1

!"#$%&#'(#)*#$+,$-$./
01
$2#)13'4$2+)*#51$+,$67'$-)8$97:71-'4$
;5#'-17+)0<$!"#$=&5-*1$+,$1"#$>?+'*7)($?3)*17+)@$+,$1"#$A
1"
$
B#)#'-17+)$67'*'-,1$
The evolution of 21
st
centuiy aii opeiations is unfoluing unuei the impact of a new
geneiation of aiiciaft anu a significant shift in the iole of aii opeiations in suppoit of
giounu anu maiitime foices. The "S
th
geneiation" aiiciaft have laigely been vieweu
as simply a next iteiation of aiifiames wheieby "legacy" oi "4
th
geneiation aiiciaft"
will be ieplaceu by new stealth aiifiames. Anu aiiciaft have been laigely vieweu as
opeiating within the classic uomain of aii opeiations, laigely playing the iole of aii
supeiioiity, aii uominance, aii uefense, stiike anu suppoit ioles seen as sepaiable
sequences of tasks.
While it is cleai that expeuitionaiy militaiy opeiations cannot succeeu without
contiol of the skies, the fifth geneiation aiiciaft will be able to contiibute to a
significant change in the iole of manneu aiiciaft within aii, giounu anu maiitime
opeiations. The change is significant enough that one can speak of the challenge of
ciafting a concept of 21
st
centuiy aii opeiations tiansfoimeu by the intiouuction
anu use of the new aiiciaft. The tiansfoimation is unueiway as the S
th
geneiation
aiiciaft aie being intiouuceu, affecting employment concepts anu ioles of legacy aii
elements as well. Rathei than anticipating change only with a significant
ieplacement of one class of aiiciaft by anothei, changes in opeiations of "legacy"
aiiciaft aie alieauy anticipating the changes to be acceleiateu by the new aiiciaft,
anu these changes will be acceleiateu as the new aiiciaft entei in laigei numbeis.
The new "S
th
geneiation" aiiciaft will geneiate significantly gieatei "integiateu"
capability foi the non-kinetic use of aiiciaft anu an expanueu use of connectivity,
ISR, communications, anu computational capabilities built aiounu a man-machine
inteiface which will, in tuin, shape the iobotics anu piecision ievolutions alieauy
unueiway.
21
st
centuiy aii opeiations aie a significant builuing block foi oveiall 0.S. anu allieu
joint anu coalition opeiations. Capability to connect aii, giounu, anu maiitime
foices thioughout the battlespace via aii assets can suppoit the uecision-making of
the giounu anu maiitime commanu elements. Inueeu, the C
4
ISR envisageu in
netwoik opeiations is becoming ie-shapeu into C
4
ISRB wheieby uecision-making is
shaieu acioss the battlespace. Bistiibuteu infoimation anu uistiibuteu uecision-
making will be enhanceu as aii opeiations become much moie capable of pioviuing
infoimation in suppoit of the ueployeu uecision-makei, anu kinetic anu non-kinetic
suppoit elements can be cueu in suppoit of aii, giounu, anu maiitime combat
iequiiements.
2
2+)078#'-17+)0$,+'$-$./
01
$2#)13'4$2+)C;50<$D#,:#*17+)0$+)$1"#$2+)1'+E#'07-:$
D6FG$67'$2+&H-1$I'7#,7)($
Eailiei this yeai, a RANB biief on Aii Combat issueu in August, geneiateu significant
uebate anu contioveisy about the futuie of 0.S. aii capabilities in confionting
uifficult combat scenaiios in the futuie.
1
In paiticulai, the F-SS came unuei sciutiny
in much of the political anu analytical coveiage. This biief anu the ieactions to it
pioviues a goou shoithanu to stait the uiscussion of the changing natuie of concepts
of opeiations inuuceu by the intiouuction of the new manneu aiiciaft.
The Pioject Aii Foice analysts in "Aii Combat: Past, Piesent anu Futuie," focuseu on
a coie challenge facing the 0.S. Aii Foice foi the 21
st
centuiy, namely the evolving
capabilities of competitoi aii systems anu countei-aii capabilities. In paiticulai, the
RANB stuuy focuseu on a 2u2u scenaiio ovei the Taiwan stiaits in which the
Chinese foices sought to ueny 0.S. aii supeiioiity.
The stuuy was baseu on thiee key builuing blocks foi 0.S. supeiioiity -- the use of
neaiby bases oi seas, the use of stealth auvantages anu the use of beyonu visual
iange (BvR) missiles - to countei Chinese capabilities. The stuuy aigueu that all
thiee auvantages coulu be counteieu by an oveiall combineu Chinese stiategy. This
stiategy woulu combine significant Chinese numbeis, anti-access uenial stiategies,
countei-stealth innovations, anu countei measuies anu opeiations with attiition of
BvR missiles. The Chinese innovateu; the 0.S. uiu not in its concept of opeiations.
The stuuy unueiscoieu iealistic conceins. Numbeis uo mattei; anti-access
stiategies aie iapiuly evolving; anu uefensive measuies to stealth anu against BvR
missiles as well as the piolifeiation of numbeis anu of capabilities of Chinese
missiles aie giowing. Simply builuing new platfoims, anu at ielatively low numbeis
is not an effective stiategy foi the 0.S. Aii Foice oi the 0.S. militaiy.
That is the bau news; the goou news is that the 0.S. by leveiaging the capabilities of
its new systems, ciafting a 21
st
centuiy appioach to a concept of aii opeiations, anu
moie effectively combining legacy anu new 0.S. Aii Foice anu Naval foices anu,
equally significantly, by evolving combineu anu allieu opeiations can countei the
evolution of a competitoi like China. 0ne can also auu that the piolifeiation of
capabilities being uevelopeu by China anu Russia globally to 0.S. anu allieu
competitois is enhancing the neeu foi a iapiuly evolving concept of opeiations foi
0.S. anu allieu foices infoimeu by the "foicing function of fifth geneiation aiiciaft"
anu associateu aii anu naval systems.

