Aytona vs Castillo Case Digest FACTS: On December 29, 1961, Carlos P.

Garcia, who was still President that time, made last minute appointments while the Commission on Appointments was not in session. Said last minute appointment included Dominador R. Aytona, who was appointed as ad interim Governor of Central Bank. The latter took oath on the same day. At noon on December 30, 1961, President-elect Diosdado Macapagal assumed office. He issued Administrative Order No. 2 on December 31, 1961 recalling, withdrawing and canceling all ad interim appointments made by President Garcia after December 13, 1961, which was the date when Macapagal was proclaimed President by the Congress. He then appointed Andres V. Castillo as ad interim Governor of the Central Bank and the latter qualified immediately. On January 2, 1962, both exercised the powers of their office. However, Aytona was prevented from holding office the following day and thus instituted a quo warranto proceeding, challenging Castillos right to exercise the powers of the Governor of the Central Bank. Aytona claims that he was validly appointed and had qualified for the post, thereforemaking Castillos appointment void. Castillo then contended that Aytonas appointment had already been revoked by Administrative Order No. 2 issued by President Macapagal. ISSUE: Whether President Diosdado Macapagal had power to issue the order of cancellation of the ad interim appointments made by President Carlos P. Garcia even after the appointees had already qualified. RULING: Upon the ground of separation of powers, the court resolved that it must decline and refuse jurisdiction in disregarding the Presidential Administrative Order No. 2, canceling such midnight or last-minute appointments. Case dismissed

Sanidad vs Comelec - A case Digest PABLITO V. SANIDAD - petitioner; newspaper columnist of the "OVERVIEW" for the BAGUIO MIDLAND COURIER, a weekly newspaper circulated in the City of Baguio and the Cordilleras COMELEC - respondent; through its Solicitor- General Type of petition filed: PETITION FOR CERTIORARI ISSUE: Whether Section 19 of COMELEC Resolution No. 2167 is constitutional or not.

FACTS: COMELEC Resolution No. 2167 was promulgated due to the enacted RA No. 6766 (An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region) last October 23, 1989, which paved for a call of a plebescite fo its ratification (original schedule was reset from December 27, 1989 to January 30, 1990. Allegations of Sanidad: 1.Unconsitutional as it it violates the constitutional guarantees of the freedom of expression and of the press 2.Constitutes a prior restraint on his constitutionally-guaranteed freedom of the press bause of its penal provsions in case of violation Responses of COMELEC -Not violative of the constitutional guarantees of the freedom of expression and of the press but only a valid implementation of the power of the Comelec to supervise and regulate media during election or plebiscite periods as enunciated in Article IX-C, Section 4 of the 1987 Constitution and Section 11 of RA 6646 -Does Not absolutely bar petitioner from expressing his views and/or from campaigning for or against the Organic Act. He may still express his views or campaign for or against the act through the Comelec space and airtime (magazine/periodical in the province)

HELD:

Petiton is GRANTED- Section 19 of COMELEC Resolution No. 2167 is declared null and void and unconstitutional . TRO made permanent due to the follwing reasons: 1. It has no statutory basis 2. Form of regulation is tantamount to a restriction of petitioner's freedom of expression for no justifiable reason 3. affected by the issues presented in a plebiscite should not be unduly burdened by restrictions on the forum where the right to expression may be exercised.

Avelino vs. Cuenco - A case digest Facts; Senator Cuenco was elected Senate President after the seat being declared vacant resulting to the other senators including the Senate President Avelino's walk-out.

Issue; WON there's quorum, enough to conduct business and therefor legitimizing Senator Cuenco's election as Senate President. Ruling; The Supreme Court held that twelve is a majority of 24 enough to conduct business taking into consideration the absence of Senator Confessor being out of the country and jurisdiction, and Senator Sotto who's in the hospital. Arnault v. Nazareno Petition for habeas corpus to relieve petitioner Jean Arnault from confinement in the New Bilibid prison. Denied. Facts: In the latter part of October, 1949, the Philippine Government, through the Rural Progress Administration, bought two estates known as Buenavista and Tambobong for the sums of P4,500,000 and P500,000, respectively. P1,000,000 was paid for the first sum and P 500,000 to the second sum both to Ernest H. Burt, a nonresident American, thru his two attorney-in-fact in the Philippines, as represented by Jean L. Arnault, for both estates respectively. However, Ernest H. Burt was not the original owner of the estate. He bought the first from San Juan de Dios hospital and the second from the Philippine trust company. In both instances, Burt was not able to pay the necessary amount of money to complete his payments. As such, his contract with said owners were cancelled.

