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I INDEX L

1NC Shell ...............................................................................................................................................................................

2-3

Genuine Consull Key ...............................................................................................................................................................

4-5

Consultation Good-NATO Expansion ...................................................................................................................................... 6

NATO Expansion Good-European Security Vacuum ...............................................................................................................7
NATO Expansion Good-Russian Imperialism .......................................................................................................................... 8
Consultation Good-Leadership .................................................................................................................................................. 9
Consultation Good-NATO Cohcsion ...................................................................................................................................... 10
Consultation Good-Soft Power ............................................................................................................................................... 11
Consultation Good-NATO Transformation ............................................................................................................................ 12
NATO Transformation Good-Rcgional Security ....................................................................................................................13
Consultation Topic-Military lssucs ...................................................................................................................................14-16
Consultation Topic4ounterterrorism ................................................................................................................................... 17
Consultation Topic-Domestic lssucs .................................................................................................................................... 18
Consultation Topic-African Crises ..........................................................................................................................................19
Consultation Topic-DADT ......................................................................................................................................................20
Relations Good-Leadership .....................................................................................................................................................
21
Relations Good-Prolif .............................................................................................................................................................
22

NATO Good-Democracy Promotion ..................................................................................................................................... -23

NATO Good-Europe Relations ...............................................................................................................................................24
NATO Good-Europe Stability ...........................................................................................................................................25-26
NATO Good--G erman Aggression ........................................................................................................................................... 27
NATO Good--Greec e-Turkey War ......................................................................................................................................... 28
NATO Good-EU Counterbalancing .................... . . ............................................................................................................29
NATO Good-Laundry List ......................................................................................................................................................30
NATO Good-Leadership ................................. . ....................................................................................................................1
NATO Good-US Power Prqjection .........................................................................................................................................32
NATO Good-Terrorism ..................................................................................................................................................... 33-34
NATO Good-Russian Imperialism .......................................................................................................................................... 35
NATO Good-Russia Imperialism Kills Caspian Oil Access ...................................................................................................36
NATO G o o d - 4 entral Asia ......................................................................................................................................................37
Central Asia Impact-Nagorno .................................................................................................................................................38
Alliance Brink ......................................................................................................................................................................39-40
AT: Bickering Turn ...................................................................................................................................................................41
AT: Collanse Inevitable .............................................................................................................................................................
L
42
AT: Delay ..................................................................................................................................................................................
43
AT: EU Counterbalancing ........................................................................................................................................................ 44
AT: EU Fill-in ............................................................................................................................................................................45
AT: Lie Perm .......................................................................................................................................................................46-47
AT: NATO Doesn't Care About Our Plan.................................................................................................................................48
AT: NATO Obsolete ..................................................................................................................................................................49
AT: Say No ................................................................................................................................................................................5U
AT: Unilat Good ................................................................................................................................................................. - 51
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I I N C SHELL I
1. Text: The United States federal government should propose that the United States federal
government do the plan to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization for binding consultation. The
United States federal government should support this proposal during consultation. The United
States federal government should abide by the results of consultation. We'll clarify.

a. Consultation is key to transatlantic relations-European countries get pissed off when US

decision making is too unilateral
Sloan, 1997 (Stanley, Middlebury visiting scholar, "Steering NATO - Not a One-Country Job,"
Christian Science Monitor, July 25, Lexis)

<But the fact that the United States appeared to have abandoned the process of NATO consultations in
making its choice clear, and then said its decision was non-negotiable, troubled even our closest allies. It
strengthened the hand of those in Europe who claim that the United States is acting like a "hegemonic"
power, using its impressive position of strength to have its wav with weaker European allies. One
official of a pro-American northern European couiltry that supports the package of three told me, "We
liked the present but were troubled by the way it was wrapped."
US officials say that they wanted to keep the issue within alliance consultations but that their position
was being leaked to the press by other allies. They decided to put an end to "lobbying" for other
outcomes. Their choice to go strong and to go public may be understandable and even defensible.
However, the acknowledged leader of a coalition of democratic states probably needs to set the very best
example in the consultative process if it wants other sovereign states to follow.
Perhaps it is just hard being No. 1. US officials have noted that the United States is "damned if it does,
and damned if it does not" provide strong leadership. Perhaps the style of the NATO decision simply
reflects a Washin~tonculture in which the bright and brash more often than not move ahead in the
circles of power. But the style does not work well in an alliance of democracies.
Whatever the explanation, US-European relations would have been better served by a US approach that
allowed the outcome to emerge more naturally from the consultative, behind-the-scenes consensus-
forming process. The final result would have been the same. and the appearance of a United States diktat
to the allies would have been avoided.>
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I 1NC SHELL

b. Transatlantic cooperation is key to addressing terrorism, global trade, genocide, proliferation,

and European stability
Haass 04 (Richard, President of the Council on Foreign Relations, "The United States and Europe:
Adjusting to the Global Era," June 1,
http://www .cfr.org/publication/7069/united~states~md~europe.html)

It will not be easy to bridge these differences. Still, I am prepared to assert that it is important to try to
maintain the integrity of trans-Atlantic cooperation - less as an end in itself so much as a means to
important ends. The United States, for all of its power, very much needs partners in addressing the
regional and trans-national or global issues that constitute the principal strategic challenges of this era.
There is nothing the United States can do better on its own. In particular, there is no way the United
States by itself can successfully tackle terrorism or the spread of nuclear weapons or global climate
change or maintaining- a world trading system. Europe both as a collective and as individual states
constitutes a principal partner, one which for all its differences and limitations is still relatively
likeminded and capable.
But Europe, too, needs to work to maintain the basic trans-Atlantic bond, if for different reasons. Europe
has a stake in the success of an American-led enterprise that seeks to promote greater order, wealth, and
opportunity. Differences over strategies and tactics should not obscure the reality that the United States
and Europe still share a good deal in common. Both oppose and are prepared to act against genocide,
terrorism, and proliferation.
In addition, Europe has much to worry about. These problems will not simply go away or leave Europe
untouched. Europe may be more at peace than at any moment over the past few centuries, but Europeans
should not assume their continent will remain an island of stability and prosperity. European
construction cannot be allowed to be a11 consuming; a parochial Europe is vulnerable to unsettled
regional conflicts and to many of the challenges associated with globalization.
Translating an appreciation of this mutual need into reality, however, will not happen of its own accord.
It will require both intellectual honesty and political investment on both sides of the Atlantic.>
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i
GENUINE CONSULT KEY I
The perm doesn't solve-consultation must be genuine to solve for relations
Sherwood-Randall, 2005 (Elizabeth, Adjunct Senior Fellow For Alliance Relations, CFR And Senior
Research Scholar, Center For International Security And Cooperation, Stanford University, Februrary
18, Federal News Service "Council On Foreign Relations Briefing,)

<First of ail, I agree on the description of the content of consultations. The distinction for me is whether
you go to inform or actually consult -- (chuckles) -- and I think the pattern of the last four years has been
we inform YOU of our views, you're with us or against us. We're looking for real -- and I think the
Europeans are looking for real -- listening and engagement.
I mean, the tradition in the alliance, the alliance that worked for 50 years, was that we actually used the
fora that we had built. both formal and informal mechanisms of dialogue, to reach agreement on the
most contentious issues out of the limelight. And the whole purpose was that we would discuss and
disagree, but not have a pissinn match in public. And so the question is whether we can find some way
to get back to a process in which we actually talk. listen and work out agreed positions on highly
contentious issues.>

Only prior and genuine consultation can improve transatlantic relations

Sherwood-Randall,2005 (Elizabeth, Adjunct Senior Fellow For Alliance Relations, CFR And Senior
Research Scholar, Center For International Security And Cooperation, Stanford University, Februrary
18, Federal News Service "Council On Foreign Relations Briefing,)

<MS. SHERWOOD-RANDALL: This is the wrong group. But I would say, 1mean, if you're looking at
transatlantic relations, the important thing is with respect to an overall plan for reaching some -- for
achieving progress on the Middle East peace front, I believe we should be doing what we have
traditionally done with the Europeans, which is to no to Europe first, talk to our key allies about what
we're thinking about doing, work out an agreed process that they are a part of it, and use our collective
leverage to bring about results. So it's not about us going out first and then hoping people will come
along, it's about going through Europe first. I mean, that's the big difference in p s ~ c h o l o ~isy ,whether
you choose to strengthen transatlantic ties as you pursue broader goals, or whether you go around
Europe and expect people to either be with vou or against you and bear the consequences of being
against you, which was the first- term approach.
My view is we are much more effective, much stronger, both in terms of our policies in the world and
also the import of our relations with Europe, if we choose to go to Europe first. That needs to be a part
of any action plan, is to consult first with our European allies bilaterally and multilaterally, in capitals
and at NATO.>
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GENUINE CONSULT KEY I
Genuine consultation is key to continued NATO relevance
Bell 05 (Robert, NATO's Assistant Secretary General for Defence Investment, NATO Review,
http://www .nato.int/docu/review/2005/issue1/english/main-pr.h tm1)

<U Usoldiering on q ONATO today is, on the one hand, being saluted bv the leaders of its most
powerful member as "more active than ever", "the most successful alliance in history", and "the vital
relationship for the United States when it comes to security". It can justifiably point with pride to its
success in expanding its membership, reorganisinn its Command Structure and Headquarters
organisation, expanding its operations and its operational reach, and making progress in modernising its
inventory of capabilities to meet new threats and security challenges. O On the other hand, doubts
about the risk of failure persist. From the Secretary General on down, the organisation bemoans the
disconnect between Allies' willingness to embrace new missions and new capabilities, on the one hand,
and to pledge the manpower, equipment and resources needed to deliver on those missions and
capabilities, on the other. In both cases, critics. and not iust critics, wonder whether the requisite
political will is really there. In addition, Chancellor Schroder obviously touched upon a raw nerve in
publicly highlighting NATO's diminished importance as a venue for genuine transatlantic decision-
making on issues of transcending strategic importance. U OBut NATO will soldier on. as it always has.
As the indispensable security alliance of the transatlantic cornmunitv of nations, NATO can be counted
upon to continue to pursue its three transformation agenda - Prague, Norfolk and Munich - with good
intent and common purpose, however haltingly, however imperfectly. Much rides on the outcome.>

Genuine consultation is key to effective cooperation

Haass 04 (Richard, President of the Council on Foreign Relations, "The United States and Europe:
Adjusting to the Global Era," June 1,
http://www.cfr.org/publication/7069/united~states~and~europe. html)

Genuine consultation is a must. Consultation cannot consist of simply informing others of what has
already been decided or going through the motions and not adapting policies yet still expecting support.
Nor can consulbitions wait until a crisis is upon us; talks should be held in advance on how to deal with
the central challenges of this era. This promises to be the best and most likely only way of forging a
policy framework relevant to the challenges central to this era of international relations.
Both Europeans and Americans have reason to maintain and where possible expand their cooperation.
As has already been alluded to, this is the optimal way to deal with those regional and global c h a l l e n e
that affect both but which neither alone can manage. such challenges (and opportunities) go beyond the full gamut of transnational
issues. Let me single out two. The first is to promote political, economic, educational. and social reform throughout the Arab and Muslim worlds. It i s
essential that young lncn and women in these societies see a reason to live. This will require meaningful reform resulting in meaningful political
participation, economic opportunity. and access to an education that will provide the tools basic to this global e n . Making progress here will require the
wisdom and resources of both Europe and the United States.>
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CONSULTATION GOOD-NATO EXPANSION I

Increased US-NATO engagement is key to NATO expansion
Riecke 05 (Henning, resident fellow at the Deutsche Gesellschaft fiir Auswartige Politik in Berlin,
specialising in European and transatlantic security, NATO Review,
http://www.nato.intldocu/review/2005Iissue llenglishlmain-pr.htm1)

<Some analysts believe that the current transformation agenda represents the greatest possible degree of
consensus that can be achieved today in NATO. As a result, they fear that whatever consensus does exist
will likely disintegrate as soon as the Alliance has to confront decisions about the use or the threat of
force, humanitarian intervention or engagement in some more remote strategic region, thereby putting
NATO's existence in jeopardy once again. Alternatively, the Alliance might survive but only as a
service provider making available capabilities for coalition operations led by the United States and
possibly in the future by the European Union. U UIn draw in^ attention to the lack of strategic discussion
at NATO, Schroder is putting these very issues on the table. He may well also have launched precisely
the kind of dialogue that he believes is necessary to revive the transatlantic relationship. While his
suggestion to create a high-level panel has not been taken up, US representatives have been quick to
indicate that thev, too, are eager for such dialogue and that thev also have a purpose for NATO. "Should
not NATO's motivating purpose now be to help extend the flag of freedom, security and peace to
peoples and countries farther south and east?" former US NATO Ambassador Nicholas Bums asked in a
newspaper interview on the eve of his departure from Brussels. The question is whether this is a flag that
Europeans can follow.>
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NATO EXPANSION GOOD-EUROPEAN SECURITY VACUUM I
NATO expansion failure leaves a security vacuum in Central Europe
Andersen 98 (James, former Defense and National Security Analyst at The Heritage Foundation,
"Answering Senate Questions about NATO Enlargement," Feb. 2,
http://www .heritage.or~research/internationalorganizations/BG
1154.cfm)

The proposed enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is one of the most
important questions before the U.S. Senate. The vote on ratification, which could come as early as late
February, presents Senators with their most far-reaching foreign policy decision since the end of the
Cold War. This decision will shape not only the future of European security, but also-and even more
important-America's leadership role in the trans-Atlantic alliance. Failure to ratify the enlargement of
NATO to include Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic would have serious repercussions: It would
demoralize these countries, which were invited to join at the July 1997 summit in Madrid; reward
Russian extremists for their opposition; and leave a potentially dangerous security vacuum in Central
Europe.>

NATO enlargement strengthens its role in European security

Andersen 98 (James, former Defense and National Security Analyst at The Heritage Foundation,
"Answering Senate Questions about NATO Enlargement," Feb. 2,
http://www.heritage.org/research/internationalorganizationsGl154.cfm)

Q:
- Will an enlarged
- alliance dilute NATO's effectiveness?
A: No. Including new states that share the political values of existing members will strengthen, not
weaken, NATO's effectiveness.
The question of dilution should not be reduced to an arithmetic calculation. Such an approach ignores
the broader context of NATO enlargement. NATO is considering the accession of three countries with
deep historical and cultural ties to the West. Equally important, these countries share the West's bedrock
political values. Their inspired political leadership. forged in opposition to Soviet tyranny, is another
a. As Freedom House president Adrian Karatnycky argues,
[No] one should dispute that NATO's leadership will be enhanced by the voices and values of such
leaders as Hungary's President Arpad Goncz, who fought for freedom in 1956 and participated in the
democratic opposition after his release from prison in the 1960s; Poland's new Prime Minister Jerzy
Buzek, who risked his personal freedom when he headed the Solidarity trade union underground in the
coal-mining region in Silesia in the 1980s; and the Czech Republic's leading fighter for freedom,
President Vaclav Have1.z
Political leaders at the Madrid Summit in July 1997 pledged to provide the necessary resources for
expanding NATO to these countries. The new members will have ample incentive to be team players;
NATO's leitmotif will remain one of shared consensus. Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic
already have increased defense spending and worked hard to meet NATO's standards. By providing
access to transportation nodes and bases on its territory, Hungary also has helped NATO with its Bosnia
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NATO EXPANSION GOOD-RUSSIAN IMPERIALISM

NATO enlargement provides democratic security and checks Russian adventurism

Andersen 98 (James, former Defense and National Security Analyst at The Heritage Foundation,
"Answering Senate Questions about NATO Enlargement," Feb. 2,
http://www.heritage.org/research~internationalorganizations/BG1154.cfm)

