg, was ordered to remove his robes before he could be administered
treatment. When he refused, staff at the hospital were forced to contact the
Deputy Minister of Health for permission, which was only belatedly granted.483
In some townships of Mandalay Division, such as Myingyan and Taungtha,
hospitals were ordered not to treat those monks who persisted in their boycott of
478
2007.
479
September 2007.
480
Source: “As Burma’s junta reclaims streets, locals stand up for monks,” The Age, 2
October 2007.
481
24 October 2007.
482
Source: “UPDATE (Burma): Protests continue despite heavy security; more people and
monks taken away; townsfolk defend monasteries with slingshots,” AHRC, 30 September
2007; “Detained monks being forcefully defrocked,” DVB, 30 September 2007.
483
Source: “UPDATE (Burma): Protests continue despite heavy security; more people and
monks taken away; townsfolk defend monasteries with slingshots,” AHRC, 30 September
2007.
150
the military regime.484 The owner of a pharmacy had his car confiscated under
accusation of having helped injured monks by providing them with medicine.485
There have also been reports of those receiving treatment in hospital being
removed by the authorities, despite the fact that they were still in need of
treatment.
“My friend, who is also a monk, was shot in his shoulder on

Pansodan Road Bridge. He visited the hospital to receive
treatment. On the same day, the security forces searched the
hospital and found him, even though he had tried to hide. They
took him away. He was detained in Insein [Prison] for a month.
When he was released his injury was still bad. He had not
received any treatment in prison”.486
Another monk, believed to be around 30 years old, was removed from the
critical care unit at Rangoon General Hospital and taken to an unknown location
on the 29 September. He had been shot in his arm. The relative of another
patient, stated:
“The monk is gone. We don't know where they will [take] him to.
The monk’s arm has been cast in plaster. He was in hospital for 3
days. They took him away yesterday morning. I mean the
policemen. We were not allowed to talk to each other”.487
From the same hospital, six patients who had been receiving treatment for
wounds sustained during the crackdown were abducted by soldiers on 3
October; with no word given to their families as to where they were taken.488 A
day earlier, the wife of one of these persons, Ko Mya Than Htaik, had reported:
“He’s doing well mentally but he can't walk. He can’t even sit up.
The bullet entered through the big toe and went out just below the
knee. He's getting better but the family members are not allowed
to see him, except our nephew who sleeps over in the ward. His
mother is 70 plus and she would like to see her son, but was not
allowed to enter”.489
484
24 October 2007.
485
2007.
486
487
Source: “A Monk Wounded by Gunshot Transferred Out of Hospital by Junta,”
DVB, 2 October 2007.
488
24 October 2007.
489
Source: Ibid.
151
Later reports placed Ko Mya Than Htaik at the GTI temporary detention
compound, where he was said to have been denied medical treatment.490
Among the other patients taken from the hospital, one man was reported to
require a below the knee amputation after a bullet had shattered his shin.491
Other reports have testified to persons, seriously injured, requesting not to be

taken to hospital, as they were wary of being punished for their involvement in
the protests. The family of Ko Ko Win, who had been heavily assaulted at Sule
Pagoda on 27 September, were initially too afraid to send him to hospital. Ko
Ko Win ultimately died a month later from the injuries that he had sustained.492
“When we arrived at Pansodan Bridge, we saw a man being

carried by his two friends. His clothes were stained with blood. His
friends told us that he had been shot in the leg. They were
searching for taxi. We heard the injured man ask his friends not to
take him to the hospital but to take him home instead, because he
did not want to be arrested”.493
Similarly, the families of those who were being treated in SPDC-administered

hospitals were keen to take their relatives either home or to private clinics, and
paid bribes to do so.
“Some people in my quarter who were involved in the protests

were badly injured during the attacks by the riot police. Their
families did not know where they were. They asked the police but
could not find anything out. They later discovered that they had
been taken by the authorities and placed under guard in the
government hospital. When they went to the hospital they were
told by the authorities that they must pay at least 40,000 kyat to
secure their release. They were not receiving sufficient care in the
hospital; there is a lack of medicine and treatment. The families
were also concerned because they are under the guard of the
authorities. So they have had to pay this money to secure their
release and to take them to a local clinic for treatment”.494
490
Source: Ibid.
491
Source: “A Monk Wounded by Gunshot Transferred Out of Hospital by Junta,”
DVB, 2 October 2007.
492
Source: “NLD youth member dies from protest injuries,” DVB, 7 November 2007.
493
2007.
494
November 2007.
152
Secret Cremations
For the majority of those killed during the crackdown the SPDC has denied any
knowledge of the event, made no attempt to identify the dead, to investigate the
cause of death, to return the bodies to their families, or to give them even the
minimum Buddhist burial rites.
Persistent reports from local residents have testified to the fact that Ye Way
Crematorium in North Okkalapa Township was operated throughout the night
from 27 September through to 30 September. During this time, a perimeter was
established around the crematorium, and armed guards patrolled the
surrounding area, threatening local residents who looked out of their windows.
Military trucks covered with tarpaulins were sighted entering and exiting the
area on those nights and streams of smoke were reported to be rising from the
crematorium’s chimneys.495
The Democratic Voice of Burma (DVB) news agency received information from
a staff member at the crematorium who had reported that 20 bodies had been
burnt on the night of the 30 September alone.496 The UN Special Rapporteur,
Paulo Sergio Pinheiro, has also heard from “credible sources [which] report a
large number of bodies [wrapped in plastic and rice bags] were burned during
the night, between 4 am and 8 am” and that “normal employees were instructed
to keep away, and that the facility was operated on those nights by State
security personnel or State-supported groups”.497
The SPDC’s refusal to account for the dead and the disappeared, has not only
served to cloud their culpability, but it has left many families in state of constant
anguish over the fate of their relatives. Buddhist monk, Ashin Sanda Thiri, was
among those reported missing, after earlier suffering a bullet wound to the leg.
His family received unconfirmed reports that his body was cremated at a
Rangoon Cemetery, although it has subsequently been reported that he is
detained in Insein prison.498 Similarly, the SPDC has refused to account for the
whereabouts of five persons who disappeared following the shooting outside
Tamwe Township State High School No.3, where it is known that a number of
bodies were removed from the scene by the security forces.499
495
Source: “Secret cremations hide Burma killings,” Sunday Times, 7 October 2007.
496
Source: “9:00 pm Burma Local Time DVB News,” DVB, 1 October 2007,
497
498
Source: “UPDATE (Burma): Three teenage sisters and a young mother of two have
disappeared,” AHRC, 3 October 2007; and Detailed List of Detainees since peaceful
Protests began on August 19, AAPPB, accessed at:
http://www.aappb.org/list_arrest_aug_sep_07.html on 6 January 2008.
499
Source: AAPP List of the Disappeared, AAPPB, accessed at:
http://www.aappb.org/disap_sept_07.htm on 6 January 2008.
153
Outside of Rangoon, the SPDC has also made attempts to cover up those killed
by its security forces. On 17 October, the dead body of 37-year-old NLD
member Nyi Pu Lay, from the town of Gwa in Arakan State, was found floating
on the Gwa River after he had been missing for four days. One local resident
reported that, “When the police learnt about it [the body], they immediately took
it away and cremated it. His family members [later] identified him from his
clothes”.500 His wife was subsequently interrogated by the police. “Local police
took her away for interrogation on 3 November, but we cannot ask her what
they questioned her about as she seems to be too scared and dare not
speak”.501
State-run press, however, continued to report that only 10 people were killed
during the crackdowns. In contrast to this, the SPDC has belatedly
acknowledged the deaths of 15 persons to the UN Special Rapporteur on
Human Rights in Burma. One of these victims was photojournalist Kenji Nagai
whose body was returned to Japan at request of the Tokyo Government. The
remaining fourteen bodies were reportedly cremated at the Htain Bin
Crematorium. Of these fourteen, three reportedly remained unidentified when
they were cremated on 1 October.502 The Special Rapporteur, however, stated
in his December 2007 report to the Human Rights Council that “several reports
of killings indicate that the figure provided by the authorities may greatly
underestimate the reality. To date the Special Rapporteur has received
information regarding the killing of 16 additional persons” and that “[a]ccording
to information received and based on credible eyewitness reports, there were
more than 30 fatalities in [Rangoon alone]”.503
Despite the hurried nature of these cremations, police chief, Brigadier General
Khin Yi has predictably laid the blame for their inability to identify these bodies
with unnamed “external elements”:
“What’s interesting is that there would not be any unidentified death