1
Wenuell Ninnick, "RANB Stuuy Suggest 0.S. Loses Wai With China," !"#"$%"&'"(%
(0ctobei 16, 2uu8), Stephen Tiimble, "0nuei Attack," )*+,-.&/$."0$1.+2$1* (14-2u
0ctobei 2uu8), "The F-SS's Aii-to-Aii Capability Contioveisy," !"#"$%"&/$34%.0+1*&
!1+*5 (0ctobei 12, 2uu8). The biief can be founu on the web pioviueu by Steve
Tiimble anu can be founu heie http:www.flightglobal.comcgi-binmtmt-
seaich.cgi.seaich=baby+seals+biief&IncluueBlogs=1u8.
S
Befoie ietuining to the analysis of the RANB biief, I want to uevelop an
unueistanuing of 21
st
centuiy aii opeiations anu the iole of S
th
geneiation aiiciaft
anu unmanneu systems within the con-ops. I will then apply the 21
st
centuiy con-
ops appioach to the RANB analysis anu suggest how the outcome might look quite
uiffeient.
%&#'(#)*#$+,$./
01
$2#)13'4$67'$;5#'-17+)0$2+)C;50$
21
st
centuiy aii opeiations is chaiacteiizeu by a significant capability to connect aii,
giounu, anu maiitime foices anu wheieby aii assets can suppoit the uecision-
making of the giounu anu maiitime commanu elements. In the oluei con-ops, the aii
assets weie laigely self-containeu anu neeueu to biing theii own assets to suppoit
theii opeiations, notably AWACS anu sepaiate electionic waifaie specializeu aii
assets. Aii combat powei was measuieu by a self-uefineu combat capability anu
stiike assets caiiieu by the combat aiiciaft ITSELF anu those of its neaiby wingmen.
In the new concept of opeiations uiiven by the S
th
geneiation aiiciaft, the combat
anu stiike powei of a single aiiciaft within the opeiation is not uefineu by what it
caiiies itself but by its ability to uiiect anu iely upon netwoik paitneis. Any assets
within iange of an iuentifieu taiget, which caiiies weapons, can be uiiecteu to stiike
by the S
th
geneiation aiiciaft, whethei this weaponiy is caiiieu by aii, giounu oi
maiitime platfoims.
In tiauitional con-ops, cieuit foi combat powei coulu only be given foi inteinal
stoiage of weapons; no cieuit coulu be given foi exteinal stiike assets oi weaponiy
uiiecteu fiom outsiue of the lethal zone. Foi the S
th
geneiation aiiciaft, a coie
ability to uiiect stiikes fiom outsiue itself is a coie competence foi the aiiciaft anu a
key element enabling 21
st
centuiy aii opeiations.
Aii battle management becomes netwoikeu as well, anu not simply ieliant on
AWACs, which potential auveisaiies will seek to uestioy eaily in an aii battle. The
0SAF consiueis the combineu aii opeiations centei oi CA0C as a weapon system in
anu of itself.
But until the auvent of the S
th
geneiation aiiciaft, CA0Cs aie physically locateu on
the giounu oi |uiiecteu byj uepenuent on AWACS, which piesents a laige piofile foi
available aii-to-aii missiles. With the auvent of the S
th
geneiation aiiciaft, fiist by
the F-22 anu then by the much moie numeious anu allieu anchoieu F-SS, the CA0C
will be become enableu by the flying ISR anu C2 systems which constitute the S
th