On September 4, 1947, the Philippine Trust Company sold, conveyed, and delivered the Tambobong Estate to the Rural Progress Administration by an abolute deed of sale in consideration of the sum of P750,000. The Philippine Government then, through the Secretary of Justice as Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Rural Progress Administration and as Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Philippine National Bank, from which the money was borrowed, accomplished the purchase of the two estates in the latter part of October, 1949, as stated at the outset. On February 27, 1950, the Senate adopted its Resolution No. 8, which created a special committee to investigate the transactions surrounding the estates. The special committee created by the resolution called and examined various witnesses, among the most important of whom was Jean L. Arnault. An intriguing question which the committee sought to resolve was the apparent unnecessariness and irregularity of the Governments paying to Burt the total sum of P1,500,000 for his alleged interest of only P20,000 in the two estates, which he seemed to have forfeited anyway long before October, 1949. The committee sought to determine who were responsible for and who benefited from the transaction at the expense of the Government. Arnault testified that two checks payable to Burt aggregating P1,500,000 were delivered to him on the afternoon of October 29, 1949; that on the same date he opened a new account in the name of Ernest H. Burt with the Philippine National Bank in which he deposited the two checks aggregating P1,500,000; and that on the same occasion he drew on said account two checks; one for P500,000, which he transferred to the account of the Associated Agencies, Inc., with the Philippine National Bank, and another for P440,000 payable to cash, which he himself cashed. It was the desire of the committee to determine the ultimate recipient of this sum of P440,000 that gave rise to the present case. As Arnault resisted to name the recipient of the money, the senate then approved a resolution that cited him for contempt. It is this resolution which brought him to jail and is being contested in this petition. Issues: 1. WON the Senate has the power to punish Arnault for contempt for refusing to reveal the name of the person to whom he gave the P440,000. 2. WON the Senate lacks authority to commit him for contempt for a term beyond its period of legislative session, which ended on May 18, 1950. 3. WON the privilege against self incrimination protects the petitioner from being questioned. HELD: 1. YES. Once an inquiry is admitted or established to be within the jurisdiction of a legislative body to make, the investigating committee has the power to

require a witness to answer any question pertinent to that inquiry, subject of course to his constitutional right against self-incrimination. The inquiry, to be within the jurisdiction of the legislative body to make, must be material or necessary to the exercise of a power in it vested by the Constitution, such as to legislate, or to expel a Member; and every question which the investigator is empowered to coerce a witness to answer must be material or pertinent to the subject of the inquiry or investigation. The materiality of the question must be determined by its direct relation to the subject of the inquiry and not by its indirect relation to any proposed or possible legislation. The reason is, that the necessity or lack of necessity for legislative action and the form and character of the action itself are determined by the sum total of the information to be gathered as a result of the investigation, and not by a fraction of such information elicited from a single question. 2. NO. Senate is a continuing body and which does not cease to exist upon the periodical dissolution of the Congress or of the House of Representatives. There is no limit as to time to the Senates power to punish for contempt in cases where that power may constitutionally be exerted as in the present case. Senate will not be disposed to exert the power beyond its proper bounds, i.e. abuse their power and keep the witness in prison for life. If proper limitations are disregarded, Court isalways open to those whose rights might thus be transgressed. 3. NO. Court is satisfied that those answers of the witness to the important question, which is the name of that person to whom witness gave the P440,000, were obviously false. His insistent claim before the bar of the Senate that if he should reveal the name he would incriminate himself, necessarily implied that he knew the name. Moreover, it is unbelievable that he gave P440,000 to a person to him unknown. Testimony which is obviously false or evasive is equivalent to a refusal to testify and is punishable as contempt, assuming that a refusal to testify would be so punishable. Since according to the witness himself the transaction was legal, and that he gave the P440,000 to a representative of Burt in compliance with the latters verbal instruction, Court found no basis upon which to sustain his claim that to reveal the name of that person might incriminate him. Case Digest: Dante O. Casibang vs. Honorable Narciso A. Aquino 20 August 1979 FACTS: Yu was proclaimed on November 1971 as the elected mayor of Rosales, Pangasinan. Casibang, his only rival, filed a protest against election on the grounds of rampant vote buying, anomalies and irregularities and others. During the proceedings of this case, the 1973 Constitution came into effect. Respondent Yu moved to dismiss the election protest of the petitioner on the