cases if they resided around here. As the incidents occurred due
to the links between the internal and external elements, we cannot
say that all the detainees were from near here. They might have
come from other organizations we haven’t known from the border
region. That was why some death cases could not be identified”.504
500
Source: “Junta releases a few detainees, several missing,” Mizzima News, 27 October
2007.
501
Source: “Junta threatens political activists in Arakan State,” Mizzima News, 5
November 2007.
502
503
Source: Ibid.
504
Source: “Nay Pyi Taw - The following are the questions of journalists and answers of
officials concerned at the press conference,” NLM, 3 December 2007.
154
While the families and relatives of the identified bodies were reportedly able to
participate in the cremations, they have nevertheless been restricted in
investigating the cause of death, and restricted in their rights to a proper
Buddhist funeral.
Sixteen year old, Maung Thet Paing Soe was shot outside Tamwe Township
State High School No.3 on 27 September. His body was immediately removed
from the scene. His family were only able to see his body after bribing U Win
Naing Oo, the chairman of the Dawbon Township chapter of the USDA, with
8,000 kyat. U Win Aung Oo only allowed four family members to see the body
before it was cremated at the Htain Bin crematorium, but prevented them from
conducting any final Buddhist rites on the body.505 Though it appeared that he
had been shot in the head at close range, the family was not given a copy of the
death certificate. His aunt reported that “there was a big hole on the back of his
head and the brain was gone. We assume it was a gun-shot wound”.506
Similarly, on 1 October, the SPDC arranged hasty and tightly-controlled

cremations for Ko Tun Tun Lin and Maung Zeya Naing, from South Okkalapa
Township, who were both beaten to death on 27 September. The Ministry of
Internal Affairs informed the families that no more than ten persons could attend
the funerals, each of whom had to bring their national identification card. They
were forbidden from holding prayer sessions for the dead.507
The regime also arranged for the rushed cremations of those who died in
custody, and forced pathologists to falsely declare the cause of death to be
natural. Venerable U Thilavantha, Deputy Abbot of the Yuzana Kyaungthai
Monastery in Myitkyina, died as a result of injuries received both on the night of
his arrest and his subsequent detention. The authorities forced the pathologist
to declare the cause of death to be a heart ailment.508
On 7 October, the family of NLD Youth member, Ko Win Shwe was informed
that he had died while being detained at Police Battalion #13 in Palate, Sagaing
Division, and that his body had already been cremated at the detention centre,
thus preventing any investigation into the cause of death. Reports testify to the
fact that he died as a result of the treatment received while under
interrogation.509
505
Source: “Dead boy’s family not allowed to conduct funeral rituals,” Mizzima News, 1
October 2007. “UPDATE (Burma): More details of deaths during protests emerge,” AHRC,
24 October 2007.
506
Source: “Family members speak about teen protestor’s death,” 19 October 2007.
507
Source: “Junta attempts to cover up,” DVB, 1 October 2007.
508
Source: “Those who died during the protest in Burma,” AAPPB, accessed at:
http://www.aappb.org/died_sept_07.html on 6 January 2008; “No return to Normalcy,” AI, 9
November 2007.
509
Sources: “Only now, the full horror of Burmese junta's repression of monks emerges,”
The Independent, 11 October 2007; “UPDATE (Burma): More details of deaths during
155
Suppression of Information
In Burma, every effort is made to ensure that people only see, hear, read, and learn
about things that support the junta’s position in power. The SPDC controls not only
Internet Service Providers (ISPs) in the country but also maintains a strict
censorship of the Internet. There are no independent Burmese television channels,
and all independent press publications must submit their work to the SPDC’s Press
Scrutiny and Relations Department (PSRD) prior to publication.
However, the proliferation of cheap transistor radios inside the country has meant
that approximately 95 percent of civilians rely on foreign radio broadcasts for
information about events inside their own country.510 The main sources of outside
information are the daily Burmese language radio broadcasts by Radio Free Asia
(RFA), Voice of America (VOA), British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) and the
Democratic Voice of Burma (DVB).
The SPDC has been extreme in its reaction to the spread of independent news
inside the country. Anyone found to have provided information to these news
services is severely punished. Burmese state-run newspapers run stories almost
daily that attack the foreign media, especially the BBC, VOA, and RFA, and at
SPDC-organized rallies, and those persons forced to attend are required to shout
slogans denouncing these radio stations.
Throughout the duration of the August and September protests, the SPDC
responded to the spread of information by increasing its policy of censorship to
totalitarian levels. Internet and phone networks completely cut, and journalists, or
those who spoke to them, attacked and arrested. Meanwhile, SPDC-controlled
media, continued to denounce external and internal agitators as the underlying
cause of the demonstrations, while also working to discredit those monks who took
part.
The Internet
Since the advent of the Internet, Burma’s military junta has retained a tight and
systematic control over all use of Internet and electronic mail in the country. In
December 2006, an online poll conducted by Reporters Sans Frontiers (RSF)
recognized Burma as the world’s worst offender of Internet freedom, with the
organization asserting that “the Burmese government’s Internet policies are even
more repressive than its Chinese and Vietnamese neighbours”.511
protests emerge,” AHRC, 24 October 2007; “Detainees Dying Under Interrogation, Say
Burmese Sources,” Irrawaddy, 10 October 2007.
510
Source: “Thanks to the Foreign Burmese Radio Services,” Narinjara News, 11 June
2003.
511
Source: “Burma Number One Internet Enemy,” Mizzima News, 7 November 2006.
156
As the demonstrations grew in size, the SPDC responded by increasing its already
significant control over the Internet. Numerous websites and ‘blog sites’ were
blocked,512 and on 3 September, SPDC authorities blocked access to popular video
sharing site YouTube which carried videos of the demonstrations inside Burma.513
Nevertheless, techno savvy independent Internet bloggers in Burma were able to

circumvent restrictions and post pictures, videos and reports of the ongoing protests
and crackdowns. Their success in doing so had multiple implications.
Primarily they provided a window into events for the outside world and helped unite
international solidarity with the protestors. This is something that was significantly
lacking during the 1988 uprising, when the news of over 3,000 deaths took days to
reach the international media.
In addition, a boomerang effect can be discerned in terms of news distribution

inside Burma. Although Internet access was heavily restricted during the days of
the crackdown, and only a tiny percentage of the Burmese population has access to
the Internet anyway, many images and stories posted on blog sites were picked up
and reused by foreign media who, in turn, transmitted this news back into the
country. It is highly likely that such distribution of news was a major contributing
factor for the rapid growth of the nationwide demonstrations.
One regrettable consequence was the personal risk these bloggers exposed
themselves to in performing this duty. On 30 November, Aung Gyi (a.k.a Aung
Thwin) was arrested by the authorities, while reportedly trying to post pictures of the
authorities shutting down Maggin Monastery. It has also been reported that at least
14 persons have been arrested at Internet cafes in relation to the crackdown.
A further unfortunate consequence of the fact that hundreds of photos and videos of
the demonstrations were readily available on the Internet has been that it appears
to have made the work of SPDC intelligence gathering somewhat easier. During
the height of the crackdown, security services circulated photos of demonstrators to
police stations and police informers. It has been reported that soldiers and
plainclothes officials arrived at homes bearing photographs of their intended targets
that were pulled off the Internet.514 Scores of people were reportedly arrested on
the basis of these photos.515
On 26 September, the first day on which violence was used against protestors in
Rangoon, the SPDC responded to the successful flow of information inside and
512
Sources: “Foreign correspondents phones under censorship blade,” Mizzima News, 12
September 2007; “Junta blocks popular blogs,” Mizzima News, 26 September 2007.
513
Source: “Burma blocks You Tube,” Mizzima News, 7 September 2007.
514
Source: “Secret cremations hide Burma killings,” Sunday Times, 7 October 2007
515
Source: “Four Burmese journalists and two “comedian-columnists” in prison as police
round-up goes on,” RSF, 12 October 2007.
157
outside of the country by closing Internet cafes in Rangoon.516 In addition, the