geneiation. The combination of sensois anu stealth allows the new aiiciaft to
opeiate at altituues (in the case of the F-22) oi ovei auveisaiy aii space (in the case
of both aiiciaft) that allow the aiiciaft to seive as noues in a uispeiseu oi
uistiibution aii battle management system. In this way, they act as an extension foi
the CA0C.
The key "foicing function" of the S
th
geneiation aiiciaft is to cieate a uistiibuteu aii
opeiations acioss the aii, sea anu giounu platfoims within which unmanneu assets
anu netwoikeu infoimation anu stiike assets become cential to the oveiall
capability of the aii foice itself. The F-22 is evolving into a battle management
4
system able to fly at substantially highei altituue than the F-SS. Aftei peifoiming its
aii uominance missions, the F-22 can tiansition into a battle management anu stiike
management aiiciaft. Inueeu, with Block SS, the F-22 can be conceiveu of as the
biain of the oveiall stiike foice of aii anu naval stiike assets.
This connectivity focus has ieceiveu a new boost fiom a iecent }oint Requiiements
0veisight Council (}R0C) uecision. In }uly, the }R0C appioveu the F-SS uata link as
the new stanuaiu foi integiating aiiboine assets. Specifically, the Nultifunction
Auvanceu Bata Link (NABL) is to be useu by both the F-22 anu F-SS as the
centeipiece foi theii uata tiansfei anu, because, the S
th
geneiation aiiciaft will be
tiansfeiiing uata to iobotic aiiboine iauais, the NABL will be impoitant foi the
next geneiation 0Avs as well. The }SF NABL system incluues six phaseu Aiiay
Antenna Assemblies (AAAs) anu thiee Antenna Inteiface 0nits (AI0s). The system
allows aiiciaft to communicate within anu between flights in oiuei to shaie a
common view of the battle space. 0SAF anu senioi officials in the }SF piogiam office
view NABL as the centeipiece of elaboiating a new ielationship between manneu
anu iobotic aiiciaft. Cuiiently, 0Avs aie built with little iegaiu to theii connectivity
with manneu systems. With the F-SS coming on line as a "flying combat system," to
use the phiase favoieu by the 0SNC, the computei systems of the F-SS will manage
new iobotic systems. Anu those iobotic systems will become pait of the aiiboine
aii battle management system. As ueneial Bavis has iecently unueiscoieu, "We will
change piocessing systems twice within the next foui yeais. We will uo this by
simply taking out the chip anu ieplacing it. The F-SS is a flying computei able to
manage the battlespace."
In tuin, a 21
st
centuiy con-ops enables the opeiating chaiacteiistics of the S
th

geneiation aiiciaft to be optimizeu. The RANB biief unueiscoieu that the Chinese
aii capability ceita 2u2u woulu pievail, in pait, because of the numbeis of aiiciaft
anu numbeis of weapons. Too few 0SAF platfoims with too few weapons woulu
allow foi a uecisive Chinese auvantage. To quote Bouglas Baiiie of 67+1.+2$&8""9&
1$3&:;1<"&="<-$2*2,5, "in the Ranu stuuy's combat scenaiio, while the exchange
iatio is hugely in favoi of the F-22, weight of numbeis (of a capable combat
platfoim) coupleu with weapons loau-out still mean key "Blue" assetstankeis,
aiiboine waining anu contiol, maiitime patiol anu suiveillance unmanneu aeiial
vehicleswoulu be lost."
2

The stuuy evaluateu F-22s anu F-SSs only in theii stealth moue, which iequiies anu
counts only missiles containeu in the inteinal bay. But the S
th
geneiation aiiciaft
will not opeiate only in a stealth moue; inueeu, the auvantage of this aiiciaft is that
it can be loaueu heavily with exteinal missiles opeiate outsiue of the "stealth
opeiational" iange, launch missiles which aie in tuin guiueu by S
th
geneiation
aiiciaft oi unmanneu systems opeiating within the "stealth opeiational iange."
Aftei fiiing the exteinal weapons oi fuel tanks, the S
th
geneiation aiiciaft can ietuin

2
Bouglas Baiiie, "Quantity anu Quality," 67+1.+2$&8""9&1$3&:;1<"&="<-$2*2,5
(11Su8), p. 66.
S
to the tankei, ietuin to the fight anu then opeiate in stealth moue, entei the combat
zone anu opeiate as foiwaiu aii contiolleis, ISR, oi C2 assets with the inteinal bay
still loaueu with missiles.