ground that the trial court had lost jurisdiction over the same in view of the effectivity of the new Constitution and the new parliamentary form of government. ISSUES: 1. Whether Section 9, Article XVII of the 1973 Constitution rendered the protest moot and academic; and 2. Whether Section 2, Article XI thereof entrusted to the National Assembly the revamp of the entire local government structure. RULING: 1. As stated in Santos vs. Castaneda, the constitutional grant of privilege to continue in office, made by the new Constitution for the benefit of persons who were incumbent officials or employees of the Government when the new Constitution took effect, cannot be fairly construed as indiscriminately encompassing every person who at the time happened to be performing the duties of an elective office, albeit under protest or contest" and that "subject to the constraints specifically mentioned in Section 9, Article XVII of the Transitory Provisions, it neither was, nor could have been the intention of the framers of our new fundamental law to disregard and shunt aside the statutory right of a candidate for elective position who, within the time-frame prescribed in the Election Code of 1971, commenced proceedings beamed mainly at the proper determination in a judicial forum of a proclaimed candidate-elect's right to the contested office. 2. Section 2 of Article XI does not stigmatize the issue in that electoral protest case with a political color. For simply, that section allocated unto the National Assembly the power to enact a local government code "which may not thereafter be amended except by a majority of all its Members, defining a more responsive and accountable local government allocating among the different local government units their powers, responsibilities, and resources, and providing for their qualifications, election and removal, term, salaries, powers, functions and duties of local officials, and all other matters relating to the organization and operation of the local units" but "... any change in the existing form of local government shall not take effect until ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose."

[G.R. No. 134577 November 18, 1998]

SANTIAGOvs. GUINGONA FACTS: The majority leader informed the body that they had elected Senator Guingona as the minority leader. By virtue thereof, the Senate President formally recognized Senator Guingona asthe minority leader of the Senate. The following day, Senators Santiago and Tatad filed beforethis Court the subject petition for quo warranto, alleging in the main that Senator Guingona hadbeen usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the position of Senate minority leader, a positionthat, according to them, rightfully belonged to Senator Tatad. From the parties' pleadings, the Court formulated the following issues for resolution: 1. Does the Court have jurisdiction over the petition? 2. Was there an actual violation of the Constitution? 3. Was Respondent Guingona usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the position of Senate minority leader? 4. Did Respondent Fernan act with grave abuse of discretion in recognizing Respondent Guingona as the minority leader? RULING: The principle of separation of powers ordains that each of the three great branches of government has exclusive cognizance of and is supreme in matters falling within its ownconstitutionally allocated sphere. Constitutional respect and a becoming regard for she sovereignacts, of a coequal branch prevents this Court from prying into the internal workings of the Senate.Where no provision of the Constitution or the laws or even the Rules of the Senate is clearlyshown to have been violated, disregarded or overlooked, grave abuse of discretion cannot beimputed to Senate officials for acts done within their competence and authority. This Court will beneither a tyrant nor a wimp; rather, it will remain steadfast and judicious in upholding the rule andmajesty of the law. After a close perusal of the pleadings10 and a careful deliberation on the arguments,pro andcon,the Court finds that no constitutional or legal infirmity or grave abuse of discretion attended therecognition of and the assumption into office by Respondent Guingona as the Senate minority leader. First Issue: The Court's Jurisdiction In Taada v. Cueno,18 this Court endeavored to define political question. And we said that "itrefers to 'those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in theirsovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to thelegislative or executive branch of the government.' It is concerned with issues dependent uponthewisd o m, not [the] legality, of a particular measure."19