SPDC-controlled Internet service provider (ISP), Bagan Cybertech, reduced its
bandwidth, preventing the transmission of photos and video over the Internet.
On 28 September, the regime then completely shut down the country’s two ISPs.517
The official explanation was that maintenance was being carried out.518 However,
trucks loaded with SPDC army troops were seen raiding the offices of Burma’s
second ISP, Myanmar Info-Tech, at noon that day.519
SPDC officials, however, continued to be able to send email messages (after

verification and approval of their content) from inside the Department of Posts and
Telecommunications building. Reporters Sans Frontiers commented that “Military
prior censorship, long applied to the print media, is now being applied to the
Internet, this case of prior control of all information sent by Internet is unique in the
world”.520
Access to the Internet was only restored on 6 October, by which time the protests
had been suppressed. All email messages sent to Burmese email addresses
during the time of Internet blackout were deleted from the ISPs and access to news
websites and blog sites during this time was unattainable.521 The SPDC
subsequently established its own blog sites, which they attempted to present as
independent and credible sources of information. This move allowed the
dissemination of misinformation as well as the monitoring of Internet use.522
After two weeks of slow-speed Internet connectivity, on 1 November, Internet

access throughout Burma was again interrupted. The cut followed a small
demonstration by monks in Pakokku the previous day. In all likelihood, this
correlation can be assumed to be more than mere coincidence. Internet service
was eventually restored on 3 November, although connection was reportedly very
slow.523
516
Sources: “Burma - News blackout accompanies military crackdown on protests,” RSF, 26
September 2007; “Burma -Internet disconnected, newspapers closed and foreign journalists
under surveillance as junta tries to seal off Burma,” RSF, 28 September 2007.
517
Sources: “Burma - Internet disconnected, newspapers closed and foreign journalists under
surveillance as junta tries to seal off Burma,” RSF, 28 September 2007; Burma forces storm
cities,” AFP, 28 September 2007; “Troops Take Back Control in Myanmar,” AP, 29
September 2007.
518
Source: “Burma ‘cuts all Internet links’,” Bangkok Post, 28 September 2007.
519
Source: “A Rangoon Diary by Thierry Falise,” Irrawaddy, 1 November 2007.
520
Source: “With Internet still disconnected, concern mounts about fate of monks and
Civilian detainees,” RSF, 30 September 2007.
521
Source: “Five journalists currently held, four others released - Internet restored for a few
hours,” RSF, 9 October 2007.
522
Source: Ibid.
523
Sources: “Myanmar axes Internet, UN official ahead of Gambari visit,” AFP, 3
November 2007; “Burmese Internet cut-off said to prevent news flow about protests,” DVB,
158
Telephone Networks Severed

In early September, staff from the Directorate of Military Engineers visited the Office
of Post and Telecommunications, where they ordered the bugging of phone lines of
prominent activists. Included on their list of around 50 persons were Su Su Nway,
Phyu Phyu Thinn, Htay Kywe and Hla Myo Naung – all of whom had gone into
hiding by that time – as well as U Myint Thein, a spokesperson for the NLD. As
some numbers on their list were mobile phones, which could not be bugged, the
authorities ordered that these lines instead be cut.524
On 11 September, SPDC authorities then cut off the mobile phones of several
journalists working for the foreign media.525 The following day, the junta cut the last
telephone line at the NLD headquarters in Rangoon.526 On 26 September, the day
on which the crackdown began, the SPDC disabled the vast majority of the
country’s mobile phone networks.527
The National Press

The Press Scrutiny and Relations Department (PSRD), a division of the SPDC
Ministry of Information, examines every publication in Burma for anything perceived
as being “anti-regime” and ensures that nothing can be reported inside the country
that might run contrary to their interests.
The PSRD not only rejected all articles in which the protests were covered in an
independent and objective manner, but Rangoon-based journals and periodicals
were actually ordered to publish articles favourable to the SPDC and denouncing
the demonstrations. They were directed to print stories accusing pro-democracy
activists of orchestrating the protests and portraying the protesters as agitators
creating violence.528 Many journals adhered to these demands. For instance, on 9
September, many publications were forced to publish an official statement accusing
4 November 2007; “Internet back in Burma at snails pace,” Mizzima News, 4 November
2007.
524
Sources: “Junta taps journalists' telephones, cuts off their mobile connections,” SEAPA,
12 September 2007; “During one month of protests, military government steps up
propaganda, censorship and violence against journalists,” RSF, 20 September 2007;
“Burmese government cuts off activists' mobile phones,” Irrawaddy, 10 September 2007.
525
Source: “Myanmar cuts phone service to activists, journalists,” AFP, 16 September 2007.
526
Source: “Burma - During one month of protests, military government steps up
propaganda, censorship and violence against journalists,” RSF, 20 September 2007.
527
Source: “Burma- News blackout accompanies military crackdown on protests,” RSF, 26
September 2007.
528
Sources: “Junta orders Rangoon based journals to denounce ongoing protest,” Mizzima
News, 24 September 2007; “Burmese journals suspend publication due to government
demands,” DVB, 28 September; “During one month of protests, military government steps
up propaganda, censorship and violence against journalists,” RSF, 20 September 2007.
159
Min Ko Naing and other 88 Generation Student Group activists of inciting a

revolt.529
While the SPDC threatened reprisals against newspapers that refused to obey
these orders, several publications, including those owned by the Eleven Media and
Pyi Myanmar press groups took the decision to close rather than submitting to such
restrictive demands.530
Concurrent to its heightened suppression of independent media, the SPDC stepped

up its own propaganda through state-owned press and television. In the past, a
favoured tactic in the event of undesirable news events has been to simply not
report on them. This tactic, however, has become increasingly untenable with the
proliferation of radios providing access to foreign and exiled media. Nevertheless,
the state-run press initially opted to largely ignore the nationwide demonstrations.
As the protests mushroomed in size and scope and news quickly spread of SPDC
brutality, the military-controlled press quickly changed their tact. The SPDC-
controlled media became a means for the junta to justify its actions, by constructing
its own version of events in order to pre-empt or defend against other views. As is
common in Burma, these constructed accounts portrayed the victims of state
violence as having incited the situation, and characterised the security forces as
being disciplined in their response, thus ostensibly absolving them from any claims
of malpractice.531 One such report read: “Because of the difficult situation, the
security forces opened fire to disperse the crowd, using just a little force against the
violent protesters. Because they opened fire, the protesters dispersed”.532
Likewise, the blame for instigating the violent protestors was placed with exiled and
foreign media. On 11 October, the SPDC-controlled English language New Light of
Myanmar stated “If we think about the causes of unrest in 1988 and today, we can
see that it is all because of foreign media, such as BBC, VOA and RFA,” 533
In a December statement, Police Chief Brigadier General Khin Yi continued in the

same vein when he labelled the Democratic Voice of Burma “the most notorious
foreign broadcasting station airing fabricated news about Myanmar”. Contrary to
this view, two days later, the organization was commended by Reporters Sans
Frontiers (RSF) for its reliable coverage of the September demonstrations.534
529
530
Sources: “Internet disconnected, newspapers closed and foreign journalists under
surveillance as junta tries to seal off Burma,” RSF, 28 September 2007; Soldiers shut down
newspapers,” RSF, 26 September 2007.
531
Source: BURMA: The Human Rights Situation in 2006, AHRC, 21 December 2006.
532
533
Source: “Arrests Continue in Burma,” Irrawaddy, October 11, 2007.
534
Source: “Regime Asks Asean Journalists to Help Counter 'Negative' Reporting,”
Irrawaddy, 6 December 2007.
160
Deliberate Targeting of Journalists