!"#$%&'('!%)*'+,-)%'.&/&%,0'1,2"34'5+"33")/'6%"7"8,0'9/7&%:%"3&';<*:)3"$*45'=87)>&%'?@4'?AA@B'
In othei woius, the S
th
geneiation aiiciaft assumeu to opeiate in the stuuy have
vastly gieatei missile loau capacity than assumeu by making calculations of
opeiating only in a stealth moue. The authois assumeu the S
th
geneiation aiiciaft
weie going to opeiate as if they weie combat aiiciaft opeiational in a 1991 aii
opeiations con-ops.
A
1"
$B#)#'-17+)$67'*'-,1<$2+'#$2-5-H7:717#0$
Foi the novice, the shift fiom "legacy" aiiciaft to S
th
geneiation aiiciaft is laigely
about the aiifiame oi that the aiiciaft is stealthy. Foi this point of view, the fiist
stealth aiiciafts, the F-117 anu the B-2, uemonstiateu the utility of stealth to
suppoit stiike opeiations anu to be able to uominate aii uefenses.
Stealth is impoitant but is the <2$>4$<.+2$ of stealth with a numbei of othei
capabilities, which cieate a uiffeient capability foi a flying foice.
Fiist, it is stealth plus integiateu sensois, which aie especially impoitant. Stealth
allows the aiiciaft to opeiate ovei enemy positions anu, with the sensois on boaiu,
6
they aie able to taiget mobile as well as fixeu taigets. Inueeu, a majoi thieat to aii
supeiioiity in the 21
st
centuiy aie the giowing capabilities of mobile aii uefenses,
because "legacy" aiiciaft iely on taiget uata obtaineu outsiue of the aiiciaft itself to
launch stiikes. With stealth anu sensois integiateu on the aiiciaft mobile taigets, an
incieasingly impoitant element of auveisaiial systems, aie within the scope of
effective stiike actions.
Seconu, the aiiciaft aie built aiounu integiateu capabilities. When piicing 4
th
veisus
S
th
geneiation aiiciaft, the piice foi 4
th
geneiation aiiciaft often quoteu uo not
incluue the auu-on systems, which aie placeu on these aiiciaft to make them moie
effective. The C
4
ISR capabilities of the new aiiciaft aie built into the aiiciaft itself.
The integiation factoi then allows the aiiciaft to piocess uata anu to make infoimeu
uecisions much moie iapiuly than a fleet of 4
th
geneiation aiiciaft. These aiiciaft
neeu AWACS, electionic attack aiiciaft anu a vaiiety of specializeu assets to
accompany them to woik effectively in a 21
st
centuiy thieat enviionment.
Thiiu, the piocessing capabilities of the new aiiciaft aie significantly gieatei than
"legacy" aiiciaft. The F-SS has an auvanceu uistiibuteu computei system on boaiu
which can be upgiaueu simply by changing the chips empoweiing the system.
Fouith, the piocessing powei anu integiation of the aiiciaft facilitate a man-
machine ielationship on the aiiciaft. The aiiciaft can piocess uata anu assist pilot
uecision-making. But moie funuamentally, the pilot will not make many of the
uecisions, which makes the aiiciaft useful to 21
st
centuiy aii opeiations. The man-
machine ielationship on the S
th
geneiation aiiciaft is essential to using aiiboine
iobotic systems in an integiateu fashion foi 21
st
centuiy aii opeiations.
The new S
th
geneiation aiiciaft cieate an inheient capability to bioauen a connecteu
battlespace, wheieby the manneu aiiciaft becomes a noue on the aiiboine netwoik,
that can suppoit othei assets, uiiect othei assets oi combine with aii, giounu anu
maiitime assets into flexible militaiy foice packages. The inheient flexibility of the
S
th
geneiation aiiciaft built aiounu on boaiu C
4
ISR capabilities iobust automation
capabilities via the man-machine inteifaces is what makes this aiiciaft the
centeipiece of tiansition in 21
st
centuiy aii opeiations.
Woiking thiough enhanceu collaboiation is an evolving effoit as S
th
geneiation
aiiciaft aie intiouuceu anu a "collaboiative woikspace" is shapeu with othei aiiciaft
anu between aii anu suiface elements. The potential is significant because of the
coie capabilities of the new aiiciaft; foi the potential to be fully iealizeu will iequiie
shaping collaboiative tools anu concepts of opeiations which leveiage the elements
of a national oi allieu foice stiuctuie. Platfoims aie significant; but woiking
thiough effective concepts of opeiations in using those platfoims is cential as well.
Anu pioviuing foi the tools, which allow foi a concept of opeiations to be
implementeu is an impoitant element as well. This is why one shoulu speak of the
"foicing function of S
th
geneiation aiiciaft," iathei than assuming simply by
intiouucing these aiiciaft into the inventoiy is a platfoim magic wanu.
7
!"#$?C..$
The fiist of the new aiiciaft is the F-22.
S
The aiiciaft has gone thiough neaily Su
yeais of evolution fiom its anticipateu iole as the ieplacement foi the F-1S anu to
pioviue foi aii uominance. 0iiginally conceiveu of as an aii supeiioiity fightei
against the Soviet 0nion, the focus was laigely upon shaping the F-22s capabilities
to geneiate multiple kills of enemy aiiciaft.
Anu while aii uominance iemains the sine qua non of successful aii opeiations anu
the entiy of powei piojection foices into uenieu teiiitoiy, the F-22 stoiy has laigely
iemaineu unueistoou in teims countei-aii opeiations. But the aiiciaft is evolving
anu its evolution is impoitant as F-SS is intiouuceu in the next few yeais. Some of
the key lessons leaineu fiom F-22 ueployments will be tiansfeiieu to the F-SS fleet,
but, above all, the aii uominance capabilities of the F-22 allow the F-SS to focus on
its syneigistic iole foi aii, giounu anu maiitime platfoims.
The F-22 has been ueployeu now foi thiee yeais anu its evolution is having a
significant impact on iethinking aii opeiations. The uecaue oi moie of ueployment
piioi to F-SS will pioviue a significant impact on the F-SS anu its concept of
opeiations.
Auuitionally, the F-22 as a ueuicateu aii supeiioiity aiiciaft ielieves the F-SS of the
task of being ieuesigneu foi this mission set. The piimaiy task of the F-22 is aii-to-
aii uominance followeu by coie competence in countei-aii uefense missions. This
lattei task is incieasingly uifficult given the evolution of mobile aii uefense systems.
Foi example, the SA-1us anu SA-2us can be uismantleu, moveu anu ieauy foi action
in a veiy shoit peiiou of time. The tienu line is towaius iapiu mobility in the
auveisaiy's aii uefenses, anu mobility in this uomain means that the incoming stiike
aiiciaft must be able to uo taiget iuentification, taiget acquisition anu stiike
missions viitually simultaneously. A key aspect of the new fifth geneiation aiiciaft
is its machine piocessing capability on-boaiu, which allows the pilot to uo
simultaneously opeiations, which histoiically iequiieu seveial platfoims opeiating
sequentially.
But the most significant evolution of the F-22 is in its ISR anu C2 capabilities, both
associateu with its unique AESA iauais.
4
The F-22 is evolving into a battle
management system able to fly at substantially highei altituue than the F-SS. Aftei
peifoiming its aii uominance missions, the F-22 can tiansition into a battle