NATO's security guarantee, enshrined in Article 5 of the treaty, is the solemn commitment of its
member states to support one another in the event of armed attack. Moreover, Article 3 requires parties
to "maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack." If Poland,
Hungary, and the Czech Republic are admitted to NATO, they will be treaty-bound to contribute to
alliance security. Expanding NATO, then, will bring Europe's security structure into alignment with the
seismic political and economic changes wrought by the end of the Cold War.Enlargement therefore will
serve concrete U.S. interests by expanding the zone of democratic security to a historically strife-torn
region.
These political and military rationales complement one another. Bringing the three candidate countries
into the alliance will provide NATO with greater insurance against the possibility of a revived Russian
threat and help ensure that Central Europe is no longer merely a checkerboard for the machinations of
revanchist powers. Equally important, an enlarged NATO will provide new members with a shield for
democratization. W. Bruce Weinrod, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for European and
NATO Policy, argues well that "Spain's admission to NATO in 1982 very likely helped reinforce and
consolidate its nascent democratic institutions; and NATO membership undoubtedly was a factor in the
consolidation of democracy in Portugal, Greece, and Turkey."3 Similarly, the accession of Poland,
Hungary, and the Czech Republic will help these former communist states cement their recent
democratic gains.>
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CONSULTATION GOOD-LEADERSHIP I
Genuine consultation is key to US leadership
Abshire and Cross 04 (David and Wesley, President and Assistant to the President of the Center for the
Study of the Presidency, "Reinvesting in the Art of NATO: The President's Best Strategic Option,"
Politics & Diplomacy, Summer/Fall, CIAO)

<NATO is the ideal forum for U.S. leadership, particularly in today's troubled times. Unilateralism
breeds mistrust over time, lacks the benefits of financial burden-sharing, and profits from none of the
complementary capabilities that NATO allies offer. NATO also comes with benefits not available at the
UN Security Council. The Security Council lacks a consensus on values and has no intricate consultative
mechanisms to adjust positions on contentious issues. Although it is not a panacea, NATO can be a
linchpin of U.S. foreign policy. The NATO framework enables the United States to consult intimately
among allies and communicate its foreign policy in a multilateral forum. Although - each NATO country
has veto power, the United States is "first among equals." The United States wields enormous political,
military. economic, and technological power that can be used to leverape the U.S. position. In many
major challenges that confront the Unit ed States and its allies, the United States should better articulate
how its own national interests are often congruent with those of its allies. Nonetheless, on especially
divisive issues, individual member countries can prove difficult to persuade. Yet this reticence is often
to their own detriment; it erodes their long-term influence. When France pulled out of the integrated
command in 1966, NATO headquarters left Paris, making Brussels the security capital of Europe. More
recently, France led the European protest against the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq; by doing so, France
divided Europe. In terms of French strategic influence, both policies seem Pyrrhic victories at best. More
often than not, whether it is the United States or France, any member country that fundamentally
violates the political will of the alliance decreases its own power and diminishes its own influence. As
majority shareholder in a consultative process, the United States should recognize that its own long-term
interests call for taking into account the opinions and concerns of its closest allies, even if consultation
ultimately serves only to better explore the United States's own policies. At NATO, such consultations
are not a drive to the lowest common denominator, nor a prescription for debate without deadlines. They
are an opportunity to seize the higher ground through powers of persuasion and create unity of effort and
concert of action. This kind of leadership, not unilateralism, will ultimately build enduring power and
influence.>
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B

CONSULTATION GOOD-NATO COHESION I

Genuine consultation is key to alliance cohesion, which is critical to maintaining its deterrent
value
Naumann 2000 (Klsns, Gcneral Inspector Por the Gcrlnan military, "The Transatlantic Link Remains Vital." Buropccrn Ajliilirs. Winter, CIAO)
In the present and near future, it is clear there is only one global power, namely the United States. But
we may well see a more multi-polar world in the longer term. Increasingly, we can expect the United
States to be less able and willing to act alone due to military downsizing, over-stretched resources,
weariness of overseas commitments, and the desire for support from allies, especially in the political
field. On the other sidc ot the Atlacnic. Eulr,pe is definitely moving lowards ge;iler inrepmtion, especially in the pervasive ~ c m o m i cdomain. There is nu shonuge uofmhircctunl desiglls ro address
Earopenn security hut. regretlably. thc same cannot k said about Eumpc's will and capnhiities. it is quile obvious. as dcmnsln~ledin Kostivo, lhnl Europe definitely does not
issues

have the military capabiIities to be an equal partner to the United States. The first and foremost
challenge for NATO is to maintain its transatlantic cohesion and its credible ability to act which, after
all, have been the underpinning of its unparalleled success over the years. Reg.uding .,. the rust aaspct. I cenainly ngree with tlx:
Secrel;uv Genenl of NAln when he stilled that it is no1 il msrtcr of roo much Ilnired Stales, but rather ol' not ennugh Eun~pr. It is no surprise tl~arAlnericnos sometimes acf unilateraliy in certain crisis
x e n ~ r i c ~when We Can definitely improve in the field of ~ ~ n ~ ~ l t hut
s we Eur<ipcnnsdo little more th:m olTw a kaleidoscope ofnp~nions. a we,
t i ~inn ,
have to ~ I T I D ~ o vconsiderably
E,rcipc. ~ in formulating a common view. m l t said. 1 w n m t help bllt think I L ~a little
preliminary consultation and r re paring the battlefield" with Allies by the United States - rather than the
last-minute surprise declarations we ropealcdly saw during Ihceivly phases ofthe crisis - would pay enormous dividends to the
KO,SOV~

United States and the Alliance as a whole. Maintaining credibility de-mands that NATO's military forces
are able to act across the entire spectrum of missions they may be asked to execute. If we retain the
cohesion and the military capabilities, the Alliance will retain its strong deterrent value against all
potential adversaries or regimes.>

Cohesion is key to NATO's success

Naumann 2000 (Klaus, General Inspector for the German military, "The Transatlantic Link Remains
Vital," Europeaiz AffuairL~,
Winter, CIAO)

<What makes NATO so unique among; security-related organizations is that while all such ornanizations
profess to have effective political consultation and decision-making mechanisms, only the Alliance has
all the necessary military means to act.
This capability, however, needs to be nurtured since history is replete with examples where the best
intentions of one side were overridden by the better capabilities of the other. It is the political cohesion,
combined with the military capabilities of the Atlantic Alliance, that continues to determine NATO's
success and credibility.
The truly invincible formula which led to NATO's unparalleled success in surviving the demise of the
enemy was the transatlantic link, combined with a credible collective defense capability.>
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CONSULTATION GOOD-SOFT POWER I

NATO consultation is key to effectively leveraging US soft power
Abshire and Cross 04 (David and Wesley, President and Assistant to the President of the Center for the
Study of the Presidency, "Reinvesting in the Art of NATO: The President's Best Strategic Option,"
Politics & Diplomacy, SummerFall, CIAO)

<Today, the opportunity for American outreach and coalition-building in NATO extends far beyond
member states. NATO has moved into an impressive staEe of political dynamism; it is feasible to
address threats beyond NATO's traditional geographical area. For instance, the Euro-Atlantic
Partnership Council brings together forty-six NATO members and partners to consider cooperation and
current political and security questions. The NATO Russia Council encourages dialogue, deepens trust,
and enables former enemies to explore where interests converge in a new spirit of cooperation. The
Mediterranean Dialogue convenes seven non-NATO Mediterranean countries to examine regional
security and stability, achieve mutual understanding, and dispel misconceptions about NATO among
those countries.7 These should be key multilateral complements to U.S. diplomacy as it addresses
y
political will and creativity of NATO's leaders will determine the organization's future influence.
NATO already plays an important role in Afghanistan, where it is led by France and Germany, and it
should play a role in Iraq as security conditions improve. NATO could certainly play a role in an Arab-
Israeli settlement, as Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman John Warner suggested. Meanwhile,
other major democratic powers, notably Japan and Australia, could appoint an ambassador to the
organization just as the United States appointed an ambassador to the EU. As a new NATO initiative in
the war on terror, the United States should build connections between the NAC and its Secretary of
Homeland Security, and directors of FBI and CIA to further common standards and compare best
practices. The NAC could energize issues that have been stymied in negotiations with the EU. NATO is
fertile ground for imaginative solutions. In the U.S. pursuit for sustainable influence, NATO's
consultative processes could become more powerful than the sum of their parts.>
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I CONSULTATION GOOD-NATO TRANSFORMATION

Consulting NATO is key to maintain transformation for security

Scheffer 05 (Jaaf, Secretary General of NATO, NATO Review,
http://www .nato.int/docu/review/2005/issuel/english/main-pr.htm1)

NATO's credibilitv rests on its cohesion and military competence - its proven ability to foster
cooperation between its member nations and to engage them in demanding military operations in regions
of vital strategic importance. In the face of a whole new set of risks and threats to our common security,
we must strengthen our political dialogue to ensure continued Allied cohesion. In short, we must
transform. A lot of public attention has focused on NATO's contributions to peace and stability in the
Balkans, the Mediterranean Sea, Afghanistan and recently Iraq. There has been considerable interest
also in the widening of NATO's membership and the deepeninn of its partnership relations. But there is
more to NATO's transformation. We have adapted our strategy and concepts, our military command and
force structures, and our internal organisation and procedures. Alliance Command Transformation is a
key driver in the military transformation process. And with the NATO Response Force and our
Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Defence Battalion, we now have force packages in
place that are specifically geared to some of the most pressing requirements. Each of our 26 member
nations has been taking a hard look at its own defence programmes and structures, to make sure that
they are relevant to today's demands. A lot has already been achieved. But NATO's transformation is
still very much a work in progress. In addition, we must ensure that NATO Headquarters structure is
geared to support this process. UThe three main strands of this work are clear. First, we need to further
enhance the usability, a~railabilityand sustainability of our forces - to make sure that a much larger
proportion of our militaries is readily available for operations away from Alliance territory. Second, we
must continue to better align our political and operational decisions - by further improving our defence-
planning and force-generation processes, and by creating greater clarity on resourcing through a better
balance between national and common funding, Finally, but fundamentally, we need enhanced political
debate to muster and sustain the transatlantic consensus that has been, and will remain, crucial to the
success of any Alliance undertaking. I am encouraged by our February Summit, where NATO leaders
committed to strengthen the Alliance as a forum for strategic and political consultations and
coordination. U L1In order to succeed, the Alliance's transformation will require continued careful
attention to the efficiency of the NATO Headquarters structure, and strong engagement by the
governments and parliaments of our member nations. I want to do my utmost to make sure that NATO's
transformation continues. It is critical to the Alliance's ability to provide security well into the future.
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NATO TRANSFORMATION GOOD-REGIONAL SECURITY

Continued transformation is key to dealing with regional security threats

Parish 05 (Jonathan, senior planning officer in the Policy Planning and Speechwriting Section of
NATO's Political Affairs and Security Policy Division, NATO Review,
http://www.nato.intldoculreview/2005/issuel/english/main~pr.html)

But what is transformation? It appears to mean different things to different people and I cannot find an
agreed Alliance definition of the term. T would suggest that the purpose of transformation is to keep the
Alliance relevant to the security environment and capable of carrying out effectively the roles it wishes
to undertake. The changes initiated by the London Declaration in 1990 were prompted by the end of
the Cold War. They can be summed up as a change from an approach to security that was defensive and
reactive, to one that was more proactive and focused on spreading security and stability. While the
collective security commitment embodied in the Washington Treaty continued, and will continue, to
underpin the Alliance and bind Europe and North America, NATO's transformation in the last decade of
the 20th century was most visibly demonstrated by partnership and crisis management. Crisis
management kept me busy during the 1990s. At SHAPE in the early part of the decade, I was involved
in NATO's first operational deployment when support was provided to Turkey during the first Gulf
War. I was also kept busy as NATO assisted in the airlifting of humanitarian aid to the former Soviet
Union. And I was even busier when NATO became progressively more involved in the Balkans, initially
supporting UN monitoring of heavy weapons, then monitoring the "no-fly" zone, and subsequently with
maritime operations in support of UN sanctions. During the latter part of that decade, I was in national
military appointments and commanding a helicopter regiment. This involved further work resulting from
NATO's crisis-management role: operational deployments to Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as
intervention in Kosovo. At the beginning of this decade, I joined the International Military Staff at
NATO Headquarters. It was there I witnessed the next stage in NATO's transformation with the
Alliance decision in 2002 to break out of its Euro-Atlantic geographic straitjacket. But I was surprised
that so many people spoke then, and continue to speak now, of Prague as the Transformation Summit.
For me, London had already set the course; Prague was a hand on the tiller. The threat from terrorism
and the dangers posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, mean that Allies' security
has become increasingly dependent on events a long way from their national territory. At Prague, the
Alliance reconnised this and further adapted accordingly. Part of this adaptation was the understanding
that in the face of these new threats, the widest possible cooperation is required, not iust with states, but
also with other international organisations
- and institutions, hence the Prague call of "new members" and
"new relationships". >
 Consult NATO CP
7 Week Juniors

J
CONSULTATION TOPIC-MILITARY ISSUES

Even domestic military operations are necessary concerns for a relevant NATO
Eide 05 (Espen, director of the International Politics Department at the Norwegian Institute of
International Affairs in Oslo, NATO Review,
http://www .nato.int/docu/review/2005/issue1/english/main-pr.htm1)

My point is that 1do not believe that a "~ure"militarv connection can be maintained over time without a
strong political underpinning - and that this political underpinning does not come by itself. We should
remember that transatlantic political cohesion was crucial - though often implicit - throughout the Cold
War. Both Western European and North American Allies agreed on deterring the perceived Soviet
threat, and both also agreed that an American commitment to Europe had a stabilising effect well
beyond the existence of a common threat. Indeed, the success of the project of European integration that
has led to the European Union should be seen in this light. The transatlantic security partnership helped
provide the conditions for functional economic integration in Europe, since some of the most politically
complicated issues could be discussed elsewhere. NATO could concentrate on its military role, because
the political cohesion was there from the outset, maintained by the continued common threat. What is
implicit and commonly agreed becomes so evident that there is no need to repeat it. Still, without this
sense of common purpose, there would have been no NATO in the first place. And even when
disagreement on strategic choices emerged during the Cold War, overall political cohesion was
maintained due to the perception of a common threat and common purpose.
Today, we haven't only moved beyond the Cold War, but also beyond the transitional, post-Cold War
period. What has become abundantly clear in recent years is that political cohesion between Europe and
the United States cannot be taken for granted, and nostalgia alone will not keep the Alliance afloat for
long. If NATO is to survive - which I both hope and believe it will - it must be the right answer to
today's, not yesterday's, challenges. n OAny use of military power remains, in Karl von Clausewitz's
words, "the continuation of politics by other means". This is particularly true when it comes to
intervening in conflicts that do not represent existential threats to us, but rather are long-term
investments in a more stable order. Joint action - like that currently ongoing in Afghanistan - must be
based on political agreement about what we are trying to achieve and where it fits into the broader
picture. Here, NATO has much to offer. Beyond agreeing on committing troops, it has a developed
system of political guidance to the military effort and a forum in which conflicting, opinions can be aired
and consensus built.>
Consult NATO CP
7 Week Juniors

CONSULTATION TOPIC-MILITARY ISSUES I

Genuine consultation on military issues is key to revitalize NATO
Bell 05 (Robert, NATO's Assistant Secretary General for Defence Investment, NATO Review,
http://www .nato.int/docu/review/2005/issue
l/english/main-pr.htm1)