The climate in which both national and foreign journalists operate in Burma has
always been tightly controlled. The control and intimidation of journalists was
heightened to new levels in response to the protests. From the beginning of the
protests, the SPDC denied visas to all foreign journalists,535 and during the protests,
foreign and local journalists were repeatedly reminded to stay away from the
demonstrations.536
On 15 August, the day in which the fuel price rise first took effect, two men, who had
photographed large crowds waiting on the streets of Rangoon, were taken into
custody and detained for the night.537 On 19 August, Burmese correspondents of
foreign news media reported being subjected to intimidation from plainclothes police
and USDA members, who were said to insult and threaten those journalists while
brandishing weapons. The following day, Brigadier General Hla Htay Win,
commanding officer of the Rangoon Regional Military Command issued orders
explicitly banned journalists from taking photos of demonstrations. Security forces
were directed to seize and destroy the cameras of those who persisted in their
coverage. On 23 August, members of the USDA alongside the police, physically
blocked journalists from reaching a group of protestors in Rangoon, and their
cameras were confiscated.538
On 28 August, Burmese photographer, Win Saing, was arrested while taking

pictures of the NLD’s regular Tuesday prayer session for political prisoners at the
Shwedagon Pagoda, and only released on 1 November 2007.539 Similarly, on 18
September, three Burmese journalists covering the now much larger monk-led
demonstrations in Rangoon were arrested and questioned by the police. Two of
those arrested worked for Japanese media (Asahi TV and Kyoto News Agency).
The third worked for The Voice Journal, a Rangoon-based magazine. Only the
Asahi TV journalist had his camera returned to him, albeit without its digital memory
card.540
During the height of the violent crackdown on demonstrators, on 26 September,

several journalists were reportedly injured, including Than Lwin Zaung Htet of the
Voice Journal. As discussed above, on 27 September, Kenji Nagai, a 50-year-old
535
Source: “Burma - During one month of protests, military government steps up
propaganda, censorship and violence against journalists,” RSF, 20 September 2007.
536
Source: “Junta taps journalists' telephones, cuts off their mobile connections,” SEAPA,
12 September 2007.
537
Source: “Milking the Cow Dry,” AHRC, 23 August 2007.
538
539
Source: “Junta taps journalists' telephones, cuts off their mobile connections,” SEAPA,
12 September 2007; “AAPP List of Released,” AAPPB, accessed at:
http://www.aappb.org/list_released_aug_sep_07.html on 6 January 2008.
540
161
Japanese photojournalist, was killed by a shot fired into his back at close range. An
SPDC army soldier then stood over him before shooting him once more. At the
time he was brandishing a camera and was clearly a member of the media. Rather
than being protected by the fact that he was a member of the press, it is far more
likely that this fact was a major contributing factor in his being shot. His camera was
removed from his dead body by security forces.
Many other journalists were arrested during the days of the crackdown. On 27
September, Win Ko Ko Latt, a 27-year-old journalist with the Rangoon-based
Weekly Eleven News Journal was arrested while covering the demonstration in
front of Tamwe Township State High School No.3. He was carrying a camera at
the time. He was detained for nearly a month before being released.541 On 28
September, Min Zaw, the Burmese correspondent of the Japanese newspaper,
Tokyo Shimbun, was taken from his home by plainclothes security personnel for
questioning.542 He was held for six days before being released, during which time
his mobile phone was confiscated.543
Min Htin Ko Ko Gyi, a cameraman, was also arrested during the height of the
crackdown. As he was injured on the head, he was held at Insein Township
Hospital, before he was released at the end of October.544 Likewise, 20-year-old
Nay Linn Aung, of the 7-Days Journal was detained for almost a month before
being released.545 Kyaw Zeya Tun, 23, from The Voice Journal was reported
missing during the crackdown. It was later discovered he had been taken into
custody, and was only released in early October.546 Ko Thu Ya Soe, a 30-year-old
photographer who works for the German news agency, European Pressphoto
Agency (EPA), has been missing since the start of October. He was last seen
taking photos near the Sule Pagoda in Rangoon.547
541
Source: “Irrawaddy Updates,” Irrawaddy, 27 September 2007; “News photographer
missing, eight other journalists still detained,” RSF, 23 October 2007.
542
Sources: “Burma - At least four journalists arrested in Rangoon, including Japanese
daily's correspondent,” RSF, 30 September 2007; “Junta detain reporter for Japanese
newspaper,” AP, 30 September 2007; “Authorities detain reporter for Japanese newspaper in
Myanmar,” AP, 30 September 2007.
543
Source: “Soldiers Hunt Dissidents in Myanmar,” AP, 4 October 2007; “At least five
journalists arrested in Rangoon,” RSF, 3 October 2007.
544
Source: “News photographer missing, eight other journalists still detained,” RSF, 23
October 2007.
545
October 2007.
546
Source: “Five journalists currently held, four others released - Internet restored for a few
hours,” RSF, 9 October 2007.
547
October 2007.
162
The death of Japanese photojournalist Kenji Nagai. These two

photographs, taken in sequence near the Sule Pagoda on 27 September
2007 clearly show what appears to be the intentional killing of a member
of the international media. [© Reuters].
163
Providing Information to the Media

It was not only professional journalists who were targeted during the crackdown, but
also those persons identified as giving information to media - ‘citizen journalists’,
who had taken it upon themselves to gather information during the crackdown.
Civilians who provide information to foreign and exiled media have long been
targeted by successive regimes in Burma. Officers at the Military Security Force
(SaYaPa; the restructured Military Intelligence network) have reportedly been
trained in methods of identifying the sources used by foreign media, and the
purchase of U.S-made intercept devices has additionally enhanced their capacity to
monitor phone calls.548
On 7 September 2007, SPDC authorities in Pakokku, Magwe Division, arrested four

local residents for allegedly providing foreign media with information on the
incidents of the 5 September.549 They were later charged with damaging public
property according to Section 6 (1) of the 1947 Public Property Protection Act, and
sentenced to long terms of imprisonment.550
Similarly, on the evening of 26 September, authorities arrested Tin Yu from his

home in Hlaingthaya Township in Rangoon. They informed his family that he was
being arrested because he had spoken with foreign media. They did not inform the
family where they were taking him. It has since been ascertained that he was
detained in Insein Prison, where he continued to be interned at the time of
publication.551
In early October, it was reported that the SPDC Ministry of Information, the official
SPDC-controlled news agency and the security forces had been instructed to work
together to identify the “citizen journalists”.552 Security forces then purposely sought
out individuals carrying cameras in downtown Rangoon, and as a result, several
persons were arrested.553 SPDC army soldiers even seized a camera being used
at a wedding ceremony. The authorities also visited the offices of various
international NGOs in Rangoon and questioned staff about technological
equipment, such as cameras and mobile phones.554
548
Source: “Junta Cracking Down On Media Informers,” Irrawaddy, 10 February 2006.
549
Source: “Pakokku residents arrested for foreign media contact,” DVB, 11 September
2007.
550
Source: “Pakokku Residents Jailed For Property Damage,” DVB, 10 October 2007.
551
Sources: “Rangoon man arrested for talking to foreign media,” Irrawaddy, 1
November 2007; Detailed List of Detainees since peaceful Protests began on August 19,
2008.
552
Source: RSF, 5 October 2007.
553
Source: “At least five journalists arrested in Rangoon,” RSF, 3 October 2007.
554
Source: “Arrests Continue in Burma,” Irrawaddy, October 11, 2007.
164
On 18 October, Shwe Pein (a.k.a. Htay Naing Lin) and Chan Aung (a.k.a. Nyi Htay),
of the Human Rights Defenders and Promoters (HRDP) group, were sentenced to
two years with hard labour for allegedly communicating with exiled media about the
arrest and sentencing of two NLD members in Sagaing Division. In their
prosecution, Deputy Police Chief Kyaw Htay relied upon telephone records and
called an official from the SPDC’s communications department to testify against the
two. The Judge, Daw Khin Myat Tar, found the defendants to have “sent news to
foreign broadcasters with intent to injure State tranquillity and the rule of law by
causing alarm to the public”.555
Foreign journalists who have left Burma reported on the increasingly difficult task of
finding reliable Burmese sources, stating that, “[t]hey are afraid and [one] no longer
know who is who, those who took part in the demonstrations have been arrested or
are in hiding”.556
Defamation of the Sangha

