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Please Read sources prior to the tutorial and address the following questions in the
tutorial
The immediate cause of the Challenger disaster was the decision by the launch
committer to launch, even though low air temperature had the potential to impair vital
function of the o-rings.
Do you think the decision to launch was incorrect given knowledge at the time?
Were all the participants free to provide their opinion? If not, what forces limited free
participation?
How important were the operational drivers relative the engineering and safety
drivers?
How did the previous decision making history provide a bias in decision making?
Suggest specific meeting guidelines that could have ensured more open review
of safety concerns.
Have you been in groups where groupthink unspoken rules or practices have limited
your ability to contribute? What were these rules?
Have you been in groups where you felt free to participate and present your point of
view? What aspects of the group gave you this freedom?
How do you think you as a manager could enhance good group based decision
making?
Source 1. Report of the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident
(Rogers Report)
http://science.ksc.nasa.gov/shuttle/missions/51-l/docs/rogers-
commission/table-of-contents.html
The black color and dense composition of the smoke puffs suggest
that the grease, joint insulation and rubber O-rings in the joint seal
were being burned and eroded by the hot propellant gases.
Both the Shuttle main engines and the solid rockets operated at
reduced thrust approaching and passing through the area of maximum
dynamic pressure of 720 pounds per square foot. Main engines had been
throttled up to 104 percent thrust and the Solid Rocket Boosters were
increasing their thrust when the first flickering flame appeared on
the right Solid Rocket Booster in the area of the aft field joint.
This first very small flame was detected on image enhanced film at
58.788 seconds into the flight. It appeared to originate at about 305
degrees around the booster circumference at or near the aft field
joint.
One film frame later from the same camera, the flame was visible
without image enhancement. It grew into a continuous, well-defined
plume at 59.262 seconds. At about the same time (60 seconds),
telemetry showed a pressure differential between the chamber pressures
in the right and left boosters. The right booster chamber pressure
was lower, confirming the growing leak in the area of the field joint.
The first visual indication that swirling flame from the right
Solid Rocket Booster breached the External Tank was at 64.660 seconds
when there was an abrupt change in the shape and color of the plume.
This indicated that it was mixing with leaking hydrogen from the
External Tank. Telemetered changes in the hydrogen tank
pressurization confirmed the leak. Within 45 milliseconds of the
breach of the External Tank, a bright sustained glow developed on the
black-tiled underside of the Challenger between it and the External
Tank.
At about 72.20 seconds the lower strut linking the Solid Rocket
Booster and the External Tank was severed or pulled away from the
weakened hydrogen tank permitting the right Solid Rocket Booster to
rotate around the upper attachment strut. This rotation is indicated
by divergent yaw and pitch rates between the left and right Solid
Rocket Boosters.
FINDINGS
2. The evidence shows that no other STS 51-L Shuttle element or the
payload contributed to the causes of the right Solid Rocket Motor aft
field joint combustion gas leak. Sabotage was not a factor.
5. Launch site records show that the right Solid Rocket Motor segments
were assembled using approved procedures. However, significant
out-of-round conditions existed between the two segments joined at the
right Solid Rocket Motor aft field joint (the joint that failed).
b. The diameters of the two Solid Rocket Motor segments had grown
as a result of prior use.
e. The lack of roundness of the segments was such that the smallest
tang-to-clevis clearance occurred at the initiation of the assembly
operation at positions of 120 degrees and 300 degrees around the
circumference of the aft field joint. It is uncertain if this tight
condition and the resultant greater compression of the O-rings at
these points persisted to the time of launch.
b. The External Tank and right Solid Rocket Booster are connected
by several struts, including one at 310 degrees near the aft field
joint that failed. This strut's effect on the joint dynamics is to
enhance the opening of the gap between the tang and clevis by about
10-20 percent in the region of 300-320 degrees.
13. There is a possibility that there was water in the clevis of the
STS 51-L joints since water was found in the STS-9 joints during a
destack operation after exposure to less rainfall than STS 51-L. At
time of launch, it was cold enough that water present in the joint
would freeze. Tests show that ice in the joint can inhibit proper
secondary seal performance.