<At the conclusion of their February meeting in Brussels, Allied leaders committed themselves to
"stren~theningNATO's role as a forum for strategic and political consultation and coordination among
Allies, while reaffirming its place as the essential forum for security consultation between Europe and
North America". n nThis initiative brought lo an end a brief but intcnsc period of consultations prompted ten days earlier hy Chancellor Schriideis written intervention
(read by Defence Minister Peter Struck, since the Chancellor had fallen ill) at the Munich Conference un Europelean Security Policy. There. the Chancellor's assertion that NATO
"was no longer the prinlary venue where transatlantic partners discuss and coordinate strategies" and his proposal for a "high-ranking panel of independent figures from both sides
of the Atlantic to help us find a solution'' for avoiding future Iraq-like crises provoked headlines and some consternation among senior NATO, as well as US, officials who had
been caught off-guard. In the ensuing controversy. German officials went to great lengths lo stress that the Chancellor had rrot been pronouncing lasl rites for NATO hut hod
wanted to strengthco it. For their part, NATO and US officials tended to differentiate between the "outside panel" s11ggestio11(which they rejected) and the underlying substanf ve
criticism. Afterall, there was no question that the United States had not been willing to use NATO as the
primary venue to discuss and coordinate such fundamental US s t r a t e ~ decisions c as those on how and
where to attack the Taliban and a1 Oaida in Afghanistan or how long to give the UN Security Council
inspection process to produce results before going to war with Lraq. Nor has the North Atlantic Council
been the primary venue for strategic consultations between the United States and its NATO Allies on
such high-priority issues as preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons or the European Union's
intention to remove the arms embargo on China. UIn effect, Chancellor Schroder was questioning
whether all the transformational reforms initiated at Prague and Norfolk would be for naught if the
Alliance was unable to function as a genuine partnership in the pre-conflict strategic decision-making
phases. In this sense, he was not only standing Genenl Charles de Gnulle's dictum- "Of what use is strategic planning if the nleens of carrying it out arc not forthcoming?.' -
on its head, but also echoing frustrations with the quality of political dialogue ;st NATO. previously broached publicly by other European leaders. including Secretary Gencral Dc
Hoop Schcfkr himselr. COBy the time the Brussels Summit had convened. ill1 parties had resolved to accentuate the positive. As President George W. Bush said at o prcss
confere~~cc the next day: "I interpreted Ihe comments to nlean he wants NATO to be relevant, a pkace where thcre is meanitigful strategic dialogue. And that was very clear to
everybody sitting around the hble. And the meeting ended with laap saying to everybody that he's going to come back with a plan to make sure that thc smlegic dialogue in
NATO is relevant," onagreeing to produce a plan is, of course, one thing. Achieving consensus on the terms of
reference for freewheeling political debate is another. For their part, those European Allies who have traditionally been least
willing to allow the Nonh Atlantic Council to discuss issues they have considered as exclusively the European Union's business. such as Galileo or the
United States will
China arms embargo. will now have to accept what before would have been s e n as NATO "meddling". And for its part. the
need to find some means of broaching strategic issues in the North Atlantic Council that have yet to be
agreed within the US inter-agency process, let alone vetted with Congress. That said, the challenge of
genuinely "consulting" with Allies as opposed to simply "informing" them of decisions already taken is
no more or no less daunting than the challenge any US administration routinely faces in trying to form
genuine partnerships with the Hill, or, for that matter, with its main partners within "coalitions of the
willing". >
 Consult NATO CP
7 Weck Juniors

I CONSULTATION TOPIC-MILITARY ISSUES L

Genuine consultation with NATO on military issues is key to American interests

Hulsman 03 (John, Reseach Fellow at the Heritage Foundation, "Prepared Statement of John Hulsman,"
Renewing the Trunsatlantic Partnership, June 11,
http://wwwa.ho~ise.gov/international~relations/lO8/8767O.PDF)

<Militarily, such an approach explains present efforts at NATO reform. Beyond the
sacrosanct Article V commitment, the future of NATO consists of coalitions-of-thewilling
acting out-of-area. Here, a realist cherry-picking strategy confounds the impulses
of both unilateralists and strict multilateralists. Disregarding unilateralist
attitudes towards coalitions as often not worth the bother, this strategy calls for full
NATO consultation on almost every significant military issue of the day. As was the
case with Iraq, if full NATO support is not forthcoming, realists would doggedly continue
the diplomatic dance, rather than seeing such a rebuff as the end of the process,
as many strict multilateralists would counsel. A Combined Joint Task Force
(CJTF) where a subset of the Alliance forms a coalition of the willing to carry out
a specific mission using common NATO resources would be this strategy's second
preference, If this too proved impossible, due to a general veto of such an initiative,
a coalition of the willing outside of NATO--composed of states around the globe
committed to a specific initiative based on shared immediate interests-would be
the third best option. Only then, if fundamental national interests were at stake,
should America act alone. Cherry-picking is a way around what has become a
cartoonish debate, as very few decision-makers are either entirely unilateral or multilateral
in orientation; the world is simply more complicated than this.
While agreeing with unilateralists that full, unqualified approval of specific missions
may prove difficult to diplomatically achieve with NATO in the new era, cherry-
pickers disagree with them about continuing to engage others at the broadest
level. For, as the missile defense example illustrates, there are almost always some
allies who will go along with any specific American policy initiative. That is, if they
are genuinely asked, By championing initiatives such as the CJTF and the new
NATO rapid deployment force, the Bush administration is fashioning NATO as a
toolbox that can further American interests around the globe by constructing ad hoc
coalitions of the willing that can bolster U.S. efforts in specific cases.>
Consult NATO CP
7 Week Juniors

CONSULTATION TOPIC-COUNTERTERRORISM I
Consultations with NATO over counterterrorism are key to renewed transatlantic dialogue
Atlantic Council 04 (Richard Clarke and Barry McCaffrey, co-chairs, "NATO's Role in Confronting
International Terrorism," June, CIAO)

<Many Europeans are acutely aware that there has been a lack of real strategic dialogue on this subiect
in recent years. On the one hand, it is apparent that many European leaders are not willing simply to
follow a "Made in the U S A strategy. Equally, however, a combination of transatlantic differences of
the kind discussed earlier and intra-European differences that have inhibited the emergence of a robust
consensus in Europe have by deFdult created a situation in which U.S. leadership has been the principal
source of strategic initiative on the subiect. If, however, as many increasingly believe, A) the struggle is
likely to last a decade or more; B) the threat is comparable in scale to that of Soviet power during the
Cold War; and C) the response of the Euro-Atlantic countries which are on the front line in confronting
the terrorists is likely to be more effective if it is a cooperative response, then there is a need for an
institution in which a shared strategy for the mobilization of the full range of appropriate policy
instruments can be developed. The United States and its allies need a consultative venue for the
development and regular updating of their strategy toward international terrorism. First, there is a need
to bridge more effectively the gulf between those countries, like the United States, that see the counter-
terrorism effort in terms of a war designed
- to suppress terrorist groups - requiring, among other means,
the use of military power in selected situations - and those, like many countries in Western Europe, that
think more in terms of managing a danger, primarily through law enforcement and intelligence
cooperation. Second, there is a need to accommodate to the fact that the threat itself is continually
evolving in ways that are of great importance to the choice of policy remedies to be adopted. In short,
the Western countries need to think and act in terms of a long-term strategy combining the whole range
of policy instruments that are relevant to the counter-terrorism effort. The analogy is to the way in
which, during the Cold War, they continually developed strategies - not without considerable
disagreements - toward meeting the Soviet threat.>
 Consult NATO CP
7 Week Juniors

I CONSULTATION TOPIC-DOMESTIC ISSUES L

Domestic policy influences foreign policy-NATO cares about domestic issues in the US because
other issues make them relevant
Busby 04 (Josh, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard, "Veto Powers and
Political Distance in International Affairs," Sept. 2,
http://wws.princeton.edu/jbusby/papers/apsa2004.pd~

<<In this constructivist explanation for transatlantic contention, differences between us derive
from distinct historical trajectories and demographic trends. We now want different things. One
expression of this view is found in Charles Kupchan's 2002 book, The End of the America Era. Like
an, Kupchan relies on the structural argument to get at the roots of transatlantic disputes. Kupchan
also argues-that new value orientations in both regions are driving a wedge between us. Forty years of
integration in the shadow of World War 11has created a distinctive set of preferences in Europe.
Likewise, the changing demography and base of political representation in the U.S. to the South and
West is undermining Eastern establishment "atlanticism." Instead of looking across the pond, Americans
are looking inward and a1 sur a ~ h i c yoa Latino ~ m Z r i c aKupchan
. points to America's brand of
laissez-faire capitalism in contrast to Europe's social democratic traditions. He suggests the cultural
divide is wide and widening as issues such as gun control and capital punishment reveal our differences.
To what extent do these different value orientations have an impact on foreign policy? Do
differences on the death penalty and capital punishment-largely domestic issues--affect any more than
the margins of foreign policy? These issues, I submit, only become salient when there are larger
international disputes between us. There may be a "values gap" that matters in the security realm, but we
need to specify what it is. Two main possibilities are relevant: (1) different values in terms of broad
policy approaches and policy tools, and (2) different values in terms of the use of force. >
 Consult NATO CP
7 Week Juniors

I CONSULTATION TOPIC-AFRICAN CRISES I

Genuine consultation with NATO over African crises is key to transatlantic security
Eide 05 (Espen, director of the International Politics Department at the Norwegian Institute of
International Affairs in Oslo, NATO Review,
http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2005/issue l/english/main-pr.htm1)

<The tone of the debate has changed radically since then. Neither Washington nor any European capital
wishes to repeat the experiences of the past two to three years. 'lhe recent visits of President George w. BUS^ and Secretary of stale
Condoleezza Rice to Europe - as well as the way they were received - symbolised a niutuai desire to demonstrate unity and commitment. BLlt beyond ~ x ~ ~ ~ s s ~ o I I s
of good will. details of a new "consensus" remain unclear. OIn my view, today's challenge is two-told: first to
make a realistic assessment of the Alliance's role in new political circumstances: and second. to repoliticise the Alliance rather than allowing - it

to atrophv into little more than a mil it^ ''~oo~~ox:. U r T h e starting point ior an assessmnt of NATO's role is recognition that Europe's
political landscape has fundamentally changed. Today. the European Union is a player in international security in its own right. Indeed. an increasingly ambitious European Union
is currently adding military capacitics to its existin:! "soft-power" tonlbnx. Many future transatlantic debates will have lo lake place between the European Union and the United
Many key issues On the CUlTent
States simply hecause the agenda has to he broader than that provided in NATO'S more classical security forum.
international agenda -the curhing ou Iran's alleged nuclear ambitions. plans to lift the arms embargo on China and the need to help Africa
emerge from its several complex crises - require multi-faceted approaches. Atlanticists should stop
deploring this. Attempts to use NATO to blunt the European Union's political ambitions are doomed to
fail. Encouraginn the European Union's political development while simultaneously forging a vibrant
security partnership with NATO is the way to go. There will still be plenty for NATO to do. The
Alliance remains the most logical forum for everything from coordinating military instruments to
stratepic debate about common security challenges between the two main pillars of the West. Moreover,
it should aim at remaining so, recognising that this is the Alliance's contribution to a broader,
transatlantic security architecture. Z UThis requires a "repoliticisation" of NATO. The Alliance must
once again become a forum for open dialogue about the maior issues it is to engage in. A sincere
transatlantic dialogue about how to deal with terrorism, for example, is ~reatlvneeded precisely because
Allies have differing perspectives on how to respond to this common challenge. NATO will also likely remain active in
places like Afghanis~anand Kosovo and c o n t i ~ ~ to
u eprovide the military musclc hchind future multilateral. peace-eniorcetnent efforts. Wherc to engage. and how to do so. may
prove controvcrsinl. Decisions should, therefore, be rooted in a broader political consensus within the Alliance
than is currently the case. And where the Aliidnce provides thc military backbone of hroader inlernationnl peace-building efforts, it needs to be better connected to the overall
political processes relating to thc political future of Lhese situations. Again, this rcquires a more political NATO and enha~iccdcooperation with other organisations. including the
United Nations. c uNATO's challenge is not merely to survive - nobody is actually suggesting that it should die
-but to remain a key player and a key forum in the very area in which it has already proved so effective.
But it will only remain effective if the Allies develop a common political understanding of its role.
There is no common enemy to substitute for the threat posed by Communism or the Soviet Union.
"Terrorism" doesn't do the trick. Instead, the Alliance today is an expression of the continued relevance
of the "West" in international security. In a renewed transatlantic political forum, however, we must
expect further disagreement. The challenge is not to pretend that differences aren't there, but to confront
them head on.>
on OU
 Consult NATO CP
7 Week Juniors

r
CONSULTATION TOPIC-DADT I
The US should consult NATO over repealing DADT
Fellner 03 (Jamie, Director, Human Rights Watch, Jan. 23,
http://www.hrw.org/press/2003/0 l/rumsfeId-ltrO 12303.htm)

<Supporters of "don't ask, don't tell" argue that permitting acknowledged gays or lesbians to serve in
the military would impair unit cohesion and hence military effectiveness. There is no evidence to
support that argument. Over the last decade, a number of U.S. allies, including the United Kingdom,
Canada, Germany, and Israel, have changed exclusionary policies and accepted open homosexuals into
their armed forces without impairing the effectiveness of their military. Today, most NATO countries
permit homosexuals to serve on the same terms as heterosexuals.
During thc Gulf War in 1991, President George H.W. Bush suspended discharges under the regulations then in place that prohibited gays from serving.
thereby acknowledging that the armed forces needed the contributions of all Americans who wished to serve their country in a time of need. We are aware of
no evidence that thc military campaign in thc Gulf was in any way conipromised by the presence of gay and lesbian servicemembm. Indeed, supporters of
"don't ask. don't tell" have not heen able to point to any empirical cvidcncc of unit disintegration or bad morale in the U.S.military arising from the
presence of known homosexuals.
The "unit cohesion" justification for "don't ask, don't tell" is premised on the assumption that heterosexual servicemembers would react in an
overwhclnungly negative way if known homosexuals were allowed to serve. A similar argument was made with regard to the ncial integration of the armed
forces, yet President's Truman's decision to end racially segregated units in the U.S. nuiitary did not generate the predicted disruptions. We believe that if
the military ensures strong leadership, training, and cnforccment of rules of conduct applicable to all, enlisted members and officers will handle the removal
of discriminatory restrictions on acknowledged gays and lesbians with complete professionalism. It is important in this regard to note the changing attitudes
in America - among the g n e n l public and within the armed forces - about gays and lesbians. According to the Gallup Organization in 2002, 86 percent of
Americans believed gays and lesbians should have equal rights with respect to job opportunities. In a 2001 Gallup poll. 72 percent of Americans said that
homosexuals should be hired in the armed forces. up from 57 percent in 1992. A Massachusetts Institute of Technology study released in 2001 showed that a
maiority of Americans (56 percent) were in favor of allowing gays to scrvc opcnly in thc military.
Views have changed within the military during the same period. In 1992. rnjlit,ary sociologists found that 77 percent of army men and 34 percent of army
wornen opposed or strongly opposed gays in the military. In August 1998. the percenrage had dropped to 52 percent among men and 25 percent among
women. In another study, researchers found a significant change in the attitudes of navy officers over a live-year period in the 1990s. In 1994.58 percent
agrccd or strongly a,med that they felt uncomfortable in the presence ofgays. By 1999, that percentage had dropped to 36 percent. In the same study, 39
percent said thcy personally knew a homosexual servicemember.
We urge you to take the following actions without delay:
Propose and pursue the repeal of 10 USC 654, the "don't ask, don't tell7' policy codified in 1993.
Implement the Department of Defense's Anti-Harassment Action Plan to address anti-gay harassment.
Order each service branch to suspend indefinitely all investigations and discharges under the "don't
ask, don't tell" policy.
- Consult with allies about how they integrated their armed forces to assist the U.S. military in
implementing a new policy of non-discrimination in the most efficient manner.>
Consult NATO CP
7 Week Juniors

RELATIONS GOOD-LEADERSHIP

Transatlantic relations are crucial to sustaining hegemony-unilateralist policies fail

Moravcsik 03 (Andrew, Harvard Government Professor, "Striking a New Transatlantic Bargain,"
Foreign Affairs, July/August, http://www.princeton.edu/-am~r'~vcs/libraryhargain.pd~

<The recent war in Iraq has triggered the most severe transatlantic tensions in a generation, dividing
Europeans and Americans from each other and themselves. Pundits proclaim daily the imminent
collapse of three vita1 pillars in the institutional architecture of world politics: nato, the un, and even the
eu. And yet some form of transatlantic cooperation clearly remains essential, given the vast mutual
interests at stake. Where, then, should the Western alliance go now? The Iraq crisis offers two basic
lessons. The first, for Europeans, is that American hawks were right. Unilateral intervention to coerce
regime change can be a cost-effective way to deal with rogue states. In military matters, there is only
one superpower-the United States-and it can go it alone if it has to. It is time to accept this fact and
move on. The second lesson, for Americans, is that moderate skeptics on both sides of the Atlantic were
also right. Winning a peace is much harder than winning a war. Intervention is cheap in the short run but
expensive in the long run. And when it comes to the essential instruments for avoiding chaos or
quagmire once the fighting stops-trade, aid, peacekeeping, international monitoring, and multilateral
legitimacy- Europe remains indispensable. In this respect, the unipolar world turns out to be bipolar
after all. Given these truths, it is now time to work out a new transatlantic bargain, one that redirects
complementary military and civilian instruments toward common ends and new security threats.
Without such a deal, danger exists that Europeans-who were rolled over in the run-up to the war,
frozen out by unilateral U.S. nation build in^, disparaged by triurnphalist American pundits and
politicians, and who lack sufficiently unified regional institutions-will keep their distance and leave the
United States to its own devices. Although understandable, this reaction would be a recipe for disaster,
since the United States lacks both the will and the institutional capacity to follow up its military
triumphs properly-as the initial haphazard efforts at Iraqi reconstruction demonstrate. To get things
back on track, both in Iraq and elsewhere, Washington must shift course and accept multilateral
conditions for intervention. The Europeans, meanwhile, must shed their resentment of American power
and be prepared to pick up much of the burden of conflict prevention and postconflict engagement.
Complementarity, not conflict, should be the transatlantic watchword.>