In justifying the raids of monasteries and the violence visited upon the monastic
community, the SPDC persisted along its earlier tack of drawing a distinction
between “bogus” monks who had violated the Vinaya (discipline) of the Buddha,
and those who they deemed to be genuine monks. In an address to the Sangha
Maya Nayaka Committee on 24 October, Brigadier General Thura Myint Maung,
SPDC Minister for Religious Affairs stated that:
“Due to political agitation of unscrupulous persons from inside and

outside the nation, who are always committing destructive acts,
monks’ protests broke out in August and September 2007. When we
look into the entire problem we have found out that bogus monks who
in reality are ex-convicts were making plots in advance with the
intention of generating a monk protest”.557
He claimed that some of the monks leading the protests had “attended explosive
courses and community organizer courses” in Mae Sot, Thailand, where many
exiled opposition groups are based, adding that “most of the monks who hatched
plots with [the] intention of generating a monks’ protest are not real monks. They
are ex-convicts and bogus monks”.558
It is evident that security forces made no such distinction, between genuine and
“bogus” monks, when conducting their night time raids on monasteries, or while
violently suppressing the peaceful demonstrations. The New Light of Myanmar
claimed that the authorities carrying out these “purification searches”, had been
555
556
Source: RSF, 5 October 2007.
557
Source: “A group of unscrupulous destructive elements tried to taint noble clear
waters of Sasana,” New Light of Myanmar, 25 October 2007.
558
Source: Ibid.
165
unable to distinguish between the real monks and impostors and so were forced to
arrest everyone.559 Unsurprisingly, the article made no mention of the
indiscriminate use of violence or the destruction and looting of property.
In a further effort to discredit those monks who participated in the protests, the
article alleged that alcohol, pornography, “sexual materials”, women’s clothing, Nazi
head bands, anti-government literature and a variety of weapons had been seized
during the raids. At the same time, the SPDC-controlled press published
photographs of SPDC officers kneeling and bowing before ‘genuine’ senior monks
providing cash and food donations.560
The SPDC then pursued this line of argument to the extreme by forcing female
detainees to confess to having had sexual relations with a number of these “bogus”
monks. In one case, the SPDC reported:
“According to the confession of Ma Ei, 24, daughter of U Than Htay of

Taungzun village, Bilin Township, she had an affair with Pyi Kyaw.
They lived together illegally. She became pregnant two times - in
February and August 2005. Abortion was made under the
arrangement of Pyi Kyaw”.561
In fact, Pyi Kaw, the Abbot of Shwedaung Monastery, was her uncle, and Ma Ei had
been staying at the monastery in order to look after her aged and paralysed
grandmother. Her grandmother responded to the concocted story, stating:
“She has been with us since she was young (7–8 years old). The
Abbot is my youngest son. They [SPDC} arrested both of them. We
have been staying in this monastery for about ten years. … It is not
true at all. How could they accuse her of such a thing[?] She looked
after me. She was with me all the time”.562
Ma Ei was detained in Insein Prison, and according to fellow detainee, Ma Ohnmar,

she had been forced to confess to having an affair with the Abbot: “[She] was under
tremendous pressure and she had to give testimony as a government witness …
and she was released about two weeks earlier than us”. According to Ma Ohnmar,
Ma Ei had denied ever having sexual relations with any monks, least of all her
uncle, and had been forced to agree to the fabricated story. 563
559
Source: “Monk responds to government accusations,” DVB, 8 October 2007; “In
Myanmar, Fear Is a Constant Companion,” New York Times, 20 October 2007; “After
the riots, Burma returns to an unspoken terror,” The Guardian, 13 October 2007.
560
Source: Ibid.
561
562
Source: BBC interview on 6 November 2007 via “Courage to Resist,” WLB,
November 2007.
563
166
Ma Ei’s cellmate, Hnin Hnin, was also used by the SPDC as a means to attempt to
defame the monks of Ngwe Kyar Yan Monastery. A report carried by the New Light
of Myanmar attested that:
“Hnin Hnin [a.k.a] Hnin New Moe who did sundry matters of [Ngwe
Kyar Yan] Monastery and U Tezinda [a.k.a] Toke Kyi were bookies of
two- and three-digit and football gambling. They lived together.
Thanda Kyaw, sister of Hnin Hnin, who lived with her, had an affair
with monk Maung Tint and she fell in love with monk Ngakhe”.564
However, Ma Ohnmar testified that in reality, “They [SPDC] recited what she [Hnin
Hnin] should say and she repeated after them. They documented it on
videotape”.565
The Pro-SPDC Rallies

The SPDC also engaged in gauche attempts to portray such viewpoints as
having popular legitimacy. In the weeks following the protests, during which
time the SPDC had violently enforced its ban on assemblies of more than five
persons, the junta organized numerous rallies, in which thousands of people
were forced to attend. Those who took part were forced to hold placards
condemning “external interference” and accused the BBC, VOA and RFA of
“airing a skyful of lies”.566 The SPDC has referred to the rallies as evidence that
the majority of the Burmese people do not support the protestors; however,
those in attendance have reported being forced to join or offered incentives to
do so.567 Several reports have testified to persons being arrested for refusing to
participate, or being critical of these rallies.
For instance, it was reported that villagers in Chin State were given the option to
attend pro-SPDC rallies or pay 10,000 kyat fine. Some, who refused to attend,
were later arrested and taken to military detention centres.568 On 16 October
2007, two former schoolteachers were arrested for objecting to an SPDC-
organized rally in Paungde Township, Pegu Division.569
Win Aung, a schoolteacher in Tenasserim (Tanintharyi) Division, was also

reportedly sentenced to one year imprisonment after he wore his work uniform
564
565
566
2007.
567
Source: “Teacher jailed for wearing uniform,” DVB, 30 October 2007.
568
Source: “Burma minority 'fleeing to India',” BBC, 23 October 2007.
569
Sources: “Bago couple arrested for challenging government protests,” DVB, 19
October 2007; “Bago couple’s hearing cancelled,” DVB, 31 October 2007.
167
to an SPDC-organized rally. A source inside the Kawthaung Township chapter

of the USDA reported that a secret order had been issued to ensure
schoolteachers and students did not wear their uniforms so as to disguise the
fact that many of those at the rallies were government employees and
schoolchildren who had been forced to attend.570
Three further persons were arrested on 14 November 2007 after distributing

leaflets at the Thiri Mingalar Market in Insein Township, Rangoon which
reportedly included statements asserting that the forcing of people to take part
in pro-junta rallies violated the Geneva Conventions.571 It remains unclear
precisely what legal precedent these statements were referring to as the
Geneva Conventions dictate the laws of armed conflict and not those governing
the freedom of association and assembly. Article 20 (2) of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), however, clearly states that “[n]o one
may be compelled to belong to an association”.
570
Source: “Teacher jailed for wearing uniform,” DVB, 30 October 2007.
571
Source: “Burma Continues Arrests of Activists,” AP, 14 November 2007.
168
X. Conclusion
At the outset of the protests, four demands were made upon the SPDC, namely:
1. To issue a public apology for the brutal crackdown on the peaceful