In the instant controversy, the petitioners one of whom is Senator Santiago, a well-knownconstitutionalist try to hew closely to these jurisprudential parameters. They claim that Section16 (1), Article VI of the constitution, has not been observed in the selection of the Senate minorityleader. They also invoke the Court's "expanded" judicial power "to determine whether or not therehas been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction" on the part ofrespondents. In light of the aforesaid allegations of petitioners, it is clear that this Court has jurisdiction over thepetition. It is well within the power and jurisdiction of the Court to inquire whether indeed theSenate or its officials committed a violation of the Constitution or gravely abused their discretionin the exercise of their functions and prerogatives. Second Issue: Violation of the Constitution Petitioners contend that the constitutional provision requiring the election of the Senate President"by majority vote of all members" carries with it a judicial duty to determine the concepts of"majority" and "minority," as well as who may elect a minority leader. They argue that "majority" inthe aforequoted constitutional provision refers to that group of senators who (1) voted for thewinning Senate President and (2) accepted committee chairmanships. Accordingly, those whovoted for the losing nominee and accepted no such chairmanships comprise the minority, towhom the right to determine the minority leader belongs. As a result, petitioners assert,Respondent Guingona cannot be the legitimate minority leader, since he voted for RespondentFernan as Senate President. Furthermore, the members of the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP cannotchoose the minority leader, because they did not belong to the minority, having voted for Fernanand accepted committee chairmanships. We believe, however, that the interpretation proposed by petitioners finds no clear support from the Constitution, the laws, the Rules of the Senate or even from practices of the Upper House. The term "majority" has been judicially defined a number of times. When referring to a certainnumber out of a total or aggregate, it simply "means the number greater than half or more thanhalf of any total."36 The plain and unambiguous words of the subject constitutional clause simplymean that the Senate President must obtain the votes of more than one half ofall the senators.Not by any construal does it thereby delineatewho comprise the "majority," much less the"minority," in the said body. And there is no showing that the framers of our Constitution had inmind other than the usual meanings of these terms. In effect, while the Constitution mandates that the President of the Senate must be elected by anumber constituting more than one half of all the members thereof, it does not provide that themembers who will not vote for him shall ipso facto constitute the "minority," who could therebyelect the

minority leader. Verily, no law or regulation states that the defeated candidate shallautomatically become the minority leader. While the Constitution is explicit on the manner of electing a Senate President and a HouseSpeaker, it is, however, dead silent on the manner of selecting the other officers in bothchambers of Congress. All that the Charter says is that "[e]ach House shall choose such otherofficers as it may deem necessary."43 To our mind, theme th od of choosing who will be suchother officers is merely a derivative of the exercise of the prerogative conferred by theaforequoted constitutional provision. Therefore, such method must be prescribed by the Senateitself, not by this Court. In this regard, the Constitution vests in each house of Congress the power "to determine the rulesof its proceedings."44 Pursuant thereto, the Senate formulated and adopted a set of rules togovern its internal affairs. Needless to state, legislative rules, unlike statutory laws, do not have the imprints of permanenceand obligatoriness during their effectivity. In fact, they "are subject to revocation, modification orwaiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them."48 Being merely matters of procedure, theirobservance are of no concern to the courts, for said rules may be waived or disregarded by thelegislative body49 at will, upon the concurrence of a majority. In view of the foregoing, Congress verily has the power and prerogative to provide for suchofficers as it may deem. And it is certainly within its own jurisdiction and discretion to prescribethe parameters for the exercise of this prerogative. This Court has no authority to interfere andunilaterally intrude into that exclusive realm, without running afoul of constitutional principles thatit is bound to protect and uphold the very duty that justifies the Court's being. Constitutionalrespect and a becoming regard for the sovereign acts of a coequal branch prevents this Courtfrom prying into the internal workings of the Senate. To accede, then, to the interpretation of petitioners would practically amount to judicial legislation,a clear breach of the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers. If for this argument alone,the petition would easily fail. While no provision of the Constitution or the laws or the rules and even the practice of the Senatewas violated, and while the judiciary is without power to decide matters over which fulldiscretionary authority has been lodged in the legislative department, this Court may still inquirewhether an act of Congress or its officials has been made with grave abuse of discretion.50 Thisis the plain implication of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, which expressly confers uponthe judiciary the power and the duty not only "to settle actual controversies involving rights whichare legally demandable and enforceable," but likewise "to determine whether or not there hasbeen a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of anybranch or instrumentality of the Government." Explaining the above-quoted clause, former Chief Justice Concepcion, who was a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, said in part: . . . the powers of government are generally considered divided into three branches: theLegislative, the Executive and the Judiciary. Each one is