14. A series of puffs of smoke were observed emanating from the 51-L
aft field joint area of the right Solid Rocket Booster between 0.678
and 2.500 seconds after ignition of the Shuttle Solid Rocket Motors.
15. This smoke from the aft field joint at Shuttle lift off was the
first sign of the failure of the Solid Rocket Booster O-ring seals on
STS 51-L.
a. A small leak could have been present that may have grown to
breach the joint in flame at a time on the order of 58 to 60 seconds
after lift off.
CONCLUSION
EARLY DESIGN
Morton Thiokol, Inc., the contractor, did not accept the implication
of tests early in the program that the design had a serious and
unanticipated flaw. NASA did not accept the judgment of its engineers
that the design was unacceptable, and as the joint problems grew in
number and severity NASA minimized them in management briefings and
reports. Thiokol's stated position was that "the condition is not
desirable but is acceptable."
Neither Thiokol nor NASA expected the rubber O-rings sealing the
joints to be touched by hot gases of motor ignition, much less to be
partially burned. However, as tests and then flights confirmed damage
to the sealing rings, the reaction by both NASA and Thiokol was to
increase the amount of damage considered "acceptable." At no time did
management either recommend a redesign of the joint or call for the
Shuttle's grounding until the problem was solved.
FINDINGS
The Commission has concluded that neither Thiokol nor NASA responded
adequately to internal warnings about the faulty seal design.
Furthermore, Thiokol and NASA did not make a timely attempt to develop
and verify a new seal after the initial design was shown to be
deficient. Neither organization developed a solution to the
unexpected occurrences of O-ring erosion and blow-by even though this
problem was experienced frequently during the Shuttle flight history.
Instead, Thiokol and NASA management came to accept erosion and
blow-by as unavoidable and an acceptable flight risk. Specifically,
the Commission has found that:
"a kind of Russian roulette. ... (The Shuttle) flies (with O-ring
erosion) and nothing happens. Then it is suggested, therefore, that
the risk is no longer so high for the next flights. We can lower our
standards a little bit because we got away with it last time. ... You
got away with it, but it shouldn't be done over and over again like
that."
Forrest, J., "The Space Shuttle Challenger Disaster: A failure in decision support system and
human factors management", originally prepared November 26, 1996, published October 7, 2005
at URL DSSResources.COM.
INTRODUCTION
This article discusses the environmental and human decision making factors that were associated
with the launching of the Space Shuttle Challenger on January 28, 1986. Shortly after launch, the
Shuttle exploded destroying the vehicle and all crew members. The cause and contributing
factors that lead to the Challenger tragedy are explored in detail. Focus is placed on NASA's use
of a group decision support system (GDSS) meeting to make the decision to launch.
Examples are included that show how contributing factors such as multiple priorities and
demands influenced NASA from operating in a responsible and ethical manner. Proof that NASA
used a flawed database in its GDSS and how it mismanaged the GDSS meeting is also offered.
Finally, the inability of each GDSS member to vote anonymously on the decision to launch is
discussed as a critical factor that, had it been allowed, probably would have prevented the
Challenger tragedy.
The Space Shuttle Challenger 51-L was the 25th mission in NASA's STS program. On Jan. 28,
1986, STS 51-L exploded shortly after liftoff, destroying the vehicle and all of its seven crew
members.
The STS 51-L mission was to deploy the second Tracking and Data Relay Satellite and the
Spartan Halley's Comet observer. Paramount to this mission was crew member S. Christa
McAuliffe - the first Space Shuttle passenger/observer participating in the NASA Teacher in
Space Program (cf. [1]). Ms. McAuliffe would have conducted live educational broadcasts from
the Shuttle and transmitted them to classrooms throughout the world.
The loss of life and the unique position that symbolized Christa McAuliffe as the first civilian
working as a teacher in space had a profound impact on society and its attitude toward NASA
and the U.S. Space programs.
As this article will explore, the tragic decision to launch STS 51-L was based on long term
contributing factors and the use of a flawed group decision support system that was further
aggravated by its related mismanagement. The outcome of this action created costs to society in
terms of life, resources and public mistrust. NASA subsequently experienced years of setback for
its related scientific research and operations.