US-European cooperation is key to solve overstretch

Haass 04 (Richard, President of the Council on Foreign Relations, "The United States and Europe:
Adjusting to the Global Era," June 1,
http://www.cfr.org/publication/7069/unitedstatesandeuro.html)

The United States also needs European resources. American power is truly great. but it is not unlimited.
The U.S. military is stretched given
- current needs in Lraq and Afghanistan; the fact that troops are being
withdrawn from the Korean Peninsula and sent to Iraq is both unfortunate and revealing. The sort of
troop-intensive nation-building exercises taking place in Iraq and Afghanistan are hardly unique; they
are sure to be repeated elsewhere, and European contributions will be required in those two countries as
well as in others. The good news is that Europe has much to add. especially as more than military might
will be relevant, This clearly pertains to the global struggle against HIV-AIDS and other infectious
diseases, as well as to global efforts to alleviate poverty. A strapped U.S. economy, one experiencing
enormous fiscal and current account deficits, cannot bear the burden of promoting world order and
development on its own.>
 Consult NATO CP
7 Wcck Juniors

I RELATIONS GOOD-PROLIF

Transatlantic relations best solve proliferation

Moravcsik 03 (Andrew, Harvard Government Professor, "Striking a New Transatlantic Bargain,"
Foreign Affairs, July/August, http://www.princeton.edu/-amoravcs/library/bargain.pd~]

<Postconflict monitoring under appropriate multilateral auspices will

be equally important, since American credibility has been undermined
by prewar errors and exaggerations. Most important of all. the transatlantic
commitment to strict controls over the use of nuclear, biolopical,
and chemical materials might be harnessed to promote a stronger
peacetime countemroliferation regime focused ~articularlyon trafficking
in wmd materials.>
 Consult NATO CP
7 Week Juniors

I NATO GOOD-DEMOCRACY PROMOTION

NATO is key to democracy promotion, solving terrorism

Kwok 05 (James, staff writer at the Harvard International Review, "Mending NATO: Sustaining the
Transatlantic Relationship," Definit~gPower, Vol. 27 (2) - Summer,
http://hir.harvard.edu/articles/ 13441)

<Additionally, there is the frequently ignored humanitarian struggle that fails to garner sufficient
attention from geopolitical gurus and pundits. Poverty, malnutrition, and lack of economic development
are still problems that lack satisfactory solutions. This is something to which no one country has been
paying marked attention. However. they cannot be blamed, as most countries lack the substantial
resources needed to meet their ~eopoliticalgoals as well as their humanitarian ones. NATO provides a
broad base from which substantial soft power can emanate. Recently, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, Secretary-
General of NATO, told an audience in Spain that spreading democracy "remains the best answer to
terror." This may well intersect with UN initiatives, but de Hoop Scheffer believes that "the most
effective way [to fight terrorism1 is to have a combination of all the things in our inventory, and that
goes from nation-building to intelligence to diplomacy, political talks, and if necessary, military power."
It is here that NATO has been focusing its attention, and it is in this direction that NATO should focus
more of its energies in the future.>
Consult NATO CP
7 Week Juniors

NATO GOOD-EUROPE RELATIONS I

Stronger NATO is key to democratic stability and transatlantic relations
Moravcsik 03 (Andrew, Harvard Government Professor, "Striking a New Transatlantic Bargain,"
Foreign Affairs, July/August, http://www.princeton.edu/-amoravcs/library/b

<An expanded nato is now widely recognized as a force for democracy and stability. Western
governments have unanimouslv authorized a dozen humanitarian interventions over the last ten years.
They work together on many other issues, including- human rights, environmental policy, disease
control, and financial regulation. Failure to cauterize and contain disputes such as that over Iraq
threatens all of this cooperation. as would any deliberate U.S. strategy of trying to weaken or divide
international organizations like the un, the eu, or m.The challenge that remains, of course, is just how
to depoliticize controversial high-stakes issues such as preventive intervention. The simplest way to do
so would be for the United States to adopt a less aggressively unilateral approach. trying to persuade or
compromise with its allies rather than simply issuing peremptory commands. Fortunately, since this
policy would appeal to any centrist U.S. administration, American strategy is likely to move in this
direction over the long term. Unless senior officials of the Bush administration undergo a radical
conversion on the road to Damascus, however, such a course is unlikely to emerge anytime soon.
Restoring diplomatic decency would be an easier first step. The transatlantic partners should commit to
Similarly,
reprisals, whether they take the form of U.S. threats against Europe or French threats against small
central European democracies, are ineffective and inflammatory, particularly when a domestic majority
supports the offending policy.>
 Consult NATO CP
7 Weck Juniors
L

NATO GOOD-EUROPE STABILITY

NATO is key to deter future nuclear European conflicts through allowing US power projection in
Europe
Duffield, 1994 (John S,, Stanford, Political Science Quarterly. New York: Winter 1994.Vol. 109, Iss. 5;
pg. 763, 25 pgs, Copyright Academy of Political Science Winter 1994, NATO's functions after the Cold
war>

<NATO continues to enhance the security of its members with respect to external dangers in several
ways. First, it preserves the strategic balance in Europe by neutralizing the residual threat posed by
Russian military power. Second, it helps to address emerging new threats, including the complex perils
posed by conflicts within and among the states of Central and Eastern Europe. Third, it impedes such
threats from arising in the first place by contributing to the process of fostering stability in the former
Soviet bloc.
Neutralizing the Residual Russian Threat
The military threat that the Soviet bloc could pose to Western Europe declined dramatically between
1989 and 1991. In particular, the danger of a massive, short-warning attack in the central region, perhaps
the most demanding contingency NATO might have faced, was eliminated. The former threat did not
disappear completely, however. The Soviet successor states continue to possess substantial military
capabilities. Most importantly, Russia remains Europe's only nuclear superpower, and even Ukraine has
so far retained a nuclear arsenal larger than those of Britain and France.(l2) In addition, despite the
Soviet departure from Central Europe, flank countries such as Norway and Turkey still face powerful
Russian conventional forces stationed near their borders.(l3)
Nor can anyone be certain that this military power will never again be used for hostile purposes. Under
Presidents Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin, the Soviet Union and Russia have pursued cooperation with the
West and sought to reduce if not eliminate altogether the role of force in their external relations. In view
of the twists and turns that have characterized Russian politics in recent years, however, it has not yet
been possible to rule out the prospect of a return to a more confrontational, even expansionist posture.
The tumultuous events of late 1993, especially the violent siege of the Russian parliament building and
the strong showing of the nationalists in the subsequent parliamentary elections, only confirmed the
view that the situation in Russia is likely to remain unsettled for a prolonged period during which
continued Western concerns about future Russian intentions will be only natural.
In view of these uncertainties, the countries of Western Europe have found it desirable to maintain a
counterweight to the residual military power of the former Soviet Union, especially Russia's nuclear
capabilities. Alone, however, they lack the means to do so. Only the United States is seen as fully able to
neutralize the potential nuclear threat, however remote it may be, and more generally to preserve the
European strategic balance.(l4) And it is primarily through NATO that American military power is
linked to the continent.( l5)>
 Consult NATO CP
7 Week Juniors

I NATO GOOD-EUROPE STABILITY

NATO is key to prevent an Eastern European arms race and maintain stability
Duffield, 1994 (John S., Stanford, Political Science Quarterly. New York: Winter 1994,Vol. 109, Iss. 5;
pg. 763,25 pgs, Copyright Academy of Political Science Winter 1994, NATO's functions after the Cold
War)

<A closely related function is that of stabilizing the countries of the former Soviet bloc in order to
prevent the outbreak of hostilities in the first place. Following the collapse of communism, many of
these states have undertaken ambitious political and economic reforms. The Western stakes in these
efforts are substantial, since failure could lead to domestic turmoil, mass migrations, armed conflicts,
and even direct military threats to nearby NATO members.
Yet success is not assured. Reform among peoples with no recent experience with democracy or free
markets is inherently difficult. And these considerable domestic obstacles are often compounded by an
uncertain and seemingly threatening external security environment.
In particular, manv Central and East European states are concerned about possible adverse developments
within the former Soviet Union that could lead to a renewal of military coercion or armed conflict on
their borders.(l9) If left unprotected, moreover, they may feel pressure to acquire additional military
forces and to take other precautionarv measures that could be viewed as provocative by their neighbors,
thereby undermining rather than enhancing stability.
NATO promotes stability in the former Soviet bloc in two ways. First, it directly fosters the success of
political reform in the region. Since 1990, NATO has established a wide array of programs
- and
institutions for dialogue and cooperation on security issues, most notably the North Atlantic Cooperation
Council (NACC) and the Partnership for Peace (PfP), through which it can assist the fledgling regimes
in reshaping their defense policies, structures, and planning processes.(20) In particular, these new
arrangements can reinforce democratic control of the armed forces and respect for civilian authority by
exposing Central and East European leaders to Western models of civil-military relations.(2 1)
Second, NATO enhances the security of Central and East European states bv assuring them that they
would not have to face external threats entirely on their own, thereby help in^ them to forgo potentially
destabilizing- actions and to pursue their ambitious agendas of domestic reform with greater
confidence.(22) Since 1990, the North Atlantic Council has repeatedly offered strong verbal expressions
of interest and support, such as the statement issued during the August 199 1 Soviet coup attempt: "We
expect the Soviet Union to respect the integrity and security of all states in Europe."(23) The NACC
allows former Soviet bloc states to voice their concerns and to discuss a wide range of security issues on
a regular basis while sitting as equal partners with their NATO counterparts.(24) And the recently
adopted PfP offers each participant formal consultations with the alliance, should it perceive a direct
threat to its security, and concrete military ties with NATO members via involvement in a variety of
military activities and operations.(25)>
 Consult NATO CP
7 Wcek Juniors

I NATO GOOD-GERMAN AGGRESSION

US engagement in NATO is vital to prevent German domination is key to maintaining balance of

power.
Duffield, 1994 (John S., Stanford, Political Science Quarterly. New York: Winter 1994.Vol. 109, Iss. 5;
pg. 763,25 pgs, Copyright Academy of Political Science Winter 1994, NATO's functions after the Cold
war>

<The existence of the integrated military structure by itself, however, is no guarantee of continued
participation by NATO members. Rather, their willingness to eschew a national approach to defense
follows from the belief that the alliance offers them greater security with respect to possible external
threats, and here the United States makes a unique contribution. It is U.S. involvement in the form of
security guarantees and the presence of American forces in Europe that perhaps more than any other
factor assuages the security concerns of other NATO countries. As a result, the renationalization of
security policy appears unnecessary and even undesirable.(41) Moreover, the protection afforded by the
United States allows NATO members to limit their armed forces. In particular, it obviates any German
need to acquire a nuclear capability.
If, in contrast, alliance members did not feel that their concerns were being adequately addressed by
collective arrangements, they would be inclined to take whatever steps they regarded as necessary to
provide for their security. Thus U.S. disengagement could trigger a renationalization of security policy,
and Germany would be no exception to this trend. Without strong security ties to the United States, it is
not unimaginable that Germany would feel compelled in the face of external threats to increase its armed
forces beyond the existing treaty limits and to develop a nuclear deterrent, notwithstanding present
domestic constraints.(42) To do any less under threatening circumstances could be regarded as an
abdication of governmental responsibility. Yet such steps would undoubtedly alarm Germany's
neighbors.
Even in the absence of the integrated military structure, direct U.S. involvement in European security
affairs exerts a calm in^ and stabilizing effect on West European politics. This is because U.S. security
guarantees and an American militarv presence also help ensure the maintenance of a balance of power
within the region. Only the United States is perceived as powerful enough to play this internal balancing
role. Yet as an extracontinental power. it does not stir fears of military domination.(43)
Not surprisingly, U.S. engagement is seen as particularly useful for providing a counterweight to
Gennany's military power and potential. In the absence of the United States, NATO would be dominated
by Germany, making the rest of Europe uneasy.(44) This function is accepted and even encouraged by
German leaders, who recognize that "an American presence in Europe allows its neighbors to feel far
more comfortable with the new and larger Germany."(45)>
Consult NATO CP
7 Week Juniors

NATO GOOD-GREECE-TURKEY WAR I

NATO prevents Greece-Turkey conflict
Andersen 98 (James, former Defense and National Security Analyst at The Heritage Foundation,
"Answering Senate Questions about NATO Enlargement," Feb. 2,
http://www.heritage.org/research/internationalorganizationsG 1154.cfm)

NATO also has helped smooth tensions that otherwise might escalate between its member states. For
example, though Spain and Britain remain at odds over air and sea access to Gibraltar, both parties are
committed to a peaceful resolution of this dispute. Relations between Greece and Turkey have always
been strained, but membership in the NATO alliance has helped assuage the tension; last November, for
example, Greece and Turkey agreed to a non-aggression pact brokered by the United States.>
Consult NATO CP
7 Week Juniors

I NATO GOOD-EU COUNTERBALANCING I

Strengthening NATO is key to preventing the rise of a counterbalancing EU
Baker 05 (Gerard, US editor of The Times of London, "Bush's Grand Tour," Feb. 28,
http://weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/A/.asp?pg=2)

<The China gambit is a naked attempt, led by the French, to foster a stronger relationship between
Brussels and Beijing, to the mutual benefit of both of these alternative poles to U.S. power. But to really
inaugurate this shift to a multipolar world, the E.U.'s leaders still need to overcome internal dissent and
the naturally fissiparous tendencies of European nation-states. So European governments and political
elites are pressing ahead with their integration proiect. The process of adopting a new constitution for
Europe is well underway in all 25 states, a process that will significantly strengthen Europe's
institutional arrangements, enabling it to develop a single voice in global affairs, while suppressing
alternative approaches favored by individual states.
The other element of this strategy is to undermine the Atlantic institution in which both the United
States and its natural allies in Europe--the Eastern European countries, Britain, and a few other
AtIanticist nations--have real clout: NATO. If France, Germany, and company can reduce NATO to a
museum piece and replace it with a strategic partnership of "equals." between the United States and the
European Union, they will significantly strengthen Europe's abilitv to act as a counterweight to U.S.
power.
This aim is now quite explicit--let rather clumsily out of the bag by Chancellor Schroder in Munich last
week. In a speech read for him by his defense minister, the chancellor said NATO was no longer the
main location for discussion of strategic transatlantic questions. The speech then called for a panel of
experts to draw up proposals for a new transatlantic architecture. Though officials tried to deny it
afterwards in hastily arranged briefings, Schroder's meaning was clear: Goodbye NATO, hello U.S.-
E.U. dialogue.
Instead of politely resisting this crude attempt to change the rules of transatlantic diplomacy, as it has
done for the last twenty years, the United States now seems to be encouraging it. On her trip to Europe
this month, Secretary of State Rice was positively enthusiastic about the E.U. constitution and the
unified foreign policy institutions it will produce:
"As Europe unifies further . . . and has a common foreign policy, T understand what is going to happen
with the constitution, and that there will be the unification under, in effect, a foreign minister. T think
that will also be a very good development," she told reporters in Luxembourg.
Not only was this an oddly undiplomatic intervention in a clearly contentious internal European matter
(at least a dozen countries are holding referendums on the constitution, and the outcome is in serious
doubt in at least three). It seemed a straight surrender to a European strategy that is designed not to help
the United States in the long run.>
Consult NATO CP
7 Week Juniors

NATO GOOD-LAUNDRY LIST

Strengthening NATO is key to solving multiple scenarios for regional conflict

Gaertner 2000 (Heinz, Professor at the Austrian Institute for International Affairs, "European Security,
the Transatlantic Link, and Crisis Management," March 14, CIAO)

The reason lies in NATO's capacity for change. NATO is redeveloping its basic structure: preparing for
a coalition war is no longer the only or even primary item on its agenda and its focus now includes crisis
management or crisis response operations, peace-keeping, humanitarian action, as well as peacc-
enforcement. The "new NATO" looks and acts in part quite differently from the old NATO.
Simultaneously, the definition of the NATO area (Art. VI) is losing relevance-the NATO-led operation
in Bosnia and in Kosovo/Yugoslavia are a case in point. NATO will be focusing on new areas in the
time to come. It will and can no longer focus on a single mission of collective defence as during the
Cold War, for if NATO remains a traditional alliance of collective defence as enshrined in Art. V of the
Washington Treaty it is likely to die out or deteriorate. The new NATO's challenges lie beyond its
territory in international terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the disruption of
Gulf oil supplies and instability along NATO's southern and eastern flanks. Since these challenges do
not represent a direct threat to NATO territory, the real issue for NATO's future is not territorial defence
but rather its structural transformation into a crisis management alliance. However, NATO's capabilities
are still aimed at mobilising large numbers of forces set to defend against a major attack in central
Europe, but not at the capabiIity of quickly moving and supporting limited forces trained and equipped
to perform specific crisis management or peace keeping operations
 Consult NATO CP
7 Week Juniors

&
NATO GOOD-LEADERSHIP

NATO is vital to maintaining US hegemony and leverage.