S
Nichael Siiak, "F-22A: The Next Stage-Raptoi Raptuie," ?1$"@%&!"#"$<"&8""9*5
(}anuaiy 18, 2uu6).
4
"F-22 Bemonstiates Sensoi Bata Tiansfei," !"#"$<"&:5%."A%&!1+*5 (Nay 6, 2uu8);
"F22s Nay Beploy to Niuule East," 67+1.+2$&8""9&1$3&:;1<"&="<-$2*2,5 (Naich S1,
2uu8), p.21; "Not just Fighteis," 67+1.+2$&8""9&1$3&:;1<"&="<-$2*2,5 (}une 2S,
2uu7), p. 27.
8
management anu stiike management aiiciaft. Inueeu, with Block SS the F-22 can be
conceiveu of as the biain of the oveiall stiike foice foi aii anu naval stiike assets.
S

?C..$-)8$?CJA$G4)-&7*0$
But the limiteu numbeis of the F-22 will ensuie that the F-SS will be the uominant
S
th
geneiation aiiciaft both in teims of numbeis anu availability in a coalition
enviionment.
6
Fiom the stanupoint of thinking thiough 21
st
centuiy aii opeiations,
the ability of the F-22 anu F-SS to woik togethei anu to leau a stiike foice will be
cential to 0.S. coie capabilities foi piojecting powei. Anu it is to be iemembeieu
that the F-SS is coming off of 0SAF aiifielus, allieu aiifielus, 0SN caiiieis, anu, in the
case of the F-SSB, viitually anywheie close to the action.

!"#$%&'?'.%,:C"8'><'D)>>"/'!B'E,"%F'G,3&F')/'1"38$33")/'H"7C'7C&'I;!4'I;+64'E)8JC&&F'+,%7"/',/F'
K)%7C%):'.%$**,/'