BACKGROUND
Although the destruction of the Shuttle Challenger was caused by the hardware failure of a solid
rocket booster (SRB) "O" ring, the human decision to launch was, in itself, flawed. The
resolution to launch was based upon faulty group decision support information and further
aggravated by the related mismanagement of that information. However, as in most
transportation accidents, there are usually other contributing factors that help to create an
environment leading to mistakes and failures. Therefore, a brief review of the contributing
factors leading to the Challenger destruction is in order.
The process of "selling" the American public and its political system the need for a reusable
space transportation system began in the late 1960's. Conceptually, the Space Shuttle was
introduced during the crest of the successful Apollo mission. Unlike the Apollo mission, the
Space Shuttle was approved as a method for operating in space, without a firm definition of what
its operational goals would be ([2] pg. 3). Here is the first contributing factor. The Shuttle was
developed as a utility without a firm application. Therefore, support for such a project, both
politically and economically, was not very strong. To gain political support it was sold as a
project with a "quick payoff" (cf., [2]). Additional support was gained by offering the Shuttle
program to the military as a means to increase national security and to industry as a tool to open
new commercial opportunity. Scientists argued to the American people that the Shuttle would be
an "American Voyage" ([2] pg. 10) with great scientific gain. Globally, the Shuttle was sold as a
partnership with the European Space Agency (ESA) and as a means to improve national and
social relations by combining peoples of different nationalities, races and sexes who would serve
as crew members.
The process used to develop economic, political and social support for the shuttle introduced the
second contributing factor called heterogeneous engineering. That is, the Shuttle engineering and
management decisions were made to meet the needs of organizational, political, and economic
factors as opposed to a single entity mission profile with specific goals ([2] pg. 9). Once
functional, the Shuttle became exposed to operational demands from a multitude of users. The
Shuttle now had to live up to NASA's promises. Coordinating the needs of political, commercial,
military, international and scientific communities placed immense pressures on the Shuttle
management team. First, political pressure to provide a reliable, reusable space vehicle with
rapid turn around time and deployment seriously hindered the ability for effective systems
integration and development. Secondly, it was not feasible to construct any complete
management support systems (MSS) that could consider all of the factors associated with such a
diverse group of environmental variables. Third, additional uncertainty and low NASA employee
moral was created when the Reagan Administration pushed for the Shuttle to be declared
"operational" before the "developmental" stage had been completed [2].
After spending billions of dollars to go to the moon, Congress expected the Shuttle program to
be financially self-supportive ([2] pg. 15). This forced NASA to operate as a pseudo commercial
business. Therefore, the environment within NASA preceding the Challenger launch was one of
conflict, stress, and short cuts [2].
NASA
The probability for disaster was growing higher as increasing demands were being placed on
NASA just prior to the Challenger launch [2]. A false sense of security was felt by NASA
officials, with twenty-four successful Shuttle missions to their credit. Just prior to the STS 51-L
launch, NASA was an organization filled with internal strife and territorial battles([3], pg. 412).
Mangers operated in an environment of "overload and turbulence" [3]. In short, NASA was
characterized as having a "disease " ([3] pg.414) of decay and destruction.
As incredible as it may seem, it would appear that NASA had no formal DSS program initialized
for the Shuttle operations before the Challenger launch. Evidence is strong that decisions were
made primarily by "satisficing" and conscious "muddling through." Specific characteristics of
decision making at the time consisted of short cuts, compromise and operational heuristics
("operational heuristics; to cannibalize existing parts" as defined by Jarman and Kouzmin [3] pg.
414). In short, NASA was operating in a phase of semi-uncontrolled decision making while
trying to serve the military, industry and international research organizations with a space vehicle
that had been declared operational before completion of the developmental stage [4].
NASA used decision making by default as its primary DSS. Its organizational boundary was
highly political and open for manipulation by any entity that could exert political power. Upon
declaring the Shuttle "operational," the Reagan Administration removed the motivation of NASA
employees to manage and left them with the impression that decision making would be made by
directive from political sources.
The declaration of "operational" status was the critical turning point for NASA and its
management of Shuttle operations. Complacency began to grow among employees and safety
considerations were traded for time spent on keeping the Shuttle on schedule and "the client of
the day" satisfied. This was the environment just before the launch of STS 51-L.