supreme within its own sphere andindependent of the others. Because of that supremacy[, the] power to determine whether agiven law is valid or not is vested in courts of justice. Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of power of the agencies and offices of thegovernment as well as those of its officers. In other words, the judiciary is the final arbiter onthe question whether or not a branch of government or any of its officials has acted withoutjurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse ofdiscretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction or lack of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicialpower but a duty to pass judgment on matters of this nature. This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which means that the courts cannothereafter evade the duty to settle matters of this nature, by claiming that such mattersconstitute a political question. With this paradigm, we now examine the two other issues challenging the actions, first, of Respondent Guingona and, second, of Respondent Fernan. Third Issue: Usurpation of Office As discussed earlier, the specific norms or standards that may be used in determining who maylawfully occupy the disputed position has not been laid down by the Constitution, the statutes, orthe Senate itself in which the power has been vested. Absent any clear-cut guideline, in no waycan it be said that illegality or irregularity tainted Respondent Guingona's assumption andexercise of the powers of the office of Senate minority leader. Furthermore, no grave abuse ofdiscretion has been shown to characterize any of his specific acts as minority leader. Fourth Issue: Fernan's Recognition of Guingona The all-embracing and plenary power and duty of the Court "to determine whether or not therehas been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part ofany branch or instrumentality of the Government" is restricted only by the definition and confinesof the term "grave abuse of discretion." By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, orto act at all in contemplation of law as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary anddespotic manner by reason of passion and hostility. By the above standard, we hold that Respondent Fernan did not gravely abuse his discretion asSenate President in recognizing Respondent Guingona as the minority leader. Let us recall thatthe latter belongs to one of the minority parties in the Senate, the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP. Byunanimous resolution of the members of this party that he be the minority leader, he wasrecognized as such by the Senate President. Such formal recognition by Respondent Fernancame only after at least two Senate sessions and a

caucus, wherein both sides were liberallyallowed to articulate their standpoints. Under these circumstances, we believe that the Senate President cannot be accused of"capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment" or of "an arbitrary and despotic manner by reasonof passion or hostility." Where no provision of the Constitution, the laws or even the rules of theSenate has been clearly shown to have been violated, disregarded or overlooked, grave abuse ofdiscretion cannot be imputed to Senate officials for acts done within their competence and authority. \ RA 9136, otherwise known ast h e E l e c t r i c P o w e r I n d u s t r y Reform Act of 2001 (EPIRA),w h i c h s o u g h t t o i m p o s e a universal charge on all endusersof electricity for the purpose of funding NAPOCORs projects,was enacted and took effect in2001.P e t i t i o n e r s c o n t e s t t h e constitutionality of the EPIRA,stating that the imposition of theuniversal charge on all endusersis oppressive and confiscatoryand amounts to taxation withoutrepresentation for not giving theconsumers a chance to be heardand be represented. Issues: W / N t h e u n i v e r s a l c h a r g e i s a tax Ruling: NO. The assailed universalc h a r g e i s n o t a t a x , b u t a n exaction in the exercise of theStates police power. That publicw e l f a r e i s p r o m o t e d m a y b e g l e a n e d f r o m S e c . 2 o f t h e EPIRA, which enumerates the policies of the State regardinge l e c t r i f i c a t i o n . M o r e o v e r , t h e Special Trust Fund feature of theu n i v e r s a l c h a r g e r e a s o n a b l y serves and assures the attainmentand perpetuity of the purposesfor which the universal charge isi m p o s e d ( e . g . t o e n s u r e t h e viability of the countrys electric power industry), further boostingthe position that the same is anexaction primarily in pursuit of the States police objectives Doctrine: If generation of revenue is the primary purpose and regulation ismerely incidental, the impositionis a tax; but if regulation is the p r i m a r y p u r p o s e , t h e f a c t t h a t r e v e n u e i s i n c i d e n t a l l y r a i s e d does not make the imposition atax.The taxing power may be used asan implement of police power.The theory behind the exercise of the power to tax emanates fromn e c e s s i t y ; w i t h o u t t a x e s , g o v e r n m e n t c a n n o t f u l f i l l i t s m a n d a t e o f p r o m o t i n g t h e general welfare and well-being of the people