S
Baviu Fulghum, "F-SS EW System Reuefines Combat," 67+1.+2$&8""9&1$3&:;1<"&
="<-$2*2,5 (}anuaiy 21, 2uu8), p. Su. Baviu Fulghum anu uiaham Waiwick, "New
Nissions foi the F-SS," 67+1.+2$&8""9&1$3&:;1<"&="<-$2*2,5, }uly 2S, 2uu8, p. 1S.
6
uiaham Waiwick, "0SAF Plots Path fiom F-22 to F-SS," 67+1.+2$&8""9&1$3&:;1<"&
="<-$2*2,5 (Septembei 29, 2uu8), p. S6.
9
The giaphic above conceptualizes how the F-22 anu F-SS might woik togethei in
suppoiting aii uominance, kick in the uooi, anu suppoit foi the inseition of a joint
powei piojection foice. Beie the F-22 laigely pioviues the initial stiike anu guiues
the initial aii uominance opeiations; 4
th
geneiation aiiciaft as well as the F-SS
suppoit the effoit, with the F-SS, because of its stealth anu sensoi capabilities, able
to opeiate in a uistiibuteu netwoik to pioviue stiike anu ISR anu capabilities to
suppiess enemy aii uefenses as well attack shoie uefenses against maiitime
piojection foices.
!"#$>?+'*7)($?3)*17+)@$+,$1"#$?CJA<$K"-57)($1"#$>L+:,5-*M@$,+'$./
01
$2#)13'4$67'$
;5#'-17+)0$
The F-35 is less a fifth generation fighter than a first generation flying combat system.
7
F-
35 is far more than a replacement for aging aircraft inventories, because the effects that
the F-35 can deliver on the battlespace are flexible, synergistic and multi-dimensional
(air, ground, maritime).
8

This is due to two core developments new technologies associated with the aircraft and
the evolution of military doctrine by the nations acquiring the F-35. It has been
characterized as 5
th
Gen by the impact of stealth and the advanced capabilities associated
with a multi functional sensor suite, which includes network, communications, sensors,
electronic warfare, and reconnaissance capacities.
The F-35s open architecture allows this flying combat system to become the focal
point of three core activities: air-to-air, air-to ground, and air-to-maritime roles and
missions. The F-35 will be defined by how its open architecture is customized by
national militaries in meeting their perceived priority needs and mix of air, ground, and
maritime mission sets. Its combat capabilities will be defined in part by con-ops
customization.
One example of an opportunity for conops customization derives from the F-35s multi-
modal/multi-mission capability, which includes the ability to deliver both kinetic and
non-kinetic (information and cyber warfare, electronic attack, ISR and C2 contributions
to ground forces, management of robotic ISR elements, processing of information to
support shared decision-making between the air and the ground forces) effects, offering
decision makers many more potential options. The nature of conflict places increasing
demands on military planners to provide options for the delivery of non-kinetic effects
demands that the F-35 is well suited to handle.

7
The 0SNC cleaily aigues foi the F-SSB as a "flying combat system." The 0SNC
aviation commanu focuses upon the F-SSB as a "key enablei foi uistiibuteu
opeiations lethality" with "unpieceuenteu situational awaieness anu connectivity
with giounu foices pioviuing oiganic high-enu ISR anu electionic waifaie
capabilities." Also see, uaieth }ennings, "Above anu Beyonu: F-SS technology offeis
a new vision of futuie combat," /$."0$1.+2$1*&!"#"$<"&B"7+"( (}une 2uu8).
8
See ueneial Bavis comments in Bouglas Baiiie, et. al., "Inuustiial Bogfight,"
67+1.+2$&8""9&1$3&:;1<"&="<-$2*2,5 (}uly 21, 2uu8), p. 24.
1u
The F-35 is central to operationalizing the netted or connected battle management
environment. It can provide services (communications, intelligence, and electronic
support) to others in the battlespace in ways that are transparent to the pilot operating the
F-35. Large platforms that are used to provide battle management can be augmented by a
reduced force mix of the F-35 and unmanned vehicles shaping a 21
st
century approach to
air operations.
Conops customization is why the F-35 STOVL version is of special interest. The USMC,
the Royal Air Force, the Italian Navy, and others will use the STOVL variant differently
than todays non-vertical lift aircraft. As a result, ground-air integration and conops will
be performed differently than with that of the F-35 conventional take-off version. And
almost certainly weaponization and ISR requirements will be modified to work with the
STOVL-enabled con-ops.
9