On the evening of January 27, 1986, Thiokol was providing information to NASA regarding
concerns for the next day's planned launch of STS 51-l. Thiokol engineers were very concerned
that the abnormally cold temperatures would affect the "O" rings to nonperformance standards.
The mission had already been canceled due to weather, and, as far as NASA was concerned,
another cancellation due to weather was unthinkable ([4] pg. 23). Both parties were already
aware that the seals on the SRB needed upgrading but did not feel that it was critical. Though the
information provided by the GDSS (with an associated expert system) showed that the "O" rings
would perform under the predicted temperatures, Thiokol engineers questioned their own testing
and data that were programmed into the GDSS. Thus on the eve of the Challenger launch, NASA
was being informed that their GDSS had a flawed data base.
At this point, NASA requested a definitive recommendation from Thiokol on whether to launch.
Thiokol representatives recommended not to launch until the outside air temperature reached 53
F. The forecast for Florida did not show temperatures reaching this baseline for several days.
NASA responded with pressure on Thiokol to change their decision. NASA's level III manager,
Mr. Lawrence Mulloy, responded to Thiokol's decision by asking, "My God, Thiokol, when do
you want me to launch, next April?" ([4] pg. 24).
After this comment the Thiokol representatives requested five minutes to go off-line from the
GDSS. During this period the Thiokol management requested the chief engineer to "take off his
engineering hat and put on his management cap," suggesting that organizational goals be placed
ahead of safety considerations [4]. Thiokol reentered the GDSS and recommended that NASA
launch. NASA asked if there were any other objections from any other GDSS member, and there
was not.
There is little doubt that the environment from which NASA and its affiliated developers
operated provided an opportunity for significant human error. Nevertheless, NASA and Thiokol
had a "golden" opportunity to avoid disaster during their GDSS meeting before the STS 51-L
launch. The following factors are offered as potential explanations for what created the flawed
GDSS and the associated mismanagement of its information:
First, Thiokol was aware of the "O" ring problem at least several months before the Challenger
launch. However, the goal was to stay on schedule. NASA was made aware of the problem but it
was "down-played" as a low risk situation. Here is the first element of flawed information that
was input into the GDSS. If NASA had been aware of the significance of the "O" ring situation,
they probably would have given more credence to the advice of the Thiokol engineers'
recommendations. However, the data transmitted during the GDSS meeting from Thiokol did say
that it would be safe to launch for the forecasted temperatures. NASA was frustrated over the
conflicting advice from the same source.
Second, the decision to delay a Shuttle launch had developed into an "unwanted" decision by the
members of the Shuttle team [5]. In other words, suggestions made by any group member that
would ultimately support a scheduled launch were met with positive support by the group. Any
suggestion that would lead to a delay was rejected by the group.
Third, all members of the GDSS felt that they should live up to the "norms" of the group.
Although the Thiokol engineers were firm on their recommendation to scrub the launch, they
soon changed their presentation of objections once threatened with the possibility of being
expelled from the program (as suggested by a NASA administrator who was "appalled" at a
company that would make such a recommendation based on the data available) [5].
Fourth, Thiokol became highly susceptible to "groupthink" when they requested a break from
the GDSS. At this point they became insulated, conducted private conversations under high
stress and were afraid of losing potential future revenue should they disagree with NASA. All
these factors are considered prime to the formulation of "groupthink" [5].
Fifth, all parties were afraid of public and political response to another launch cancellation (there
had already been six cancellations that year). Each party began to rationalize that past success
equaled future success [5].
Finally, the GDSS was seriously flawed. As already mentioned, the data base contained
erroneous information regarding the "O" rings. Ideas, suggestions and objections were solicited
but not anonymously. Individuals who departed from the group norms were signaled out as
unwelcome members. An agenda was never defined and NASA was therefore surprised by the
Thiokol presentation. Conflict management was avoided by NASA's domination of the entire
meeting. NASA, at times, became very assertive and intimidating. Considering NASA's attitude,
no group member or individual was willing to be held accountable for any comment or decision
[5].