Duffield, 1994 (John S., Stanford, Political Science Quarterly. New York: Winter 1994.Voi. 109, Iss. 5: pg. 76.3, 25 pgs,
Copyright Academy of Political Science Winter 1994, NATO's functions after the Cold War)

<Continued strong American baclung for the alliance is further assured by the fact that NATO remains the principal
institutional vehicle through which the United States can influence West European policies.(61) Alliance membership entitles
thc United States to play a dircct rolc in shaping a varietv of European security issues. And active American en,oagement,
including the presence of U.S. lbrccs on thc continent, endows the United States with considerable leverage. Indeed, the
influence provided by its NATO involvcrnent may cven extend to other bilateral and multilateral issues. including those in
the economic field. One American diplomat reporlcdlv stated that by exerting its militarv weinht in Europe through NATO,
the United States is able to "tell the Europeans what we want on a whole lot of issues-rradc agriculture. the gulf, you name
lt."(62)
Finally, there is the intangible matter of American prestige. Perhaps no development would symbolize the decline of U.S.
power and international influence more than would the effective demise of NATO. Thus policies that could put the alliance,
whether intentionally or not, are sure to face strong resistance, if only out of an unwillingness to countenance any diminution
in the global stature of the United States.>

NATO is essential to continued US troop presence in Europe

Duffield, 1994 (John S., Stanford, Political Sciencc Quarterly. New York: Winter 1994.Vol. 109, Iss. 5; pg. 763, 25 pgs,
Copyright Academy of Political Science Winter 1994, NATO's functions after the Cold War)

It could be argued that many of the contributions that thc United States makes to stabilizinp relations among the countries of
Western Europe could be accomplished without NATO. For example. the United Slatcs could offer security guarantees on an
individual basis. Likewise, it might bc possiblc lo make bilateral arrangements for the stationing of U.S. troops in Europe.
NATO is likely to remain essenlial for perpetuating U.S. involvement in Europcan security affairs. howcvcr. Bilatcral
security guarantees could be viewed as directed against specific countries, thereby increasing rather than rcducing intra-
European tensions. In addition, NATO greatly facilitates a continued U.S. militarv presence on the continent, which is what
in turn gives American guarantees much of their force. This presence would be harder to organize and to legitimize outsidc of
a multilateral framework.>

US involvement in NATO is key to hegemony in Europe

Duffield, 1994 (John S., Stanford, Political Science Quarterly. New York: Winlcr 1994.Vol. 109, Iss. 5: pg. 763, 25 pgs,
Copyright Academy oSPolitical Science Winter 1994, NATO's functions alier thc Cold War)

<The United States also provides a number of valuaMe military resources that its European allies would bc hard pressed to
match, either singly orjointly. These include satellite survcillancc: command. control. communication. and intelligence;
loaistics; long-range airlift and sealift; all-weather aviation; amphibious capabilities; large-deck aircraft carriers; and missile
defenses. Without U.S. participation, Western Europe's ability to engage in oul-of-area operations and perhaps even to defend
against certain regional threats would be much reduced. Indeed, as allied defense budncls continue to shrink. the
attractiveness of relying on American troops and technoloay may cvcn grow. Thus thc West Europeans have no simple
alternative to continued military dependence on the United States for years to come.(50)
The U.S. contribution is not iust a matter of military capabilities. however. hut also one of political leadership. While the
countries of Western Europe may not always agree with the policy goals or instruments favored in Washinnton, its
preponderance within the alliance allows the United States to exercise such leadership as setting the agenda, defining options,
and determining the pace of NATO action. In the absence of a natural leader. in contrast. anv West European groupjna will
find it more difficult to act decisivelv in contingencies short of an immediate military threat.(5 I)>
Consult NATO CP
7 Week Juniors

NATO GOOD-US POWER PROJECTION

NATO is key to maintaining US hegemony over Europe and European stability, significantly decreasing the risk of
war in Europe
Feng, 2004 (Liu. Master candidate, Ins~itutcof International Relalions. Nankai University, "Alliance. Institution and NATO
in the Post-Cold War Era." http://www.siis.org.cn/engIish/journa1/20C)4/4/clt37/liufeng.htm)

<The automatic collapse of the Soviet Union produced a post-Cold War international structure with the U.S. as the sole
superpower. The U.S. has intended to nrcserve its lone-standing predominance in international politics and NATO is one of
the significant tools to maintain and enlarge its hegemonic power. The need of U.S. hcgcmonv is the forenlost factor in
NATO's persistence while the need tt) dominate European securitv is the guarantee lor the U.S. to preserve its presence in
European conlinent and to stabilize the neopolitics in Eurasia. The strategic transformation of NATO in the post-Cold War
era has been conducted under the leadership of the US. The US has also been the initiator and supporter of NATO's eastern
expansion, intending lo take away the sphere of influences of the former Soviet Union and push hard Russia's existential
space so that Russia would have no strategic protection in Middle Europe and lose the powcr to compete against the US.
Meanwhile, i l NATO becomes a security institution for the whole Europe and takes a dominant position in future European
security architccture, the US will easily dominate the European affairs. The US endeavors to spread its values in these areas
by enforcin~NATO's political functions and promoting the political and economic systems in Middle and Eastern Europe to
be transformed in western way.> 2. The Worry of Re-nalionalization Since the end of the Second World War, Europe has
been the consumer rather than provider of security. The presence of the US vower in Europe is the important cause for
European nations to get out of centuries of mutual fighting and start cooperative development. because only when security is
guaranteed can nations pursue other noals such as peacclulness. aains and vower.[20] Although thcre are still some harsh
conllicts among European nations. there does not exist any threat of war, which is the precondition for them to develop
cooperative relations. The context under which this significant change takes place is that Europe beconles part of the US
hegemony and eniovs the "~ublicbenefit" of security provided bv the hegemony. If the US military presence is withdrawn
from Europe, the Europcan security will likely kcomc a problem. In the context of the end of the Cold War and the
unification of the two Gcrmany. European nations began to worry about each other's intentions, particularly about the future
going of a strong Germany. Robert Art has made an cxtensive examination of the diplomatic activities of the US, UK and
France on the issue of Germany's unification and shows that Britain and France have to promote the process of European
integration in order to bind Germany. Britain and Francc have put forward that the US protection and NATO's persistence be
the precondition of the unification of Germany and Gcrmany accepted this in order to reassure other European nations.[21]
The US and its European allies agree that the US must play an important role in Europe through NATO. 3.Declining m d
Suppressed Russia The disintegration of the Soviet Union rrlcans the loss of the raiscm d'ktre lor NATO, a milita~y-politicalorganization directly confronting
with the Soviet Union. Meanwhile. due lo Russia's inahility to resist the US expansion in the Middle and Eastern Europe. NATO could expand rapidly in the
former Soviet Union's sphere of influences as the US wishes. Lkspite that the international structure of bipolar rivalry has collapsed and Russia has taken the
road of capitalist. the struggle between the US and Russia in Europe is still going on and the security dilcmrna between these two powers exists. Indeed. the
policy-makers and academia in the West worry about Russia. a major military power that CaMOt be overlooked. The purpose of NATO's persistence and
expansion into the Middle and Eastcrn Europe is to confine Russia's strategic spacc and prevent it fmm rising again. NATO's expansion into the three
nations in the Baltic sea arca rncans that the glacis belween NATO and Russia disappear conlpletely and Russia's backyard becomcs NATO's frontier. At
the same time. the power structure between Kussia and NATO has experienced radical change. The persistence and exoansion of NATO as an
alliance and an institution in the post-Cold War reilects the intentions of the US to constantly control the West Europe,
promote American political and economic systems and values in the Middle and Eastern Europe. and contain Russia in order
to maintain its primacy and hegemony in thc world. Due to European nations' worry of re-nationalization in security and
defense and Russia's weakness, the US makes it possible to continue its military presence and exert its influence in Europe
through NATO. There is an obvious conncclion between NATO's wrsistence and American hegemony. institutionalism
explanation deliberately ncglects this conneclion and thus cannot reach a convincing conclusion. In explaining NATO's persistence we need to employ
rwlism theory to analyze the international structu~~and nations' function,which help support institution's persistence.>
Consult NATO CP
7 Week Juniors

NATO GOOD-TERRORISM I
NATO is key to the global war on terror
Atlantic Council 04 (Richard Clarke and Barry McCaffrey, co-chairs, "NATO's Role in Confronting
International Terrorism," June, CIAO)

<Individually and collectively, national leaders must be able to make a compelling case about why
substantial resources and sacrifices are necessary to deal with terrorism. The discussions and arguments will
vary in each country, bul these will all benefit from Ihc cxtcnt to which they rcflcct a common undcrstanding of thc
problem with other countries and leadcrs. There are several fora that have the ability to help build such a
common understanding and NATO is certainly one of them. The process of consensus-building is
important because international cooperation is critical: the costs of fighting terrorism will be enormous
and only the highest political levels can make the difficult choices and national trade-offs that are
necessary to commit substantial resources to this purpose. Furthermore, given that confronting terrorism
is likely to be a long-term, indefinite struagle, there is a danger of mission fatigue that can be mitigated
if individual responses are part of a larger, credible international effort. NATO has a unique way of
mobilizing a wide range of important countries. It plays a leading role in defining threats to international
security and, in the case of terrorism, has ensured that this problem receives regular attention at the
highest political levels in Europe and beyond. By addressing terrorism in the systematic, comprehensive
manner that characterizes NATO's approach to security issues, consensus has been built on the nature of
the problem and, in general, on appropriate responses. As a result of this and similar efforts by other institutions, it
is no longer acceptable for any nation to provide a permissive environmenl for terrorists, sonletimes justified as "freedom
fighters". in return for terrorists not causing trouble within its territory. Providing Intelligence Intelligence is critical to
fighting terrorism. "Seeing the enemy", in the case of international terrorism, requires looking beyond onc's borders and
exchanging information with other countries in order to understand the international networks through which modcrn
terrorists operate. Discussions with European governments, as well as longstanding U.S. preferences, make it quite clear that
specific. "actionable" intelligence will continue to be exchanged almost exclusively on a bilateral basis so that it may be
acted upon quickly and without jeopardizing sources and methods. Additionally, NATO typically deals with "finished"
intelligence that has already been analyzed by national intelligence agencies, as opposed to "raw" intelligence that involves
original source reporting and may be incomplete, or, in some cases, intentionally misleading (if it is derived from double-
agents who are not known to the reporting intelligence service). If NATO were to rely on raw intelligence or to try to
generate original intelligence, it would be more vulnerable to dcccplion. But there is widespread interest in the
possibility that, at a more general level and drawing on a broad set of information from national sources,
NATO could act effectively as a clearinrzhouse for exchanging assessments of the terrorism problem.
This is a necessary part of the consensus-building process through which members reach general
agreement on the nature of the problem before making decisions on responses. Given the wide range of
experiences with terrorism of member and partner countries, NATO can provide a useful forum for
comparing- views and developing a deeper overall understanding of the phenomenon. These efforts
might usefully be expanded to include the sharing of academic perspectives on terrorism and better
sharing of information on international criminal activities that potentially offer support to international
terrorism.>
Consult NATO CP
7 Week Juniors

NATO GOOD-TERRORISM

Consultations with NATO are uniquely key to deterring terrorist attacks

Atlantic Council 04 (Richard Clarke and Barry McCaffrey, co-chairs, "NATO's Role in Confronting
International Terrorism," June, CIAO)

<* NATO is best suited for promoting strategic consensus among its members and for roles that involve
coordinated action over a sustained period of time, such as coordination and integration of preventive
measures, consequence management, stability operations, surveillance of airspace and sea lanes g&
enhancing national capabilities, particularlv among weaker states. Challenges Seeing the Enemy
Sharing sensitive intelligence information will normally be done bilaterally, rather than multilaterally
through NATO. Yet, accurate and timely intelligence information is critical to confronting terrorism.
"Seeing the enemy", in the case of terrorism, poses a fundamentally different challenge for NATO than
does the more traditional task of seeking to determine the composition and disposition of enemy forces.
Each NATO member and partner faces unique circumstances that result in varying perceptions of the
terrorist threat. Systematic analytic exchanges are critical in building consensus on the changing nature
of the threat as well as understanding important differences in national perspectives. The highly
adaptive nature of the terrorist threat requires frequent adiustments in ways of thinking and responding.
NATO can provide unique added value by focusing on improving understanding of terrorist modes of
operation and intelligence problemsolving, rather than on the exchange of actionable intelligence that
involves highly sensitive sources and methods. Such intelligence is better handled and shared through
bilateral arrangements. NATO can bring together analysts from a wide range of countries, experiences
and disciplines whose collective wisdom can lead to a better understanding of how terrorists think -
something that no single member would likely be able to accomplish alone. NATO can be a forum for
intelligence analysts and scholars to build understanding and
solve specific problems.>

NATO is key to the ideological war on terror

Atlantic Council 04 (Richard Clarke and Barry McCaffrey, co-chairs, "NATO's Role in Confronting
International Terrorism," June, CIAO)

<A decisive arena in confronting terrorism is the realm of ideas. The populations in target areas must
come to believe that terrorism is neither justified for any political or religious reason, nor likely to
achieve political or social goals. Terrorism must be discredited as a means of political expression.
NATO's role to date on this front has been indirect - consisting primarily of exporting security so that local
governments have the possibility of providing good governance and more tolerant, attractive alternatives to tacitly
accepting, effectively harboring or even actively encouraging terrorist movements. However, NATO has the
potential, as it did during the Cold War, to offer an attractive, positive vision of diversity, tolerance and
progress heneath its security umbrella that could make a valuable contribution to the overall
confrontation with international terrorists.>
Consult NATO CP
7 Week Juniors

NATO GOOD-RUSSIAN IMPERIALISM L

The alternative to NATO engagement is Russian imperialism

Cornell et ale 04 Wegionill Swority io the Sooth Cauucnsus: Thc Role of NATO.' is a I>olicyPalwr produced by 11sCz'rntriil Asia-C:IUC;INISInstili~tr.Paul ti. N i l z k h o o l ol.Advanced
Sludies. k~hnsIlupkins Ilaibersily. It is co-aalhoued hg Svanle E. C:omclI. Kogcr Mc1)crunotl. William IYMallcy, Vlatiumir Socor, and S. Fu~derickS I ~ I T .
I~~lern:uional
http://w ww.silku~~1~dst~idic.~.i~r.r/d~~c'sl~~11blic~~ti~~11d2004/1~at~~pdf~