demonstration of monks in Pakokku;
2. To immediately reduce all basic commodity prices, fuel prices, and rice
and cooking oil prices;
3. To release all political prisoners, including Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and all
detainees arrested in the ongoing demonstrations over the fuel price
hike; and
4. To immediately enter into dialogue with democratic opposition groups to
seek national reconciliation and to resolve the crises and difficulties
suffered by the populace.
However, not one of these demands has been seriously engaged with by the
regime. Rather, the violence visited upon monks in Pakokku was magnified in later
crackdowns as a means to repress such claims. Since that time, the regime has
continued to demonstrate an unwillingness to address, or even acknowledge, the
root causes of the protests, or to engage in any real effort at national reconciliation.
Instead the junta has heralded a return to the status quo as something to be lauded
by the population of Burma and the international community alike.
On 7 November 2007, SPDC Information Minister Brigadier General Kyaw Hsan,

was trying his hardest to assure UN Special Envoy, Ibrahim Gambari, and by
extension, the international community, that “there are no more arrests, night
apprehensions and search of monasteries in connection with the incident”.572 He
added that:
“The protest in which the people and true monks did not take part has
been under control and stability has been restored in the entire nation.
So, we have already lifted the martial law … as peace and stability is
prevailing in the whole nation since [the] situation has returned to
normal”.573
While rights groups were quick to point out that the crackdown was still ongoing,
with arrests and monastery raids evidently continuing, the statement by Brigadier
General Kyaw Hsan belies a more significant truth. A return to “normality” in Burma
is not something that should be accepted, nor commended, by the international
572
Source: “UN Envoy holds talks with Spokes Authoritative Team of SPDC, meets
NPED Minister, Foreign Minister, Religious Affairs Minister, Labour Minister,
members of social organizations, representatives of national races,” New Light of
Myanmar, 7 November 2007.
573
169
community. Normalcy is the continuation of an abusive military class system within

the country sustained through the systematic exploitation and forceful oppression of
the population. The crackdown on peaceful protestors in September 2007 was
simply a further manifestation of the self-sustaining nature of this repressive system.
The one variable that changed in August through October was that the civilians in
the towns and cities of Burma summed up the collective courage to peacefully
protest against the situation confronting them. The reaction of the SPDC was
entirely consistent with their oft-displayed modus operandi. A week after Brigadier
General Kyaw Hsan’s initial pronouncement, Deputy Defence Minister Major
General Aye Myint, typified the SPDC’s own view of normality, when he declared
that “[n]ow the situation in Myanmar is in normalcy. We totally control all the
situation”.574
A monk from Pakokku, however, provided his own, somewhat different, analysis of
the situation:
“[The people are] still against the government mentally but not
physically because we can't do anything. If we do they will arrest us.
We don't want to be killed. We don't want to be tortured. The
government takes advantage of this. The government suppressed the
protests but there's not really quiet. There's a lot of defiance”.575
Similarly, an individual who was involved in the protests in Rangoon told HRDU that
he believed the general population still felt restless following the protests,
suggesting that the right trigger was all that was needed to lead to further
demonstrations.
“The bitter experience and achievement of our September movements

are still in the hearts of all of the people. The people have been
motivated by the September demonstrations. I would like to send a
message to Burmese people to take part in the future movements for
democracy in Burma and at the same time I would like to request the
whole world to support our people’s struggle for our cause”.576
During his address to the UN Special Envoy, SPDC Information Minister, Brigadier
General Kyaw Hsan also lectured on the intricacies of Burmese politics, as a means
to justify the military’s continued grip on power through the rhetoric of security and
stability:
574
Source: “We are in control: Myanmar defence official,” AFP, 14 November 2007.
575
Source: “Spies, suspicion and empty monasteries - Burma today,” The Guardian, 15
December 2007.
576
170
“To discuss [Burma’s] affairs, you should have thoroughly studied not
only the current situation of [Burma] but also the significant facts
throughout the history, we would like to suggest. In fact, [Burma’s]
affair is subtle and very complicated. We have over 100 national
races who have been residing all over the country together since long
long ago. Our nation has suffered the internal armed insurrection for
many years and it is still in existence till today. Politically, we are not
mature and there are a variety of parties. Thus, it would be a very
serious mistake if [Burma’s] affair is viewed superficially for seeking a
solution like that of other nations. Hence, in addition to current
situation of our country, other matters such as the nationalities' affairs,
internal insurgencies, political, economic and social affairs, etc. along
the history are to be studied thoroughly and reviewed correctly. In this
way, correct and proper review and assessment can be made”.577
It is a common strategy of the SPDC to highlight the country’s ethnic diversity and
history of internal armed conflict as a means to justify their continued role in
ensuring the non-disintegration of the Union. It is a view that has been picked up on
by some journalists and foreign governments alike in the wake of the protests.
China, for instance, has continued to emphasise the need for stability, and has
insisted that “We cannot permit Myanmar to fall into chaos, we cannot permit
Myanmar to become another Iraq. No matter what ideas other countries have,
China's stance on this is staunch”.578
The regime’s stubbornness over addressing the root causes of the protests is
further evidenced in their unwillingness to accept any responsibility for the endemic
levels of poverty within the country. Given that the economic situation is
demonstrably the result of SPDC design and self interest, it is little wonder that
there is an ingrained reluctance to bring about any level of reform. On 24
November 2007, Charles Petrie, the UN Resident Humanitarian Coordinator in
Rangoon, issued a public statement in relation to the demonstrations. In it, he
stated:
“The [protests] clearly demonstrated the everyday struggle to meet

basic needs, and the urgent necessity to address the deteriorating
humanitarian situation in the country. … [T]he UN system in Myanmar
[Burma] sees every day that in this potentially prosperous country
basic human needs are not being met. … The concerns of the people
577
578
Source: “China Says Myanmar should not be another Iraq,” Reuters, 14 November
2007.
171
have been clearly expressed through the recent peaceful

demonstrations, and it is beholden on all to listen”.579
In response, the SPDC ejected him from the country and SPDC Information
Minister, Brigadier General Kyaw Hsan later angrily responded:
“Anti-government groups, global powers that are supporting them and

even some UN officials are slandering the government's efforts to
implement the task including our Millennium Development Goals to
develop the people's socio-economy. We openly say that we cannot
accept such biased slanders. In reality, not only the developing
countries like ours but also the developed countries are also facing the
problem of poverty which is an international dilemma”.580
It is indicative of their priorities that the SPDC has referred to its lack of mandate to
conduct necessary economic reforms; “The government to be elected by the people
[following completion of the seven step roadmap] will try its best to seek ways and
means to tackle the problem ’lowering consumer prices’ and it will be the one
capable of handling the problem”.581
Such statements, however, are incongruous with the regimes enactment and
implementation of a host of laws and orders enabling it to repress fundamental
freedoms, and its continued capacity and willingness to set economic policy for its
own benefit.
The aversion of the SPDC to reforming its economic policies, or to counter the
abuses committed by its armed forces under the rubric of counter-insurgency or
their Self-Reliance Program, will mean the continued impoverishment of the
population. It is also likely to lead to further economic shocks such as those that
sparked the September protests, for which the populace is entirely unequipped to
cope. Sharing this view, Sean Turnell of Burma Economic Watch (BEW) has
predicted more of the same in stating that “further reforms such as this, half-hearted
and most damaging to the general populace – are still in store, not least because
the underlying reasons requiring them won’t go away”.582
Certain apparent concessions made following the protests, including the