The setting for such an important GDSS meeting was also ineffective. Considering that a speaker
phone and CPU modem was used, it was easy for NASA to down-play the personal opinions of
the Thiokol engineers. If the meeting could have been held at the same place for all members, the
outcome might have been different. At the end of the meeting NASA, very reluctantly, suggested
that they would still cancel the launch if Thiokol insisted. No response from Thiokol was made
and the NASA officials could not see the expression of "self-censorship" that was being
communicated on the face of each Thiokol engineer [5].
Perhaps the most significant flaw in the GDSS was when Thiokol requested a private five minute
meeting with its own members. Up to this point Thiokol had stayed with its recommendation to
cancel the launch. Once disconnected, Thiokol became an isolated member and the GDSS failed
altogether. Once reconnected, Thiokol had changed its position and offered the go ahead to
launch without any objection.
CONCLUSIONS
Many conclusions may be drawn as to the primary cause and contributing factors associated with
the Challenger tragedy. It is the opinion of this author that regarding the GDSS and decision to
launch the ability of each member to have voted anonymously was the key factor that would
have maintained the integrity of the GDSS and the quality of the decision.
It has been shown that just after Thiokol's presentation to NASA, most of the GDSS group
members were very concerned with the "O" ring situation and believed that the opinions
expressed by Thiokol engineers were cause for serious consideration of launch cancellation [5].
However, only selected senior officials were allowed to vote their "opinion", which they did
verbally and at the request of NASA. From the research conducted on this paper, the author
believes that had a universal anonymous vote been conducted of the total GDSS membership, a
decision to cancel the launch would have been made.
The factors which lead to the Challenger incident can be traced back to the inception of the
shuttle program. NASA and Thiokol failed to maintain a quality assurance program through
MSS, as was initiated on the Apollo program, due to multiple source demands and political
pressures. The GDSS used for the launch decision contained inaccurate data. Engineering
members of the GDSS did not believe in the testing procedures used to generate the data
components in the GDSS. And, the entire meeting was mismanaged.
The decision to launch the Challenger Shuttle and its subsequent destruction had a major affect
on society and the management of our space program. Challenger's unique mission and the death
of Christa McAuliffe opened the door for discussion and research on how managers use DSS to
make decisions that will affect public trust.
AFTERMATH
A complete discussion of ethical decision making is beyond the scope of this article. However,
the question of how NASA and Thiokol managed ethical considerations is central to the decision
to launch the Challenger Shuttle and, therefore, deserves a brief overview.
The first area of ethical concern is the area of information accuracy. The fact that both NASA's
and Thiokol's managers had little regard to the concerns of Thiokol's engineers is very
distressing. All members of the group made a decision knowing that the decision was based on
flawed information. A second concern is that the decision made put safety last and operational
goals first. Only one member of the GDSS expressed serious concern for the potential loss of life
[5]. Additionally, open and free communication before and during the GDSS meeting was
discouraged through such group dynamics as mind guarding, direct pressure and self-censorship
[5]. Individuals who know of a situation that, unless acted upon with integrity might cause social
harm, have a responsibility to contact any authority that will manage and control that situation in
the best interest of the public ([4] "Whistleblowing, pg. 34).
Human factors analysis and management science have begun to define the incorporation of
MSS/DSS as a socially responsive way of conducting business ([6] pg. 826). This is especially
true for government agencies and large public projects like the Shuttle program. It could be
argued that GDSS technology had not evolved to the level of effectiveness that was needed to
support the Challenger project. The success of the DSS used in the prior Apollo mission shows
that this was not the case. In the Challenger program social and ethical decision making was
discarded for the sake of cost, schedule and outside environmental demands.
REFERENCES
[2] Launius, Roger D., "Toward an Understanding of the Space Shuttle: A Historiographical
Essay". Air Power History, Winter 1992, vil. 39, no. 4.
[3] Jarman A. and Kouzmin, A., "Decision pathways from crisis. A contingency-theory
simulation heuristic for the Challenger Shuttle disaster", Contemporary Crises, December 01,
1990, vol. 14, no. 4.
[4] Kramer, Ronald C. and Jaska, James A., "The Space Shuttle Disaster: Ethical Issues in
Organizational Decision Making", Western Michigan University, April 1987, 39 pgs.
[6] Turban, Efraim, Decision Support and Expert Systems, Macmillan Publishing Company,
N.Y., N.Y. 1993.