Case Digest: Emmanuel Pelaez vs. The Auditor General FACTS:

From September 4, 1964 to October 29, 1964 the President of the Philippines issued executive orders to create thirty-three municipalities pursuant to Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code. Public funds thereby stood to be disbursed in the implementation of said executive orders. Suing as a private citizen and taxpayer, Vice President Emmanuel Pelaez filed a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction against the Auditor General. It seeks to restrain from the respondent or any person acting in his behalf, from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of the executive orders aforementioned. ISSUE: Whether the executive orders are null and void, upon the ground that the President does not have the authority to create municipalities as this power has been vested in the legislative department. RULING: Section 10(1) of Article VII of the fundamental law ordains: The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus or offices, exercise general supervision over all local governments as may be provided by law, and take care that the laws be faithfully executed. The power of control under this provision implies the right of the President to interfere in the exercise of such discretion as may be vested by law in the officers of the executive departments, bureaus, or offices of the national government, as well as to act in lieu of such officers. This power is denied by the Constitution to the Executive, insofar as local governments are concerned. Such control does not include the authority to either abolish an executive department or bureau, or to create a new one. Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not merely fail to comply with the constitutional mandate above quoted, it also gives the President more power than what was vested in him by the Constitution. The Executive Orders in question are hereby declared null and void ab initio and the respondent permanently restrained from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of said Executive Orders or any disbursement by the municipalities referred to. Title: United States v. Ang Tang HoGR 17122 February 27, 1922Johns, J Facts: At its special session of 1919, the Philippine Legislature passed ActNo. 2868, entitled "An Act penalizing the monopoly and holding of, andspeculation in, palay, rice, and corn under extraordinary circumstances,regulating the distribution and sale thereof, and authorizing the Governor-General, with the consent of the Council of State, to issue the necessaryrules and regulations therefor, and making an appropriation for thispurpose," the material provisions of which are as follows:Section 1. The Governor-General is hereby

authorized, whenever, for anycause, conditions arise resulting in an extraordinary rise in the price ofpalay, rice or corn, to issue and promulgate, with the consent of the Councilof State, temporary rules and emergency measures for carrying out the purposeof this ActAng Tang Ho was charge, was tried, and then found guilty in violation of suchact. Ang Tang Ho appealed to this court questioning the validity of the saidAct.Issue: Whether or not the Governor-General can fix the price of rice and makeit a crime to sell it at a higher price.Held: No, the Governor-General cannot fix the price nor make it a crime tosell it in a higher price.By the organic law of the Philippine Islands and the Constitution of theUnited States all powers are vested in the Legislative, Executive andJudiciary. It is the duty of the Legislature to make the law; of theExecutive to execute the law; and of the Judiciary to construe the law. TheLegislature has no authority to execute or construe the law, the Executivehas no authority to make or construe the law, and the Judiciary has no powerto make or execute the law. Subject to the Constitution only, the power ofeach branch is supreme within its own jurisdiction, and it is for theJudiciary only to say when any Act of the Legislature is or is notconstitutional. Assuming, without deciding, that the Legislature itself hasthe power to fix the price at which rice is to be sold, can it delegate thatpower to another, and, if so, was that power legally delegated by Act No.2868? In other words, does the Act delegate legislative power to theGovernor-General? By the Organic Law, all Legislative power is vested in theLegislature, and the power conferred upon the Legislature to make laws cannotbe delegated to the Governor-General, or anyone else. The Legislature cannotdelegate the legislative power to enact any law. If Act no 2868 is a law untoitself and within itself, and it does nothing more than to authorize theGovernor-General to make rules and regulations to carry the law into effect,then the Legislature itself created the law. There is no delegation of powerand it is valid. On the other hand, if the Act within itself does not definecrime, and is not a law, and some legislative act remains to be done to makeit a law or a crime, the doing of which is vested in the Governor-General,then the Act is a delegation of legislative power, is unconstitutional andvoid. Ynot vs. IAC FACTS: Petitioners 6 carabaos were confiscated by the police for having been transported from Masbate to Iloilo in violation of EO 626-A. He brought an action for replevin, challenging the constitutionality of said EO. The trial court sustained the confiscation of the animals and declined to rule on the validity of the law on the ground that it lacked authority to do so. Its decision was affirmed by the IAC. Hence this petition for review. ISSUE:

Whether or not the confiscation of the carabaos amounted to arbitrary confiscation of property without due process of law

RULING:

Minimum Requirements of Due Process: Notice and Hearing The minimum requirements of due process are notice and hearing which, generally speaking, may not be dispensed with because they are intended as a safeguard against official arbitrariness. It is a gratifying commentary on our judicial system that the jurisprudence of this country is rich with applications of this guaranty as proof of our fealty to the rule of law and the ancient rudiments of fair play. We have consistently declared that every person, faced by the awesome power of the State, is entitled to "the law of the land," which Daniel Webster described almost two hundred years ago inthe famous Dartmouth College Case, as "the law which hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial." It has to be so if the rights of every person are to be secured beyond the reach of officials who, out of mistaken zeal or plain arrogance, would degrade the due process clause into a worn and empty catchword. Exceptions to Notice and Hearing This is not to say that notice and hearing are imperative in every case for, to be sure, there are a number of admitted exceptions. The conclusive presumption, for example, bars the admission of contrary evidence as long as such presumption is based on human experience or there is a rational connection between the fact proved and the fact ultimately presumed therefrom. There are instances when the need for expeditions action will justify omission of these requisites, as in the summary abatement of a nuisance per se, like a mad dog on the loose, which may be killed on sight because of the immediate danger it poses to the safety and lives of the people. Pornographic materials, contaminated meat and narcotic drugs are inherently pernicious and may be summarily destroyed. The passport of a person sought for a criminal offense may be cancelled without hearing, to compel his return to the country he has fled. Filthy restaurants may be summarily padlocked in the interest of the public health and bawdy houses to protect the public morals. In such instances, previous judicial hearing may be omitted without violation of due process in view of the nature of the property involved or the urgency of the need to protect the general welfare from a clear and present danger. Due Process is a Restraint on Police Power The protection of the general welfare is the particular function of the police power which both restraints and is restrained by due process. The police power is simply defined as the power inherent in the State to regulate liberty and property for the promotion of the general welfare. By reason of its function, it extends to all the great public needs and is described as the most pervasive, the least limitable and the most demanding of the three inherent powers of the State, far outpacing taxation and eminent domain. The individual, as a member of society, is hemmed in by the police power, which affects him even before he is born and follows him still after he is dead from the womb to beyond the tomb in practically everything he does or owns. Its

reach is virtually limitless. It is a ubiquitous and often unwelcome intrusion. Even so, as long as the activity or the property has some relevance to the public welfare, its regulation under the police power is not only proper but necessary. And the justification is found in the venerable Latin maxims, Salus populi est suprema lex and Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, which call for the subordination of individual interests to the benefit of the greater number. First Requisite of Substantive Due Process: Interests of the Public Generally Require Interference xxx we hold with the Toribio Case that the carabao, as the poor man's tractor, so to speak, has a direct relevance to the public welfare and so is a lawful subject of Executive Order No. 626. The method chosen in the basic measure is also reasonably necessary for the purpose sought to be achieved and not unduly oppressive upon individuals, again following the above-cited doctrine. There is no doubt that by banning the slaughter of these animals except where they are at least seven years old if male and eleven years old if female upon issuance of the necessary permit, the executive order will be conserving those still fit for farm work or breeding and preventing their improvident depletion. Second Requisite of Substantive Due Process: Reasonable Means Necessary for the Accomplishment of Purpose, not Unduly Oppressive Upon Individuals But while conceding that the amendatory measure has the same lawful subject as the original executive order, we cannot say with equal certainty that it complies with the second requirement, viz., that there be a lawful method. We note that to strengthen the original measure, Executive Order No. 626-A imposes an absolute ban not on the slaughter of the carabaos but on their movement, providing that "no carabao regardless of age, sex, physical condition or purpose (sic) and no carabeef shall be transported from one province to another." The object of the prohibition escapes us. The reasonable connection between the means employed and the purpose sought to be achieved by the questioned measure is missing We do not see how the prohibition of the inter-provincial transport of carabaos can prevent their indiscriminate slaughter, considering that they can be killed anywhere, with no less difficulty in one province than in another. Obviously, retaining the carabaos in one province will not prevent their slaughter there, any more than moving them to another province will make it easier to kill them there. As for the carabeef, the prohibition is made to apply to it as otherwise, so says executive order, it could be easily circumvented by simply killing the animal. Perhaps so. However, if the movement of the live animals for the purpose of preventing their slaughter cannot be prohibited, it should follow that there is no reason either to prohibit their transfer as, not to be flippant dead meat. Even if a reasonable relation between the means and the end were to be assumed, we would still have to reckon with the sanction that the measure applies for violation of the prohibition. The penalty is outright confiscation of