The South Caucasus forms an arena of two competing integration visions. A nascent vision envisages
the region's - anchoring and eventual integration into Euro-Atlantic security and economic systems. This
would ensure and consolidate the sovereignty and modernization of the region's countries that choose
this model. 11 is C I ~ S C II"*c~
~ with internal e\rolotion toward better iuusritutionol periormmcr. cooslitulionai govcrnmenl a d rule law. The other model, capitalizing

on an early start, is Russia's. It has sought to regain predominance over the South Caucasus through
military presence, manipulation of ethnic conflicts, control over energy supplies, takeovcrof iu~solwntindostlies through debt-
lilr-:asets sw:lps. support for Moscow-oriented local political forces, and expansion of government-connected shadow

business from R u s ~ i a i n t e ~ ~ e n e t rwithk>cnlcounterpms.

eti~ Thriving on the insecurity and weakness of nation-states in the
region, this integration - model aims to draw them into a Russian-led political, military and economic
bloc, in which Moscow would exercise droits de regard over these states' policies. Rusqian I n t e r e s t s S i ~ ~ c c findcpcndeixe hc

ofrheSuuth Caucmus, MOSCOW has reluctantly seen its influence in the region gradually declining, a process that it
has sought to block by the use of various diplomatic, economic. and military means. Mosn)ahnstricd tokccp t h S o o t h
Caucasus wilhin lhc Russian sphere ot'influcncc. w d has to that cnd tried to hinder the local slales from pursuing independent ioreipn policies. and impede the United Stales and Torkey imm incrcaniulg thcu
Ties with Iran have also served this purpose. Russian overt policy demanded that all
presenceandinfl~anceinthercgioo.

three states acceded to the CIS, accepted Russian border guards on their 'external' border with Iran and
Turkey, and allowed Russian military bases on their territory. M o ~ o v e , , Russia seeks to monopolize the
transportation of Caspian energy resources to world markets, and has sheltered coup-makers and
secessionist leaders from Azerbaijan and Georgia. sincc hrridcnl Putin come to pow,er.Russia llns doptud a more pragmatic position toward Azrb;~ijan.
;~llitidcill Ihc Minsk (iuvop ncpolillions: H U S S ~has illso k e n less vocel tounrd expandcd Amcrican a d Turkish i n l l u e ~ ~
Jeadillg III 311 impovmmenl ill rehlions and a more consll~~lclivc incthe region.
~ ~ ~ > continued
~ . e ~ ~ r . strongarm policies toward Georgia generate doubt as to what Moscow's intentions are. With
respect to the stalemated conflicts of the region, Moscow's policies have given abundant evidence to support
that Russia finds the present status quo convenient, and does not desire a resolution to anv conflict.>

US-NATO cooperation decreases Russian antagonism

Cornell et al. 04 rRcginnal Securily in lhe Sou~lhC;mcasns: Thc Role of NATO'. is I'olicy I'apcr produced by the Central Asia-Caucasus I~~rtilurc.lJaul H.Nilzc Schod of h d ~ l n c c d
:I
lolemnlirrnal Sludies. .Ioh~:sHopkins Unircrsiky. It is co-wthorcd by Sv;inte li. Clorncll. Rogcr McI>eumotl.William O'Mallcy. Vladimir Socor. and S. Frederick Sl;ur.
httpJ/www.silkroadstudics.or~docslp11bIi~'dtiou1s/2004/naro.pdn

C.cotr;~ltosochanopproachisthnt the definition of NATO and U.S. interests and goals - must be carried out initially
without regard - for Russian responses. Russia itself is in flux and its policies a half decade hence may
differ from those of today, especial1y as they relate to former Soviet territories.ITNATOand U.S.deillc~n.urratethat their
pdicizs in the south Coucasoa ;ur compntiblc wilh ~ u s s b ' sIegitimatc security concerns (its opposed to po~iticalaspirations). a d a 1 1even he n~pponivcof ihem. it enhances the

possibility that Russians not committed to zerosum thinking may gain - influence in Moscow. ual-ilr b~
NATO in defining its own strategy, directness in articulating it, and flexibility in its execution are the
hallmarks of any future success.>
Consult NATO CP
7 Week Juniors

RUSSIA IMPERIALISM KILLS CASPIAN OIL ACCESS I

NATO bulwark against Russian expansionism ensures Caspian oil access
Cornell et al. 04 ("Regional Security in the South Caucasus: The Role of NATO" is a Policy Paper
produced by the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International
Studies, Johns Hopkins University. It is co-authored by Svante E. Cornell, Roger McDermott, William
O'Malley, Vladimir Socor, and S. Frederick Stan.
http://www.silkroadstudies.org/docs/publications/2004/nato.pd~

The Russian integration model aims to a situation where the U.S., NATO and EU
would be required to deal primarily with Moscow - rather than with the South
Caucasus states themselves - on key issues of Caspian energy transit to the West and
strategic access to operational theaters in Eurasia. In that case, Moscow would obtain
major bargaining cards vis-8-vis Washington and European allies. Leading policymakers,
especially in Moscow's power ministries, have sought to apply a policy
paradigm of controlled instability in the South Caucasus through "peacekeeping" and
mediation in ethnic conflicts and through military footholds in the region. This
policy is based on perpetuating the conflicts within predictable and usable parameters,
frustrating their settlement without allowing their escalation. The primary goal is
political leverage over Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia, through Russian arbitration
among the parties to those conflicts and through preservation of local protectorates in
areas bf ~u-ssiantroop deployment. This paradigm can be seen not only in Georgia,
toward which Moscow long pursued a clearly adversarid policy, but also applies to
Russia's ally Armenia in a slightly different form: it ensures that country's
dependence on Russia by freezing Armenian territorial gains inside Azerbaiian, while
asserting control over Armenian industries as a result of debt-for-equity swaps
brought about by Armenia's economic debt to Russia.>
 Consult NATO CP
7 Week Juniors

NATO GOOD-CENTRAL ASIA

NATO provides Transcaucasian security

Cornell et al. 04 ("Regional Security in the South Caucasus: The Rote or NATO'' is a Policy Papcr produced by the Central Asia-Caucasus
Institute. Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University. It is co-authored by Svante E. Cornell, Roger McDermott.
William O'Mallcy, Vladi~nirSocor, and S. Frederick Starr. h~p://www.silkroadstudics.o~I~lws/puhlicationd2004/nato.pdt~

The South Caucasus forms the hub of an evolving neostrategic and geo-economic system that stretches
from NATO Europe to Central Asia and Afghanistan. It provides unique transit corridors for Caspian
energy supplies and ~ e n t r n hl i a n cnmmoditics to the EM~O-rlt~a~ltic
community, as well as direct access for allied forces to bases and

operational theaters in the Greater Middle East and Central Asia. Thus the Black Sea and Caspian
basins, with the South Caucasus uniting them, comprise a functional aggregate, now linked directly to
the enlarged
- Euro-Atlantic alliance. Although located on the Euro-Atlantic world's outer edge, this
regjon has already begun functioning as a rear area or staging ground in terms of projecting Western
power and values along with security into Central Asia and the Greater Middle East. This function is
likely to increase in significance as part of U.S. and NATO strategic initiatives. For all of the above reasons, security
threats to South Caucasus countries and the undermining of their sovereignty run counter to major Euro-Atlantic interests.>

NATO is uniquely necessary for Caucasian stability through dialogue and CBMs
Cornell et al. 04 ('.Regional Security in the South Caucasus: The Role ol. NATO" is a Policy Papm produced by the Ccntral Asia-Caucasus
Institute. Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University. 11 is co-authored by Svantc E. Cornell. Roger McDerr~stt.
William O'Mallcy, Vldimir Socor. and S . Frederick Starr. http://www.silkroadstudies.org/docslpublicationsMW/na~pclf)

<The fundamental challenge facing NATO is the issue of whether the Alliance is in political and
strategic terms willing to change the nature of its relationship with the South Caucasus. Howcwr. twoofthekey
chullenges hamper~npthc countries developing c11)ser relatio~~s
with the Alliance are geneally financial ;md lingn~stic.though complicalad still turtller by Ihe pmhletns o f c o m ~ p ~ i oand
~ r (hcu as yet limited
exposulr . o > ~ t u v c r . ~constraints
m~crnmi,itariesM h~ of their rather stubborn reliance on Soviet-era doctrine, a resistance to
change. and their differing priorities (such as. to forge a capability to retake and restore territorial
integrity by moving against the breakaway regions rather than a true professional national armed forces,
and their present and potential ambitions to wield a political role) underscore deep worries over the
future course of civil-military relations in the regional states. ~ h financi~lconstnints
c placecj npon ~ a t i ~ ndefense
al bdgels also slouts lhcpacc oi
d c k ~ i s ew h r m and ensures that ;n~gel'forls to increasr Ihc lcvcl of pnnicipntinn in NATO pmp~;uns will he dzpendent upon cithcr changing political prirrrildes rrr exle~nalfinancial :isuistance. Key. therefotr. lo
NATO developing itspmtrx~shipwilh 1k Sooth Car~c:lsoslies In actively seeking sponsorship fiom mcnibcr stales lo fund serious rimc-phased progmns that arc designed lo enhance the nulitxy and secm'i(y

capabilities olthe indi:lcooos wiled forces are extreme in a region that

seek m promotc regional coopcratinn and. in turn. stability. Clearly. S U C challenges
~
has been plagued by internecine political violence and "frozen conflicts", however, the process, as
difficult as it may be, requires every possible encouragement from the international community and
NATO can play a unique role in promoting dialogue and stimulating confidence building measures.~k
madmap a, c b s r r relalio~~s
hetween NATO i~ndthe rcgbn Innst rweibe visinnxy polilical backing: othe~wiseall cffr~fls lo achieve progress bill h i 1 Equdlly. pivcl~thc hterdependence heliveen Ihcse stat&<
and Russia, sarhilily cnii only he achieved in [hc wnlext of continued g d relations t!elu.cen Ihc Allin~iceand Rossia. whits1 seeking ILI reniind Moscow nf its 1999 lslanhul cummitme~~la lo "completely"
withdraw ils milililry forces f r u ~ nCicorxi;~.During his visir lo NATO Headqii.ulcr~on April 7. 2004. Sankashvili rcmivod suppnfl br Georgia's slance on this issue frtlm Inap de Hoc~pSchehr. NATO
~ ~ ~ ~NATO
- ~ supports
i ~ ~ e the
whossi,~that
~ t ~ ~ ~ ~full
~ implementation
. of the Istanbul agreement and hoped that
negotiations between Georgia and the Russian Federation on the withdrawal would resume as soon as
possible. l22>
Consult NATO CP
7 Week Juniors

CENTRAL ASIA IMPACT-NAGORNO I

Karabakh conflict escalates, drawing in Russia, Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, and the US
Cornell et al. 04 ("Regional Security in the South Caucasus: The Role of NATO" is a Policy Paper
produced by the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International
Studies, Johns Hopkins University. It is co-authored by Svante E. Cornell, Roger McDermott, William
O'Malley, Vladimir Socor, and S. Frederick Starr.
ht tp://w ww.silkroadstudies.org/docs/publications/2004/nato.pdf)

Of these, the unresolved conflict between Armenia and Azerbaiian is the largest
threat to peace and security in the South Caucasus and perhaps in the wider region.
With every year that the deadlocked conflict continues without a solution, the risk of
a resumption of hostilities looms larger, with ever larger implications.AI ,sent. the c~~rrrrnpolitical c~itcsin bolh .blocni;~a d Azerbaijan
sccm inclincd to find a st~li~livnby pcacch~lmeans. Whilc Armenia his suffered cons~derablyIn both economic and demographic tc11ns (due to oul-mi$raImn) :L% ;i ~rsull01 Lhc mnllict. its currcnl leadership
reiupes to compromise on Mooaalnous Ka~~hilkh's i~rdependence.This is rhc casc in part due lo the dominance of a Karahakh elite in Armenian pulitics: Presidnit Kobclt Kochxian is t k lormcr Presidenl of
lltc unrecognized repuhlic. and deCense rnmister Scrzh Sa~X.irianis its former defcnsc minislcr. This elite secms to give ill l e ~ sequal
l e~iiphnsisto Kurabakh's disrincl intcrcsts cnmp:wd LO those of hrmeni:~
proper. unlike former Pwsidrnl Ter-Pelrossian, who concluded by 1997 thal Arnmeoia's intcrcsls required a comprnmisr on Lhe svalus of Kxabikh. The Almenian leadership currently conlmls thc ternlory of
Mountainous h a b i l k h and seven a1,jarnnt Azcrb;lijalli recions, a~nilhcrcfore fecls less urgency i n n solutiiln. knncnia is clearly intcrestd in preserving Ihe mi1it;lry stalus quo lmtil it can get a favorable de:~l.
Thc .&/.c&iiani stKiely and leadaship. on the other hand. 1s deeply disrurkd hy the humilialion of losing nlmasl a fifih of Ihe cc~unt~y's territory, and the mssivc refugee and IDP population is both an
economic drain and :I political conccrn. Both Azerbaijan's Commu~lislrcgimc alkf the RIqiky go\cmmenl Cell in great put due lo their fail~nesill the war. and the new Prcsidcnt. Ilham Al~yev.is well aware of
the cenLri~lityof tla Kmhakh issue in Ihe c o u n t ~ ' spohics. Moreover, popular fr~~striition in the ctiuntry is on the risc with what is perceived as ?\rmrni.~n intransigence and internolional dlregud to the
a$prcssion commit~cdagainst their country. l'residenl Heydar Aliyev's effnrts lo conuul Ihc II>P popillation seems to have k c n thc major I-chsln thal spontnnetius rrva~~chist movements. including piimmilitsry
ones, are nor urnerging. cq)cci:~llyimrrn tk ~ e h ~ gpopulation.
er The hilurc olncgotintion.~has afnrsenulmallets. When President Ter-Petm.isiln :ccczpled Ihe 1997 Minsk Group pmgsal. hundteds of
thoosiuuls ofIL>l's rejoiced at Ihr prospea of m imminent retilm home. In laic 1999, :in i~nn~inenr dcal was shelved after the October27 wgedy in thc Armcninn parliament, whilc g ~ n hopcs l wcrc a_rain
d:tshed in the Sprine 01 2001. l o August 2002. President Ileydnr Aliyev offcrcd thc ~.cstoralionof economic relaliona ill retor11 t i ~ Arnleniln
r withdrour\.iilRam the ftar occupied ten.itarics along the 1nnlu11
bolder. P~rside~u Robert Kocharynn's refusi~llo discuss this ofler led to a widespread senlhl~entill Azerbaijan that Armenia's Icadcrship was 1101intercstcd in :L ncgolii~ledsolution, ud lhal aa R resull a militxy
solution iq the O I E Iremaining
~ optinn to ~ s t t > lthe nham Ali yev's government, which has
r costlt~?.s terrilorill intcprity and e s ~ h l reti~grrs
e to return 10 L ~ Chomes.5
L

always kept the military option as a last resort, is now increasinglv stressing that the Azerbaijani army is
ready to liberate its territorv if negotiations fail. If the present deadlock continues, as seems likely, the
public and elite mood in Azerbaiian will continue to graduallv tilt towards war. Meanwhile, Azerbaiian
is recovering economicallv. and is beginning to receive substantial oil revenues. It is also building its
armed forces with Turkish assistance - and Armenia's population is shrinking. Azerbaijan may hence
feel the odds are in its favor. A new war between Armenia and Azerbaiian, should it take place, is
unlikely to remain as limited as the previous One was. In 1901.~4.IIW IWO ~131- had only wjimcntiuy weaponry. and thr milit.uy involvetl were h r tiom ~OWS

pmkssional. U U ~in lilst eight w;ws. both states have acquired more sophisticated and therefore more dead1y arms,

meaning that a new war would almost certainly cause much larger human and material destruction.
Perhaps even more alarming is the network of alliances that both states have built, with Russia and
Turkey respectively. Neither Turkey nor Russia is likely to remain on the sidelines of a new
confrontation. Fighting is also likely to take place close to the Iranian border, therefore possibly drawing
Iran into the conflict as well. Pakistan has also offered Azerbaiian military assistance, while the United
States has crucial interests in the region's stability. Great power involvement may help prevent a new
war, but would give it regional implications of a massive scale if it were to occur.>
Consult NATO CP
7 Week Juniors

ALLIANCE BRINK I
NATO relations are on the brink
Singer, 2003 (Peter W., John M. Olin Post-Doctoral Fellow, Foreign Policy Studies, "New Thinking on
Transatlantic Security: Terrorism, NATO, and Beyond," January 15,
http://www.brookings.edu/views/speeches/singer/2OO31 i5.htm)