appointment of a special liaison officer to meet with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, and
permitting Professor Paolo Sergio Pinheiro, the UN Special Rapporteur on Human
579
Source: “Statement of the United Nations Country Team in Myanmar,” UNIC, 25
October 2007.
580
581
Source: “It is time to take correct path,” New Light of Myanmar, 8 October 2007.
582
Source: “Burma Junta Refuses To Bear Share of Pain,” Financial Times, 12
September 2007.
172
Rights in Burma, to visit the country, are not ends in themselves. They rather are a
means often employed by the regime to deflect global condemnation and to placate
the international community without actually bringing about any fundamental
changes in the country or the way in which it is governed.
Nevertheless, the fact that the SPDC felt obliged to make such gestures, however
meaningless they may be, demonstrates that the regime is responsive to the
demands of the international community. It is thus crucial for the international
community and the United Nations to maintain and increase its efforts, and add real
weight and purpose to those initiatives that are already underway. A failure to do so
will mean yet another missed opportunity, resulting in the continued suffering of the
Burmese people under military rule.
Much as had happened following the mass demonstrations of 1988, we may never
know the actual number of those who were detained or killed for their part in the
September 2007 protests. Official statistics provided by the regime are at best
conservative and at worst complete fabrications of the truth, and though we may
never know the true human toll, there is little doubt that the real number of dead is
far higher than that suggested by the SPDC. According to the AAPPB, at least 84
persons still remained unaccounted for by the end of January 2008, four months
after the crackdowns.583 It is unknown whether these individuals languish in
detention or if they have been killed, however, it is quite likely that at least some of
this number belong to the latter category.
Contrary to the assertions of the SPDC, the will of the Burmese people has once
again been made evident: that the Burmese people seek freedom from the
oppressive and exploitative rule of the SPDC. It is thus imperative that the
international community acknowledges these wishes and bands together behind
the Burmese population to ensure that such atrocities cannot continue.
583
Source: “Those who disappeared during the protest in Burma,” AAPPB, accessed at:
http://www.aappb.org/disap_sept_07.htm, on 28 January 2008.
173
A young Buddhist monk hold his alms bowl high in the emblematic
gesture of “overturning the alms bowl”, symbolizing the
excommunication of the SPDC, and all its agents, allies, and associates.
[unknown].
174
XI. Recommendations
The main obstacle in Burma today is the unwillingness of the SPDC to address
the problems faced by the Burmese populace or to make any sincere efforts
towards reconciliation. Given this intransigence, the international community
must continue to make concerted and coordinated efforts to press the regime
for change.
The mediation efforts of the Good Offices of the UN Secretary General must be
strongly backed by the UN Security Council (UNSC) and other relevant
mechanisms of the United Nations. There must also be critical engagement by
individual countries of concerned and regional groupings in addition to
diplomatic and economic pressures which target the regime as well as an
increase in support for the democracy movement.
“We would really like the international community and the United
Nations to help us and to see the whole picture regarding the
situation in Burma. They need to take strong actions against the
military government to stop their abuses as soon as possible. It is
unarmed civilians who continue to suffer under the military
government’s persecution”.584
“We, the people couldn’t do much because they oppress us with

weapons. I thought and believed that we were winning this time
but they stopped us with force. To achieve victory in our struggle,
we need help in the form of international pressure against the
SPDC”.585
To the UN Security Council

Given the extent of the violence used to suppress the peaceful September 2007
protests in Burma in flagrant disregard of the appeals of UN and world leaders
to show maximum restraint, the UN Security Council should adopt a binding
resolution that:
• Deplores the use of violence against the peaceful demonstrations and

ongoing arbitrary detentions and practice of torture in detention
centres;
• Expresses deep concern on the lack of tangible progress and lack of
inclusiveness in the process towards national reconciliation and calls
584
October 2007.
585
November 2007.
175
on the SPDC to take positive steps for a transition via an inclusive

process towards a democratically elected government;
• Calls on the SPDC for the early lifting of restrictions placed on political
parties, the early release of those placed under detention including,
but not limited to, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, and to implement effective
and meaningful dialogue between all parties concerned;
• Calls on the SPDC to provide immediate and unhindered access to all
areas of Burma to the relevant UN agencies and other international
humanitarian organizations to allow the distribution of humanitarian
aid to those in need;
• Requests the UN Secretary General to provide for his Good Offices
and pursue his discussion on the situation of human rights and the
restoration of democracy in Burma and to report the progress this
process back to the UNSC;
• Calls on the SPDC to fully cooperate with the UN Secretary General
(UNSG) in order to perform his Good Offices mandate and implement
an equitable national reconciliation and democratic transition plan for
Burma, which includes members of the democratic opposition parties
and representatives of ethnic nationalities in addition to members of
the SPDC; and
• Calls on the immediate and unconditional imposition of arms embargo
against the Burmese regime.
To the Good Offices of the UN Secretary General

In order to facilitate discussions among all parties concerned and make the
national reconciliation process irreversible, the SPDC should accept the
mediation of the Good Offices of the UN Secretary General and that process
needs to be institutionalized as soon as possible. At a minimum, the
institutionalization of the mediation role of the Good Offices of the UN Secretary
General should include the following:
• Agreement on regular and unimpeded visits of the Special Envoy of

the Secretary General (SESG) in accordance with a prearranged
schedule;
• Agreement on an agenda of open discussion;
• Creation of a liaison office of the SESG in Burma;
• Formation of an expert Working Group to suggest policy options; and
• Convene regular consultative meetings with members of UN Core
Group on Burma
176
To the UN Human Rights Council

The NCGUB was encouraged by the convening of the UN Human Rights
Council’s Special Session on the Human Rights Situation in Myanmar on 2
October 2007 and its adoption by consensus of the Resolution of the Fifth
Special Session of the Human Rights Council on the Human Rights Situation in
Myanmar in which it was stated that the UNSC was not only “[d]eeply
concerned at the situation of human rights in Myanmar”,586 but also that it
“strongly deplored the continued violent repression of peaceful demonstrations
in Myanmar”.587 However, the NCGUB appeals to the Human Rights Council to
take the following additional steps:
• Advocate and ensure the immediate unrestricted visit to Burma of

Professor Paolo Sergio Pinheiro, the UN Special Rapporteur on
Human Rights in Burma so that he may conduct a thorough fact
finding mission into the SPDC’s suppression of the September 2007
protests;
• Establish a commission of enquiry to look into the systematic and
widespread violations of human rights and international humanitarian
law in Burma;
• Institutionalise arrangements for briefings on Burma by the High
Commissioner for Human Rights to the Security Council; and
• Ensure that more information about the communications between the
SPDC and the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
(OHCHR) be made publicly available.
586
Source: Resolution of the Fifth Special Session of the Human Rights Council on the
Human Rights Situation in Myanmar, HRC Resolution S-5/1, 2 October 2007, accessed
at:
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/specialsession/A.HRC.RES.S.5-
1.pdf.
587
Source: Ibid.
177
To the Member Governments of ASEAN

“We were born with no basic human rights under military rule, and
we have suffered the abuse of our basic human rights for many
years. This government [SPDC] doesn’t take any responsibility for
its citizens. The SPDC is like a psychopath. If there is a
dangerous psychopath living in your neighbourhood, everybody’s
life is in danger. Now that man not only destroys our future but he
also kills the monks and civilians. I would like to ask our
neighbours not to abstain from their responsibility to stop that man.
Our neighbouring countries must take action on Burma now
because we all are suffering terribly under the military regime as
though we are living next to a psychopath”.588
It is also strongly recommended that the member governments of the

Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) initiate collaborative
regional talks with representatives of the SPDC along with key regional
stakeholders such as China to discuss matters of shared concern. Such
talks should address the following:
• Shared condemnation for the SPDC’s disproportionate use of

violence in the suppression of the September 2007 protests;
• Common concern over the lack of any genuine progress towards
democratization and national reconciliation in Burma;
• Acknowledgement that the human rights situation in Burma affects
not only neighbouring countries but the ASEAN region as a whole,
and as such that it should cease to be considered to be an internal
matter for which responsibility lies entirely with the SPDC;
• Further progress on the drafting of the ASEAN charter, with the
codification of regional human rights standards and monitoring
procedures; and
• The imposition of targeted economic sanctions against the SPDC, its
allies, agents, and cronies.
The member governments of the ASEAN grouping should also continue to

encourage Burma to not only move towards a democratically elected system of
government, but also reduce restrictions placed upon the fundamental and
political freedoms of the populace, and to cease the use of military force against
unarmed civilians, particularly against those in ethnic areas.
588
November 2007.
178
To the International Community

Though it may often seem as though the SPDC is unresponsive to international
pressure, certain conciliatory gestures made on their part for the sole purpose of
appeasing the international community while deflecting its condemnation
demonstrate that the opposite is true. It is therefore vital that international
pressure on the regime is maintained and increased to help bring about
substantive change in Burma. To this end, the international community and
foreign governments should:
• Condemn the SPDC for its excessive use of violence, the ongoing
system of arbitrary arrests in the suppression of the September 2007
protests, and the widespread practice of torture employed in Burma’s
detention centres;
• Express collective concern over the curtailing of civil and political rights
which oppose the policies and programs of the SPDC and the
concomitant repression of economic, social, and cultural freedoms in
Burma;
• Support and coordinate with the mediation efforts of the UN, the
Secretary General, his Special Envoy, and his Good Offices mandate
to bring about a peaceful transition to a democratically elected
government, genuine national reconciliation, and an overall
improvement in human rights standards;
• Advocate for the regular and unimpeded visits of the Special Envoy of
the Secretary General;
• Support the drafting of a binding UN Security Council resolution on
Burma;
• Maintain international diplomatic pressure on the SPDC, its allies,
agents, and cronies with the continued application of targeted
economic sanctions, and encourage Burma’s trading partners to follow
suit by adopting similar targeted economic sanctions;
• Impose restrictions on SPDC members, their families and business
associates limiting their access to financial, educational and medical
facilities in your respective countries;
• Support calls for the imposition of an immediate and unconditional UN
arms embargo against the SPDC;
• Advocate for release of all political prisoners, including, but not limited
to Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and all those arrested in relation to the
September 2007 protests, and for the immediate and unconditional
cessation of the use of military force against Burmese civilians;
• Sponsor calls for the SPDC to provide unhindered access to all areas
of Burma to the relevant UN agencies and other international
humanitarian organizations to allow the distribution of humanitarian aid,
particularly to internally displaced communities, and where necessary,
support the distribution of cross-border aid to such groups;
• Initiate preparations for transitional activities that will facilitate the
reconstruction of significant political and economic institutions;
179
• Champion efforts that will lead to the implementation of genuine and

meaningful tripartite dialogue between the SPDC, members of the
democratic opposition, and representatives of ethnic minorities; and
• Increase support programs for the promotion of human rights,
democracy, national reconciliation, independent media, independent
trade unions, gender equality and the empowerment of women,
environmental preservation and sustainable development which will be
beneficial for pro-democracy and ethnic groups operating inside Burma
and in exile.
The NCGUB also welcomes the additional measures recently imposed by the
European Union (EU). Unless the SPDC complies with recommendations made
in the Council’s conclusion, the EU should consider adopting further steps, which
at a minimum should include the following:
• Suspension or withdrawal of existing investments in the oil and gas

sector in Burma;
• Financial restrictions which lead to the freezing of all EU-based assets
of the SPDC, its members, agents, and their families; and
• Imposition of a ban on the import of all marine products from Burma.
Moreover, the NCGUB calls on China to make use of its unique strategic position
with the Burmese regime as its strongest political, economic and military
supporter. As such, the Government of China should:
• Acknowledge not only that the human rights situation in Burma spills
across the country’s borders affecting neighbouring countries, but also
that the widespread violation of human rights in Burma constitutes a
threat to international peace and security, and as such is not an internal
matter for which the sole responsibility lies with the SPDC;
• Impose targeted economic sanctions against the regime, including the
freezing of SPDC assets held in Chinese banks, a ban on new
investment in Burma and enforce an injunction on all business dealings
with corporations controlled by or colluding with the SPDC;
• Immediately cease the supply of all arms, ammunition, and other
military supplies and materiel to the SPDC; and
• Support movements in the UN Security Council to draft a binding
resolution on Burma.
180

Bullets in The Alms Bowl

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BULLETS IN THE ALMS BOWL

An Analysis of the Brutal SPDC Suppression

May that memory not fade

Written, edited and published by the Human Rights Documentation Unit

Front Cover: A procession of Buddhist monks marching through downtown Rangoon

Acronyms and Abbreviations ………………………………………………… 3

I. Executive Summary ………………………………………………………….. 9

II. Government by Exploitation: The Burmese Way to Capitalism? ….... 15

III. Growing Discontent: The Economic Protests ……..…………………... 31

IV. The Saffron Revolution ………..…………………………………………… 37

V. Crackdown on the Streets ……...………………………………………….. 49

VI. The Monastery Raids .……………………………………………………… 79

VII. A Witch Hunt ……………….……………………………………………….. 93

VIII. Judicial Procedure and Conditions of Detention ……………………. 111

X. Conclusion ………………...………………………………………………….. 169

XI. Recommendations ………………………….…..…………………………… 175

Acronyms and Abbreviations

LID Light Infantry Division

Abbreviations, Terms and Units of Measurements

a.k.a also known as

Above: Map of central Rangoon (Yangon) showing the locations of several of

Opposite: Map of Burma showing the locations of all reported demonstrations

Such open dissent is rare in the authoritarian country, where fundamental

This report is based upon the detailed testimonies of over 50 eyewitnesses to

Following this, a section focusing on detention and judicial procedure includes

A further section focussing on the days of the crackdown provides an analysis

On 15 August 2007, the SPDC suddenly and without any forewarning

population was immediate, and served to highlight the ever-worsening

Through the violent disruption of demonstrations by USDA and SAS members,

Nevertheless, the protests had spread throughout the country, and on 28

Then, on 5 September 2007, a significant catalyst to the subsequent growth of

Outraged over the events of the previous days, on 9 September, an

During the week from 18 to 24 September, tens of thousands of Buddhist

On the evening of the 24 September, Brigadier General Thura Myint Maung,

On 25 September 2007, despite such threats, tens of thousands of people once

Particularly violent crackdowns occurred on 27 September in South Okkalapa

While in many cases shooting into crowds was conducted indiscriminately, in

certain individuals, either due to their apparent leadership role, or simply

It has been estimated that approximately 6,000 people, including as many as

Those detained in relation to the protests were subjected to conditions of

The response to the protests highlights the SPDC’s complete unwillingness to

A column of monks marching in protest of the SPDC and their continued

II. Government by Exploitation: The Burmese

The recent demonstrations and their subsequent brutal suppression in Burma

The SPDC’s pervasive military apparatus is also an important factor in

The effects of under-funding are readily evident in the standard of healthcare

Similarly, Burma’s deteriorating education system is largely the result of

Such monetary expansion has inevitably been accompanied by attendant high

Chronic levels of inflation are further aggravated by periodic shocks, of which

The tremendous discrepancy between official and unofficial exchange rates

The Economic Cost of Militarization

Two of the most significant military-controlled conglomerates are the Union of

“I cannot remember that we have ever experienced such bad

The Self-Reliance Program also encourages widespread extortion and looting.

Similarly, thousands of acres of farmland have been confiscated by the military

Prominent labour rights activist Daw Su Su Nway (centre) struggles with

The Straw that Broke the Camel’s Back

“I want to talk about a woman who lived in Hlaing Tharyar, on the

“I live in North Okkalapa [Township] and to get to Sule [Pagoda] I now

large scale subsidising of fuel, as a means to balance these deficits.72 However, an

Member of the 88 Generation Student’s Group, Mie Mie (right) leads a

III. Growing Discontent: The Economic Protests