the carabao or carabeef being transported, to be meted out by the executive authorities, usually the police only. In the Toribio Case, the statute was sustained because the penalty prescribed was fine and imprisonment, to be imposed by the court after trial and conviction of the accused. Under the challenged measure, significantly, no such trial is prescribed, and the property being transported is immediately impounded by the police and declared, by the measure itself, as forfeited tothe government. EO 626-A is unconstitutional In the instant case, the carabaos were arbitrarily confiscated by the police station commander, were returned to the petitioner only after he had filed a complaint for recovery and given a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00, which was ordered confiscated upon his failure to produce the carabaos when ordered by the trial court. The executive order defined the prohibition, convicted the petitioner and immediately imposed punishment, which was carried out forthright. The measure struck at once and pounced upon the petitioner without giving him a chance to be heard, thus denying him the centuries-old guaranty of elementary fair play. It has already been remarked that there are occasions when notice and hearing may be validly dispensed with notwithstanding the usual requirement for these minimum guarantees of due process. It is also conceded that summary action may be validly taken in administrative proceedings as procedural due process is not necessarily judicial only. In the exceptional cases accepted, however, there is a justification for the omission of the right to a previous hearing, to wit, the immediacy of the problem sought to be corrected and the urgency of the need to correct it. In the case before us, there was no such pressure of time or action calling for the petitioner's peremptory treatment. The properties involved were not even inimical per se as to require their instant destruction. There certainly was no reason why the offense prohibited by the executive order should not have been proved first in a court of justice, with the accused being accorded all the rights safeguarded to him under the Constitution. Considering that, as we held in Pesigan v. Angeles, Executive Order No. 626-A is penal in nature, the violation thereof should have been pronounced not by the police only but by a court of justice, which alone would have had the authority to impose the prescribed penalty, and only after trial and conviction of the accused. We also mark, on top of all this, the questionable manner of the disposition of the confiscated property as prescribed in the questioned executive order. It is there authorized that the seized property shall "be distributed to charitable institutions and other similar institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat Inspection Commission may see fit, in the case of carabeef, and to deserving farmers through dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of carabaos." (Emphasis supplied.) The phrase "may see fit" is an extremely generous and dangerous condition, if condition it is. It is laden with perilous opportunities for partiality and abuse, and even corruption. One searches in vain for the usual standard and the reasonable guidelines, or better still, the limitations that the said officers must observe when they make

their distribution. There is none. Their options are apparently boundless. Who shall be the fortunate beneficiaries of their generosity and by what criteria shall they be chosen? Only the officers named can supply the answer, they and they alone may choose the grantee as they see fit, and in their own exclusive discretion. Definitely, there is here a "roving commission," a wide and sweeping authority that is not "canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing," in short, a clearly profligate and therefore invalid delegation of legislative powers. To sum up then, we find that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process is violated because the owner of the property confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and is immediately condemned and punished. The conferment on the administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions and militates against the doctrine of separation of powers. There is, finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers mentioned therein who are granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken. For these reasons, we hereby declare Executive Order No. 626-A unconstitutional.