<Too often discussions of the future of NATO focus on the bureaucratic minutia of the institution itself,
rather overall context in which it must exist. The result is that they reach great level of details, but
unlinked to the world that shape the institution.
Instead, any consideration of transatlantic security policy must take into account three critical dynamics
that are presently changing how Americans and Europeans view the world. With these transformations
in outlook, our preferences are shifting in differing directions and the utility of longstanding institutions
are called into question. Given these forces, NATO stands at a critical iuncture.
For the sake of preserving our close transatlantic relations, it is important that Americans and Europeans
be frank about how our world is changing and our outlooks along with it. Only then, can we maintain
our long friendship and continue to work together towards our many common goals and values,>

Transatlantic relations are on the brink now-recommitment now is needed to a strong NATO
Sloan, 2002 (Stanley, Middlebury visiting scholar, "Toward a new transatlantic bargain," May 17,
Christian Science Monitor, Lexis)

<However, NATO's utility will shrink unless the US and Europe also deepen their commitment to
translatlantic cooperation. As NATO Secretary Genera1 Lord Robertson observed this week, NATO
must "modernize or be marginalized."
In the 1990s, the allies sought to adapt NATO to post-cold-war challenges. Nevertheless, they now face
a crisis of confidence. The Europeans have fallen far behind the US ability to deploy military forces on a
modem battlefield. European weakness has contributed to unilateralist temptations in Washington.
Some on both sides of the Atlantic suggest making a virtue out of necessity: Let the US take care of the
"war fighting" while Europe provides peacekeeping forces and finances reconstruction and
development.
However, this sort of division would only intensify transatlantic differences about the nature of
international problems and which instruments to use to deal with them - with the US always quicker to
resort to force than Europe.
In spite of current differences, close Euro-Atlantic ties remain essential. If the US and Europe cooperate,
as they must to conduct an effective war on terrorism, things pet done. If they are at odds, international
cooperation generally becomes more problematic.
When the transatlantic relationship faced a crisis in years past, the allies acted to strengthen their ties.
Today, they face the same choice: Revitalize the Atlantic communitv or risk its growing irrelevance.>
Consult NATO CP
7 Week Juniors

ALLIANCE BRINK

Now is a key time-NATO cooperation is on the decline-renewed genuine consultation is key to a revitalized alliance
framework
Kamp 05 (Karl-Heinz, Security Policy Coordinator of the Konrad-Adenauer-Foundat~on,"The Need to Adapt NATO's
Strategic Concept," Securio Strategies and their Inrplications for NATO's Stratc~gicConcept, November. CIAO)

.
<Transatlantic reconciliation notwithstanding, NATO is plagued by two closely intertwined difficulties. The first problem is
that thc "old" European members oT NATO in particular are less and less committed to the alliance. They support NATO
rhetorically, but hardly live Up to ~ommitmellts.For instance. promised fonu in~provementsin Afghanistan or in the Ba1k:lns often remain a de;ld letier. As a
result NA.l.O's SACEUR or Secretary General has to waste endless tin= to literally go begging for a few helicopters here or a few police units there. F01. manV members,

worse, hardly anyone in NATO cares that they don't care - a classic circle of silence. As a consequence, there is the second
problem that NATO has lost its function as the primary forum for achieving political consensus on security questions. Slowly
but steadily, NATO is improving its military capabilities. At the same time, there is less and less consensus on how and for
what DurDoses these forces will be used. Does NATO have to tackle drug trafficking in Afghanistan -yes or no:' Will NATO need to be engaged militarily in Imq
- yes or no'? What about the security challenges beyond thc classic NA'rO agcnda? What is NATO's view on the final political status of the Balkans? To give one example of the
political vacuum in NATO: there is no doubt that at present Iran poses one ofthe most severe security challenges for a11 NATO allies. Alas. in the last three years there has not
been a sing[e NATO nxeting at ambassadorial level dealing with Iran. Instead. Brussels is overburdened with day to day operations. How can an alliance which is hailed as the
litlchpin 11f Western security dare to ignorc crucial issues like Iran? Somc have suggested a "Wisc Mcn Group" or a new Hamxi Committee to develop suggestions on how to
overcotrle these problctns. 60th suggestions mjss a crucial point. It is not SO much the advice of experts or wise men that is needed. but action by
the member states. There are NATO members actively blocking, for example, coordination between NATO and the EU
because they want lo block these developments, not because they don't know any better. Some NATO members refuse to
consult other partners efl'cctivelv - simply because they do not want to consult them and not because they have no awareness
of the necessity of consulting. These countries are not likely to change their minds simoly because experts or committees say
-
SO. What is to bc done? Why does a new smtegic concept appear to be a feasible option? son^ may argue that NATO already has a viable strategy. Indeed, NATO already has a
Strategic Concept. hut this document was agrccd upon in 1999 - in thc midst of the Kosovo war. That was - before NATO took 011 a new type of peace enforcement in the Balkans.
- before Scptcmber 11 altered threat perceptions and the political priorities of the entire Western world, - M o r e NATO assumed a crucial role in Afghanistan. - herore thc Iraq war
Icd to a fundalilental discussio~kon the role of "preemptive" defense. - and k f u r c NATO took in seven new nwmbers. a innjor increase which has led to severe problems of
assin~ila~ion.None of these developments is niirrorcd in NATO's prcscnt suatcgy. Furthcrmorc. the United States and the European Union have come up with new post- 911 1
stratesic docun~e~its (the European Security Stratcgy and thc US National Security Stratcgy). which nuke the need for NATO's strategic adaptation even more pressing. lostead,
NATO has only been able to a p e on certain summit declamtiol~s.or individual docu~netlnsuch as the "Strategic Vision" paper released by SACT and SACEUR. but not on a
cohesive new strategy, The reason is as siniplc as it is disastrous: it appcars to hc too cutnhcrso~neand too titlie consuming to work on a c o ~ ~ v n owording.
n Moreover. there are
concerns that a strategic debate could reveal iust how deep the frictions in NATO really are. and could therefore lead to
further transatlantic cslrangcment. However, NATO cannot escape the process of strategic adaptation, since shaky strategic
foundalions are an impcdinicnr to successful common action. Postponing that process would not buv time. Thus, there is an
urgent need for NATO to start updating its strategy. Is a new strategic concept a panacea for all difficulties? Of course not -
but even an a~onizingstrategic debate with dissenting views and "agccments to disagree" would have at least two crucial
advan~ages:1- All NATO mcmbers would be forced to clarifv and prcciselv express their own positions. Such transparencv
would increase the general prcssurc to adapt thc individual ennawrncnt to commonl~anreed positions. Free riding would
become much morc difficult. 2- BYdefinition. NATO would become the center of the transatlantic security dialogue again.
Furthermore. popular mispcrceptions of Europeans humbly accepting US orders would be countered. Assuming that NATO agrees on
such a strategic debate. what would its content be? What are the points to bc tackled in a new strategic concept? Before the delails of a strategic discussion can be identified. two
fundamental insights, often disguised by political rhetoric. need to be taken into account. I - The inconiestablc dominance of lhc United States not O ~ inY
military but also in economic and political terms is going to persist for many years to come. This American "hyperpower" is
not per se "good" or "bad", but it has to be taken into account - whether one likcs it or not. This has Lwo vital implications: a)
any future direction of NATO will be determined crucially by the national prcrcrences of the United Slates; b) "muItipoIarity"in the
scnsc of countcrbalarring American supremicy is not goin:! to happen any time soon. even if the call for a nlultipolar world is constantly repeated irr Paris. Heijing or Moscow.
Moreover. i t is far fiom sure whether such a multipolar world with Anrrica. Europe, Russia. China. India and other potential "poles" would be a more stable one.>
Consult NATO CP
7 Week Juniors

AT: BICKERING TURN

Strategic dialogue urgently needs to be reestablished in NATO-bickering ultimately sublimes

into a better alliance
Riecke 05 (Henning, resident fellow at the Deutsche Gesellschaft fiir Auswiirtige Politik in Berlin,
specialising in European and transatlantic security, NATO Review,
http://www .nato.intldocu/review/2005lissuel/english/main-pr. html)

When the German Chancellor went on record at this year's annual Munich Security Conference in
February saying that NATO was "no longer the primary venue where transatlantic partners discuss and
coordinate strategies", he was only stating the obvious. But what is most troubling is that there is no
other such venue. The reason Gerhard Schroder chose to highlight the Alliance's predicament is that
NATO is designed, in part. to build consensus between Europe and North America in the security field
and he believed it should be doing a better job. Schroder proposed the creation of a high-level panel to
discuss how to improve transatlantic relations, with the goal, among others, of re-establishing a culture
of strategic dialogue within the Alliance. To achieve this, NATO has to adapt. nThe Alliance is not,
of course, the only international institution that has to adapt to today's fluid and complex security
environment. Both the European Union and the United Nations have to be equally reform-minded and
ambitious, if they, too, are to move with the times and contribute to building a more stable world. Nor is
it the first time that NATO has found itself in such a situation. Indeed. it is difficult to think of a time
that the Alliance has not been in the process of reinventing itself. [?Though frequently written-off over
the years as irrelevant or dying by critics and advocates alike, NATO has made adapting to new
challenges some thin^ of a speciality. That said, change has not always come easily. Indeed, more often
than not, the process has been characterised by frustration, friction and protracted consultations, making
the Alliance appear at times a hotbed of infighting rather than a consensus-building institution. But no
matter how acrimonious the discussions leading to eventual compromise, such adaptation has been
critical to NATO's successful evolution as well as to maintaining wider stability. Moreovcr, NATO is
currently in the process of an extremely dynamic military transformation. Why then does the Alliance appear so divided
politically? J OUnderstanding the way that NATO adapts requires an analysis of the driving forces behind Alliance cohesion.
At times when the security environment changes, issues such as a joint threat perception, a shared interest in maintaining the
US presence in Europe and common values inevitably come under scrutiny. This was very much the case, for example, in the
1960s when the United States became vulnerable for the first time as a result of thc dcvclopmcnt of Soviet intercontinental
missiles. At the time, the Alliance responded by changing its strategic doctrine from one of massive retaliation to one of
ilexible response and, following adoption of the Harmel Report in 1967. by redefining the Alliance's future purposes as both
providing dclcrrcnce and promoting dktente. _I LlIn this way, adaptation relates not only to the instruments at the
Alliance's disposal, but also to the purpose of NATO as a whole. and to the rules that guide cooperation.
The emergence of non-traditional threats since the end of the Cold War has made negotiations about a
shared perception of security difficult. At the same time, however, responding to these threats has
demanded greater openness and flexibility in strategic planning so as to prepare the Alliance for a wider
range of tasks. >
Consult NATO CP
7 Week Juniors

AT: COLLAPSE INEVITABLE

NATO collapse is not inevitable-multiple variables affect the alliance

Busby 04 (Josh, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard, "Veto Powers and
Political Distance in International Affairs," Sept. 2,
http://wws.princeton.edu/jbusby/papers/apsa2OW.pd~

The argument that differences in material conditions between the U.S. and Europe--essentially a
realist argument--merits more examination. One strand of this argument takes the end of the Cold War
as the point of departure. Kenneth Waltz, the father of modern realism in international relations,
proclaimed in 1993 that without the common security threat. the U.S. and Europe were ineluctably going
to be driven apart. With the Soviet Union gone, Waltz predicted that "NATO's days are not numbered,
but its years are."21 However, this argument assumes the inevitability of both the NATO alliance and its
demise, as if the material environment demands a single policy response.
However, both in the formation and the potential dissolution of the Atlantic alliance, material
signals do not determine state behavior. Jackson makes a convincing case that American multilateralism
in Europe after World War I1 was not a foregone conclusion. The immediate post-war years brought a
rapid retrenchment the military. Isolationist sentiment, an important strand of American thought dating
back to George Washington, was strong in the Congress led by Republican Robert Taft. Only skilled
leadership by Truman and Marshall transformed re-building Europe and creating NATO into the defense
of a common civilization.22 By the same token, there is nothing inevitable about the end of the alliance.
While there may be new constraints that put the alliance under strain, there are off-setting pressures-
shared values, a history of cooperation, interdependence-which pull in the other direction. Which view
ultimately prevails is as much or more a consequence of deliberate choice than it is the product of
material forces. >
 Consult NATO CP
7 Week Juniors

I AT: DELAY

New consultation architecture ensures quick dialogue

Broekema 06 (Frits, principal consultant at Capgemini, FACE vol. 4 no. 1,
http://www .nl.capgemini.com/m/nI/f2f/service~oriented~enterprise/03~Navo~uk.pdf)

This approach to architecture is no longer based on the business processes of the respective NATO
countries, but focuses instead on the desired effect. The advantage is that NATO can anticipate a
dynamic environment - which by definition a war zone certainly is - much quicker. Kruidhof:
"Architecture must give systematic form to country's mutual trust in one another and, of course, the
rights people have to each other's belongings.'' Operations in many areas far from European borders
such as Afghanistan, Iraq and Darfur and the ever-increasing diversity of the mission partners increases
risks. Along with this, it also increases the necessity for even more efficient collaboration and better
utilisation of the synergy between the various svstems than is now the case. With a service-oriented
architecture under construction, NATO is preparing for a new era just in time.

Quick committee action makes reaching consensus q u i c k 4 8 hours max

Michel03 (Leo, Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for National Strategic Studies, "NATO
Decisionmaking: Au Revoir to the Consensus Rule?", Strategic Forum, August,
http://www.ndu,edu/inss/strforum/SF202/SF202 .pdf)

The inherent flexibility of the consensus rule also was demonstrated in decisionmaking on the timing,
strategy, and tactics of Allied Force. For example, during the crisis, the NAC frequently decided not to
engage subordinate committees. This kept sensitive NAC discussions as private as possible and
facilitated its rapid decisions, normally with a 48-hour (or less) turnaround. Then-Secretary General
Javier Solana played a key role in reconciling divergent views within the NAC using a "summarv of
discussions," one of several techniques devised to avoid putting any single Ally "on the spot."
Furthermore, the NAC delegated to Solana the authority to implement, suspend, or terminate the
Limited Air Response-the first phase of the air campaign. In this way, the NAC ceded (by consensus)
the decision to Solana to initiate a preapproved spectrum of airstrikes. There were differences later
among Allies over target selection and mission assignments, but these generally were solved through
bilateral channels outside NATO and involved only the parties directly concerned. In sum, while
extraordinary efforts were required to maintain consensus throughout Allied Force, these arguably were
vital to preserving NATO solidarity and ultimately achieving its stated objectives in Kosovo. September
1I. The consensus rule did not prevent NATO from acting quickly-that is, within 24 hours of the
terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001-to invoke, for the first time in its history, Article 5. Although
the immediate operational impact of that action was negligible, the NAC decision was a powerful
political statement of solidarity that was warmly welcomed by the United States. After all, the shock of
the attacks was soon compounded by warnings of additional, imminent, and potentially catastrophic
terrorist strikes.
 Consult NATO CP
7 Week Juniors

I AT: EU COUNTERBALANCING

Europe won't counterbalance-it's too weak and disunified

Hulsman 03 (John, Reseach Fellow at the Heritage Foundation, "Prepared Statement of John Hulsman,"
Renewing the Transatlantic Partnership, June 1 1,
http:Nwwwa.house.gov/international~relatons/ 08/87670.PDF)