An additional aspect in developing joint or coalition concepts of operations for the F-35
will revolve around its interaction with other manned and unmanned assets. With regard
to manned assets, a key challenge will be to work an effective connectivity battle space
with other manned aircraft, like the Typhoon or legacy U.S. aircraft. Here the
advantages of each platform in contributing to the air battle and to the type of flexible
military force packages, which 21st century air capabilities contribute, will be the focus
of a joint concept of operations.
In addition to the core dynamic of working with a variety of manned aircraft across the
joint and coalition battlespace, the F-35 will be highly interactive with the evolution of
robotic elements as well. UAVs are not well designed for self-defense. For early entry
UAVs to stay alive, they need to be part of a woolpack built around the protective
functions of the manned aircraft. As air dominance and air superiority operations
succeed, their significance can recede during a particular operation, which then allows the
role of the unmanned aircraft can go up significantly and over the duration of the
operation supplant manned aircraft in an ISR and C2 role.
But the man-machine and computational capabilities of the F-35 provide a significant
opportunity to evolve the robotic elements within airspace to provide for data storage,
transmission, collection, weapon emplacement, loitering strike elements, all of which can
be directed by the manned aircraft as the centerpiece of a manned-robotic strike or
situational awareness wolfpack. Rather than focusing on robotic vehicles as self-
contained units with proprietary interfaces and ground stations, the F-35 can be useful in
generating common linkages and solutions to combine into a core wolfpack capability.
N:-*7)($1"#$./
01
$67'$2+)C+50$>B'78@$+)1+$1"#$D6FG$K*#)-'7+$
Unlike the authors of the RAND study, I am assuming that the U.S. is innovating as well
and is applying a 21
st
century approach to a concept of operations which will complicate
Chinese planning and effectiveness. The Chinese will attack U.S. air power with counter
air assets, including fighters in number and in force, and with significant missile strike
assets. The Chinese will assume as do the RAND authors that the USAF will fight alone

9
Robbin Laiiu, "Recoveiing the Stiategic Context foi }SF," !"#"$%"&'"(% (Septembei
4, 2uu6), p. 21.
11
and following 20
th
century air battle management and attack con-ops. This assumption
will be an important contribution to the Chinese defeat in this scenario.
First, the USAF and the USN can operate as an integrated strike and defense approach.
The 5
th
generation aircraft will be used as forward air assets to support co-coordinated
strike and defense operations. As the Chinese reach out to strike U.S. air assets, the
distributed operations of the air and naval forces will use unmanned, 5
th
generation air
assets, legacy air assets, integration with Aegis systems, and reliance on USN strike
missiles to provide a comprehensive capability. Allies who can contribute weapons to the
fight whether land-based, sea-based or air-based can contribute. It is important to
remember here that the 5
th
generation forward air controllers can call for missile strikes
from virtually any asset US bombers, missiles from any US Naval asset (or allied asset
for that matter). By providing a significant and complicated set of vectors of attack and
defense, the Chinese strike assets will be exposed to counter-strikes as they seek to reach
out to assets they think they can see in the forward area.
Second, the 5
th
generation fighters will draw on lethal assets outside of the forward area
to attack approaching Chinese forces. The distribution over the battlespace, including
operating simply as nodes in the strike determination network, will allow the 5
th

generation aircraft to guide strikes and to determine core targets for a counter-offensive.
Third, the vertical lift F-35Bs can be distributed throughout the battlespace on dispersed
launch points to contribute to the diversity of vectors of attack and defense against the
Chinese. For the STOVL F-35, their ability to penetrate the battlespace in a stealth mode,
land in a remote area and then wait to deploy against a primary target is an additional
capability, which this 5
th
generation aircraft contributes to the new con-ops.
Fourth, allies will be available to contribute ISR and other nodes in the attack and defense
network, which can contribute to a further enhancement of the distributed network.
Australian F-35s can participate in the fight or their Wedgetail and Global Hawk assets
deployed to provide further battle management capabilities.
Fifth, the introduction of UAVs, like the USNs new UCAS systems can provide
important strike assets which can be directed by the F-22s and F-35s functioning as
forward air controllers.
Sixth, the movement away from AWACs to the use of the 5
th
generation fighters as air
battle management assets will significantly reduce the ability of the Chinese to shut down
the force multiplier aspects of a air battle management directed force. Indeed, the RAND
study provides an important warning for why the US needs 5
th
generation aircraft.
Simply continuing to rely on the AWACS provides an increasingly easy target for a force
like China.
12

!"#$%&'L'G)7C'7C"3',/F'7C&'M)00)H"/#'30"F&',%&'7,J&/'M%)*'7C&'>%"&M':0,8&F')/'7C&'H&>'><';7&2&'N%"*>0&'
Seventh, the tanker vulnerability identified in the study is a very good argument for the
next generation tanker. The tanker selected by the USAF in 2008 (the NG A330) would
deploy further from the strike area, be able to remain aloft indefinitely (with crew rest
areas) and capability to be re-fueled while deployed, and would provide an important
force multiplier for the 5
th
generation fleet. This fleet operates as a combined strike, ISR
and communications asset and as such needs to stay on deployment as long as the pilots
duration allows, not simply with regard to how large the planes weapons load is.
1S