<As with military matters, the overall view must be qualified. Over the past five
to eight years, the British, Spanish, Dutch, and Irish economies have been growing
at very respectable rates. Given their more open pensions systems, neither Dublin
nor London face the same demographic crisis currently looming in Italy, France, or
Germany. Great Britain remains the largest direct investor in the United States,
as America does in the UK. Moving geographically around the traditional motor of
EU integration-France, Germany and Italy--economic liberalism is found flourishing
on the European periphery. It is hard to characterize a common European
economic state of being, as the differences outweigh the economic commonalities.
This is even truer in the political realm. Contrary to any number of misleading
commission communique's, the Europeans are light years away from developing a
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). One has only to look at the seminal
issue of war and peace during the past year- what to do about Saddarn Hussein's
Iraq-to see a complete lack of coordination at the European level. Initially, the UK
stood shoulder-to-shoulder with the U.S., Germany's militant pacifists were against
any type of military involvement, be it sanctioned by the UN or not; with France
holding a wary middle position, stressing that any military force must emanate from
UN Security Council deliberations. It is hard to imagine starker and more disparate
forei~npolicy positions being staked out by the three major powers of Europe.
Even on issues relating to trade, there are vast differences within the EU. The
recent spat between President Chirac of France and British Prime Minister Blair
was about far more than atmospherics. It was about whether northern European
countries, such as the UK, would continue to countenance southern EU countries'
(such as France) dogged desire to protect the wasteful Common Agricultural Policy
(CAP), even though it may well prove to be a deal-breaker at the Doha global free
trade round. On missile defense, relations with Turkey, and critically, the future
course of the EU-with Germany for deepening and widening. the UK for widening
primarily, and the French stressing deepening of EU institutions--one finds a cacophony
of European voices. rather than everyone singing from the same hymnal.
Military weakness, economic stagnation and political disunity-this is the reality
that confronts American decision-makers today when looking at Europe. Despite
overly cheerful rhetoric and the hopes of many on the continent, Europe is not likely
to challenge American primacy in the long-run. This is not due to any general, continental
love of Washington or its policies. Rather, it is the result of European political,
military and economic weakness.>
Consult NATO CP
7 Week Juniors

AT: EU FILL-IN

The EU cannot replace NATO

Kwok 05 (James, staff writer at the Harvard International Review, "Mending NATO: Sustaining the
Transatlantic Relationship," Defining Power, Vol. 27 (2) - Summer,
http://hir.harvard.edu/articles/ 13441)

<The goals of any country do not always match up with those of its multilateral institutions, but
European Union as it stands has not rendered NATO obsolete. If anything, the European Union needs to
rely on NATO for the military force that underpins any sort of cultural or "soft power" that Europe can
lend to international politics. Currently, the military expenditures of the three largest countries in the
European Union-the United Kingdom, France, and Germany-hover around US$40 billion. In stark
contrast, the United States spent roughly US$370 billion equipping its military forces in 2004, more than
the aggregate of the three countries' military expenditures. Close association with the US ability to
marshal massive resources is necessary if Europe wishes to invoke the threat of military force to back its
diplomacy: it inevitably will need to when its influence and voice grow.
While the European Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy is starting to provide another basis
for EU primacy in its own security affairs, NATO still stands as a key determinant in transatlantic
security. That the United States is some sort of power mongerer wishing to emasculate transatlantic
security for its own sake is a specious notion. In 2002, the administration of US President George W.
Bush called for a highly responsive "rapid reaction force" within NATO, comprising 20,000 troops. At a
time when the European Union is developing military capabilities of its own, it seems that US policy is
trying hard to establish a diplomatic relationship with Europe that is reliant on a common multilateral
institution.>

The EU cannot fill in NATO's consultative role

Atlantic Council 04 (Richard Clarke and Barry McCaffrey, co-chairs, "NATO's Role in Confronting
International Terrorism," June, CIAO)

<* The U.S.-EU process is at present a less apt institution for this purpose. The agendas
for the U.S.-EU summits have expanded considerably in recent years to include security
matters and the U.S.-EU process would be more acceptable to some European countries
than would NATO as an institutional home for such a dialogue. But there is little
prospect that it would be seen on the U.S. side as suitable, if only because the range of
subjects on which the EU participants are empowered to act independentlv of the
member states does not include many of the most important subiects involved in dealing
with the terrorist threat. The US.-EU summit process also excludes Russia and, as
currently constituted, only indirectly involves all the governments that need to be part of
the deliberation.>
Consult NATO CP
7 Week Juniors

AT: LIE PERM

Leaks happen-NATO will find out

Rurnsfeld 05 (Donald, Sec. or Defcnse, Feb. 13, "NATO," http:llwww.usembassy.org.uk/nato191 .hlml)
Thank you, Horst. I can't challenge the individual who said that important issues aren't bcing discussed in NATO but my
impression from reading the cables and from participating in NATO defense ministcrial meetings and participating in NATO
summit meetings, I have the impression at least that important issues are discussed at NATO, and usefully so. There may
be othcr things that could be discussed hut of course we have 26 members and they can all lob then1 over the transom and see that thcy pet considered. Thc
qucstion I believe that Mr. Chipman raised, it was about military transformation. I don't t h n k of transformation as something that starts un-transformed and
gtas to something that is transformed. I think of it as a process where we are forced by the nature of our world in this 21 st century to continue, and it's more
a matter of culture and attitude than it is technologies or platforms. It's more a question of recognizing that in the world today we are faced with things t h ~ t
come at you very fast and we need speed and we need agility and we need flexibilily in our militaries if a g c a t Inany lives are to be saved. 1noted that
somebody mentioned the Allied Transformation Command that is headed by Ed Giambostiani. We call it Joint Forccs. It
is our Transformation Command. It is working effectively with NATO and with NATO nations in my vicw. J
have seen a great deal of effort on the part of some of our allies to connect there. I would add that we are also
including other countries - South Korea, Japan and Australia - in working with the Allied Commantl Transfornlation hecause we recognize how important
that is. The question 1 think went on to ask about peacekeeping ahout post-conflict stabilization. And you are right, these are tembly i~nportantaspects of it.
and they are not something that the Department of DeCense alone is involved in. In many cases, as we found in Bosnia and Kosovo. for example, you can put
some military people in there but unless you develop the non-nlilitary part of a society, the civil justice system and the c-riminal justice system and a court
system and the other aspects that go along with making a civil socicty. it doesn't work. So we have a Joint Forces Comniand. The Allied Conln~and
Transformation after the Iraq major conflid ended did n very comprehensive "lessons learned." They then went and worked with the Iraqis who were in
prison for the most part and did a "lessons learned" from their standpoint. What did it look like from their standpoint? And the two briefings are fascinating. I
got an hour and a half on the first one and ended up going back for another 1.5 or 20 hours to try to understand precisely what took place and why and, of
course. the thing that many observers to conflict forget, is that plans kind of end when you hit the battlefield and you are against a thinking cnerny and the
enemy adapts and ad,jusls.The thing (hat strikes me, and the other day I sat down and started musing over what it was that was going on. and came to the
conclusion that waging a war is obviously atways difficult but givcn the realities of the 21st century. it is particularly complex and we have lo recognize that
this global war on terror is the first war in history that is hcing conducted in a world dominated by a particular set of new realities. Multiple global satellite
television networks. 24 hours news coverage, dozens of domestic and international television channels devoted
to news, commentary and analysis, live covcrage of terrorist attacks, disasters and combat operations, 24 hour talk
radio where everything gets chopped around and discussed and analyzed, a global Internet with
universal access and no inhibitions - something doesn't have to be true to be thcre, you might not have noticed that -
bloggers and hackers and chatrooms, digital cameras and camcorders, wielded by journalists, the public, by soldiers, emails
and cell phones with global reach where something is happening on one place is instantaneously known
halfway around the world; the reporters embedded with the military who are physically thcre looking at a slice
of what's taking placc, a single slice to be sure but an accurate single slice; a Congress that stays in session near
endlessly with television broadcast and 1 believe the number of congressional aides has doubled fro1118.000 to 16,000 since I was Secretary
of Defense back in the 70s. That is a lot of congressional aides. A House and a Senate in the United States, and I suppose in the parliaments of other
countries as well. where fewer and fewer members ever served in the military. The increasingly casual regard for national security
and classified documents. Things leak out continuously. It alters how you have to behave. m discussing things.
if you know a classified document is likely to leak, you end up not having that document - which forces you to do things in dilferent ways, non-intuitive
ways
 Consult NATO CP
7 Week Juniors

1 AT: LIE PERM

Lying is worse--destroying NATO's credibility destroys the alliance

Andersen 98 (James, former Defense and National Security Analyst at The Heritage Foundation,
"Answering Senate Questions about NATO Enlargement," Feb. 2,
http://www.heritage.org/research/internationalorganizations/BG 1154.cfm)

Insuring Credibility UIn developing a coherent military strategy, NATO must consider existing
resources, military capabilities, and potential threats. As historian Donald Kagan of Yale University
argues, "The expansion of NATO will be worse than useless unless it is backed by the military power
needed to fulfill the pledges we are undertaking."43 In other words, bluffing is not an option; operational
capabilities must be exercised, lest NATO's credibility atrophy.
During the Cold War, the United States participated in annual NATO exercises to test its reinforcement
capabilities during periods of crisis. By tangibly demonstrating Washin~ton'sintention to honor its
security commitment, these exercises also served a political function. It is not necessary to duplicate the
scale of Cold War exercises today; however, reinforcement options still need to be exercised. The size,
scope, and frequency of these exercises will vary depending on the country. For example, reinforcing
Hungary will pose a special challenge to military planners, since it does not share a contiguous border
with any other NATO country. Furthermore, computer simulations, though helpful, cannot entirely
replace reinforcement exercises. Computer simulations do not carry the same political weight. Nor do
they account for the real-world frictions that invariably arise when moving personnel and supplies over
vast distances.>
Consult NATO CP
7 Week Juniors

AT: NATO DOESN'T CARE ABOUT OUR PLAN I

Using NATO for new purposes ensures its continued relevance
Parish 05 (Jonathan, senior planning officer in the Policy Planning and Speechwriting Section of
NATO's Political Affairs and Security Policy Division, NATO Review,
http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2005/issue l/english/main-pr.htm1)

<Looking back, both London and Prague can be seen to be reactions to changes that happened around
NATO. Whereas London was a response to the end of the Cold War, Prague was a response to the
terrorist attacks on the United States on 911 1. So Prague was not the Transformation Summit, but it
ensured that the Alliance remained on the path it had embarked upon in London - ensuring NATO's
continued relevance by undertaking new roles and acquiring the capabilities necessary to carry them out
effectively. >

NATO provides a consultative framework for issues like the plan

Gaertner 2000 (Heinz, Professor at the Austrian Institute for International Affairs, "European Security,
the Transatlantic Link, and Crisis Management," March 14, CIAO)

<The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) provides a mechanism for productive consultation and
more meaningful communication among Partners as well as a framework in which the enhanced PfP can
develop. There will also be possibilities for closer political dialogue, consultations and greater scope for
joint decision-making and coordination. With the creation of the EAPC, NATO carries forward its
transformation on the basis of a broad, cooperative approach to security. Partners will have new
opportunities to consult with the Alliance more regularly and more substantively. The EAPC is thus the logical
political complement to a strnnger. more clperalional Partnership for Peace. As the Basic Docu~nentof the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council of May 30,
1997 states: In addition, the Council will provide [he franiework to afford Partner countrics, to the maximum extent possible, increased decision-making
The specific subject areas in which Allies and Partners would
opportunities relating to activities in which they participate
consult within the framework of the EAPC might include, but are not limited to: political and security
related matters; crisis management; regional matters; arms control issues; nuclear, biological and
chemical (NBC) proliferation and defence issues; international terrorism; defence planning and budgets;
defence policy and strategy; and security impacts of economic developments. EAPC's scope will include
consultations and cooperation on issues such as: civil emergency and disaster preparedness; armaments
cooperation under the aegis of the Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD); nuclear
safety; defence related environmental issues; civil-military coordination of air traffic management and
control; scientific cooperation; and issues related to peace support operations. This array of options and
cooperation provides for an innovative capacity in the face of new challenges not requiring an Art. V
(collective defence) response. This broad security approach encompasses not only military, but also
economic, political, societal and environmental concerns. These occur simultaneously at global, regional
and local levels. As non-Art. V continxenciesthey will be ddressed by "coalilions of the willing" which include. as in Bosnia and Kusovo, both
NATO and non-NATO mcrnhers. NATO will create flexible military assets, suitable for use by varying "coalitions," which it can cmploy when taking on
crisis management tasks itself but also to lend to the Europeans according to the idea of "separable but not separate" capacities.>
Consult NATO CP
7 Week Juniors

AT: NATO OBSOLETE .

Lack of European conflict hasn't lessened NATO's relevanc+still important for US-Europe
cooperation
Kwok 05 (James, staff writer at the Harvard International Review, "Mending NATO: Sustaining the
Transatlantic Relationship," Defiizing Power, Vol. 27 (2) - Summer,
http://hir.harvard.edu/articles/l344/)

<However, the concept of NATO was not solely a military role. This means that it can change to meet
the demands of the future. NATO can move beyond providing security in the heartland of Europe to
working on projects in which the United States and Europe have common interests. EU member-states
under NATO have been paying close attention to Eastern Europe and Eurasia. a point that usually fails
to garner much attention in US foreign policy. Recently, the US command in Europe decided to shift its
NATO-affiliated personnel from western European countries like Germany to places closer to Eurasia,
such as Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania. With the recent expansion of NATO to include Poland,
Hungary, the Czech Republic, Cyprus, and Malta, there is a closer emphasis on looking eastward into
trouble spots to which NATO previouslv could not extend. On March 2,2005, NATO signed an
agreement with Georgia's Minister of Foreign Affairs Salome Zourabichvili to allow transit of supplies
from Europe to reach war-torn Afghanistan. Collaboration with NATO can also bring countries on
Europe's periphery closer into the international community.
Consult NATO CP
7 Week Juniors

AT: SAY NO L

NATO won't say no-US is too dominant

Schwarz 02 (Peter, "Prague NATO Summit," WSWSt
http://www.wsws.org/articles/2O02/dec20tml)

For the time being, European governments are reluctant to engage the US in an open conflict. They are
deterred by the economic and military dominance of the US as well as the divisions in their own ranks.
Foreign policy conflicts with Europe's most important trading partner would have significant
consequences for European economies already plagued by economic problems.

NATO's consultative framework generates pressure to agree

Clark 01 (Wesley, Army General, "An Army of One??', Washington Monthly,
http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/features/2OO1/0209.clark.html)

NATO itself acted as a consensus engine for its members. Because it acts on the basis of such broad
agreement, every decision is an opportunity for members to dissent--therefore, every decision generates
pressure to agree. Greece, for example, never opposed a NATO action, though its electorate stron~lv
opposed the war and the Greek government tried in other ways to maintain an acceptable "distance"
from NATO military actions. This process evokes leadership from the stronger states and pulls the
others along.
Of course, this wasn't a pleasant experience for any of the participants. For U.S. leaders during the war,
it meant continuing dialogue, frictions, and occasional hard exchanges with some allies to get them on
board. For some European leaders, the experience must have been the reverse: a continuing pressure
from the United States to approve actions--to strike targets--that would generate domestic criticism at
home. There was no escaping the fact that this was every government's war, that they were intrinsically
part of the operation, and each was, ultimately, liable to be held accountable by its voters for the
outcome.
 Consult NATO CP
7 Week Juniors

I AT: UN1LAT GOOD

NATO is key to US leadership and transatlantic security-unilateralism is not sufficient

Busby 04 (Josh, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard, "Veto Powers and
Political Distance in International Affairs," Sept. 2,
http://wws.princeton.edu/jbusby/papers/apsa2004.pdf)

Ikenberry, in his book After Victory, reminds us that, through careful design of multilateral
institutions like NATO, the World Bank and the IMF, the U.S. was able to extend its power and
legitimate its influence after the Second World War.38 He argues that the interests of great powers are
not always best served through the expedient choice of unilateral means. While the U.S. possesses
enough military power to achieve most of its ends through force alone, there are better (read: less costly)
ways to get things done in the international system than through coercion. Ikenberry suggests, even as
unipolarity removes certain constraints on unilateral action, there are offsetting signals-
-

interdependence. the stability wrought by locking other states into a rule-based order. and American
public opinion -- that encourage multilateral action.39 If Ikenberry's analysis is correct, the "ambivalent
internationalism"40 that has characterized U.S. foreign policy since the end of the Cold War
demonstrates a misunderstanding of the U.S. national interest and the lessons of history.
Indeed, transnational problems, even security issues like terrorism, demand global solutions
which ultimately limit the ability for any one country to solve the problem on its own. Even if the U.S. is
relatively more powerful militarily than all rivals, it is not all powerful and cannot get its way without, at
the very least, token overtures to its allies to participate. This was clearly evidenced by U.S. difficulties
to secure basing rights from Turkey before the war in Traq and has since been borne out in problems the
Americans have had in inducing others to contribute to Iraq's reconstruction. >