In short, by confronting the Chinese with a distributed 21
st
century concept of air
operations, the US and its allies can prevail. If the USAF operates alone and follows 20
th

century air concepts of operations and relies on the limitations of legacy aircraft, the US
loses. Surely, the US if it followed such a strategy would lose. That is why it is
imperative to focus on a 21
st
century con-ops and to build, buy and deploy joint and
combined assets, which enables such a con-ops.
2+)*:307+)<$9+E7)($?+'O-'8$+)$6*P37'7)($1"#$N7#*#0$,+'$1"#$./
01
$2#)13'4$2+)C
+50$N3QQ:#$
Obviously, acquiring 5
th
generation aircraft in sufficient numbers to enable 21
st
century
air operations is crucial. The termination of the F-22 now poses fundamental questions
of how the USAF will use the remaining F-22s as a special asset in shaping capabilities
and concepts of operations. By reducing numbers, the F-22 might well be configured to
be used as special assets somewhat similar to the F-117. And the termination might well
lead to the need to slow down the possibility of eliminating several legacy systems,
which was possible if F-22s had been acquired in greater numbers. If acquired in greater
numbers, one could have eliminated several legacy systems, e.g., AWACS and dedicated
electronic warfare assets, which saves money in terms of acquisition and logistics as well
as enhances the capability of U.S. operations.
Leveraging legacy fleets is equally important. The F-35 and its relationship to legacy
aircraft will be central to shaping the evolution of 21
st
century air capabilities. The F-35
as a flying combat system will have an immediate impact on air capability with its
14
initial deployment. The first squadron(s) of aircraft will bring a C4ISR platform into the
air combat domain and with it a major contributor to air-surface operations. But beyond
the core capability of the new fighter comes its ability to force multiple legacy assets.

How will the F-35 work with legacy air assets and in an air-to-surface environment? The
key way to think about the F-35 as shaping a transition in capability is its ability to
process data in the air, using its revolutionary man-machine capabilities, and then its
transfer of processed data into Link 16 message sets. Surface assets suffer from a
significant bandwidth problem: F-35 processors can assist by processing data and sending
appropriate results to the ground forces.
And organizing air combat operations is significant as well. The later generation aircraft
such as Eurofighter and upgraded F-15s and F-16s can be optimally organized for
operations by F-35. The older aircraft can be organized more efficiently as well by F-35
processing and stealth capacities.
And rolling out of capability as squadrons are added to the fleet will transform operations
as numbers of F-35s are augmented in the fleet. Each new squadron will allow the F-35
to become a more significant player in shaping the operations of air and surface forces.
A way to think about the insertion of F-35s in the fleet is to conceptualize a sliding scale
of capability, which grows as F-35s supplant legacy. But the great thing about the F-35 is
that you do not have to wait for the legacy fleet to be completely replaced to get
significant enhancements of overall fleet capabilities.
1S

The F-35 has the further advantage of being a joint and coalition aircraft. This means
that the integration of a significant part of U.S. power projection forces USAF, USN
and USMC is built-in to the acquisition of the aircraft. And as coalition partners
acquire the aircraft worldwide, working joint concepts of operations with those allies
allows the US to enable both allies and the US to operate in a 21
st
century concept of
operations approach.
Indeed, integration of the USN and the USAF within an overall power projection force is
suggested by such an approach. As the USN deploys its first 21
st
century carrier, it will
carry F-35s and hopefully UCAS on board. This will allow the USN to configure the
carrier as a significant contributor to joint con-ops. And the UCAS will precede any new
bomber for the USAF and, as such, can contribute an important technological and
operational step towards defining how a new bomber can contribute to the joint
battlespace.
And the USN by becoming much more closely integrated with the USAF can make
intelligent decisions about the future of its surface fleet. The F-22 will play a key role as
the lead element of a USN or USAF strike force. But the RAND analysis underscores the
need for the US to have a significant increase in the number of bullets which it can
bring to the fight. The USN can provide these bullets in terms of missiles carried and
launched from the surface fleet.
And, the further developed of the unmanned contributors to the joint fight should be
defined by their ability to work with the 5
th
generation aircraft. Some simply need to
operate as decoys against threats like China whereby the Chinese fire against what they
think are deployed US strike assets only to discover that they are striking decoys and by
so striking open themselves to a powerful counter strike from distributed assets. Some
will operate as airborne routers operating in the battlespace to receive data from 5
th

generation fighters machine systems and then distribute that data to the relevant assets in
the proximate battlespace. Airborne routers and other assets would as well dump data to
ships for further processing and distribution in determining strike and defense positions
which can then be provided to the shooters available to strike key targets.
In short, a 21
st
century concept of air operations opens the way to an overall 21
st
century
concept of power projection con-ops. And shaping such an approach is crucial to
defeating an adversary such as that sketched in the RAND report, or to the general ability
to link U.S. and allied capabilities into a collaborative force able to provide for a global
security enterprise.